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Abdacom 1942-reasons For Failure World Naval Ships Forums Archive

Abdacom 1942-reasons For Failure

Posts 1 to 18

[B][B]The Allies – the United States, Britain and the Netherlands – had always believed that defense of the Far East against the Japanese was an iffy proposition at best, but the speed of the Japanese advance was still surprising.[/B][/B] An attempt was made to pool their slender resources available into an organization called ABDACOM – the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command. The naval component – comprised of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, elements of the British Far Eastern Fleet, the Dutch East Indies Squadron and elements of the Royal Australian Navy operating under Royal Navy command – was known as ABDA-Float, which by mid-February 1942 was commanded by Dutch Admiral Conrad E. L. Helfrich were all involved in the disastrous [B][B] Battles of the Java Sea [/B][/B] [B][B]A fully-integrated multinational force, like ABDACOM was then and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is today, was a relatively new-fangled thing. From its inception, ABDA-Float was crippled by five major issues:[/B][/B] [B][B]1. Communications [/B][/B]– Integrating sailors from four different countries and three different navies who spoke two different languages was never going to be easy. The additional pressures of a fast and relentless Japanese advance made it next to impossible. [B][B]2. A complete lack of air power[/B][/B] – The loss of the US Far Eastern Air Force (caught on the ground and destroyed by the Japanese due to the incompetence of US General Douglas MacArthur) and the British Malaya air force crippled ABDA air efforts, denied ABDA-Float necessary air protection and hampered intelligence gathering. [B][B]3. Operational accidents and mechanical breakdowns[/B][/B] – The speed of the Japanese advance and the lack of air protection denied ABDA-Float the necessary time and security for maintenance and repair of their ships and rest for the crews. Facilities for such maintenance and repair in the Indies were basically limited to the principal Dutch naval base at Soerabaja (Surabaya), which became a major target for Japanese air attacks, and one floating drydock at Tjilatjap (Cilacap), inconveniently located on Java’s southern coast. The results further crippled Allied efforts. [B][B]4.Command Structure[/B][/B]-Because it was a Multinational Force is was naturally multilingual-certainly not good for successful cohesion [B][B] 5.Force Deployment and Battle Tactics.[/B][/B] These factors would show themselves again and again. [B][B]By the end of February, ABDACOM had proven to be ineffective and was dissolved, with the remaining ABDA forces placed under Dutch command for the last ditch defense of Java. Defense was more akin to leaving one’s head in a noose, however, as by then Java had been cut off by the losses of Malaya, Singapore and Sumatra to the west, and the islands of Bali and Timor to the east. [/B][/B] Tactical command of the ABDA naval forces was placed in the hands of Dutch Admiral Karel Doorman.[B][B] Time and again, Doorman would sortie out to challenge the Japanese advance, only to be turned back by Japanese air attacks. So often did this happen that Doorman’s courage was questioned and he was nearly relieved of duty several times. After the Battle of the Java Sea, questions about his courage seemed to vanish. Not coincidentally, so did he.[/B][/B] [B][B]DISCUSS PLEASE[/B][/B] [url]http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/endofbattleofjavasea.aspx[/url] jainso31

[B][B][B]ADDENDUM TO THE ABOVE[/B][/B][/B] [B][B]Battle of Sunda Strait[/B][/B] Perth and Houston were at Tanjung Priok on 28 February when they received orders to sail through Sunda Strait to Tjilatjap. Material was running short in Java, and neither was able to rearm or fully refuel. Departing at 21:00 on 28 February for the Sunda Strait, by chance they encountered the main Japanese invasion fleet for West Java in Bantam Bay. The Allied ships were engaged by at least three cruisers and several destroyers. [B][B]In a ferocious night action that ended after midnight on 1 March, Perth and Houston were sunk[/B][/B]. A Japanese minesweeper and a troop transport were sunk by friendly fire, while three other transports were damaged and had to be beached. [B][B]Second Java Sea[/B][/B] After emergency repairs, the badly-damaged[B][B] Exeter[/B][/B] left for Ceylon; she departed Surabaya at dusk on 28 February and limped toward Sunda Strait, escorted by[B][B] Encounter and Pope[/B][/B]. However,[B][B] all three ships were intercepted and sunk by the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro on the morning of 1 March.[/B][/B] [B][B]Bali Strait[/B][/B] The four U.S destroyers of DesRon 58—John D. Edwards, John D. Ford, Alden and Paul Jones—were also at Surabaya; they left for Australia at nightfall on 28 February. After a brief encounter with a Japanese destroyer in the Bali Strait, which they were able to evade, they reached Fremantle safely on 4 March. [B][B]Consequences[/B][/B] [B][B]A further two American, and one Dutch destroyer were sunk as they attempted to escape to Australia. The main ABDA naval force had been almost totally destroyed: 10 ships and approximately 2,173 sailors had been lost. [/B][/B]The Battle of the Java Sea ended significant Allied naval operations in South-East Asia in 1942, and Japanese land forces invaded Java on 28 February. The U.S. and Royal Air Force then started to retreat to Australia. Dutch troops aided by British remnants fought fiercely for a week. In the campaign the Japanese executed many Allied POWs and sympathizing Indonesians. [B][B] Despite their logistical problems, the decisive factor in Japan's favor seems to have been air power. Eventually, the Japanese won this battle of attrition and ABDA forces surrendered on 9 March[/B][/B]. jainso31

It was doomed from the start. Politically the members had talked prior to war being declared but physically the navies / armed forces had not exercised and got to know each other and develop commonality. The pressure of a relentless Japanese advance gave them no time and the end results were a forgone conclusion. Precious ships, aircraft and men lost for nothing. It was also noted in many books from that period the NEI administration and civilians were apathetic about the fight - what hope then the possible success of any military enterprise based around the NEI? None. Perhaps another what if- what if the Abdacom structure had been in place for some time prior to war's outbreak and the fleet had time to concentrate - either at Singapore / Manila. Basically, same air, sea and land forces but with a chance to exercise together, develop commonality and work out war plans. I'd also suggest that superior Japanese sea fighting ability and tactics at that stage of the war stood them in good stead against the scratch allied forces as much as dominant airpower.

Sadly Anzac you have hit the nail squarely on the head-there was little right about ABDACOM-the "What If" you mentioned might,just might,have made a difference; but I do think that the Dutch commander's vacillations were lethal-ships like Houston,Perth and Exeter were lost in penny packets and these ships shoild have been under American or British command-where was Adm Harwood of cruiser command at the River Plate; already "blooded" to stand up to and possibly outwit, the superior Japanese fighting tactics?? I think in the long run you are right -the Dutch had no stomach for the fight and not so much lost their ships and crews- but gave up on them. Despite the lack of air cover-no ship was lost to enemy aircraft. My thanks for your interest and input. jainso31

I've always thought that the saddest aspect of the loss of SE Asia to Japanese aggession Dec 41- March 42 was the lost opportunity of the allies to concentrate forces prior to war being forced upon them by Japanese action. I cant recall the exact date at this stage but recee and spies had spotted Japanese forces on the move and concentrating in IndoChina prior to December 41. The NEI possessed a sizeable and useful collection of destroyers and subs- something the RN lacked. In addition, the Far East Command had managed to gain some degree of US co-op in permiting a USN destroyer squadron to join the RN forces at Singapore when hostilities opened. If somehow all this could have been concentrated in the Singapore area around early Dec before the Japanese struck the allies would have bene in a much better situation. Still lacking airpower but maybe such an arrangement would ahve forced RN hands and summonsed up the old HMS Hermes from South African station and prodded RAF and Churchill for some more air resources. By the time of NEI campaign it was a case of being continually back pedalling and not being able to stop and get ones balance. It was only when the Japanese stopped coming at them were the allies able to catch their breath and organise. Politically, they made the decision to give fighting commands to the Dutch- a huge mistake as they had had no experience, whilst overallcommand lay with Wavell (talk about being sold a lemon!!!!!). The fighting commands of sea, land and air should ahve gone to however was the most experienced immaterial of nationality.

I think the main trouble lies in the attitude of the Phoney War personified in Belgium and France in 1940-peacetime regular soldiers led by Great War generals all waiting for something to happen and it did in the form of Blitzkrieg . Similarly in India and SE Asia what was available was much the same- dugout Generals and Admirals and poor strategies Pearl Harbor unquestionably wakened the Americans up and fast. GB and it's Commonwealth however had been at war for nigh on two and a half years; and still hadn't pulled it's finger out eg. POW and Repulse sunk for nought.Singapore with 130000 troops given away by a timorous General who was out- thought by a Japanese general who "frightened" him. Resources aplenty but under extremely poor management; and apathy- lost us this particular stage of the war.I cannot but agree with you it was by far one of the saddest aspects of the SE Asia Campaign jainso31.

ABDA was largely gutted by the British. In a futile attempt to save Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, ground and air forces were moved up to those locations and ultimately lost or forced to surrender/retreat. It should have been realized that the prize in the area was the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies and all available forces be saved for its defense even if it resulted in losses of those other areas. Instead, in trying to guard everything, they ended up guarding nothing because the forces were spread too thinly allowing the numerically inferior Japanese to obtain serial local superiority because they had the initiative and so could choose when and where to strike.

Hello, I will attempt to flesh out a few points on this discussion that may add a little light to this subject. 1.) ABDACOM was Wavell's title. The overall command & area was ABDA. (Originally it was called ADBU, I think.) 2.) ABDAFLOAT was originally ADM Thos. C. Hart, head of the US Asiatic Fleet (CINCAF); he was replaced in early Feb by VADM C. E. L. Helfrich of the Royal Netherlands Navy, and known as CZM also, who had worked behind the scenes against his own allies from the start to have Hart removed. [B][I]That[/I][/B] in itself should give everyone a very good idea of the quality of cooperation that ABDA saw... How anybody imagined that they were going to enjoy the luxury of such back-stabbing and prima donna-ish displays is staggering. {By the same token, Hart's diary repeatedly speaks of the absence of any sense of urgency in his co-commanders...as if they had all the time in the world. ABDA conferences were frequently spent discussing what they were "going to do" in a couple of months when they received all manner of supplies, etc. Meanwhile "Mr. Jap" (as Hart termed our enemy) was steadily moving south, and gaining land, air, and sea in huge gulps.} 3.) Hart later wrote (repeatedly) that he considered ABDA primarily a British Army set-up, and as such the principal focus was generally Singapore/Malaya. 4.) Hart never once saw the air echelons (ABDA AIR) at his HQ or heard of their operations while he was at Bandoeng/Lembang. The GHQ was described by Hart as [I]"highly complex"--[/I]which is a polite way of saying it was a bloody mess, I suspect--and gettting it into any semblance of order was going to be an arduous task. [I][I]"It has to handle three armies, three navies, and no less than six air organizations." [/I][/I] And he noted that the enemy, MUCH stronger, is continuing to knock at the door throughout the Far East every day... 5.) When he returned from the abortive naval strike of mid-Feb into the Gaspar Strait area towards Banka, RADM Doorman said that he "expected to be condemned for his actions" or words to that effect. He was no fool, and understood what was wanted and what had failed. Doorman was well-liked by his fellow naval officers who called him frank, congenial, and a good, bluff seadog type. Hart said that his attributes were that he at least "knew the waters" they would be fighting in, and that there was "no evidence he [was] not good." Nonetheless, he was not the right man for the job, but then there were exceedingly few "right" men out there at the time. 6.) To even remotely suggest ABDA was an 'integrated mulitnational force' is misleading, although I understand this is not meant in a technically precise sense. ABDA never had the time or means to become anything of the sort. AT BEST what it resembled, as an officer on HOUSTON remarked after the war, was an All-Star team of players who had never known one another or practiced together at all, and with no common playbook, facing a cohesive championship team of veteran players. More often, though, the GHQ resembled a "refugee camp" as one American officer later wrote, where chaos was endemic. And such camps do not make for well-organized or effective resistance to a determined, powerful & cunning foe. 7.) Yes, communications were just awful. They employed Dutch land-lines, numerous types of codes & cyphers, so-called "secure" phone lines between Bandoeng/Batavia & Surabaja--which worked poorly--and despatch riders on motorcycles & bicycles (between Bandoeng & Lembang at least), w/many of these females, and not all of those free from security issues, which the cautious Asiatic Fleet people saw as far too lax. (One was recognized by an ABDA naval officer as a White Russian cabaret dancer fron Shanghai...) The USN brought in a number of its own personnel to help out, while the British had moved quite a few women, sent down in the exodus from Singapore, who worked as clerks in the communications sections. I believe there were not only Dutch, but British, American, and even French codes used at various times. 8.) Hart considered the British "fair and open" by & large--although he didn't get along too well w/Layton--and he thought highly of ABDAFLOAT's British CofS, Palliser ("a worker and bright") and the Australian CCCF/Collins (whom he felt was the most qualified naval commander out there at the time.) Not so Helfrich: [I]"...he is another cup of tea...always plotting..."[/I] 9.) It is worth recognizing that Hart had initially requested Van Staveren of the Dutch navy as ABDAFLOAT Chief of Staff, but Helfrich denied the request. 10.) A number of American officers in higher echelons were found wanting as well. These are noted in the diary of General Brett, and reveal more of the same in terms of apathy, complacency, incompetence, etc. Finally, Hart reports more than once that the general tenor of ABDA was "Let the other fellow do the hard tasks, and always blame someone else for not pulling their weight." I suspect there is much (unhappy) truth to that observation. Not for nothing were the Americans reluctant--in the extreme--to place any of their units under foreign command after the debale of ABDA.

I recall from my long ago youth reading a book about the battle of the java sea and i was almost comical in describing some of the confusion and 'antics' the fleet / collection of ships got into once engaged with the IJN. Communications via the dutch flagship were labourious and slow- totally unsuited to actual battle requirements and several examples were cited where non-ordered actions saved the ships. If memory serves me right- the Exeter was hit and fell out of line, the following Australian and US cruisers thought it was an ordered action and followed suit leaving the 2 x dutch cruisers in the lead going off on their own in a very dangerous situation. The IJN thought it was a great, deliberate tactic to momentarily disengage. It was anything but. Great example of fuitility. I dont doubt the bravery of all the seamen, indeed servicemen, on the Allied side, in the circumstances of 1941-42 they were badly led, supplied and used as tokens. The phrase 'sometimes men have die' is used to cover up inadequacies and failures elsewhere. I think the collapse of SE Asia is one of those examples.

WWII pacific history is my thing! Especially the early war period and the Asiatic fleet. Abda was a mess, for all the reasons cited above and a LOT more! The problems encountered and the results were more self inflicted than Japanese prowess! Several corrections first, theres were ships sunk by japanese air power, the USS Pope, DD-225 for one, The langley for another. The Dutch threw away for many years any chance of developing a real resistance capable of fighting the Japanese on java, by forceing Javanese natives to hate them even more than they hated the Japs. To this day there is still no real estimate to how many ABDA survivors were actually killed by the Javanese, possible more than the japanese later killed after rounding up the survivors/prisoners. The ABDA command from a naval standpoint failed to provide any way of translating their codes, flag signals or even plain radio languge (Dutch) to any of the other commands. They just simply expected the others to know it! There has been plenty of comment over the years on what was signaled to the various ship commanders at the battle of Java. The most used and commented on was the order by Doorman to "follow me" with NO other orders or signals given? Follow me where? Captain Rooks of the Houston was reported to have said to his other officers. When the Exeter slew out of line during the Java sea battle, and Houston and Perth followed, they thought another course or tactic change had occured again without a signal as had happened before with doorman. The americans and autrailians went to the trouble of haveing laison officers sent to the dutch ships to interpret and relay signals but were not givin enough time to do so. The dutch for their part, incompetent as their leadership was, were fighting for their last bit of National homeland. Stress and pressure after already haveing lost their true homeland to the germans was considerable, But inexcusable! Hart was sent home cause like a handfull of commanders includeing Rooks, he also felt it was time to pull back to austrailia! A more secure line with far greater potential for airpower to play a part in its defense. As far as doorman goes, he died fighting a fight he wasnt nearly qualified to even play a part in let alone command! Its sad that his commander, helfrich in his biographies blamed everyone else includeing doorman for their losses, he had no honor!

A fully worked-up ABDA naval force, with all ships & crews working together perfectly, under the most competent admiral on the planet... simply couldn't do a lot more against the MUCH stronger Japanese forces arrayed against them! The ABDA naval forces were simply totally inadequate for the mission. Of course, so were the ABDA land and air forces, so we can't just focus on that handful of ships for criticism.

Some other conversations ongoing you might find usefull on why ABDA failed....[url]http://www.network54.com/Forum/594514/message/1278301544/Secret+Japanese+Overture%28s%29+To+NEI+Government[/url] and here as well [url]http://www.network54.com/Forum/594514/message/1335560179/The+ADB+Conversations+-+Why+did+no+one+listen-[/url]

Filched from various Wikipedia entries and edited by me. [B][B] I totally agree with Jon-Commands thrown together in war have one thing in common - they dont work![/B][/B] Now while the British and Dutch were happy to plan a command and strategy, [B][B]the problem is that the USA refused to discuss or do anything (ironic, seeing as how it was their policy to Japan that started the war!) than involved any sort of committment to anyone else. This was political - it seemed the US commanders in the front line were far more realistic and prepared to discuss things. So you'd need some way of changing the politics, or maybe hiding what was actually going on in the Pacific[/B][/B] Admiral Hart indicated the nature of the difficulties: [B][B]"ABDACOM had a very complicated command, involving four Army, four Navy and six Air organizations. Consequently there was a great deal to do in organizing and equipping a GHQ, which naturally required time. In the face of an advancing enemy there was, of course, not time. The command function had to be exercised; but we never reached a condition under which it could be so exercised that there would be certainty that information and clear directives would be transmitted with despatch." [/B][/B] There was, too, the difference in language, always a handicap, even in such small ways as the inability of our officers to read Dutch charts and sailing instructions, which were superior to ours for Netherlands East Indies waters. [B][B]Finally, beyond the major common interest, there were differences in national attitudes which made it difficult to frame our ultimate strategy. For instance, when the time came it was the natural and courageous determination of the Dutch to make a desperate, last ditch stand in Java. The British view was that it was more important to preserve our forces intact for a moment when they might be used to greater advantage. How could such views be reconciled?[/B][/B] jainso31

Just add to all the info here my father was signalman on exeter and as a boy I always heard him say it was the Dutch that were to blame for the mess...except he did not put it that polite. also the dutch were hated in the camps

The Dutch were fighting for their last place to call home...the Germans took their more formal home already and the Japs were going to take their colonial home! Real soon!!!! They were desperate! They wanted everybody to be fighting on their side.....and until the end if neccessary! They also didnt have as much experiance in combat. Not that the dutch had any opportunity in a very long time to get that experience. They did get some folks a little upset when they were suggesting that everybody should be willing to die for their cause though, and a LOT of people did! A lot more than should of since it was painfully clear from the beginning almost which way this game was going to go! The Japs were steam rolling everyone, how the Dutch though a make shift fleet and less than 70 P-40s were going to make the difference??? Again, they were desperate and we all know what desperate people can and will do!

Hello, If the Dutch were so desperate and determined, then why did they not fight more stubbornly on Java? A 700-mile long island was invaded, its defenders surrendering inside a week with almost no resistance on the ground. For comparison look at Wake Island--a tiny coral atoll with a coastline of just 12 miles--where the fighting lasted some two weeks; or Iwo Jima, an island of merely 8 square miles in size over which fighting lasted five times as long as on Java... To contend that the Dutch on Java (or Sumatra, Borneo, or Celebes) were going to "fight to the last" is in complete opposition to reality & the facts, simple as that. The Dutch in the NEI seem to have thought of their countrymen in Holland, for many East Indian residents believed they could capitulate to the Japanese and they would then be allowed to live in their homes, as had most civilians in Holland.

Well....where should i begin? First, i didnt write the word determined, only desperate. I should have said determined though! They were definitely determined that everyone should die for their cause! "Fight to the end" Helfrich was fond of saying...without the ability to do math unfortunately! Compareing the Dutch army to Marines on wake was like compareing spiders to lions! I would rather face the former than the latter for sure! Theres far more dynamics that involved the dutch and the allies on java than the marines on wake!!! First and probably the most important factor to consider was the locals on Java not to mention sumatra, celebes, etc. The javanese, like their cousins in India felt the same way. They hated their overseers and welcome the change! Not knowing better of course but they hated who they served more than who came to rescue them from the white devil! Theres still no certainty on how many Dutch and allies were killed by javanese who were trying to escape into the jungle from the japs! The bottom line, just as the english had so much difficulty forming guerilla units of locals, the dutch had no luck doing the same! The US army had no problem what so ever forming guerilla units in the phillipines, unfortunately, they couldnt be trained fast enough to make a difference early on but did later on. Helfrich and Doorman DID NOT KNOW naval tactics or battlefield management in the sense we do today or even then! Their expectations of the outcome of the Langley/Sea witch dash for Jtilapjap prove that! How they though 59 P-40s would change the tide is bizarre to say the least! Let alone the fact there were NO airtfields in Tjilapjap!!! My point is can you blame the desperate actions of the hopeless? To some degree yes, but thats like blameing the french for not stopping the blitzkreig with all that pre-war rhetoric and laying the blame for dunkirk at their feet! Lots of blame to go around! Somebody and Hart tried, should have said, Hey, this games up and only the insane or completely ignorant doesnt see it! Roosevelt gave in to the Dutch and commited our forces to suicide and King who could have had his way with Roosevelt had he tried harder....didnt! General Brett knew it was all over but the crying!!! Wavell knew the jig was up! Glassford, for reasons that still amaze me, all though i do have some serious questions concerning secret orders from him to the USS Phoenix, should have known better too, i think his actions had more to do with trying to prove he was the better man than Hart though!..... One further note if i may. I notice some folks here like to quote wikipedia here...really, thats your primary source? I would be to worried about my reputation to even consider quoteing that!

Though the Dutch had concentrated their remaining ground forces in Java, mostly in the western portion of the island, the issue was never in doubt. The Japanese moved inland rapidly, splitting the Dutch Army on the island and isolating the defenders into small groups. Batavia fell on the 2d without a struggle, after the government moved inland to Bandoeng. It was not safe even there, for the Japanese closed in on this mountain retreat and by the 8th were in position to attack the remnants of the Dutch Army defending it. The next morning the Dutch surrendered and the fight for Java was over.57 For the Japanese, the conquest of the Indies was the crowning achievement of the war. It realized their long-cherished dream of empire. The rich resources of Southeast Asia, the oil, rubber, and manganese needed for war and for the control of Asia, were now in their possession. And all this had been won in three months. For the Allies the fall of Java marked the loss of the Malay Barrier, "the basic defensive position" in the Far East. The strategic significance of this loss was enormous. Not only did the Allies lose the resources of the Indies and their lines of communications northward, but they found themselves in a perilous position, split into two areas and threatened by invasion. The gateway to the Indian Ocean lay open and Australia and India were in dire danger. And the Allies could ill afford to lose the ships, planes, and men that went down in the heroic defense of Malaya, Singapore, and the Indies. [B][B][B]The defeat of ABDACOM was, in a sense, the inevitable outcome of Allied weakness. There was no time to assemble in an area so remote from the sources of supply sufficient aircraft to contest Japanese domination of the air. Although reinforcements adequate for this task were allocated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, only a trickle, barely enough to replace losses, reached its destination. The warships that might have challenged the invaders were engaged in other tasks, and when they were finally organized into a combined striking force it was already too late. In the six weeks of its existence ABDACOM never had a chance to test the validity of General Marshall's contention that a unified command would "solve nine-tenths of our troubles." But important lessons about Allied command could be learned from the disagreements and differences which marked the brief existence of ABDACOM and these were not lost when the time came to establish other commands later in the war.[/B][/B][/B] While the campaign for Java was in progress, the Japanese had pushed on to take northern Sumatra and central Burma, thus consolidating their control of the southern area and cutting China off from its Allies. From Singapore, ten days after that fortress had fallen, came the troops to take northern Sumatra. With their arrival the defenders of the island fled to Java in time to join the fight there, and eventually to surrender. Burma was to have been seized in two phases and its occupation completed only after operations to the south were over. But early in January the schedule had been speeded up and before the end of the month the 15th Army had pushed across the Thai-Burma border and seized Moulmein. On 8 March, after the battle of Sittang Bridge where the Japanese destroyed two Indian brigades, they captured Rangoon, southern terminus of the supply line to China and the port of entry for lend-lease supplies. Pushing on to the north, they had by mid-March reached the Toungoo-Prome line in central Burma, and though they did not finally gain victory there until early in May they had effectively blockaded China by the time the Indies had fallen.58 [B][B]By the end of March, the vast area of sea and land from New Guinea and northwest Australia to central Burma, which had formed ABDACOM, was under Japanese control. Only to the north, in the Philippines, where American and Filipino troops still stood fast, had the Japanese failed to meet their timetable of conquest.[/B][/B] [url]http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-7.html[/url] jainso31

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