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10th Destroyer Flotilla 1944 World Naval Ships Forums Archive


10th Destroyer Flotilla 1944


Posts 1 to 42



This flotilla was created to clear the channel of German interference with D-day and post D-day cross channel shipping. Almost nightly this collection of RN and RCN Tribal class destroyers, Polish manned destroyers and a small 6" cruiser, Bellona or Black Prince would go out and indulge in high-speed running battles with their German antaggonists. These battles were fought often at full speed, in complete dark with radar and experience the predominent ingredient. The attached was written by "Anon" at least no one can now recall, and certainly displayed in Ashanti. This copy was sent to my father in the 1960's by a former colleague who had rediscovered it.
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Splendid ditty here Tim, the right hand page even clearly shows the tribal as Ashanti at the top. Interestingly, when you read those 8 names of the 10DF at this time, we have Tartar Ashanti Blyskawica - Polish Haida - Canadian Piorun - Polish Huron - Canadian Eskimo Javelin Another member had been lost, the 1st Canadian tribal Athabaskan and she was lost on 29 Apr 1944, so your papers must surely post date that. Of the 8 tribals built for Canada, 2 carried the name Athabaskan, a comparatively rare, but by no means unique event.


not forgetting the night Ashanti ran into Huron at 30+ kts. narrowly averting going straight through Huron by going full ahead on one engine and full astern on the other, they managed a pointy side-swipe that bent Ashanti's bow round and crumpled most of Huron's side plating. I have a pic of Huron the morning after, does anyone have one of Ashanti?


[B][B]The 10th DF was formed in January 1944, to seek out and destroy the enemy at night at high speed in narrow,mine infested,rock strewn,treacherous waters,There was no room for mistakes in this type of warfare-to say there were none -would be stretching the truth.The destroyers had to work as a team with utter confidence in their fellows;and yet be prepared to work independently if the need arose. The responsibility for forging this team and leading it into action fell upon Commander Jones in Tartar who was Captain(D),[/B][/B] Hereunder the principle tasks undertaken in the western English Channel and between each operation they fuelled,ammunitioned,repaired damage,exercised and prepared for the next foray.:- 19/20 Jan.Ashanti,Athabaskan,Haida, and Iroquois and three Hunts carried out an uneventful Tunnel Operation 2/3 Feb.Tartar,Ashanti,Haida and Iroquois another uneventful Tunnel Operation 1/2 March Radar contact on Elbings,but no engagement resulted. 11 March Haida screened amphibious exercise. 19 March 10th DF practised indirect bombardment. 24/25 March Athabaskan,Haida and Huron took part in Exercise Tiger off Slapton Sands 30 March Haida and Huron practised gunfire support. 12 Apr.Minesweeping exercise off the Isle of Wight.Athabaskan practised bombardment while Tartar ,Haida and Huron screened the covering force.Tartar underwent a short refit after this. 22/23 Apr.Ashanti,Athabaskan, and Haida screened Apollo laying mines off the French coast. 23/24 Apr.Ashanti,Athabaskan,Haida,Huron and Black Prince carried out another uneventful Tunnel. 25/26 Apr.Ashanti ,Athabaskan ,Huron and Black Prince sank T29. 26/27 Apr.Athabaskan and Haida covered amphibious exercise. 28/29Apr.Athabaskan was lost but Haida sank T27. 2/3 June Tartar,Ashanti,Haida,Huron,Eskimo,Javelin,Blyskawica and Piorun began patrolling the Channel to cover the western flank of Operation Neptune 8/9 June. They engaged T24,Z24,Z32 and ZHi (ex Dutch) Tartar took four hits Her Galley and Bridge were set on fire,four men were killed and twelve wounded,including Commander Jones. Her mast hung over the side.all the radar and communications went dead and she had to drop out of the fray. The wounded crewmen were treated in the undamaged A I Centre,while damage control parties put out the fires-she was still "Lucky Tartar" Teamwork paid off here and by dawn's early light Z32 and ZH1 had been sunk. To be Continued jainso31


[B]Continued from previous post[/B] 10th DF Actions 13/14 June Ashanti and Piorun sank and damaged several minesweeprs between the CI and St Malo. 24 June Eskimo and Haida moved down Channel and sunk U971 27/28 June Eskimo and Haida engaged several minesweepers and trawlers off St Malo 30June/1 July Ashanti and Piorun successfully engaged three trawlers off the CI 1/2 July Tartar,Huron,Eskimo and Javelin patrolled off Ushant,Eskimo and Javelin collided and had to be taken back to Plymouth 8/9 July Tartar and Huron engaged two trawlers off St Malo butvwerevdriven off by shore batteries. 14/15 July Tartar,Haida and Blyskawica destroyed a convoy off Lorient 5/6 Aug. Tartar,Ashanti,Haida and Bellona destroyed two convoys off St Nazaire 14/15 Aug.Iroquois ,Ursa and Mauritius destroyed two convoys. 20-23 AugIroquois,Ursa and Mauritius carried out a successful patrol in the Bay of Biscay and destroyed a further two convoys. This was the end of the Flotilla's naval actions jainso31


posted before but goes well with Jim's item above....
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how Ashanti's part was written up by Adm Hill in Lewin of Greenwich..... Lewin of Greenwich Chapter 2 Part 3 1944 was the year of Operation Overlord, the invasion of German-occupied France by British, American and Canadian forces. Planning for this massive undertaking was already well advanced, and dispositions were being made accordingly. After a brief return to northern waters covering two Arctic convoys Ashanti moved south to Plymouth once more, to become a permanent member of a powerfully armed cruiser and destroyer force whose mission was to deny the western approaches to the Channel to all enemy surface forces, whether these were bent on resupply by coastal convoys or on disrupting invasion preparations. Operations of this sort had been going on since the middle of 1943, under the overall title of Operation Tunnel. Initially they had been very much ad hoc, conducted by units brought together at short notice, and this had on one occasion ended in disaster when the cruiser Charybdis and the destroyer Limbourne were sunk by a much better-prepared and better co-ordinated German force. Now British forces were to have more cohesion. The 10th Destroyer Flotilla was formed under Commander Basil Jones , consisting of four British ships, Tartar, Eskimo, Ashanti and Javelin; four Canadian Tribals, Haida, Huron, Iroquois and Athabaskan; and two Polish ships, Blyskawica and Piorun . They were rigorously worked up, concentrating on night encounter exercises, often with a light cruiser whose principal duty, according to the destroyers, was to illuminate their targets with starshell while the flotilla attacked with gunfire and torpedoes. Activity became steadily more intense from the beginning of April onwards. Many of the sweeps were unproductive. The night of 25-26 April, however, saw some hot action. The allied force consisted of the cruiser Black Prince and the destroyers Haida, Athabaskan, Huron and Ashanti. Unknown to them, a force of three German destroyers had left St Malo soon after dark . These were ‘Elbing’ class vessels, classed as torpedo-boats by the German Navy but in fact the equal of many allied destroyer classes, though inferior in gun-power to the Tribals. Their mission was twofold: to lay a minefield off the north coast of Britanny, and then to cover the passage of a convoy going down-Channel to Brest. By that stage of the war, radar was generally fitted in the surface craft of both sides, and shore radars were operated by the Germans on the French coast. What is now known as Electronic Warfare was also practised; not only was Bletchley Park decrypting a great deal of German radio traffic - producing the famous ‘Ultra’ material - but intercept equipments in ships were in fairly general use. Ashanti was fitted with ‘Headache’, which was able to listen in to German voice radio, and had the added bonus of a Danish rating who spoke German and, listening to this device, was able to give a commentary in real time . The opposing forces first became aware of each other’s presence soon after 1 am on the 26th, and the first thought of the commander of the German destroyers was to protect the convoy which was to the west of him. It soon became clear, however, that his own force and not the convoy was the allied force’s objective, and realising his inferiority he turned east. It was too late; the attackers had superior speed and gained on the Germans, opening fire at about 2.20 am and quickly gaining hits. Starshell was fired by both sides, and the Germans conducted a spirited counter-attack with torpedoes, duly reported by the Ashanti’s ‘Headache’ which helped the British and Canadian ships to comb the tracks. The Black Prince withdrew because of the torpedo threat; it must be presumed that this was part of the doctrine of these operations, since there was no subsequent censure. The destroyers, now under the tactical command of Commander H.C.deWolff RCN in Haida, were in any case well superior in fighting power to the Germans, without the cruiser’s support. Yet they found it extraordinarily difficult to sink the most heavily-hit of the ‘Elbings’, the T29; four outfits of torpedoes were fired without success. The usual coup de grâce weapon having failed, she was finally sunk by gunfire at 4.20am. The other two German ships escaped under cover of smoke. . The 26 April action ended with an unfortunate mishap when Ashanti collided with Huron. Lewin’s recollection of the event (he was on the bridge, though Barnes was handling the ship) was twice recorded during the 1990s; the accounts differ in detail. The earlier one read ‘We were … leaving the scene of action at 30 knots in the order Haida, Ashanti, Huron, Athabaskan. Jimmy Barnes was doing his destroyer commander act, gripping both voice pipes and following the next ahead at two cables [400 yards]. Haida signalled on TBS [voice radio] “Blue Six” (sixty degrees to starboard together), then “Negative”. There was some doubt by the Yeoman of Signals whether it was “Negative” or “Executive” - which was what we said in those days. Everyone was watching Haida to see if she started turning, and she did, so Jimmy B. put on starboard twenty [degrees of wheel]. We discovered afterwards that there had been the same mix up on Haida’s bridge, and the officer of the watch had turned although the signal had in fact been cancelled and she soon started turning back. We were all still watching Haida when someone looked the other way and saw Huron about to cross our bows at speed. We went full astern but our bow scraped down her port side, wiping off her boats, the torpedo davit and the depth charge thrower’. Barnes’s reaction had been extremely quick and Lewin’s later account sums the affair up as ‘not really a bad collision … [it] led to another couple of weeks in dock while our bow, which had been turned round a bit, was straightened out …’ . In another account , Ashanti’s damage is given as the bow being split back 19 feet from the stem. War and peace are indeed very different: the reaction of the media to damage of that nature today can be imagined. Meanwhile Jane Lewin, still in the Operations Branch of the WRNS, had been transferred from Immingham to the operations room near Fort Southwick just north of Potsmouth, augmented to control the invasion forces. There were snatched moments of leave together, but the war’s imperatives made them brief. D-day on 6 June found the 10th Destroyer Flotilla working out of Plymouth again, with the task of sealing the Channel approaches against any German incursion from the Brest area. On the night of 9 June all eight operational ships were at sea, alerted according to one account by air reconnaissance though another ascribes the information to Ultra . Four German destroyers were expected to make a sortie from Brest. Ashanti was short of fuel, having been recalled to patrol before she could be topped up, but had just enough to stay in company and had added water ballast to give stability . Jones stationed the more experienced division of his destroyers - Tartar, Ashanti, Haida and Huron - directly in the expected path of the German force, with the other division - Blyskawica, Eskimo, Piorun and Javelin - two miles on his seaward quarter. The enemy was detected ten miles ahead at 1.14 am, and Jones manoeuvred his force skilfully to spread the ships across the Germans’ front , with all forward guns bearing but at the same time well-disposed to comb torpedo tracks in the face of the expected attack. This duly happened at a range of just over two miles, and all the allied ships reported seeing the tracks, but none hit. The enemy force now split, the leading ship turning north towards the seaward of the allied divisions. Blyskawica, leading this division, turned to fire torpedoes, but then unaccountably carried on to the north and effectively led her division away from the action. This was a most unusual thing for a Polish ship to do - they were generally keen to the point of imprudence to get at the enemy - and can probably be ascribed to confusion as to the true situation. The battle then developed into a gunfight between four German destroyers and four Tribals. The Germans turned out later to have been a powerful force: two Narvik-class ships, Z24 and Z32, armed with five 5.9 inch guns, an ex-Dutch destroyer, the Tjerk Hiddes now called ZH1 , which had five 4.7 inch, and the ubiquitous Elbing T24. The Tribals gave much better than they got. Tartar was hit several times, a fire being started at the base of her funnel from paint irregularly stowed (‘an acquisitive First Lieutenant’, commented Lewin) and Ashanti suffered one hit, but ZH1 was mortally wounded and finally blew up after being hit by two torpedoes from Ashanti, while Z32 was pursued by the Canadian Tribals and finally driven ashore on the Ile de Batz. Z24 and T24, the latter it seemed having a charmed life, escaped, though both were damaged. As with all night actions at this time, the impression was one of extreme confusion and mayhem. Lewin spent much of the action in the charthouse plot, which was a rudimentary operations room, but made frequent sallies up to the bridge to see what was going on. At one point he was about to remonstrate with his captain for turning to join Tartar without finishing off the ZH1, when he was told the latter had just blown up. The subsequent report of these proceedings gives an interesting insight into the developing arrangements for Action Information, a rapidly expanding science. Only the Tartar had anything resembling the operations rooms that became standard a few years later, and only Tartar and Eskimo had Plan Position Indicators, the now-familiar rotating radar displays. It was little wonder that the plots were confused. It is most unlikely that the lessons were not hoisted in by the keen and highly intelligent 24 year old First Lieutenant of the Ashanti. He was to make use of them many times, most tellingly of all a whole generation later. The Ashanti’s largely conscript, hostilities-only ship’s company had come a long way from the dispirited, seasick, far from battle-ready crew they had been six months before. Leo Lee, Able Seaman, recalled half a century later how Barnes and Lewin ‘soon licked HO ratings into shape. A generally happy “bluenose” crew …’ . Lewin would no doubt have given credit too to the hard core of ex-Mashona ratings he had managed to retain - particularly Chief Petty Officer Dockwra, who was not only a highly effective Chief Boatswain’s Mate but the Director Layer in action, providing the basic elevation and training data to the guns’ fire control systems, and introducing at least one important innovation that greatly helped accuracy in blind fire . But the morale and spirit of a ship must stand or fall by the personality and professionalism of the captain and first lieutenant, and in this the Ashanti was, as in all else, lucky. The results of the Ile de Batz action were far-reaching. In effect, the Germans decided that allied dominance of the western approaches to the Channel was so complete that major movements along the Britanny coast were no longer feasible . Sporadic enemy activity continued, however, and on 13 June Ashanti and Piorun made havoc amongst a group of German minesweepers between the Channel Islands and St Malo, sinking three and putting several more out of action. This success was repeated a fortnight later, and by the end of it no less than ten minesweepers and two armed trawlers had been removed from the order of battle. Now it was time to extend the sea reach of allied forces to help in eliminating German ground resistance in western France, and Ashanti found herself often ‘trailing her coat’ on the Bay of Biscay coast. Terry Lewin ‘would be sent in with a gang of armed thugs in a motorboat to make contact with the Free French, [giving them] cased sten guns and ammunition … to stir up trouble with the Germans … I can remember particularly the enjoyable visit to Sables d’Olonne … where we were welcomed with open arms, rushed off to the local free French headquarters, given champagne, and sent off back to the ship with very large baskets of apricots’ . More orthodox operations included cruiser and destroyer sweeps against surface forces operating out of St Nazaire, a particularly successful action in early August almost completely annihilating an eight-ship convoy and its minesweeper escort. During this action Ashanti suffered her only serious casualty of the war: a rating manning Y gun lost a leg, and some others were more lightly wounded. She was a lucky ship. But by now she was, materially, a desperately weary ship. Often she returned to harbour with only one boiler working out of three; she regularly ran out of fresh water, her auxiliary machinery was in a parlous state, and constant high-speed running and frequent gunfire had aggravated every mechanical and electrical ill . Early in October 1944, now under the command of Lieutenant-Commander C.R.Purse, she was ordered to Palmers’ Yard on the Tyne to refit.


a few more pictures to accompany the story, all i have, does anyone else have more? tim
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[B][B]When Ashanti arrived at Palmer's Jarrow Yard -she was opened up and her troubles were found to be very serious indeed[/B][/B].All ancillary gear was replaced,the LP turbines were taken out and partly rebladed,the stern tube and A brackets were rebored,the superheaters retubed,an additional evaporator improved water capacity,an extra generator and split ring main boosted electricity supply.[B]A quarter of a million pounds had been spent on her[/B]. When the refit was over,her stern tube bushes gave more trouble and she was held up again.This time she was passed over; and went into Reserve at Rosyth-thence to Harwich and [B]on 12 April 1949 she was sold for breaking up at Troon.[/B] [B]So passed Ashanti -Sic Transit Gloria.[/B] jainso31


she didnt quite sic transit there and then; by one of life's extrodinary coincidences she hung around for several more years gradually being dismantled as time passed. When my father was posted to Corunna in 1956 she was lying at Rosyth. on arrival there, it was a pierhead jump as her original skipper had been obliged to take compassionate leave, there was G51, Ashanti against the wall on the opposite side of the basin. No guns, no masts but generally complete otherwise. Boarding her with his boat's crew they entered the wardroom to find the print of the Girl with the Pearl that Colin Maud had presented them in September 1942 after the failed attempt to save Somali in "the Long Tow" in the Arctic. The print was still attached to the bulkhead and was swiftly liberated by the boat's coxwain and reinstalled in the Captains cabin of Corunna. This was seen as a great piece of joss resulting in a very happy commission. When it was over the Girl with the Pearl came home to live on dry land and now hangs a few feet from where i sit. Here she is....posted before but twice is better than never. Thanks for the updates Jim.... tim ps. last Victory Day i presented the crest plus two Russian Medals, the Red Banner and Victory Medal to the Arctic Convoy Museum at Loch Ewe, the right place.
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Thank you for the very fine story Tim-I am pleased the old girl was not cut up immediately-you would not now be in possession of such exquisite relics.:):) jainso31


Lt W.Kon in his little book The Destroyer Circus that covers the later period of his war memories including the 10th Flotilla operations in The Channel gives some more observations of the destroyers' war when he was XO on ORP Piorun in 1944. He says that ORP Piorun disliked working together with the sub-flotilla leader, another Polish destroyer ORP Blyskawica. There was nothing personal among the crews - they were of the same nation and were friends but the "style' of the former was carrying out missions made difference. ORP Blyskawica was using the same "style" as the flotilla leader HMS Tartar and it was always using flank speed, sort of "charging" - not liked by the rest of the flotilla. In the action off St Malo on 13/14 June 1944 the leader ORP Piorun (LtCdr T.Gorazdowski) and HMS Ashanti employed the style of slow and deliberate tracking of the German minesweepers before they both fired guns and (Piorun) torpedoes sinking one and demaging four of the German minesweepers. The action was hampered by sudden loss of power on Piorun and steering gear problems of Ashanti - the destroyers missed collission just by couple of yards. For some period of time the Piorun captain was using the gyrocompass located in the asdic compartment still servicable but deep to the bottom of his ship. The 10th Flotilla destroyers used to enter in to the St Malo gap which was not covered by the heavy guns of the German batteries located on the Channel Islands with high speed and they were not much impressed with fire they were received. The guns were firing on the limits of their range at high angle and hitting the relatively small target of a detroyer deck of 370ft by 33ft was hardly possible. W.Kon calls the gap as "a little hole" in which the destroyers were able to operate freely outside the shore batteries range though surrounded by them plus numerous obstacles of minefields, rocks, etc and after the mission they were returning with 28kts speed surrounded again by columns of water rised by heavy German shells. He remembers that navigators were using in summer 1944 the new navigation system called QH3 - the preedecesor of the later Loran. He assumes the action off St Malo as the success as compared to the previous action against the German destroyers on the 08/09 June which he assessed would be better executed if the 10th flotilla was not speeding "to brake neck" (Polish expression for dangerous speeding) and specific just for the Flotilla positioning of the ships. There are many other remarks and memories about destroyers work and the atmosphere in the 10th Flotilla. In order not to create sort of Canadian vs British war I better avoid one of them!:D Regards, GD


[quote=greendragon;10133717]He remembers that navigators were using in summer 1944 the new navigation system called QH3 - the preedecesor of the later Loran.[/quote] Hello GD, do you have any information about the QH3 navigation system. I thought I knew of most radio navigation systems in use at that time, having worked for the Decca Navigator Company developing the LORAN C system, but I have never heard of this one. :confused:


[QUOTE=emason;10133721] .... information about the QH3 navigation system.[/QUOTE] Just did a quick search on Google. QH3 is referred to in this document:- [url]http://jproc.ca/sari/sarrad2.html[/url] Another result was:- Masters of the Channel Night: The 10th Destroyer Flotilla's Victory off Ile De Batz, 9 June 1944 at:- [url]http://www.specialcamp11.co.uk/General%20der%20Artillerie%20Anton%20von%20Bechtolsheim/Masters%20of%20the%20channel.pdf[/url] Pete


Thank you Pete, From the first link: [quote]Apart from these and other radar sets, I was also responsible for a new navigation aid called the QH3. It was developed by the RAF and later, its two military designers formed the DECCA Navigator Company. The QH3 was fitted while Haida was in Plymouth in 1944 and was housed in the chartroom, directly below the bridge. This set used a triangular transmission system that was reputed to fix our position to within a cable length. [/quote]From the second link: [quote]Other new equipment contributed to the flotilla's mastery of the night. Navigation, notoriously difficult in the Channel, was simplified by the radio navigation aid GEE, which according to Ashanti's "pilot," enabled navigators "to pinpoint their position virtually at the touch of a button."[/quote]From this it seems that QH3 was the code name for GEE. The author of the first link confuses the two systems when he states that "[I]It was developed by the RAF and later, its two military designers formed the DECCA Navigator Company[/I]." and "[I]The QH3 became known as the QM set in the Royal Navy after 1945[/I]." QM was the code name for DECCA system From Wikipedia: [quote][U][B]Origins[/B][/U] In 1936 William J. O'Brien, an engineer, contracted tuberculosis which put his career on hold for a period of two years. During this period he had the idea of position fixing by means of phase comparison of continuous wave transmissions. This was not the first such system, but O'Brien apparently developed his version without knowledge of the others, and made several advancements in the art that would prove useful. He initially imagined the system being used for aircraft testing, specifically the accurate calculation of ground speed. Some experiments were carried out in California in 1938, selecting frequencies with harmonic "beats" that would allow for station identification in a network of transmitters. Both the US Army and Navy considered the idea too complicated and work ended in 1939. O’Brien's friend, Harvey F. Schwarz, was chief engineer of the Decca Record company in England. In 1939 O’Brien sent him details of the system so it could be put forward to the British military. Initially Robert Watson-Watt reviewed the system but he did not follow it up, deeming it too easily jammed (and likely due to the existing work on the Gee system, being carried out by Watt's group). However, in October 1941 the British Admiralty Signal Establishment (ASE) became interested in the system, which was then classified as [U]Admiralty Outfit QM[/U]. O’Brien brought the Californian equipment to the UK and conducted the first marine trials between Anglesey and the Isle of Man, at frequencies of 305/610 kHz, on 16 September 1942. Further trials were conducted in the northern Irish Sea in April 1943 at 70/130 kHz. . . . . A follow-up test was carried out in the Irish Sea in January 1944 to test a wide variety of upgrades and production equipment. [U]By this time the competing Gee system was known to the Admiralty and the two systems were tested head-to-head under the code names QM and QH. QM was found to have better sea-level range and accuracy, which led to its adoption.[/U][/quote]Full article here: [URL]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decca_Navigator_System#CITEREFBlanchard1991[/URL] (As an aside, while at the Decca Navigator Company, I worked with Bill O'Brien, who was responsible for the overall design of the LORAN C receiver being built for the US Bureau of Ships.) Apologies for going off thread.:o


Thanks for that clarification. That web site .... [url]http://jproc.ca/[/url] ... looks like it has some interesting articles. Pete


Thanks Pete for the excellent article by Mr M.Whitby. Lt W.Kon memories describes LtCdr K. Namiesniowski (ORP Blyskawica captain) personality as keyed up and lacking of calmness. Commander B. Jones opinion about Blyskawica blunder as "a Polish variation" proves the politeness of English indeed. Regards, GD


[QUOTE=greendragon;10133717]Lt W.Kon in his little book The Destroyer Circus that covers the later period of his war memories including the 10th Flotilla operations in The Channel gives some more observations of the destroyers' war when he was XO on ORP Piorun in 1944. There are many other remarks and memories about destroyers work and the atmosphere in the 10th Flotilla.[B] In order not to create sort of Canadian vs British war I better avoid one of them[/B]!:D Regards, GD[/QUOTE] GD: Surely you're not going to leave us hanging with your last sentence? I am sure that neither the Brits nor the Canadians (of which I am one!) would take offense if you posted any stories you might have.


As far as I know the Canadians and the British their sense of humor is really unmatched by many other nations - especially for the Polish who are notorius for being annoyed if a joke takes them as an target. So lets hope this will not make the British unhappy. Anyway, about the 10th (quote W.Kon): "....the Leader of the whole flotilla was British Tartar, despite his captain was lower in seniority to one of the Canadian captains ([I]Cdr DeWolf, I believe[/I]). Discrimination of the Canadian who was attached to the first division ([I]No 19th, led by the Cdr Jones, leaving the 20th for LtCdr Namisniowski[/I]) was also an accent of a specific >style<. The humilated Canadians commented; Wonderful flotilla and really international one. Had it had the Norwegians and the Dutch instead of the Englishmen - this would had been flotilla! Both flotilla commanders (Jones and Niesniowski) had the same style of the mission execution - they loved flank speed and that made them unpopular by the rest of flotilla . They were speeders because of them being keyed-up ([I]org "nervous"[/I]) in specific circumstances...." Regards, GD As for speed another good story is told by LtCdr W. Kon also reflecting sense of humour. An escorted aircraft carrier asked the escort about increasing speed and what would be good for them. Sea was 4-5B and course straight against wind and waves. The destroyers were working hard with speed of 16kts. The Polish Piorun answered - I can add one more knot. The mate and sister ship HMS Mahratta made a try, increased speed and was seen covered from bow to stern by sprays of waves; she slowed down, returned to its position and answered short: "sixteen". Smaller and 12 years elder HMS Antelope - despite of her name of a fast animal - response was sort of sarcastic -" thirteen knots is my maximum speed". They maintained 16 knots.


Dear GD, my father was there as No.1 of Ashanti, captain Jimmy Barnes, they also loved to burn oil, any excuse for full ahead they took it, my father was like this in later life, he believed that if your destroyer has 56,000 SHP, it was not there to keep with the library books! here is a pic from 1956 and another from 1966... when he received a call to assist a former govt minister in the Caribbean who he had been told had a heart attack they ran old Urchin at her maximum 28/30kts all night, burning all the paint off the funnel in the process, only to arrive and find it was a false alarm! sadly no picture of that tho.. tim
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Tim It is surprising how many times there is a little bit of extra FFO available for a full speed trial when you have been away for a few months and it might just get you into harbour a few hours more quickly. Twice we had full power trials on AISNE whilst coming up the Channel with the engine room staff trying desperately to squeeze 32 knots out of a 20 year old ship. A great photo of Corunna at speed Geoff


[QUOTE=Geoff H.;10133793]Tim [B]It is surprising how many times there is a little bit of extra FFO available for a full speed trial when you have been away for a few months and it might just get you into harbour a few hours more quickly[/B]. Twice we had full power trials on AISNE whilst coming up the Channel with the engine room staff trying desperately to squeeze 32 knots out of a 20 year old ship. A great photo of Corunna at speed Geoff[/QUOTE] Geoff: Those "extra" revolutions at the end of a lengthy deployment were what we used to refer to as "homeward bounders."


Speeding must be international case or sin depends of where we are seated/appointed. I had a pleasure of sailing/racing many times with the Bundesmarine LtCdr who told me that he loved high speed and when he had been skipper of one of their frigates he was always taken in front of his admiral to answer just one question: "Why have you burnt 500t more oil than my ship of the same class in the same EX?". Regards, GD As for sailing despite our efforts we were not able to push his classic, (thirties' design Olympic class) Dragon, beautiful looking and kept sailboat to higher speed and were in most races losers to the Dannish armada of much newer sailboats of ugly bath tube hulls but modern design !:mad:


thanks Geoff, that was only from a ten year old! lots more from this comission on the Battle Class thread (i think!) delighted you enjoyed it tim


There is a further thread, in the Battles and Events section, which covers the 10th Flotilla's sinking of U971 in June 1944 [URL="http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=17449"]here[/URL]. Jim


[QUOTE=jbryce1437;10133858]There is a further thread, in the Battles and Events section, which covers the 10th Flotilla's ......... Jim[/QUOTE] ... and also ' Naval Action off St Malo-14/15 June 1944' at ... [url]http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=16896[/url] ... where a gap (described as bolthole) in the German defensive coverage is discussed. Pete


Inside this exccellent material Masters of the Channel Night by M.Whitby I saw a picture of Cdr Basil Jones the 10th commander. There is no doubt that he was a tough man and leader. Sure his enemies would have kill him but certainly not defeat him. I have found that he also wrote a book and I have had already look at Amazon but found it not on shelves and (sadly) also bloody expensive. It would be interesting to know what he wrote about his Polish destroyers. Tim, what do you know about above? Regards, GD


I did not know about Basil Jones book, i will try to find in other ways. The navigator of Ashanti, John Watkins, wrote a book which covers this period, this i have and will look again to see if he makes any reference to the Polish division. To all accounts Basil Jones was actually a very humane person with a much appreciated "soft side" for his men. I know Michael Whitby, and have his paper on the Isle de Batz action, i can forward to you if you remind me your email address in a private message. Actually i have several accounts of the action but they tend to be from a quite restricted perspective (my ship, kind of thing) and from memory there is not very much mention of the role of the Polish ships. I do seem to remember that Ashanti's "headache" operator, key person, was a Pole with German language skills. I will email Michael now and ask if any of his research papers contain wider refs to your ships, he is writing a book about Harry De Wolf just now so i am sure will have more stuff than i know about. best for now tim


Thanks Tim very much for all the information. Cdr B.Jones book is: And So to the Battle, a Sailor's Story. W.Kon mentioned here remembered also the "headache" operator in his memories and role he played during naval operations. The one on ORP Piorun had been before a signaller in the German army, was captured POW in North Africa and perfectly knew the German sigs' slang. The Polish were forced to serve in the German armed forces because they were German citiziens (i.e. Silesians) and this was enough to be forced to serve for the Nazis. They had no choice: refusal of being drafted was death penalty. Some of them felt more ties with Germans and were loyal to them or had no chance to surrender to the Allies. Some like those "headache" operators (and for example significant number of them who during the Falaise battle were taken POW by the Polish 1st AD immediately joined Polish troops in the combat) joined Polish army. They were good Poles. I would be glad to know more about the 10th Flotilla and I am sending you my address. Regards GD


Tim & others, Have you seen these? Both taken after action against German minesweepers. Persons: LtCdrs Barnes, Gorazdowski (CO ORP Piorun) and the 1stLT Levin. GD
Attachments :



thanks GD, the one on the right I have, it was used briefly for propaganda! but the one on the left I had not seen. "Jimmy" Barnes was a popular skipper and reportedly excellent ship handler having spent most of his sea time in destroyers.


[url]https://vimeo.com/154011412[/url] password Ashanti This film is a series of bits of 8mm taken by Sub. Lt. alan "Tassie" Richmond in Ashanti during 43/44 and covers various interesting shots of the ship at work. I attach the "commentary" prepared by John Watkins who was the pilot at the time. Some of the film is very degraded, nothing I can do about that, but other parts are commendably clear. There are some interesting shots of KG5 at sea with WSC onboard, think this was Feb '44 when he was returning from Tehran (conference) and was told to rest up in morocco after a bout of pneumonia. The Tribals Ashanti and Athabaskan (Canadian) were sent to escort him back. Crossing the Bay of Biscay they ran into a force 12 nor-easter through which WSC insisted they press on at 24 kts. both the destroyers took a fearful beating leading to a period of dry dock for repairs immediately after. Ashanti needed 60 feet of bottom plating replaced. this gave both watches an unexpected break so my father immediately arranged with my mother to get married which fortuitously fell on Valentines day '44, the wedding is in the film. Soon after this the 10th Destroyer Flotilla was formed, during night actions Ashanti managed to run down the side of Huron at 32 kts, and Eskimo had an unfortunate tussle with Javelin, you can see Eskimo' battered bow after she returned to Plymouth (A second such repair for her). After the 10th DF actions Ashanti went to work running down the islands of the West Coast of France delivering weapons to the Free French Resistance who repaid the delivery in fruit and fish which was much appreciated and can be seen in one of the better bits of the film. Tassie Richmond went home after the War where he took up the editorship of the newspaper in Tasmania, he and my father met again when my father, still serving, was there for the Cook bicentennial. He sent my father the films a few years later. They were copied to VHS by the NMM but the tapes gradually became unwatchable. Last week I found the original film in an unmarked box and have just had it copied digitally by a superb company in Cambridge called "Cine-magic", the result is miles better than the VHS ever was. Tim


ASHANTI FILM List of clips 2 Seydisfyord ? 3 Ashore 4 KGV-King George V 5 Ashore again-sledge 6 Horse,skiing 7 Ashanti? Berthed 8 Snow, rocks, water, bridge 9 Boyling 10 Punta Delgada, Azores 11 KGV again – Churchill 12 Javelin 13 Gun crew 14 Children 15 Boat alongside 16 Paddy Marsh -Isle of Wight 17 Castle – Isle of Wight 18 Paddy Marsh 19 Donkeys 20 Village 21 Terry Lewin wedding, Doc Stevenson 22 Imperial Airways? 23 Boyling 24 Huron? 25 Black? 26 Captain JR Barnes 27 John Watkins 28 Terry Lewin 29 Line ahead 30 Doc and Terry Lewin 31 Beach 32 Doc +? 33? + fire 34 St N? 35 Imperial Airways 36 Doc and Tassie R 37 Russian convoy 39 Signaller 40 Gun turret 41 Sun over convoy 42 Cruiser? 44 Line astern 45 Making smoke 46 French resistance 47 Sunken wreck 48 Tassy R 49 French Resistance 50 Making smoke 51 Boyling 52 Heavy seas 53 Tassy R 54 White cliffs, very heavy sea, Paddy M 55 Crane lifting 56 Fuel 57 Richmond family


Many thanks for the link Tim, I very much enjoyed viewing the film. I did notice that, the clips of your parents wedding, shows your father as a "two-ringer", but the rings stopped halfway round, I wonder if this was a wartime epediency measure to save uniform costs? Jim


I had never noticed that! He was at the time First Lt. of Ashanti, age 24....I have no idea how we could investigate this! but delighted you enjoyed the film, I was so pleased to find it again. tim


Good one indeed! Shows people as they are. Much more to see and enjoy than professional official documentaries. Regards, GD P.S. The destroyer G75 (HMS Eskimo) minus significant part of her bow towed by two tugs. What did happen to her?


she had an argument with Javelin! the first time she lost her bow was in Norway, 1940 when all forward of B mounting went....


Tim, that really is great footage, and how splendid to have your parents' Wedding. Re. the halfway ring. I've seen this before and am almost 100% certain it was widely applied by war's end. Many thanks, Mike


Almost all small book The Destroyers Circus by W. Kon (XO on ORP Piorun) is about the 10th DF and actions in summer 1944. LtCDR Kon wrote one or two more books and all of them say well about him as a good observer of the times he lived in WW2. HMS Ashanti mentioned here in the Forum has been observed and described in rare novelist type of writing rather than tactical one during action against the German minesweepers off StMalo. So for all of you chaps who were avoiding classes of Polish here you go: "...Piorun and Ashanti kept the style of fight. Trusty "African" was close behind us and also was sending to enemy silver and orange tracers of shells. While changing course she discovered for short time her beam camouflaged in geometric figures. That way might be real warriors of the Ashanti tribe painted their faces when were going to combat with bows and arrows. What was happening with the ship called Ashanti could have been compared to an image of these African warriors when they were getting through jungle like here HMS Ashanti between splashes of water rised by coastal guns, rocks and she being covered with dense net of colorful gun tracers". "(Fighting with minesweepers) we were not able to avoid being covered with coastal guns shelling...and they shelled us mercilessly. Luckily we were at the limit of their range and the Germans chance on hitting us were limited". "And then in the time when we were in the centre of their shelling the light was gone from all the gyros. The message was sent from the Piorun bridge to Ashanti; I have problem, take the lead. Piorun slowed down a bit and Ashanti increased speed....When Ashanti was passing along Piorun and was going on a slight curve line to port to take the lead her steering gear got jammed. Knowing nothing about it Piorun was going across Ashanti's wake behind her stern . Ashanti unable for manouver went under Piorun bow. On Piorun all attention was concentrated at enemy and the possible collision was noticed late, the uncertainty of what was going wrong with Ashanti added to confusion. In the last moment Piorun quickly changed the course and avoided hiting Ashanti with her sharp bow by one or dwo yards from the Ashanti stern... Ashanti leading and blinking "sorry" for the mess. Her steer was repaired fast and question of who would be leading - the blinded or the crippled was not necessary to be answered". "At down strong and nimble destroyers open their valves of energy...speed 28 knots...the detroyers like two mustangs entered strait between islands. Splashes of 280 mm shels do not make any impression on enyone....Next night we were together with Ashanti in "the little hole". It was said in the staff - you are both like at home there so why send others?" Regards, GD


Thanks for posting the film Tim. Just checked my father's old WW2 uniform jacket and the rings only go half way round.


delighted you enjoyed it, and many thanks fro that dramatic extract GD. there are some good Canadian accounts as well. tim


please all see my post on the HMS Tartar thread, as no one has come forward since the first note in 2011 I now plan to go ahead and prepare this for publication. Don't know how long it will take and quite a few other pressing things in life right now, like earning a living and preparing for the visit of our Russian WW2 veterans in May.......but it will be done, and as per, a free copy when finished to all forum members tim





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