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Chinese Aircraft Carrier World Naval Ships Forums Archive

Chinese Aircraft Carrier

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China must build aircraft carrier 'soon' military says China must build an aircraft carrier "soon" if it wants to be taken seriously as a global superpower, a Chinese military official has said. By Peter Foster in Beijing Last Updated: 7:21AM GMT 06 Mar 2009 The Chinese navy has been lobbying for permission to build an aircraft carrier since the 1980 Photo: AFP Speaking on the fringes of the National People's Congress, China's rubber stamp parliament, the official added that China now had the technology to build an indigenous carrier and should use it. "Building aircraft carriers is a symbol of an important nation. It is very necessary," said Admiral Hu Yanlin in an article published in the government-sanctioned China Daily newspaper bearing the headline "Build aircraft carriers soon". "China has the capability to build aircraft carriers and should do so," he added in remarks that will fuel speculation that, after two decades of research, China is ready commission its first carrier. [COLOR="Red"]The comments come two days after China announced a 14.9 per cent increase in defence spending for 2009[/COLOR], a rise that will have seen total Chinese military spending increase by more than 50 per cent since 2006. The Chinese navy has been lobbying for permission to build an aircraft carrier since the 1980s, but analysts say it has been over-ruled by the country's Central Military Commission anxious that China's rise should not appear to upset regional security balances. However remarks last December by a spokesman for China's National Defence Ministry that aircraft carriers were "a reflection of a nation's comprehensive power" and were needed to meet the demands of a modern navy were seen as an indication that China would build a carrier soon. The Chinese government is highly sensitive to claims that its increased military spending will have a potentially destabilizing effect in the Asia-Pacific region. Earlier this week Li Zhaoxing, the official spokesman at the National People's Congress, bristled at suggestions that China's increased military spending was grounds for concern. "China's limited military force is mainly for safeguarding our sovereignty and territory and forms no threat to any other country," he said. [COLOR="red"]Defence analysts say that acquisition of aircraft carrier, which would allow China to project power into the South China Sea, could be seen as a first step towards a long-term goal of challenging US pre-eminence on the high seas.[/COLOR]More immediately, however, the decision to build a carrier could threaten to expose a renewed rift with neighbouring Japan, whose long-strained relations with China have eased in recent years to enable top-level visits. Under Japan's "peace" constitution, aircraft carriers are considered an "offensive weapon" and a decision by China to build a carrier would, some analysts believe, increase pressure within Japan to reconsider its non-offensive military posture.

The release is some what dated. But in the release there is some hint's of wisdom as far as the regional effects the Carrier would have! As for the effect's it would have on Japan i think that is an open debate. Regards Charles

Japan and SOUTH KOREA both, methinks! Given the massive, considering their size, buildup the South Korean Navy has undergone in a relatively short space of time...hhhmmmm? DFO ;):)

China navy to stage sail-past celebration next month amid aircraft carrier speculation By CHRISTOPHER BODEEN, Associated Press Writer 11:03 PM PST, March 5, 2009 BEIJING (AP) — China's navy is planning major celebrations for its 60th anniversary next month, official media reported Friday, amid rising speculation over a possible announcement of plans to build an aircraft carrier. A sail-past featuring some of the navy's most modern craft and ships from other nations is being planned, Friday's Global Times newspaper said, citing the commander of the east China fleet, Adm. Xu Hongmeng. The report did not say exactly where the sail-past would happen or when, although the navy's founding anniversary officially falls on April 23. The east China fleet is based in Shanghai, while many of the navy's most advanced craft are based at the northern fleet headquarters in Qingdao, about 310 miles (500 kilometers) southeast of Beijing. Global Times quoted Xu as saying that China was in need of a carrier. "Both technologically and economically, China already has the capacity to build a carrier," Xu said. Beijing has been researching an aircraft carrier for years, having bought and towed to China a mothballed Russian carrier, the Varyag, in 1998. The PLA is also rumored to have purchased four carrier landing systems and up to 50 Russian Su-33 carrier-based aircraft. Strategically, a carrier is seen mainly as a deterrent to U.S. intervention in a conflict over Taiwan, although Chinese experts say it would mainly serve to police the 1.16 million square miles (3 million square kilometers) of sea claimed by Beijing as its maritime territory. Long neglected in favor of the army and air force, the 255,000-member People's Liberation Army Navy has taken on an increasingly prominent role in recent years as the country's sea-borne trade expands and Beijing moves to assert its offshore claims and stymie moves by Taiwan toward formal independence.

The main issue now comes out! [B]Tiawan[/B], this has been ongoing since the Que Moy quisis in the late 50's when the US sent the then new F-104's to Tiawan for there self-defense. I think it's a stratagic mistake to use Tiawan as a premise to build a aircraft carrier when in fact China has NO Carrier time in there Navy. Second of all the Chinese Naval Commanders do NOT have the flexability to make decisions real time. Moreover, I will be surprised if China comes out with a carrier design that does not incorperate existing design features from the Western World Carriers. The the issue of reliability of the component's they plan to buy, i.e., the landing system for the Jet's they plan to use comes into question. Again, this issue is a wait and see what they produce as far as a carrier Design. Regards Charles

By 'Four Carrier Landing Systems', do they mean four Projector landing sights? Four Arrestor Engines (ie sufficient for one ship) or Four [I]sets[/I] of Arrestor Engines, sufficient for four carriers? Sometimes I wish these reports could be written by someone who knows what they are talking about...:confused:

Well, let's see the press release's coming from China are alway's lacking in information when it comes to there ships. As for the new carrier, it's based on a Russian design. So they for one would assume they are going to use the Russian landing system on there New Carrier. Now wether it has the 4 "Fresno Light's" as do the US Navy carriers does, that remain's to be seen. So would not put to much hope in the Chinese letting information out on this carrier sinse it is there first effort. You might be disappointed! Regards Charles

from AVIATION WEEK............. China to Build Aircraft Carrier Posted by Christina Mackenzie at 3/24/2009 2:32 PM CDT [COLOR="red"]China will develop an aircraft carrier in line with its status as a major global power , Defense Minister Liang Guanglie told visiting Japanese Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada on Friday, according to reports carried widely by the Chinese state press and reported by AFP.[/COLOR] "Among the big nations, only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," the Oriental Morning Post -- citing Japanese official sources -- quoted Liang as saying. "China's navy is currently rather weak," he added, "we need to develop an aircraft carrier." [COLOR="Red"]Building aircraft carriers is a symbol of an important nation. It is very necessary," the China Daily paper quoted Admiral Hu Yanlin as saying earlier this month. "China has the capability to build aircraft carriers and should do so," he said.[/COLOR] "China needs an aircraft carrier because its global status is rising and it needs to defend its maritime territory and help maintain international peace," Jia Qingguo, an international security expert at Peking University, told AFP. "Sooner or later China will build an aircraft carrier. When it happens will mainly depend on whether the demand for this intensifies or not," he said. In China's annual parliamentary session earlier this month, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said the nation's military needed modernising across the board as his government asked legislators for a 15.3% increase in defence spending for 2009. The defence budget will rise to 472.9 billion yuan ($69 billion) in 2009, an increase of 62.7 billion yuan on last year and a doubling of defense spending since 2006.

However, JANE's says............ Top NewsView archive | RSS Feed China aircraft carrier said years away LONDON, April 1 (UPI) -- China is years away from realizing ambitions to build an aircraft carrier force and is instead rehabbing an old Russian carrier, British naval experts say. The London publication Jane's Navy International Wednesday quoted U.S. officials as saying China is unlikely to build any aircraft carriers before 2015, but added that Beijing is continuing a time-consuming project to retrofit the former Russian carrier Varyag. "It is likely that the ship will emerge from Dalian in the next few years to perform, initially, a training role," said Commodore Stephen Saunders, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships. "It has always been difficult to gauge progress in this project, given the lack of information about the original material state of the ship, but there seems little doubt that refit work is proving to be more technically demanding and time-consuming than originally intended." Saunders said it was thus reasonable to assume that plans for any Chinese-made carriers have also been delayed. "As yet there are no firm indications of building at any of the major dockyards and it is quite possible that the initiation of such a prestigious project would be publicized at the time."

More on the PLAN....... Observing the Pentagon Report on China Military Power On March 25, 2009 the Pentagon released Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (PDF), the annual report on Chinese military power required by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2000. In years past, opinions of this report have been generally negative, as the quality of the report has not been up to the task of generally reported information, indeed a lot of information inside the report itself would be inconsistent, and generally useless. The 2009 report is a significant upgrade in my opinion, and does a far better job than previous Pentagon reports. The research quality is substantially better, and yet it does not sensationalize while being much more informative than in the past. In particular I thought Chapter One: Understanding China's Strategy, Chapter Two: China's Military Strategy and Doctrine, and Chapter Three: Force Modernization Goals and Trends were well done and particularly useful. For example, the report was likely finalized for approval sometime in late January or early February, as it usually takes several weeks for a report like this to make the rounds and get the bureaucratic approval necessary to go live. This report likely took the full 60 days, which is why it comes at the end of March as opposed to the end of February like last year. That means that while the report was probably finalized before the Impeccable incident in the South China Sea, the report demonstrates relevance because it specifically addresses the maritime sovereignty issues that are directly related to that incident. The same applies to the recent open source discussions of the DF-21 missile, indeed the report has a graphic lifted from a 2006 Chinese Second Artillery Engineering College article of the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile concept on page 21 (PDF page 33). Whoever wrote the 2009 report did a much better job than the 2008 report, and it is also clear they were very different people. A few observations. First, it is clear to me the Pentagon report is borrowing primarily from what is available in the open source, and not being leveraged to reveal intelligence information. The strategic observations appear to match up almost entirely with the work often produced from the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. I think this is very smart actually, because the tone does not come off alarmist in any way, and is structured to be informational while detailed. Indeed, of the many ways to describe the 2009 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China report, neither alarmist nor confrontational would be useful words in description, although I believe the words competition and comparative would both apply. China disagrees, but their lack of transparency is the primary reason for the necessity of the report in the first place. When China learns to act like an emerging superpower with transparency (read like an adult instead of a child), they will find these type of reports are no longer necessary. As my focus is primarily focused on the PLA Navy, a few observations. In the past, I have considered the best government produced research on PLAN naval affairs to be Ronald O'Rourke's CRS report China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress. If Ronald O' Rourke has used the Pentagon report in the past as a foundation for research, he might recognize that it would appear the Pentagon's report has reshaped itself to align itself with his research found in the November 19th edition of his report. In other words, his research appears to have trumped their research of the past, and while the DoD doesn't cite sources in its report... Ronald is clearly one of their top sources now for naval research. There are a number of Navy issues to cover in the 2009 report, lets begin by highlighting the evolution of the PLA Navy over the last three Pentagon reports. Vessel Type Total 2007 Report Total 2008 Report Total 2009 Report Destroyers 25 29 27 Frigates 47 45 48 Tank Landing Ships 25 26 27 Medium Landing Ships 25 28 28 Diesel Electric Submarines 53 54 54 Nuclear Attack Submarines 5 5 6 Coastal Patrol (Missile) 41 45 70 If the Pentagon report is the definitive bottom line regarding the PLA Navy construction, then the Pentagon report for 2009 suggests that China commissioned into operation 30 warships in 2008. That number of 30 may not be accurate, but if it isn't it is because the DoD wasn't counting ships in the past. Indeed, if you look at the numbers in the 2009 report, this report appears to be missing some ships that I would think would be counted, and doesn't shape up as accurate either, but we'll cover that in more detail below. According to the report, the DoD is saying 25 Type 022 fast attack catamarans, 1 Shang (Type 093) class submarine, 1 Type 071 LPD, and 3 Jiangkai II (Type 054A) FFGs entered service since the 2008 report for a total of 30 new warships just in the last year. The problem is, when you try to break down the numbers of hull types for surface combatants and submarines, it all falls apart. Lets examine a few things. PLA Navy Surface Combatants: The Pentagon report claims the PLA Navy has 27 destroyers and 48 frigates for a total of 75 surface combatants. When I do my count, I can come up with 75 surface combatants broken down into 26 destroyers and 49 frigates. Destroyer Type NATO Name Quantity Luzhou Type 051C 2 Luyang-II Type 052C 2 Luyang-I Type 052B 2 Sovremenny Project 956EM 2 Sovremenny Project 956 2 Luhai Type 051B 1 Luhu Type 052 2 Luda Type 051 13 Total 26 Frigate Type NATO Name Quantity Jiangkai-II Type 054A 4 Jiangkai-I Type 054 2 Jiangwei-II Type 053H3 10 Jiangwei-I Type 053H2G 4 Jianghu-V Type 053H1G 6 Jianghu-IV Type 053HT-H 1 Jianghu-III Type 053H2 3 Jianghu-II Type 053H1 8 Jianghu-I Type 053H 11 Total 49 It would be useful to see which frigate the DoD is claiming is a destroyer, or if the DoD would detail out their list to determine what they are counting that is different than what I am counting. My list for surface combatants matches the list found under 2008 at Sino-Defense.com, although I do not think the list at Sino-Defense.com is always accurate. PLA Navy Submarines: Last year I was highly critical of the reporting regarding submarines in the 2008 Pentagon report. I think someone was listening. In the 2008 report, the report specifically claims there are 10 Song class submarines. I noted last year that testimony before Congress in March of 2006, not to mention a listing by Janes Fighting Ships 2008-2009 both listed the number of Song class submarines at 13. This number is different than the number listed at Sino-Defense.com, which notes by hull number that there are 16 Song class submarines. I tend to agree with Janes, the Navy, and the latest Pentagon report that the number 13 is accurate for Song class submarines. While I find it difficult again to match up numbers to conclude there are 54 Diesel-Electric submarines in the PLA Navy, the total number of diesel electric submarines is less relevant. I'll explain more below. The 2009 Pentagon report claims there are 6 nuclear attack submarines in service. We know how the report comes to this number, by specifically claiming: Two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and one JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN have entered service alongside four older HAN-class SSNs and China’s single XIA-class SSBN. In other words, the report is specifically claiming the 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) are 2 Shang (Type 093) class and 4 Han (Type 091) class submarines. As I noted earlier, it would appear the Pentagon report is specifically designed not to reveal intelligence, rather allow open source intelligence to drive what is included in the report. In a way, that does reveal intelligence by confirming it. Back on August 3rd, Hans M. Kristensen was playing around with Google Earth when he noted that the current image of Jianggezhuang Naval Base shows the Xia-class (Type 092) SSBN which was previously in drydock was out of drydock and on the pier. He also took note of the other nuclear powered submarines visible from the Google Earth satellite photo (still available if you want to open up GE and look yourself) when he said: The image also shows what appears to be all of China’s five Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), the first of which are being retired and replaced with the Shang-class SSN. One of the five is a little longer than the others and could potentially be a Shang. The Pentagon report appears to support his speculation that the other 5 submarines visible in the December 5, 2007 satellite image includes 4 Han (Type 092) class SSNs and 1 Shang (Type 092) class SSNs. It would also support the speculation that the first Han (Type 091) class SSN (hull number 401) has expended its nuclear fuel and been retired. The other Han (Type 091) class SSNs (402, 403, 404, and 405) were modernized in the late 80s/early 90s, but will also soon begin running out of nuclear fuel. Which leads us to the replacement SSNs: the Shang (Type 093) class. In a recent satellite image taken on September 15, 2008, also currently available from Google Earth, Hans M. Kristensen noted that there are 2 Shang (Type 093) class submarines at the new naval base near Yulin on Hainan Island. This is the naval base the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) was operating near when it was harassed by Chinese vessels last month. This suggests that as of just over 6 months ago, long before the Pentagon report was finalized, that the PLA was operating 2 of the new SSNs from this base. One of these is not the two Shang (Type 093) class submarines the Pentagon report is counting for its total of 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines, because the report specifically includes a map that lists 5 SSNs in Qingdao and 1 SSN at Shan Jiang (Hainan Island). The Pentagon report also doesn't include the latest open source reports. Of late, the Chinese Navy and Air Force have been staging maneuvers almost every month in the East China Sea off Shanghai. After leaving China's nuclear submarine base in the Yellow Sea, Han-class nuclear subs and newer Shang-class models have been conducting frequent patrol missions in the East China Sea, Western Pacific and elsewhere, according to MSDF sources. These moves are believed to be aimed at enhancing China's naval maneuverability, presumably with a view to staying abreast of the United States in the Pacific. This news suggests the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is monitoring the operations of PLA Navy nuclear-powered attack submarines from its north sea fleet naval base at Qingdao. The combination of satellite photography and open source intelligence, and because it is apparent the Pentagon report does not reveal any intelligence, suggests the number of Shang (Type 093) class nuclear-powered attack submarines is higher than the number 2 claimed in the Pentagon report. The Pentagon report also claims there are only 2 Yuan class submarines, one in operation and one undergoing sea trials, but I have photos of those two, and a third which is slightly different in design. If we assume for a moment that as of the end of 2008 there were 2 Shang (Type 093) class SSNs, 2 Jin (Type 094) class SSBNs, and 2 Yuan (Type 041) class submarines in service, than between 1995-2008 the PLA Navy has added 9 Ming (Type 35) class diesel electric submarines, 13 Song (Type 39) class diesel electric submarines, 2 Yuan (Type 041) class submarines, 10 Kilo (Project 636) class submarines, 2 Kilo (Project 877EKM) class submarines, 2 Shang (Type 093) class SSNs, and 2 Jin (Type 094) class SSBNs in 14 years. That is a total of 40 submarines in 14 years, an average of 2.86 submarines annually, and we already have reports of more Yuans, Shangs, and Jin class submarines in the water at the beginning of 2009. I have a ton more this week (and I'd bet Feng does too) on this subject. Keep in mind, military shipyard production slowed for the Olymipics last year. We are already seeing a lot of information that since the Olympics have concluded, several new things are happening and the military activity at Chinese shipyards has reached a new high point. As a point, I note the picture at the top of this post is an official photograph of a Shang (Type 093) class submarine. We never see official photography of submarines unless the platform type has concluded meaning all Type 093s are in the water and the Type 95 has begun construction, or the platform has gone to full production which means a bunch of Type 093s are already under construction. Either way, the photo suggests China is rapidly expanding its SSN fleet, and that would match a lot of analysis from various experts last year. [I][COLOR="SeaGreen"]from a Naval Blog....DFO [/COLOR][/I] ;)

Varyag 2005 to 2008 at the Dalian Shipyard.:)
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From a CHINESE website, take it with a grain-or bag?-of salt........ [COLOR="Red"]China's navy to go high tech on the high sea[/COLOR] Source: Xinhua | 2009-4-16 | NEWSPAPER EDITION LARGE combat ships, supersonic aircraft and high-speed intelligent torpedoes are among the sophisticated marine weapons that China plans to build. "The navy will move faster in researching and building new-generation weapons to boost the ability to fight in regional sea wars using information technology," Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli said in an interview yesterday - a week ahead of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Navy. In addition to ships, aircraft and torpedoes, long-range missiles with high accuracy, submarines with heightened stealth capability and endurance, and electronic weapons and facilities are also on the navy's agenda. Wu said the navy will incorporate the capacity for non-wartime military actions into the country's integrated military force planning, especially emergency offshore search and rescue and anti-terrorism activities. Since 2003, President Hu Jintao has repeatedly inspected the navy and made suggestions on its development. "The navy should be strengthened and modernized ... to serve the country and its people more effectively," Hu said when meeting with representatives of the Navy's 10th Party congress on December 27, 2006. China has huge strategic benefits in its sea areas, and current threats to the country's security come mostly from the seas, said Hu, who is also chairman of the Central Military Commission. Hu urged the navy to achieve rapid development and enhance its defensive operations with information technology. The Chinese navy will continue its missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali coast this year to protect merchant vessels against spreading piracy. The Gulf of Aden is one of the world's busiest shipping routes, through which about 1,000 Chinese vessels pass each year. Meanwhile, more than 40 naval vessels are expected to join an international fleet around April 23 in a display to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA navy, according to previous reports. The navies of 15 countries have pledged to send ships to the port city of Qingdao as part of the celebrations, and at least 28 foreign countries will send delegations. The event presents an opportunity for foreign navies to make close observations of the PLA navy's equipment and personnel.

The Chinese have MOVED their "carrier"......... [COLOR="Red"]Chinese Carrier Goes Into Dry Dock[/COLOR] April 30, 2009: China has moved its aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang, into dry dock, apparently to install engines and other heavy equipment. A year ago, the Russian aircraft carrier Varyag was renamed the Shi Lang (after the Chinese general who took possession of Taiwan in 1681, the first time China ever paid any attention to the island) and given the pennant number 83. The Chinese have been refurbishing the Varyag, one of the Kuznetsov class that Russia began building in the 1980s, for five years now. It is expected to be ready for sea trials by the end of the year. Maybe. No one is sure exactly what plans the Chinese have for the Shi Lang, although work has been going on for years, and it's believed that the carrier will eventually be used to train the first generation of Chinese carrier aviators and sailors. The Varyag has been tied up in a Chinese shipyard at Dailan since 2002. While the ship is under guard, it can be seen from a nearby highway. From that vantage point, local military and naval buffs have noted that some kind of work is being done on the ship. The only visible signs of this work are a new paint job (in the gray shade used by the Chinese navy) and ongoing work on the superstructure (particularly the tall island on the flight deck.) Many workers can be seen on the ship, and material is seen going into (new stuff) and out of (old stuff) the ship. Shipyard workers report ever tighter security on the carriers, and stern instructions to workers to not report details of what is happening on the carriers. Originally the Kuznetsovs were to be 90,000 ton, nuclear powered ships, similar to American carriers (complete with steam catapults). Instead, because of the high cost, and the complexity of modern (American style) carriers, the Russians were forced to scale back their plans, and ended up with the 65,000 ton (full load ) ships that lacked steam catapults, and used a ski jump type flight deck instead. Nuclear power was dropped, but the Kuznetsov class was still a formidable design. The thousand foot long carrier normally carries a dozen navalized Su-27s (called Su-33s), 14 Ka-27PL anti-submarine helicopters, two electronic warfare helicopters and two search and rescue helicopters. But the ship can carry up to 36 Su-33s and sixteen helicopters. The ship carries 2,500 tons of aviation fuel, allowing it to generate 500-1,000 aircraft and helicopter sorties. Crew size is 2,500 (or 3,000 with a full aircraft load.) Only two ships of this class exist; the original Kuznetsov, which is in Russian service, and the Varyag. Currently, the Kuznetsov is operating in the Mediterranean. The Chinese have been in touch with Russian naval construction firms, and may have purchased plans and technology for equipment installed in the Kuznetsov. Some Chinese leaders have quipped about having a carrier by 2010 (this would have to be a refurbished Varyag). Even that would be an ambitious schedule, and the Chinese have been burned before when they tried to build new military technology in a hurry. Late last year, China announced that its first class of carrier aviators had begun training at the Dalian Naval Academy. The naval officers will undergo a four year course of instruction to turn them into fighter pilots capable of operating off a carrier. China already has an airfield, in the shape of a carrier deck, built at an inland facility. The Russians have warned China that it may take them a decade or more to develop the knowledge and skills needed to efficiently run an aircraft carrier. The Chinese are game, and are slogging forward.
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It will be a few more years before this carrier even true operational capability. Having said that it would be even longer before it even be able to land it's first fighter on deck. So in terms of the threat, that i would submit maybe 10 to 15 years out, at best! Regards Charles

Depending on what they are going to do now that she is back in drydock; like FINALLY make her more than a dockside target.....she could be useable in 4-5 years would be my guess. OTOH, given the chicoms...I would NOT under estimate them IF they have finally decided to make her "operational"! DFO :eek:

China ready to build aircraft carrier By Andrei Chang June 02, 2009 [COLOR="Red"]The No. 3 military dock at the Changxing Island Shipyard in Shanghai, China, where the country’s first aircraft carrier is to be built. [/COLOR] Hong Kong, China — Shipbuilding experts from Eastern Europe have confirmed that China will start to build its own aircraft carrier this year, as preparations for the project are complete. The experts had visited the No. 3 military dock of the Changxing Island Shipyard – the new location of the Jiangnan Shipyard, known as the cradle of China’s defense industry – based in Shanghai, where they acquired exclusive photos of the interior of the shipyard. From these it can be deduced that China is ready to commence building the aircraft carrier at this dock. Chinese armed police have dramatically strengthened their watch on Dock No. 3. All the entrances to and exits from this dock are under armed police guard, with plainclothes police on patrol. In contrast, the entrances to Dock No. 1, where civilian ships are built, are guarded only by shipyard security staff. Dock No. 3 is 580 meters long, 120 meters wide, and completely encircled by a wall at least 2.5 meters high. A giant gantry crane has been built, with a capacity to lift at least 600 tons. The dock is large enough to build a medium-sized conventional aircraft carrier similar to the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov class with a light load displacement of about 50,000 tons. The outfitting quay for No. 3 Dock has been finished and includes a large gantry crane. According to the Eastern European sailors who visited the shipyard, the quay is 8 kilometers long, and was finished in the autumn of 2008. A number of large containers have been shipped to the area near the dock. Among senior shipbuilding experts from Germany, France and Italy who examined the shipyard photos, one suggested the containers might be loaded with oxygen supplies and power-generating equipment, as huge amounts of oxygen and power would be required for welding engineering. An Eastern European source familiar with the aircraft carrier project said China had invested 35 billion yuan (US$5.1 billion) in the facilities at Changxing Island, including three gigantic joint-structured indoor assembly workshops in which the separate sections of the carrier would be built. The expert from the French shipbuilding industry said these facilities could be used for processing steel plates and section materials, or the preliminary treatment or assembly of separate sections of the carrier. Sources say that the shipyard and all its facilities were built at a very fast pace. A separate road network was finished around January 2007, to provide safety and security for the project. Despite attempts at secrecy, many residents of the nearby Changxing township knew that the shipyard was being readied to make China’s first aircraft carrier. The facilities include numerous five-story buildings – accommodations for nearly 60,000 peasant laborers hired to build the aircraft carrier facilities – that have been in use since early this year. A correspondent for Kanwa Defense Review visited the area to interview peasant workers recruited for this project. The workers said they were paid from 3,000 to 4,000 yuan (US$440 to $585) per month, which is three or four times what an ordinary laborer in Shanghai can earn, and that their living conditions were very good. The round-shaped headquarters building was to be finished this spring. Free-standing residential buildings in red and grey have been constructed for the shipbuilding experts. Satellite photos show that these houses are quite luxurious. Judging from the size of the three gigantic joint-structured indoor assembly workshops affiliated to Dock No.3, it is fully possible that the separate modules of the ship will be built in these workshops and finally assembled at the dock. Sources claim that China intends to build, equip and launch its first aircraft carrier – internally named “Beijing” – between 2009 and 2015. It is possible that the process could take longer, however. The first steps will include the processing and cutting of steel plates and section materials as well as the assembly of sectional parts. When the keel is laid down it will be difficult to keep it secret, as the keel of the aircraft carrier must be towed to the dock in one piece. June 3 is a date worth watching, as that day will be the Jiangnan Shipyard’s 144th anniversary. It is part of Chinese culture to mark anniversaries in a special way to bring good fortune. Therefore, China may take the opportunity to officially launch the aircraft carrier project on this date.
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Deja Vu...all over again???? [COLOR="Red"]New Naval Race Much Like the Old[/COLOR] by Mike Burleson As with the nautical marvels of 100 years ago, the Dreadnought battleship, a new naval race is brewing in the world today, this time with the building of large deck aircraft carriers. [I]We wonder if the past rivalries on the oceans that eventually led to a century of destructive warfare, might also be repeating itself as precious funds are summoned from more useful exertions to enhance the prestige of rising and traditional seapowers.[/I] There are currently 21 aircraft carriers and numerous aviation capable ships in the navies of the world today, with more than half belonging to the US Navy. There are also 7 such vessels under construction, with China, Russia, and India expressing interest in acquiring up to 6 for their respective fleets. In future decades America intends to replace the 10-strong Nimitz class with 10 similar Ford class aircraft carriers, the first of which is already under construction. Recently Japan has commissioned a new “helicopter destroyer” that some claim could also operate V/STOL aircraft at some future date, causing surrounding nations such as South Korea to plan such ships for themselves. This new rivalry between nations couldn’t come at a worse time, with ongoing wars in the Middle East and the rising asymmetrical threats at sea with piracy. Both of these more immediate concerns do not require large and intimidating new battleships, and these very costly to operate, maintain, and protect vessels are actually hurting the effort to bring about peace. Just as the dreadnoughts of the last century drained precious funds for the war effort in the First World War, so do the aircraft carriers drain scarce moneys for new equipment from the “boots on the Ground” in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concerning the first naval race, Lisle A. Rose writes in “Power at Sea” that: Ironically Britain had almost lost the war because of these crude leviathans; they required so many escorts to protect them that it proved impossible for the Admiralty to supply sufficient destroyers to convoy merchant shipping. Even more bizarre, the New Naval Race of the 21st century, this time with aircraft carriers instead of gun-armed battleships, is again affecting Great Britain. After its recent apparent failure in Iraq, and an ongoing struggle in Afghanistan, the Army is in dire straits, and needlessly so, according to this opinion article from the UK Times: It is clear enough what Iraq needed and Afghanistan needs: more men, more helicopters, better armoured protection – the same as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. But what of future war?…War among the people, whether inter-state or counter-insurgency, needs, above all, state-of-the art intelligence and general purpose infantrymen; it needs the type of aircraft that can support them – helicopters not more Eurofighters; it needs ships able to control coastal waters in the way that troops control the streets – frigates not Leviathan aircraft carriers. Britain, having once before discarded her World War 2 era flattops for smaller carriers in the 1970’s, is seeing the handwriting on the wall, and has delayed her 2 giant ships to cut costs. Still the aircraft carrier, like the battleship of a bygone age, is a symbol of national power and the sign of a modern navy. As a symbol their giant bulk can be very intimidating, but also tempting to a rising navy wishing to make a name for itself. As such awesome harbingers of force, they themselves have become targets of destruction. Thus, instead of decreasing the likelihood of war, the possession of such fearsome weapons actually increases the risk of conflict. Ships which we never have enough of, frigates, coastal corvettes, patrol craft, even submarines would be more useful and less intimidating to other navies. In our recent land wars, COIN experts will insist that “the lightest, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention…will achieve the necessary effect.” So would these smaller “Influence Squadrons” also be less intimidating, more effective, and certainly less a drain on strained defense budgets.

If you look at history and how the worlds navies have prepared for future Navy unit's you will find it's almost alway's never on the mark as far the type and numbers on ship's needed for those future threat operations. His use of the term "Battleship" is losely applied to modern combatant's and is not really an accurate term in the modern Navies of the world. For brown water operations you do need your entire navy to fit that kind of operation. It would be wise to have a wide assortment of ships to deal with real world conflicts. I cannot see his point about Carries being built by other countries. Why not? If that country can afford to build it's carriers, then one would assume it could maintain the vessel. It would appear to be an arms race for those countries trying to fit into the global enviroment and there policitical aspirations. Regards Charles

Here is the latest pic-from website noted-of the ex-Varyags CUT DOWN island. Does look like the[I] plan[/I] is serious about doing something to her.......DFO :eek:
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From TAIWAN............ Taiwan says China starts building first aircraft carrier (AFP) [COLOR="Red"]TAIPEI — Taiwan said Wednesday that its giant neighbour China has started building its first aircraft carrier, a move analysts have said could raise military tensions in the region.[/COLOR] The head of Taiwan's National Security Bureau told parliament construction of the carrier had begun, Lin Yu-fang, a legislator of the ruling Kuomintang party, told AFP. However, the security chief, Tsai Teh-sheng said the carrier's construction "has not been smooth" and that the Chinese navy may struggle to put it into service by 2012 unless it makes a manufacturing breakthrough soon. "This is the result of an evaluation not only from (Taiwan's) National Security Bureau...but also from the Chinese communists," Tsai said, according to Lin. Taiwanese military experts expect the People's Liberation Army to take at least 10 years to have its first operating carrier group complete with carrier-based fighters and other warships. "Once they complete the ambitious project, it will have a serious and far-fetched military impact on the region," said Wung Ming-hsien, professor at Taipei's Tamkang University. "And by that time, the United States, Japan, and Taiwan will need to overhaul their military strategies." A carrier group would potentially double the military threat posed to Taiwan by China by allowing the Chinese to approach from directions other than across the Strait, he said. Two weeks ago Taiwan's defence ministry said in its annual report that China had continued its military build-up against the island despite warming ties, tipping the military balance in the Taiwan Strait with more than 1,300 ballistic and cruise missiles targeting the island. Ties between China and Taiwan have improved significantly since the China-friendly politician Ma Ying-jeou became the island's president last year, vowing to adopt a non-confrontational policy towards the mainland. But China still regards Taiwan as part of its territory awaiting to be reunified by force if necessary, although the island has governed itself since 1949 when a civil war ended. The United States has repeatedly urged China to be more transparent about its rapid military buildup, warning of a shifting balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region that could cause misunderstanding.

More "progress" appears to be happening on ex-Varyag as she now appears to have a new mast structure..........DFO ;)
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Guesstimate about mast: "looks like they are setting it up to install something like the Foremast that they have on 051C and 054A (so a Sea Eagle volume search radar and possibly other sensors)." DFO :)

if they had bought one of ours it would have been far less trouble, they still could if they get in quickly....

A pic dated 2 NOV that has now appeared....NOTE installed radar on mast + (in circle) what appears to be a RAM type launcher. They are busy apparently finishing this carrier to soon (?) become operational. Japan and South Korea will do what? DFO :eek:
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from a Naval Blog........... [B]2010 is the start of PLAN's second building boom [/B] Over the past few months, we have really started seeing new warships appearing in different naval shipyards in China. We saw the appearance of the 5th 054A in HP shipyard and then the 5th 054A in HD shipyard. We also saw 2 submarines (including a mysterious new type) appearing in WC shipyard. Over the past week, we have seen a flurry of new photos coming out of different shipyards that really showed the extent of the current buildup. On top of these photos, we also have plenty of rumours surrounding which ships might show up in the coming few months. First, to show the ships that we have photographic confirmation for. This is the 5th 054A from HP shipyard. It still does not have the number painted, but looks to be ready for sea trials soon. At the same time, the 4th 054A from HD shipyard will be commissioned soon and the 5th one has yet to be launched. (see first attached pic) In the same shipyard, we are seeing continuous progress in the second of the class of Type 071 LPD. From just looking at the previous pictures of the front of the new unit and this photo of the back, it seems to not have changed much from the first of the class. (second pic) Of course, we also have our favourite floating casino ( x-VARYAG CV-see pic in[I] previous post[/I]) still undergoing construction in Dalian shipyard. I personally believe that it would've been much further along if the refitting work was done in Shanghai or GuangZhou, but Dalian was chosen right from the start. We have seen the Sea Eagle (similar to top plate) volume search radar installed on top of the island and a mysterious launcher (circled in the second photo) installed where one of the eight kashtan used to be installed. We think that this new launcher is going to look a lot like SeaRAM. A couple of years ago, we saw something like SeaRAM called FL-3000N in the Zhuhai airshow. It looks like this will be installed on Varyag for close in defense and could also be installed on 998, 999 and other ships. The rumoured designation of this CIWS is HQ-10. Finally, JiangNan shipyard is also back in business now that the new location in ChangXing has become fully operational First of all, we see that a new DDG is under construction in this shipyard that looks to be not too far from getting launched. From what I can see, the outer structural appearance looks very much like that of 052C. It will just be a little while longer before we can see what the entire ship looks like. The rumour is that it will be launched later this month. (third pic) We also received the photo of a second DDG under construction in JN shipyard. From the look of this picture and pictures of other modules of this ship, it does not look that far behind the progress of the first DDG. In the same shipyard, we have also seen a new MCM ship (said to be a minehunter like 804) getting close to been launched. I can only see the back of the ship, so I can't really verify that is the case yet. At the same time, I have read a lot of about ongoing activities in different shipyards that have not appeared in photographs yet: In JN shipyard, a total of 4 DDGs are said to be under construction. That is not too surprising if you consider that the 4 052B/Cs were built in a relatively short time span by JN. On top of the MCM ship that has already appeared, at least one more is under construction. And finally, two conventional submarines (most likely Yuan class) are all been worked on in JN. In GuangZhou shipyard, work has started on 3 or 4 new large replenishment ships. PLAN has really seen the need for new replenishment ships since the start of the missions to Gulf of Aden. The ships 886 and 887 have been really overworked in the past 2 years. In HuDong shipyard, there are supposedly a couple of new LPDs that are also on the order books. We could also see more 054As to appear out of no where, but this wave seemed to have stopped after the 5th pair. In Huangpu shipyard, they are concentrated on completing the 5th 054As and the 4 cutters for China Marine Surveillance. A new class of ship (speculated to be type 056) will also be appearing before the end of the year. This ship is supposed to fill the gap between 022 and 054A and play the role of offshore patrol vessel. Similar to 022, PLAN has awarded contract for this ship to numerous shipyards across the country (including smaller ones). So as you can see, this shipbuilding boom is quite extensive. Many of the prototypes from recent years have gone into mass production. There were a couple of years of lull in 2008 and 2009, but 2010 brings back the memories of 2004 to 2006. BUSY aren't they?.....rather different from USN or RN........DFO :eek:
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And from an "ASIAN" news source............. Asia Pacific News [B] Aircraft carrier plan shows China naval ambitions[/B]Posted: 18 November 2010 1643 hrs [B]BEIJING : The new generation of combat aircraft China proudly showed off at the Zhuhai Air Show in the country's south this week could soon be taking off from a prestigious runway: an aircraft carrier.[/B] Beijing has become increasingly assertive in its ambitions on the high seas -- as demonstrated by recent tensions with old rival Japan -- but still lacks this naval centrepiece. This looks set to change. Although it has not officially announced as much, China is working on a carrier and Western experts believe it could be comissioned as early as next year, though not in a fully operational state. [I] It is a former Soviet aircraft carrier called the Varyag, currently being refurbished in the port city of Dalian in northeast China.[/I] Rick Fisher, a Chinese military expert at the International Assessment and Strategy Centre in the United States, told AFP the Pentagon estimates China's carrier will start operations by 2015. "This is a reasonable projection. China could have enough of the carrier air wing flying by that time to start developing carrier operating procedures and fighting tactics," he said. Fisher said that Chinese leaks to media in Hong Kong and Japan last year indicated that Beijing plans a five-strong carrier fleet, including two nuclear-powered vessels. Arthur Ding, an expert on the People's Liberation Army, which operates the country's navy, said owning an aircraft carrier is a prestige issue for China, whose 2.3-million-strong military is already the world's largest. This is particularly so when neighbours -- and rivals -- including Japan and India are already equipped with them, said Ding, of National Chengchi University in Taiwan. But there is a second, practical reason, he added. "As China's interests expand globally, the Chinese navy needs to go further outbound, and an aircraft carrier is needed," he said. China has a nuclear arsenal and the world's second-largest defence budget after the United States -- although experts believe China spends more than it reveals -- but its military capabilities beyond its borders are limited. As a tool for projecting power, the aircraft carrier is unsurpassed. "When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it's no accident the first question that comes to everyone's lips is: where is the nearest carrier?" former US president Bill Clinton once said. Some Western experts believe the Varyag could be more useful to the Chinese as a means of learning carrier technology than as a naval tool in its own right. China's defence ministry declined comment on the warship's future role when questioned by AFP. China has a problem accessing the Pacific Ocean, as it lies beyond an arc of rival powers: South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, as well as US bases. Beijing, envious of Washington's naval dominance, has reacted with resentment to recent US manoeuvres in the China Sea and Yellow Sea, which it considers its backyard. The presence of US carriers compounded the insult. Fisher said that while China seeks to "cover its growing iron fist in the velvet glove of 'soft power'," acquiring carriers is vital for China's strategic vision. "China seeks to become a global superpower capable of defending its increasingly international political-economic interests with greater levels of military might," he said. "Building a fleet of aircraft carriers will be essential to this goal." China cultivates the image of a country that arms itself solely for self-defence and has no interest in becoming a dominant power. Developing aircraft carriers could tarnish that image. Ding said that is why Beijing has been coy about its plans -- it worries the carrier will feed fears about China's rise. But Chinese enthusiasm for carriers is not confined to the military headquarters. The population seems to be strongly behind building them as standard-bearers for national pride. A poll by China's state media found 98 percent of people think it is time the nation had an aircraft carrier, and 71 percent think at least four are needed. The fortnightly Chinese magazine "Modern Ships" launched a design competition for carriers in 2007 and still receives impassioned contributions, according to deputy editor Cui Yiliang. "Most Chinese people think the navy's abilities do not match the country's needs," he said.

Apparently their was a BAD accident last week on the rebuild of x-Varyag. Found 2 Chinese links, but only this "interpertation" of the incident: Piecing together pieces on the 2 links, the incident happened at about 0900 that day, at that time the dry dock was putting together sections of a ship. One of the sections, weighed 200 metric tons, came loose from its tether and fell straight to the dock below. At that time over 40 workers working there, about a dozen give or take make it out, the remaining 30 odds 7 confirmed dead, rest were injured at various degrees. Some eyewitness claimed the dead were literally crushed to mush and pancakes by the huge piece. [B]Local authorities have clamped down on the news. [/B] The last line certainly is NO suprise, now is it?? If this is correct it sounds like the part did not hit the ship? Of course, unfortunately, workers seem to have PAID the price; suspect there is no such thing as our OSCHA in Red China. DFO :eek:

[B][I]From USNI...rather more about strategy than a ship............[/I][/B] December 2010 Vol. 136/12/1,294 By James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara [B]While Mahan, with his vision of naval strength as the key to "the power and prosperity of nations," thus far has guided China's emergence as a sea force to be reckoned with, Chinese naval thinkers such as Shi Xiaoqin have come around to the realization that "only knowing Mahan is dangerous."[/B] Chinese navalists have been mixing some Sir Julian Corbett into their Mahanian cocktails lately. That is wise on their part, and something that bears American scrutiny. Some years ago, as China cast about for sea-power theories to guide its naval rise, its attention alighted on the works of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the second president of the U.S. Naval War College and the author of influential works such as The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 and The Problem of Asia. Mahan exhorted nations to amass international commerce, forward bases, and merchant and naval fleets in order to gain commercial, political, and military access to key theaters like East Asia. Mahan’s overarching “logic” of sea power remains compelling for many Chinese naval advocates. But in Asia as in the West, his strategic “grammar” of armadas battling for “command of the sea” has an antiquarian feel to it.1 Progress in naval technology has overtaken much of his “theory of naval strategy and defense,” predicated as it was on armored dreadnoughts and other fin de siècle armaments.2 Concepts from land warfare, most notably Mao Zedong’s doctrine of “active defense,” can infuse contemporary meaning into Mahan’s logic of commerce, bases, and ships. Staying close to base areas, seizing opportunities for local tactical engagements, and wearying a superior foe over time were staples of Maoist warfighting doctrine. A vast nation like China, rich in manpower and resources, could play for time to tap its material superiority. And another Western maritime theorist’s writings fit ideally with China’s largely defensive operational needs: British historian Sir Julian Corbett, Mahan’s nemesis and the author of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. This renowned treatise appeared precisely 100 years ago, during the waning days of the British Empire and its Royal Navy. A Star is (Re)born [B]Corbett is poised to make a comeback in Asia a century hence. Indeed, while Mahan’s writings still dominate Chinese academic and strategic discourses on sea power, mounting evidence suggests that China’s thinkers are widening their gaze to incorporate the Englishman’s works. [/B]In-depth assessments of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, historiographies of Corbett, and comparisons with Mahan have appeared in Chinese military literature with growing frequency since 2008. Analysts find Corbett highly relevant to China’s seafaring project. Fu Zhengnan of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Foreign Language Institute concludes an exhaustive survey of Some Principles by prophesying that “absorbing and drawing lessons from the essence of Corbett’s theories would have tremendous theoretical meaning for our nation’s naval development.”3 While crediting Mahan for providing a “guide” and a “basic framework” for Chinese sea power, Shi Xiaoqin, a researcher at the prestigious Academy of Military Science, bluntly warns that “only knowing Mahan is dangerous.” Concurring with Fu, she asserts that “learning Corbett’s sea power theory not only advances our understanding of the strategic thought of the great maritime powers, but it can also help us discern the basic themes of sea power theory, thus providing a rich academic foundation for China’s research on sea power theory.”4 High praise, indeed. If China’s voluminous reflections on Mahan are any indication, industrious Chinese scholars will pore over Corbett’s theories, composing imaginative, analytically sophisticated works that apply directly to Chinese naval strategy. What such commentators learn may tell us a great deal about the future employment of the Chinese navy and its sister services. Beijing’s foray into Western strategic thought may yield insight into China’s high-seas future. [B]Corbett will supplement—not replace—Mahan among China’s pantheon of strategic theorists.[/B] At the Naval War College we often ask students whether they consider themselves Mahanian or Corbettian. While this makes for lively debate, one without the other is a dubious choice. By taking the best from each thinker—and by acknowledging that their works are compatible on many questions—strategists can fuse Mahanian and Corbettian precepts into a grand theory of sea power and naval warfare. Should the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) embrace Corbett, its operations and tactics could take on a different complexion than one would expect from a navy beguiled by Mahan. This warrants American scrutiny. A Maritime Theorist a Land Power Can Love That Corbett fits with the traditions of a great continental power like China—despite hailing from the British Isles, an epicenter of sea power—is abundantly clear. There is much in a name. Consider the formal name of China’s navy: the People’s Liberation Army Navy is the navy of a great army. For Mahan it was a “fundamental truth, warranted by history” that sea power is “chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations.”5 Corbett found little in this claim to quarrel with, but he insisted that Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.6 Accordingly, maritime strategy was the art of determining “the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war.” The navy’s purpose was to control vital sea routes, not cover itself in glory. Corbett decried battles fought for their own sake. Such “sea heresies” scarcely endeared him to a Royal Navy establishment reared on the lore of Vice Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson and the Battle of Trafalgar.7 Like Mahan, Corbett maintained that proper strategy involved seeking out the opponent for decisive combat at the outset of war. Or rather, this was “sound and applicable” nine times out of ten. But he also beseeched the Royal Navy to restrain its “battle faith” in the “doctrine of overthrow.”8 He dwelt on the remaining one-tenth of cases in Some Principles. Absolute sea control of the kind extolled by Mahan—“overbearing power” that expelled enemy shipping from important waters, more or less permanently, or at most allowed it to appear “as a fugitive”—was seldom if ever attainable in Corbett’s view.9 An uncommanded sea was the normal state of things. Nor did command automatically pass to one belligerent if the other lost it. The British scholar, furthermore, applied his energies to espousing the naval defensive and the “fleet-in-being.” A navy resorted to the defensive as a temporary expedient, postponing a major engagement “by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation develops in our favor.”10 While such concepts were anathema to a Royal Navy that bestrode the world, [B]they will apply to the PLAN as long as it remains inferior to the combined forces of the U.S. Navy and its Asian allies.[/B] Over the past decade, influential Chinese strategists have conveyed similar ideas about the ambiguous nature of command of the sea. Rear Admiral Huang Jiang, the former dean of the Naval Command College and deputy commander of the PLAN’s East Sea Fleet, trenchantly counsels: Seizing command of the sea is not a zero-sum interaction. In sea battle, the loss of our freedom of movement does not necessarily mean that the enemy has gained freedom of movement. Similarly, preventing the enemy from attaining freedom of movement does not mean that we possess freedom of movement. It is only when one side not only immobilizes enemy freedom of movement at sea, but also enjoys unfettered ability to maneuver at sea that command of the sea has been grasped. Otherwise, command of the sea remains in a contested state, belonging to neither side.11 In a similar vein, the official PLAN encyclopedia definition of “command of the sea” proclaims that local command is attainable in generally contested waters. Under such conditions, declare the authors, “each side must assume significant risk to operate [at sea], requiring effective sea control within a limited sea area and limited timeframe to conduct certain naval operations.”12 This is precisely what Corbett meant by “command in dispute,” which the Englishman describes as the “most important [stage of naval warfare] for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.”13 Active Defense = Superior Offense These sober—and very Corbettian—Chinese pronouncements are a far cry from neo-Mahanian assertions that China can and should seek absolute command.[B] In practical terms, this more realistic appraisal conforms to China’s offshore-defense strategy, which seeks to assert sea control for a finite time up to several hundred miles off the mainland’s coast. Corbett doubtless would have approved.[/B]Indeed, Corbett’s language of nautical “active defense” presaged Mao Zedong’s famous works on protracted war years before the Chinese Communist Party chairman wrote them. For Corbett, offense constituted the essence of active defense. Command of the sea—or, as he called it with greater precision, “permanent general control”—remained the paramount goal. But it need not be the lesser fleet’s immediate goal if an unfavorable balance of forces augured disaster. “True Defensive,” he proclaimed, “means waiting for a chance to strike,” whether by launching “minor counterattacks” with asymmetric means or at asymmetric sites, inducing the foe to waste his strength, or augmenting one’s own strength at sea.14 As Corbett’s hero Carl von Clausewitz pointed out, “the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive.”15 An inferior but savvy fleet could play defense, overextending an antagonist’s communications, exploiting familiar ground, and harassing a retreating foe. If commanders were unable to win sequentially—that is, in an orderly process by which they cleared the sea of enemy fleets before exercising command—options still remained. Military logic dictated sequential operations, admitted Corbett, but war is not conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in practice . . . . owing to the special conditions of naval warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it inevitable that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow operations for securing command.16 An inferior fleet could exercise control before obtaining it. Audacity was the soul of the naval defensive. Defense could never deliver positive goals, but it could frustrate an adversary: That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore.17 Corbett recalled that Lord Torrington had prevented a superior French fleet from landing forces in Ireland in 1690, despite his fleet’s inferiority. Unable to win a decisive engagement, the Royal Navy fleet shadowed the French, posing a threat to French landing operations. Merely disputing command helped the English commander realize his chief goal: King William III consummated his land victory without external interference. Torrington won strategically, despite coming up short tactically.18 For Mahan, concentrating the fleet for battle was crucial. Only thus could commanders avoid piecemeal defeat as enemies fell on individual detachments. As in other matters, Corbett took a more supple view, arguing that the purpose of naval concentration was to cover the widest possible area, and to preserve at the same time elastic cohesion, so as to secure rapid condensations of any two or more of the parts of the organism, and in any part of the area to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the strategical center.19 Elastic cohesion fits with China’s extended coastline, which lets PLAN commanders mass forces rapidly from different sites. It also fits with Chinese strategic preferences for attacks dispersed in space and time.20 So long as the PLA contents itself with fighting in China’s extended neighborhood, keeping forces dispersed along the mainland seaboard and condensing them for battle only makes sense. It is worth noting that most unresolved territorial disputes along the Chinese maritime periphery involve islands. The list of challenges includes not just Taiwan but outlying Taiwanese islands such as Kinmen, Matsu, and the Penghu Islands. Beijing claims the many islands that dot the South China Sea. And PLAN egress into the Western Pacific depends on safe passage through the Ryukyu island chain, which runs from Okinawa through northern Taiwan. Wresting one or more of the Ryukyus from Japan would guarantee access to vital waters in times of strife. In short, Corbett’s writings could help the PLA yoke naval power to amphibious operations along the periphery. Certain things have changed over the past century, but those pose few problems for Chinese thinkers looking to Corbett. The English writer could scarcely conceive of “using the land to control the sea,” or using shore-based aircraft and antiship missiles to hold off rival navies. In all likelihood, however, his silence on such matters was a function not of theoretical quibbles but of technological change.21 Shore-based gunnery could reach only a few miles offshore in the days of Mahan and Corbett—a far cry from antiship cruise missiles boasting ranges measured in scores of miles and, potentially, an antiship ballistic missile able to strike at targets under way hundreds of miles distant.22 Living in an age when the torpedo remained a promising but unproven innovation, Corbett could not imagine land forces boasting today’s reach and lethality. But if the purpose of maritime forces is to influence the outcome on land, land forces ought to help ward off hostile men-of-war while allowing friendly fleets into important coastal waters to project power ashore. Corbett would certainly have smiled on close interactions between land and sea operations. Sir Julian Lands in Asia A Corbettian PLAN acting on Mahanian logic would prove more nimble, more resilient, and more formidable than a Mahanian fleet obsessed with absolute sea control. Consequently, it behooves the U.S. Navy to monitor Chinese strategic commentary for further signs of a turn to Corbett, and to foresee the likely composition and practices of such a fleet should one take to the Asian seas. A logical next step for Chinese strategists would be to explore the writings of British Army Colonel Charles E. Callwell, another contemporary of Corbett and a fellow enthusiast for naval support to land operations.23 Callwell too appears to fit with Chinese needs and interests. U.S. naval officers and leaders should strive to be as intellectually curious and innovative as the Chinese, lest they one day find themselves caught flat-footed. They must also rethink the long-standing assumption that command of the commons belongs to the U.S. military. It does not. To their credit, the framers of the nascent AirSea Battle Doctrine seem to be of a Corbettian frame of mind. They understand that access is something that could be lost—and for which the armed forces must fight. Corbett is leaving his mark not only on Asian thinkers but also, apparently, on their counterparts in the West. Well worth carefully considering..........DFO :)

Interesting and thought provoking. Thanks.

from a Naval Blog today........... [B]Official Evidence Cited: China Building Aircraft Carrier [/B] Asahi Shimbun is citing an official report published by the State Oceanic Administration that says Chinese leaders decided last year to back plans to build China's first aircraft carrier. Despite numerous official references in the past, this would represent the first official validation of an aircraft carrier construction effort. The report comes with details: [B]Chinese military sources said initial plans had called for launching a conventional powered carrier with a displacement of between 50,000 and 60,000 tons in 2015. But, with construction progressing quickly, the launch of the first Chinese-made aircraft carrier now appears to be set for 2014. Construction has already begun at six military-affiliated companies and research institutes in Shanghai and other locations.[/B] The plan calls for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be launched by around 2020. Meanwhile, the Varyag, a Soviet-era Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier bought from the Ukraine, is undergoing repairs in the northeastern port of Dalian and is expected to be pressed into service as a training vessel from 2012. The report appears to be about more than aircraft carriers though, as the Asahi Shimbun article goes on to explain: The report, written by a research institute affiliated to the State Oceanic Administration, sketches a strategy for expanding the reach of Chinese sea power and strengthening its ability to protect its maritime interests. As part of that strategy, the report says, the Chinese military "came out in 2009 with a vision and plan to construct aircraft carriers." [B]It also maps out a longer-term drive to build China into a mid-level maritime power by about 2020, able to counter challenges and threats at sea. [/B] The revelation that construction has begun on domestically developed Chinese aircraft carriers is certainly not shocking, indeed it would be more shocking if the Chinese had not already begun construction. I am also not surprised to hear the first aircraft carrier could be launched in 2014, earlier than expected. The thing is, we see evidence every year of the good health in the Chinese shipbuilding industry producing vessels at a rate faster than expectations, so why would be surprised that China is capable of producing aircraft carriers faster than expected too. I expect the first pair of conventional aircraft carriers to be very similar to Varyag, because history tells us China usually starts ship classes by copying what others have already done before modifications are introduced that are more Chinese in character. If we observe the PLA Navy growth in terms of 5 year plans, then in the tenth five-year plan (2001-2005) we saw China develop conventional submarines and experiment with surface combatant classes. In the eleventh five-year plan (2006-2010) we saw China continue building conventional submarines, also build nuclear submarines, build a large number of coastal missile vessels (Type 022), build coastal maritime patrol vessels, expand construction of the surface combatants with 10 frigates and more destroyers, build a single amphibious vessel, and begin modernization of Varyag. In the twelfth five-year plan (2011-2015) we can expect steady construction of conventional and nuclear submarines, more coastal combat vessels, a large block of maritime patrol vessels, steady construction of frigate sized surface combatants, steady construction of amphibious vessels, and now steady construction of aircraft carriers. In other words, we should expect steady construction where either steady construction already existed or where experimentation was conducted during the previous five-year plan. That also means we should be watching for new classes, likely small builds of larger destroyer and cruiser sized surface combatants and potentially an LPH/LPD type amphibious vessel, which would represent experimentation in classes that we will not see reach steady construction until the thirteenth five-year plan (2016-2020). China has a remarkably healthy shipbuilding industry that keeps construction costs much lower than the US, and fixed labor costs also keep construction costs very low. That will allow China to get at least twice, and potentially four or five times more, the number of vessels per year than the United States. It is remarkable to me that the US is even considering cutting the 25 Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutters when China plans to build 30 maritime law enforcement vessels of similar size in the next 5 years alone. The reality though is that because the health of the Chinese shipbuilding industry is so much better than the shipbuilding industry of the United States right now, an industry that could really use General Motors level attention by the current administration btw, China is able to procure the same vessel types for three or four times less than we can. Aircraft carriers represent incredible investments of state treasure, so this undertaking by China is not trivial. It will be worth watching to observe what the steady construction rate for other vessels becomes as China builds aircraft carriers. Will we see what we have been seeing? For example, will the steady average annual rate of construction continue to at minimum be 12 FACs, 2 SSKs, 1 SSN or SSBN, 2 FFGs, 1 DDG, 1 LP(X), and now 1/2 CV/CVN per year? Over a five year plan that represents 60 FACs, 10 SSKs, 5 SSN/SSBNs, 10 FFGs, 5 DDGs, 5 LP(X)s, and 2 CVs for a total of 37 major and 60 minor combat vessels. Over the same period the US is planning 1 CVN, 10 SSNs, 8 DDG-51s, 18 LCS, 1 LPD-17, and 1 LHA(R) for a total of 21 major combatants and 18 minor combatants. In the near term China can and likely will nearly double our major surface combatant output and at least triple our minor combat vessel output. Clearly a naval buildup competition to match China is a long term losing proposition, so we need to be very smart about what we are doing if we believe there is some necessity for concern. Quite a Program; quite the CONTRAST to the poor RN, too........DFO :eek:

from the US Armed Forces Journal comes this interesting analysis........ [B]China’s naval ambitions[/B] [I]10 myths America holds about China[/I] BY CMDR. THOMAS HENDERSCHEDT AND LT. COL. CHAD SBRAGIA The U.S. maritime strategy charges the naval services to develop “cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise ... to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners.” Unquestionably, no nation demands this expertise more than the People’s Republic of China. [B]Its sheer size and pace of growth, coupled with a strategic stance that is often divergent from ours, demands attention, particularly in the maritime realm[/B]. Indeed, China’s leadership shares this perspective. Gen. Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission said that “the China-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. ... The military relationship constitutes an important part of the overall bilateral relations. It is important not only to the strategic trust and comprehensive and practical cooperation between our two countries, but also to regional stability and world peace.” While few can doubt the importance of trust and cooperation between the U.S. and China,[I] recent activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), including the fall 2008 and winter 2010 cessation of military-to-military contact, the cancellation of the 2007 visit of the carrier Kitty Hawk to Hong Kong and the 2009 harassment of the Navy survey ships Impeccable and Victorious are cause for serious concern. [/I]Understandably, these events have reinforced and added urgency for U.S. senior leaders to pursue an understanding of this enigmatic people and military. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, commented that the Chinese “are developing capabilities that are very maritime focused ... and in many ways, very much focused on us.” While in Beijing in April 2009 for the PLAN Fleet Review, Chief Of Naval Operations Adm.Gary Roughead stated that understanding PLAN developments is important: “We can look at the types of ships and airplanes … but it is how countries elect to use those capabilities and how they would interact with other navies that’s important.” [I] This understanding of the PLAN is critical to the Navy Department’s worldwide interaction with PLAN platforms and personalities. Over the authors’ nearly two decades of China experience, however, it has become very evident that the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps combat team suffers from gross conceptual errors in its understanding of China and the PLAN.[/I] While this is not surprising, in light of common misperceptions of China and the Chinese in the U.S., it is a serious challenge that should be immediately addressed and remedied. Failures to correct our preconceived notions will at best prove embarrassing, and at worst facilitate a catastrophic miscalculation between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN. We have identified 10 myths that should be debunked in the U.S. maritime services. Myth 1: The People’s Republic of China has a Navy and a Marine Corps. In reality, the People’s Republic of China has an army-subordinate navy and two brigades of marines administratively subordinate to the South Sea Fleet of the PLAN. This argument is not one of semantics. It is difficult, if not impossible, to examine any organization with “navy” in the title and not place it in our experiential context. Unlike the U.S. Navy, however, the PLAN is not a separate, independent organization within the Chinese defense establishment. Its name is instructive: It is the People’s Liberation Army Navy — a navy subordinate to the People’s Liberation Army and under the operational control of the PLA General Staff Department. This is not because it is a “joint” force, but because the PLA is the military of China. The PLAN has its own bases, a navy career path, navy uniforms and recognition as a major regional navy, but in China’s current military culture, it remains heavily dominated by the Army’s history and experience, which retains a continental orientation. Indeed, the PLAN’s most influential commander, Liu Huaqing, was a PLA officer “seconded” from the PLA to the PLAN for service in 1952 following more than 20 years of army service. While the PLA ground forces remain the predominate military culture, under the current PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli, this singular strategic orientation is changing, albeit slowly. The fact that it was only in 2006 that PLAN officers were finally authorized to wear naval uniforms in billets outside of the navy demonstrates the often glacial pace of the trend away from PLA ground forces primacy. Nevertheless, Wu recognizes the rewards and challenges of building a “separate” navy and has called for the “development of an advanced military culture with naval characteristics.” This is an important shift from a continental orientation toward a maritime, power-projection alternative. It is our view that Wu will be a transformative leader of the PLAN and, in the future, likely be viewed as the father of the modern PLAN. This is not simply due to the influence of his personality but, rather, because the navy’s alternative approach — overseas presence/power projection — is increasingly viewed as more relevant to evolving pressures on national security than the PLA’s continental orientation. As China has become more engaged internationally, particularly economically, it has fueled support for Wu’s vision and, seemingly, been embraced by at least some senior party leaders. This emerging alternative, naturally, drives competition for resources, which apparently kindles friction as the divergent approaches vie for relevance, bureaucratic authority and patronage. Myth 2: The PLAN doesn’t really “get it.” [I]Actually, the PLAN understands the U.S. Navy far better than the U.S. Navy understands the PLAN.[/I] During the Cold War, our Navy enjoyed an almost singular focus on the Soviet Navy. While there were other occasional “pop up” concerns, the Soviets were clearly the main effort. Cold warriors were singularly focused and experienced, and the Soviet target set was relatively easy — the U.S. and the Soviet Union shared a similar background and similar historic concepts and we defined each other as enemies. Nothing could be farther from today’s China challenge. PLAN “America” experts spend an entire career developing a deep understanding of the language, culture, history, strategy and current significant personalities of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps combat team, while U.S. Navy personnel are rarely able to focus on one area for longer than a single tour. China’s effort has built PLAN foreign affairs officers who are fluent in English, have studied abroad, possess an intimate understanding of U.S. Navy issues and are trusted advisers to PLAN senior leaders. The PLA’s research and evaluation of U.S. strategy and operational art is shockingly deep and broad, and often shapes war-fighting doctrine. [I]Conversely, while many U.S. maritime services personnel are dedicated to China, few currently on the “China account” have visited China, fewer still speak Chinese and nearly none have enjoyed direct, day-to-day experience with the PLAN and PLAN strategic initiatives.[/I] Disappointingly, no experts are placed to affect critical Navy Department planning and policy efforts. The deep understanding by the PLAN allows its officers to be extremely predictive on how the U.S. will act, react and negotiate. The inverse is also true — our superficial approach does not allow deep, predictive analysis of PLAN strategic initiatives. Myth 3: History is history. [I]The Chinese view of history is fundamentally different from the American perspective.[/I] PLA officers frequently quote a 5,000-year history of China. While this statement is somewhat true, it facilitates a very selective view of history. A 5,000-year history provides multiple, and in many cases, contradictory, historical cases to support arguments. For example, while Chinese officials prior to 2006 argued that China was a continental power, an examination of the great voyager Zheng He reveals a time when China “ruled the waves” and was undoubtedly one of the world’s pre-eminent sea-powers. Since 2006, however, China and the PLAN have recast China as a maritime nation and claim the logical Zheng He lineage. Americans are very much prisoners to views of history in linear, discrete periods, sometimes identified with four-year blocks of presidential administrations. Conversely, Chinese see history in a way that facilitates strategies bounded in decades, if not centuries. Apocryphally, when asked in 1972 about the importance of the 1789 French Revolution, Premier Zhou Enlai responded that it was “too early to tell.” It is fair to state that this historical long-view greatly shapes PLAN strategic thinking and enables very different approaches to engagement and planning. The frequent, and simplistic, assumption by U.S. officers is that Chinese officers know “true” history, but are obliged to repeat the Communist Party of China (CPC) narrative. In practice, the party perspective is an accepted construct. While the complex and paradoxical jingoism of its narrative often muddies even its own debates, it is naïve to assume the PLAN can be persuaded simply by our rational, frank talk, or personal relationships built during a single meeting. Right or wrong, divergent perceptions shape the relationship. Myth 4: PLA senior leaders are party hacks. While this argument may have been accurate in the past, the PLA continues to professionalize and modernize. A crude mistake is to assume it is simply a numb, incompetent tool of the party; it is not. Many of the new generation of PLAN senior leaders are leaders because, like U.S. leaders, they have mastered their craft. While they are all party members, to view them solely in a party context is not appropriate — these seniors are not just party members (all are), but they truly understand the maritime profession of arms. For example, Wu is a party member and a member of the 17th Central Committee of the CPC. He also has had a significant operational career in the PLAN including a destroyer command, a destroyer flotilla command, command of the pre-eminent PLAN naval academy (there are multiple PLAN academies), a fleet command, and service as a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff prior to assuming command of the PLAN in 2006. Other significant PLAN leaders such as Deputy Commander Vice Adm. Xu Hongmeng, Chief of Staff Vice Adm. Su Shiliang, North Sea Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Tian Zhong and Wu’s possible successor, Vice Adm. Sun Jianguo, currently a deputy chief of the General Staff, have had similar career progression. While meritocracy is progressively becoming more influential to advancement, especially for senior leaders, party loyalty remains the pre-eminent condition for a successful career. But extrapolating increased professionalism as a signal of impending emancipation from the CPC is to apply our ideal state-military relationship to the PLA. Simply, PLA officers will never be an entity detached from the party apparatus; they are a part of it even as they develop greater professionalism. Myth 5: They’re structured like us. [I]While partially true, this is a misconception. The PLAN has, and displays, a rank system comparable to our British Royal Navy-derived structure.[/I] The PLAN officer’s rank, however, is not the indicator of hierarchy in the PLA. It is, instead, the positional grade or zhiwu dengji of the officer. Every officer’s job in the PLA is coded to a positional grade — from platoon leader to central military commission vice chairman. Every positional grade can be filled by a primary or secondary rank. For example, the position of commanding officer of a frigate may be “coded” to the positional grade of a regiment deputy leader (fu tuan). As such, the primary rank for that commanding officer would be a commander, while the secondary rank would be captain. This causes a great deal of confusion among American interlocutors, particularly when confronted with a base/ship/squadron commander who is actually junior in rank to his deputy commander. Recent evidence of this phenomenon is exemplified by the PLAN Gulf of Aden Task Group of late 2009-2010. The task group was commanded by Senior Capt. Qiu Yanpeng. The deputy commander was Rear Adm. Gu Likang. The important question is not the rank, but the positional grade of the officer. U.S. Maritime Service personnel comprehension of the PLA system is further complicated by the absence of the rank of brigadier general, and the addition of the PLA rank of senior colonel (senior captain in the case of the PLAN; the Chinese words to describe army and navy ranks are the same, a navy commander, therefore, is referred to as a “navy lieutenant colonel”). This does not, however, necessitate the equivalence of a PLAN senior captain to a U.S. rear admiral. There are many senior captains in expert, technical jobs such as photographer, band leader, etc., yet there are no U.S. Navy rear admirals serving as the chief of naval operations’ photographer. Myth 6: The PLAN will pursue “dual wins.” This myth is based on U.S. desire.[I] The PLAN, actually, will pursue Chinese wins. [/I]The U.S. very much seeks cooperation, transparency and reciprocity from China and the PLAN. Indeed, the 2009 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China explains “the limited transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.” It is imperative to understand, however, that China, and by extension the PLAN, will behave in its own interest, even as the U.S. seeks cooperation and avenues for PLAN transparency. While we continue to pursue “dual wins” with the Chinese, it is very instructive to note that the Chinese language has no native means of conveying this concept. Diplomatic language used to convey this widely sought result expresses “dual win” as shuangying, or literally, “a pair of wins.” If 5,000 years of Chinese history have not required a means to communicate dual wins, is it realistic to believe that it will be a pursued Chinese methodology? It is counterintuitive for the PLAN to pursue outcomes seen as advancing U.S. worldwide goals. PLAN leaders have heard the translation of “dual win” enough to understand how much emphasis the U.S. places on these outcomes, and parrots “dual win” discussions. Evidence since the commencement of contemporary military-to-military relations with China does not support, however, that the PLA or PLAN will work to advance U.S. goals, but will pursue the goals of a modern, growing China. The PLA strongly reflects balance-of-power realism and typically uses a “win-win” paradigm only when it actually calculates some advantage. Since 2005, when then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick urged China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” PLA officers regularly, and enthusiastically, use this verbiage to assert mutual benefits. When the PLA applies this premise, however, the U.S., often mistakenly, assumes its counterparts are seeking dual wins or are concerned with the well-being of the international system when, in fact, PLA officers routinely assess a zero sum benefit. The PLA profits from this misperception and the PLAN, in particular, echoes this tactic loudly. Positive outcomes for the PLA may be access to venues not previously accessible, new opportunities to operate autonomously, or even an ability for China to maneuver independently bolstered by international legitimacy. For the PLAN, it also justifies a broadening reach. For example, many would herald the PLAN deployment to the Gulf of Aden as evidence of new Chinese and PLA desires to behave as a responsible stakeholder. It is more likely, however, that the perception of danger to Chinese-flagged shipping caused this decision, which validates the PLAN’s — and by extension the party’s — strategic framework. It is important, therefore, that the PLAN has deployed to the Gulf of Aden — not because of a desire to combat worldwide piracy, but in spite of a desire to remain outside of regional issues. [I]The reality of Chinese actions in the interest of China does not suggest we should ignore the PLAN. The PLAN’s deployment is an important step. It should be interpreted, however, using Chinese logic, not ours. Even for the most benign issues, the PLA seldom compromises, rarely concedes, and never considers “paying it forward.” [/I]Logically, we can not resent or admonish the Chinese from acting in accordance with their vital interests, even when it is applied with realist arithmetic. It is critical, however, to appraise Chinese motivation honestly, and candidly manage our approach and expectation. This demands we continue to seek participation and cooperation in areas that are of high importance to PLAN and Chinese leadership, and facilitate the mutual understanding and trust we so strongly pursue. Further, this also compels the U.S. maritime services to pursue a deeper understanding of PLA and PLAN methodologies and strategic thought — if for no other reason than the comprehension of what is, and is not possible, in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Myth 7: The PLAN is not transparent. Where you sit determines what you think.[I] The PLAN is transparent — but only to the PLAN.[/I] The U.S. continues to pursue and encourage transparency from the PLA and PLAN. Through the U.S. prism, of course, the PLAN is anything but transparent. According to the 2009 Military Power Report, there are ample examples of PLA obfuscation, deception and espionage. The PLAN’s perspective of transparency, however, was exemplified by the April 2009 International Fleet Review in Qingdao, China. At the review, the PLAN “debuted its nuclear submarines.” Submarines, to include the nuclear-powered, 30-year-old Type 092 Xia-class SSBN, were in fact on parade — transparency according to the PLAN. The fact that the modern 093 (Shang-class SSN) or 094 (Jin-class SSBN) submarines were absent was beyond the scope of relevancy to the PLAN. PLAN leadership reasoned that, since the PLAN had never displayed the 30-year-old Xia, a 2009 Fleet Review presence allowed them to “debut” the boat. This example highlights the common misinterpretation that characterizes many military-to-military events: an assumption that Chinese officials will reciprocate U.S. efforts equally. Naturally, we use our definitions of reciprocity, transparency and sincerity; Chinese perspectives on these topics, as well as continuity of PLA personnel, facilitate PLA exploitation of the mil-to-mil relationship. Myth 8: The PLAN is developing a professional NCO corps. The PLA certainly desires a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. In fact, the Chinese Ministry of Defense 2008 White Paper even highlights that the PLAN is “also endeavoring to expand the scale of training for NCOs and foster intermediate and senior NCOs qualified for technically complex posts.” Of course, identifying the need or desire for a professional NCO corps, and making it work are two different things. It is useful to examine the PLA’s challenges by applying the theories contained in Geert Hofstede’s “Power Distance,” concepts that are also addressed in the best-selling work “Outliers,” by Malcolm Gladwell. Power distance is the difference between groups, or individuals, in a system of inequality; in this case, the difference between officers and noncommissioned officers. American military power distance is somewhat low, Hofstede would argue, as American NCOs can address problems, mistakes or efficiency and make substantive decisions. The PLA, however, suffers from high power distance; it increasingly appreciates the strength the U.S. military draws from the skill, leadership and intelligence of our NCOs. Chinese society, however, creates an atmosphere where the Chinese non-college-graduate, non-party-member NCO, cannot, and likely will not in the near future, be empowered to suggest, critique or lead to the commander’s intent. Even the ability to discuss NCO-related issues for the PLA is difficult. In June 2008, the Pacific Command’s senior enlisted leader led a delegation of senior command NCOs to China. The reciprocal visit during October 2008 was led by Maj. Gen. Zhong Zhimin, chief of military affairs at PLA General Staff Department, not a Chinese NCO. How will a military establish a professional NCO corps when the NCOs are not empowered to speak to other NCOs? The Chinese are likely attempting to “downgrade” positions previously held by junior officers to NCOs as well as attract some college graduates as NCOs for short-term service. This is, however, more likely described as “noncommissioned officers with Chinese characteristics,” not a professionalization of the NCO corps. Myth 9: It’s all about the guanxi. Guanxi is defined as relations, as well as connections or networks, and is extremely important in Chinese society, as well as the PLA. Indeed, leadership monitoring of China is heavily involved in the understanding of the relationship linkages of different camps such as the Shanghai clique or Communist Youth League clique. To a certain extent, these linkages continue into the Chinese military with different military members likely tied to different party leaders. These relationships, however, are far more important to the Chinese and the PLA culture than they are to the U.S.-PLA military relationship. There is a very common misconception that we can find “our guy” in the PLA who understands us, will talk to us and with whom we can work. This has even become a joke to the Chinese, with a recent lampooning of U.S. military leadership desires for friendship with PLA generals in an infamous cartoon showing four PLA generals around a map of the mainland and Taiwan. One general states that a U.S. military leader “in addition to wanting your mobile phone number also wants to be your Facebook friend, sir.” This one-to-one desire for a personal relationship is, however, contrary to PLA organizational behavior. Understandably, the U.S. places high premiums on interpersonal relationships — it has served us well in the past and it is how we approach our personal friendships. The PLA, however, has demonstrated that there are not personal relationships that can be leveraged during periods of tension or emergencies. The example of Adm. Joseph Prueher, former commander of Pacific Command and former ambassador to China, on relationships with senior Chinese decision makers, is instructive. During his tenure as PACOM commander, he met most of the senior PLA leaders. When the EP-3 crisis unfolded, these same leaders would not accept Prueher’s calls. Charles Hooper points out in “Going Nowhere Slowly: U.S.-China Military Relations 1994-2001” that: “The secretive and conservative culture of the PLA and the nature of domestic PRC politics precludes meaningful relationships between senior PLA officials and their U.S. counterparts. … The facts remain that in crisis, a top priority of most senior Chinese leaders — in addition to resolving the crisis — is assessment of how their involvement might impact or influence their future position and status. ... Since no PLA leader would risk being labeled as a potential traitor in the aftermath of a potential Sino-U.S. crisis, regardless of the stakes or outcome, it is unlikely that they would reach out to a U.S. counterpart or that they would accept a telephone call from one.” Even with the 2008 implementation of the Defense Telephone Link, or hot line, it is likely that PLA, and PLAN, leadership will continue to use practiced tactics of “silence, denial, and obfuscation.” Myth 10: The PLA (and therefore the PLAN) is a national military. The PLA, including the PLAN, is the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a party, not a state or national, military. Officers, soldiers and sailors swear allegiance, first and foremost to the party, then to the people with the service member’s oath of: “I am a member of the People’s Liberation Army. I promise that I will follow the leadership of the Communist Party of China, serve the people wholeheartedly, obey orders, strictly observe discipline, fight heroically, fear no sacrifice, loyally discharge my duties, work hard, practice hard to master combat skills, and resolutely fulfill my missions. Under no circumstances will I betray the motherland or desert the army.” Indeed President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Hu Jintao outlined the values of the PLA as: “Be loyal to the party, love the people, serve the country; devote yourself to [the party’s goals]; and value honor.” Party control of the military is not just a holdover from the Red Army days of Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. As recently as spring of 2009, Gen. Li Jinai, director of the General Political Department, called debate on government control of the PLA “wrong thinking.” Li stated that the PLA must “unshakingly uphold the basic principle and system of the party’s absolute leadership over the army.” Loyalty to the party is so important that it is often reiterated and reinforced. Officers and sailors of the PLAN task groups deploying to the Gulf of Aden, usually shortly after departing Chinese waters, swear an oath of success for their mission. This oath begins with a statement of loyalty to the party, and then to the Chinese motherland, and lastly to the mission. While it is imperative to understand party loyalty, this by no means argues for a “less than loyal” PLA. A PLA Navy officer is just as capable, just as loyal and just as patriotic as any American naval services officer. It appears that both sides of the Chinese-U.S. relationship are still attempting to define each other in today’s post-Cold War world. Some people, such as retired Adm. James Lyons, former commander of the Pacific Fleet, see a “real and growing” Chinese threat in the Asia-Pacific region. Others, such as Thomas Barnett, argue that much deeper and broader military-to-military engagement is possible — even in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The truth is somewhere between the two. The PLAN is here to stay. It is successfully deploying, rapidly developing and revamping its doctrine. [B]The most important near-term task is not establishing whether the PLAN is or is not a threat, but truly establishing a deep understanding of the PLA Navy, one that would rival the PLAN’s understanding of the U.S. Navy. Then, with clear penetration of Chinese maritime strategic thought, U.S. Navy “China hands” will be prepared to answer any call — from a PLAN threat or a PLAN partner. AFJ [/B] Navy CMDR. TOM HENDERSCHEDT is a China specialist in the U.S. Navy [B] partner???[/B] DFO

just wondering...how do you LAUNCH 65000 tons of CV that has been in the water for what...@ 20 years??? [B]China may be ready to launch its first aircraft carrier in 2011[/B]: China may be ready to launch its first aircraft carrier in 2011, Chinese military and political sources said on Thursday, a year ahead of US military analysts' expectations. [B]Analysts expect China to use its first operational aircraft carrier to ensure the security of its oil supply route through the Indian Ocean and near the disputed Spratly Islands, but full capability is still some years away. [/B] "The period around July 1 next year to celebrate the (Chinese Communist) Party's birthday is one window (for launch)," one source with ties to the leadership said, requesting anonymity because the carrier programme is one of China's most closely guarded secrets. The defence ministry spokesman's office declined to comment. The possible launch next year of the ex-Soviet aircraft carrier 'Varyag' for training, and testing technology, will be one step towards building an operating aircraft carrier group, analysts said. The US Office of Naval Intelligence estimates the Varyag will be launched as a training platform by 2012, and China will have an operational domestically built carrier after 2015. Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson of the US Naval College wrote that it was "conceivable that carrier-relevant research, development, and even production ... could proceed with a rapidity that might surprise Western analysts". China, which would be the third Asian country to have a carrier after India and Thailand , needs hardware, software and pilot training. "The acquisition of a carrier doesn't equate to the acquisition of a capability -- the ability to use it effectively -- the latter involving a process that can take decades," said Robert Karniol, a veteran defence analyst based in Canada. The 300-metre (1,000-foot) Varyag is undergoing refit at a state-run shipyard in northeastern city Dalian, sources said. A Chinese firm bought the then-engineless Varyag from Ukraine in 1998 for $20 million, planning to convert it to a floating casino in Macau, but the Chinese military then bought the vessel. Chinese air force pilots have yet to master takeoffs and landings from carriers. They have been undergoing training, but have far fewer flying hours than their US peers. "They must realise that their learning curve will be costly in terms of blood and treasure," Erickson and Wilson wrote. "The Varyag will allow us to familiarise ourselves with aircraft carrier tactics of war," one Chinese military source said. The United States and China's neighbours are nervous about how China could use its growing navy, and speeding up preparations for an aircraft carrier group could add to those jitters. "Just the prospect of China building aircraft carriers has already made neighbours uneasy," former Taiwan deputy defence minister Lin Chong-Pin said in an interview. China has refused to rule out the use of force to unify with Taiwan, a self-ruled island over which Beijing claims sovereignty. Tensions between the two sides have eased in recent years. In March, China announced a 7.5 per cent increase in its 2010 military budget to about $78.6 billion. But Washington suspects Chinese spending to be double that figure. China is seeking to buy ship-borne Su-33 jets from Russia and is working on a variant of its own J-10. The Varyag will be based in the southern province of Hainan. and the speculation continues..........DFO :eek:

Two new photos; certainly looks like funnel smoke. Also note radar on mast plus orange covered satcom balls (?).........progress. From Sino-Defence Forum. DFO :eek:
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from the same Blog the previous 2 photos came from. If true............ [B]China and Brazil are to sign a SOFA to train PLAN personel in aircraft carrier management using the Sao Paulo (ex-Foch). [I]The ship crew will be trained by this group in the land based instalation and will be ready and operational when she goes to sea.[/B][/I] The chicomms have built, on land, what appears to be a life size, concrete "mock up' of the x-Varyag. Also, it has a ski jump at its end........training proceeds apace with REconstruction??? What are friends for, right?? DFO :rolleyes:
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Money seems to trump friendship. Brazil has been quite cozy with China lately.

You noticed, me too....joy. Of course based on what I've read-IF true-Brazil's x-French CV seldom goes to sea....prestige semi-hulk??? DFO :eek:

More about BRAZIL's help................ NAe Sao Paulo [B]In a May 9 interview with Brazilian defense, strategy and intelligence news website Defasanet, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim stated that Brazil and China had reached an agreement to train personnel from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in Brazil.[/B] In the interview (available in Portuguese), Jobim announced that the two sides reached a training agreement to stage PLAN officers aboard the NAe Sao Paulo, Brazil’s Clemenceau-class aircraft carrier (Defesanet, May 13). There has been no reported official confirmation from the Chinese government concerning this agreement, however, on May 19 the official Xinhua News Agency released a news report in its Spanish portal (no equivalent has been found in the news agency’s Chinese or English portal), which cites remarks that Jobim made to the media about the nature of the plan in question. The Xinhua report cited Jobim as saying that the agreement was reached in April during Navy Admiral Carlos Soares de Moura Neto’s official visit to Qingdao to attend the PLAN’s 60th Anniversary Naval Review (Xinhua News Agency [Spanish], May 20). The defense minister noted that the Chinese wanted aircraft carriers for power projection, and that he hopes naval cooperation between Brazil and China can serve as the gateway for defense cooperation in other areas (Defesanet, May 13, Xinhua News Agency [Spanish], May 20). Jobim is planning a visit to China in September or October, which analysts say is likely to finalize the training agreement. [B]Although the details of this alleged agreement are still unknown, given the chronic lack of funding for the NAe Sao Paulo within Brazil’s national budget, some observers speculate that a part of the deal may involve the Chinese paying for some of the restoration of the aircraft carrier in return for some real on-deck operational experience for its carrier officers.[/B] An article that appeared in a Chinese naval university’s website, “Why did China Choose Brazil to Train it Carrier Pilots?” referenced an unspecified source as saying that the Chinese will provide technical support to Brazil for constructing its nuclear submarines (Haijun.xaut.edu.cn, June 1). Western and Chinese analysts believe that at a minimum this agreement will allow the Chinese access to Brazilian naval aviation expertise in addition to the carrier itself.[B] In any event, training of PLAN officers on NAe Sao Paulo would accelerate the development of Chinese capacity in naval aviation, which has been a major weakness in China’s efforts to operationalize an aircraft carrier.[/B] Certainly would not want any weaknesses in the chicoms carrier program now would we?? DFO :rolleyes:

[QUOTE=designeraccd;145328]More about BRAZIL's help................ NAe Sao Paulo [B]In a May 9 interview with Brazilian defense, strategy and intelligence news website Defasanet, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim stated that Brazil and China had reached an agreement to train personnel from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in Brazil.[/B] In the interview (available in Portuguese), Jobim announced that the two sides reached a training agreement to stage PLAN officers aboard the NAe Sao Paulo, Brazil’s Clemenceau-class aircraft carrier (Defesanet, May 13). There has been no reported official confirmation from the Chinese government concerning this agreement, however, on May 19 the official Xinhua News Agency released a news report in its Spanish portal (no equivalent has been found in the news agency’s Chinese or English portal), which cites remarks that Jobim made to the media about the nature of the plan in question. The Xinhua report cited Jobim as saying that the agreement was reached in April during Navy Admiral Carlos Soares de Moura Neto’s official visit to Qingdao to attend the PLAN’s 60th Anniversary Naval Review (Xinhua News Agency [Spanish], May 20). The defense minister noted that the Chinese wanted aircraft carriers for power projection, and that he hopes naval cooperation between Brazil and China can serve as the gateway for defense cooperation in other areas (Defesanet, May 13, Xinhua News Agency [Spanish], May 20). Jobim is planning a visit to China in September or October, which analysts say is likely to finalize the training agreement. [B]Although the details of this alleged agreement are still unknown, given the chronic lack of funding for the NAe Sao Paulo within Brazil’s national budget, some observers speculate that a part of the deal may involve the Chinese paying for some of the restoration of the aircraft carrier in return for some real on-deck operational experience for its carrier officers.[/B] An article that appeared in a Chinese naval university’s website, “Why did China Choose Brazil to Train it Carrier Pilots?” referenced an unspecified source as saying that the Chinese will provide technical support to Brazil for constructing its nuclear submarines (Haijun.xaut.edu.cn, June 1). Western and Chinese analysts believe that at a minimum this agreement will allow the Chinese access to Brazilian naval aviation expertise in addition to the carrier itself.[B] In any event, training of PLAN officers on NAe Sao Paulo would accelerate the development of Chinese capacity in naval aviation, which has been a major weakness in China’s efforts to operationalize an aircraft carrier.[/B] Certainly would not want any weaknesses in the chicoms carrier program now would we?? DFO :rolleyes:[/QUOTE] You definately have a problem with China,try looking at them without blinkered eyes,you could see the future! It is NOT the US unfortunately.

No blinkers on my eyes, see the world as it is evolving.....or is it DEvolving? DFO :eek:

A "new" photo of the CV.........DFO ;)
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[quote=Richard56;145620]You definately have a problem with China,try looking at them without blinkered eyes,you could see the future! It is NOT the US unfortunately.[/quote] I wholeheartedly agree with Richard. Why not call it the Chinese carrier rather than all the endless Chicom comments/jibes. Like it or not China will be probably the Worlds only superpower by the mid century, we have to live with her and should be encouraging the great steps she has already made in opening up to the rest of the world. Being stuck with 1960`s attitudes helps nobody.

Did I miss a change over there? Last time I looked it was the[B] Communist Party [/B]that [B]CONTROLS[/B] that Country. That political "system" is the exact opposite of the one that is in place here or in the UK, for example. [B]PC[/B] is not the way the USMC taught me to express things,[I] honesty is. [/I] I have no desire to engage in a discussion about politics here; simply trying to put forth information and photos about the PLAN and their carrier in the making. DFO

[QUOTE=designeraccd;146191]Did I miss a change over there? Last time I looked it was the[B] Communist Party [/B]that [B]CONTROLS[/B] that Country. That political "system" is the exact opposite of the one that is in place here or in the UK, for example. [B]PC[/B] is not the way the USMC taught me to express things,[I] honesty is. [/I] I have no desire to engage in a discussion about politics here; simply trying to put forth information and photos about the PLAN and their carrier in the making. DFO[/QUOTE] You remind me of a bloke waving a piece of paper in the 1930's. Not that it matters much. It didn't then? Subsequently......

Why thank you; I presume you refer to Sir Winston before he returned to power and was ridiculed by many, as I understand it, in the UK. DFO :D:D

And however you prefer to refer to the carrier...here is a nice close up, taken recently, of her new radar.........DFO ;):D
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from AVIATION WEEK's site comes this: By Richard D. Fisher, Jr. Alexandria, Va. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is assembling the production and basing capacity to make its aircraft carrier program one of Asia’s largest military endeavors. A plausible near-term projection for China’s aircraft carrier ambitions was revealed in two 2009 articles in Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which featured rare access to Chinese military and shipbuilding sources. The sources noted that China would first build two non-nuclear medium-sized carriers similar to the 50,000-ton ex-Soviet/Ukrainian Project 1143.5 carrier Varyag being rebuilt in Dalian Harbor. These carriers would start initial construction in 2009. Beginning in 2020 or soon after, two 60,000-plus-ton nuclear-powered carriers would follow, based on plans for the Soviet-designed but never built Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk class. This would mean a likely fleet of five carriers by the 2020s, including Varyag, which entered a phase of accelerated reconstruction in 2009. Work surrounding this carrier is also serving to create the development and production infrastructure for future carriers. Since mid-2005, Varyag’s reconstruction has been documented by images from Chinese military fans on dozens of web pages. In April 2009, Varyag was moved from its Dalian berth to a nearby drydock. Surrounding the drydock are large ship-component construction hangars, from which the next carriers may emerge. By April 2010, the ship was berthed outside the drydock. Since the move the hull has undergone degaussing, likely in preparation for the now-visible outfitting of a new naval electronics suite. This suite will include four arrays for Chinese-developed naval phased-array radar and new rotating-array radar. Emplacements for the electronic warfare suite are visible. A “Sinicized” model of a Varyag-like carrier, built in 2003 by students at Harbin Technology Institute, which does carrier development work, indicated it would carry a heavy fixed armament of YJ-63 long-range antiship cruise missiles, vertically launched medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Type 730 30-mm. close-in weapon systems (CIWS). Last November, however, Internet imagery indicated it might carry a lighter weapons suite. It will be the lead platform for the short-range FL-3000N SAM, similar to Raytheon’s SeaRAM, though it carries 24 missiles. The imagery shows that Varyag will carry four FL-3000N launchers and at least two Type-730 30-mm. CIWS. Varyag’s air wing is becoming visible. Chinese Internet sources reported that the first flight of the Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s copy of the Sukhoi Su-33 was in August 2009, and by early 2010 Internet imagery and a video confirmed Shenyang had copied the Su-33. Since 2005 Russian sources have insisted to this writer that China could not copy the Su-33, as it was a radical modification of the Su-27SK design. By 2009, these sources anticipated China would purchase an upgraded Su-33 as it developed its own version with a Chinese-designed WS-10A turbofan. In 2010, an Asian source said the PLA might not be pleased with its Su-33 copy, and would consider buying the Sukhoi-built version. Since 2005, negotiations have been held up over Russia’s insistence that China buy a profitable number, around 40. It is now expected that Shenyang will perfect its Su-33 copy, which will feature the latest Chinese-designed active phased-array radar, and new 5th-generation air-to-air missiles and long-range antiship missiles, such as an air-launched version of the YJ-63, with a range of 600-plus km. (373 mi.). Varyag may start its service with a multirole fighter more capable in some respects than the Boeing F/A-18E/F. In 2010, Internet images appeared of a new airborne early-warning and control radar array of the size needed for a carrier aircraft. This followed a 2005 partial image of a turboprop-powered AEW&C. In October 2009, Internet images emerged of possibly retractable AEW&C radar on a Chinese Z-8 helicopter, which may form part of the initial air wing. The PLA is also building escort ships for its carrier fleet. In the autumn of 2009 it appeared that two Chinese shipyards were building two new destroyer classes, but their configurations and equipment are not apparent. The PLA is expected to build up to 18 modern Type-065A air-defense frigates. Two new Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been built, and a more capable Type-095 SSN is expected. When it enters service around 2015, the Varyag and its sisters, plus escorts, may be located at a recently constructed naval base near Sanya on Hainan Island. DFO ;)

Link from a[B] UK paper [/B]sent to me by a Canadian Forum member. Interesting: [url]http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/chinas-naval-coming-of-age/article1871223/[/url] DFO ;)

POV from a [B]NON NAVAL [/B]blog............... [B]China's navy[/B] It is time to discuss the developments in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy and its urgent drive toward sea control in Asian waters. [I] I believe that it is only a matter of time before the People's Republic of China invokes a duplicate of the Monroe Doctrine for all of Asia.[/I] [For those educated in the past couple of decades, the 1823 Monroe Doctrine stated that efforts by European countries to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring U.S. intervention]. The Forces The media is focusing on the new J-20 Stealth fighter, and appear to have forgotten that "the Chinese have built, tested and are on schedule to deploy next year a missile designed to kill an American carrier. The Dong Feng 21D, according to published reports based on Chinese sources, could penetrate the carrier's existing antimissile defenses from 900 miles away with a nonnuclear precision warhead. A version of this missile was seen publicly for the first time in a Chinese military parade last year. [I]American defense analysts acknowledge that this missile could be a game-changer, immediately affecting American naval operations within 1,000 miles of the Chinese coast." [1]. [/I] In fact, the government is not paying attention either. "On Feb. 11, 2010, the ... U.S. Missile Defense Agency airborne laser in a Boeing 747-400F successfully shot down a sea-launched liquid-fueled ballistic missile in ignition stage (within two minutes of launch) and, within one hour later, shot down a solid-state land-launched rocket. . . . [B]"Once in office, Obama cut the program's budget, eliminated a second airborne laser 747 and scaled back the ground-based antimissile weapons scheduled to be built in Europe to defend against Iranian threats, and in Alaska to counter North Korean missiles aimed at Los Angeles and Seattle.[/B] After the successful February 2010 test, no further tests were scheduled or conducted by the administration. Obama's proposed 2011 federal budget eliminates all funding for laser-based antimissile weapons systems." [2] Completely forgotten now are the 81 (in 2009)[3] Australian designed (thanks, mates) high-speed wave piercing 140 ft. catamaran missile boats which carry 8 anti-ship missiles each - that's 480 missiles, which can be fired from a distance of 100 miles [3]. The USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, is composed of the carrier plus two guided missile cruisers (CG), seven guided missile destroyers (DDG), an attack sub (SSN) and an oiler [3]; that makes eleven surface targets. Each combatant ship is equipped with two Phalanx 20mm radar-aimed guns (Close In Weapons System) able to fire off their full magazine of 1,550 rounds in 20 seconds for last ditch defense, plus a variety of missile launchers firing 500-1,500 pound missiles with ranges of 5 to 15 miles. The argument could be made that 480 incoming missiles could overwhelm the strike group's defenses! The Tactics "Well, one might certainly say, "the Chinese certainly aren't going to go to war with a country that owes them over one trillion dollars." Agreed - they aren't going to go to war! But there's a lot of conflict that falls short of war. Remember when the Israelis deliberately sank the USS Liberty? "[Chinese] PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. US DOD analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggested as of 2007 that in the near term, China was seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defense that reaches out to the "second island chain" (i.e., the islands extending south and east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean).[6] The Chinese were offended at the US Navy's proposed exercises in the East China Sea off the western coast of South Korea in November, 2010, and so the US moved it to the east side of Korea. If the US hadn't cooperated, or if conflict arose in Korea or Taiwan, one can imagine the Chinese saying that those countries are in China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and that although they sincerely wish to retain trading and financial relationships with the United States, any intrusion of US forces into those territorial waters would be an aggression which could and would repulsed by what will shortly be credible force, even as our countries remained at peace. I believe that the current government of the United States would capitulate and remain outside whatever EEZ China declared, and that our influence in Asia will be at an end unless measures are taken today to restore and expand our missile defense capabilities. (1) [url]http://www.wnd.com/index.php?pageId=189193[/url] (2) Ibid. (3) [url]http://www.janes.com/news/defence/naval/jir/jir090730_1_n.shtml[/url] (4) [url]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2LmLaZmvJQ[/url] (5) [url]http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/csg.htm[/url] (6) [url]http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.ht[/url] m DFO

from Canada comes this: [B]Ukraine reportedly helping China build aircraft carrier[/B]2011/01/25 20:23:58 Hong Kong, Jan. 25 (CNA) Ukraine has been providing China with the technics to build an aircraft carrier, according to the latest issue of the Canada-based Kanwa Asian Defense magazine. In addition, Ukraine experts are also involved in the restoration of Varyag, an derelict carrier that China bought from Ukraine in 1999, Kanwa said. "The restoration of Varyag has been completed, and the vessel has been equipped with Ukraine developed power systems, " the monthly said. China bought the Kuznetsov-class Varyag, minus any power, radar or battle systems, and towed it via the Black Sea to the northern port of Dalian under the pretext of transforming it into a tourism attraction. But many military observers believed that China is turning Varyag into a training ground for its pilots on the soon-to-be established fighter fleets on the carrier. Andri Pinkov, founder and editor-of-chief of the monthly, said that Ukraine also helped China's Harbin boiler plant manufacture military boilers and steam machines as part of efforts to adopt the[B] "catapult assisted take off [/B]and arrested recovery system" that is used by Russian carrier aircraft. Besides, China has built two platforms to train its pilots for its carrier fleets, he added. First report I've seen alleging this. What catapults does the Kutnetsov use? Guess I've missed them in every photo I have; time for FACT CHECKING?? ......DFO

The Radar array on the Chinese carrier Looks familiar!!!!Methinks a little Industrial Espionage has taken place......or should one of the Nimitz class OODs check their Foremast!!!!

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