WW2 German Naval Plans World Naval Ships Forums Archive

Naval History by Country :

ROYAL
NAVY

US
NAVY

GERMAN
NAVY

FRENCH
NAVY

*VIEW ALL OF OUR CURRENT ART SPECIAL OFFERS ON ONE PAGE HERE*
NAVAL ART	AVIATION ART	MILITARY ART	SPORT ART

ALWAYS GREAT OFFERS :

20% FURTHER PRICE REDUCTIONS ON HUNDREDS OF LIMITED EDITION ART PRINTS

BUY ONE GET ONE HALF PRICE ON THOUSANDS OF PAINTINGS AND PRINTS

FOR MORE OFFERS SIGN UP TO OUR FREE NEWSLETTER

WW2 German Naval Plans World Naval Ships Forums Archive

WW2 German Naval Plans

Posts 1 to 28

I am interested in any info about planned builds for the german navy which didn't get built because of the war. I know there was some sort of plan to produce a navy to match the RN and plans for various ship types for example large cruisers and ocean raiders and even larger battleships. I an a wargamer and am interested to find info on these and then see how the RN would have fared if the war had been delayed a few years.

I'll start with the caveat that looking at German naval construction is only a secondary approach to understanding the prospects for a naval campaign between Germany and Britain. The Germans had a fine surface fleet in WWI, and all it accomplished was to keep able-bodied men from participating in the war on land where Germany's decisive defeat took place. The reasons for this lack of capability was examined by Wegener, while the war was still ongoing. (!) He said that Germany could not match Britain in naval strength and that attempts to do so were a waste because geography had stacked the deck against Germany. While imperfect in its details, Wegener's thesis was essentially correct, but by making these statements during the war, he made himself something of an outcast. As you might imagine, the upper echelons didn't want to hear that message, so they tapped one of their talented up-and-comers to write a rebuttal which pointed out Wegener's errors--the fact that it couldn't rebut the fundamental argument was overlooked. The author of this rebuttal was named Raeder.... This explains how it was possible for the Germans to commit the same grotesque miscalculation in WWII. The German naval build-up of the 1930's was one without strategic purpose, and the wheels came off right about the time when the Anglo-German naval agreement legitimized an enlarged German fleet. You've already concluded that I could ramble on about this subject for some time, so I'll just note that, shortly before the war, the head of the KM Fleet Dept wrote a memo stating that he could find no documentation of the intended mission for his newest and most powerful units (the Hippers, Scharnhorsts, and Bismarcks). These ships were not built for any reason except to get them built. If you're interested in German never-were ships, run a search for "Z Plan." That should give you plenty of useful hits. You can also get specific: "H" class battleships "O" class battlecruisers Cruiser "P" "M" class cruisers Spahkreuzer aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin A delay in the start of World War II means the fighting doesn't break out until Britain has made further developments in radar and carrier aviation. That means the Germans will be even less able to use their warships as high-seas raiders despite having a more powerful force. And they still won't have the strength to challenge Britain in a fleet engagement, so the KM surface fleet looks even more like the Kaiser's white elephant.

Thank You Tiornu Very usefull information thanks. I am not so certain about your final paragraph, Yes I am sure that British Ship and equipment development would not be static but there is a question of how much progress would have been made in the political and economic conditions prevailing at that time. In my personal opinion (which is open to amendment) With funding tight and the lack of political will to consider the possibility of conflict then progress would be slow. Plus of course there is the fact that whatever the ostensible purpose of the German fleet what it did do in the first and second world war was to tie up the British fleet and more importantly a large number of smaller surface combatants as escorts preventing their employment in ASW operations. The fact was these large warship programmes were supposed to run alongside major submarine building programmes. With a larger number of German surface combatants a larger proportion of British capital ships and escorts would have to be maintained in home waters and our control of sea lanes in the N & S Atlantic the Med and IO would have suffered allowing more scope for Raiders, AMC's and Submarines. The fact is My wargaming What if's are really to give something different to my players and maybe to prompt them to research and broaden their knowledge a bit.

Hindsight is not as 20/20 as we sometimes think, and it has done some disservice on this subject. I often see KM expansion analyzed in terms of anticipated employment against the British, when in fact it had its origins in a French scenario. The armored ships were intended to raid French shipping and attract French cruisers that would otherwise be raiding German shipping. Both Scharnhorst and Bismarck were designed against benchmarks of French battleship design. But with the switch from diesels to turbines in Ship D (the eventual Scharnhorst), the coherence of German planning began its collapse. The end of German high-seas raiding by warships (this does not include AMCs, it does not include warships sortying to attack a known target) did not result from a loss of warships but of support ships. The Bismarck mission was a disaster, not just because of Bismarck's sinking, but also because six (?) of her support ships were hunted down; Prinz Eugen ran into the very real chance of running out of fuel in mid-ocean, and the Germans never again planned to send out another turbine warship for a raiding cruise. I understand that a delayed war also delays the urgency of wartime, but radar matured without that urgency, and British carrier expansion initiated before it as well. The Z Plan included lots of surface warships and only a modest U-boat force, and if the Germans were expecting these surface and submerged fleets to combine into any credible threat to Britain on their own, they were even more oblivios to WWI than I have thought. Both fleets were proportionally weaker than their WWI counterparts which obviously had failed.

I see your point that the KM was aligning itself as a foil to the french fleet rather than the British but I would like to see the numbers with regard to relative strengths vis a vis the british fleet. The fact is that with sub sorties mainly from german ports during WW1 they came very close to starving britain. The lack of support ships you allude to could very well have not come to pass if more of the British fleet was being held to counter the threat of a large german fleet. Also the attempt to draw parralels to the First world war is tempting but ultimately misleading. WW1 being in essence a european mainland war whilst WW2 can better fit the World War title with a far more extensive area of operations and thus commitments. The argument that it didn't work in the first war so it wouldnt in the second is in my opinion flawed. Also the German fleet in WW1 held it's own quite well in my opinion but it's employment left much to be desired. I suppose these differences in interpretation and opinion are what keep things interesting rather than just nuts and bolts and statistics. As an aside i have rum some senarios past my club for the french fleet either ending up in German hands or ending up in British hands and by pure numbers this has a huge effect on things either way, certainly the french fleet was a force to reckon with and the decision to neutralise it was, while distasteful, in the circumstances quite understandable.

Hee! I'd disagree with you also that the actions against the French fleet were understandable. Oh well!

From the british point of view the idea of the french fleet becoming part of the german fleet was a nightmare scenario. The french fleet may have felt bound by the capitulation of the french government to return to french ports and hand their vessels over to the new (German) power. The british felt that this would pose a significant threat and tried to persuade the commanders of the french vessels abroad to either sail to a neutral port and be interned or scuttle their vessels to prevent their use under german control, they chose to do neither. The british at this juncture felt that they had to deal with the threat there and then. It was a tradgedy that Loyal and honourable men on both sides were thus put in a position where a hostile act had to be considered. Surely you can see the position the British were in at the time with all of europe overrun and the fleet stretched was a crisis situation and half measures and a wait and see attitude could lead to disaster. This at least is my veiw on those events, I would be very interested Tiornu to hear yours as you obviously have a different one and I am not a closed minded person.

Which was a greater threat, the neutral French fleet or the hostile Italian fleet? Viewed militarily, the attack on the French was a huge blunder, and I don't believe that fact should have been beyond the foresight of the decision-makers. As far as I can tell, the only benefit lay in its value as a publicity stunt.

There were also politics to take into account. HMG had at the time wanted to emphasise their support for De Gaulle and the Free French forces. I have read somewhere that his views favoured strong action to prevent the French fleet from falling into German hands, and that view did carry some weight...

There was another player this, the US had a role in the concern's over the French Navy and if the fleet did in fact surrender to Germany, i.e., Eisenhower in operations "sledgehammer and Torch". Regards CGRET

Tiornu Certainly the italian fleet posed a threat and one that was already being faced but if you add the french fleet to the german and italian fleet then the result is loss of control of the SLOC. British forces could just about match up against the two axis fleets adding a third would be very nasty. Its not about publicity or expediency or political influence but about survival. CGRET I don't know if US thoughts had any part to play, this was early to mid 1940 and I thought that at that time the US was still sitting on the fence. Astral trader Certainly the free french opinion had to be very much considered in this and I am fairly sure there were free french officers as part of the staff involved in negotiating with the french fleet. I am certain De Gaulle didn't want those ships in german hands but in his own.

I agree with the points that you make Blaydon. [It is Terry by the way!]

Thanks Terry, BTW I am unhappy being a fish head can I be a Marine again? LOL;) Tiornu has some interesting opinions on things and I was wondering if he would care to share his nationality with me? Its Kev BTW

I found a listing for RN construction as projected in 1936 for completion in 1945. Obviously these figures would have changed over time, but it shows British plans from around the same time when the Germans were forming their plans. Battleships 18 Fleet carriers 8 Trade carriers 4-5 Heavy cruisers 8 Large light cruisers 37 Small light cruisers 18 Destroyers 114 I've included only fleet units, and note that this shows only new construction. Here's the corresponding information for the Z Plan, but for totals of completed and plannned ships. Battleships 10 Battlecruisers 3 Aircraft carriers 4 Heavy cruisers 8 Light cruisers 17 Scout cruisers 22 Destroyers 68 The battleships include the Scharnhorsts, Bismarcks, and H class. Heavy cruisers include the armored ships.

[QUOTE]Tiornu has some interesting opinions on things and I was wondering if he would care to share his nationality with me?[/QUOTE] I'm in Missouri, which is currently part of the US. Hee!

Good figures, and nice to hear from you colonial cousins.:) Figures are one thing and effect can be disproportionate for example how many units were there searching for the Graf Spee. Obviously the main 4 Ajax, Achilles, Exeter and Cumberland. Plus in the area Havok and Hotspur,Sussex,Shropshire, Ramillies,Kent, Suffren,Renown, Ark Royal,Berwick,York, Cornwall, Eagle, Dorsetshire, Malaya, Glorious, Furious, Repulse, Hermes, Strasbourg, Algerie and two french cruisers all warned off for the search. So we have about 25 allied ships hunting for one raider. What if there were three or four would the allies have enough ships to cover Something to think about is it not?;)

It's nice, the massive force you can dedicate to a single target when you have overwhelming superiority.

The problem with that was, that was about every available vessel from three oceans, The home fleet was stuck in harbour against the chance of a major german sortie. If there were three raiders one in each of the three oceans that would be diluted down the concentrarion and might have been too much. Say three Deutchland class vessels, then each search group would have to be at least 3 cruisers or maybe a carrier a capital ship plus cruisers and destroyers or just a capital ship cruisers and destroyers. You have to be able to do several things. 1 find it 2 Keep in contact 3 Get enough firepower there to ensure victory As Langsdorf is supposed to have said they were faster than anything that could outrange them and could outgun anything faster than them. Which was close as I think only Renown, Repulse and Hood were faster. As it was Graf Spee might have got away if it hadn't been for the fact that they thought they had come across a cruiser and two destroyers. It was not until they were in range that they realised that the two smaller vessels were in fact 6" cruisers.

The pocket battleships did not have much effect on the war, and none undertook a high-seas cruise after 1941. In addition to the battlecruisers that could outrun and outgun the pocket battleships, there were several carrier squadrons.

Tiornu, I take it from your comments so far that you consider that Britain had things pretty well sown up at sea right from the outset and that the german fleet posed no real threat? What I have tried to indicate is that the percieved treat was significant and as british actions were always going to be based on the percieved threat rather than the actual threat the German fleet had to be considered significant. The significance can be seen in the holding of fleet units in home waters the development and use of X craft to attack them and the use of RAF heavy bomber forces to attack them. If they were really insignificant would the British have bothered with all that? BTW I saw your post about the french naval plans online and am in the process of translating things for the Mogador probably one of my favourite vessels along side the Leander and Dido class cruisers.

As far as the German surface fleet is concerned, it was hopeless from the get-go. Raeder was well aware of that. Since he could not employ his capital ships in their proper role as sea command vehicles, he defaulted to guerre de course, which was never a threat to Britain's existence. By mid-1941, even that was impractical, and the Germans settled for a fleet-in-being. This does not mean the ships were worthless, especially in the specific context of World War II--German conquest of Norway and France, Italy's entering the fight, war with Japan on the other side of the world. Mogador was featured in Warship 2007. Have you seen it? The volume also features a pictorial piece by me on Soviet wartime cruisers.

Do you think this was Raeder or was it Hitler deciding not to risk bigger units, he seemed to be a bit anal about that even down to changing Deutchlands name. Do you think if given a free reign the KM would have perhaps made more of a showing? No I haven't seen that but I will try to find a copy.

It might be hard to distinguish between the two. I think it was Raeder who changed Deutschland's name, anticipating Hitler's intent. But I can't fault the decision here, whoever made it. Certainly a challenge to Britain's command of the sea would be pure madness. The withdrawal from raiding cruises seems prudent in view of the Bismarck experience. It was Hitler who wanted to just scrap the surface ships, we know that for a fact, and Donitz had to step in to save the day.

I have always been of the opinion that if Germany had not built their "big ships" and had instead devoted all their ship-building resources into better quality and far larger numbers of U-boats, then they would have achieved far greater success and might well have brought Britain to her knees during the first three years of the war...

That may be. Sometimes it's hard to address hypotheticals. Without the impetus of Germany's capital ship program, how much more effort does the RN give to its anti-submarine program?

Yes but of course the Washington treaty allowed for ships to be built but not subs and had they started their sub building sooner the wrath of the international community would descend upon them. But certainly if they had started the war with more than the I think about 60 (someone will know the exact number) things could have got very bad. A lot of effort would have been put into ASW as we almost starved in the first war and those lessons had not been forgotten

Rather, the Versailles Treaty. The Anglo-German agreement of 1935 legitimatized Germany's repudiation of the Versailles limits, so they could have concentrated on subs from that point. They had already built a handful of boats through IvS, a Dutch-fronted company. This change could eliminate the Scharnhorsts, Bismarcks, Hippers, and Graf Zeppelins--that's 270,000 tons of material. But clearly a sub-centric effort puts Britain on notice.

Absolutely agree. Nevertheless I cant help but be aware of the perilous position Britain was in when the U-boats had the upper hand in the Atlantic. It was always the thing that worried Churchill the most. If Doenitz had possessed considerably more Uboats at that time?? Also the excellent new U-boats that were too late to have any impact, they would have been fully in production without the huge drain in resources devoted to Germanys capital ships... Still we are in the realms of what if... With the benefit of hindsight, etc...

Everything we obtain for this site is shown on the site, we do not have any more photos, crew lists or further information on any of the ships.

COPYRIGHT NOTICE. ALL IMAGES DISPLAYED ON THIS WEBSITE ARE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW, AND ARE OWNED BY CRANSTON FINE ARTS OR THEIR RESPECTIVE OWNERS. NO REPRODUCTION OR COPYING ALLOWED ON OTHER WEBSITES, BOOKS OR ARTICLES WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT.

Contact Details
Shipping Info
Terms and Conditions
Cookie Policy
Privacy Policy

Sign Up To Our Newsletter!

Stay up to date with all our latest offers, deals and events as well as new releases and exclusive subscriber content!

This website is owned by Cranston Fine Arts. Torwood House, Torwoodhill Road, Rhu, Helensburgh, Scotland, G848LE

Contact: Tel: (+44) (0) 1436 820269. Email: cranstonorders -at- outlook.com

Return to Home Page