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The Action off Calabria (Battle of Punta Stilo) - 9th July 1940 World Naval Ships Forums Archive


The Action off Calabria (Battle of Punta Stilo) - 9th July 1940


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[CENTER][U][B][/B][/U] [U][B][SIZE=3][B]The Action off Calabria (Battle of Punta Stilo) - 9th July 1940 [/B][/SIZE][/B][/U][/CENTER] This meeting of the forces of the Royal Navy and the Regia Marina, was the first by the battle fleets of the two belligerents in the Mediterranean in World War 2. It was the result of both Britain and Italy simultaneously sending supplies by convoy to their forces in Egypt and Libya respectively. It took place off Calabria (the toe of Italy), 50 miles east of Punta Stilo, and about 250 south of Taranto. [ATTACH]88346[/ATTACH] [U][B][B]Background[/B][/B][/U] The British had planned to bring two convoys, one slow (MS) of four ships, and one fast (MF) of three ships, from Malta to Alexandria leaving on the 9th July. On the 7th July Admiral Cunningham departed Alexandria with his Battle Fleet to meet and escort the two convoys. On the 8th July Admiral Somerville sailed from Gibraltar towards Malta in a diversionary sortie with a similar sized Force H, with an air strike against Cagliari, Sardinia as his objective. Part of the British plan also contemplated a confrontation with the Italian Fleet "[I]if the occasion arises[/I]". Italy’s declaration of war on Great Britain and France, on 10th June 1940, had left its large army in Libya unprepared for war and needing considerable re-supplying and reinforcement. To this end, a fast convoy to deliver 2,190 men, 232 trucks, 10,445 tons of war material and 5,720 tons of fuel and lubricants, was scheduled to depart Italy on 6th July for Benghazi, Libya. On the 4th July, two days before the Italian convoy was due to sail, Italian naval intelligence had warned the Supermarina about the British operation. Supermarina decided to concentrate their Battle Fleet in the Central Mediterranean to protect the convoy and if necessary to confront the British Fleet before it could be united with the Gibraltar force, which they left to be attacked by their submarines and aircraft. The Regia Marina’s two battle fleets were readied for action and on the 7th July, the 2nd Fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Paladini, sailed from Augusta, Messina, and Palermo; and later that same day, the 1st Battle Fleet, commanded by Admiral Campioni sailed from Taranto. 　 [U][B]The British Forces[/B][/U] [U]Force A, (Vice-Admiral Tovey)[/U] 7th Light Cruiser Squadron - [I]Gloucester, Liverpool, Neptune, Orion, and HMAS Sydney[/I], Destroyer [I]- Ilex[/I]. [U]Force B, (Admiral Cunningham[I])[/I][/U] Battleship - Warspite, Aircraft carrier [I]– Eagle[/I], (813 Sq 17 Swordfish, 824 Sq 3 Gladiators) Destroyers - [I]Nubian, Mohawk, Hero, Hereward and Decoy.[/I] [U]Force C, (Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell) [/U] Battleships - [I]Royal Sovereign and Malaya[/I], Destroyers - [I]Hyperion, Hostile, Hasty, Dainty, Defender, Juno, Janus, HMAS Stuart, HMAS Vampire and HMAS Voyager.[/I] [[B]Note[/B]: Admiral Somerville’s Gibraltar Force H took no part in the action, so is not detailed here] 　 [U][B]The Italian Forces[/B][/U] [U]Convoy Close Escort[/U] 2nd Light Cruiser Division – [I]Bande Nere, Colleone[/I] 10th Destroyer Squadron – [I]Maestrale, Libeccio, Grecale, Sciroco [/I] 14th Destroyer Squadron – [I]Vivaldi, Da Noli, Pancaldo, Tarigo[/I] Torpedo Boats – [I]Pilo, Missoni[/I] [U]1st Fleet (Admiral Campioni)[/U] 5th Battleship Division - [I]Giulio Cesare, Conte di Cavour[/I] 4th (Light) Cruiser Division - [I]Barbiano, Giussano, Cardona, Diaz[/I] 8th (Light) Cruiser Division - [I]Abruzzi, Garibaldi[/I] 7th Destroyer Squadron - [I]Freccia, Saetta, Dardo, Strale[/I] 8th Destroyer Squadron [I]- Folgore, Fulmine, Baleno, Lampo[/I] 15th Destroyer Squadron - [I]Pigafetta, Zeno, Mosto, Verrazzano, Malocello[/I] 16th Destroyer Squadron - [I]Recco, Usodimare, Tarigo, Pessagno[/I] [U]2nd Fleet (Vice-Admiral Paladini)[/U] 1st (Heavy) Cruiser Division - [I]Zara, Gorizia, Fiume[/I] 3rd (Heavy) Cruiser Division - [I]Pola, Trento, Bolzano[/I] 7th (Light) Cruiser Division - [I]Aosta, Attendolo, Montecucco[/I]li[I], Savoia[/I] 9th Destroyer Squadron - [I]Alfieri, Oriani, Carducci, Gioberti[/I] 11th Destroyer Squadron - [I]Artigliere, Nera, Aviere, Geniere[/I] 12th Destroyer Squadron - [I]Lanciere, Carabiniere, Corazziere, Ascari[/I] [[B]Note[/B]: The Italian order of battle is probably wrong, as there is much confusion about which ships, and how many, were actually present, particularly destroyers, and no two accounts agree. Even the Regia Marina website contradicts itself. The source of the confusion is that several ships (light cruisers [I]Diaz, Cadorna[/I], and destroyers [I]Dardo, Da Noli, Strale[/I]) had to return to Taranto under escort (escort numbers and names unknown), due to breakdowns and technical difficulties, and were replaced by other ships which, although nominally present, may have taken no part in the action due to late arrival.] [B][U]　[/U][/B] [U][B][B]Prelude [/B][/B][/U] On the morning of 8 July, Cunningham was informed, from submarine reports, of the presence of an Italian force which included two battleships, about half-way between Taranto and Benghazi, steaming south. He rightly assumed that this force was covering a convoy sailing to Libya and ordered aerial reconnaissance to keep contact with it. That afternoon the aircraft found and reported the force of 2 battleships, 6 cruisers and 7 destroyers was 100 miles northwest of Benghazi sailing south. An hour later it reported a change of course, and the force was now sailing north. Cunningham changed to a more northerly course towards Taranto, in order to get between the Italian Force and its base, and ordered a postponement of his convoy’s departure. From about 10.00 that day, Italian aircraft had subjected Cunningham’s Fleet to a series of bombing attacks. Unlike the dive-bombing tactics favoured by the Germans, Italian bombers operated in formations at high altitudes, dropping their bombs together from about 12,000 feet. Cunningham reported that "[I]for this type of attack their accuracy was very good. We were fortunate to escape being hit.[/I]" Although one bomb did hit [I]Gloucester’s[/I] bridge, killing the captain and seventeen other men. Near misses also lightly damaged [I]Warspite[/I] and [I]Malaya[/I]. Admiral Campioni knew of Cunningham’s approach and ordered Paladini’s 2nd Fleet to turn north-northwest at 14.30, following himself at 15.20 with the 1st Fleet. The Italian convoy reached Benghazi on the evening of the same day. Italian Naval Intelligence informed Supermarina that Cunningham intended to be off Calabria at noon on the 9th July. From these reports it was thought that he planned to bombard Augusta, Sicily, so Supermarina ordered the two fleets to converge on a point about 65 miles south east of Punta Stilo at 14.00 on the 9th in preparation for the expected engagement. The Regia Aeronautica was to attack the British Fleet to weaken it before any naval action took place. At daylight on the 9th July, the British fleet was heading NW about 200 miles SE of Calabria with the light cruisers of Force A some ten miles ahead of [I]Warspite[/I] in Force B, which was eight miles ahead of the slower battleships of Force C and [I]Eagle[/I]. Air reports placed the enemy some 145 miles ahead. [[B]Note:[/B] In battleships Cunningham appeared superior on paper, but the slowness of the [I]Royal Sovereign[/I] and [I]Malaya,[/I] and the fact that their guns had a range of only 23,500 yards compared with [I]Warspite’s[/I] 32,000, made his superiority more apparent than real. In cruisers and destroyers he was greatly outnumbered.] [B][U]　[/U][/B] [U][B][B]The Cruiser Action[/B][/B][/U] On 9th July at 07.30, a Sunderland from Malta regained contact with the Italian 1st Fleet and shadowed it for nearly four hours. Several air strikes were ordered from the [I]Eagle,[/I] but not until 13.15 did a group of nine Swordfish find the heavy cruisers of the 2nd Fleet, forty five miles east southeast of Cape Spartivento. They attacked, but all torpedoes missed and three aircraft were damaged by heavy antiaircraft fire. The presence of carrier planes alerted Campioni. His cruisers launched their aircraft, and one of these finally located the British Fleet to the northeast. Although the Regia Aeronautica had not delivered its promised attacks, Campioni changed course to seek battle. By 14.15 Cunningham had gained the position he was seeking between the enemy and Taranto, so he altered course more to the west. At 14.47 the [I]Orion[/I], on the cruiser screen, spotted smoke on the western horizon, but it was her sister ship, the [I]Neptune [/I]which, at 14.52, reported two ships 15 miles to the WSW, the first report of an enemy battle fleet since Jutland, and the first such report to be made in the Mediterranean since Nelson’s time. The ships seen by the [I]Neptune[/I] were the light cruisers of the Italian 8th Division. The range closed rapidly, and at 15.08, as more masts appeared above the horizon, [I]Neptune [/I]reported two enemy battleships fifteen miles to the WSW. Tovey immediately swung north and then northeast, away from the enemy. At 15.12 however, Cunningham ordered Tovey to engage. Tovey turned his cruisers around and the action began at 15.15 when the Italian cruisers, now joined by their 4th and 7th Cruiser Divisions and the 9th Destroyer Squadron, opened fire from 23,000 yards, [I]Neptune[/I] and [I]Liverpool[/I] replying two minutes later from 22,000 yards. However, at 15.22 Tovey, outnumbered and under intense fire, decided to disengage, and by 15.30 firing had ceased. Only the [I]Neptune[/I] had been hit, receiving light damage to her seaplane from a 6 inch shell. Meanwhile [I]Warspite, [/I]ten miles away to the southeast, opened fire at 15.26 on the Italian cruisers from which Tovey was attempting to disengage. [I]Warspite[/I] fired ten 15 inch salvos at the cruisers in four and a half minutes, alternating guns to maintain a steady stream of fire, followed by another six salvos to see them on their way, as the Italian cruisers prudently turned away under cover of smoke. 　 [U][B][B]The Battleship Action[/B][/B][/U] Following the cruiser action, [I]Warspite[/I] was out of position, and Cunningham didn’t intend to engage enemy battleships if he was outnumbered. He signalled Tovey "[I]Do not get too far ahead of me. I am dropping back on battle force. Air striking force will not be ready till 15.30[/I]." [I]Warspite[/I] then turned through 360 degrees and then a large ‘S’ turn, allowing the slower [I]Malaya[/I] to catch up. The [I]Royal Sovereign[/I] was by now too far behind to actively participate. The Italian Fleet had been steering NNW in four columns spaced five miles apart. Campioni’s orders were specific: "[I]Your action today is inspired by the following concepts: do not go beyond the range of our aero-naval bases so as to permit simultaneous pre-emptive aerial actions against the enemy. Contact is allowed against main armoured groups while they remain separate. Delay gun action to permit disabling of enemy forces by aerial bombardment. At sunset return with larger units to base. If conditions are favourable, make nocturnal contact with torpedo boats.[/I]" But with no sign of the Regia Aeronautica making an appearance, Campioni changed course at 15.23 to the NNE towards the British Fleet. Campioni assigned a single target to each of his battleships to prevent confusing the fall of shots. The [I]Cesare[/I] would engage the [I]Warspite[/I] while the [I]Cavour[/I] would aim at the approaching [I]Malaya[/I] and eventually the [I]Royal Sovereign[/I]. At 15.48 the [I]Cesare [/I]opened fire on the [I]Warspite[/I] at a range of 29,000 yards. At 15.53 the [I]Warspite[/I] began firing, splitting her fire with the fore turrets trained at the [I]Cesare[/I] and the aft turrets at the [I]Cavour[/I]. But the [I]Cavour[/I] was not firing, as her target[I] Malaya[/I] was three miles behind and not yet within range. During this exchange a salvo from the [I]Cesare[/I] overshot the [I]Warspite[/I] and landed near the destroyers [I]Hereward[/I] and [I]Decoy[/I], causing some minor damage. At 15.54 the Malaya, although out of range, also opened fire on the [I]Cesare[/I] until 15.58. She was too far away to reach the target but still it was giving the Italians the impression that she was attacking. While the battleships were exchanging fire, Paladini’s heavy cruisers were closing on Warspite, and at 15.55 [I]Trento[/I] opened fire with three salvos from her maximum range of 28,000 yards, the others joining in three minutes later. Tovey’s light cruisers turned to WNW and closed the Italian heavy cruisers, some of which switched their fire to the light cruisers. [I]Warspite[/I] was being straddled by enemy salvos, and with the additional concern of fire from the heavy cruisers, at 16.00, altered course twenty degrees to port (towards [I]Cesare[/I]) and increased speed to seventeen knots. Her guns temporarily fell silent as she swung to her new heading. The [I]Malaya[/I] continued firing, but realizing that her shells were falling 3,000 yards short, changed course and reformed on [I]Warspite[/I]. The last 15 inch salvo [I]Warspite[/I] fired from 26,000 yards, before changing course, completed its 33 seconds flight and, in one of the longest range gunnery hits in the history of naval combat, struck the [I]Cesare[/I], detonating prematurely. Apart from wreckage among the light armaments on her upper deck, she had four boilers put out of action and suffered 115 casualties. Her speed was temporarily reduced to 18 knots. Campioni assumed the worse, and declining to face three more powerful enemy units with only one effective battleship, he ordered his battle line to turn away, covered by his cruisers and a smokescreen from his destroyers. The damage to the [I]Cesare [/I]was less than immediately feared. The ship had retained all of her fighting capabilities, but it had lost speed which was soon restored with the activation of two of the four boilers. [ATTACH]88347[/ATTACH] [U][B][B]Final actions[/B][/B][/U] Although the battleships had disengaged, the cruisers and destroyers on both sides continued fighting. Paladini’s six heavy cruisers were still engaging Tovey’s four light cruisers, and at 16.07 the [I]Bolzano[/I] was hit three times by 6" shells from [I]Neptune[/I], temporarily locking her rudder and suffering two fatalities at the torpedo room. At 16.10 nine Swordfish from the [I]Eagle[/I] attacked [I]Bolzano[/I] and [I]Trento[/I] without success. Paladini turned his cruisers away, their retreat covered by smoke. The smoke screen was effectively laid, and destroyers darted in and out of it, firing torpedoes and a few rounds and then disappearing again, making them difficult targets to hit. [I]Warspite[/I] and [I]Malaya[/I] both joined briefly in the fight, but little damage was done on either side. Gradually the Italians ships drew away to the west behind the smoke, and by 16.50 all firing had ceased. At 16.40, the Italian air force with 126 aircraft, made a late appearance and dropped their bombs from high altitude impartially on both friend and foe alike, reporting damage to [I]Eagle[/I], [I]Warspite[/I] and [I]Malaya. [/I]By 17.00 not an enemy ship was in sight, and the Calabrian coast was clearly visible from [I]Warspite[/I], only 25 miles away. When it became clear to Admiral Cunningham that the enemy had no intention of renewing the fight he turned towards Malta, and cruised to the south for the next 14 hours, while the destroyers entered harbour to fuel. The two convoys from Malta had meanwhile sailed to the east under their own escorts, and early on 11th July the main body of the fleet followed. Once again the British ships were subjected to heavy and persistent bombing attacks. The ordeal which [I]Warspite[/I] underwent is shown by the fact that during the morning of the 12th July, her officers counted no less than 300 bombs dropped around her in twenty two attacks; and on one occasion two dozen heavy bombs fell close along her port side simultaneously with another dozen off her starboard bow, all within 200 yards of the ship. [I]Warspite[/I] and part of the fleet, together with the fast convoy from Malta, arrived safely back in Alexandria on the 13th July. The other two battleships and the [I]Eagle[/I] followed a day later, and on the 15th the slow convoy also made port safely under a separate escort. [U][B][B]Aftermath[/B][/B][/U] Both opponents had achieved their main objective, the safe arrival of the convoys they were protecting. The "Action off Calabria" on 9th July, 1940, though indecisive, appears to have had more important results than were realised at the time. [U][I][I]The British reaction[/I][/I][/U] This encounter with the Regia Marina had shown Admiral Cunningham that to enable him to force a decision against a superior enemy he badly needed more modern ships. With the knowledge that the Italians would soon have two more modern battleships available, the [I]Vittorio Veneto[/I] and [I]Littorio[/I], currently commissioned but still undergoing trials, Cunningham told the First Sea Lord that he "[I]must have one more ship (besides Warspite) that can shoot to a good range[/I] ", that the old battleships were more of a handicap than a source of strength to him, that he needed heavy as well as light cruisers; and that perhaps the most valuable reinforcement of all would be a modern carrier with an armoured flight deck, able to provide fighter protection for the fleet. But, the battle showed the Royal Navy that although it was inferior in numbers and speed, it currently had the measure of the Regia Marina and could, with reinforcements, command the central Mediterranean. [U][I]The Italian reaction[/I][/U] Following the battle, the already existing acrimony between the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica worsened. The Regia Aeronautica was mainly ineffective, with the exception of the damage to [I]Gloucester[/I], yet their battle reports were inflated to the point of claiming damage to half of the British Fleet. Under political pressure, the Regia Aeronautica was credited with an unbelievable list of successes. Count Ciano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in his diary "[I]The real issue in the area of naval engagement is not between the British and us, but between the Air Force and the Navy[/I]." Ciano went on to state that he was sceptical about the many successes claimed by the Regia Aeronautica, but Mussolini was not; he truly believed that he had already destroyed half of the British naval power in the Mediterranean. For the Regia Marina, although they returned to harbour with only a battleship and a heavy cruiser damaged, the chance to achieve a decisive result had not been seized. But the battle had heartened them, instilling a belief that they could match the Royal Navy in battle and even defeat it. Admiral Paladini wrote after the battle, "[I]I think that one result that occurred in the battle, and not the least important, was the fact that all personnel, even the most humble, felt the deeply rooted conviction of . . . . our ability to confront and beat the enemy[/I]." The reality was waiting for them, eight months later at Matapan. 　 　 　
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Only HMS Warspite could have achieved a victory with a single shot ;) Great article, thanks mate

How very interesting.

Hi Bill.(No dont collapse it's Sean not Steve!!) Yet another of your very well researched pieces of work.Well done,and keep them coming.

[quote=Sean Roberts;163226]Hi Bill.(No dont collapse it's Sean not Steve!!) Yet another of your very well researched pieces of work.Well done,and keep them coming.[/quote] Hello Sean, I must admit that when I saw the moving Manx flag and the opening "Hi Bill" I had a pang of deja vu. I am very glad to see you as an active member of the forum, and hope you get as much enjoyment from it as Steve obviously did. Thanks for your nice comment, I glad you enjoyed it.

Bill Thanks again for a very interesting and factual account, a pleasure to read. I appreciate the time you must have spent on it. Brian

Bill, Very interesting read indeed. I wonder if you will do a similar summation for 'The Battle off Cape Spartivento'? I hear the Regia Marina claim to have won that one too. An excellent source is Peter C. Smith's - "Action Imminent" - 1980, William Kimber & Co. ISBN 0 7183 0197 8 Monty Mills

A Trade Mark account Bill-all in order and nowt left out .A splendid read by the main man. jainso31

[quote=BCRenown;163338]Bill, Very interesting read indeed. I wonder if you will do a similar summation for 'The Battle off Cape Spartivento'? I hear the Regia Marina claim to have won that one too. An excellent source is Peter C. Smith's - "Action Imminent" - 1980, William Kimber & Co. ISBN 0 7183 0197 8 Monty Mills[/quote] Thank you for the suggestion. I will add it to my "must do" list.

Hallo everyone. I've been down to the National Archives at Kew looking for the logs of [I]Warspite, Eagle, Royal Sovereign[/I] and [I]Malaya[/I] for July 1940 (A favour for a friend in Italy who is a naval historian and working on Calabria/Punto Stilo, rather for than my own research). They don't exist. Roskill must have had them when he wrote "The war At Sea", at which time I guess they were still property of the Royal Navy. I've been told the Archives don't have them and never did - it isn't a case of their having gone missing or been filched. The suggestion is that they were among a number of boxes that were labelled with the assorted ship-types whose files were in those boxes, and someone misread [I]Destroyers[/I] as [I]Destroy... [/I]The Archives suggested I ring the RN Museum at Portsmouth but they couldn't help. Any bright ideas would be greatly appreciated, not least by my Italian friend who is trying to prove a theory and needs the logs. Thanks. Jean

After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya. Meanwhile, the Allied ships also reached Alexandria along with their escort. Although the battle was indecisive, Allied sources claimed that the Royal Navy asserted an important "moral ascendancy" over their Italian counterpart. [B][B]One question is why the Italians did not send their two remaining battleships of the Vittorio Veneto class at Taranto, both almost ready for action and only a few hours from the scene. Both capital ships were still undergoing trials, and the Littorio had suffered an electrical mishap on one of her main turrets. Littorio and Vittorio Veneto would have tipped the balance of fire well onto the Italian side.[/B][/B] [B][B]Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even.[/B][/B] The Italian superiority in aircraft due to the nearby land-based aircraft of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) was ineffective. In fact they played almost no part at all, with the exception of the damage to Gloucester, yet their battle reports were inflated to the point of claiming damage to half of the Allied fleet. [B][B]Overall, Allied gunnery proved superior, while the Italian salvoes were too widely dispersed due to technical reasons, not to be overcome until the end of the conflict.[/B][/B] jainso31

Why didn't Littorio and Vittorio Veneto sail to participate in the Action off Calabria? They weren’t ready. Erminio Bagnasco’s excellent work “The Littorio Class” gives a full explanation. Basically, the 15-inch guns were not calibrated. Also, on 7 July workers from Ansaldo accidently ignited an fire in Littorio’s No. 1 turret that ruined all the cables in the conduit to the turret and distorted several plates of the central hoist shaft. The problems with the 15-inch guns were not fully resolved until October. I understand that the captains wanted to participate but the naval command did not see any compelling reason to send their newest and best units into action with ineffective weapons. Also, I think this has been brought up before but the whole matter of Italian long range gunnery is one that has provoked a lot of discussion. Comparison of data from gunnery trials of British and Italian 15-inch rifles shows that observed dispersion of salvos were similar. There has been debate in the Italian literature whether the assertions made by Admiral Iachino in his 1966 book Tramonto di una grande marina about the problems with dispersion and the quality of ammunition were self-serving or factual. Giuliano Colliva in his 2003 article Questioni di tiro . . . makes a strong argument they were false. Tabulations made by Enrico Cernuschi indicate that over the course of the war Italian guns inflicted more damage at long range than British guns. Of course, none of this alters the fact that at Calabria Warspite hit and the Italian battleships didn’t but I don’t think conclusions about the overall effectiveness of Italian and British gunnery can be drawn from this one engagement. Vince

[QUOTE=Vince O'Hara;10040855] Also, I think this has been brought up before but the whole matter of Italian long range gunnery is one that has provoked a lot of discussion. Comparison of data from gunnery trials of British and Italian 15-inch rifles shows that observed dispersion of salvos were similar. There has been debate in the Italian literature whether the assertions made by Admiral Iachino in his 1966 book Tramonto di una grande marina about the problems with dispersion and the quality of ammunition were self-serving or factual. Giuliano Colliva in his 2003 article Questioni di tiro . . . makes a strong argument they were false. Tabulations made by Enrico Cernuschi indicate that over the course of the war Italian guns inflicted more damage at long range than British guns. Of course, none of this alters the fact that at Calabria Warspite hit and the Italian battleships didn’t but I don’t think conclusions about the overall effectiveness of Italian and British gunnery can be drawn from this one engagement. Vince[/QUOTE] Is not Cernusco the man who is adamant that the WARSPITE was badly damaged at Calabria (Punta Stilo), returned to Alexandria with difficulty and the whole affair was covered up by the Brits? If the table referred to is his analysis of daylight engagements between the two navies, I note that Norman Friedman thinks that he “omits Italian destroyers lost to British gunfire but includes British destroyers damaged by Italian fire”.

[QUOTE=patroclus;10041236]Is not Cernusco the man who is adamant that the WARSPITE was badly damaged at Calabria (Punta Stilo), returned to Alexandria with difficulty and the whole affair was covered up by the Brits? If the table referred to is his analysis of daylight engagements between the two navies, I note that Norman Friedman thinks that he “omits Italian destroyers lost to British gunfire but includes British destroyers damaged by Italian fire”.[/QUOTE] Cernuschi suggests that Warspite was hit by an 8-inch shell from one of the cruisers, I can't recall off the top of my head which one. If you're curious I'll get the reference for you so you can see for yourself what he really says and what evidence he advances. I'm not familar with the Friedman thoughts you cite or where they're expressed but I'd love to see them. Vince

[QUOTE=Vince O'Hara;10041578]Cernuschi suggests that Warspite was hit by an 8-inch shell from one of the cruisers, I can't recall off the top of my head which one. If you're curious I'll get the reference for you so you can see for yourself what he really says and what evidence he advances. I'm not familar with the Friedman thoughts you cite or where they're expressed but I'd love to see them. Vince[/QUOTE] As you will see from his posts at the URL below, he maintains more than that: [url]http://forum-marinearchiv.de/smf/index.php?topic=4392.15;wap2[/url] According to the British bombing report, on 8th July, 1940 the WARSPITE was near-missed by one estimated 250lb Instantaneous Fuse bomb on the port side near the No. 2 - 4" mount causing minor structual damage, mainly splinter effect. No hard evidence is offered by Cernuschi for any of his claims. The vague reference to a very large ADM file is not good enough. Perhaps he provides this evidence elsewhere? What he is actually saying is that the Brits falsified the entire report of the action. He even manages to imply that WARSPITE's turn towards the enemy was as a result of damage from enemy fire. Friedman's statement is in his "Naval Firepower", Page 310, Note 25.

Yes. "Suggests" is too soft a word. The most recent expression of this theory is contained in Storia Militare February 2012. In any case, this is Cernuschi's theory, not mine and I don't care to get sidetracked into a debate about it. All I say is that your dismissal would have more weight if you had read it. The topic was long range gunnery and whether the Italians shot better than commonly believed. I looked up the Friedman reference. This was a footnote to the comment: "Most Mediterranean gun battles were fought at long range under good visibility. The Italian navy could be proud of its ability to hit at such ranges. (pg 267). This was my basic point. As for the omission of damage to Italian destroyers, Friedman was looking at a table produced in 1992 in Rivista Marittima. My reference to Cernuschi was based on the appendice in Fecero tutti il loro dovere from 2006 which lists all the damage suffered by major warships in the Mediterranean. It includes two pages of damage to Italian destroyers. Send me a PM and I'll be happy to make a pdf and email it to you. Vince

The accuracy of the Italian guns needs to be further investigated,largely because this action had been decided by the British gunnery.It has to be admitted that Warspite's hit on Cesare was a lucky one,however there was an effective salvo that hit the Bolzano. The Italian heavy guns salvoes were too widely dispersed,which has received wide criticism over the years, including Italian historian Alberto Santoni who noted that in 39 months of war Italian naval guns sank only two British motorboats. Even well aimed salvoes were too widely dispersed and only rarely achieved a hit.This problem was caused by a number of factors :- 1)The Italian navy's pursuit of long range fire before the war resulted in their guns having excessive muzzle velocities,which led to rapid wear of the barrel linings and consequent loss of accuracy.As an example the 15" Model 1934 guns of the Littorio Class had a muzzle velocity of 2854 ft/sec.,with an approximate life of 110-130 firings whereas Warspite's 15"guns muzzle velocity was 2458 ft/sec.which gave an approximate barrel life of 335 firings. The 12.6" guns of Cavour and Cesare shared this problem with muzzle velocities of 2723 ft/sec.giving a barrel life of 150 rounds,and this was after the original muzzle velocities had been reduced when the gun barrels had been rebored. 2)Accuracy was further reduced by the poor quality of shell production,resulting in a wide variation in the weight of shells. VADM Silvio Salza spoke of the poor quality of the filling of shells and he stressed 3)The lack of training under realistic battle conditions. 4)Admiral Iachino stated that this situation was well known before the war.Reports addressed to Cavagnari in July 1939,signed by VADM Salza,saying that the scattering of salvoes was too high from 12.6" and 6" guns,while ammunition quality was declining.It was difficult to accept that this state of affairs was not addressed by Cavagnari and his Admiral's Committee. jainso31

[B][B]POSTSCRIPT[/B][/B] The German Naval Staff saw the encounter as a missed opportunity for the Italian Navy,since they had good intelligence on the enemy,superior speed and the availability of nearby air force bases,-conditions which allowed for the collaboration of a friendly air force,submarines and torpedo boats.The failure to deploy destroyers on an almost moonless night that followed the battle, was also regarded as a mistake,as was Supermarina's order to Campioni not to engage.The radio intercepts were on the other hand judged to be very good,thanks to B-Deinst,made easier by "the carelessness of the British in dealing with their messages" The final assessment was that "the Italian Navy on the 9th and 10th July had lost her decisive opportunity"as such favourable conditions could not be expected to recur in war. NB. Mention made of the Italians poor shooting (discussed in my previous post 17) and that British gunnery was reported as "very well aimed" and their salvoes concentrated in one space -and not over 70m !!! jainso31

A brand new in-depth study in the battle off Calabria, based on all currently available Italian and British/Commonwealth archival material and published works, has been issued of late by the Italian Navy Historical Office. The 400 pages volume (in Italian of course - unfortunately, no English edition is presently being envisaged) includes many rare and some hitherto unreleased photos, magnificent large size foldable colour maps, a painstaking minute-by-minute reconstruction of every ship's movements and actions, and a chapter on the ground warfare in North Africa June to November 1940 (the Italian fleet had been escorting to the Libyan shore a vital convoy for the Army, after all). I am the author of the North African operations chapter. Among many other issues, evidence shows that: 1) The German B-Dienst played no role whatsoever. Italian codebreakers of the 5th Section, Navy Foreign Codes Office at Supermarina cracked Cunningham's message telling London about the forthcoming sortie of the Mediterranean Fleet. The decrypted text (copies have been found in the Italian Army archives) was immediately sent on to Supermarina's top admirals, who took the decision to engage. Italian battleships would be fewer and less powerful than their British counterparts and 12.6 inch shells could not pierce through the enemy's main armoured belts at textbook combat ranges. So winning the battle would look from the outset like a tough proposition. However, factoring overall Italian numerical superiority and land-based airpower in, a 50% chance of inflicting significant damage and forcing a British retreat was assessed and held as sufficient for engaging. 2) The Italian engagement plan basically worked out well and Campioni gained a tactical advantage over Cunningham. His two battleships plus the heavy cruisers found themselves in the position to take on Warspite alone while the two other British battleships would be plodding along behind it. The advantage was squandered by Campioni's ill-advised decision (harshly criticized during and after the battle by his subordinates) to have Cesare fire on Warspite and Cavour on Malaya/Royal Sovereign instead of training the two warships' combined heavy cannon on Warspite. 3) Beyond any doubt and demonstrably, in two different combat phases Warspite was hit respectively by a 6-inch (from light cruiser Da Giussano) and an 8-inch (from heavy cruiser Trento) shells, causing not negligible superstructural damage - knocking out artillery and AA emplacements, blowing up AA ammunition storage sites and spraying deck and superstructures with high velocity splinters - and, most assuredly, casualties among the crew. Additionally, 8-inch and 12.6-inch very near misses (not aerial bombs) caused considerable damage to the keel. Warspite shipped tons of water through the leaks and visibly listed to starboard, as spotted from aboard Italian ships. Such damage, not only detected from aboard Italian vessels but relayed to Rome by Italian intelligence operatives in Alexandria and eventually confirmed by a shot down and captured British naval airman under interrogation, was later effectively covered up and whitewashed by British propaganda and post-war literature. A sensational, so far unpublished photo taken by an Italian seaman shows the 8-inch hit flash on the horizon. These hits and near misses are discussed at length in the book. A chapter is devoted to the fascinating story of the missing seaplane. During the battle, Italian light cruiser crews distinctly sighted on Warspite the flash of what looked like a hit scored on the battleship. In 1947, the Italian Navy asked the now friendly Royal Navy about that episode and the official reply was that the flash had been one of Warspite's seaplanes set ablaze by the 15-in guns blast. In fact, a meticulous research proves that on 9 July 1940 Warspite only carried one seaplane, and that aircraft was seen by everybody flying above the two embattled fleets just when according to the RN post-war reply it should have been set afire on board Warspite by the big guns blast. Therefore, the explanation provided is untrue. A seaplane was actually set ablaze by the gun blast - on Malaya. British post-action reports obliterated the real cause of the fire on Warspite, the 6-in round hit, and "switched" on board Warspite the seaplane actually lost on Malaya due to own gunfire. A successful propaganda sleight of hand, perhaps due to the wonderfully creative pen of C. S. Forester or George Orwell, then working for Brendan Bracken. 4) Warspite and the British cruisers happened to repeatedly steer to starboard and draw away from the Italian fleet, clearly to avoid the Italian shot which was falling dangerously nearer and nearer. Italian range-finder evidence and reports ("enemy turning away, running from our shelling") match the actual course taken by the ships as found in carefully researched British records. The flimsier Italian battleships on their part would do likewise on a couple occasions, but then they risked destruction if they drew too close to the enemy 15-inch guns. In general, the British conduct of the battle appears to have been somewhat cautious and hesitant. The book suggests that, based on their experience with the Italian Navy as an ally in the First World War, they expected an easier business with the Italians, and were taken aback by the latter's relatively good gunnery, tactics and aggressiveness. 5) Contrary to the received wisdom, the battle did not practically end when Warspite's "lucky shot" struck Cesare, but it went on through further sharp fighting actions. 6) Shell and aerial bomb splinter and near miss damage on British ships turns out to have been slightly more extensive than previously thought. 7) Italian rate of fire was - throughout the war - about twice as slow as the British one, and this helps explain the marginally higher number of hits scored by Royal Navy units. But Italian gunnery is rated as "fairly accurate" (possibly a British understatement for "remarkably accurate") in contemporary British accounts, and is praised by Cunningham in a 1941 report. The shell dispersal problem was largely overdone after the war, by naval writers and officers partly echoing one another's unwarranted commonplaces, partly aiming at excusing operational and tactical mistakes by advancing non-existent or exaggerated technical shortcomings. 8) Any post-war statements about a British "moral ascendancy" achieved over the Italians as a result of the battle are senseless. On being told they would clash with the Mediterranean Fleet, Italian officers' and crews' morale shot sky-high. It was an emotional moment for high ranking officers who could finally crown their professional career by facing the most challenging naval opponent in the world. After the battle, the firm belief was held that if the fleet had not won, the British hadn't either despite their superiority. The fleet had performed satisfactorily and from the technical viewpoint most everything had gone well enough.





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