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Raiders in New Zealand Waters World Naval Ships Forums Archive


Raiders in New Zealand Waters


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Ship No. 36, otherwise known as Orion sailed from Germany on 6 April 1940, three days before the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. Under the command of Captain Kurt Weyher the ship entered the Atlantic by way of the Denmark Strait and cautiously made her way south. The typical looking freighter belied the hidden armaments onboard; one 3-inch and six 5.9-inch guns, six light anti-aircraft guns, six torpedo tubes in triple mountings, and she also carried an Arado seaplane. Below decks, her holds contained 228 mines. Having refueled from her supply tanker, Orion entered the Pacific on 21 May, passing about 200 miles south of Cape Horn and arrived in New Zealand waters on 13 June. Her orders from the German Naval Command were that all 228 mines should be laid in the approaches to Auckland. With good visibility, under a cloudless sky, she cautiously approached the land in the early dusk of mid-winter to carry out this operation. The details of the cruise of the Orion are taken from the war diary of Captain Weyher and from records supplied by him at Wilhelmshaven after the war. Starting at 7.26 p.m., the Orion laid the first row of mines across the eastern approach to the passage between Great Mercury Island and Cuvier Island. ( The cruiser HMNZS Achilles had been anchored nearby over the previous two nights but was anchored in Auckland Harbour on this night). In the clear weather prevailing, said Captain Weyher in his war diary, it was ‘not possible to approach closer than eight German nautical miles to the Cuvier lighthouse without being sighted by the Signal Station.’ A second barrage of mines was laid across the approach to Cuvier Island in a zigzag which overlapped the south-east end of Great Barrier Island. A third and much longer barrage was laid across the northern approaches to Hauraki Gulf. It extended from a point off the northern end of Great Barrier in a wide arc 6 ½ miles off Moko Hinau Islands and thence in a straight line to the north-west, passing about six miles outside the Maro Tiri Islands to a point about five miles from the mainland. All the mines were of the moored contact type. In his war diary Captain Weyher records that during the seven hours operation, three outward-bound steamers and one inward-bound vessel were sighted by the Orion, but by eleven o'clock the sky had clouded over and she was not detected. HMNZS Achilles and the armed mercchant cruiser Hector arrived at Auckland between nine o'clock and midnight and the collier Kaimiro at 12.45 a.m. The raider dropped her last mine at 2.36 a.m. and then steamed away at full speed to the north-east. Five days passed, during which a number of vessels (including the Canadian-Australian mail steamer Niagara, 13,415 tons, when she arrived from Sydney) must have passed close to, if not through, the mine barrier. But the Niagara was unfortunate when she struck a mine soon after sailing from Auckland for Suva, and Honolulu. Germany could not have chosen a better target , Niagara had 136 passengers, general cargo, and a shipment of 590 gold bars valued at £2,500,000 being pay from England to the United States, which had not yet entered the war, for munitions in the fight against Germany. At 3.44 a.m. on 19 June 1940, Wellington Radio intercepted an alarm signal, followed a minute later by a wireless distress message from the Niagara: ‘Explosion in No. 2 hold, Position Maro Tiri, 270 deg., six miles.’ With the ship going down by the head, crew and passengers abandoned ship and took to the lifeboats. On receipt of these messages HMNZS Achilles weighed anchor at 5.23 a.m and proceeded to sea. At 5.30 a.m. the minesweepers James Cosgrove and Thomas Currell were ordered to carry out a sweeping search in the vicinity of Maro Tiri. At 8.12 a.m. Achilles sighted the lifeboats and the liner Wanganella arrived on the scene. She was requested by wireless to accommodate survivors and assist with a motor-boat, and at once agreed to do. Further assistance to Achilles boats was given by the coastal vessel Kapiti . the services' speedboat and the launches Kowhai, Menai, and Meander. Achilles left at four o'clock with the Niagara's lifeboats in tow. Not one life was lost. The minesweepers James Cosgrove and Thomas Currell commenced operations in the vicinity of Maro Tiri at 12.25 p.m. and at 2.47 p.m. reported a mine in the sweep. Two hours later the Senior Officer, Minesweepers, reported that two mines had been sunk but not exploded. They appeared to have been newly laid and were identified as German contact mines. They were ordered to break off their sweep at sunset and proceed to Colville Channel (the eastern approach to Hauraki Gulf) to carry out a sweep there, beginning at dawn on 20 June (to be continued) Brian
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Brian: You have started a very interesting story and I look forward to the next instalment. Most Canadians would not know that the Germans took the war to New Zealand. Brian


[quote=Brian Wentzell;10063047] I look forward to the next instalment. [/quote] me to...:D


(continued) The loss of the Niagara and the finding of the mines confirmed that an enemy ship was operating in the New Zealand area. All sailings from Dominion ports were stopped for the time being and coastwatching stations were warned to keep a specially sharp lookout for suspicious vessels. It was also arranged with the Royal New Zealand Air Force for a daily dawn air reconnaissance of the approaches to Auckland, Cook Strait, Lyttelton, and Otago harbour, of the North Auckland peninsular area twice a week, and the West Coast sounds of the South Island once a week. This arrangement was modified a few days later, the daily air reconnaissance of the Cook Strait, Lyttelton, and Otago harbour areas being discontinued. On 22 June a signal from Intelligence Staff, Singapore, reported that radio direction-finding bearings indicated a German vessel in a position roughly 120 miles south-west of the Chatham Islands roughly 800 kilometres (500 mi) east of Christchurch and another in a position far to the eastward. A later bearing indicated a ship in a position north of the Chathams. Auckland Radio reported wireless transmissions on northerly bearings. The former were subsequently diagnosed as ‘reciprocals’, but at the time they were reported the possibility of a German ship moving north from the Chatham Islands area could not be disregarded. The armed merchant cruiser Hector was sailed from Auckland and ordered to patrol the eastern approaches to Cook Strait. Aircraft carried out a dawn reconnaissance of that area next morning. Back in NZ the sighting of a strange vessel in the vicinity of Curtis Island in the Kermadec Group at 2 p.m. on 14 June had been reported to Navy Office, Wellington, with a brief description and a sketch of the unknown ship. Navy Office thereupon promulgated this description of the ship sighted as that of a probable raider. It is now evident that it could not have been Orion, which left NZ in the early hours of 14 June. The Kermadecs lie some 600 miles north-east from Auckland, so that it was impossible for the raider to have been in the vicinity of Curtis Island that afternoon. Her war diary and track chart show that she passed south of the Kermadecs in the evening of 15 June. A search was made north to the Kermadec Islands area (800–1,000 km (500–620 mi) northeast of New Zealand's North Island) by Achilles and the trans-Tasman flying boat Awarua . It had been intended to fly-off the ship's Walrus aircraft, but conditions were unsuitable. After searching the eastern and southern bays of Sunday Island, the Achilles proceeded to Macauley and Curtis Islands to support the flying-boat search. Nothing suspicious was sighted and Achilles shaped course for Auckland. After patrolling the Wellington area, Hector was released to proceed to Fremantle. Actually, the raider was far away from New Zealand by that time. After her last mine had been laid in the early hours of 14 June, Orion steamed to the north-eastward until midday and then proceeded on an ‘easterly course on the Australia-Panama route’ to meet her supply tanker Winnetou. On 19 June Orion was in a position about 800 miles east of the Kermadec Islands and 400 miles south of Rarotonga where she captured the Norwegian motor-vessel Tropic Sea. She continued still further to the eastward and for the next three weeks Orion cruised in that area of the Pacific. Orion spent a completely fruitless three weeks cruising on the Pacific trade routes from New Zealand to Tahiti, San Francisco, Vancouver, and the Panama Canal. A testimony to the value of evasive routeing is found in Captain Weyher's comment in his war diary that the ‘unsuccessful patrols along the previously quoted shipping lanes under conditions of about twenty to twenty-five nautical miles maximum visibility prove that enemy shipping, even in Australian, New Zealand and South Seas waters, no longer steers the peace time routes. Radio interception shows merely the traffic of U.S.A. and Japanese passenger ships which apparently still run on these routes. …’ Between 21 and 23 July the raider rounded the Fiji Group to the southward, and on 28 July she refuelled and then proceeded to the south-west and later on a southerly course to search for shipping in the area ‘between New Caledonia, Australia and New Zealand.’ In the morning of 10 August, when approaching the latitude of Brisbane the raider sighted a steamer, judged to be the Pacific Phosphate Commission's Triona, which took prompt evasive action and was not attacked. In the afternoon of 11 August the Orion was 120 miles from Brisbane, and for the next four or five days she cruised in the area between that port and New Caledonia. On 14 August her seaplane made a reconnaissance flight over Noumea and was recovered after making a forced landing due to shortage of fuel. The Orion then worked her way south into the Tasman Sea to patrol the routes between New Zealand and Sydney This period of apparent quiet in NZ coastal waters was about to be rudely shattered (to be continued)
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Brian: A fascinating account thus far. Brian


(continued) In the late afternoon of 20 August Orion intercepted the New Zealand Shipping Company's steamer [I]Turakina,[/I] 9691 tons, on passage from Sydney to Wellington, in a position approximately 290 miles west by north from Cape Egmont and 380 miles from Wellington. The [I]Turakina[/I]’s captain had earlier promised that he would fight to the last if intercepted by an enemy raider. But the freighter’s solitary 4.7-inch defensive gun was no match for the six 155-mm (5.9-inch) weapons of the German warship. The ships were on reciprocal courses when the [I]Turakina[/I] first sighted the raider, which soon afterwards turned and approached her at full speed. [I] Orion[/I] then ordered [I]Turakina [/I]to stop instantly and not to use her wireless. Captain Laird at once ordered maximum speed, put his ship stern on to the enemy, and instructed the radio office to broadcast the ‘raider signal’, giving the ship's position and indicating that [I]Turakina[/I] was being attacked. Thereupon, [I]Orion[/I] opened fire with the immediate intention to destroy the [I]Turakina[/I]'s radio and aerials. This was the customary practice of German raiders, all of whom were ruthless in their methods of attack and some of whom were wont to open fire without warning to prevent wireless messages being transmitted. Nevertheless, [I]Turakina [/I]was able to make her signal several times and it was taken in by stations on both sides of the Tasman Sea, despite the raider's efforts to jam the transmission. The menace of a German raider was confirmed once more in NZ waters and a proud NZ ship was about to fight for life. The [I]Turakina[/I] promptly replied to the enemy's fire, and so, in the gathering dusk, began the first engagement ever fought in the Tasman Sea. The odds were heavily in favour of [I]Orion[/I] with her powerful armament and large, well-trained crew. The [I]Turakina[/I] carried but a single 4•7-inch gun, mounted right aft and manned by her merchant seamen, assisted by one naval gunner. It was a most unequal contest, but Captain Laird had vowed that he would fight his ship to the last if ever he was attacked. At the close range of less than three miles, the raider's fire quickly wrought havoc in the [I]Turakina.[/I] The first salvoes brought down her fore topmast and the lookout man in the crow's nest, who was badly wounded, partly wrecked the bridge, destroyed the range-finder, and put most of the telephones out of action. The officers' quarters and the cook's galley amidships and a deck-house at the foot of the mainmast were wrecked by shells which set the ship badly on fire. In little more than a quarter of an hour the[I] Turakina [/I]was reduced to a battered, blazing wreck and was settling aft; more than half her crew had been killed and others were wounded. At least one of her shells had hit the raider and wounded a number of Germans. To hasten her end [I]Orion [/I]discharged a torpedo at a range of about a mile, but ‘due to the swell it broke surface and hit the steamer on the stern. No visible damage results. The vessel burns like a blazing torch,’ wrote Captain Weyher in his report. Meanwhile, Captain Laird had given the order to abandon ship. The two port lifeboats had been wrecked, but one of the starboard boats got away from the ship with three officers and eleven men, seven of whom were wounded. Other wounded men were put into the remaining boat, but when it was lowered a sea swept it away from the ship's side and it was some time before it could be worked back again. Captain Laird came down from the bridge to the main deck at this moment. He had a bad gash on one side of his head and another on his face. He wanted to have ‘another shot at the—-’, but the third officer pointed out that only the muzzle of the gun was then above water. As the lifeboat neared the ship, Captain Laird told those left on board to ‘jump for it’; but no one moved until the boat came alongside with a crash. The badly wounded first radio officer was put into it as it lifted on a swell. As the others jumped over the side there came a terrific flash and explosion. The raider had fired a torpedo which hit the ship in the engine-room. That was the end of the [I]Turakina[/I], which sank rapidly. The only survivors of the explosion were the third officer, the seventh engineer, an apprentice, two seamen, a fireman, and a steward. They were picked up by the raider, as were the fourteen men in the other boat. The badly wounded lookout seaman died on board the Orion and was buried next day. Captain Laird and thirty-four of his officers and men had died in the Turakina; Twenty survivors were prisoners in German hands. In refusing to stop when challenged and ordering a wireless message to be transmitted, Captain Laird carried out an obligation that was accepted and performed by thousands of British and Allied shipmasters. The sending of such a message might not save the ship and her company but it pin-pointed the position of the enemy at the time and so materially assisted to save other ships and helped the efforts of the naval authorities to compass the destruction of the enemy. The [I]Turakina[/I] and her ship's company paid the extreme price, but the raider was compelled to leave the Tasman Sea and did not sink another ship for two months. What was Captain Laird's design in engaging so formidable an opponent? The enemy raider was far from any friendly port. If, therefore, he were badly damaged, even though in suffering damage he sank the [I]Turakina,[/I] his power to harm other merchant ships might be lessened, if not destroyed. (to be continued)
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(continued) [I]Turakina[/I]'s wireless raider signal, made several times between 6.26 and 6.30 p.m. NZST was read by Brisbane , the Chatham Islands, and Taieri wireless stations. The reception of the nearer stations was effectively interfered with by strong spark signals transmitted by the raider. [I]Achilles[/I], at Wellington, raised steam for full speed and arrangements were made for an air search to be carried out from Auckland by the flying boat [I]Awarua.[/I] It was thought probable that the raider would attempt to escape to the southward. [I]Achilles[/I] sailed from Wellington at 9.30 p.m., and proceeded at 25 knots for the Tasman Sea. The flying boat [I]Awarua[/I], took off from Auckland at 5.17 a.m. on 21 August and was sighted by Achilles at 8 a.m. well to the westward of Cape Farewell. She flew on her curve of search to a point about midway between New Zealand and Australia and thence on a direct course to the position given by the [I]Turakina[/I]. After steaming west by south, the[I] Achilles[/I] altered course at 11 a.m. towards the point of attack, arriving at 5.10p.m.. The ship made a close search of the area but saw no wreckage or other traces of the [I]Turakina[/I]. The flying boat, meanwhile, had returned to Auckland. Ten other ships were in the Tasman Sea when [I]Turakina [/I]was attacked and they were warned that an enemy raider was at large. Sailing orders were cancelled for other vessels bound on trans-Tasman passages either way. HMAS [I]Perth [/I]sailed from Sydney at 10 p.m. on 20 August and steamed at 20 knots to a point south-west of the [I]Turakina[/I]'s position when attacked and thence to about 200 miles east of Gabo Island off the eastern extremity of the coast of Victoria, thus covering the approaches to Bass Strait. Five Hudson aircraft also carried out a search from Sydney on 21 August. Direction-finding that morning gave bearings of a German naval unit near Campbell Island, 700km south of NZ South Island. The Admiralty, however, was of the opinion that the message was transmitted by a vessel operating north of Scotland. On 21 and 23 August radio direction-finding bearings indicated that a German naval unit was in the area to the southward of New Zealand. The relevant messages were passed to Commodore Parry in the [I]Achilles[/I]. Two of the bearings passed through Stewart Island. Next day he was informed that an air search in the area of the West Coast sounds and Stewart Island and towards Campbell Island was made with negative result. The [I]Orion[/I] had, in fact, steamed south after sinking the [I]Turakina[/I], though she did not approach Campbell Island. She went well to the southward of Tasmania and thence across the Australian Bight to the vicinity of Albany, where she laid a number of dummy mines. Thereafter the raider kept well off shore and spent some days in fruitless cruising along the shipping routes west and south-west of Cape Leeuwin. On 9 September she started on her return to the South Pacific. Commodore Parry was unaware of this, of course. In view of his unsuccessful search on 21 August, the fruitless air search about Stewart Island, and the fact that the radio direction-finding bearings were considered to be ‘reciprocals’, he came to the conclusion that the raider possibly had escaped to the northward. [I]Achilles[/I] therefore shaped course for the vicinity of Three Kings Islands in support of a search westward from Cape Maria van Diemen by the flying boat [I]Awarua[/I] on 22 August. Reviewing the position next morning, Parry came to the conclusion that, even if the raider was still in that area, there was little danger to shipping, except for two or three vessels approaching New Zealand from the eastward. He therefore went into Auckland that night to refuel, arriving and sailing during the hours of darkness to avoid attracting attention. Throughout the next day the [I]Achilles[/I] patrolled off the approaches to Auckland to cover the shipping released from that port. On 25 August Parry received the signal from Navy Intelligence indicating a possibility that the raider might be in the vicinity of Campbell Island. [I]Achilles[/I] therefore, proceeded to the southward at 20 knots during the night. At six o'clock next morning, however, the Admiralty message indicating a false alarm was received and the cruiser turned to the northward to resume her patrol of the Auckland approaches. In the evening two more ‘false alarms’ were received by [I]Achilles[/I]. The first signal said that a noise that might have been gunfire had been reported from Cape Maria van Diemen, the northernmost point of NZ. Parry determined to search that area the following morning. But two hours later a signal from Navy Office reported that a ship was being attacked in a position on a line of bearing north-east from Napier on the east coat. This decided Commodore Parry to alter course again to the southward and increase speed to 25 knots. On receipt of a later signal which showed that ' this catastrophe was not occurring in New Zealand waters’, speed was reduced to 15 knots. Commodore Parry in his report of proceedings remarked that lessons to be learned from the search operations were the need for more long-distance reconnaissance aircraft to locate a raider in the Tasman Sea, and the importance of sifting information passed to ships at sea. It would be more helpful, he said, if each report could be accompanied by some indication of its reliability. Returning to more normal duties [I]Achilles[/I] shaped course for Wellington, where she arrived early on 27 August.and escorted three troopships to Melbourne. On arrival she sailed again and proceeded at high speed to Auckland, where she arrived at 10.15 p.m. on 5 September. Having embarked a special mission she sailed again, this time to Tahiti where she remained until 15 September, returning to Auckland on 23rd. On 15 October Commodore Parry was succeeded in command of the[I] Achilles[/I] by Captain Barnes, RN. The broad pendant of Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron was struck in [I]Achilles[/I] at sunset that day. In the early hours of 21 October several wireless stations intercepted a distress message from the Union Steam Ship Company's motor-vessel [I]Karitane[/I], on passage from Melbourne to Auckland, indicating that she was being attacked by a raider in a position in the eastern approach to Bass Strait. [I]Achilles [/I]immediately raised steam for full speed, but shortly afterwards she was ordered to carry out her previously arranged programme and sailed to patrol the North Cape focal area. On the Australian side HMAS [I]Adelaide[/I] left Sydney to patrol an area about 120 miles south-east from Gabo Island and searches were made by aircraft. Merchant ships were ordered not to sail from Melbourne and Hobart, but this instruction was cancelled when no further signal was received from the [I]Karitane[/I]. When that ship arrived at Auckland some days later her master reported that late at night on 20 October a vessel steering a westerly course and ‘showing many deck lights but no navigation lights’ had been sighted at a distance of eight miles. [I]Karitane[/I] took avoiding action and afterwards altered to her original course. About two hours later the stranger was sighted about three miles off, showing her side lights. Course was altered to bring the vessel astern, but when she appeared to be gaining, [I]Karitane [/I] made the raider signal. The stranger then dropped astern and out of sight. It is possible that the ship sighted may have been the Norwegian tanker [I]Storstad,[/I] captured by the raider [I]Pinguin[/I] and renamed [I]Passat[/I]. During that week the tanker laid minefields off Wilson's Promontory, in Bass Strait, and off Cape Otway; and in the night of 28 October [I] Pinguin[/I] laid four rows of mines between Sydney and Newcastle. Orion was already heading back to NZ, and this time she would bring some friends. (to be continued)
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Sorry for the delay in progressing the story, had a small battle with pneumonia. Normal service will be resumed asap. Brian


Brian: Under the circumstances we will happily await your recovery. Cheers, Brian


[QUOTE=Old Salt;10066824][B]Sorry for the delay in progressing the story,[/B] had a small battle with pneumonia. Normal service will be resumed asap. Brian[/QUOTE] Please take your time Brian -your health comes first!


(continued) [I]Achilles[/I] sailed from Sydney under orders to visit the Auckland Islands and Campbell Island, which, it was thought, might be used by enemy raiders as refuelling and refitting bases. After a stormy passage, she arrived off the Auckland Islands in the early morning of 20 November. Nothing of a suspicious nature was seen in Carnley harbour or in Port Ross. The next day Perseverance Harbour at Campbell Island was searched. With nothing seen, [I]Achilles[/I] sailed for Port Chalmers. The following day her orders were changed to Lyttelton as an enemy raider had been reported by the steamer [I]Maimoa[/I] in the south-east Indian Ocean. [I]Achilles[/I] could be refuelled and ready for operations should the raider arrive in New Zealand waters from the Indian Ocean The raider, which had attacked and sunk the [I]Maimoa[/I] in a position about 850 miles west from Fremantle, was the [I]Pinguin[/I] (Ship No. 33). Her allotted area of operations was the Indian Ocean, but during October 1940 she and the captured Norwegian tanker [I]Storstad[/I], which had been renamed [I]Passat[/I], had laid minefields in the approaches to Sydney ,Newcastle, Hobart and Adelaide, and in Bass Strait.1 After sinking the [I]Maimoa[/I], the [I]Pinguin[/I] also sank the [I]Port Brisbane [/I]and [I]Port Wellington.[/I] But while precautions were being taken against the possible approach of the [I]Pinguin[/I] from the Indian Ocean, a German raider operation was actually in progress in New Zealand waters. At the time the [I]Achilles[/I] was on passage from Campbell Island to Lyttelton, two raiders with a supply ship in company were cruising in an area eastward and southward of the Chatham Islands on the prowl for merchant ships. This enemy force comprised the [I]Orion [/I](which had laid the Hauraki Gulf minefield in June and sunk the [I]Turakina [/I]in August), the [I]Komet[/I] (Ship No. 45), and the supply ship [I]Kulmerland.[/I] After her return from the Indian Ocean in September, the [I]Orion[/I] had spent nearly a fortnight cruising in the Tasman Sea and about the Kermadecs without success. On 1 October she headed north, passing close by the Fiji Group to the Marshall Islands where she took some 3000 tons of fuel-oil as well as stores and provisions from a supply ship. Both ships sailed to the Lamotrek in the Caroline Islands, sinking the [I]Ringwood[/I] on the way. There they joined company with the raider [I]Komet[/I] and the [I]Kulmerland[/I]. The captains of the raiders decided to ‘operate together in the waters east of New Zealand along the routes leading from there to Panama.’ This was an area of good promise as, on an average, eight or nine loaded ships left New Zealand every month for the United Kingdom via the Panama Canal and an approximately equal number arrived by that route, not counting other ships moving to and from the Pacific coast. Passing close by Nauru Island ‘in the rather vain hope of coming upon steamers carrying cargoes from there to Australia’,the ships proceeded southward between the New Hebrides and Fiji. In the evening of 3 November the American steamer [I]City of Elwood,[/I] 6197 tons, was sighted and stopped by warning shots, but when the raiders' searchlights revealed her name and American markings she was allowed to proceed. On 7 November, ‘having reached the sea lanes Cook Strait-Tahiti-Panama and Auckland-Panama’, the German ships had arrived in their first operational area, about due east of East Cape, and, since they were more than 400 miles from the coast, ‘it was by experience outside the range of enemy aerial reconnaissance’. During daylight hours the three ships cruised in line abreast, at masthead visibility distance apart, the [I]Kulmerland[/I] in the centre acting as guide ship. This disposition gave the raiders a range of vision of from 90 to 100 miles in clear weather. After four days of unsuccessful cruising in poor visibility in the East Cape area the raiders proceeded 300 miles to the southward. This placed them about 530 miles to the eastward of Cape Palliser, ‘so as to concentrate activity on the Wellington route.’ There again the raiders failed to sight any ships, ‘so, assuming that shipping was following a course south of the Chatham group, reconnaissance was transferred there on 20 November.’1 This move took the raiders about 200 miles south-east of the Chathams, where they cruised for four days but sighted no ship. On 24 November they rounded the islands with the intention to proceed direct to Nauru Island, which was to be attacked at dawn on 8 December. That German raiders had already spent nearly three weeks in cruising to the eastward of New Zealand was, of course, not known at that time. The [I]Achilles[/I] arrived at Lyttelton from Campbell Island on 23 November in the expectation that, if operations against an enemy ship eventuated in New Zealand waters, they would be concerned with a raider direct from the Indian Ocean. The armed mechant cruiser [I]Monowai [/I]was to visit the Gilbert and Ellice Groups and, Nauru Island, which lies about 160 miles to the westward of the former. Usually, there were a number of ships loading at or lying off those islands. It remains a matter of conjecture as to what would have happened had the Monowai encountered two raiders in the vicinity of Nauru Island, especially in view of the unfortunate experiences of three armed merchant cruisers in action at different times with a small, fast, well-armed raider in the Atlantic. At eight o'clock in the morning of 25 November the German raiders happened upon the small steamer [I]Holmwood[/I] which had left Waitangi, in the Chatham Islands, at 2.30 a.m. bound for Lyttelton. She was stopped by the [I]Komet[/I], which was disguised as the Japanese ship[I] Manyo Maru[/I]. The passengers and crew, numbering twenty-nine in all and including four women and two children, as well as some hundreds of sheep and stores, were taken off the [I]Holmwood,[/I] after which she was sunk by gunfire. Less than forty-eight hours later, about 450 miles to the northward, the raiders intercepted and sank the New Zealand Shipping Company's motor-liner Rangitane, 16,712 tons. (to be continued)
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Glad to read that you recovered from your "bout" and back in action.I must say Brian -this magnum opus is a remarkable piece of work-more strength to your arm old buddy-KIA KAHA !! jainso32


Brian: Welcome back. You have presented another interesting chapter. Brian


(continued) No radio message was transmitted by the [I]Holmwood[/I] before she was captured and consequently no warning of the presence of enemy raiders east of New Zealand was received. A subsequent commission of inquiry strongly expressed the opinion that, had the sending of a wireless message been attempted, ‘it would probably have reached New Zealand, or if the enemy had attempted to jam the message, this jamming would have been heard in New Zealand. The evidence of Commodore Parry established that the receipt of such a message in New Zealand would have resulted in the recall of the [I]Rangitane[/I] which had left her anchorage off Rangitoto at about 5.30 a.m. that morning. Having regard to the position then existing, it is also clear that the receipt of a message from the [I]Holmwood[/I] would have given the Navy certain advantages in searching for the raiders which did not exist at a later date.’ ‘We are fully aware,’ said the Commission's report, ‘that any attempt to send the message would have brought about the shelling of the [I]Holmwood[/I], and that this might have meant heavy loss of life, including the lives of women and children. But, having regard to the methods of warfare with which we are faced, that consideration is irrelevant. Loss of civilian lives must be faced in an effort to locate and destroy raiders. This should be realised by persons who travel by sea, and by the parents of children who travel by sea; and, lest the cool, prompt judgment of masters be hampered at critical moments, there should, we suggest, be no unnecessary passenger traffic. [I]Rangitane[/I] was fully loaded with frozen meat, dairy produce, wool, and other cargo for the United Kingdom. Her crew numbered about 200 and she was carrying 111 passengers, including 36 women. She was about 300 miles to the eastward of East Cape when, at 3.40 in the morning of 27 November, the raiders were sighted by the lookouts. Captain H. L. Upton, DSC, ADC, RNR, master of the [I]Rangitane[/I], who was promptly on the bridge, at once instructed the wireless office to broadcast the ‘suspicious ship’ message (QQQQ) and if the raiders opened fire (which he expected would happen, as soon as the wireless was used) to send the ‘raider’ message (RRRR). He also ordered ‘utmost speed’ on the engines and warned the engine-room that an attack by raiders was imminent. He made alterations of course to bring his ship stern on to that raider which seemed to be in the best position to open fire. He also ordered the crew of the defensive gun aft to close up and be ready for action. After signalling by morse lamp ordering [I]Rangitane[/I] to stop and not to use her wireless, [I]Orion[/I] switched on a searchlight and both she and the [I]Komet[/I] commenced firing. The[I] Rangitane's [/I]wireless messages were repeated, the first two or three times, and the raider message six or seven times, and all got through to New Zealand. When Captain Upton was informed that the messages had been transmitted, he stopped his ship. The time was then 3.59 a.m., so that only nineteen minutes had elapsed since the raiders were first sighted. They continued firing after the [I]Rangitane[/I] stopped. Captain Upton signalled that there were women on board and shortly afterwards the firing ceased. [I]Rangitane[/I] was badly damaged and well on fire by that time. Five passengers, including three women, were killed and a number wounded, one of the latter, also a woman, dying on board the [I]Orion[/I] the next day. Two stewardesses and three engine-room hands were killed, and five others of the ship's company were wounded. The conduct of the ship's company was exemplary and in keeping with the traditions of the British Merchant Service. They went about their duties calmly and did all that was possible for those in their charge. After the firing had ceased, a German boarding party arrived in a motor-launch and ordered the immediate abandonment of the ship. The sea-cocks were opened and, as soon as the passengers and crew had been taken on board, [I]Komet[/I] sank the [I]Rangitane[/I] by a torpedo. The raiders and their supply ship then steamed away at full speed to the north-east. At this time New Zealand had no idea of the sinkings or what was to come. (to be continued)
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Brian:You have added another interesting chapter to the stories of the raiders but it also appears that the NZ government was ill prepared to deal with the menace. Were there any real new attempts to counter the threat? Brian


Brian -thank you for another fine piece of reporting Echoing Brian's comment-the underlined passages seem contradictory however [B][B]The Rangitane's wireless messages were repeated, the first two or three times, and the raider message six or seven times, and all got through to New Zealand. [/B][/B]When Captain Upton was informed that the messages had been transmitted, he stopped his ship. The time was then 3.59 a.m., so that only nineteen minutes had elapsed since the raiders were first sighted. They continued firing after the Rangitane stopped. Captain Upton signalled that there were women on board and shortly afterwards the firing ceased. Rangitane was badly damaged and well on fire by that time. Five passengers, including three women, were killed and a number wounded, one of the latter, also a woman, dying on board the Orion the next day. Two stewardesses and three engine-room hands were killed, and five others of the ship's company were wounded. The conduct of the ship's company was exemplary and in keeping with the traditions of the British Merchant Service. They went about their duties calmly and did all that was possible for those in their charge. After the firing had ceased, a German boarding party arrived in a motor-launch and ordered the immediate abandonment of the ship. The sea-cocks were opened and, as soon as the passengers and crew had been taken on board, Komet sank the Rangitane by a torpedo. The raiders and their supply ship then steamed away at full speed to the north-east.[B][B] At this time New Zealand had no idea of the sinkings or what was to come.[/B][/B] jainso31


Some recollections of a crew member who was one of the survivors of the attack, by her niece, see:- [B][SIZE="3"]The Attack on the Rangitane [/SIZE]by newcastlecsv[/B] Contributed by newcastlecsv People in story: Judith Colquhoun, Jessie "Janie" Balding Location of story: Emerau Island / New Zealand Background to story: Royal Navy Article ID: A4372562 Contributed on: 06 July 2005 My aunt Janie worked as a ship’s stewardess, and during the war was aboard the liner Rangitane, when it was attacked by a German torpedo in 1940. The passenger numbers were about one hundred, including women, children and many RAF ratings to swell the fighting forces, and a crew of 200 officers and men, and they were 600 miles out from Auckland when it happened. The liner, of the New Zealand shipping company, captain H L Upton, was intercepted and sunk by a German commerce raider from 320m off East Cape New Zealand on Nov 26th 1940. The attack took place at 3.47am and the first intimation of the enemy’s presence came when shells began to fall on the liner, blowing away her bridge and destroying communication with the engine room. This was followed by a torpedo which set the vessel on fire, despite which good discipline was maintained, although many persons had been killed or injured. In the meantime the wireless operator had succeeded in getting through a message, giving the ship’s position before the aerial was destroyed. [B]The abandonment of the liner was conducted in great haste, as the Germans had become aware that aircraft from New Zealand were searching the area, in response to the wireless messages[/B]. Finally, everyone was taken on board the raider and she made off. The survivors spent several weeks aboard the German vessel, before being landed on the small island of Emerau, whence they were rescued later. The total number killed was 16, of whom 6 were passengers. [B]My aunt, Miss Jessie Balding, known to the family as Janie, was one of the survivors, she was a stewardess on the ship and went on to tell us how the Germans were very kind to them, they looked after them on the ship[/B]; it was actually a supply ship that they were put onto which was supplying two other raiders, but they were given medical attention by the raiders, and they found out that the name of the prison ship was Kulmerland; someone had seen that on one of the charts. They had the best of medical equipment, including x-ray apparatus. She saw many of her friends beside her killed by the torpedo, but the survivors were taken off the boat and put into dinghies to be taken over to the other boat. She got severely sunburnt legs, and when she arrived on the German ship they took care of them all very well. I suppose the Germans looked upon it that the survivors were all family belonging to somebody and they were very kind to them, the doctor was in attendance all the time and really busy looking after people. One person needed an amputation and they did their best for them. They were doing their job trying to stop this particular ship loaded with food stuff heading for a British Port. Eventually, when they were due to come off, Captain Upton actually wrote a petition thanking the Germans for their kindness and supplying them with clothing and other luxuries. They were put onto a tropical island, and there were only two white men who lived on the island, the rest were natives. The island was Emirau Island, and it’s in a place called The Admiralty Group, and it’s a few miles south of the equator. It was a copper and timber plantation that these two Australian gentlemen were running — they lived there with their families. Four hundred and ninety five survivors landed on the island. They weren’t on the island very long before they were rescued and sent back to Australia — I can remember my aunt telling me they received a civic welcome in Sydney, so they were taken through the streets with ticket tape and eventually my aunt came back home to Newcastle, I think it would have been about April or May in 1941. There were pieces in the local paper all about her, it was a very interesting story. [B]Source[/B] [URL="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/62/a4372562.shtml"]BBC Home WW2 People's War[/URL] Note; I have highlighted a couple of passages in the text. Little h


.... and an excerpt relating to HMS PURIRI and her involvement:- [B]HMS PURIRI[/B] Author Tonson, A.E. BEFORE WORLD WAR II the Anchor Line twin-screw vessel Puriri, of 927 gross tons, built by Henry Robb Ltd. of Leith and launched on 25th October 1938, was considered as the most modern collier of that time in New Zealand. Accommodation was good, with two-berth cabins for all crew members. She was then engaged as a cargo vessel around the New Zealand coast, but the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 was to change all that and after requisition by the Government in October 1940 she was to become a minesweeper in the then New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. While the vessel was at the Naval Base, Auckland on 27th November 1940, awaiting conversion to a minesweeper, news was received of an early morning attack on the Rangitane, a 17,000-ton vessel owned by the New Zealand Shipping Company Ltd. This ship had a crew of 200, carried 111 passengers and was fully laden with produce for Britain. The news followed the sinking of the Holmwood, two days before. At first came the QQQQ suspicious vessel report, followed immediately by an RRRR raider report as the raiding ships began firing. The attack, by the armed German raiders Orion (Captain Kurt Weyher) and Komet (Rear- Admiral Robert Eyssen) and the tanker supply ship Kulmerland occurred 300 miles east of East Cape. After transmitting the reports the Rangitane was damaged by gunfire and finally sunk by torpedoes after survivors had been transhipped to the raiding vessels, the blazing ship with seacocks opened taking too long to settle and betraying the position of the attacking vessels. Five passengers and five crew, half of them women, were killed by the gunfire and others wounded, another woman passenger dying next day, and it was only after being signalled that women and children were aboard that the raiders ceased fire. The raider Orion, an armed merchant cruiser of 7,000 tons was, like the Komet of 3,300 tons, equipped with six 5.9 inch guns, anti-aircraft guns, torpedo tubes and a seaplane and, having entered the Pacific Ocean via Cape Horn on 21st May 1940, was causing considerable havoc to allied shipping. The vessel travelled 102,000 miles during a voyage lasting seventeen months, sinking or capturing 12½ allied vessels, mostly in the South Pacific. (The Rangitane sinking was shared with Komet.) These were the Haxby, Notou, Turakina, Holmwood, Rangitane, Triaster, Triadic, Triona Vinni, Komata, Ringwood and Tropic Sea. Altogether 228 mines were laid by the Orion off the approaches to the Hauraki Gulf, taking seven hours on the night of 13th June 1940 and, when their presence became known after the sinking of RMS Niagara on 19th June, carrying £2.5 million in gold bullion, the four main ports were immediately closed to shipping. It was 10th September before the gulf area was considered relatively safe, after 131 mines had been destroyed, though mariners were warned to watch for isolated mines. The Orion met up with the Komet and Kulmerland on 18th October 1940 at Lamotrek in the Caroline Islands. However, we will return to the Puriri. Following the raider report from the Rangitane, the Puriri was loaded with blankets, food and survival essentials and despatched at full speed to the scene of the sinking, travelling all night and reaching the area on 28th November 1940. There was little to see, bar an oil slick extending for about nine by two miles, dozens of butter boxes and some red and white lifebelts. [B]The Puriri at this time had a merchant navy captain, and naval personnel aboard were [U]four telegraphists, one being myself[/U], to maintain an around-the-clock listening watch, and one signalman.[/B] While the area was being checked the New Zealand-based light cruiser HMS Achilles turned up, having been sent from Lyttelton, and with the sun behind it immediately flashed out a challenge to ascertain what ship lay ahead. The Puriri had high masts and was probably not unlike a raider from a distance, and she was steaming towards the Achilles. Aboard the Achilles the crews were already closed up at action stations and cheered when it was thought that a raider had been located. Our signalman attempted to flash out a reply to the challenge with his Aldis lamp, but his batteries were flat and no signal was being projected. We saw the 6-inch guns of Achilles swing towards us and expected a shot at any time. The captain, somewhat alarmed, said to the signalman ‘Do something man‘, and the latter asked the captain to turn the ship sideways to provide a good silhouette while he readied flags to run up, which was accomplished to the relief of those aboard. I had served on Achilles in 1939 on a South Pacific Islands cruise, and it was a strange experience being at the wrong end of its guns. All ships had been warned by radio to avoid the position given by the Rangitane by 200 miles to escape attack, and one wonders how the unarmed Puriri would have fared had it encountered the raiders? How these ships escaped from the scene of the sinking and avoided detection by two patrolling flying-boats, by Achilles and its Walrus plane and by Puriri and other ships is difficult to understand, but they did, and the three vessels anchored on 29th November off the Kermadec Islands, 600 miles north-east of New Zealand. One of the two TEAL flyingboats, Awarua and Aotearoa, probably the former, was actually seen from the Orion on the evening of 28th November, but it was not the other way round, so eight armed RNZAF planes on standby at Gisborne were not called to attack. The civilian prisoners carried by the raiders were landed later, on 21st December, on Emirau Island in the Bismarck Archipelago. ..................(article continues) [B]Source[/B][URL="http://rnzncomms.org/ourhistory/hms-puriri/"] RNZN Communicators Association[/URL] Little h


[QUOTE=jainso31;10068314]Brian -thank you for another fine piece of reporting Echoing Brian's comment-the underlined passages seem contradictory however [B][B]The Rangitane's wireless messages were repeated, the first two or three times, and the raider message six or seven times, and all got through to New Zealand. [/B][/B]When Captain Upton was informed that the messages had been transmitted, he stopped his ship. The time was then 3.59 a.m., so that only nineteen minutes had elapsed since the raiders were first sighted. They continued firing after the Rangitane stopped. Captain Upton signalled that there were women on board and shortly afterwards the firing ceased. Rangitane was badly damaged and well on fire by that time. Five passengers, including three women, were killed and a number wounded, one of the latter, also a woman, dying on board the Orion the next day. Two stewardesses and three engine-room hands were killed, and five others of the ship's company were wounded. The conduct of the ship's company was exemplary and in keeping with the traditions of the British Merchant Service. They went about their duties calmly and did all that was possible for those in their charge. After the firing had ceased, a German boarding party arrived in a motor-launch and ordered the immediate abandonment of the ship. The sea-cocks were opened and, as soon as the passengers and crew had been taken on board, Komet sank the Rangitane by a torpedo. The raiders and their supply ship then steamed away at full speed to the north-east.[B][B] At this time New Zealand had no idea of the sinkings or what was to come.[/B][/B] jainso31[/QUOTE] Fair comment ! That should read 'sinking of Holmwood' . Searches were made to look for her. Brian


[QUOTE=Brian Wentzell;10068311]Brian:You have added another interesting chapter to the stories of the raiders but it also appears that the NZ government was ill prepared to deal with the menace. Were there any real new attempts to counter the threat? Brian[/QUOTE] The raider threat was a constant danger taken very seriously by the NZ government. They were tasked with providing troops and supplies for the war effort and food supplies for the UK. These ships were escorted as far as posible. At that stage of the war NZ had only two ships available to use for the raider situation: cruiser [I]'Achilles'[/I] ; armed merchant cruiser '[I]Monowai[/I]'. Admiralty were in charge, NZ ships were 'HMS' , part of the NZ Division of the RN. The official war history covers the dialogue between the NZ government and the Admiralty: for brevity I have not included that in the story. The main task of the two ships was to escort ships when in NZ waters as you can see at :[url]http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Achilles[/url]. Monowai was similarly involved in escorting ships eastwards of NZ. Actions to search for raiders was in fact a deviation from their normal tasking. For aerial searches NZ was obliged to use the flying boats of Tasman Empire Airlines Ltd. (TEAL), the forerunner of Air NZ. Indeed scant resources to cover a huge sea area with dozens of small uninhabited island groups providing likely havens for the raiders. The steaming figures for 'Achilles' are staggering, about 26 days at sea every month with distances up to 10,000 miles per month. Not forgetting the grand contribution of 'Monowai' with similar time at sea. Probably just as well she did not meet up with 'Orion' and ' Komet', but the likelihood was always there. Another important task of the NZ government was the re-roueting of ships. The small percentage of ships sunk by raiders is reflected in the numbers which the raiders spent weeks seeking but never located. I know not what else could be done. Brian


Brian: There does come a point where one, be it an individual or a government, can do no more. Technology was still in its infancy and based mainly on radio intercepts, long range aircraft had not yet arrived in significant numbers, and useful warships were in short supply. The results were recorded as history. Brian


[QUOTE=Brian Wentzell;10068364]Brian: There does come a point where one, be it an individual or a government, can do no more. Technology was still in its infancy and based mainly on radio intercepts, long range aircraft had not yet arrived in significant numbers, and useful warships were in short supply. The results were recorded as history. Brian[/QUOTE] Quite so, the RDF bearings were new technology but could not provide accurate bearings and often confused the situation. I wonder whether the reciprocal bearings were instrument or operator error ? One can smile these days at the thought that the only long range aircraft had to be borrowed from the airline. There is no doubt that the raiders were a constant threat just being in the area. Brian


Thanks Harry for a confirming report from author Tonson. Well spotted Brian


Thanks Harry for the lady's story from Peoples War. You always seem to be able to find new treasure ! Well done indeed ! Brian


(continued) When the Rangitane's radio messages were received in Navy Office, Wellington, Achilles at Lyttelton was ordered to raise steam with all despatch. Monowai on passage from Suva for Nauru Island was instructed to return to Suva to complete with fuel-oil. All inward-bound merchant ships were warned to avoid the area of attack by at least 200 miles. No merchant vessel was due to sail to the eastward from New Zealand on 27 November. The Tasman Airways flying boats were ordered to be fuelled and ready for reconnaissance duties as soon as possible. Eight aircraft of the Royal Air Force were sent to Gisborne airfield to be ready at a quarter of an hour's notice as a striking force. Achilles sailed from Lyttelton at 8 a.m. and steamed at 25 knots towards the point of attack. HMS Puriri, which was at Auckland undergoing conversion to a minesweeper, was ordered to sea. Though her engines were partly dismantled, she was quickly got ready and sailed that evening. The flying boats Awarua and Aotearoa carried out an extensive searches up to their maximum endurance with the point of attack as centre, assuming that the enemy had left that position at 4 a.m., steaming at 15 knots on any course. It was unfortunate that the aircraft did not sight any of the three German ships. Had it done so it would have afforded a definite clue to the approximate position and course of the raiders for Achilles, which was coming up from Lyttelton at high speed and which, with the assistance of the flying boats, might well have intercepted the enemy during the following day. Against this it can said that, had the aircraft sighted any of the German ships and reported the fact by wireless, they might have dispersed, though their relatively low speed would not have taken them beyond the range of the flying boats by the time the Achilles could arrive in the area. At 4 a.m. on 28 November Achilles catapulted her Walrus aircraft, which made a reconnaissance flight of two hours but sighted nothing. At 10.30 a.m. the cruiser sighted the flying boat Awarua who reported seeing a large patch of oil and several very small floating objects at the point of attack. Achilles arrived at one o'clock in the afternoon at the leeward end of the oil patch which extended for nine miles to the southward from the point of attack. She steamed to the other end of the oil and sighted one red and white lifebuoy and a number of boxes of butter, two of which were recovered. No wreckage or boats were seen. Achilles then proceeded to patrol to the north and north-east to give the maximum cover to shipping during the night, returning to the position of attack before daybreak and then searching to the westward. In the forenoon of 29 November. Achilles met the Puriri, which had nothing to report and was ordered to return to Auckland. The cruiser continued her search for possible survivors of the Rangitane until dusk, when she steamed towards North Cape, patrolling the approaches to Auckland. By that time the raiders and their supply ship were well away to the northward. Early in the morning of 29 November they arrived off the Kermadec Islands. There, while the commanding officers of the Orion and Komet discussed their proposed attack on Nauru Island, the prisoners were more evenly distributed in the three ships, the thirty-nine women and five children being accommodated in the Kulmerland. The Monowai, which had left Suva on 30 November, looked in at the Kermadecs on her way to Auckland but sighted nothing suspicious. By this time the raiders had moved well away to the north-westward after crossing the Monowai's track. But they were to return. (to be continued)
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Another magnificent episode Brian-an extremely interesting story,full of detail-I commend your effort. jainso31


[QUOTE=jainso31;10068886]Another magnificent episode Brian-an extremely interesting story,full of detail-I commend your effort. jainso31[/QUOTE] Thank you Jim, much appreciated. All started as just an idea but then the story developed as I read more. I am glad you like it. Brian


When "Achilles" visited the Auckland Is in Sep-Oct 1939, wasn't "Erlangen" holed up in one of the coves of Carnley Harbour? IIRC, SD Waters' official history of the RNZN in WW2 contains something to this effect. Or, possibly, Jack Harker's account of "Achilles" does so?


[QUOTE=fisher44;10068987]When "Achilles" visited the Auckland Is in Sep-Oct 1939, wasn't "Erlangen" holed up in one of the coves of Carnley Harbour? IIRC, SD Waters' official history of the RNZN in WW2 contains something to this effect. Or, possibly, Jack Harker's account of "Achilles" does so?[/QUOTE] Short answer is I will have to look it up. Brian


[QUOTE=Old Salt;10069082]Short answer is I will have to look it up. Brian[/QUOTE] [I]Achilles[/I] headed off for South America, so it was not her. It was in fact [I]Leander [/I] :QUOTE: Next morning the Leander anchored in Port Ross, or Sarah's Bosom-harbour, on the north-east coast of the Auckland Islands. After inspecting this locality she steamed along the east side of the main island and lay-to two miles to seaward of the entrance to Carnley harbour in a gale, with visibility of about six miles between the rain squalls. Nothing suspicious was seen in the eastern end of Carnley harbour or in the inlets further up the coast. The Leander returned to Wellington on 1 October There is little doubt, however, that the German steamer Erlangen, 6100 tons, was lying in a remote anchorage in Carnley harbour at the time the Leander made her first visit to the Auckland Islands [U]Title: The Royal New Zealand Navy Author: Waters, S. D. [/U] QUOTE: On 26th August 1939 the German steamer [I]Erlangen[/I] of 6101 tons slipped unobtrusively from her berth at Dunedin, ostensibly bound for Port Kembla to coal. It was fairly obvious at the time that war with Germany was imminent, and considerable interest had centred round the activities of this ship. Her master, Captain Alfred Grams, was in a dilemma, as although he had about 175 tons of coal in the bunkers that amount would soon be exhausted, and in the absence of instructions from his owners he decided to proceed to Port Kembla. But the Erlangen did not arrive at Port Kembla, and her probable movements were causing some speculation amongst those interested enough to wonder what had become of her. Some months later news was received that she had arrived at Santiago under sail. However, this explanation was not accepted without reservations, and it was suspected that additional fuel was obtained from another source. In some quarters it was thought possible that she might have obtained a supply of firewood from the Auckland Islands, one of the groups of sub-Antarctic islands lying to the south of New Zealand, and which were known to be partially forested. Further cause for suspicion was soon forthcoming in connection with the activities of the Erlangen, as a considerable area of recently felled bush was discovered in the north arm of Carnley Harbour, near what is known as Round Point. The work had been done unobtrusively. From the sea there was no sign of anything having been touched, but from the hills the denuded area was readily visible. Tools with German markings made it seem even more likely that the Erlangen was responsible. Confirmation of the theory eventually came from Captain Grams himself, who reported that after leaving Dunedin, New Zealand, he abandoned the idea of making for Australia, and decided to call at the Auckland Islands to await developments. Upon seeing the extent of the forest of rata he conceived the plan of utilizing it for fuel to take his ship to a neutral port. Difficulties soon arose, especially over the matter of getting the wood on board ship. Finally he decided to risk beaching the Erlangen, and by working long hours his crew managed to cut and load 20-25 tons of wood daily. In the meantime the chief officer and the Chinese quartermasters made two sails out of tarpaulins, and rigged the masts with yard-arms improvised from derricks. The long voyage to Chile was eventually accomplished, although not without incident. Fuel became so short that many of the ship's wooden fittings were fed into the furnaces, and food was in very short supply. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the exploit amply demonstrated the resourcefulness of Captain Grams UNQUOTE [U]Title: Islands of Despair Author: Allan W. Eden[/U]
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(continued) At that time still nothing was known in New Zealand of the fate of the [I]Holmwood[/I] which was reported as being forty-eight hours overdue at Lyttelton on 29 November. HMS [I]Muritai[/I], ex-ferry, sailed from Wellington to carry out a search. With only two 1914 vintage twin Lewis guns mounted, she updated her position hourly on a three part signal awaiting transmission should one of the messages apply : (1) “ Have sighted suspicious vessel in position ……………..” (2) “ Am under fire in position ……………” (3) “Am sinking in position …………. The flying boat [I]Awarua [/I]made two flights from Auckland to the Chatham Islands and two RNZAF aircraft from Christchurch flew a parallel track search for a distance of 120 miles to the eastward from Lyttelton. Nothing as sighted by the aircraft or by the [I]Muritai,[/I] which returned to Wellington on 1 December. The sinking of the [I]Rangitane [/I]and [I]Holmwood[/I], following at intervals of some months the loss of the [I]Niagara [/I]and [I]Turakina, [/I]caused much anxiety and misgiving in New Zealand and gave rise to many rumours concerning the raiders and allegations that, by some means, they were being supplied with information about the movements of shipping. When the survivors of ships sunk in New Zealand waters and at Nauru Island returned to Australia and the Dominion in January 1941, statements made by them to the newspapers intensified the public suspicion that there had been leakages of information to the raiders. The New Zealand Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry which heard voluminous evidence from thirty-one survivors from sunken ships and fifty-nine other witnesses and carefully examined the whole of the numerous written statements made and signed by survivors after they reached New Zealand. According to the master of the Rangitane and Holmwood, and other witnesses, the Germans had claimed that they knew the times at which ships left New Zealand and Australia, that they met the Rangitane by design and not by accident, and that they possessed information which enabled them to intercept her. All this was believed by many of the survivors from the captured ship. The Commission in its report found that ‘having regard to the amount of traffic from New Zealand the actual successes of the raiders in the Pacific over a period of months do not appear consistent with their having had any such information. If he really had such complete and regular information, it does not seem probable that he would reveal the fact or, alternatively, that he would afterwards release the persons to whom he had made such revelations. The statements attributed to him seem to us to be more likely part of an attempt to impress his captives, and, through them, to disseminate uneasiness and distrust in New Zealand, or they may have been manifestations of boastfulness and of a taste for melodrama. The accounts which Captains Miller and Upton gave of their interviews with this German commander create the impression that he took a good deal of trouble to impress them with his cleverness and his omniscience. Several witnesses informed the Commission that some twenty-eight Polish seamen and women, discharged from a ship of that nationality, who were passengers in the [I]Rangitane[/I], were interrogated in German and appeared to become friendly with their captors. ‘There was thus available to the Germans,’ said the Commission's report, ‘an obvious source from which they may have obtained information as to the movements of the Rangitane from the time she left the Auckland wharf, even if they did not succeed in getting this from unguarded remarks made by British captives in casual conversation. …’ In general, the Commission of Inquiry found that, while there had been much careless talk about ships in New Zealand, there was no proof of any leakage of information to the German raiders. Neither was there any evidence that any person had, in fact, acted as an enemy agent, but the Commission did not think it followed that the possibility of such a happening could be dismissed. Since the war the German records of the cruises of the several raiders have become available. These include the official war diaries of the [I]Orion [/I]and[I] Komet[/I], and a very detailed narrative of his operations, compiled in July 1945, by Rear-Admiral Kurt Weyher, who was commanding officer of the [I]Orion.[/I] These make it abundantly clear that neither he nor Rear-Admiral Robert Eyssen, commanding officer of the[I] Komet[/I], had any fore-knowledge of the wartime movements of New Zealand shipping other than that certain general routes were followed; and that the interceptions of the[I] Turakina, [/I][I]Holmwood[/I], and [I]Rangitane[/I] were entirely fortuitous. ( to be continued)


Regarding the German steamer Erlangen I have a recollection of a 1955 WW2 movie "The Sea Chase"starring John Wayne and Lana Turner. Wayne plays the part of the Master of the Ergenstrasse Captain Erlich which calls at the Auckland Islands to obtain firewood for fuel.A good old Hollywood swashhbuckler. Regards to all,Geoff


I am thoroughly enjoying this thread Brian ... please keep the posts coming!


[QUOTE=Scatari;10069305]I am thoroughly enjoying this thread Brian ... please keep the posts coming![/QUOTE] Thanks for the encouragement ! There are still dramas to come !!. Brian


Thanks for clarifying that matter. "Leander" seemed to get all the gash jobs didn't she?


[QUOTE=fisher44;10069540]Thanks for clarifying that matter. "Leander" seemed to get all the gash jobs didn't she?[/QUOTE] I have never thought of that. If you put the two war histories alongside each other, they both seem to have been worked hard on similar duties [url]http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Achilles.htm#convoy[/url] [url]http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CL-Leander.htm#convoy[/url] Brian


(continued) The two raiders and their supply ship carried out an intensive patrol of the trade routes east of New Zealand from 6 to 24 November without success. They were actually leaving the area when they happened first upon the [I]Holmwood[/I] and, two days later, upon the [I]Rangitane[/I]. Yet, during that period of three weeks, eleven large ships had arrived at Auckland and Wellington from the Panama Canal and seven had left for Balboa; while seven vessels had arrived from and five had sailed for the South Sea Islands and North America. In other words, the raiders intercepted only the Rangitane out of thirty overseas ships which passed through the area searched by them. That the raiders had not the slightest idea of the identity of the [I]Rangitane [/I]when they met her in the darkness of early morning is clearly shown in Rear-Admiral Weyher's narrative. ‘Whether this ship was proceeding to the east or west could not at first be made out,’ he wrote. ‘The size of the ship made me first suppose I had to do with a bigger warship, which, as was found out later on, had also been the idea on the auxiliary cruiser[I] Komet. [/I]… Even under the impression to have come across a much more powerful man-of-war, I could not, on account of low speed, get my auxiliary cruiser [[I]Orion[/I]] away unseen. It had to be assumed that the supposed warship would have sighted at least one of the three [German] ships. To leave unnoticed and escape was, therefore, on account of the approach of dawn, most improbable. Accordingly I decided to attack, especially because I could use the gunnery of the [I]Komet[/I] assisting me; so that, even at own loss [sic] I could at least expect to damage the opponent and, by holding him, give one of the other ships the chance to escape.’ After the preliminary manoeuvres of the raiders, Weyher says: ‘Meanwhile it had been possible to recognise the vessel as a big two-funnel ship, on an easterly course ‘ [I]Achilles[/I] arrived at Auckland from her patrol at three o'clock in the morning of 1 December and completed with fuel-oil. During the month of November she spent twenty-three days at sea and steamed 6161 miles. The cruiser sailed in the afternoon resuming duties of escorting troopships and other major ships to and fro across the Tasman and South Pacific. Another raider alarm was given next morning when Auckland wireless station intercepted an RRRR message from the Union Steam Ship Company's motor-vessel Karitane, which gave her position as approximately midway between Tasmania and New Zealand. The flying boat Aotearoa took off from Auckland during the forenoon and the Achilles sailed from Wellington at 2 p.m. to carry out a search for the reported raider. Navy Office, Melbourne, informed Navy Office, Wellington, that the Adelaide was not available, but a search by aircraft had been ordered, with instructions to attack any ship sighted within 200 miles of the Karitane's given position, except the Dutch tanker Nederland, 8150 tons. In reply to a query Navy Office, Wellington, said no other vessel was known to be in the area. At about the time Achilles left Wellington the master of the Karitane reported that he had sighted a large tanker which was behaving ‘very suspiciously’ and heading west when last seen. Navy Office, Wellington, informed Melbourne that the vessel sighted resembled the Nederland. The flying boat was recalled to Auckland and Achilles cancelled her proposed search. At that time the German raiders were actually more than 2500 miles away to the northward of New Zealand, intending to strike a resounding blow at Nauru Island shipping. Leaving the Kermadec Islands at the end of November, they steamed to the north-west and passed between New Caledonia and the New Hebrides and south-east of the Solomon Islands. According to the war diary of the Komet, their intention was ‘to destroy the phosphate works, the harbour installations and the wireless station’ on Nauru Island. This was to be carried out by a landing party of 185 men from the Orion and Komet, which were also to furnish ‘prize detachments to take over any ships lying at the buoys.’ (to be continued)
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(continued) At that time seventeen vessels were regularly employed in carrying phosphates from Nauru and Ocean Islands, mainly to Australia and New Zealand. The annual exports of well over 1,250,000 tons, including shipments to the United Kingdom, Japan, and elsewhere, involved the loading of more than 150 cargoes in twelve months. During periods of unfavourable weather it was sometimes necessary for the ships to drift for a fortnight or more in the vicinity of the islands until conditions became suitable for mooring and loading. At times there were as many as ten ships waiting to load at Nauru and Ocean Islands, where they were fairly easy prey for enemy raiders. And because of urgent needs elsewhere, it was not considered possible for either New Zealand or Australia to spare a cruiser to patrol that distant area. The risk of enemy attack had to be accepted. On 6 December whilst a day's steaming from Nauru Island, [I]Orion[/I] and[I] Komet [/I]intercepted and attacked the specialised phosphate carrier[I] Triona[/I], 4413 tons, on passage from Melbourne and Newcastle. The crew, originally sixty-four men, of whom three were killed, and the passengers, six women and a child, were taken on board the [I]Orion[/I] and [I]Kulmerland[/I]. The two raiders sank the [I]Triona[/I] with torpedoes. Next day the chartered Norwegian motor-vessel [I]Vinni[/I], 5181 tons, was found drifting off Nauru Island waiting for an opportunity to load. She was captured by [I]Komet[/I], whose boarding party took prisoner her crew of thirty-two and sank her with demolition charges. In view of the adverse weather conditions – a strong westerly wind was blowing and a heavy sea running, with considerable surf close inshore – the commanding officers of the raiders decided, after a discussion, that the proposed landing operation was not practicable. On 8 December the steamer [I]Komata[/I], 3900 tons was also found drifting. When her wireless officer tried to send the ‘suspicious vessel’ signal, it was jammed by the enemy and he then attempted to transmit the ‘raider’ message. Komet opened fire at close range, one shell putting the transmitter out of action and another carrying away the main aerial. The Chief Officer was killed and the Second Officer mortally wounded. Captain W. W. Fish and several of his men were slightly wounded. In the meantime Orion had intercepted and sunk the speciallly designed phosphate motor-vessels[I] Triadic[/I], 6378 tons, and[I] Triaster[/I], 6032 tons, within a few miles of Nauru Island. There were now 675 prisoners in the German ships – 265 in [I] Orion[/I], 153 in [I] Komet[/I], and 257, including 52 women and 6 children, in the[I] Kulmerland.[/I] The raiders did not visit Ocean Island, 160 miles to the eastward of Nauru, or they might have found the steamer [I]Silksworth[/I] which had been drifting there for some days waiting a chance to load. She and the steamer [I]Kaikorai[/I], which was on passage to Nauru Island, were subsequently ordered by wireless to return to Suva. [I]Komet[/I] refuelled from the [I]Kulmerland[/I] in the Marshall Islands on 12–13 December, while [I]Orion[/I] cruised in the direction of the Caroline Islands. The three ships reassembled on 15 December about 250 miles north of Nauru Island. A plan to land the prisoners there and shell the phosphates plant was abandoned and the Germans steamed to Emirau Island, in the Bismarck Archipelago, where they arrived on 21 December. While the prisoners were being disembarked there, [I]Orion[/I] took in the 1100 tons of fuel-oil remaining in[I] Kulmerland[/I] . The raiders landed 343 Europeans and 171 Chinese and natives. Weyher refused to release any European prisoners from the Orion, as he held that ‘trained officers and crews are as much a problem for Britain as shipping itself.’ Unknown to the raiders there were two white planters and their families on the island who did everything possible for the castaways. They sent natives in a canoe to Mussau Island, 15 miles away, for a motor-launch in which a party went to Kavieng, New Ireland, for assistance. On 24 December the schoone[I] Leander[/I] arrived with food and other stores and a doctor with medical supplies. The Administrator of New Britain also arrived from Rabaul in a flying boat, bringing still more supplies. The steamer [I]Nellore[/I] was diverted from Rabaul to Emirau Island, where she embarked the stranded people on 29 December. The overcrowded ship arrived on 1 January 1941 at Townsville, whence special trains took her passengers on to Brisbane and Sydney. The Australian and New Zealand Governments had made elaborate plans for the well-being and repatriation of all those who had suffered so trying an experience. After leaving Emirau Island, the German ships parted company. The [I]Kulmerland[/I] went to Japan,[I] Orion[/I] steamed north and met the tanker[I] Ole Jacob[/I], 8300 tons, and the German motor-ship [I]Regensburg,[/I] 8000 tons, with supplies of fuel and stores from Japan. The three ships arrived on 31 December at Lamotrek, in the Caroline Islands. [I] Orion[/I], which had been under steam for 268 days and had covered 65,327 miles since leaving Germany, started an overhaul of her engines and boilers. Both Captain Weyher of the Orion and Captain Eyssen of the Komet were much perturbed when they learned from wireless reports that their former prisoners had been found and released from Emirau Island. Weyher had all along opposed the landing of prisoners, but had been overruled by Eyssen, who was the senior officer and regarded them as an encumbrance. In his war diary Eyssen recorded that ‘had he been able to foresee the repercussions of his putting white prisoners ashore’, he ‘would have acted differently.’ Their early return to Australia and New Zealand ‘meant that the enemy was now in possession of not only a description of the two raiders and the routes and tactics used on previous operations, but also that he was aware that German ships could read the [British] Merchant Navy code.’ On 19 February 1941, after a study of the war diaries of the two raiders, the German Naval Staff issued a directive to ‘all ships outside home waters’ that the practice of putting prisoners ashore ‘is not to be condoned’, and that ‘wherever possible, they should be sent back to Germany for internment.’ The German raiders were now intent on carrying out what would be their greatest success in the Pacific. (to be continued) Photos :NZETC
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Brian: This thread just keeps getting better and better ... please keep the posts coming!


Great post. I grew up on Nuguria Islands (far eastern edge of your map). My grandfather, a survivor from the western front in WW1, purchased the property from the reparation board after WWI, an ex German plantation. My grandfather was interned in Rabaul after the Japanese occupied in early 42 and perished in the Montivideo Maru, Australia's greatest maritime tradgedy but that's a different story.


Brian, just to say I am continuing to enjoy this most informative and entertaining story, and looking forward to more.


Well, thank you gents for your words of encouragement. Not a patch on what was going on elsewhere in the world with the big ships, but an interesting story of a very different form of warfare played out over a long period. Brian


Great read Brian..my memory is fading further..do you know who the German Captain was who was interned on Motuihe Island (Former HMNZS Tamaki)..As a Seamen Boy on 'the rock' I can recall him being part of the local folklore!..cannot recall whether it was WW1 or WWII...Regards Br ian


[QUOTE=brian james;10070305]Great read Brian..my memory is fading further..do you know who [B]the German Captain was who was interned on Motuihe Island [/B](Former HMNZS Tamaki)..As a Seamen Boy on 'the rock' I can recall him being part of the local folklore!..cannot recall whether it was WW1 or WWII...Regards Br ian[/QUOTE] Count Felix von Luckner, CO of the WWI German raider [B]Seeadler[/B]


[QUOTE=brian james;10070305]Great read Brian..my memory is fading further..do you know who the German Captain was who was interned on Motuihe Island (Former HMNZS Tamaki)..As a Seamen Boy on 'the rock' I can recall him being part of the local folklore!..cannot recall whether it was WW1 or WWII...Regards Br ian[/QUOTE] That was Count Felix von Luckner of the German raider [I]Seeadler[/I]. A fascinating story of his capture, confinement, escape, recapture and further confinement. I intend recounting that story after 'Raiders'. Brian
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[QUOTE=Old Salt;10070321]That was Count Felix von Luckner of the German raider [I]Seeadler[/I]. A fascinating story of his capture, confinement, escape, recapture and further confinement. I intend recounting that story after 'Raiders'. Brian[/QUOTE] A wee bit off topic Brian but your mention of Seeadler reminds us of the largest naval base in the SW Pacific during WW2, Seeadler Harbour, Manus Island [URL="http://navy.memorieshop.com/Adair/Cruise-Book/Manus.html"]http://navy.memorieshop.com/Adair/Cruise-Book/Manus.html[/URL] Cheers Chris


Scatari and Brian...thank you both....that jogs the ol' cells...also on the 'Rock' was an old cemetary..from memory... a few shipwrecks and I think Quarantine victims were buried there...Looking forward to more of your engrossing stories Brian......Regards to all...Brian


[QUOTE=ASSAIL;10070327]A wee bit off topic Brian but your mention of Seeadler reminds us of the largest naval base in the SW Pacific during WW2, Seeadler Harbour, Manus Island [URL="http://navy.memorieshop.com/Adair/Cruise-Book/Manus.html"]http://navy.memorieshop.com/Adair/Cruise-Book/Manus.html[/URL] Cheers Chris[/QUOTE] Thanks for that, Chris: whilst knowing Manus Island was a base, I did not know it was called Seeadler Harbour. Every day I learn something new from reading this Forum, the members have such a wide range of knowledge. Brian


(continued) [I]Komet[/I] arrived off Rabaul during the night of 23 December 1941 with the intention of laying mines in the fairway The failure of the fast motor-launch [I]Meteorit[/I]’s port engine caused the operation to be abandoned. [I]Komet [/I]then steamed to Nauru Island, where, in the early morning of 27 December, she bombarded and wrecked the phosphates plant, including the great cantilever loading structure and the oil storage tanks. The raider then made off in the direction of the Gilbert Islands, north of which ‘she chased a Norwegian ship for four hours on 31 December, but without success’. The German Naval Attaché, Tokyo, reported to the naval staff in Berlin that the ‘Japanese Navy were annoyed about the bombardment of Nauru as this has interfered with its phosphates consignments. Collaboration is threatened; possible restriction of Japanese aid’. The Naval Attaché recommended ‘avoiding operations of this type near the Mandated area.’ The German Naval Staff considered that the bombardment of Nauru Island was outside the scope of the Komet's operation orders and ‘could not, therefore, approve of it, though recognising that, as an isolated case, it had been a success.’ About 200 shells had been fired at the shipping plant and fuel-oil storage, besides hundreds of rounds of armour-piercing and incendiary bullets. One of the concrete foundations of the loading cantilever was so damaged that apparently another shell would have brought the whole structure down on the reef. Of the three sets of main moorings holed by armour-piercing bullets, two of the large buoys were saved by the four-watertight-compartment construction. The oil storage tanks and about 13,000 tons of oil were destroyed and the blazing oil spread in all directions. The 12,000-ton shore bin of the cantilever suffered badly as the blazing oil made the heavy steel supporting columns white hot and they collapsed. The German raiders' attacks on Nauru Island and its shipping were, in effect, their greatest success in the Pacific, since they seriously affected the volume and continuity of the supplies of phosphates to New Zealand, Australia and Britain. The sinking of five ships totalling 25,900 tons, including three specially designed steamers was a heavy blow in view of the increasing shortage of tonnage and the consequent difficulty of chartering suitable vessels. But far worse was the economic effect of the drastic reduction in the available supplies of Nauru phosphates. It was ten weeks after the bombardment before shipments from Nauru Island were resumed, the loading of the first cargo starting on 6 March 1941. The bombardment damage and a long period of bad weather reduced shipments in 1941 to be well short of the annual estimate; to supplement Nauru and Ocean Islands' shipments of phosphates the British Government refrained from drawing supplies for the U.K from those islands. New Zealand and Australia were given preference up to 120,000 tons from Makatea Island in the Pacific and 100,000 tons from Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean. Supplies from those sources were relatively small because of the shortage of shipping tonnage,; several ships chartered to bring phosphates from Egypt to New Zealand were requisitioned for urgent war purposes. In July 1941 New Zealand farmers were on a ration for fertilisers, based on a total annual importation of some 200,000 tons of phosphate rock. The raiders could therefore be well pleased at the long term results of their attack on Nauru as they moved northwards to evade detection. [I]Note: Supplies of phosphates from Nauru and Ocean Islands were to cease entirely when those islands were occupied by the Japanese in 1942[/I] (to be continued)


Brian: This is a most interesting account. The Germans must have had a decent understanding of the importance of Nauru to the NZ economy and overall war effort. Such a bold attack would certainly turn up the "heat" on the raiders and reduce the likelhood of continued operations in the Eastern Australia-New Zealand area. Brian




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