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The Loss of Sir Galahad World Naval Ships Forums Archive

The Loss of Sir Galahad

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[B]THE FALKLANDS WAR[/B] On 3 June 1982 Fitzroy on the south side of East Falkland was occupied. The campaign on land had been going reasonably well with troops crossing the main part of the island from San Carlos but it was decided to open up a further line of advance from Fitzroy. In doing this two of the landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were sent carrying equipment, ammunition and several military units including part of the Welsh Guards. On 8 June they were at anchor there in daylight. Before unloading could be completed the ships were attacked by five Argentine air Force A-4 Skyhawks. Bomb and cannon hits were taken on both causing fires, worst in Sir Galahad, leading to her being abandoned. Unfortunately there was heavy loss of life, especially on board Sir Galahad, a total of 50 men killed or missing with more wounded. It might have been worse without timely rescue efforts by helicopter and boat and rapid medical assistance. Subsequently Sir Tristram returned to the UK, was repaired and returned to service. Sir Galahad, more seriously damaged, was taken out to sea and sunk. Funny to see the pic in colour. The world got coloured by 1982 Builder: Alex. Stephen Laid down: February 1965 Launched: 19 April 1966 Commissioned: 17 December 1966 Status: Destroyed 8 June 1982, during Falklands War. Sunk as a war grave post-war. General characteristics Displacement: 3,270 tons standard 5,674 tons fully loaded Length: 412 feet (126 m) Beam: 60 feet (18 m) Draught: 13 feet (4.0 m) Propulsion: 2 Mirrlees National ALSSDM10 diesels. Power: 9,400 bhp (7010 kW) Speed: 17 knots (31 km/h) Range: 9,200 nautical miles (17,040 km) at 15 knots (28 km/h) Capacity: 2,404 tons Complement: 68 crew, up to 340 passengers Armament: Two 40 mm Bofors AA guns. Aircraft carried: Up to 20 Wessex helicopters
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[FONT="Times New Roman"][SIZE="3"]The RN suffered very badly at the hands of the Argentinean Air Force the following aircraft types their success and losses are included for information. The Argies did not get off scott free either and they lost nearly 50 aircraft of various types. [B]1st Attack Sqdn (1 Esc)[/B] 6 Aermacchi MB-339A's to Falklands, 2 lost and 3 captured Minor damage to "Argonaut" by cannon (21st May) [B]2nd Fighter and Attack Sqdn (2 Esc) [/B] Super Etendard flying from Rio Grande with no losses Destroyer "SHEFFIELD" (4th May) and Support ship "ATLANTIC CONVEYOR" (25th May) hit by Exocet; both sunk [B]3rd Fighter and Attack Sqdn (3 Esc) [/B] Skyhawk A-4Q's flying from Rio Grande, 3 lost Frigate "ARDENT" sunk by bombs (21st May) [B]4th Attack Sqdn (4 Esc)[/B] 4 Mentor T-34C's to Falklands, all lost [B]1st Air Transport Group (Grupo 1) [/B] C130 Hercules (1 lost), also photo-rece Learjets (1 lost) [B]2nd Light Bomber Group (Grupo 2) [/B] Canberras flying from Trelew and Rio Gallegos, 2 lost [B]3rd Attack Group (Grupo 3)[/B] 24 Pucaras to Falklands, 13 lost and 11 captured, plus one mainland-based aircraft lost The only British aircraft casualty directly due to Argentine aircraft was Royal Marine Scout [b28] shot down by a Grupo 3 Pucara on the 28th May [B]4th Fighter Bomber Group (Grupo 4)[/B] Skyhawk A-4C's flying from San Julian and Rio Grande, 9 lost Believed to have damaged LSL's "Sir Bedivere", "Sir Galahad" and "Sir Lancelot" with UXB's (all 24th May) [B]5th Fighter Bomber Group (Grupo 5)[/B] Skyhawk A-4B's from Rio Gallegos, 10 lost Destroyer "Glasgow" damaged by UXB (12th May) Frigate "Argonaut" damaged by UXB (21st May) Frigate "ANTELOPE" sunk by bomb (23rd May) Destroyer "COVENTRY" sunk by bombs and frigate "Broadsword" damaged by UXB (both 25th May) LSL's "SIR GALAHAD" (later scuttled) and "Sir Tristram" damaged; "Fearless" LCU F4 sunk by bombs (all 8th June) [B]6th Fighter Bomber Group (Grupo 6)[/B] Daggers from Rio Grande and San Julian, 11 lost Destroyer "Glamorgan", frigates "Alacrity" and "Arrow", minor damage by cannon fire and near misses (all 1st May) Destroyer "Antrim" damaged by UXB, frigate "Ardent" damaged by bomb (21st May) Frigates "Brilliant" and "Broadsword" minor damage by cannon fire (all 21st May) Frigate "Plymouth" damaged by UXB and cannon (8th June)[/SIZE][/FONT]

The tragic losses incurred aboard Sir Galahad was mainly due to the fundamental error of not evacuating the ship the minute she arrived. The most dangerous moment of any assault ship is when it arrives, General Wolfe (Quebec) recognised this and was quoted as saying that the first responsibility of a soldier is to get off the ship not the shore. Had she debarked everyone the losses would still have been materiel but the men would have been saved. tim

The other point of note on the Losses and the Damage looking at my earlier response there was a lot of damage by UXB ( Unexploded Bomb) now had some of these gone off then I am sure the Brits may have looked very closely at what they were doing and how to go on supporting the ground troops perhaps by the then the Argies were done anyway.

I was just looking at your list of UXB damage Digger. "Sir Bedivere" "Sir Lancelot" Destroyer "Glasgow" Frigate "Argonaut" Frigate "Broadsword" Frigate "Plymouth" One would have to ask the question here. What was wrong with the Argintine's bombs? Incredible.

I think the problem for the Argentinians was that their pilots were doing their job too well. By flying so low to avoid anti aircraft fire they were reaching and hitting their targets but the bombs were not falling far enough to arm themselves before impact. I think we Brits had to consider ourselves very fortunate that all these 'hits' did not explode. Had all those ships actually been sunk, the course of the conflict might well have taken a very different path. Regards...John

That is a very good reply John. I believe that is exactly why they didn't arm now that you come to say it. And no one is disputing the fact that we weren't very lucky and that many of our guys lives were saved because of it. Graeme

You are correct John if you also look at how the Argie planes were bought down it was by close in support AA like the 40mm Bofors and the old 50 Cal machine gun

the ferocity and accuracy of the AA fire was indeed the answer to the failure of the bombs to explode ( I have some little insight into this!) the Argentinian planes were flying so low that the bombs in very many case indeed failed to arm their fuses. tim

One of the bombs which didnt explode - thankfully. RFA Sir Lancelot 28 May 1982. [url]http://www.rfaaplymouth.org/lancelotreunion/index8.htm[/url]
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RE Argentinian air losses...... SEA HARRIERS ?

[QUOTE=tim lewin;2487]The tragic losses incurred aboard Sir Galahad was mainly due to the fundamental error of not evacuating the ship the minute she arrived. The most dangerous moment of any assault ship is when it arrives, General Wolfe (Quebec) recognised this and was quoted as saying that the first responsibility of a soldier is to get off the ship not the shore. Had she debarked everyone the losses would still have been materiel but the men would have been saved. tim[/QUOTE] Whilst that is undoubtedly true, the failure to disembark on arrival was despite the urging of Maritime authorities at the scene, who were well aware of the need. The reasons why this tragedy occurred are many. The whole move on the Southern Flank by 5 Brigade was marred by insufficient planning, lack of assets and failure of communications from the start. Map of Fitzroy - [url]http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/attachment.php?attachmentid=37261&d=1236260570[/url] For the full story, I recommend Reasons in Writing by Ewen Southby-Tailyour. ISBN 0 85052 310 9.

I concur with Lancastrian it was Ewen Southby-Tailyour himself who went aboard to try and persuade them to disembark. He was instrumental in the planning and conduct of amphibious operations around the Falklands as ex Commanding Officer of Naval Party 8901 the standing Royal Marine unit in the Falklands which acquitted themselves very well against the Argentine forces until the Governor Rex Hunt ordered them to Lay down their arms to prevent needless bloodshed.

Hi all, Im new to the site but came across this thread & thought I would contribute. I was an MEA3 (baby Tiff) on HMS Fearless during the Falklands & was part of the fire fighting team sent round to try to extinguish the fire before Sir Galahad was scuttled. We sailed round on the 'Black Pig', a small rig supply vessel captured from the Argies, & myself, Sub Lt Waltho, POMEM Mal Lock & MEA3 Johnson were the fire fighters that boarded her. Very vivid memories with it being 30 years ago.

The journal of the Royal Marines, the 'Globe and Laurel' features a small but illuminating section of 'Where do you read yours', it generally shows serving or former Royal Marines 'reading the 'G&L' in various poses and locations all over the world. In a recent edition Ewen Southby-Tailyour is pictured in civvies, wearing shirt and tie with his Green Beret against a tree at an Argentine Defence building of some sort in Buenos Aries! ;) Picture taken by an unsuspecting tourist - such is the measure of the man.

If you were going to find anyone doing that, Ewen would be high on the list. Quite a character

Hereunder link to the official report of the Board of Enquiry into the loss of Sir Galahad and Tristam RFA's [url]http://www.rna-10-area.co.uk/files/boi_rfas_tristram_galahad.pdf[/url] jainso31

The elephant in the room has always been why were the Welsh Guards on the Sir Galahad in the first place.

[QUOTE=johnny07;10035061]The elephant in the room has always been why were the Welsh Guards on the Sir Galahad in the first place.[/QUOTE] The way I heard it was the Welsh Guards were hitching a lift on Galahad to go & relieve the guys on the front line, who were exhausted after fighting to take one of the peaks (Mount Pleasant I think). When they got to Bluff Cove they were told to get off 'sharpish', but a Welsh Guards Officer would not let his men travel on a float loaded with ammo. The time lost proved crucial for his men & could have damaged the whole operation. We were damned lucky down there, despite our losses, things could hve been a whole lot worse!

[ATTACH]118880[/ATTACH] Earlier in this thread I posted about being part of the fire-fighting team that went on Galahad to try to put out the fire on the day of the service before she was towed out & scuttled. Well the picture shows us at work. Im on the extreme right, tending the hoses.
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One of the reasons that the Argentinian airforce come in so low and fast is that they knew the limitations of the type 965 radar fitted to most of the escorts down south, especially against backround clutter overland is that at the time it was already fitted to the type 42s that they operated at the time ,that we obviously supplied.Plus Ithink the senior officer at the time decided to get the rapier air defence systems off first rather than the men (Thank God that idiot was,nt in charge on D-Day 1944!).

Now I haven't studied the Falklands Conflict in any detail, but my interest in it was that my 17 year old son was down there serving aboard HMS FEARLESS. My impression of the cause of the incident was down to the irresponsibility of the British Press. On the day before the bombing of Sir Galahad, the "red tops" in UK ran a banner headline about a British Army Officer who used the Falklands telephone landline to ask a farmer near Fitzroy if he had any "visitors" in the area. They (the press) bragged that this army officer had obtained intelligence for a measly sum of 5p (or so). Now, any Argentinian sympathiser in the UK at the time could have read this story and relayed the relevant information to Buenos Aires. I read this article in one of the popular "red tops" and can remember thinking how dangerous this revelation could be to future operations. The following day my fears were to be proved correct, when the appalling news came of the Sir Galahad incident, along with the ghastly images. Over the span of 30 years, exact dates and locations may have become confused, but I clearly remember my utter indignation at the time, and of the irresponsibility of the press. I realise that other oversights and misjudgements may also have been contributary in this disaster, but I still feel that the press had some culpability. Next Saturday we entertain my son and family, that being the 30th anniversary of his arrival back in home waters. Sandy.

I think it's fair to say that the key to the majority of all the British losses in 1982 was the simple fact that we did not have Air supremacy over the Falklands. Our guys did their best with what they had, but there weren't enough Sea Harriers or Pilots to fly them. Had there been, things would have been very different.

[QUOTE=Stealthman;10035088]I think it's fair to say that the key to the majority of all the British losses in 1982 was the simple fact that we did not have Air supremacy over the Falklands. Our guys did their best with what they had, but there weren't enough Sea Harriers or Pilots to fly them. Had there been, things would have been very different.[/QUOTE] Did we not lose Sea Harriers (& helicopters) on Atlantic Conveyor? Also it took ages to get the Rapiers set up so on Fearless we had Marines firing rifles & machine guns at fast jets!! Quite bizarre really. :)

The harriers lost on the Atlantic Conveyor were RAF Ground Attack aircraft and the helicopters were all but one of the Chinooks. As for not having air superiority you should read "Sea Harrier over the Falklands" by Sharky Ward, if he is right in what he says and I would not doubt him the problem was how they were employed not how many of them there were.

[QUOTE=downhill;10035065]The way I heard it was the Welsh Guards were hitching a lift on Galahad to go & relieve the guys on the front line, who were exhausted after fighting to take one of the peaks (Mount Pleasant I think). When they got to Bluff Cove they were told to get off 'sharpish', but a Welsh Guards Officer would not let his men travel on a float loaded with ammo. The time lost proved crucial for his men & could have damaged the whole operation. We were damned lucky down there, despite our losses, things could hve been a whole lot worse![/QUOTE] I believe that the Welsh Guards were on board as was alluded to by Rick Jolly in his book "The Red and Green Life Machine" that they had just come off ceremonial duties and there fittness was a bit lacking so they were being shipped around so they didn't have to yomp. Ewen Southby-Tailyour in his book "Reasons in Writing" states unequivocably that he personally went on board and advised the WG to get ashore despite the fact they were travelling onwards aboard it was safer for them to disembark and re-embark after nightfall.

[QUOTE=Blaydon;10035207]The harriers lost on the Atlantic Conveyor were RAF Ground Attack aircraft and the helicopters were all but one of the Chinooks. As for not having air superiority you should read "Sea Harrier over the Falklands" by Sharky Ward, if he is right in what he says and I would not doubt him the problem was how they were employed not how many of them there were.[/QUOTE] I've read Sharky's book, he does question the manner in which the 800 Sqn SHAR's were deployed at times,and reckons that the tactics employed did lead to the unnecessary loss of a number of vessels. But he also makes it clear that his pilots became excessively tired because there were not enough of them, and that combined with a limited number of airframes meant that although they gave a good account of themselves, they did not have air superiority.

[QUOTE=downhill;10035065]The way I heard it was the Welsh Guards were hitching a lift on Galahad to go & relieve the guys on the front line, who were exhausted after fighting to take one of the peaks (Mount Pleasant I think). When they got to Bluff Cove they were told to get off 'sharpish', but a Welsh Guards Officer would not let his men travel on a float loaded with ammo. The time lost proved crucial for his men & could have damaged the whole operation. We were damned lucky down there, despite our losses, things could hve been a whole lot worse![/QUOTE] The story I got was that Maj Gen Moore knew that the Welsh Guards were unable to march to their objective because they were so unfit. They had attempted to do this but had failed and were re called to be taken by sea.

[QUOTE=Blaydon;10035207]The harriers lost on the Atlantic Conveyor were RAF Ground Attack aircraft and the helicopters were all but one of the Chinooks. As for not having air superiority you should read "Sea Harrier over the Falklands" by Sharky Ward, if he is right in what he says and I would not doubt him the problem was how they were employed not how many of them there were.[/QUOTE] Hi No Harriers were lost on the Atlantic Conveyor, just helos and a lot of gear to make our lives a little bit better

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