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The Loss of the MV Derbyshire World Naval Ships Forums Archive

The Loss of the MV Derbyshire

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© Crown Copyright/MoD (1998). [COLOR="Red"][SIZE="3"]THE LOSS OF THE 'DERBYSHIRE'[/SIZE][/COLOR] [SIZE="3"]A REPORT[/SIZE] BY EUR ING David K. BROWN, RCNC Fig1[ATTACH]123821[/ATTACH] [U]Introduction[/U] The Derbyshire (FIG. 1) disappeared in Typhoon ORCHID during September 1980 with the loss of 44 lives. An inquiry was finally held in 1989 which found that she was 'overwhelmed by the forces of nature' and that the evidence did not support any further conclusion. In May 1994 an expedition, funded by the International Transport Workers Federation, located the ship's remains (FIG. 2) 400 miles east of Okinawa in 4,200 metres of water and obtained some pictures. Lord DONALDSON then carried out an assessment assisted by PROFESSORF AIJLKNER RCNC and Mr WILLIAMS. They recommended that a further expedition be carried out which was accomplished in two phases; an exploratory visit in July 1996 and a detailed survey in March and April 1997. The survey was carried out by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution using the Washington University's ship Thomas G. Thompson. They returned with 135,774 individual images which identified: 100% of the keel line 85% of the port side and deck plating 80% of that on the starboard side. The bow and stem sections were recorded. A crucial set of observations was of 13 complete hatch covers and most pieces of the remaining 5 covers. This survey was largely funded by the European Union who were represented by a third assessor, Remo TORCHIO. Fig2[ATTACH]123822[/ATTACH] [U]The Scenario[/U] Study of the evidence gave what seems overwhelming support for the following scenario. As the typhoon approached the Master steamed slowly into the storm keeping the seas on the starboard bow. Green seas were breaking over the bow and the small hatch to the bosun's store, which had not been properly secured, carried away (FIG. 3). Within an hour this space flooded slightly reducing her already barely adequate freeboard of 7.5 metres. At about the same time three ventilators to the fore peak tank carried away allowing the tank to flood over some 12 hours (FIGS. 4&5). This would have let in about 1000 tons of water and trimmed her 2.5m by the bow. In a typhoon, at night, this would not have been noticed on the bridge. Figs3,4,5[ATTACH]123823[/ATTACH][ATTACH]123824[/ATTACH][ATTACH]123825[/ATTACH] Waves some 25m high were now sweeping the fore deck and at some time an abnormally large wave or group of waves crashed down on the cover to No l hold. This was designed to withstand l.75m head of water and crumpled under a head of some 10-14m letting some 10,000 tons of water into the hold (FIG. 6). Almost instantaneously, No 2 cover failed in the same way (FIG. 7). The ship just drove on down, the final phase lasting about 2 minutes, accounting for the failure to send a Mayday message. Figs 6,7[ATTACH]123826[/ATTACH][ATTACH]123827[/ATTACH] As she went down, the voids between the inner and outer skin imploded (FIG. g), with great violence, due to the external pressure, at a depth of between 25m and 100m-it was estimated that the total energy release was of the same order as 17 tons of TNT. This has completely shattered the whole cargo section which failed in brittle mode. The stern section seems largely to have flooded on the surface though some tanks and voids imploded. The evidence for this scenario is very strong and too lengthy to give in full in a short article. The principal points which clearly show in photos are the missing store hatch and the position of the toggles which show it was not secured. The holes left by the missing ventilators are clearly seen whilst the fact that the bow is fairly intact shows it was flooded on the surface (FIG. 9). (It hit the bottom hard-30 to 40 knots-and the bottom is crushed by impact.) The damaged hatch covers make the cause of the final sinking very clear. Figs 8;9;10[ATTACH]123828[/ATTACH][ATTACH]123829[/ATTACH][ATTACH]123830[/ATTACH] [U]Other scenarios[/U] Collapse of the main hull structures at bulkhead 65, the fore end of the engine room has often been postulated. This appears relatively undamaged but the voids either side have imploded (FIG. 10) showing that the structure in this area was substantially intact as she plunged. At the time of Lord DONALDSON's assessment there were 13 possible scenarios plus the 14th-the 'Unforeseen'. None of the others can explain the state of the wreckage as it lies. This was the largest Marine Forensic investigation ever held and reflects great credit on all those involved. [U]The Way Ahead[/U] John PRESCOTT has announced that the formal inquiry will be re-opened. The assessors list a considerable number of design changes which are being put to IMO. The most important is the need for a formal safety assessment of each new ship taking into account the possibility of meeting abnormal seas. This leads to a requirement for stronger hatch covers and more freeboard combined with strong, high breakwaters. They also recommend that all bulk carriers should be of double hull construction. The crew should have safe access to the bow in any weather. The illustrated summary report (23 pages) can be obtained from HMSO at £10 (IBSN 1-85 1 12-075-0), whilst the full report is unlikely to be a best seller at £180!
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[B][SIZE="3"]THE MV DERBYSHIRE[/SIZE][/B] [B]PROLOGUE[/B] We know much of this paper will find agreement with the Derbyshire Family Association: we hope all of it will. But it is the sole work and responsibility of Paul Lambert (Chairman of the Derbyshire Family Association) and Dave Ramwell (Captain), and it must not be taken as necessarily reflecting the views of any other party. [B]SAFETY FIRST - COMMERCE SECOND[/B] [B]INTRODUCTION[/B] The "Derbyshire", an oil/bulk/ore (OBO) ship, loaded with 150,000 tons of iron ore and carrying 44 persons, disap peared in a typhoon she should have shrugged off with ease - and so quickly that not even a distress signal escaped. [B]BACKGROUND[/B] "Derbyshire" was supposedly well found, classed to highest standard and barely four years old. (In terms of working life, three, as she had been laid up at Stavanger for a year). Her crew consisted of competent, qualified men, she was fined with the latest navigational equipment and all her papers were in order. News other loss in September 1980 prompted an instinctive reaction from seafarers : "She's too big to disappear ......." Indeed, when nine year old "Mineral Diamond" disappeared in uncannily similar circumstances 11 years on, the subsequent inquiry, instituted by the Hong Kong Director of Marine, concluded: "...... it seems most likely that a major structural failure of her hull, which resulted in her breaking in two, is the cause of her sinking ....." Events following the severe cracking of sistership, "Tyne Bridge", in 1982 were to prove "Derbyshire" and all her sisters were weak just forward of the accommodation superstructure, and in all but the first of the six ship series extemporaneous construction methods in the region of frame 65 introduced a potentially fatal flaw. The UK Department of Transport recognised this in its first report after preliminary investigation of the loss of the "Derbyshire" conducted in 1985. The report was changed in 1986 to blame the weather. Parties who perceived possible compromise of their position in the 1985 version, were happier with the second - not surprising when it is known their input led to the change. The only ill built and un-restored "Derbyshire" sister, in a collapsing and abandoned state, collided with Southern Ireland and, in doing so, precipitated the Formal Investigation of the loss of "Derbyshire" over six years earlier. [B]FORMAL INVESTIGATION[/B] Hopes, by those who lost loved ones in "Derbyshire", that the Formal Investigation would deliver the truth at last, were dashed when, by ignoring or trivialising the history of the damage throughout the fleet, and by failing to call crucial witnesses, the Court nursed ''Lost in Bad Weather" over the finishing line well ahead of all other runners. But the whitewash was at least blatant enough to excite the anger of others who, like most of the families^ knew they had just witnessed a cover-up. A formidable team, formed almost spontaneously by a shared burning desire for justice, joined forces with the Derbyshire Family Association. Together they forced a review of the Formal Investigation, captured the interest of the media (investigative programmes were broadcast on national stations, both TV and radio), wrote a book on the case, published articles, initiated questions and debates in both Houses of Parliament, and, most crucially, stemming from the initiative of Shaun Kent, working with John Jubb, located the wreck of the "Derbyshire" 2.8 miles deep. The DFA and its helpers provided the wherewithal to find "Derbyshire" when others said it could not be done. In searching the wider bulk carrier scene for any corroborative general evidence it was inevitable that this team would stumble on "the bulker problem"; it was too big to miss. Put simply the problem is: most bulk carriers are not strong enough to do the job for which they were built over the lifetime that was originally projected for them. Hundreds of seafarers have lost their lives as a result. It is being argued by some that, regrettable as the losses are, the problem cannot be cured quickly. We, the two authors of this paper present the wherewithal to show that it can. The "Derbyshire" is a separate case covered by separate argument; she was a new ship and only carried the ageing bulker problem in embryo. But our knowledge of the unacceptable toll of life, and our awareness that, through a profile raised by the "Derbyshire", we can make an impression, emboldens us - indeed, we feel, leaves us no alternative other than - to open this wider front in the battle for justice, in the interests of all who still sail in these coffin ships. If we complicate matters for ourselves, so be it..... we cannot just walk away. [B]LOSSES IN BULK[/B] How could the late Doug Foy, retired seafarer turned marine journalist, pre-empt the classification societies, with their vast data banks, in warning of the inadequacy of bulk carrier design? It was November 1990 before Lloyd's Register conceded that the then current spate of losses signaled a need for investigation into the type. At the beginning of that same year one spokesman claimed those losses were "atypical", another told a BBC Interviewer, Lloyd's Register "don't believe the vessels have a fundamental design fault; they believe the ships' sides simply wear out because of corrosion and punishment they receive as cargo is loaded and unloaded". Which prompts the question, if it was not the job of the classification society to foresee and cater or such corrosion wastage and natural punishment, then whose job was it? Perhaps the authors of "A Ship Too Far; The Mystery of the Derbyshire" (one of them Dave Ramwell) touched on the truth: “The classification society system no longer works in today's fiercely competitive environment. It should be ended." We think ail the classification societies have fallen short of those standards which could reasonably be expected of them; that measures could have been taken much earlier and that, even now, their diagnosis does not properly disclose the severity of the malady. During the. five years before the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) reviewed the safety and structural integrity of bulk carriers, losses averaged 10-per year and 700 seafarers died in the type. In 1990 the total bulk carrier fleet represented 7% of the world's fleet -and accounted for 57% of its casualties. In the period 1980 to 1996 43 'standard' bulk carriers of over 20.000 dwt were lost in circumstances where structural failure could well have played a part. (Taking a 'standard' bulk carrier to be a vessel with a configuration where there is a single skin, transversely framed side, double bottom, with topside and hopper tanks running through the cargo holds). Other bulk carriers failed structurally but were fortunate enough not to be lost as a result. The age of the ships varied - from only eight years to thirty nine years old. The average age was18, with 78% of them fifteen years or over. At the time of writing statistics (source: MARINE ENGINEERS' REVIEW, April '97) give 4,200 bulk carriers (of all configurations) of 150 m or more, 1,900 of these are fifteen years old or more. As the MER points out, "...... the ships were built to class and international regulations that applied at the time of their construction." But the plain fact is many of these ships were built when the classification societies knew, or ought to have known, those regulations were inadequate. Track records spell out the only sure way of eradicating the danger posed by the fifteen year old bulk carrier – scrap it. Recently IACS has claimed its Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP), started in 1993, has reduced bulker losses. We believe such reduction could have more to do with the raised level of awareness of the mortal dangers attaching to old bulkers. It is not a case any more of clapped out rustbuckets slipping quietly below the waves, with a "can't lose" owner recovering his "total loss" from the underwriters. Now the public increasingly demands an answer, and it harbours a sympathy for the seafarer that would countenance the spending of £ millions to investigate one "classic case" lying 2.8 miles down. This awareness, together with recent moves to update the marine insurance industry towards better actuarial practice, is the real medicine to start the cure. To what extent, we wonder, was the "raised awareness factor" instrumental in dictating the fate of the "Nafsika M", last of the "'Derbyshire" sisters? Despite her owners having spent thousands of dollars to (one would suppose) extend her life just two and a half years ago, she is now destined for breaking up in Bangladesh. Paul Lambert warned the major classification societies of the difficulties in making such an old bulk carrier safe. He was rewarded with threats from the Greek lawyers of her owners with action against him in the civil and criminal court. That legal action may still be pending, but, in the meantime, given "Nafsika M's" implications for the "Derbyshire" case swivelling the spotlight on her, would any classification society now dare to put her in class unless she was absolutely seaworthy? Conversely, without such spotlight, would she have been granted a few more years to justify all that expenditure in the Gdansk shipyard? Whatever the case with "Nafsika M", we believe the IACS' ESP is ineffective. Early February 1997 the bulk carrier, "Leros Strength" sank off Norway, killing her 20 man Polish crew and sending 15 tons of oil ashore to foul the coast. •"Leros Strength" had been through the ESP. • "Leros Strength" had been classed by RINA, the Italian classification society and an accredited member of IACS • Transfer of "Leros Strength" from the American Bureau of Shipping had conformed to all reporting requirements laid down by IACS. Just a few weeks later the bulker "Albion Two" was discovered broken in two on the seabed some 70 miles west of the tip of Brittany. She is now the grave of 25 men. She had been through the ESP. When the sinking of a deliberately scuttled, loaded bulk carrier ("Gallant Dragon") takes six seconds, when a 22 year old bulker ("Trade Daring") simply snaps in two alongside whilst loading, when plates peel away from ships' sides, and when, over a period of only eighteen I months, the deaths number nearly 300, with thousands over two decades .... then we think we are justified in demanding of IACS, and all who help keep these old bulker carriers in circulation; take more positive action, because the measures you have taken so far are clearly not enough. [B]NEW CRITERIA[/B] In December 1996 IACS ratified its decision requiring the corrugated bulkhead between holds No. 1 and No. 2 and the double bottom structure in way of No. 1 hold, to meet new criteria for single skin bulk carriers of 150 m in length or over, being, at the same time, fifteen years or more in age, and likely to carry cargo that includes material of bulk density lt/m3 or more. This requirement was shaped by statistical indication that tonnage over fifteen years old was most at risk, and hold No. 1 was most likely to flood - making the corrugated transverse bulkhead between holds 1 and 2 the most structurally vulnerable. (Some 40% of the bulker losses involved water ingress to No. 1 hold). But, again, given the vast data banks of the classification societies, why did it appear to us that John Jubb, Welding Consultant, beat the whole maritime regulatory system to the draw on this one, when he was promoting awareness of the relative fragility of these connections during talks he gave (and still gives) on "Derbyshire"' and bulk carriers, generally? We believe most fifteen year old bulkers cannot be made safe without spending more than the ship is worth. Tinkering about with bulkheads could even prolong the sickness by creating the impression that something positive is being done. You cannot make a silk purse out of an old sow's ear. We believe all bulk carriers should be scrapped on their fifteenth 'birthday', unless the owner makes specific appeal on the grounds that his ship is well above average condition for her age. If the owner does so appeal there should be an initial and relatively cursory inspection by an independent suitably qualified professional to check whether the ship in fac t tallies with her owner's optimistic assessment. If it does there should be a further inspection, this time of a thorough and rigorous nature, using the most sophisticated crack detecting and weardown measuring instruments available. The ship would be taken out of service for as long as the inspectors 'considered necessary. It would be for the owner to ensure his ship was brought to such condition as would best facilitate such survey. This second survey would be carried out by an International Maritime Organisation (IMO), or IMO appointed, team. (It is envisaged the IMO would be "empowered" as in point 10 of the 30 point presentation attached). And we would suggest an owner be assisted with his survey costs should such IMO team agree to extending the life of his 15+ bulker, monies being taken from an IMO centrally administered fund created with levied contributions from the shipping industry and the marine insurance industry - both of which stand to gain from this policy in the long term. The policy puts the onus on the shipowner and, if he believes his ship warrants it, encourages him to avail himself of such option. Conversely the rust bucket, cowboy will have little choice but to cut his losses (and, as a happy incidental, the seafarers' death rate in bulk carriers) by sending his ship to the scrapyard where he can at least get the price other metal. IACS may be making moves in the right direction, but the loss of "Leros Strength" and "Albion Two" do not inspire confidence in the effectiveness of those moves. More, much more, needs to be done. Old bulk carriers - rundown ships generally - are a global problem requiring a global strategy. Self regulation has failed; a radical, new approach is needed. We believe safety at sea can be enhanced, and enhanced quickly, but it would require the implementation of '"people orientated" policies, and these days such a bias is out of fashion. It would require safety first, commerce second. We are certain that once such policies have been established, such commerce as grows out of the new regime will be on sounder and more profitable footing. And not in spite of, but because safety is the first consideration. Some may think us arrogant for taking upon ourselves to advise the maritime establishment. Indeed we know we have entered territory that should rightly be occupied by others - but now we’re here, we've looked around, and we seem to be on our own. [B]PROPOSALS - 30 POINT PLAN[/B] So - here is our 30 point plan to make things better ... 1. Damage arising from possible design flaws in a ship should be promulgated by M. Notice, or other means, to alert others in similar ship type to their potential danger. 2. Should any party not so broadcast such possible danger, it shall count as having recklessly endangered life and attract meet penalty 3. An International Ship Data Base (ISDB) should be established to record the salient details of every ship. It should be managed by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 4. There should be a basic "core record" for each ship, and this core would reflect those conditions against which a good maritime insurance company would set its judgment as to what constitutes a "good risk". For example, criteria would include: ship's age; condition at last survey; history of insurance claims/accidents; number and nationality of crew; qualifications. 5. Anyone should have access to ISDB information provided they can prove good intent to the IMO. For example, parties engaged in safety exercises should have unimpeded access, but where suspicion of seeking knowledge to secure, say, commercial advantage over rivals exists, the IMO would have to be circumspect to greater degree. (Charges for information should be only that necessary to cover costs. There is philosophy behind the ISDB such that seeking to profit by it would compromise it as a "lifesaver"). 6. Anyone having knowledge of what he/she considers to be a dangerous defect in a ship should have the right to cause such defect to be appropriately recorded with the ISDB. Should the IMO refuse to so record such alleged defect then the IMO should give to the complainant its written reasons. Such response would then, potentially, have the force of a legal document and a copy would be retained by the IMO. 7. Similarly, if an applicant is refused details he/she has requested from the ISDB, and same applicant is not satisfied with the IMO verbal explanation for refusal, then same applicant should be given a written letter detailing the reason(s) for such refusal. 8. The criteria as to what constitutes a seaworthy ship must be agreed between: the IMO. the marine insurance industry, maritime regulators, seafarers, seafarers' unions and professional bodies (e.g. Nautical Institute), ship-builders, shipowners and naval architects. In the event of disagreement the final arbiters would be the IMO in collaboration with the marine insurance industry. 9. There should be global standardisation of rules and regulations governing the building and operation of ships in order to stop the downward spiral of safety standards caused by solely profit relat ed flag of convenience 'standards'. 10. The IMO, presently responsible for formulating and bringing to ratification, rules and regulations, should also be responsible for the implementation, and then policing, of such rules and regulations. 11. Where safety is concerned (e.g. reserves of stability in a damaged roro, or the current unacceptable rate of bulk carrier losses and associated deaths) there should be an agreed "fast track" towards implementation of necessary measures. 12. The classification society system is failing to protect life at sea to satisfactory level; it should be ended - along with the shipping industry's over reliance generally on self regulation. No replacement system should be profit orientated, inter-classification society competition having helped to drive standards down to present state. 13. Respective governments should 'take charge of issuing all licences and certificates through different shipping levels - from certifying the seafarer's qualifications to granting licence for a shipping company's formation. 14. Governments should ensure that the responsibility for both promoting and regulating the shipping industry does not reside with the same Government (or Government appointed) Department. (This has been done in the off shore UK oil industry. After the Piper Alpha explosion safety matters were removed from the Department of Energy and given to the Health and Safety Executive). 15. The current UK ship accident investigation body is the Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport. It cannot be seen as truly independent; there should be a Civil Maritime Authority (analogous to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)) recognised by all parties as being professionally impartial, and the CMA alone would make official investigation post accident. 16. Such CMA would count as "any party" within the context of point 2 of this presentation. 17. An individual, or a board of directors, should be named as being solely responsible for the efficient running of the ship(s) within their company, and an address should be given. Such address being the place where the responsible party can be accessed at all times by anybody having legitimate cause for enquiry. This should be a condition of their licence to operate as a shipping company. 18. Every ship must be appropriately insured and carry proof of insurance. 19. Underwriters should accelerate moves to update actuarial practice (still rooted in the days of Samual Plimsoll) and simplify procedures after an accident. In associated legal proceedings, lawyers unnecessarily complicating or drawing out cases would be named and fined. 20. If, during insurance related, legal, or any other proceedings, there emerges information with the capacity to enhance safety elsewhere, that information shall be promulgated as per points 1 and 2 of this presentation. Confidentiality or other judicious precaution shall, as far as possible protect the interests of parties specific to the case, but, whatever, the promulgation of such information must take precedence. 21. When standards have been internationally agreed they must be treated as minimum; enhancement above the benchmark should be encouraged. For example, the UK DOT cites roros as meeting the highest standards - and they do. But presently agreed standards, where they address matters of reserve buoyancy and stability in the event of accident, are themselves too low. Again, the US has decreed above minimum standards for the construction of tankers sailing in US waters, in deference to environmental safety. This has pushed up general standards as owners anticipating trade with the US have to meet those US standards. Also, a ship not complying with these enhanced standards would lose resale value vis a vis one that did. 22. Anyone having legitimate cause for concern over matters relating to safety should never be discouraged from expressing such concern for fear of adverse consequences. Any party threatening such adverse consequence in order to protect their own position, or for any other reason, should be severely penalised. 23. A system for the confidential reporting of "near misses" (akin to that run by the CAA) should be established internationally. (The Nautical Institute runs such a scheme voluntarily; it could serve as a model). 24. The location of ''Derbyshire" 2.8 miles down demonstrates that a sh»p need never bi? "lost" again - only "missing pending location". Where a foundering has similar controversial connotations to "Derbyshire's" case, or where forensic examination of the wreckage could usefully add to the store of scientific maritime knowledge, then such wreckage investigation should proceed under the authority of the CMA proposed in point 15 of this presentation. Findings should be made public in every case, or, if there is compelling reason for secrecy, such reason should be given as fully as possible. The usual''.... It will not serve the public interest..." will no longer be acceptable. 25. Following such wreck examination by the CMA there should first be published the CMA findings; but these should be regarded in the first instance as 'draft' only; responses from various and acknowledged expert individuals and organisations shall be fully considered and the draft, if appropriate, amended and published in 'final' version. Where there is disagreement between parties this should be noted with, as appropriate, explanations to support opposing views to those published in the body of the final version, and such views shall be published as an annex to and integral part of same final CMA publication. (In event of similar accident this will alert parties involved to all likelihood. Such a mechanism, had it been in place, would have long ago accelerated moves to improve bulk carrier safety and saved many hundreds of lives). 26. The proposed CMA should undertake the monitoring of quality control at shipyards, mainly by un-announced spot checks. Regular reports on the different yards should be sent to the IMO by the CMA (and its equivalent in other countries, using the same criteria by which to make judgment). The IMO should publish the names of any shipbuilders who fall so short of good practice as to compromise safety. 27. If inspection of a ship reveals evidence of bad practices at her builders (for example, welding rods, found during repairs, which were used in the building as ‘fillers’ in a weld), then it should be investigated by the CMA and the builders brought to account. In each such event the CMA would report to the IMO, and as soon as possible where the CMA judges other contemporaneously built ships from the same yard could have been similarly the subject of bad practice. 28. Records of all shipyard related reports should be retained by the IMO, and yards should be aware that bad practices could adversely affect future cases involving ships built at their yards, especially in legal context. 29. If statistics alone indicate patterns giving cause for concern (e.g. excessive losses in the older sections of the bulk carrier fleet, and in the fishing fleet) then this should be sufficient reason for the IMO to mount appropriate investigations. Any protests resulting from such initiative should be made in writing, and protesters should be aware that attempts to compromise safety, by seeking excessive accommodation of factors conducive to profit for example, would meet with severe penalties. (Again, had such facility been in place 10 years ago hundreds of lives would have been saved). 30. The IMO alone, using its ISDB and established ground rules, shall' -decide what constitutes "fair treatment", and then it will ensure global implementation of same. Captain Dave Ramwell Chershire, UK Paul Lambert Chairperson MV Derbyshire Families Association Liverpool, United Kingdom source [URL="http://www.itfglobal.org/seafarers/icons-site/images/104.pdf"]here[/URL] (International Transport Workers' Federation itfglobal.org) PS; apologies - have not yet been able to establish a date for the article above. Little h

Harry-is the understatement what this thread is about or is it a re-investigation??? [B][B]The reports of the first formal investigation into the loss of the Derbyshire, held in 1987, reached the conclusion that the Derbyshire “was probably overcome by the forces of nature in Typhoon Orchid”. [/B][/B] However, the Derbyshire Families Association, set up following the tragedy, was greatly disappointed by the inconclusive report. They requested an underwater survey, which was initially delayed as the exact location of the ship was unknown and adequate technology was not yet available to obtain photographic evidence. T[B][B]he re-opened investigation, conducted between 1997 and 1998, concluded that the loss of the vessel was caused by seawater entering the bow section, which caused the vessel to sit lower in the water. The investigation resulted in a total of 24 safety recommendations, which have now been addressed in maritime regulations and guidance. [/B][/B] Paper records of the original inquiry are also available alongside the digitised re-opened investigation. jainso31

Jim, My take is that... Andy, having opened the thread, has opened up the possibilities for all issues, investigations, reports and comments to be discussed. I noticed the particular emphasis on the concern surrounding ships being 15 years old and beyond and decided to post the complete paper which also includes the originators 30 points. Little h

[QUOTE=harry.gibbon;10049916]Jim, My take is that... Andy, having opened the thread, has opened up the possibilities for all issues, investigations, reports and comments to be discussed. I noticed the particular emphasis on the concern surrounding ships being 15 years old and beyond and decided to post the complete paper which also includes the originators 30 points. Little h[/QUOTE] Quite so, Harry. My intention is always to promote/stimulate all types of discussion on any subject I post. I enjoyed reading your additional information.

[B]Case Study II [SIZE="3"]DERBYSHIRE[/SIZE] Loss of a Bulk Carrier[/B] [B][U]Quick Link Index[/U]:[/B] [B]Vessel Particulars[/B] [url]http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#Vessel[/url] Particulars [B]Summary of Structural Failure[/B] [url]http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#Summary[/url] of Structural Failure [B]Background[/B] [url]http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#Background[/url] [B]Detailed Description of Structural Failure (Proposed)[/B] [url]http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#Detailed[/url] Description of Structural Failure [B]End Result[/B] [url]http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#End[/url] Result [B]Acknowledgements[/B] [url]http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml#Acknowledgements[/url] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B]Vessel Particulars [/B] Length: 281.94 Meters Beam: 44.20 Meters Depth: 24.90 Meters Construction date: 1976 Location: United Kingdom Classification: Lloyds Register Vessel Type: Oil/Bulk/Ore (OBO) Carrier Arrangement: Accommodations and machinery aft. Nine bulk cargo holds separated by double skinned bulkheads. [B]Arrangement and Construction Details:[/B] Last of six sister ships designed in 1969 in the UK and built from 1970-76. The hull was double skinned and double bottom equipped. Each cargo hold was covered by 2 hatch covers (port and starboard). At the time of the loss, she had been in service only 4 years, and was considered a well-maintained ship, and was piloted by an experienced captain. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B]Summary of Structural Failure [/B] This paper discusses two possible explanations for the loss of the MV DERBYSHIRE during a severe storm, both of which postulate foundering due to structural failure of critical components. One scenario assumes the breakup of the ship due to fatigue failure of longitudinal structural members in the aft portion of the ship, while the other assumes foundering resulting from collapse of hold covers under sea loading. The two loss scenarios were compared in the light of the results of recent technical investigations and wreckage surveys. In the past decade this topic has produced intense debate in the maritime community, so the authors consider the topic worthy of review. The reader should bear in mind the complexity of ship systems and the highly irregular environment in which they operate, and realize that the loss of a ship is usually the result of many factors, including environmental, structural, and operational. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B]Background[/B] MV DERBYSHIRE was a British Oil/Bulk/Ore, (OBO), carrier transporting ore from Canada to Japan when she was lost during the typhoon ORCHID on the 9th or 10th of September 1980. She went down with all 44 on board without any distress signal. DERBYSHIRE is the largest British bulk carrier ever lost and has been the object of several investigations and discussions regarding bulk carrier safety. This loss is just one in a long list of bulk carrier losses from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. Every year 10 to 20 bulk carrier losses occur, where structural failure might be the cause, (Ref. 2). The shared opinion among marine engineers is that this is an unacceptable number of losses, and that it is necessary to improve the design criteria of the classification societies. Because of the poor history of bulk carrier safety, a great deal of energy has been put into the investigation of the DERBYSHIRE casualty. It was hoped that if it could be recovered, the complete picture of the catastrophe would give valuable insight into potential structural weaknesses and inadequate ship design procedures. [B]History of Investigation [/B] Since there initially was no evidence that structural failure caused the loss, the UK Government did not hold a formal investigation into the loss the DERBYSHIRE. In 1982, eighteen months after the loss, her sister ship, TYNE BRIDGE, experienced severe brittle fractures. These cracks initiated at frame 65 and propagated into the deck. After this fracture, the DERBYSHIRE Family Association (DFA) started investigating frame 65 cracks on the other sister ships. They hypothesized that this might be the cause of the loss the DERBYSHIRE. In 1986 another sister ship, KOWLOON BRIDGE, broke at frame 65 after grounding. These events caused a closer look into the loss of the DERBYSHIRE. In 1994 the DFA had raised enough funds to conduct a survey of the wreckage. This first survey had the goal of locating the DERBYSHIRE and investigating the cause of the loss. The survey was completed in May 1994. The results of the survey were inconclusive, but they located an object assumed to be the stern, separated from the rest of the wreck by approximately 600 meters. The survey led to further investigation. The new goal was to examine the loss of the DERBYSHIRE to learn more about structural weaknesses and to increase the safety of ships for the future . Thirteen loss scenarios were listed after an investigation of the service experience for the class and general casualty data for ships, specifically for bulk carriers, (Ref. 1). A lot of effort was put into the analysis of each loss scenario with the results that some were excluded while others were confirmed as more probable. This remainder of this paper discusses the two failure modes/loss scenarios that have been offered the most attention: Fatigue Failure at Frame 65 and Hatch Cover Collapse. [B]Detailed Description of Structual Failure (Proposed)[/B] Fatigue Failure at Frame 65 Before the possible structural defects are discussed, the general arrangement for the region around frame 65 must be described. Frame 65 is the transverse watertight bulkhead that separates Hold 9 from the pump room. The longitudinal structure makes a drastic change at Frame 65 from a main longitudinal girder to a longitudinal bulkhead separating the pump room from the slop tanks (see sketch of general arrangement below). .....(dev 1) The possibility of failure at frame 65 was realized after the KOWLOON BRIDGE ran aground and broke into three pieces. One break occurred at the bow where it was resting on the reef and the second near frame 65. Other sister ships began reporting visible cracking in the deck above frame 65. These incidents caused the industry to examine the structural design for weaknesses. The examination revealed that the method used to transition from the longitudinal girder to the longitudinal bulkhead could have resulted in the catastrophic failure of the MV DERBYSHIRE. FURNESS BRIDGE, the first ship of the class, used an accepted design method for the longitudinal transition at frame 65 by continuing the girder through Bulkhead 65 and then tapering and finally welding it to the longitudinal bulkhead in the pump room (the drawing below shows the general structural design). ..........(dev 2) In the later ships, however, the design was changed to accommodate of coffer dams added to isolate the slop tanks from Hold 9 and the pump room. The new design ended the girder at Bulkhead 65 and started the longitudinal bulkhead on the aft side of the bulkhead (see drawing below for details). .............(dev 3) Ideally, the longitudinal girder and bulkhead would be in line at the transverse bulkhead, but if they are misaligned, the fatigue life of the structure could be reduced. As the ship cycles from hogging and sagging moments the misalignment causes the transverse bulkhead to be distorted fore and aft. The fluctuating distortions would result in high local stresses that could lead to cracking due to the shortening of fatigue life. The existing sister ships were found to have misalignments between the girder and bulkhead. Of course, the alignment for the DERBYSHIRE is unknown. Although the magnitude of the misalignment is under debate, it could have been as much as 45 mm (see drawing below for a basic representation). .............(dev 4) Because of the high profile nature of the accident, eventually enough money was gathered to conduct a survey of the wreck. The survey revealed that the ship was in two main sections, but the stern section was only 600 meters from the forward section. Since the ship descended 4000 meters to reach the bottom, it seems unlikely that the break-up occurred at the surface. Therefore, failure in the region of Bulkhead 65 was not the likely cause of the foundering of the DERBYSHIRE. [B]Hatch Cover Collapse[/B] The hatch cover design is another frequently discussed failure argument. In 1966 the International Convention of Load Lines, (ICLL), categorized a new freeboard class B-60, where the freeboard requirements of the ordinary B class may be reduced by 60 cm. The only requirement is that the ship survive flooding of one compartment without loss of sea keeping. The new B-60 class resulted in a decrease of freeboard in the majority of newly built bulk carriers. The smaller freeboard caused an increase of wetted deck occurrences and pressure head experienced by deck plating and hatch covers. The design pressure was set to 1.75 tonne/m2 at the same conference, but it can be questioned if this pressure is high enough. Description of No 1 Hatch Covers ...........(dev 5) There are two covers on each hatch with length 14.68 m and beam 11.0 m (Cover No. 1) The stiffeners are T beams with 635 mm web an flanges of 280 mm x 25 mm. They are tapered at the end with a depth of 483 mm. The transverse center girder is 920 mm deep with a small 75 mm x 25 mm flange and the side girders have webs of 560 mm and flanges of 100 mm x 25 mm. All webs and plate thicknesses are 10.5 mm. The stresses in the hatch cover stiffeners met the requirements set by ICLL in 1966 according to Ref. 1. The requirements, taken from Ref. 3, page 3, are listed below: Hatch covers in the forward quarter-length (0.25L) to be designed for a uniform pressure of 1.75 tonne/m2. Level of stress not to exceed Ultimate Tensile Strength (UTS)/4.25. (which equals 0.40sigmay for mild steel) Limiting plate thickness for mild steel is b/100 or 6 mm, where b is spacing between stiffeners. To determine the maximum load a rule-designed hatch cover can carry, we set plastic collapse as the ultimate state. The T stiffener has a plastic shape factor, s, of 1.25. (The shape factor refers to how much the load can be exceeded from first yield to full yield of the cross section). Then the ratio of the full plastic collapse load and the design load is: [EQUATION: Ultimate stress / Design stress = 1.25sigmay/0.40sigmay = 1.25/0.40 = 3.125] This means that we can increase the design pressure to a pressure of 3.125 (1.75 tonne/m2) = 5.47 tonne/m2 uniform pressure. This equals a water height of = 5.32 m over the hatch cover (Head = pressure/sea water density = 5.47 tonne/m2 / 1.028 tonne/m3). The collapse head shows the true pressure a rule-designed cover can carry before collapse. But did the cover truly fulfill the requirements? Finite element analysis of the hatch cover design shows that they would collapse under a static pressure of about 4.1 m (Ref. 1, pg 9) (hyperlink). This is above the ICLL requirement to resist a uniform pressure of 1.75 tonne/m2, but is still under the predicted collapse head of 5.3 m corresponding to the design pressure. [B]Basic Calculation Procedure for a Stiffened Plate Field[/B] The stiffened plate of the hatch cover is modeled as a rigidly supported beam under uniformly distributed load. The beam length is taken as the stiffener span between the girders. The end moments, M, for a rigidly supported beam are given by: [MOMENT EQUATION: M = pbL2/12] where: p = pressure = 1.75 tonne/m2 = 17.17 kN/m2 b = stiffener spacing = 0.994 m L = span of the member = 14.72 m/4 = 3.68 m. The longitudinals are assumed to be rigidly supported, because of symmetric loading on each side of the girder, and because the girder is usually much stiffer than the longitudinals. The design moment for the stiffeners with length 3.68 m is then M = 1.963 tonne-m = 19.56 kNm. This is the maximum load the member must carry according to the design pressure. This gives a section modulus, Z, for the stiffeners of: [SECTION MODULUS EQUATION: Z = M/sigma] where sigma is the acceptable stress level in the member. The stress was not to exceed UTS/4.25, which equals 0.40sigmay for mild steel, where sigmay is yield stress (This is commented as an irrationally low stress limit, but it still exists, 1998). Required section modulus is thus 19.56 kNm / [0.40(235 MPa)] = 204 cm3. The actual section modulus of the T beam stiffener can be calculated or taken from a table (Z = Iz /ymax where Iz is the 2nd moment of inertia about the z-axis and ymax is the distance from the neutral axis to the furthest flange). We do not use the dimensions of the tapered end of the stiffener because the ends are approximated as simply supported because the loading is not symmetric, and because the side plate at the end of the hatch cover is flexible. The most critical part of the stiffener is the end condition at the girder, so stiffener height at this location must be used in the calculations. The stiffeners used fulfill the requirements, according to Ref. 1. See also calculations in the Appendix (MS Excel Spreadsheet). These calculations show that the required Z is about 204 cm3 (without corrosion allowance) and the actual Z is 1169 cm3, so the stiffeners seem to be over designed, if calculated in this manner. It can be questioned whether these calculations describe the structure's capacity correctly, since the transverse girders are not as effective as assumed. One reason is that the depth of the side girders are smaller than the depth of the stiffeners, so in fact, the actual moment capacity of the girders is about 0.2MP, where MP is the plastic moment capacity of the stiffeners. The narrow flange of the girders provides much less bending strength than necessary to restrain bending of the cover. This leads to significant bending of both the girders and the longitudinals, and therefore, compression at the top of the members and the thin welded cover plating. The compression in this welded zone is substantial as bending increases toward collapse. This is not mentioned in the references, but as far as we can calculate, the side girders do not fulfill the section modulus requirements. According to Det Norske Veritas (DnV) rules (Part 3, Ch.1 Sec.8, D201) the section modulus of the girders should be Z = 8133 cm3 (without corrosion allowance), but our calculations show Z = 2330 cm3 for the side girders, and Z = 4251 cm3 for the center girder. This is dramatically lower than the required scantlings (see Appendix [MS Excel Spreadsheet]). The requirements are based on the moment equation above, but with 10 in the denominator because the girders can not be considered to be rigidly supported, but rather a condition between simple and rigid support which yields a maximum moment greater than pbL2/12 but less than pbL2/8. Improved Design of No 1 Hatch Covers? Faulkner (Ref. 1) suggests an improved design of the hatch covers where the three girders are removed, and the l0 longitudinal stiffeners are replaced with 14 similarly sized transverse stiffeners. He claims that this will improve the capacity of the cover by 85%, by decreasing the effective span of the stiffeners to 11.00 meters. This structure is lighter and also less expensive to construct. He claims the new structure is able to resist a pressure head of 7.0 meters, which is significantly better than the original design pressure head of 5.31 meters. Faulkner has not shown his calculations and we are not convinced that this is a much better design. He believed that the girders are ineffective, because they will reach plastic collapse early. After the girder collapses the stiffeners have to carry all additional load, and now with a span of 14.72 m. In this aspect, the girders are ineffective and can be removed. By orienting the stiffeners transversely, the span is reduced to 11.0 meters. ................(dev 6) Our calculations show that the new suggested design fulfills the requirements for section modulus (see Appendix [MS Excel Spreadsheet]), but we question the ability of the design to resist longitudinal bending. Faulkner's design has no longitudinal stiffeners to prevent failure in this mode, except the side plates of the cover. Therefore we doubt the soundness of this suggested design. Also, the stiffener ends are not rigidly supported so the denominator in the moment equation should be closer to 8 than to 12, and the maximum moment occurs at the midpoint of the stiffeners. We calculated the maximum moment using 10, for the same reason as for the transverse girders in the original design. In our opinion it is better to increase the scantlings of transverse girders in the original design and decrease those of the stiffeners. The flange of the girders should be increased and the depth should be equal for all three girders. A possible solution incorporates three girders of 900 mm depth and a 300 mm flange, and stiffeners of 200 mm depth and 75 mm flange (see Appendix [MS Excel Spreadsheet]) . Note, however, the design of the hatch cover is not a straightforward process, and more complex methods must be used to calculate the interaction between the deflection of the girders and the stiffeners. [B]Dynamic Loading[/B] The hatch covers can fail not only due to static pressure, but under dynamic loading as well. Breaking or plunging waves impacting the covers can generate very steep pressure impulses. Even for mild steel this can lead to brittle fractures. The steep impulse is called the gifle peak, and evidence of this type of fracture has been found in DERBYSHIRE's wreckage. The peak is a result of the velocity of the water particles the moment they hit the structure. The retardation is extremely large because the fluid particles can attain very high velocities. To determine the velocities, we can use breaking wave theory. The classification society rules do not seem to account for the dynamic impact. The only requirements from DnV on design pressure for hatch covers is the static design head rhoH = 1.75 tonne/m2. (DnV Part 3, Chap 1, Sec 4, C401, 1998). This equals a pressure of 1.75 x 103 kg/m2 (9.81 kg/N) = 17.2 kN/m2, and this is significantly lower than the peak of 200 kN/m2 shown on the graph. The dynamic loading has less inertia forces than the static pressure, because the amount of water involved is less. Therefore, the nature of the inertial forces effects the material surface. In contrast, the static forces have to be resisted by structural support and moment carrying members. Design for impulse gifle peaks from dynamic forces then becomes a question of material quality and ductility. So, it would be better to use more ductile materials in hatch cover construction. ................(dev 7) Water Impact Diagram [B]Extreme Wave Probabilities[/B] One of the important topics that has been discussed during the investigation on the loss of the DERBYSHIRE, is the maximum wave height encountered during Typhoon Orchid. The goal was to establish a probable pressure head on the hatch covers. Some assumptions are required to model the behavior of the ship in typhoon driven seas. .................(dev 8) One assumption is that the ship is plunging through the steep crests rather than rising on the top of them. This is because these ships are long and heavy and have a natural pitch period longer than the wave period. We obtain a quasi-static wave profile when the wave is passing over the first hatch cover. This profile can be characterized with the equation: [EQUATION h = alpha H - (F + C)] where: h = maximum head pressure over the cover alpha = nonlinear wave ratio between the crest and the trough = 0.65 for a nonlinear wave in deep water H = the wave height F = freeboard = 6.9 m C = coaming height = 2.0 m From this profile we find the maximum mean pressure head hb at Hatch Cover 1. [EQUATION: hb = h(1 B mL/4h)] where: L = length of the cover = 14.72 m m = mean slope of the crest face and back, assumed to be 0.5 during Orchid. The model of the nonlinear wave can be sketched as in the figure below. ...............(dev 9) From this wave crest model and extreme wave probability analysis, based on an energy spectrum that can be assumed realistic during typhoon Orchid, certain wave heights and probability of exceedence can be obtained, depending on the duration of the storm. The results of the analysis are shown in the table (Ref. 1, pg 9): .............(dev 10) The results should startle most mariners, since the design head is about 1.7 meter head pressure (1.75tonne/m2 / 1.028tonne/m3) according to the rules, and total collapse occurs at 5.3 m head for a well designed cover. As a reaction there have been suggestions to improve class requirements. One is based on the existing stress criterion of UTS/4.25 and turns out to demand a pressure head of 4.5 m for No 1 cover, 4.0 m for No 2 cover, and 3.5 m for No. 3 cover (Ref. 3). Another suggests using the ultimate collapse of the covers and a factor of safety of 1.5. This turns out a design head of 9 m for No1 cover, 7.5 m for No 2 cover, and 6.0 m for No 3 cover (Ref. 1, pg 11). Including the safety factor gives a probability of collapse during a typhoon like Orchid of less than 1 % in 12 hours storm duration. As far as we know, the new suggestions have not yet been included in the classification society rules (DnV 1998, ABS 1995), but Faulkner comments that changes are discussed, and at least one classification society is about to change its design rules. [B]Implosion and Explosion[/B] Large pressure differences develop when an air filled watertight body sinks. This knowledge can be used when inspecting a shipwreck. Any air filled compartment that was not damaged before sinking occurred would experience an increasing pressure differential with increasing water depth. At some point the outside pressure will exceed the pressure that the hull can resist. The compartment would then implode. When the compressed air is released from the compartment, there is a kind of explosion that result in shock waves in the water and the structure. This can lead to considerable damage, which can be confirmed by inspection. The DERBYSHIRE had many void spaces, and the cargo holds were also partly filled with air. So it should be possible to determine which compartments were damaged before sinking. From the design of each compartment, one can determine at what water depth the compartment should collapse, this would be the implosion pressure head. These vary a lot for each compartment. The hatch covers would collapse at about 4.1 meters submergence, but the hopper tanks would be able to resist the external pressure to a depth of 60 meters. [B]Final Survey[/B] The final survey was conducted in two parts: Phase 1 in July 1996 and Phase 2 in March and April 1997. Phase 1 was a limited reconnaissance survey of opportunity, and undertaken by the same company that did the survey in 1994. The main goals were to confirm the stern location and visually inspect the stern and bow. The contractor for the second part was the Deep Submerged Laboratory of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. They had great experience with surveys of the Titanic and Bismark. The goal was to either prove or disprove each of the 13 loss scenarios mentioned earlier. They hoped to confirm the cause of the loss, but if they were unsuccessful, the survey should demonstrate that nothing more could be done to determine the failure mode. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B]End Result [/B] The surveys confirmed that the object located 600 meters from the bow was the stern. It was considerably damaged by implosion-explosion forces. Bulkhead 65 was no longer connected to the stern. From these observations, the most probable conclusion to the Frame 65 argument is that the stern was intact when sinking started. The increasing pressure led to implosion of the stern as the ship sank deeper, with the hull eventually breaking near frame 65, which certainly was a weak point. As the stern and the rest of the ship continued to sink, the two parts separated, eventually settling only 600 meters apart. The final conclusion is that the frame 65 cracking was not the cause of the loss, but that this failure occurred as the ship approached the seabed. The inspection of the hatch covers showed that all of them had external pressure as the initial failure mode. Most of the cracks occurred near the welding of the center girder, and at the connection of the stiffeners to the girders. The surveyors examined the edges of the tears, and from these observations they concluded (Ref. 1, pg 21) that several of the covers had collapsed before sinking started. They found indications of tearing damage between the longitudinals in 7 or 8 of the covers. This was probably from plunging sea waves encountered after the initial damage (Ref. 1, pg 9). The discovery of these failure modes confirms, or at least increases the likelihood, that the sinking was caused by hatch cover collapse. Hopefully the incredible amount of money and effort invested during the investigation of the DERBYSHIRE casualty will lead the classification societies to develop design codes that can reduce the probability of similar failures. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B]Acknowledgements [/B] References: [1] An analytical Assessment of the Sinking of the MV DERBYSHIRE, Professor D. Faulkner 1999 [2] A theory on the loss of the MV DERBYSHIRE; by R.E.D. Bishop, W.G. Price and P.Temarel 1990 [3] Design for Abnormal ocean waves; Professor D. Faulkner and R.A. Williams 1996. RINA [4] Hull Structural design, Ships with length 100 metres and above; Det norske Veritas rules 1998, Part 3 Chapter 1 [5] Hull construction and Equipment; American Bureau of Shipping rules 1995, Part 3 Author(s): Daniel Tarman and Edgar Heitmann This web site was developed by: JMS Naval Architects & Salvage Engineers [CENTER]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[/CENTER] source [URL="http://www.shipstructure.org/derby.shtml"]Ship Structure Committee [/URL]An Interagency Research and Development Committee for Safer Ship Structures [B]Important Note[/B]; there are numerous links to open within the source link Little h
Attachments :

The Derbyshire Family Association was awarded the Marine Society's Thomas Gray Silver Medal in July 2004 for campaigning for better safety regulations regarding bulk carriers. Rumours of crew negligence circulated in the marine industry early in the investigation were based on the leaked unfinished findings of the assessors appointed by Lord Donaldson of Lymington on behalf of the British Department of Transport. These rumours were not substantiated by the investigation. They examined the 135,774 pictures of the Derbyshire wreck taken during two surveys by a research vessel of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. [B][B][B]These assessors, Robin Williams and Remo Torchio, both naval architects, concluded that amongst other obvious openings for water ingress, including broken ventilators, a mooring rope coming out of a relatively undamaged and unlatched fore deck access hatch led to the possibility that over several hours the vessel took on water in the storm to a degree that produced a marked bow down trim coupled with large waves crashing onto the first hatch cover and its eventual failure. The vessel then began to take on more water and sank very quickly.[/B][/B][/B] 2001 RINA Analysis The third assessor, Douglas Faulkner, Professor of Marine Architecture and Ocean Engineering at the University of Glasgow, departed the investigation before the stories of crew negligence circulated. In 2001, Prof. Faulkner published a lengthy and highly analytical paper examining the Derbyshire's loss in light of the emerging body of scientific evidence regarding the mechanics of freak waves. Among other things, it is now becoming more widely accepted in the scientific community that such rogue waves are far more common than previous mathematical models (and the older shipbuilding standards that stemmed from them) had suggested. Prof. Faulkner's paper won the Royal Institution of Naval Architects's (RINA) award for excellence that year. [B][B]Prof. Faulkner took direct issue with the conclusions of the original assessment, noting that given the meteorological conditions, and the length of time she was exposed to the peak conditions of the storm, it was almost certain that Derbyshire would have encountered a wave of sufficient size to destroy her. He concluded: "Beyond any reasonable doubt, the direct cause of the loss of the MV Derbyshire was the quite inadequate strength of her cargo hatch covers to withstand the forces of Typhoon Orchid." This conclusion has potentially dire implication for many earlier-generation bulk carriers, as they were all built to loading standards considered safe before the mechanics of these giant waves were understood.[/B][/B] [B][B][B][B]Changes to the regulations In November 1997 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted new rules covering survivability and structural requirements for bulk carriers of 150 metres and upwards. The bulkhead and double bottom must be strong enough to allow the ship to survive flooding in hold 1 unless loading is restricted. It also adopted revised guidelines on ship surveys and a code of practice for safer loading and unloading[/B][/B][/B][/B] jainso31

Extract of Hansard report; debate on the MV Derbyshire in the House of Lords taken on the evening of Wednesday 3rd December 1997. [CENTER]-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B]Table of Contents for Wednesday 3 Dec 1997[/B][/CENTER] [B][CENTER][SIZE="3"]MV "Derbyshire"[/SIZE][/CENTER][/B] 8.47 p.m. Lord Dixon rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have received the second survey report on MV "Derbyshire"; and, if so, what action they are proposing to take. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in tabling this Question, I should like to comment on some of the more unsatisfactory aspects of this long-running saga, and try to put them in context with the current investigation. It is now over 17 years since MV "Derbyshire" disappeared on 10th September, 1980, 200 miles from Japan, in a typhoon that many felt she should easily have braved, resulting in the loss of everyone on board; 42 crew and two wives of officers. Despite the loss of life, the Government of the day refused to have a formal investigation. If this accident had happened in any other mode of transport--in aviation for instance--all similar types of aeroplane would have been grounded and unlimited money would have been spent to identify the cause. Given such a loss of life, an investigation should have been the norm rather than the exception. Instead the Minister announced in May 1981 that there was not enough evidence to justify an inquiry. Since the disappearance of the "Derbyshire" we have had 12 Secretaries of State for Transport, the current one being my right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister. The Derbyshire Family Association has fought amazingly hard and showed much patience just to seek the truth and achieve natural justice for the relatives who perished on the "Derbyshire". I, along with others, have been angered over the years by the cavalier way in which the Department of Transport has at times treated the association, in my opinion denying them natural justice. Indeed, if it had not been for the Derbyshire Family Association and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers and their technical advisers, the loss of the "Derbyshire" would have been a footnote in maritime history. For it was those, along with the International Transport Federation, who found the funds to finance a marine search and succeeded in locating the wreck two and a half miles beneath the China Sea. The "Derbyshire" was a Bibby Line-owned bulk carrier built by Swan Hunter at Haverton Hill on Tees-side in 1976. She was the last of the six Bridge class oil, bulk and ore combination carriers. They were the first of their kind to be built in the United Kingdom. Out of the six ships only the first, the "Furness Bridge", was built to the original design. On March 11th 1982, on passage from Hamburg bound for Brazil, the "Tyne Bridge"--the second of the six-ship series--encountered a North Sea storm and 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1455 started to split badly around frame 65. Such was the captain's concern he arranged for the majority of the crew to be airlifted to safety. The ship was towed to Hamburg for repairs. Inspection of the "Tyne Bridge" in dry dock showed that she had not been built to design and the damage was attributed to the method of connecting the forward cargo section of the hull to the after-engine room section. So alarmed were the surveyors of the "Tyne Bridge" damage that, unsolicited, they sent out warnings to the owners of similarly built sister ships. Two were given the same strengthening treatment in the same year. If actions speak louder than words this is what the repairs said: one, the longitudinal--that is, the spinal--girders should not have been terminated at and welded to the transverse bulkhead; they should have carried through the bulkhead. I have spent 34 years as a shipwright building and repairing ships. I never in my life experienced this type of construction. Two, a thick longitudinal should never be butted to the thinner one aft of the bulkhead. Three, the metal should have been either D or E grade. Four, sharp edges should always be avoided on ships because they raise stresses. Five, the deck should have been 30 per cent. thicker. The question that has never been answered is how do those claiming that the hull of the "Derbyshire" was adequate and up to specification reconcile those claims with the fact that hundreds of thousands of pounds needed to be spent on her sister ships on strengthening and repairs? Out of the six sister ships, one was built to original design, three had to undergo repairs at frame 65 to restore them to the original design and make them seaworthy; the two that were left were the "Kowloon Bridge" and the "Derbyshire". On 25th November 1986, the "Kowloon Bridge", in an abandoned condition, struck Stag Rocks off the southern coast of Ireland and gradually sank, splitting at frame 65 as she sank. It was not until the loss of the "Kowloon Bridge" that a formal investigation into the loss of the "Derbyshire" took place, six years after the tragedy. The report was published in 1989 and stated that: "The Derbyshire was probably overwhelmed by the forces of nature in Typhoon Orchid". It added that: "the evidence available does not support any firmer conclusion". It was an investigation which many in the maritime community felt was a complete whitewash. I received a copy of a letter from Mr. J. F. Ibbotson, leader of the Australian Derbyshire Family Association. In it he said: "One of our Group, in command of an Australian registered bulk carrier and taking the same course and the same cargo to Japan heard no distress signal from the Derbyshire because her end must have come too quickly--in seconds. The same member did not consider the typhoon to be much different from the 30 or 40 that occur each year in the typhoon season, in which he has made safe passages for many, many years". So much for the forces of nature. 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1456 After the finding of the wreck by the DFA, the RMT and the International Transport Federation, the Government commissioned the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, to carry out an assessment into what further work should be undertaken to identify the cause of the sinking of the "Derbyshire". Although it was a well written report, one has to ask if this assessment was necessary. If a plane crashes into the sea, we do not have to have an assessment as to whether you can go in and retrieve the black box. I always understood that the criteria for reopening a formal investigation is that there has to be a new and important evidence. Surely the finding of the wreck must have met this criteria? If so, the formal investigation could have then been reopened, and the expedition planned and carried out with technical experts from all interested parties. In that way we would have had a balanced expedition. Unfortunately, the Department of Transport took control of the investigation--the very party that is known to have a vested financial interest in its outcome. I will explain that financial interest. In 1986 the shipyard which built the "Derbyshire" was privatised, and in order for the deal to go through the Government gave the new owners indemnity against any claims that might arise from the sinking of the "Derbyshire", thus making the Government liable to meet any successful claims. Some have said that is why there were significant differences between the draft report in 1985 and the final report in 1986. For the present survey the DoT appointed the Ministry of Defence as project managers and appointed two UK assessors who were known to favour a particular loss scenario--"hatch cover failure", the same as put forward at the formal investigation by the shipbuilders. These two assessors made a sort of league table of probabilities, and sure enough the hatch cover failure came way out on top, promoting a loss scenario that would favour the builders and the DoT cannot be described as being objective. As a member of the All Party Derbyshire Committee, I was disturbed to learn that one of the assessors--Professor Faulkner--got together with a technical expert who represented the builders of the "Derbyshire" at the formal investigation and co-authored a technical paper. This paper also included work that was sponsored by the builders, Swan Hunter. Hardly impartial or objective behaviour. We took a delegation to the shipping Minister Viscount Goschen to complain about this and other matters. Unfortunately our protests fell on deaf ears and Professor Faulkner continued to promote his pet theory. I can accept that the theory addresses a point of valid concern, but I cannot accept the behaviour of the assessor in presupposing that hatch failure was the cause of the ship's loss. If we need further evidence of the UK assessors swinging away from hard circumstantial evidence of structural failure, there is the fact that the assessors went into print and stated that the structural failure circumstances of the sister ships "Tyne Bridge" and "Kowloon Bridge" were not relevant to the loss of the 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1457 "Derbyshire". I understand that Professor Faulkner has now been asked to resign. This was long after our delegation went to see the Minister. In a letter of October 28th from my honourable friend the Minister at the Department of Transport, Glenda Jackson, she says: "Professor Faulkner's active promotion of the theory that the DERBYSHIRE sank when her hatch covers gave way is a matter of dismay for the Department. Officials have written to Professor Faulkner to convey the Department's displeasure in his untimely interventions. In response, he has offered his resignation as an Assessor ... " This was over a year after we complained about his lack of impartiality. Probably one of the most important aspects of this investigation was to retrieve certain pieces of wreckage for structural and metallurgical analysis. This was requested by the families and by the All Party Group of MPs. It was rejected by the assessors. Instead they opted for a cutting system, that was unproven, in which they proposed to cut only small samples to validate the photos of the fracture faces, not for analysis as was required. I am informed that this cutting equipment failed. I would therefore ask my noble friend if any attempt was made to retrieve any wreckage. I understand that the survey vessel was equipped with alternative methods of retrieval, such as a deep water grab system, and diesel bags that could float wreckage to the surface. This is a proven method of retrieval. If they did not obtain samples, I would like to know why not, as it is of paramount importance to determine the quality of steel used in the "Derbyshire's" construction. Not trusting the independence of the assessors, the DFA solicitors sent a letter to them requesting they look for quality deficiencies that were known to exist in her sister ships, such as defective welding, misalignment, etc. The assessors refused to do this. Again, I believe that that showed a lack of objectivity. Contrary to what had been stated, the DFA has never been involved in any planning of the expedition, only attending meetings with assessors in order to be kept informed of developments. The families made suggestions, but they were not accepted by the assessors, for what I consider to be unconvincing reasons. Such is the families' distrust of the Department of Transport's investigation that they cannot put their faith in the assessors' report and are now setting up a trust fund to finance their own experts to analyse the data and produce their own report. It is a terrible reflection on the Department of Transport when the dependants of the deceased have to find the wreck themselves and then find a considerable amount of money to fund their own independent experts to examine the evidence. They should be able to have complete faith in the assessors' report, but, because of the assessors' unacceptable and biased conduct, they simply do not trust them. In saying that, I do not in any way question the integrity of the EEC assessor, who carried out his duties in a most professional and impartial way. In the light of what has been stated and bearing in mind that data will form the evidence in any future court of inquiry, may I ask my noble friend whether the analysis and interpretation of the data brought back from 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1458 the wreck site can now be carried out by an independent team of experts? Will the Department of Transport provide the funds for such an exercise in order to inject some fairness and impartiality into the proceedings? All that the DFA and the maritime community ask for-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lord Haskel: My Lords-- Lord Dixon: My Lords, I have just one more point to make. Some of my noble friends do not intend to take their full nine minutes. Lord Haskel: My Lords, this is a time-limited debate. The noble Lord's time was up two minutes ago. Will he please wind up? Lord Dixon: My Lords, I was winding up. Finally, if there is a new or reopened formal inquiry, may I ask my noble friend whether it can be held in Liverpool? Liverpool was the "Derbyshire"'s registered port. Furthermore, a significant number of the crew came from Liverpool or the North East, so the dependants would be assisted if they could attend the inquiry without incurring the considerable expense that they incurred last time when the inquiry was held in London. 9.1 p.m. Viscount Caldecote: My Lords, I apologise to the House for speaking in two debates on the same day. I have never done it before and I do not suppose that I shall ever do it again. The "Derbyshire" was the largest UK-built ship ever to have been lost at sea. The trend now is to build ever-larger ships, even bigger than the "Derbyshire". Therefore, it is very important that we learn as much as we possibly can from that tragic loss. The sea is a very hard taskmaster, never to be underrated--and I have seen a few waves in my time. Nevertheless, we should be very hesitant in attributing such disasters to forces of nature, as did the preliminary inquiry in 1980. Mistakes can be made, especially when there are big changes in design, size or type of ship. Subsequent to that preliminary inquiry, other evidence came to light. I refer, for example to the cracking of the sister ship, the "Tyne Bridge", in 1982, to which the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, referred. Research was commissioned by the Department of Transport. In March 1986, the report was published, but it was an amended version of the original 1985 report. In May 1986, the Department of Transport refused to release the original version of the report. Then, in November 1986, another sister ship, the "Kowloon Bridge", ran into trouble and sank. There were clear indications of structural failure. A further investigation followed. A report was published in 1989, again concluding that the problem was that the ship had probably been overwhelmed by the forces of nature. Discussions continued and in 1990 an important paper was read to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects by the late Professor Bishop. However, in 1991 the Department of Transport again refused to reopen the investigation. Later in 1991 there was another refusal to place the full report of 1985 in the Library of either the House of Commons or this House. That report was made by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1459 So, before the wise recommendation made in 1996 by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson of Lymington--I am glad that he is to speak in this debate--that further investigations were needed, it was a rather sorry story of reluctance to face up to the real issues right from the start of the case and to make full public disclosures of all the views expressed in the various investigations and discussions. Further, as the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, mentioned, there have been delays and other problems in keeping the Derbyshire Family Association fully in the picture at all times. I am glad that that has improved lately. I understand that the new report will be completed early in 1998. No doubt the Minister will tell us when it is likely to be published. May I ask the Minister to give us two assurances: first, that when the new report is published, it will be published in full, in its original form, without censorship of any kind and without any scaling down of any of the views expressed; secondly, that the Derbyshire Family Association will receive free copies of the report well in advance of publication, as they have requested, to minimise any further distress that may be caused to the families of those who were lost in this tragic accident? I look forward with great interest to the Minister's reply. 9.6 p.m. Lord Dean of Beswick: My Lords, I rise to compliment my friend and colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, on initiating this debate on such a serious and sad question. I know that he followed the matter assiduously in another place. Over a number of years, I have raised the problem in your Lordships' House, mainly in Questions--and I have never received what I would call a definitive answer. The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, has been mentioned. He was the previous Minister responsible for this. The last time that I asked the noble Viscount a Question on this, it was a complete waste of time. At the time I considered that what I was asking for was reasonable and in the interests of those who had lost family members. However, it was useless; there was no progress whatsoever. We talk about tragedies, but I wonder whether many people realise the enormity of what happened. The "Derbyshire" was at least twice as big as the "Titanic". It may even have been bigger, but it disappeared without trace and with total loss of life. For the life of me, I cannot understand how it has been possible--it appears to be a case of vested interests in this country to prevent those who are most entitled to know, the relatives and dependants of the people who died in this ship, from learning what took place. One obstruction has been placed on top of another. As one jumps over one obstruction, another is erected. I have a copy of the report prepared by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson. In a technical sense it is excellent. I do not wish to clash with my noble friend Lord Dixon or anyone else in the field of shipbuilding. I am an engineer and have never been a shipbuilder, but I know enough about steel construction to appreciate that the box compartment method of building is doomed 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1460 to failure. Wherever it has been adopted in bridge building or anywhere else it has been a disaster. As my noble friend Lord Dixon has said, in this type of construction there is no continuous keel. Therefore, it must be a main contributing factor to what took place. I do not have the figures with me, but these incidents occur in all of the oceans of the world. An annual count is made and the latest figure is 20. This type of ship has disappeared without trace in different parts of the world. No one seems to bother. It must be a cheap method of construction. All that appears to be expendable but cannot be quantified is the loss of life. A second survey is to take place. If a proper survey had been done in the first place and the results had been made available to those who had lost their loved ones--that was all they asked for--these problems would have been avoided. They had an absolute entitlement to it but it was withheld. One can think of other similar incidents in this country. It appears that where there is loss of life at the lower levels of society no one bothers too much. Another example was the "Piper Alpha" disaster, in which 100-odd men are still entombed. The relatives did not receive justice. There was no attempt to deal with that situation. The relatives and survivors wanted certain action taken, but it was too expensive. That was not said but it was the only conclusion that could be drawn from that situation. I hope that when the second survey is completed a final answer will be provided from a completely independent point of view, not the point of view of someone who sits on a commission, finds in one way, leaves and is then used by someone else and gives a verdict having abdicated his original responsibility. This is not new; it has happened in other industries. I recall one situation in which Heriot-Watt University in Scotland was commissioned to carry out another task but suddenly withdrew because of pressure exerted by industrialists who financed the university. I do not know when the second survey will be completed but the sooner the better. If legal assistance is required and the matter goes to court, I hope that the dependants who are left, who have had to beg or borrow to be represented, will have the same access to legal aid as others of whom we read in the press. For example, we regularly read of people who have gone off with other people's money in a grandiose fashion and ended up obtaining legal aid, on one occasion to the tune of £15 million. In another case a German who lived in Italy and who had never visited this country obtained half a million pounds a few months ago in order to sue a Japanese company because that company's business headquarters were in London. In another case an Iranian gentleman who was alleged to have milked the funds of the Arab League, or a similar body, of a substantial amount of money--about £30 million--had his legal costs funded by the British taxpayer. I hope that if the dependants of those who died in this terrible disaster require representation, at whatever level, that will be looked upon sympathetically. If it is not, there is something wrong with justice in this country. My noble friend Lord Dixon has drawn our attention to an important problem. We should start to look at such a matter as an industrial disaster that needs our fullest 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1461 attention. It is a reflection on this country and on some of the people of the establishment--it is 11 years ago now--that we are still struggling for justice for the people who should have been given it right away. 9.14 p.m. Lord Donaldson of Lymington: My Lords, I do not want to say anything about the chapter of events that took place before I became involved in assessing what should be done thereafter, save to say--I have said it before--that the Derbyshire Family Association deserves great credit for its persistence in trying to get the authorities to find out what was the cause of the loss of the "Derbyshire" or at least to see what lessons could be learnt to the benefit of shipping generally from such evidence as could be gathered about that. If it is any consolation to the families, if there had been attempts to take the matter further at a very much earlier stage, the technology which is now available would not have been available, and I doubt whether they could have obtained a tithe of the evidence which has now been uncovered. Furthermore, human nature and, above all, ministerial human nature, being what it is, had they had a series of inquiries as each new piece of evidence arose, there would have been considerable resistance to going into the matter further. We now have the position that an expedition has worked day and night for 57 days over the wreck. Photographs have been taken of every part of it. I am told that there are now 140,000 photographs, all of which have to be matched together to find out from where they have come. Some of them have to be looked at with much greater care to see what lessons can be learnt. There is a mass of factual evidence. There are two stages to this. There is the factual evidence which anyone can see, or will be able to see in due course; and there is the interpretation of that evidence. I hope that no one in their enthusiasm for any particular cause will suggest that those who worked professionally on this survey have in any way suppressed anything. It is all there. There will be legitimate room, no doubt, for differences of opinion as to what inferences, what conclusions, should be drawn; but that is a different matter. On that, if the "Derbyshire" families have a different view, no doubt they will put it forward. They will no doubt be advised whether there are grounds for different views. The function of the people who have been involved in this--in particular, Robin Williams, who has been in charge from the technical point of view--is to lay the facts before the Secretary of State, and to state their conclusions. Those conclusions will be open to debate, if anyone wants to, but I hope that there will be no challenge to the facts. Let me say a word about the approach to my assessment. We had to rate probabilities in some sort of order, because it is no good spending £2 million, which is what we are talking about, on trying to find something that virtually could not have happened. Equally, we are not justified in spending such a sum on looking for evidence of a cause if, in the nature of things, the evidence could not be there. 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1462 I shall give an example: fire. Fire would have left carbon deposits which would have been washed away ages ago. We took various hypothetical causes and gave them probability ratings on the basis of such information as we had, and also evidential ratings--the chances of our being able to find any evidence. We added the two scores together which gave us a league table. In that league table it is not correct to say, as I have heard it said in the Chamber today, that hatch covers were the front runners. There were joint front runners--fore end flooding is a better way of putting the matter, because the water can enter in a number of ways--fore end flooding and Frame 65. There were other subsidiary issues with lesser scores, if one may put it that way. It is not true to say that the assessors favoured hatch covers rather than Frame 65. All three of us approached the matter on the basis that we did not know what the answer was. We wanted to decide what we were justified in spending the money on in the search for truth. There have been references to Professor Faulkner. It is true that from an early stage in our deliberations he was saying to me, "Look, you really ought to consider this question of the strength of hatch covers", because Lloyd's Register, if I remember rightly, said that in the light of current knowledge the strength of those hatch covers was inadequate. It does not follow that they were the cause of the loss in any way. But, as a result, the question of the strength of the hatch covers is now being examined. I hasten to say that the "Derbyshire" was constructed entirely in accordance with the standards of the day. It is a question of the information that has come to light since. Professor Faulkner also stated that he believed that inadequate attention had been paid to special forms of sea that can occur in a typhoon. We paid attention to that, but it did not affect our scaling of the probabilities. It merely meant that fore end flooding and hatch covers had to be examined seriously, just as Frame 65 had to be examined seriously. There was evidence to support both. We heard about the bridge class vessels in relation to Frame 65. We must also take account of the fact that the ITF expedition found the bow virtually intact. I am no expert or naval architect, but it raises the issue of whether that area of the vessel was flooded before she began to sink. One would have expected to find--indeed, the first survey did find--that watertight parts of the vessel exploded as it sank causing considerable damage. There appears to have been no damage to the bow. That does not mean to say that that was the position. It merely raises the probability to a level which comes within a measurable distance of Frame 65. We now have the facts. They must be incorporated in a report in order to make sense of them. I do not know whether those working on the report have formed any conclusions, but they must do so and then report to the Secretary of State. No doubt at that stage everyone concerned will be able to form a view on whether they accept the report or undertake their own investigations before deciding. But that will be the time to make a decision and I deplore any attempt to rush those who are assembling and analysing the evidence. We can never 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1463 undertake the task again; we must get it right this time. If it takes time, then it takes time. I hope that the families of those on the "Derbyshire" will understand that I and the three assessors in their different ways are trying to find out the truth. That is what matters and we must allow sufficient time to achieve that objective. 9.22 p.m. Lord Monkswell: My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, for introducing this important Question. I speak in this short but important debate as a disinterested observer, but one with an engineering background. I have no special knowledge of the "Derbyshire", except what I have gleaned from the newspapers and been able to assess from those reports from my knowledge and experience of engineering history and practice. Until I had heard the explanations of previous speakers, my understanding of the situation was as follows. First, the MV "Derbyshire" was one of a series of large bulk carriers built to the same or similar design at the frontiers of knowledge at the time, or certainly close to those frontiers. Secondly, she was lost without warning on a routine passage, admittedly during a period of heavy weather, but not, so far as we can tell, freak conditions. Thirdly, she was relatively new. Here is where my knowledge of engineering history comes in. One example that I can give is the experience of the early jet engined, aluminium bodied aircraft which suffered metal fatigue as a result of high cyclical stresses. That was a new phenomenon and the experience of the failure resulted in much experimental and research work which pushed back the frontiers of knowledge and resulted in the safe, fast, economical air travel on which we have come to rely. There is another example which may be a little closer to the case of the "Derbyshire". That is the catastrophic failure of liberty ships sailing in cold waters in the early part of the last war. The failures in those cases were found to be brittle fracture associated with the welded hull structures in conjunction with cold environments. Again, research and development led to shipyards being able to weld hull structures in such a way as to provide safe construction of shipping since the war. I have given your Lordships those two examples to suggest that the situation of the MV "Derbyshire" may have been that it was so close to the frontiers of knowledge that it pushed beyond what was known at the time. I have gathered that it was argued by the ship designers and constructors that the "Derbyshire" was just a development of current normal practice and that the insurers put the loss down to an act of God. I may have a suspicious mind, but does that mean that the insurers were not liable to pay out? Can my noble friend the Minister tell the House what the insurers' situation would be if the loss of the "Derbyshire" was due to either poor design or poor workmanship? There is also the situation of the people lost at sea as a result of the "Derbyshire" loss. I am sure that we all grieve for their families. I applaud the campaign that the families have waged to find the truth. But there are other 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1464 horrors. What risks have been faced by the crews of the sister ships of the "Derbyshire", and others built to the same design and manufacturing standards? Do the Government have any figures for the number of ships and seafarers who come into that category? Further, can my noble friend advise the House how many of them have been lost or suffered severe structural problems? I think we are entitled to ask if insurers have a duty of care to the human beings involved in vessels, or types of vessels, similar to those that founder in unexplained circumstances. There is also another avenue to explore. If it is not the insurers' responsibility to determine the facts of the case, either as a duty to their shareholders--or, is it "partners", in the Lloyd's sense?--or as a duty of care to the seafarers involved, is it the duty of the shipowner, the national government or the International Maritime Organisation to determine the facts? Who determines the facts in such cases? Here I believe that we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the various seafarers' unions that funded the original search for the wreck of the "Derbyshire", which was amazingly successful. I hope that the Government can tell us today if they have received the second survey report--or, indeed, when they expect to receive it--and that they can advise us of what action they propose to take, particularly to ensure that the lessons are learned effectively and, most importantly, to protect the lives of seafarers in the future. 9.27 p.m. Lord Murray of Epping Forest: My Lords, I confess that I do not know what caused the tragic loss of the MV "Derbyshire". I wholly agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, that the assessors must be given the time and the resources to do the job which they have accepted to do properly. However, as has already been said, I do know that it is 17 years since the ship went down with 42 seamen and two wives. I also know that their loss has caused deep and continuing grief to their families, who are desperately anxious to know what happened. I also know that it was the persistence of those families, sustained by the mutual support that they built in the Derbyshire Family Association and the practical help that they received from the maritime unions, that has led, at last--in the face of apathy at best and resistance at worst from government departments--to the present survey which at least holds out some hope of answering their question. I do not propose to speculate on what form that answer will take. The noble Lord, Lord Dixon, to whom we are indebted for the debate, asked what lessons we could draw from the events which led up to the present survey. When the MV "Derbyshire" went down in September 1980, the dependants concerned had to get on with life and cope with their grieving as best they could. They tried to pressure the then Government to mount an inquiry. In May 1981, the Minister for Trade announced that a formal investigation was not warranted. 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1465 In the words of an article in The Times magazine of 20th September last, "The Government had better things to worry about than dead merchant seamen. Cargo ships ... were always sinking: they only became news if they polluted beaches, threatened wildlife or could be photographed, preferably breaking up dramatically against British rocks". As has been said, this was not some clapped out rust bucket. As the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, said, this was the biggest British merchant ship ever lost--170,000 deadweight tonnes. It had been built in the UK four years previously. It was double-skinned and well maintained. It was owned in the UK by a reputable line. It was registered in the UK. It was classed with Lloyd's register. It was crewed by competent UK seafarers. However, its loss did not even warrant a formal investigation. There the matter would have rested had it not been for the stubborn determination of the families. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, has said tonight, and as he noted in his 1995 assessment, "The members of the MV 'Derbyshire' Family Association have played a major role in ensuring that the cause of the loss of the 'Derbyshire' is and remains a matter of public concern ... directly and indirectly their persistence has made a major contribution to the cause of maritime safety". I hope the noble and learned Lord will forgive me for quoting from that assessment. As we have heard, it took the break-up of another sister ship, "The Kowloon Bridge", off Ireland in 1986 to jolt the Government into launching a formal investigation in October 1987. In spite of the key part played by the dependants in keeping the issue alive--because without them the issue would have been dead in the water--they were not even included in the list of interested parties. It was only after the intervention of the National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers--in which I declare an interest as a trustee--that they were included. But even then they were refused assistance to obtain legal representation, which they obtained only because the maritime unions paid for it. NUMAST paid over a quarter of a million pounds. In the event the conclusions were unconvincing. There the matter would have rested had not the trade unions again taken the initiative, as we have been reminded tonight. In March 1994 the International Transport Workers Federation agreed to provide the £320,000 needed to fund a search for the wreckage. The results of that search persuaded, or rather shamed, the Government into inviting the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, to assess what further work should be undertaken. Your Lordships have, on previous occasions, paid tribute to the noble and learned Lord's report. However, as the noble and learned Lord has generously acknowledged, the real tribute should be paid to the families of those on the "Derbyshire" for refusing over all those years to take no for an answer. What conclusion the experts will reach from their analysis of the 140,000 photographs and hundreds of hours of videos remains to be seen. However, if the issue is finally to be laid to rest, it will require--as has been said in this debate--more than an assessment by the three government experts. I am not suggesting for a 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1466 moment--I pick up a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson--that the experts would misrepresent the facts or suppress the truth. But this has all gone on far too long and generated far too much suspicion--some demonstrably justified, some perhaps not--to be dealt with in an ex parte manner. As I have acknowledged, the assessors must be given the time and resources to do the job properly. So must the dependants. They must be given the time and resources to do their part of the job. The first question I wish to echo--it has been put already to the Minister--is whether the Government will make the evidence available to bodies which have shown a valid interest, including the Derbyshire Family Association and the maritime unions, and whether they will financially assist the DFA and the unions to hire competent advisers to examine the evidence, and advise them on their judgment. Beyond that, this case history demonstrates the need to establish once and for all the right of the dependants and their representative unions to play a full part in future inquiries of this kind, and to make their contribution to reaching the conclusions which can bear on their rights to compensation as well as enabling them to come to terms with the tragedy of bereavement. When, during the inquest into the "Marchioness" disaster, it was ruled that legal aid was not available, the Lord Chancellor himself arranged for public funding of the families' legal representation. Similarly, the costs incurred by dependants in the "Piper Alpha" inquiry, to which my noble friend Lord Dean referred, were refunded. As it was put in the report of the "Piper Alpha" inquiry: "There are considerations of public policy in favour of not discouraging trade unions and other bodies and persons of limited resources from participation in public inquiries into matters of safety". My second and concluding question to the Minister is whether she accepts that judicial recommendation, and whether she will ensure that legal assistance is provided automatically in future cases of this kind to dependants and their organisations. 9.37 p.m. Baroness Thomas of Walliswood: My Lords, I apologise that in speaking late in the debate I shall almost inevitably repeat points made by previous speakers. From my point of view, there are three stories which run through the 17-year history of events since the sinking of the "Derbyshire" in September 1980. The first is the story of the people involved: the 42 crew members and two wives who perished in the wreck, their surviving relatives in the DFA, the naval architects and other maritime experts who have taken up their cause, and the MPs and Members of your Lordships' House who have kept this issue alive in Parliament, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, both with the debate today and in former times when he was the honourable Member for Jarrow in another place. We should not forget that it was the DFA and its supporters which kept up the pressure for a formal inquiry into the wreck. It was they who increased that 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1467 pressure following the wreck of the "Kowloon Bridge" in 1986. It was they who, despite the conclusion of the 1986 formal inquiry, maintained the need to consider the possibility that a design fault at No. 65 bulkhead might be the underlying cause of all the problems experienced by the Bridge class. It was they who persuaded the International Transport Workers Federation to fund the expedition which found the wreck of the "Derbyshire" in 1994. And it is they who have the greatest personal interest in the report which we discuss today. It is beyond question that the Derbyshire Family Association and its supporters feel that they have received less than their due in the long years since the loss of the crew of the "Derbyshire". The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Epping Forest, has referred to the very different treatment in terms of funding which they have received compared with other family members of persons injured in other types of disaster. Their expert advisers and supporters have not been called upon to give evidence. They have not been able to pursue any claim against the shipbuilder or the shipowner. They have on too many occasions learned important news from the press rather than directly from the Department of Transport. Their confidence in government has been damaged by their experiences. Like others, I wish to ask the Government whether they will give the DFA a sight of the report of the second survey of the wreck site before it is published, and whether they will assist the DFA with the circulation of the technical report to its members. Secondly, there is the story of the ships themselves--six giants of the Bridge class, built by Swan Hunter, which was then in public ownership, during the 1970s. Of the six, two foundered, the "Derbyshire" in 1980, when it was only four years old, and the "Kowloon Bridge" in 1986. The third, the "Tyne Bridge" returned to port when its master heard cracking noises coming from somewhere forward of the superstructure during bad weather. Serious cracking and misalignment in the area of No. 65 bulkhead were discovered, together with the evidence of an earlier repair. The Italian classification society concerned recommended the introduction of continuous plating through No. 65 bulkhead and a greater thickness of deck plating in that area. In effect, a partial redesign of a particular part of the ship was demanded and undertaken as a condition of further insurance. In 1982, two further members of the class--the "Alexander Glen" and the "Cast Kittiwake"--were inspected and modified in the same way as the "Tyne Bridge". In effect, all three of those ships, it is suggested, were returned to something nearer the original design of the vessels which was registered with Lloyd's. One of the mysteries surrounding the sinking of the "Derbyshire" and the subsequent decisions following the preliminary inquiry in 1980 and the formal inquiry in 1986 is whether the modified design was registered at Lloyd's and, if so, where it is now. 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1468 In the light of all this experience with faults in the sister ships, it seems extraordinary that it was not until the exploratory expedition funded by the ITWF actually located part of the wreck in 1994 that the possibility that the sinking of the "Derbyshire" was caused by faults in design was given any public credence by the Government or by inspectors at the two inquiries. Another aspect of the story has been the fact that marine inspectors and others with expertise were not called to give evidence at the inquiries. As a result, the previous Government have been accused, however unfairly, of a cover-up or of a bias against the surviving relatives. Obviously, we cannot today anticipate the result of the recent survey or of any conclusions which may flow from it. But a number of questions can legitimately be asked and answered today, I hope. First, are the Government likely to convene another inquiry or to reopen the previous inquiry following consideration of the report? If so, will the widest possible trawl be made for expert evidence and will the DFA receive any support--financial support, that is--for their representation at such an inquiry? Can the Government confirm that Her Majesty's Government stand by their decision to bear responsibility for any claims against the shipbuilders that might arise, as was stated at the time of the privatisation of Swan Hunter? Can the Minister reassure those who are waiting to learn how this Government will handle the case that they will approach it in a spirit of openness, fairness and generosity? The last theme that has run through these 17 years is that of safety at sea. Of course, we have in this House in the person of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson of Lymington, an acknowledged expert in the field and one who has made a unique contribution to policy-making on these issues. I am very much indebted to him for the work that he does in informing us all of progress, however partial, towards improving safety at sea. I shall not repeat his arguments or the many statements on the need to improve the safety of ships and of their crews which have been made in connection with the loss of the "Derbyshire". Suffice it to say that this case raises a number of very important issues to which speakers have referred already and, in particular, the degree to which lessons learnt from accidents at sea are applied to ship design. It is striking, to me at any rate, that faults in the design or performance of aircraft--metal fatigue, for example--are taken on board not just by the manufacturer of that particular aircraft but by all manufacturers. The "Derbyshire" was one of a rather experimental class of very large cargo vessels yet, as I understand it, it was not put through the same kind of rigorous trials as modern or experimental aircraft have to undertake. Finally, for a number of reasons, there is no ship certification process in existence which has the worldwide force of the aircraft certification process. I acknowledge that there has been considerable progress in other matters affecting safety at sea; for example, the more demanding port inspection procedures instituted under the Paris Memorandum of 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1469 Understanding and supported by a 1994 EU directive, and the greater exigency of the more important classification societies. But have the Government consulted with experts or received advice or formed a view as to how, given the fragmented state of the shipping and shipbuilding industry by comparison with the aircraft and airlines industry, it will be possible to ensure that shipbuilders take due care in launching new types of ship and learn from the mistakes of others? Is there any action that the IMO, for example, can take in that respect? The safety record of bulk carriers is sufficiently poor and the number of lives lost in accidents involving them sufficiently great, even in the past few years, to make it a matter of urgent concern that everything possible should be done to improve the safety of merchant vessels and particularly bulk carriers and their crews. 9.45 p.m. Lord Inglewood: My Lords, in his opening remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Dean of Beswick, congratulated the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, on asking this Question, for he raised a matter of wide-scale and important public interest. That reflects his long-standing concern and interest in this matter, going back to his responsibilities for his constituents when he was a Member of the other place and relying on his knowledge and first-hand experience of the shipbuilding industry. As we are now late in the evening I do not want to be repetitious and go over ground already covered, particularly in relation to the chronology of this matter, which was spelt out in some detail by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon, and my noble friend Lord Caldecote. That was supplemented by the extremely valuable contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, talking to us about the work that he has done on the inquiry into this matter. As has already been mentioned this evening, when we were in government we instigated the second survey following the recommendations which were made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson. Reference has also been made to the role played by the Derbyshire Family Association in taking forward this matter; in trying to establish what actually took place in this sad and tragic accident on the high seas. It is understandable that the Family Association wished to have a close involvement with the second inquiry. But, as my noble friend Lord Goschen said on behalf of the government at that time and as was reiterated by my then honourable friend Mr. Stephen Norris in the other place, the government were concerned about the integrity of the investigation. While they understood the Family Association's disappointment at not having greater control and/or involvement in the inquiry, they felt strongly--I believe rightly--that it must be the prime interest of all the parties involved that the expedition and any subsequent assessment and analysis of what was discovered should not be impugned for partiality, or on the basis of procedural irregularity or by virtue of some possible breach of the rules of natural justice. 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1470 A number of important points have already been raised this evening. Again, I do not want to delay your Lordships by repeating them; I merely record that I, as much as anybody else in the Chamber this evening, am anxious to hear the replies that the noble Baroness, for the Government, may be able to give us later. However, it is important that we look at this matter from the position of where we are now. As has already been said, the story is already a long one. While it is helpful in clarifying and elucidating the position, we must not become bogged down in what is essentially history. In particular, the questions I should like to ask the noble Baroness are, first, whether she knows when the report of the inquiry will be published. Secondly, is the analysis of the findings of that inquiry to be published simultaneously? If not, can she say when it will be published? Thirdly--a point raised by a number of other speakers--what opportunity, if any, will be given to those who wish to comment or take issue either with the findings or with the conclusions reached? What help, if any, will be provided to assist those families who, in one way or another, are so closely associated with the tragedy that occurred? I echo most strongly the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, when he emphasised that this matter must not be rushed. After all, as he said, we have only one opportunity to carry out this inquiry and this analysis, and it is important that we achieve the right answer--right both in terms of being factually correct and right in terms of justice. But, equally, in seeking the truth, we must not be delayed simply gratuitously. When this chapter has been concluded it is important that, as far as we can, we know what happened in the case of this disaster. We must also know, if we possibly can, why those things actually happened. Certainly consequences flow from that. What are the consequences of what occurred both in legal and other terms? Finally--and this is perhaps the most important aspect of the whole story--what lessons should be learnt and what steps should be taken by governments and by others involved in the industry to ensure that such an accident does not happen again? 9.51 p.m. Baroness Hayman: My Lords, in replying to this short but valuable debate, I am conscious that I am joining others who have a long-standing and detailed interest in the subject. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Dixon for the way in which he introduced the debate and to other noble Lords for their contributions. In replying, I am aware that we are debating the issue on the same day as the report of the international inquiry into the 1994 "Estonia" disaster is published. The timing properly serves as a reminder to the House that the sea can be a cruel and dangerous place. At the beginning of my reply I should like to extend my condolences to the families who were bereaved by the deaths of the 42 crew members and the two wives who were on board the "Derbyshire". I shall do my best to reply to the points that have been made. However, perhaps I may say in direct reply to my noble friend's Question that the Government have 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1471 not yet received the report of the assessors on the second survey of the wreck of the "Derbyshire". However, I now have the opportunity to inform noble Lords of the progress that has been made, to address some of the issues and, I hope, to give the House an idea of what is likely to happen next and of the way forward. However, before doing so, I should like to pay tribute to the efforts of the Derbyshire Family Association, which has succeeded in keeping the tragedy in the public eye for all those long years and for ensuring, as my noble friend pointed out, that the circumstances of the ship's loss were fully investigated. It was through the association's efforts that the International Transport Federation funded an expedition which successfully located the wreck in 1994. That was a remarkable achievement, considering the slim chances of success. In his independent assessment of the matter in 1995, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, also praised the work of the association. His report recommended that a second extended and last examination of the wreck be undertaken. He concluded that the likely cost would be fully justified in the light of the potential benefits to ship safety. That conclusion was accepted by the previous Administration and in June 1996 they announced that the return expedition would take place in two phases: the preliminary survey to be followed by the main survey. The costs of the expedition were shared with the European Commission. Three naval architects, who are also leading experts in the analysis of ship wreckage, were commissioned to act as assessors. Two were appointed by the Government and one by the European Commission. I have to say at this point that I know that the Derbyshire Family Association wanted to be part of that expedition. This Government wish that they had been able to be so. However, the previous Administration decided that only the independent assessors and their supporting team should take part. All the interested parties were, however, subsequently invited to a colloquium in March 1996 and to other briefings to discuss the planning and execution of the expedition and the appointment of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. This American research organisation already had extensive experience of examining wrecks at ocean depth. An important aspect in the planning, execution and analysis of the data was, and continues to be, that all possible loss scenarios are thoroughly researched without prejudice. I believe that is the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, made. Where possible, the evidence collected will be used to support or refute each scenario as a possible cause of the sinking. Phase One, the preliminary survey, took place in July 1996 and succeeded in locating, and positively identifying, the stern of the vessel, tested the technical feasibility of the project, and confirmed the findings of the ITF survey. Phase Two occurred in March and April this year and returned with a mass of new material for examination comprising some 200,000 photographs and 4,000 hours 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1472 of video footage. Samples of the evidence have been shown to the interested parties by the assessors who have also explained their methods of analysis. When necessary, the assessors have been assisted by other widely-respected experts who have contributed their specialist knowledge to the assessment. I have to say to the House that the assessor's report has taken longer to compile than was originally envisaged. I believe that several noble Lords who contributed to the debate remarked how important it is that we get the process right. We need to ensure that the distress and uncertainty caused over the years has been resolved. The survey was remarkably successful in providing useful images of the wreck, which have yielded a great deal of information that has had to be analysed. The emphasis throughout this project has been on the thorough investigation of all possible loss scenarios and to obtain as much information as possible from the available evidence. My noble friend Lord Dixon asked about the retrieval of wreckage. The assessors based their survey on photographs of the wreckage. There was, and is, no proven method of cutting and recovering from the depth involved. The cutting equipment designed for the expedition failed, but alternative means were found to validate the detailed photographs. My noble friend also raised the issue of the resignation of Professor Faulkner, one of the assessors. He submitted his resignation for personal reasons. However, as was made clear from the correspondence that my noble friend referred to, he was well aware of our concerns about certain of his public statements in this area. As regards timing--that was an issue raised by several noble Lords tonight--I am pleased to be able to report to the House that the assessors have nearly completed their work. It remains for them to draw their conclusions and prepare their report. In answer to the specific question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, and others, the report is expected to be published early in the New Year. It will be published in full and without censorship. I say that in response to a direct question that was asked. The Government have given an assurance--and this is another issue on which a specific assurance was asked for by the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, and others--that the Derbyshire Family Association and other interested parties will be given advance copies of the report before it is published. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas of Walliswood, the Derbyshire Family Association will be assisted with the distribution of the report as well. Following the publication of the report, the Government will then make arrangements for each of the interested parties to be granted access to the data. Owing to the almost unique status of some of the equipment needed to view the photographic images, access to the data can only be given on the premises of the department. It is anticipated that the interested parties will wish to undertake their own analyses and to compare these with the findings of the assessors. The Government will facilitate these analyses by providing help in the retrieval and presentation of the images. However, I have to say that it will not be possible to provide funds to pay for technical analysis of the 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1473 information on behalf of any of the interested parties, because this money would have to be made available to all the interested parties. The issue as to whether it was necessary to have an independent analysis of the data funded by the Government was raised. I think it would be prudent to wait until we have had the opportunity to consider what the assessors have to say. It would not be helpful to dismiss their report in advance before it has been submitted. This is an issue that we wish to approach in an open way and, as I have said, a full account will be made available and there will be no question of censorship. During the time the interested parties are expected to undertake their own analysis the Government will be considering the report of the assessors in deciding whether or not it would be right to reopen the formal investigation into the loss of the "Derbyshire". The report of the previous formal investigation was published in 1989 and concluded, as many of your Lordships may have noted, that the ship was probably overwhelmed by the forces of nature in a typhoon. Several speakers who have spoken tonight have recorded the deep-seated concerns there were at that conclusion. The Government will decide whether to reopen the formal investigation on the basis of whether new and important evidence has been found which substantially adds to or challenges the findings of the original investigation. I hope that noble Lords will understand that I cannot prejudge the decision of the Government about reopening the formal investigation prior to the publication of the assessors' report. However, my noble friend Lord Dixon asked whether, if that investigation were to be reopened, we would consider that inquiry taking place in Liverpool. I can give him the assurance that in the event of a formal investigation being reopened we would consider that suggestion. My noble friend Lord Monkswell asked about the decision of the insurers in respect of the loss of the ship. The insurers have paid the full claim for the loss of the 3 Dec 1997 : Column 1474 ship and they may wish to seek to recover the moneys paid from any party whose actions led to the loss. It will be a matter for the insurers to pursue, if they consider there is sufficient evidence to pursue their claim through the civil courts. My noble friend also asked about the ships similar to the "Derbyshire", the number that were lost and the number of crew involved. I have to say that, although many bulk carriers have been lost, of the "Derbyshire"'s sister ships only the "Kowloon Bridge" was lost at sea and all her crew were rescued. The other four sister ships worked until they were scrapped. My noble friend Lord Dean of Beswick has raised the issue of the availability of legal aid in the event of the formal inquiry being reopened. Legal aid is only available under the legal aid rules in criminal and limited civil cases. The point was raised regarding the view of the inspector following the precedent referred to by my noble friend Lord Murray, and the views of Lord Cullen following the "Piper Alpha" disaster. It is up to the individual inspector to make his own decision, but in doing so he would no doubt have regard to the views of Lord Cullen as expressed following the "Piper Alpha" tragedy and its investigation. The noble Baroness, Lady Thomas, asked about the action we are taking to ensure safety at sea generally; and my noble friend Lord Monkswell asked who was responsible for safety. Ultimately the ship's flag's state is responsible but all the involved parties--owners, crews, insurers, cargo owners, builders, repairers and classification societies--must play their part in imposing and maintaining safety standards. We shall be working through the International Maritime Organisation to ensure that new ships are designed and built to the highest safety standards. What is already clear from the survey is that it has set a new standard in the retrieval of information from sunken wrecks for accident investigation purposes. It has returned valuable information which it is important that we use properly to investigate what actually happened to the "Derbyshire" and also to contribute to wider efforts to improve safety at sea. House adjourned at six minutes past ten o'clock. source; [URL="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo971203/index/71203-x.htm#contents"]www.publications.parliament.uk[/URL] Little h

Of the same class as the Derbyshire, is there any information about the cause of the explosion on board the Ocean Bridge in 1971. Phill

[B]Ocean bridge explosion march 1971[/B]. I was 2/eng. on the OCEAN BRIDGE when No. 9 tank exploded . We were 60 mile off Cape Finisterre at the time and were standing by the BRITISH COMET, she had sent distress call. She was adrift with no power due to flooding in the boiler room. We had stopped tank cleaning a couple of hours before the explosion which happened at about 1830 Hrs. After the explosion we were on fire and sinking by the stern due to the engine room being holed and flooding fast. The captain Harry Pyle could not be found amongst the rubble. We took to a lifeboat and proceeded to the British Comet. By the next morning she had partial power and at reduced speed headed for La Corunna,Spain. After repatriation myself , 3/Eng. John Edgington and Elect. Ian Young, returned to Spain to assist in the salvage, which took about 6 months to make her safe to tow to Scot Lithgows at Greenock for rebuild. The rebuild took one year. I then did the new maiden voyage, In all I spent about 1 year & 10 months on the ship. Sadly Captain Harry Pyle was the only crew member killed in this sorry saga. The Captain of the German salvage tug Pacific was killed during the salvage, then three of Scot Lithgows workers were killed in the engine room while in drydock. Space is running short so I will continue this tale latter. See photos below. regards to all Colin Last edited by COLIN McCLELLAND; 11th July 2009 at 02:47 PM. [CENTER]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[/CENTER] source [URL="http://www.merchant-navy.net/forum/bibby-line/996-bibby-line-message-4.html"]Bibby Line .... Message[/URL] .... [B]where messages from other contributors can be read plus several images of the damage.[/B] [B]also[/B] [B]OIL TANKER "OCEAN BRIDGE" (ACCIDENT) [/B] HC Deb 22 November 1971 vol 826 cc954-7954 §Dr. Dickson Mabon (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the serious incident on the vessel "Ocean Bridge" while in the Greenock Dry Dock on Friday, 19th November, which resulted in the death of two men and injury to others. §The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Robert Carr) I have been asked to reply. 955 I understand that the "Ocean Bridge", an oil tanker of 113,000 tons, was damaged in a fire at sea about five months ago. She was brought to the Clyde and taken first to a tanker cleaning berth. She entered dry dock for repairs about two weeks ago. On Friday, 19th November a shipyard manager and a number of workmen went on board the "Ocean Bridge" while she was in dry dock at Scott Lithgow's yard on the Lower Clyde. There appears to have been a sudden discharge of carbon dioxide gas—presumably that used in the fire-extinguishing system—into the engine room of the ship, asphyxiating the men who were working there. The manager and one other man died and 10 men were taken to hospital, one of whom had fractured his skull, probably in a fall. There will be a fatal accident inquiry under Scottish law. Meanwhile the accident is being investigated by the Factory Inspectorate. I am sure the House will join me in expressing profound sympathy with the relatives of those who have died, and with the injured. §Dr. Mabon I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for making that statement. I should like to associate my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself with the right hon. Gentleman's expression of sympathy to the widows and families, and to the injured men and their families. May I ask the Minister whether he knows from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether the inquiry following the explosion to which he referred on this ship while at sea five months ago has been set up and, if it has been at work, when it might report? Perhaps he does not have the information today. If not, perhaps he will let us know in due course. In particular, will the right hon. Gentleman make sure, either through the Lord Advocate, or through the Secretary of State, or by whatever process he likes, that the findings of the inquiry into the incident at sea are made known to the inquiry which he has announced today, so that if there is a common factor between the two incidents it can be taken into account? 956 §Mr. Carr I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is right in suspecting that I do not know the answer to the first question, but I shall find it out and write to him about it. I shall certainly take into very close account the proposition which he has put forward and see that that, too, is conveyed to my right hon. Friend, and that close attention is paid to it. Mr. Edward Taylor Has my right hon. Friend considered what appears to be an increase in the incidence of accidents in ship repairing, as opposed to shipbuilding? Second, there appear to have been remarkable acts of selfless bravery following this accident, and a tribute has been paid to them. Would my right hon. Friend and his colleagues make sure that in the Honours List account is taken of bravery in factories, as well as services elsewhere? §Mr. Carr My hon. Friend will know that it would not be proper for me to reply in any specific terms to his last point, except to say that we are all aware of the great bravery which people show under these circumstances, and only a few months ago such bravery was recognised. I am aware of the increasing number of accidents, particularly on oil tankers, and that is one reason why every case must be particularly closely looked into. §Mr. Buchan I should like to thank both sides of the House for their expressions of sympathy. As hon. Members know, both men who died were from my constituency. I take the point made by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward Taylor) on the particular incident of bravery involving one of these men. I wonder whether the fatal accident inquiry will be able to generalise, as well as looking into particular problems. For example, will trade unions be able to be represented by counsel to see whether there is a general problem arising from this kind of ship which is likely to increase in future? That is one of the anxieties with which I hope the fatal accident inquiry will deal. §Mr. Carr I do not think that it is for me to presume to say how a fatal accident inquiry should be conducted 957 under Scottish law, but I shall make sure that the hon. Member's point is drawn to the attention of those concerned. [CENTER]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[/CENTER] source [URL="http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1971/nov/22/oil-tanker-ocean-bridge-accident"]hansard[/URL] Two incidents/explosions/accidents reported. Will continue searching for enquiry results. Little h

[B][SIZE="3"]OCEAN BRIDGE[/SIZE][/B]/GLOUCESTERSHIRE (3) was built in 1970 by Sumitomo Shipbuilding and Machinery Co. at Yokosuka with a tonnage of 66057grt, a length of 849ft 10in, a beam of 134ft 1in and a service speed of 15.5 knots. Bibby's first OBO (ore, bulk, oil) carrier she was launched on 21st November 1969 and delivered in the following March for charter to the Seabridge Consortium. On 8th March 1971, during a voyage from Rotterdam and Pepel, she stopped off the coast of Spain to assist the British Tanker Co.'s British Comet which was taking water in her engine room. As the Ocean Bridge stood by there was an explosion in her No.9 hold which destroyed her pumproom and blew a hole in the starboard side forward of the bridge the size of a tennis court. A resulting fire destroyed the bridge superstructure and on 19th March she was towed into Huelva by the tugs, Pacific and Heros, both owned by Bugsier and Smit's Hudson. On 25th April she arrived under tow in Gibraltar Roads where she was patched up and sent to Marseilles for dock repairs. She was subsequently towed to Scott Lithgow Drydocks Ltd at Glasgow where she arrived in the October to have her after section rebuilt. The repair which cost £2,500,000 was reputed to be the most expensive on a British merchant ship. In 1977 she was renamed Gloucestershire and in the following year sold to Sevenseas Navigation Transport Inc. of Monrovia who renamed her Oceanic Victory. She was owned by Chiu Lung Investments of Monrovia in 1984 who sold her to the Chinese Petroleum Corp. of Taiwan. Renamed Ocean Victory she was transferred to the Chinese Maritime Transport co. of Taipei who changed her name to China Victory. On 17th July 1986 she sailed from Tubarao bound for Kaohsuing where she arrived in the October to be broken up. [CENTER]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[/CENTER] source [URL="http://www.red-duster.co.uk/BIBBY15.htm"]The Red Duster[/URL] The Merchant Navy Association Little h

[QUOTE=phill rose;10050603]Thanks for the information Harry. I was Electrician on the Comet at the time of the incident, and it came up on another site recently that you were still tank cleaning when you came to stand by us. My opinion was that the sensible thing would have been to have stopped tank cleaning which you have confirmed. Have had quite a few conversations on this subject, regarding the state of Captain Pyles grave and so on, also emails from your catering super who came out to Corunna. I did make the trip up to see one of your lads in hospital, but after all this time cannot remember who it was. Phill[/QUOTE] Phil, Sorry, my posts appear to have misled you; the ' I ' in the opening sentence of one of my posts is entirely lifted from the website that I linked and is not me in the first person, simply part of the excerpt that I copied. But thanks for the information in your post. Little h

[QUOTE=harry.gibbon;10050662]Phil, Sorry, my posts appear to have misled you; the ' I ' in the opening sentence of one of my posts is entirely lifted from the website that I linked and is not me in the first person, simply part of the excerpt that I copied. But thanks for the information in your post. Little h[/QUOTE] Thanks, have deleted the post.:o

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