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Western Approaches in WW2 World Naval Ships Forums Archive

Western Approaches in WW2

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The Western Approaches is a rectangular area of the Atlantic ocean lying on the western coast of the United Kingdom. It is roughly the same height as the west coast of Britain, starting directly on the coast and ending in the Atlantic roughly at Iceland. The area is particularily important to the UK, because many of the larger shipping ports lie in this area. [B][B]The term is most commonly used when discussing military actions, notably during the Battle of the Atlantic (both of them) when the German Kriegsmarine attempted to blockade the UK with U-boats operating in this area[/B][/B]. Since almost all shipping would pass through this area, it was an excellent hunting ground and had to be heavily defended. During WWII the task was so important that it had its own commander, and the HQ was moved to Liverpool to be closer to the action, while most of the fleet HQ was in Plymouth. [B][B]The most famous commander of the Western Approaches was Admiral Sir Max Horton, who took command in November 1942 and immediately instituted a series of tactical changes in the way the escort ships were to be used. Organizing them into "support groups" and "hunter-killer groups", they were to operate at longer distances from the convoys and prevent the deadly wolfpacks from ever forming. The technique was successful: with more forces becoming available, rapidly improving technology (particularly radar), and information being provided by Ultra, the battle was soon over with the Allies successful. [/B][/B] [B][B][B]The GIUK gap is an area in the northern Atlantic Ocean, the name an acronym for Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom[/B][/B][/B], the gap being the open ocean between these three landmsses. The term is typically used in military topics. The GIUK gap is of particular import to the Royal Navy, as any attempt by northern European forces to break into the open Atlantic would have to do so either through the easily defended English Channel, the Strait of Gibraltar past British shore guns, or through one of the exits on either side of Iceland. Only France and Portugal had direct access to the ocean in a way that could not be easily blocked at a choke point by the Royal Navy. [B][B]During World War II the gap was used by German ships to break out from their bases in northern Germany and Norway in an attempt to attack convoys, but these actions were generally unsuccessful due to blocking efforts in the North Sea and GIUK gap.[/B][/B] The Germans were aided tremendously with the fall of France, when they were able to base their submarines on the French coast. Between 1940 and 1942 the area between Iceland and Greenland was one of the few where RAF patrol bombers couldn't reach, and thus became the center for considerable action. [B][B]The origin of the term "gap" can be traced to this period, when there was a gap in air coverage known as the "Greenland air gap". The gap was eventually closed in 1943 with longer-ranged versions of aircraft such as the Shorts Sunderland and B-24 Liberator, making submarine actions in the Atlantic nearly impossible[/B][/B]. [B][B]In 1941 WAC had 8 escort groups formed. These typically comprised 4 to 8 ships, under the command of an RN officer, usually a Commander or Lt Cdr. By operating together under a single commander, groups were able to develop group tactics and practice their use; with the issue of a single short command the various ships of the group, often out of sight of each other, could be relied upon to act in a co-ordinated fashion. Later these tactics were standardized and taught to all escort group commanders at the Western Approaches Tactical Unit.[/B][/B] This level of teamwork was never achieved by the attacking U-Boats. Although the wolfpack was a co-ordinated in that a number of boats would be concentrated on a target convoy, once gathered the boats would attack individually without any attempt at further co-operation. It was not unknown for U-boats to get in each others way whilst attacking, or collide with each other. T[B][B]ime and again during the Battle of the Atlantic relatively small, well-handled escort groups were able to frustrate attacks by more numerous groups of U-boats, and ensure the “safe and timely arrival” of their charges. In one example, in November 1942, Convoy ON 144 of 33 ships protected by the B-6 Escort Group of just 5 corvettes, were attacked by a group of 10 U-boats. Over the next three days they fought off attacks by the wolfpack for the loss of 5 ships and one corvette. 28 ships arrived safely. Following this action the SOE (Senior Officer Escort) was “warmly congratulated” for preventing what could have been a major disaster, and the contrast with HX 79 was apparent. jainso31 [/B][/B].

[B][B]ADDENDUM[/B][/B] [B]Battle of the Atlantic -[/B] [B][B]Conclusion [/B][/B]- Just 68 months before, northwest of the British Isles liner "Athenia" was torpedoed by "U-30" and 11 days later "U-39" sunk by Royal Navy destroyers. Since then, tens of thousands of lives, thousands of ships and hundreds of U-boats had been lost in the battle to sustain Britain as the base without which the liberation of Europe would had been impossible.[B][B] As the United States took over from Britain the mantle of the world's most powerful navy, so the last merchantmen and U-boats of the Battle of the Atlantic went to the bottom in American waters and involving American ships. [/B][/B]6th - "U-881" was sunk by the US Navy south of Newfoundland. On the same day, "U-853" torpedoed freighter "Black Point" off New York, was hunted down and sunk by US destroyer escort "Atherton" and frigate "Moberley". [B][B]The cost of the Battle is usually measured in terms of the 2,400 merchantmen sunk in the North and South Atlantic. To this must be added one battlecruiser, three fleet and escort carriers, two cruisers and 47 destroyers and escorts of the Royal and Canadian Navies lost in the Atlantic, excluding the convoy routes to Russia. Also the warships lost by the United States and other Allied navies[/B][/B] jainso31

Jim: As you have noted the Battle of the Atlantic was not an inexpensive enterprise. The British, Canadians and Americans bore the brunt of the battle but we must not forget the Free Norwegians, French, Dutch, Danes and Belgians who participated as well on the sea and/or in the air or in the littorals. Brian

[QUOTE=Brian Wentzell;10045012]Jim: As you have noted the Battle of the Atlantic was not an inexpensive enterprise. The British, Canadians and Americans bore the brunt of the battle but we must not forget the Free Norwegians, French, Dutch, Danes and Belgians who participated as well on the sea and/or in the air or in the littorals. Brian[/QUOTE] And the Poles

Brian and Tim thank you for your interest and input-the British certainly could not have won the Battle of the Atlantic alone-their meagre but gallant forces were fortunately augmented by the RCN USN aboard ships including those manned by the Free French,Poles,Norwegians et al and of course ,aircraft manned these many allied peoples. jainso31

The history of the Western Approaches in WW2 covers a six year battle and many books tell the stories and changes of fortunes for each side. The escort groups with their coordinated tactics, were aided by the code breakers at Bletchley and the introduction of new technologies'. Knowing the areas where Uboats were operating reduced searching an immense area of ocean to pinpointing a small area where the likelihood of success was great. Ships with radar were able to keep a continuous watch for Uboats. They were now detectable at night when surfaced to charge batteries. Added with the Allies extended air coverage it became much harder for the Uboats to operate. The introduction of HFDF (High frequency Direction Finding) enabled ships of the group to monitor the compass bearings of Uboats radio transmissions. By plotting the bearings from different escorts, triangulation provided the location of the submarine. Just a few factors in a huge subject. Brian

Many thanks for your interest and input Brian.Hereunder a brief look at the Tactical Unit or Plot [B][B]Western Approaches Tactical Unit[/B][/B] [B][B]This unit was housed at Derby House. A large plotting table could take 24 players, and the Directing staff could simulate a convoy escorted at sea, and its defense when both threatened and then attacked by U-Boats.[/B][/B] The Director, Captain Gilbert Roberts, Royal Navy, and his staff devised tactics code named Raspberry, Pineapple, Beta Search, Step Aside, etc. all designated to combat and outwit specific German submarine tactics and moves. Roberts would sum up a session saying, [B][B][B]"It is the war of the little ships and the lonely aircraft, long patient and unpublicized, our two great enemies -- the U-Boats and the Cruel Sea."[/B][/B][/B] Nicholas Monsarrat as a young Lieutenant did not forget this summing up. He recalled his tactical course and wrote about it in his now classic book, The Cruel Sea. [B][B]Escort Commanders and Coastal Command Staff all came together here for WATU courses[/B][/B] jainso31

[quote=Old Salt;10045064]The history of the Western Approaches in WW2 covers a six year battle and many books tell the stories and changes of fortunes for each side. Brian[/quote] Probably the most significant change of fortune can be traced to May 1943 when the westbound convoy ONS5 was attacked by about 40 U-Boats, an account of which can be found here: [URL]http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6964[/URL]

[B][B]Bill that was you at your best[/B][/B]- I have taken the liberty of posting your conclusion here because it indicates a lot of detail in ships,weapons et al.which certainly has a place in Western approaches Command. "CONCLUSION [B][B]The battle for ONS.5 was a turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic. Although thirteen ships were lost, with forty U-boats attacking, there should have been many more. But for the training, skill and determination of the escorts, there would have been.[/B][/B] Most revealing is that a very large "wolfpack" has been defeated by the surface escorts only. The Germans blame their defeat on the fog and radar. This is partially true, but should have been anticipated, as fog is the normal weather conditions for this part of the Atlantic, and it was the Germans who chose the place and time of the battle. From a total of 40 U-boats assembled to attack, only 15 were ever in a position to make an attack; the others being thwarted by the aggressive tactics of the escort. It is interesting to note that just one U-boat (U438) was sunk by the Support Groups, while the Close Escort B7 sank four, with one shared. [B][B]The main weapons used were HF/DF, ASDIC and radar for detection, with the depth charge and Hedgehog for destruction. These were not new weapons, although the depth charges were more powerful types, but with the advanced training provided by the Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU), escorts became better at using them effectively. (The new depth charges were filled with Torpex instead of Amatol, which increased the effective kill range from 20ft to 26ft, and the damage range from 40ft to 52ft. Also new detonating pistols increased their depth from 550ft to 700ft.) [/B][/B] A remarkable prediction was made on 2 February 1943 by Rodger Winn, Director of the Submarine Tracking Room in a paper entitled "Appreciation for the period May to August 1943". Paraphrasing him, he said that "For this period, U-boats would concentrate between Newfoundland and Iceland; and there would be no change in BdU’s policy unless U-boats losses exceeded 15%, whereupon the change would be sudden and almost complete". In May 1943, U-boats losses were 30% of all those operating in the North Atlantic, when Admiral Doenitz pulled the plug, and drained the North Atlantic of U-boats." jainso31

Let's not leave out one of the most important figures to participate in the BOTA, without whose contribution to anti-Uboat tactics was nothing short of seminal. I am referring, of course, to (then) Commander Frederick John "Johnny" Walker R.N., later Captain and D.S.O. Without Walker's brilliance and vigilance, surely more lives and material would have been lost in the final tally.

Can't argue with that Dan-Walker was a brilliant tactician and his contribution was substantial-unfortunately it cost him his life. jainso31

[B][B]At the beginning of 1940 the three great operational bases of the Western Approaches Command (Liverpool, Greenock and Londonderry) controlled twenty-five groups of escort vessels totaling some seventy destroyers, eighteen sloops, sixty-seven corvettes and ten ex-American coast guard cutters.[/B][/B] In addition to these ships American destroyers were still escorting certain North Atlantic convoys, and were using Londonderry as their base. The British groups were divided into four categories. Firstly, the [B][B]'Special Escort Groups'[/B][/B], composed of short-endurance destroyers, looked after WS and PQ convoys during the first part of their passages, met the 'monster' liners when they started to bring American troops across the Atlantic, and undertook any unusual requirements which might arise. [B][B]Secondly, there were the groups of long-range destroyers and corvettes, which provided the ocean escorts for the North Atlantic convoys from the Western Ocean Meeting Point right home to Britain, and also escorted the Gibraltar convoys.[/B][/B] There were now sufficient long-range ships to avoid, save in exceptional circumstances, the complication of having to send escorts to Iceland to refuel while on passage, as had been necessary in 1941. Indeed, the importance of Iceland as a refueling base for the Atlantic escorts had declined just when its importance as an air base came to be fully exploited. These first two categories of escort groups were based on Liverpool, Greenock and Londonderry. [B][B]The third class of escort group was composed of long-range sloops, destroyers and ex-American cutters. There were six of these groups, and they usually worked from Londonderry to escort the SL/OS convoys to and from the rendezvous with the Freetown local escorts.[/B][/B] Lastly, there were[B][B] anti-aircraft groups[/B][/B], which consisted mainly of auxiliary A.A. ships and worked in the Irish Sea, besides escorting the Arctic and Gibraltar convoys. The Greenock, Londonderry and Liverpool groups were theoretically interchangeable, but every endeavour was made to keep each individual group intact and to employ them on one route, thereby gaining the advantage of familiarity not only with each other but with the problems peculiar to that route. jainso31

Johny Walker is still there today keeping watch over the Western Approaches. " Not dust, nor the light weight of stone, but all the waters of the Western Approaches will be his grave " Ray H

Thank you Ray- for the line from Captain Walker's funeral eulogy orated by Adm. Sir Max Horton-it belongs right here. jainso31

Vice Admiral Sir Peter William Gretton KCB OBE DSO DSC (27 August 1912 – 11 November 1992) was an officer in the Royal Navy. [B][B]He was active during the World War II Battle of the Atlantic, and was a successful convoy escort commander.[/B][/B] He eventually rose to become Fifth Sea Lord and retired as a vice admiral before entering university life as a bursar and academic. jainso31

[B][B]Vice Admiral Sir Peter William Gretton KCB OBE DSO DSC (27 August 1912 – 11 November 1992) was an officer in the Royal Navy.[/B][/B] [B][B]He was active during the World War II Battle of the Atlantic, and was a successful convoy escort commander.[/B][/B] He eventually rose to become Fifth Sea Lord and retired as a vice admiral before entering university life as a bursar and academic. [B][B]Capt. Donald Macintyre was a highly successful U-boat killer, a soubriquet he took as the title of his autobiography. He was responsible for the destruction of six U-boats during the Second World War, making him one of the highest scoring ASW commanders.[/B][/B] He was also an equally successful escort commander, taking seriously the "fateful instructions that" 'the safe and timely arrival of the convoy' "was our main objective".[31] Over a two year period with B-2, Macintyre commanded the escorts for 28 convoys, a total of 1100 ships, with the loss of just two. The vast majority (99.8%), arrived safely, a record of which Macintyre was justifiably proud, although he was "in a fury"[32] at the loss of the two ships when escorting SC 129. [B][B]Macintyre was also highly decorated for his service, winning the Distinguished Service Order with two bars and the Distinguished Service Cross.[/B][/B] jainso31

The Western Approaches Liverpool War Museum, which is underneath Derby House in part of the old headquarters, is well worth a visit. The address is 1-3 Rumford Street (Near Town Hall), Liverpool, L2 8SZ. It's quite big, being spread over probably a dozen or more rooms (although some are quite small), and there's plenty to see. There's a lot of memorabilia and photographs etc., and a very moving tribute to the Royal Canadian Navy at the end. Here's a link to their web site: [url]http://www.liverpoolwarmuseum.co.uk/[/url] :)

I am much obliged to you Former Chief-I really ought to see it for my late father's memory-he served in HMS Anemone (B4 Escort Group) as a gunlayer on the forrard 4"; but had been WAC for the first three years of the war.Got a PHJ to the Far East after that. jainso31

If you want to learn more about "Johny Walker" and his escort groups read "The fighting Captain" by Alan Burn..and "Relentless pursuit" by Commander.Wemyss. Good books both!

Hi Stan-I do have Alan Burn's "Fighting Captain" and "Walker RN" of course; but not Wemyss-I shall look out for it though.Truth to tell I do have at least ten or more books on the subject of Atlantic Convoy Escorts. jainso31

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