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Battle Of Otranto Strait-12 Nov. 1940 World Naval Ships Forums Archive

Battle Of Otranto Strait-12 Nov. 1940

Posts 1 to 18

[B][B][B]The Battle of the Strait of Otranto (12 November 1940) was a minor naval action during the Battle of the Mediterranean in World War II. It took place in the Strait of Otranto in the Adriatic Sea, between Italy and Albania.[/B][/B][/B] The battle occurred when an Allied squadron entered the Adriatic Sea looking for Italian naval targets.[B][B] Although they did not know it at the time the squadron's real purpose was to help draw enemy attention from a major action against the main Italian fleet base at Taranto. [/B][/B] [B][B]The Allied squadron was commanded by Vice Admiral Henry Pridham-Whippel in the light cruiser HMS Orion, and included the light cruisers HMAS Sydney and HMS Ajax and the destroyers HMS Nubian and Mohawk.[/B][/B] On 12 November, an Italian Navy (Regia Marina) convoy of four merchant ships—Antonio Locatelli, Premuda, Capo Vado and Catalani—were on their way back from Valona, Albania to Brindisi, Italy while escorted by the World War I-era [B][B]torpedo boat Fabrizi, [/B][/B]commanded by T.V.c. Giovanni Barbini and the [B][B]auxiliary cruiser Ramb III [/B][/B]commanded by C.F. Francesco De Angelis. The ships were travelling darkened without navigational lights. The Allied ships proceeded north during the night of 11 November, and upon reaching a notional line between Bari and Durazzo by 01:00 without incident, they turned to run southward. Twenty minutes later, the raiders encountered six darkened enemy ships, including what they thought were two destroyers and four merchantmen. The enemy vessels passed across their front and were making for the Italian mainland. HMS Mohawk opened fire at 01:27, and action became general. I[B][B][B]n a confused night time action, HMAS Sydney attacked the leading freighter at a range of 11 km (5.9 nmi; 6.8 mi), setting it on fire. Over the next 23 minutes, the other three merchantmen were either sunk or damaged and left burning. Fabrizi was hit and heavily damaged and retired toward Valona with 11 dead and 17 wounded. Ramb III after an initial exchange of 19 salvoes broke off the action unscathed. The merchantmen were all sunk in the engagement. The Allies suffered no damage or casualties, although a torpedo narrowly missed Sydney's stern at 01:40. The Regia Marina suffered casualties totalled 36 dead and 42 wounded.[/B][/B][/B] Ramb III, the only standing player of the battle, will be on display at Rijeka as a museum ship as the Galeb. The Italians retaliated by sending aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica to locate the British naval squadron; however, the CANT flying boats which eventually located the naval squadron were shot down.[B][B][B] The Regia Marina sent motor torpedo boats located north of Valona, Cruiser Squadron 7, consisting of light cruisers Muzio Attendolo, Eugenio di Savoia, Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta, the 15th Destroyer Division from Brindisi, Cruiser Squadron 8, consisting of light cruisers Duca degli Abruzzi and Giuseppe Garibaldi, with the 7th and 8th Destroyer Divisions from Taranto sailed to intercept the British naval squadron in the Otranto Straits, but they failed to make contact[/B][/B][/B]. The day after the battle, two Italian torpedo boats—Curtatone and Solferino—rescued a total of 140 sailors. [B][B]PS Is it more than likely that VADM Pridham-Wipple WOULD have known the Squadron's true purpose???[/B][/B] jainso31

[B][B]ADDENDUM TO THE ABOVE[/B][/B] [B][B]Ramb III returned to Brindisi undamaged,where her commander was relieved and faced a court-martial for desertion. [/B][/B] [B][B]This action marked the first night surface action against an Italian convoy and it foreshadowed how deadly British Strike Forces would be[/B][/B].This was the only time Allied surface warships successfully attacked Italy's Balkan supply route,which at the time occupied a quarter of the nation's merchant shipping-however further sweeps of the Otranto Strait in the ensuing three months proved fruitless. jainso31

[QUOTE=jainso31;10044653] This action marked the first night surface action against an Italian convoy and it foreshadowed how deadly British Strike Forces would be.[B]This was the only time Allied surface warships successfully attacked Italy's Balkan supply route[/B],which at the time occupied a quarter of the nation's merchant shipping-however further sweeps of the Otranto Strait in the ensuing three months proved fruitless. jainso31[/QUOTE] Contrary to the public perception, the RN was not that successfull, when attacking the supply route to North Africa. While some convoys got butchered indeed, most got through unharmed. ~90% of the men and ~75% of the equipment made it to Libya.

When the Italians declared war on the British by attacking British Somaililand and Eritrea then moving their forces into Egypt from Libya, the British force was far to small and scattered to enable an effective defence and counter offensive. The Italians had numerous successes and managed to reach the Egyptian border, but when the British sent reinforcements and Operation Compass was launched by Wavell, the battle for North Africa was turned around almost overnight with the Italians being completely taken by surprise at the speed of the British build up. Within a two month offensive the British had captured 130,000 Italian soldiers and reached El Agheila where it was ordered to stop. It was in this first phase of the Desert War that supplies proved to be crucial to modern warfare and especially so in the case of the North African Campaign where the front stretched for hundreds of miles and was also very far away from the two main participating countries homelands (Britain and later Germany). In 1941 Allied shipping losses were very high, but as the Allies became more proficient at suppyling Malta and North Africa as a whole, these losses halfed in 1942 and both Naval and Air superiority were regained in the Mediterannean. [B][B]Torbruk was able to withstand an eight month siege from April 1941 to December as supplies were delivered via the port and the Allied offensive in the Mediterannean became more and more effective throughout 1942 with the Italians losing 50% of their supplies at sea in December 1942. In 1943 the Axis suffered even more catastrophic losses in the Mediterannean with 1,200 ships being sunk; and �in february only 25,000 tons had arrived instead of the 80,000 required3: the effect on the Axis forces in North Africa certainly being decisive. The Afrika Korps were heavily handicapped by the fact that supplies did, at certain critical times in the campaign, dictate their strategy.[/B][/B] Malta was a critical asset to the Allies and a grave thorn in the side for the Axis powers throughout the war in North Africa; it was the Allied success in keeping Malta supplied and therefore allowing Force K to effectively operate against the Italian Merchant Fleet that was the decisive factor in winning the North African war for the Allies. If Malta had fallen to the Axis powers as had Crete, then the Luftwaffe and the U-Boats would have had the perfect base from which to attack British supply convoys, control the Mediterannean and the ability to supply the Afrika Corps effectively with much less risk. lDuring the pendulem war that continued over hundreds of miles between the Eighth Army and the Afrika Korps there was another critical battle continuing in the Mediterranean between the Italian Merchant fleet and Allied Submarines based at Malta as well as the Surface forces at Gibralta (Force H), Alexandria (Force B) and Malta (Force K). This was to be a critical battle due to the distances involved in the fighting in North Africa, where supply lines grew longer and longer and fuel became more scarce due to the highly mobile warfare that was being fought. Both sides suffered from this style of warfare and this created the pendulem war referred to earlier with one army advancing too fast for its supplies to keep up, making it vulnerable, whilst the other shortens his supply lines as he is beaten back towards his base, which enables the counter offensive and so it continued. This account would somewhat refute what you have claimed.I truly believe that your 90% and 75% figures are overstated jainso31 [url]http://www.topedge.com/panels/ww2/na/supplies.html[/url]

[QUOTE=jainso31;10044692] This account would somewhat refute what you have claimed.I truly believe that your 90% and 75% figures are overstated jainso31 [url]http://www.topedge.com/panels/ww2/na/supplies.html[/url][/QUOTE] Understated! Acc. to 'The Struggle for the Middle Sea', the numbers are 92% and 86%. The British-Italian war in the Med lasted almost three years. By 1943 it had become hopeless for the Italians but before that there were some bad and many not so bad months, because the RN could not always fully concentrate on the convoys. Whenever the Axis ground troops were advancing and Malta was bombed by the LW intercepting convoys got harder. Greece and Crete were also huge distractions of British naval power, so was the war with Japan after December 1941. It was the similar in the Atlantic. During the first two years only 19 out of 900 convoys lost six or more ships. Out of the ~12,000 ships that sailed in convoys only 291 were sunk, a mere 2%.

I have to admit- that on consulting Chart C on p259 of "Struggle for the Middle Sea" that you are correct- assuming,of course, that Vince O'Hara's figures are accurate- but then- who am I to argue with Vince?? In addition I think your reasoning for this high success rate, certainly had much to do with the heavy commitment laid on the RN in 1941/42. I cannot go off thread further to comment about the Atlantic- which is a mighty subject in it's self.If you have any further comment to make re.this thread- will be only too happy to run with you. jainso31

The chart on page 259 of Struggle for the Middle Sea wasn't sourced: I put this together sometime in 2007 or 2008 using Sadkovich's "Italian Navy in World War II" (table 10.9 on page 343 and 10.10 on 344) and the statistics section in Bragadin's "Italian Navy in World War II." Sadkovich copied the tables in"La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale." Volume I. . Dati statistici. (Rome, 1972). The tables on Italian traffic in Playfair's "The Mediterranean and Middle East" (these are scattered throughout the volumes, see 281, Volume II for an example) are based on Bragadin. I've since acquired the relevant tables from Dati statistici and also the volumes in the official Italian history that cover the convoys to North African and the Balkans. My next book, which is due out in two months, covers the traffic to North Africa in some detail, although the focus is the mid-June 1942 convoys Harpoon and Vigorous. All of this is to say that it is true that over the course of the war 98 percent of the men and 90 percent of the material that shipped from Italian ports for Africa or the Balkans arrived safely. Some months (November 1941 or October 1942) it was much less, other months, the safe arrival percentages were near 100%. We hear about the convoys that get shot up but not about the hundreds of routine sailings that arrived without problem. Vince

QUOTE FROM PREVIOUS POST "All of this is to say that it is true that over the course of the war 98 percent of the men and 90 percent of the material that shipped from Italian ports for Africa or the Balkans arrived safely. Some months (November 1941 or October 1942) it was much less, other months, the safe arrival percentages were near 100%. [B][B]We hear about the convoys that get shot up but not about the hundreds of routine sailings that arrived without problem."[/B][/B] Thanks for clearing that particular matter up Vince-I must confess that I was hoping that your new work may have revised figures for the success rate of Italian convoys to North Africa but excluding the Balkans. jainso31

[QUOTE=Vince O'Hara;10044744] [B]I[/B] put this together sometime in 2007 or 2008 using Sadkovich's "Italian Navy in World War II" (table 10.9 on page 343 and 10.10 on 344) and the statistics section in Bragadin's "Italian Navy in World War II." ... [B]I[/B]'ve since acquired the relevant tables from Dati statistici and also the volumes in the official Italian history that cover the convoys to North African and the Balkans. [B]My[/B] next book, which is due out in two months, covers the traffic to North Africa in some detail, although the focus is the mid-June 1942 convoys Harpoon and Vigorous. [B]Vince[/B][/QUOTE] ? *cogs turning* = Vince O'Hara as in Vincent P. O'Hara! Talk about surprises and a [B]great[/B] book! 'In Passage Perilous' just went into the shopping basket. Strange that Amazon Germany has it listed in November, while Amazon UK in January 2013.

Do I understand you correctly- that Vince's new book is out already in Germany and will not be available until 2013 in England?? I hope you do not mind me asking this -what should I call you-I don't care to talk as if you did not exist.Everybody calls me Jim- which I am comfortable with What did the "turning cogs" tell you?? jainso31

[QUOTE=jainso31;10044753]QUOTE FROM PREVIOUS POST Thanks for clearing that particular matter up Vince-I must confess that I was hoping that your new work may have revised figures for the success rate of Italian convoys to North Africa but excluding the Balkans. jainso31[/QUOTE] Jim: to North Africa (Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia the totals were 2,671,550 tons of materiel shipped and 2,236,487 tons arrived. That's 83.7 percent. By year it was 1940: 97.7% arrived (297,475 tons) 1941: 83.9 percent (1,016,442 tons) 1942: 83.8 percent (1,043,128 tons) 1943: 68.9 percent (307,513 tons) There were five months (all in 1940) when 100% of materiels shipped arrived. There were two months (November 1941 and May 1943) when less than fifty percent arrived. The most tons in any one month was April 1942 when 150,389 tons (99.2%) arrived. M. Becker. Thank you for the interest. In the US the publication date for "In Passage Perilous" is now November 5, 2012. It one point it was January 2013 but the publisher has been moving it up. You can check out the cover on the Indiana University Press web site. Vince

Once again my thanks for all the assistance you have given Vince-I note the reduced success rate with the Balkans removed from the equation!!. I look forward to your new book:):)

[QUOTE=jainso31;10044830]Do I understand you correctly- that Vince's new book is out already in Germany and will not be available until 2013 in England??[/quote] No. It is not out, just on the website. You can pre-order it but release the release date is November. Not that this means much on Amazon. Where is my ‘Nelson to Vanguard’, not to mention Eric Bergerud’s ‘Oil on the Water’. :( [quote]I hope you do not mind me asking this -what should I call you-I don't care to talk as if you did not exist. Everybody calls me Jim- which I am comfortable with[/quote] It is Markus. Should have chosen ‘Markus Becker’ as my username. [quote]What did the "turning cogs" tell you??[/quote] I was wondering about him saying ‘I put’, I’ve’ and ‘my next book’. Language like he was the author of ‘The Struggle for the Middle Sea’ and then it clicked. He is the author.

Hi Markus-thanks for your post re Vince's coming book etc.Do hope you will join me in my next offering. jainso31

Hi all, Nice to see you back Jim! In looking at this action and where it took place, my thoughts are that the British squadron pushing up into the Adriatic was actually quite brazen! That narrow Otranto Strait should have been so easy to plug by the Italians so that the British ships would never get back to base! As it were, the RM was unable to acomplish this even with two squadrons of cruisers & destroyers, plus torpedo boats, allowing the British to do their deed and get clean away. [IMG]http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cb/Gulf_of_Taranto_map.png/545px-Gulf_of_Taranto_map.png[/IMG] I would think the V-Adm should have been aware, but I doubt that would have benefitted the crews to know they were, in a sense, "bait". I suppose too that their success was vastly overshadowed by the success of the Taranto raid. All the best with the new book Vince! I'll look it up.

Hi Paul-happy to see you in print again-thought you had dropped off the radar. The thought- the raid up into the Adriatic-had escaped me along with the suggestion that the British Force could well have been "bait"-but knowing the nature of the Italians-they would have been full occupied by what was going on at Taranto-despite signals from the wretched convoy-which they obviously were aware of; because they sent the two Torpedo Boats Curtatone and Solferino out to pick up 140 survivors.By this time the birds fad flown. My thanks for your post and excellent map. jainso31

[QUOTE=Paul C.;10044971]Hi all, All the best with the new book Vince! I'll look it up.[/QUOTE] Thank you Paul! As for the Italians intercepting the British squadron, It was only possible if there was an Italian force at sea in the vicinity. If the units at Taranto had full steam up (which they didn't) and if they had gotten underway at the same time the British broke off the action (and were not distracted by the Taranto raid, which they were and they had instant communications with the convoy and a perfect understanding of what had happened, which they didn't) and if they had sailed two knots faster than the British force for five hours until daybreak, they'd still have been 50 miles behind. Vince
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[QUOTE]As for the Italians intercepting the British squadron, It was only possible if there was an Italian force at sea in the vicinity. If the units at Taranto had full steam up (which they didn't) and if they had gotten underway at the same time the British broke off the action (and were not distracted by the Taranto raid, which they were and they had instant communications with the convoy and a perfect understanding of what had happened, which they didn't) and if they had sailed two knots faster than the British force for five hours until daybreak, they'd still have been 50 miles behind. [/QUOTE] Thanks Vince - makes it all very clear. And I'd suspect the British too were very well aware that interception was unlikely unless there were ships already at sea - and probably had the intelligence to know that they weren't any (given the planning for Taranto). Doesn't say much for Italian reconn in the area that the British could operate undetected so close to their coast in relatively confined waters.

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