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RAF Coastal Command in the Battle of the Atlantic World Naval Ships Forums Archive

RAF Coastal Command in the Battle of the Atlantic

Posts 1 to 50

Costal Command came into existence in 1936, as a result of a major restructuring of the RAF in response to the military expansion of Nazi Germany. By the outbreak of war in September 1939, Coastal Command possessed 176 aircraft of various types, most of which were unsuitable for anti-submarine operations over the Atlantic. Not only were there quantitative and qualitative issues with aircraft, but the equipment and weapon systems they carried were also pretty poor. None of Coastal Command’s aircraft were equipped with radar or navigation aids and the standard anti-submarine weapon was still the 100lb bomb, which was largely ineffective against U-boats. Part of the reason for the neglect of airborne ASW development during the inter-war period was the untested conviction that ASDIC equipped surface units would now provide the solution to the submarine menace that had been lacking in WW1. Following the German occupation of France in June, 1940, German U-boats gained easier access to the Atlantic and merchant shipping losses began mounting. Coastal Command was very conscious of its own shortcomings and were well aware of the contribution that maritime aircraft could make, but they struggled to obtain the necessary hardware (sufficient numbers of very long range aircraft) - Air Ministry priorities always seemed to favour Bomber Command. Eventually however suitable new aircraft were forthcoming, particularly with the introduction into service of the Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber. Not only that, but significant steps forward had also been taken on the equipment side with new detection devices, tactics and weapons fit. The deployment of VLR aircraft and the establishment of new airbases in Iceland & the Azores (and also the introduction of escort carriers) all helped close the mid-Atlantic gap, where U-Boats had previously held the upper hand. During August & September 1942 sixty U-Boats were sunk, which was almost as many as in the previous two years. And by May 1943 the Battle of the Atlantic had reached a turning point with 43 U-boats destroyed in one month alone, and a total of 258 during the entire year (with Coastal Command aircraft accounting for 90 of these). The Battle of the Atlantic wasn’t yet over, but from this point on, the Allies held the advantage and U-Boats were on the run. There's much to discuss here in relation to aircraft, systems, weapons, tactics and how Coastal Command operated. I'm looking forward to seeing some interesting postings in this thread - a topic not entirely lacking in controversy! Michael

Michael. Thanks for this great post! It's well timed to go with the thread on the loss of Courageous in that it highlights the development of the use of air power versus the u-boats and the fact that in 1939 the use of aircraft carriers in such a role was premature.

[B][B]The Lockheed Hudson was Coastal Command's mainstay in 1939/40-[/B][/B]it was ultimately overshadowed by the larger ,more modern Liberator and Catalina but not before the ex Bomber Command Wellington had carried out sterling work. In late 1937 Lockheed sent a cutaway drawing of the Model 14 to various publications, showing the new aircraft as a civilian aircraft and converted to a light bomber. This attracted the interest of various air forces and in 1938, the British Purchasing Commission sought an American maritime patrol aircraft for the United Kingdom to support the Avro Anson. On 10 December 1938, Lockheed demonstrated a modified version of the Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra commercial airliner, which swiftly went into production as the Hudson Mk I. [B][B]A total of 350 Mk I and 20 Mk II Hudsons were supplied (the Mk II had different propellers). These had two fixed Browning machine guns in the nose and two more in the Boulton Paul dorsal turret. The Hudson Mk III added one ventral and two beam machine guns and replaced the 1,100 hp Wright Cyclone 9-cylinder radials with 1,200 hp versions (428 produced). The Hudson Mk V (309 produced) and Mk VI (450 produced) were powered by the 1,200 hp Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp 14-cylinder two-row radial. The RAF also obtained 380 Mk IIIA and 30 Mk IV Hudsons under the Lend-Lease programme.[/B][/B] [B][B]By February 1939, RAF Hudsons began to be delivered, initially equipping No. 224 Squadron RAF at RAF Leuchars, Scotland in May 1939. By the start of the war in September, 78 Hudsons were in service.[/B][/B] Due to the United States then-neutrality, early series aircraft were flown to the Canadian border, landed, and then towed on their wheels over the border into Canada by tractors or horse drawn teams, before then being flown to RCAF airfields where they were then dismantled and "cocooned" for transport as deck cargo, by ship to Liverpool. [B][B]The Hudsons were supplied without the Boulton Paul dorsal turret, which was installed on arrival in the United Kingdom.[/B][/B] [B][B]Uboats sunk by Lockheed Hudsons of Coastal Command[/B][/B] 1941 U-570 +, 1942 U-656, U-503, U-573, U-701, U-754, U-619, U-658, U-411, U-595 +, U-605, U-259, U-331 +, 1943 U-442, U-83, U-77, U-167 +, U-447, U-646, U-273, U-755, U-594, U-97, U-199 +, U-336, [B][B]25 U-boats lost to Hudson aircraft. + means that the Hudson shared the credit for the sinking.[/B][/B] jainso31

The main limitation of the Lockhead Hudson was its relative lack of payload capacity. OK for carrying bombs, but unsuitable for depth charges. The Hudson accounted for 25 U-boats during WW2. The Hudson Mk I began squadron service with the RAF Coastal Command's No. 224 Squadron in the Summer of 1939. By September, No. 233 Squadron was similarly equipped, while No. 220 Squadron had begun to replace its Avro Ansons with the Hudson Mk III. Not long after war broke out, Hudsons also equipped No. 206 and 269 Squadrons. These squadrons all flew maritime patrol and anti-shipping sorties from the British Isles. Additional squadrons were formed during the war until the RAF saw a peak of 17 Hudson squadrons. The Hudson's first combat success was on 8 October 1939, when a Hudson Mk I of No. 224 Squadron shot down a Dornier Do-18D off Jutland. In a famous incident, a Hudson Mk III of No. 220 Squadron guided a British destroyer to the prison-ship Altmark in Norwegian waters, freeing many British sailors. Hudsons assisted in the Norwegian campaign and in the evacuation of Dunkirk. Hudsons began to receive ASV radar in early 1940, and were assigned specifically to antisubmarine duty beginning in August of 1940 from Aldergrove, Northern Ireland. In March, 1941 No. 269 Squadron began operations from Iceland. One of the Hudson's first successes against U-boats was on August 27, 1941, when an Iceland-based Hudson bombed and damaged U-570 and, after repeated strafing passes, observed the U-boat crew to surrender. Hudson’s went on to achieve two dozen additional successes against U-boats. An Africa-based RAF Hudson of No. 608 Squadron was the first aircraft to sink a U-boat with rockets. The first two U-boat sinkings achieved by American forces were both achieved by US Navy Hudsons, and the first sinking by the USAAF was also by a Hudson. The first submarine sinkings by Brazilian and RNZAF forces were also by Hudsons. Michael

[B][B]Coastal Command Wellingtons carried out anti-submarine duties and sank their first enemy vessel on 6 July 1942.[/B][/B] DWI versions (see below) fitted with a 48 ft (14.63 m) diameter metal hoop were used for exploding enemy mines by generating a powerful magnetic field as it passed over them. [B][B]Coastal Command variants[/B][/B] [B][B]Type 429 Wellington GR Mark VIII[/B][/B] Mark IC conversion for Coastal Command service. Roles included reconnaissance, anti-submarine and anti-shipping attack. A Coastal Command Wimpy was the first aircraft to be fitted with the anti-submarine Leigh light. A total of 307 were built built at Weybridge, 58 fitted with the Leigh Light. [B][B]Type 458 Wellington GR Mark XI[/B][/B] Maritime version of B Mark X with an ordinary nose turret and mast radar ASV Mark II instead of chin radome, no waist guns, 180 built at Weybridge and Blackpool. [B][B]Type 455 Wellington GR Mark XII[/B][/B] Maritime version of B Mark X armed with torpedoes and with a chin radome housing the ASV Mark III radar, single nose machine gun, 58 built at Weybridge and Chester. [B][B]Type 466 Wellington GR Mark XIII[/B][/B] Maritime version of B Mark X with an ordinary nose turret and mast radar ASV Mark II instead of chin radome, no waist guns, 844 built Weybridge and Blackpool. [B][B]Type 467 Wellington GR Mark XIV[/B][/B] Maritime version of B Mark X with a chin radome housing the ASV Mark III radar and added RP-3 explosive rocket rails to the wings, 841 built at Weybridge, Chester and Blackpool. [B][B]Uboats sunk by Coastal Command Wellintons in WW2[/B][/B] 1942 U-502, U-372 +, U-165, U-412, 1943 U-268, U-562 +, U-126, U-435, U-459, U-614, U-403, U-134, U-760 +, U-431, U-566, U-340 +, U-966 +, U-211, U-542, 1944 U-231, U-545, U-283, U-575 +, U-852 +, U-846, U-616 +, U-960 +, 1945 U-321, [B][B]28 U-boats lost to Wellington aircraft. + means that the Wellington shared the credit for the sinking.This is a fair estimate and the figure could be slightly higher[/B][/B] [B][B]During the first three years of the Second World War, Coastal Command and the Admiralty fought a continuous battle with the RAF and Air Ministry over the primacy of trade defence in relation to the bomber effort against mainland Germany, a strategic tussle which conceivably could have cost the Western Alliance the Battle of the Atlantic. The Air Staff and Bomber Command enjoyed the backing of Churchill and the maritime air effort struggled to receive the recognition it needed. On the outbreak of war, the order of battle listed just 298 aircraft, of which only 171 were operational[/B][/B] jainso31

Coastal Command did not receive its first Wellingtons until November 1940, when No. 221 Squadron was formed using Mk ICs equipped with anti surface vessel (ASV) radar. ASV radar used in conjunction with the Leigh light and depth charges proved a lethal combination. The Leigh Light was a powerful searchlight fitted to a number of Coastal Command aircraft. It was successfully used from June 1942 onwards to attack U-boats recharging their batteries on the surface. Up to then they had been relatively safe from attack at night. The aircraft would locate the sub on the surface using its radar and only switch on the searchlight beam during the final approach in order to retain the element of surprise. The illumination of the target allowed the attacking aircraft to more accurately time the release of its depth charges. The first confirmed U-boat kill by a Wellington came on 5 July 1942 when U-502 was sunk crossing the Bay of Biscay. Given the shorter patrol range of Wellingtons they were most often used for submarine interdiction out over the waters of the Bay of Biscay, rather than deeper into the Atlantic. Michael

So as you said in your Intro -only 60 Uboats were sunk by Coastal Commands aircraft by about mid 1942. After this with new aircraft-the Catalina and the start of a flow of B24 Liberators (both from the American aviation firm Consolidated),new bases and new strategies were coming on line.The tide was about to turn. [B][B] In 1943, the Command received the long-range aircraft it needed. The Liberator and increased numbers of British types, including the Halifax and Lancaster bomber, in part, were diverted to Coastal Command to deal with the U-boat threat in March. [/B][/B]In May the Command sighted 202 U-boats and attacked 128. The Command lost heavily during this period, but it succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the U-boats. Moreover, German blockade runners were prevented from carrying their cargo to Germany-held ports in France.[B][B] During the year 1943, U-boat losses amounted to 258 to all causes. Of this total, 90 were sunk by Coastal Command, and 51 damaged. Up until that time, in May 1943, Coastal Command had sighted submarines on 825 occasions, which resulted in 607 attacks. Only 27 were sunk, and three were shared destroyed. Another 120 were damaged. Against those figures, 233 aircraft, 116 of which were lost owing to weather conditions, were destroyed. Of this figure, 179 were from No. 19 Group RAF, attacking U-boats over the Bay of Biscay.[/B][/B] PS Shall you put the Short Sunderland on record?? jainso31

It wasn't only the aircraft that changed the fortunes of Coastal Command, it was the way in which they were used, which was revolusionised by the Operational Research section. See here, post #18: [URL]http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6964&highlight=empire[/URL]

I think I inferred that in my previous post Bill; but many thanks for your interest and excellent resume of the strategic war as played out in the Battle of the Atlantic. jainso31

Bill, I presume you are referring to the Liberator when you say it wasn't the only aircraft that changed the fortunes of Coastal Command. If so that's perfectly true, but to be fair, I can't see any claim here that it was Coastal Command's only aircraft type. What is true however, is that the Liberator was a very long range endurance aircraft, which became the mainstay of anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic and this aircraft had by far the best number of U-Boat kills, especially vital in helping to close the 'gap'. (Great article by the way, and thanks for posting the link in this thread). As you say, it was the way in which aircraft of all types were used that really revolutionized anti-submarine warfare and I think I made it clear in my opening posting that it was not only endurance limitations, but also the equipment the aircraft carried (and tactics used) that finally helped beat the U-Boat. We have already mentioned a little about radar, Leigh lights and depth charges, but these were not the only technological developments that shifted the balance of power in the Atlantic (and hopefully as this thread progresses we will learn more about these various innovations and improvements in tactics). Important also were such things as HF/DF signal intercepts and Enigma decoding, as well as more mundane stuff like the introduction of LORAN which better enabled maritime aircraft to more accurately navigate to known U-Boat locations. Airborne ASW started the war with exceedingly limited capability, but it ended WW2 as a highly efficient operation, even able to detect submerged U-Boats by aircraft deployed sono-bouys and finish them off with fast homing torpedoes - quite some progress! Michael

[QUOTE=jainso31;10021179] PS Shall you put the Short Sunderland on record?? jainso31[/QUOTE] I sincerely hope so Jim - the Sunderland may well be a fat goose compared to the sleek lines of a Catalina, but it was certainly the aircraft that fired my imagination as a kid, and initially the only aircraft type capable of deploying the modified 450 lb Admiralty Mk. Vii depth charge (other aircraft had to await the development of the 250 lb Torpex DC). Michael

[B][B]Later depth charges would be developed specifically for aerial use.[/B][/B] Such weapons still have utility today and are in limited use, particularly for shallow-water situations where a homing torpedo may not be suitable. [B][B]Depth charges are especially useful for "flushing the prey" in the event of a diesel submarine lying on the bottom or otherwise hiding, with all machinery shut down.[/B][/B] Homing torpedoes can be used for the same purpose, but the cost is prohibitive and aircraft and shipboard inventories limited. An example of such a weapon is the BAE Systems Mark 11, deployed by the British Fleet Air Arm. [B][B]Effectiveness[/B][/B] To be effective depth charges had to be set to the correct depth. To ensure this, a pattern of charges set to different depths would be laid atop the submarine's suspected position. The effective use of depth charges required the combined resources and skills of many individuals during an attack. Sonar, helm, depth charge crews and the movement of other ships had to be carefully coordinated. [B][B]Aircraft depth charge tactics depended on the aircraft using its speed to rapidly appear from over the horizon and surprising the sub on the surface (where it spent most of its time) during the day or night (using radar to detect the target and a Leigh Light to illuminate just prior to the attack), then quickly attacking once it had been located, as the sub would normally crash dive to escape attack.[/B][/B] jainso31

[quote=KizmeRD;10021191]Bill, I presume you are referring to the Liberator when you say it wasn't the only aircraft that changed the fortunes of Coastal Command. If so that's perfectly true, but to be fair, I can't see any claim here that it was Coastal Command's only aircraft type. Michael[/quote] Michael, I think you misunderstood my meaning. I was using the term "aircraft" in the plural sense, making the point that it was the way in which they were used rather than the type of aircraft.

As mentioned previously, the 100 lb anti-submarine bomb had proven to be rather of a disappointment in wartime service as it required a direct hit, and even then little serious damage to U-Boat hulls resulted. During the spring of 1940 experiments were carried out to see if an aircraft could successfully drop a depth charge. This proved feasible, provided that the aircraft was not flying too high or too fast. Thus the aerial released depth charge became a new weapon in the armoury of Coastal Command. Initially, only the Sunderland flying boats were able to carry the 450 lb depth charge in service in 1939. This was the 450 lb Admiralty Mk. VII DC modified for aircraft use by fitting nose and tail fairings. It had a hydrostatic pistol set to explode at 50 ft. (this was later found to be too deep). In January 1941 a new 250 lb Torpex filled DC was introduced which had improved accuracy and could be dropped from any height up to 250 ft. Being smaller, lighter and more streamlined, this new DC was also now capable of being used in a variety of Coastal Command aircraft and it rapidly became the main weapon employed against U-Boats. (The depth setting and detonation problems were solved by June 1942). Michael

[QUOTE=emason;10021202]Michael, I think you misunderstood my meaning. I was using the term "aircraft" in the plural sense, making the point that it was the way in which they were used rather than the type of aircraft.[/QUOTE] My apologies sir!

Thanks for that Michael-I could not find this particular detail-just a broad brush description.Have you seen a theatre of operations Map by any chance??I also looked for a Coastal Command Groups Map of the British Isles which I have in Correlli Barnett's book but it's too big to scan. Coastal Command had a bitter enemy in Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris who saw it as "merely an obstacle to victory"He was so absolutely blinded by his own crusade that he could make such a crass statement-this was when he was asked to augment Coastal Command by two squadrons from his command.He went on further to say "I am so strongly convinced of this that I regard the loss of these TWO squadrons of Bomber Command to Coastal Command as unacceptable" NB Coastel Command aircraft were purloined to make up his 1000 Bomber Raid on Cologne jainso31

It didn't take you too long to move onto the controversial aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic Jim - and there was I patiently awaiting a posting on the Sunderland Flying Boat!:D Essentially, the main dispute between the Admiralty/Coastal Command and the Air Ministry/Bomber Command was one of strategic focus. Coastal Command sort to utilize aircraft primarily in defensive roles to protect shipping from U-boat attack. Bomber Command, on the other hand, wanted aircraft to be used purely for the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. The outcome of this bickering dictated the allocation of long-ranged aircraft resources. Until late 1942 it was Bomber Command that received the lion's share of the longer-ranged aircraft (with Harris as the chief proponent, supported by Churchill). It was not until shipping losses reached alarming numbers, threatening Britain's very survivability that the powers that be allowed Coastal Command the resources it so desperately needed. It wasn't until the end of April 1943 that sufficient aircraft became operational, not before the Allies suffered their heaviest shipping losses in March of that year. After that, it only took 45 Liberators and 3 escort carriers eight weeks to close the mid-Atlantic air gap. Here are the big questions: 1. Why was the political and military leadership of the country unable or unwilling to allocate VLR aircraft earlier? 2. Why did Bomber Command neglect bombing U-Boat Pens for so long – instead of concentrating on German cities? Michael

The B24 Liberator was an American heavy bomber and was the mainstay of the US Air Forces that were not equipped with the B17 Flying Fortress-hence it is my opinion that this caused a delay in the B24 getting into Coastal Commands service [B][B][B]For 12 months in 1942/43, No. 120 Squadron RAF of Coastal Command with its handful of much-patched and modified early model Liberators, supplied the only air cover for convoys in the Atlantic Gap, the Liberator being the only warplane with sufficient range.[/B][/B][/B] The VLR Liberators sacrificed some armor and often gun turrets in order to save weight, while carrying extra aviation gasoline in their bomb-bay tanks. Liberator Is were equipped with ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) Mark II radar, which together with the Leigh light gave them the ability to hunt U-boats by day and by night. These Liberators operated from both sides of the Atlantic with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the U.S. Navy from the west; and with the RAF from the east, based in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Iceland, and beginning in mid-1943 from the Azores. This role was dangerous, especially after many U-boats were armed with extra anti-aircraft guns, some adopting the policy of staying on the surface to fight, rather than submerging and risking being sunk by ASW (anti-submarine warfare) torpedoes and depth charges from the bombers. In addition to flying from the East Coast of the United States, American Liberators flew from Greenland, the Azores, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Trinidad, and from wherever else they could fly far out over the Atlantic. [B][B]The rather sudden and decisive turning of the Battle of the Atlantic in favor of the Allies in May 1943 was the result of many factors. However, it was no accident that it coincided with the long delayed arrival of many more VLR Liberators for maritime patrols. Liberators were credited in full or in part with 72 U-boat sinkings.[/B][/B] [B][B]In all, 18,482 B-24s were built by September 1945[/B][/B]. Twelve thousand saw service with the USAAF, with a peak inventory in September 1944 of 6,043. The U.S. Navy received 977 PB4Y-1s (Liberators originally ordered by the USAAF) and 739 PB4Y-2 Privateers, derived from the B-24. [B][B]The Royal Air Force received about 2,100 B-24s equipping 46 bomber groups and 41 squadrons;[/B][/B] the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 1,200 B-24Js; and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 287 B-24Js, B-24Ls, and B-24Ms. Liberators were the only heavy bomber flown by the RAAF in the Pacific. Two squadrons of the South African Air Force (SAAF), these were 31 & 34 Squadrons under No 2 Wing SAAF based at Foggia in Italy flew B-24s. These two squadrons claim to fame were the relief flights to Warsaw & Kraków in Poland to support the Polish Uprising against Nazi Occupation. Their missions / exploits are graphically covered in Lawrence Isemongers's book, The Men Who Went to Warsaw.[21] [B][B]Coming to the bombing or lack of bombing of Uboat pens[/B][/B].It had been pointed out by the C in C Joubert that the bombing of the transit areas of the Uboats was just plain common sense. [B][B]It was all specious enough, but wholly mistaken.First of all Uboat pens had 26ft thick reinforced concrete roofs and current bombs were of little use in attacking such an edifice.QED[/B][/B] jainso31

[B][B]The Short Sunderland in RAF Coastal Command[/B][/B] The Sunderland was easy and pleasant to fly, but for long patrols the pilots had the benefit of an autopilot. Its cruising speed was about 225km/h and it usually flew patrols at low altitudes. The main task of many Sunderlands was tracking enemy shipping, flying long patrols over an empty sea. Some crews never saw an enemy in the entire war. The Sunderland also flew search-and-rescue missions. It has to be pointed out that normally, the Sunderland could not land to pick up survivors. Like other flying boats, it could land and take-off only from sheltered coastal waters. From 1942 onwards, landings in open sea were expressly forbidden, except in special circumstances and with permission. [B][B]U-boat patrols, carrying eight depth charges, were an important task of the Sunderlands. They patrolled the approaches, or flew convoy protection missions. The two were often combined, with the Sunderlands meeting the convoys at some distance in the ocean. When an U-boat was sighted, the Sunderlands tried to attack it before it submerged. Although described as "depth charges", its bombs were set to explode at a depth of 25 feet to 30 feet, effective enough against surfaced submarines. Late in the war, the submarines were well-armed with Flak and willing to fight it out, while zig-zagging on the surface. In response, the Sunderlands were fitted with four fixed, forward-firing guns, to silence the Flak. The confrontations were extremely dangerous for both the Sunderland and the U-boat. Sunderlands also attacked small surface ships.[/B][/B] [B]The Sunderland was vulnerable to enemy fighters, because it was slow and operated out of the range of Allied fighter[/B]s. However, the later Sunderlands were well-armed, with nose, dorsal and tail turrets, gun hatches in the aft fuselage, and often some additional guns added by the crews. Flying low above the waves to prevent attacks from below, a Sunderland was not an easy victim, and managed to defend itself very well. For example, in 2 June 1943 a Sunderland survived an attack by eight Ju 88s, shooting down three of them, although it was riddled with holes, lost an engine, and several crewmembers were wounded.[B][B] Such exploits allegedly earned it the German nickname of "Fliegendes Stachelschwein" (Flying Porcupine), although this could also be attributed to the large array of radar antennas fitted to many Sunderlands.[/B][/B] P[B][B]erhaps the greatest weakness of the Sunderland was that its range, while significant, was not long enough the close the "mid-Atlantic gap". Coastal Command had to wait for the Liberator to cover the entire Atlantic. But where the Sunderland could operate, it was very effective[/B][/B]. [B][B]U-boats sunk by this aircraft[/B][/B] 1940 U-55 +, U-26 +, 1942 U-559 +, 1943 U-465, U-663, U-753 +, U-440, U-563 +, U-607, U-461, U-383, U-454, U-106 +, U-489, U-610, 1944 U-426, U-571, U-625, U-675, U-955, U-970, U-243, U-1222, U-385 +, U-270, U-107, U-297, [B][B]27 U-boats lost to Sunderland aircraft. + means that the Sunderland shared the credit for the sinking.[/B][/B] jainso31

[QUOTE=jainso31;10021216]Coming to the bombing or lack of bombing of Uboat pens[/B][/B].It had been pointed out by the C in C Joubert that the bombing of the transit areas of the Uboats was just plain common sense. [B][B]It was all specious enough, but wholly mistaken.First of all Uboat pens had 26ft thick reinforced concrete roofs and current bombs were of little use in attacking such an edifice.QED jainso31[/QUOTE] My mistake Jim (too hasty in typing) - but my point is that surely RAF Bomber Command could have done more (earlier) with ordinary bombs to disrupt the programme of submarine pen construction and attack port facilities? And not just submarine pens, but also the main U-Boat building yards in Kiel and Hamburg? Interestingly, after the blitz on Hamburg, practically the only part of the city left standing was the area of the Blohm & Voss shipyard on the south side of the Elbe - how can this be militarily justified? After Dunkirk, Bomber Command sold the value of an independant air force to the Government by saying it was the only branch of the services still able to carry the fight to the enemy. However since precission bombing was not yet possible, most the effort of the bombing offensive was wasteful as the majority of bombs never hit their intended target (hence the requirement for large numbers of aircraft, to compensaate for inaccuracies in bomb aiming). Bomber Command had the means of shortening the war, but the concentration on civilian targets, rather than military ones, simply prolonged the war and consumed vast quantities of both human and material resources, all of which were in short supply. Michael

I am ashamed to say this; but Butch Harris's almost maniacal preoccupation was the bombing of the civilian populace-with the conviction that this would bring Germany to her knees.Quite ridiculous of course,bordering on the lunatic, this whole concept of his was; and it cost 55000 Operational Deaths in the Command. What more can I say-he didn't care for the Oil Plan or DDay but he grudgingly did it .Uboat Pens and construction sites-he just was not interested and nasty with it. An absolute nut case.!! jainso31

[B][B]The Catalina at War[/B][/B] Number of Squadrons No.119 Squadron - Iceland Briefly operated a single Catalina I in 1941, but the main use came in 1942 when it became one of only two RAF squadrons to operate the Catalina IIIA Amphibian, flying operationally from Iceland for a short period from August 1942. The squadron then briefly operated the Catalina to ferry Catalinas across the Atlantic, before converting to the Short Sunderland in November 1942. No.190 Squadron – Scotland No.190 Squadron operated the Catalina during 1943, carrying out patrols north from Scotland. Most operations were flown in support of the Russian convoys. No.191 Squadron - India No.191 Squadron flew maritime reconnaissance patrols over the Indian Ocean, from bases on both sides of the sub-continent, and on Sri Lanka. Consolidated Catalina of the No.202 Squadron No.202 Squadron – Gibraltar then Ireland No.202 Squadron operated from Gibraltar from September 1939 until September 1944. The first Catalinas arrived in May 1941, and were used to protect the Straits of Gibraltar. The squadron returned to the UK in September 1944, and flew anti-submarine patrols from Northern Ireland. No.205 Squadron – Sri Lanka No.205 Squadron operated the Catalina from April 1941 until July 1945. From March 1941 it operated from Singapore and Sri Lanka, and suffered heavy losses during after the Japanese invasion of Malaya, Sumatra and Java. The squadron reformed on Sri Lanka in July 1942, flying a mixture of missions over the India Ocean. No.209 Squadron – UK then East Africa No.209 Squadron operated the Catalina for four years from April 1941 to April 1945. The squadron received its first Catalinas in April 1941, and used them to fly anti-submarine patrols from Scotland. The squadron spent August-October 1941 operating from Iceland, before making a more dramatic move in March-June 1942, relocated to East Africa. From there it flew anti-submarine patrols over a quiet part of the India Ocean, seeing little action. No.210 Squadron – UK No.210 Squadron operated the Catalina from bases in Britain, flying anti-submarine and convoy escort patrols. No.212 Squadron - India No.212 Squadron operated the Catalina from bases around India, flying anti-submarine mission for most of the war, adding Air Sea Rescue duties in 1945. No.240 Squadron - UK, Far East from 1942 No.240 Squadron operated the Catalina from March 1941 until 1946. For the first year it flew them on anti-submarine patrols from Scotland, before in February 1942 the squadron prepared for a move to India. The squadron saw much less action in the new theatre, eventually adding meteorological and special ops flights to its list of duties. No.259 Squadron – East Africa No.259 Squadron received its Catalinas when it reformed at Beaumaris in January 1943. The squadron then flew out to East Africa, from where it flew patrols over the Indian Ocean. No.262 Squadron – East Africa No.262 formed late in 1942, and received its Catalinas in February 1943. The squadron then flew to East Africa, from where it carried out anti-submarine patrols. It slowly became more South African in nature, and was eventually transferred to the SAAF in February 1945. No.265 Squadron – Madagascar No.265 Squadron operated its Catalinas from March 1943 to April 1945 from Diego Suarez, at the northern tip of Madagascar, flying convoy escort missions off the east coast of Africa. No.270 Squadron – West Africa No.270 Squadron operated its Catalinas from November 1942 to May 1944, flying anti-submarine patrols from West Africa. No.321 Squadron – Sri Lanka No.321 Squadron reformed as a Catalina squadron on Sri Lanka in August 1942, with crew and aircraft that had escaped from the disaster in the Dutch East Indies. The squadron flew anti-submarine patrols over the Indian Ocean, eventually adding transport duties to its role. No.330 Squadron - Iceland No.330 Squadron operated the Catalina for a short period in 1942 to supplement its Northrop float planes on anti-submarine patrols from Iceland No.333 Squadron - Scotland No.333 Squadron was formed from No.1477 (Norwegian) Flight in May 1943, receiving its Catalinas in October. The squadron used them for anti-submarine patrols from Scotland, while at the same time flying anti-shipping Mosquitoes. No.357 Squadron – India and Sri Lanka No.357 Squadron was a special duties squadron, which used its Catalinas to drop special agents on rivers and along the coast of Burma and Malaya. No.413 Squadron RCAF – Sri Lanka No.413 Squadron RCAF operated the Catalina with Coastal Command from July 1941 to April 1942, before moving to Sri Lanka. It arrived just as the Japanese made their only move into the Bay of Bengal, but after this active start soon settled into a routine of anti-submarine, Air Sea Rescue and convoy escort work. No.422 Squadron RCAF - UK No.422 Squadron RCAF briefly operated the Catalina from August-October 1942. These aircraft were used to fly supplies to the Soviet Union, and then to escort the Russian convoys. No.490 Squadron RNZAF – West Africa No.490 Squadron RNZAF operated the Catalina over the South Atlantic from bases on West Africa, from June 1943 until July 1944. No.628 Squadron - India No.628 Squadron operated the Catalina flying boat on meteorological missions over the Indian Ocean from March to October 1944 jainso31.

[B][B]COASTAL COMMAND-STRIKE WINGS[/B][/B] In the earlier years of World War II the anti-surface unit element of Coastal Command was bolstered through the transfer of squadrons from both Bomber and Fighter Commands. These Sqns were in the main equipped with the Blenheim, Hudson, Hampdens and Beaufort. Early achievements were highlighted by the award of a Victoria Cross to RAF North Coates and 22 Sqn's Fg Off Kenneth Campbell. Detached to RAF St Eval he crippled Battle Cruiser Gneisenau in Brest Harbour. In the early years the strike force demonstrated its courage but was hampered in its tactical development by operating in small formations in poorly performing aircraft, with unreliable weapons and poor aiming aids and no fighter cover. Their light armament was extremely outgunned by German heavily-armed convoys and land-based defences. This led to Coastal Command strike formations generating the highest casualty rate in the RAF, losing 648 aircraft. Target sets included the 'Gold Run', cargoes of iron ore from neutral Sweden and other metals from Norway and Finland destined for the munitions complexes of the Ruhr Valley. [B][B]Strike Wings reformed[/B][/B] Nov 1942 saw the reforming of Coastal Command's Strike Wings, employing new tactics on the new Beaufighter. They were armed with 4 x 20mm Hispano Suiza Cannon and 1,000 rounds including tracer and 8 rocket projectiles. [B][B]New tactics[/B][/B] A change in command at North Coates 236 Sqn to Wg Cdr Nebbie Wheeler let to the development large formation attack tactics combining 143 Sqn employing cannon and 236 Sqn employing cannon and rocket projectiles to minimise enemy ships' flak, saturating the heavily armed shipping with cannon fire from a height of 1,500ft or below. Below the joint 143 and 236 Sqn formation, 254 Sqn's torpedo-armed Beaufighter had a lesser flak barrage to face and were able to focus on an accurate and smooth run to their release point. Fighter Command was called on to provide escorts to these composite air operations. These tactics were put to practics in 1943 in attacks let by Wg Cdr Wheeler. In a 10 month period 27 000 tonnes of shipping were sunk. They were further adapted to combat a shift in enemy operations whereby shipping was moved from port to port during night hours. Assaults on previously safe harbours were commenced with a Gironde River attack on 24 Aug 1944 by 18 Beaufighter of 236 Sqn and 404 Sqn. Additional attacks were conducted by 143 Sqn. On 12 Sep 1944 40 aircraft of 236 Sqn, 254 Sqn, 455 Sqn and 489 Sqn entered Den Helder harbour and took losses. On 23 Sep 1944 Flt Lt Bob Pinkerton led 254 Sqn, 455 Sqn and 489 Sqn repeating the attack with 73 aircraft. On 25 Sep 1944 65 Beaufighter from the same three squadrons attacked again. Finally on 17 Jan 1945, 32 aircraft from 236 Sqn and 254 Sqn struck the Helder harbour one last time. [B][B]The Strike Wings[/B][/B] North Coates Strike Wing: For more information about the North Coates Strike Wing, see the North Coates page. Langham and Dallachy Wing: This wing consisted of 455 Sqn RAAF and 489 Sqn RNZAF. It lost 71 aircrew during conflict. Strubby and Dallachy Wing: This wing consisted of 144 Sqn and 404 Sqn RCAF. It lost 70 aircrew. Banff Wing: The wing included 333 Sqn (Norway), 143 Sqn, 235 Sqn and 248 Sqn, and lost 87 aircrew jainso31

RAF Coastal Command aircraft were responsible for sinking a total of 155 U-Boats during WW2. But before getting involved in this thread, I hadn't imagined the extent of losses they incurred - in all, 741 aircraft were lost during anti-submarine sorties. Michael

[B][B]BALANCE SHEET[/B][/B] The service saw action from the first day of hostilities until the last day of the Second World War. It flew over one million flying hours, 240,000 operations and [B][B]destroyed 212 U-boats. [/B][/B][B][B][B]Coastal Command's casualties amounted to 2,060 aircraft to all causes and some 5,866 personnel killed in action[/B][/B][/B].[B][B] From 1940 to 1945 Coastal Command sank 366 German transport vessels and damaged 134. [/B][/B]The total tonnage sunk was 512,330 tons and another 513,454 tons damaged.A total of 10,663 persons were rescued by the Command, including 5,721 Allied crews, 277 enemy personnel, and 4,665 non-aircrews. jainso31

Sorry, I should explain that my numbers relate solely to Coastal Command aircraft losses from anti-submarine operations in the Battle of the Atlantic (not other theatres of operation). And same goes for my total of U-boats sunk - only German U-Boats sunk in the Atlantic by RAF Coastal Command aircraft (not all enemy submarine kills in all parts of the world). Obviously Coastal Command squadrons were also engaged in lots of other wartime activities, in the Mediterranean & in Italy, in North Africa, over Germany, in the Middle East, Indian Ocean and Far East. This accounts for the differences between my totals in post number 24 and Jim's figures in post number 25. Michael.

Jim and Michael, Many thanks to you both for an extremely enlightening thread - I'll have to go through it again slowly to digest it all! Paul

[B][B]Eventually the Command was given the investment it needed. Radar and long-range aircraft enabled the Command to hunt down and destroy U-boats with growing efficiency. [/B][/B]German submarines had been sinking a large number of Allied ships in the Atlantic Gap, which was a stretch of water in the central Atlantic beyond the range of most Allied aircraft. The covering of the gap by long-range aircraft equipped with radar helped reduce the effectiveness of U-boats.[B][B] In May 1943 the campaign reached a peak, when a large number of U-boats were sunk with little loss to Allied shipping. [/B][/B]During this time Coastal Command gained the initiative. It was known by the Germans as Black May. Thereafter the suppression of German submarines was made not only in the Atlantic, but also in their transit routes through the Bay of Biscay in 1942, 1943 and 1944. In June 1944 the Normandy landings and subsequent Operation Overlord liberated France and cost the Germans their air and submarine bases, won in 1940. [B][B]The U-boats were thus forced to relocate to Norway and Germany in August, restoring the many of the difficulties faced by the Kriegsmarine in 1939 and early 1940. [/B][/B] [B][B]The entire strategic position, which had been the foundation of the U-Boat war since June 1940 had been undermined.[/B][/B] In the last three years of the war, Coastal Command sank more U-boats than any other service and continued to hold the technological advantage from 1943 onwards. A brief threat, in the shape of the German Type XXI submarine emerged, but was too late to alter the course of events. It was not until midnight, on the 4 June 1945 when official wartime operations ceased. The last mission was flown by Wing Commander J. Barret DFC, GOC No. 201 Squadron RAF.[B][B] By that time over 2,000 decorations had been awarded. These included four Victoria Crosses, 17 George Medals, and 82 Distinguished Service Orders.[/B][/B] There is one aspect of Coastal Command's war in the Atlantic which has not been discussed fully -[B][B][B]the Mid Ocean Air Gap and Bases-[/B][/B][/B]perhaps we should cover this aspect. jainso31

[B][B]The Mid-Atlantic Gap was the gap in coverage by land-based Coastal Command antisubmarine (A/S) aircraft during the Battle of the Atlantic. [/B][/B]It is frequently known as[B][B] The Black Pit,[/B][/B] as well as the Atlantic Gap, Air Gap, Greenland Gap, or just "the Gap". This resulted in heavy merchant shipping losses to U-boats. The Black Pit, the most feared area where most losses occurred, was the area southeast of Greenland. [B]The gap was eventually closed in May 1943, as growing numbers of VLR Liberators (Very Long Range models) and escort carriers became available, and as basing problems were addressed.[/B] [B][B]Coastal Command's prize was the Liberator GR.I, commonly called the VLR Liberator or just VLR[/B][/B]. The Liberator B.I proved too vulnerable for bombing missions over Europe, but had excellent range and payload, ideal for A/S patrol.[B][B] Top priority for these was the U.S. Navy [/B][/B]for reconnaissance operations in the Pacific, where their long legs were equally valuable, but where they generally carried out missions of lower priority than Coastal Command's. [B][B]It remains unclear why the Short Stirling, which had better range and payload performance still, was not preferred.[/B][/B] [B][B]VLRs were of particular importance in times when Bletchley Park was unable to read Kriegsmarine Enigma (Ultra).[/B][/B] When ON 127 was attacked U-584 on 11 September 1942, there was exactly one VLR of 120 Squadron overhead. Fifteen U-boats converged on ON 131, only to meet aircraft, and Coastal Command sank two, while in protecting ON 136, 120 Squadron's VLRs sank U-597 on 12 October 1942. Even then, VLRs proved invaluable in co-operation with shipborne "Huff Duff". Defending SC 104, VLRs guided by HF/DF drove off three shadowers in one day, 16 October. They bettered the performance on 29 October, for HX 212, driving off five, and seven on 6 November around SC 107. "...[T]he apparent inadequacy Newfoundland-based air support was highlighted by the early interception of SC 107 and the resultant bitter and costly battle." This led RAF to belatedly move a number of Coastal Command squadrons. The paltry nine Liberator GR.Is operating over the Atlantic, members of 120 Squadron based in Iceland, were nevertheless a worry to Admiral Dönitz, BdU. As a measure of how valuable they were, after patrols off Canada were added in 1942, only one ship was lost in convoy.[B][B] Even in mid-1942, Coastal Command only had two squadrons of Liberators and B-17s, and at the first sign of Coastal Command's success against U-boats, Harris sought to have their aircraft used in attacking German cities.[/B][/B] jainso31

I can't really let this thread draw to a close without mentioning the most sucessful Coastal Command pilot of the Battle of the Atlantic, this was S/Ldr Terence Bulloch who had already been awarded a DFC and a Mention in Despatches before jcoming to No. 120 Squadron in August 1941. The squadron was based in Iceland and flew Liberators, providing convoy cover and giving U-boats a hard time in waters previously free from aircraft patrols. He was soon in action and on 12th October he was awarded a bar to his DFC for sinking U-597. Then whilst out on patrol on the 5th November, he and his crew sighted and sunk U-132. On the 8th December 1942, in the space of just 5 hours, he made 8 sightings and 7 attacks. During his time with No. 120 Squadron he had sighted a total of 23 U-boats and attacked 16 of them, and in the process was further awarded with a DSO and bar. He later joined No 244 Squadron and on 8th July 1943 he attacked and sunk U-514 off Cape Finisterre. His official U-boat 'tally' is 4 confirmed kills and 2 damaged. Michael

I selected this man at random- [B][B]Wing Commander Peter Cundy DSO DFC AFC [/B][/B[B]]TD[/B] Cundy joined the Territorial Army in 1936. In 1940 he transferred to the RAF for Army Co-operation duties and having completed his training he was posted to 53 (Army Co-operation) Squadron. I[B][B]n May 1940 he took part in bombing raids against the Biscay ports, including the attacks on Brest where Scharnhorst, Gneisneau and Prince Eugen were in residence. Having completed his first tour he was posted to 120 Squadron providing air escort to the Atlantic Convoys. On 22 May 1941 he spotted and attacked U-373 along with her blockade runner and escorting Heinkel 115 aircraft. In October 1942 he joined No 224 Squadron, as 'A' Flight commander. On 26 February 1943 he attacked U-437 and later the same day attacked and seriously damaged U-508. On 3 July he attacked and sunk U-628, however he had to fly home on three engines[/B][/B] He looked to have out a lot of time in. jainso31

[B][B]When the war began the Command only had 3 Operational Groups,[/B][/B] 15, 16 and 18 with Group 17 taking care of training. [B][B]No. 15 Group had its HQ at Stanraer [/B][/B]after it moved from Plymouth after the fall of France in June 1940. Its responsibility was mostly to provide support in the Western Approaches and convoy escort. The Group covered the Western and North Western Approaches from the Atlantic. [B][B]No. 16 Group had its HQ in Gillingham in Kent.[/B][/B] This was not really an anti U-boat unit but its aircraft did attack U-boats in the last days of the war. [B][B]No. 18 Group had its HQ in two places; operations were planned at Donibristle while the admin section was at Pitreavie. [/B][/B]After the German loss of the Biscay bases in late 1944 it helped counter the threat of U-boats from Germany and Norway. [B][B]No. 19 Group was formed about the same time as No 15. Group moved northwest from Plymouth and No. 19 moved into the old HQ and made its home there. [/B][/B]This Group covered the Bay of Biscay and nearby waters. It scored the greatest number of U-boat kills as it patrolled the area of highest concentration of the enemy. [B][B]One week after the war began Coastal Command set up a base in Gibraltar[/B][/B] to cover the southern part of the Bay of Biscay and the waters closest to this entry into the Mediterranean. This was a very important base of course. [B][B]Operations in Iceland began in May 1940 and by 1942 its aircraft were providing convoy cover and giving U-boats major troubles in those waters previously free of aircraft.[/B][/B] In late 1943, after a British-Portuguese agreement,[B][B][B] Coastal Command put aircraft of the No. 247 Group on the Azores,[/B][/B][/B] beginning operations in October with two B-17 Fortress squadrons supported by two Leigh Light detachments from Gibraltar. [B][B]The most successful squadrons were the No. 86 and No. 120 squadrons each with 14 U-boats sunk.[/B][/B] These were the most successful U-boat hunters in the war.[B][B] No. 224 followed them with 12 kills and No. 179 with 11 kills.[/B][/B] Squadrons from nations other than Britain fought under the Coastal Command such as the [B][B]No. 330 and No 333 (Norwegian), No. 304 (Polish), No. 311 (Czech) and No. 344 (French). [/B][/B] jainso31

[B][B]As the war progressed a huge range of new technologies were developed to combat the Uboat and these included :-[/B][/B] High frequency direction finding (HF/DF), including shipborne sets, to pinpoint the location of an enemy submarine from its radio transmissions. The introduction of seaborne radar which could enable the detection of surfaced U-boats. Airborne radar. The Leigh light airborne searchlight, in conjunction with airborne radar to surprise and attack enemy submarines on the surface at night. Magnetic anomaly detection Diesel exhaust sniffers Sonobuoys jainso31

[B][B]A means of detecting surfaced submarines at night, when they were at their most vulnerable, recharging batteries, and felt most safe, was a top priority for Coastal Command. ASV gave it to them. [/B][/B]The previous AI.II (Mark 2 Airborne Interception) radar became ASV.II (Air to Surface Vessel Mark 2) fitted in Coastal Command aircraft. Coastal Command priority for it, however, ranked behind Fighter Command's night fighter units. ASV.II's 1½-metre wavelength (actually 1.7 m, 176 MHz), however, meant a submarine was usually lost in sea return before it came in visual range, at around a mile (1,850 m), by which time it was already diving. In response,[B][B] the Leigh light was developed.[/B][/B] [B][B]Though it had to overcome Air Ministry indifference, and only entered service in June 1941, it proved very successful. [/B][/B]This, however, required a large aircraft, such as the Wellington or Liberator, to carry the generator needed to power the light, and most of Coastal Command's aircraft were incapable of it, nor were Bomber Command inclined to turn over anything better.[B][B] Moreover, the Germans developed Metox, which picked up ASV's radar pulses before it was able to detect a submarine at all, rendering it useless.[/B][/B] T[B][B]he appearance of H2S (10 cm) radar changed that, and the combination of H2S (as ASV.III) and Leigh light would prove lethal to U-boats.[/B][/B][B][B]Churchill backed Harris, however, denied Coastal Command H2S, claiming Bomber Command needed it to find targets, in preference to Gee and Oboe, while arguing Coastal Command might lose it to the Germans. him up. Marshal John Slessor, head of Coastal Command, countered Bomber Command also risked having it fall in enemy hands, and having the Germans produce a countermeasure against it, before Coastal Command ever got to use it. In the event, this was exactly what happened. [/B][/B]The first ASV.III was fitted to a Coastal Command Wellington at Defford in December 1942, with twelve based at Chivenor by February 1943, while a copy of H2S was lost 2/3 February when a Stirling Pathfinder was shot down over the Netherlands, on only H2S's second operational use.[B][B] Harris made similar objections to supplying 3 cm-wavelength H2X to Coastal Command (which knew it as ASV.IV),again got higher priority, and again saw it fall into German hands, almost exactly a year later, in February 1944.[/B][/B] [B][B]As Coastal Command predicted, the Germans captured the damaged H2S, which would have been next to impossible from a Coastal Command aircraft downed at sea, rather than over land, and Telefunken produced the Rotterdam Gerät (Rotterdam Device, named for where it was captured).[/B][/B] Coastal Command's first ASV.III-equipped patrol took place over the Bay of Biscay 1 March. ASV.III made its first U-boat contact on the night of 17 March, but unfortunately the carrier Wellington suffered a malfunction of its Leigh Light and was unable to press home the attack. The first attack using the system occurred the next night. [B][B]When ASV.III did enter service, German submariners, right up to Dönitz, began to mistakenly believe British aircraft were homing on emissions from the Metox receiver, which no longer gave warning. [/B][/B]Meantime, German scientists were perfecting the Rotterdam Gerät to create FuMB7 Naxos U (commonly just Naxos) for U-boats. While fragile, Naxos worked. [B][B]However, it entered service the same day as H2X (which Naxos could not detect) became operational in Coastal Command.[/B][/B] Naxos was replaced by FuMB36 in Tunis in May 1944, and was supplemented by Stumpf, what today would be called radar absorbent material, under the codename Schornsteinfeger[B][B] ("Chimneysweep").[/B][/B] PS I am not particularly "au fait" with the German Metox. jainso31

[B][B]SONOBUOYS[/B][/B] Modern anti-submarine warfare grew from the WWII convoy and battle group movement through hostile waters. It was imperative that submarines be detected and neutralized long before the task group came within range of an attack. [B][B]Aircraft-based submarine detection was the obvious solution.[/B][/B] The maturity of radio communication and sonar technology made it possible to combine a sonar transducer, batteries, a radio transmitter and whip antenna, within[B][B] a self-contained air-deployed floating (sono)buoy. [/B][/B] [B][B]Early sonobuoys had limited range, limited battery life and were overwhelmed by the noise of the ocean. [/B][/B]They first appeared towards the end of WWII where they were first used in July 1942 by RAF Coastal Command under [B][B]the code name 'High Tea',[/B][/B][B][B][B] the first squadron to use them operationally being No. 210 Squadron RAF, operating Sunderlands.[/B][/B][/B] They were also limited by the use of human ears to discriminate man-made noises from the oceanic background. However, they demonstrated that the technology was viable. With the development of better hydrophones, the transistor and miniaturization, and the realisation that very low frequency sound was important, more effective acoustic sensors followed. [B][B]The sonobuoy went from being an imposing six feet tall, two feet diameter sensor to the compact suite of electronics it is today.[/B][/B] jainso31

In 1942 when the Battle of the Atlantic was getting harder-failure to get Coastal Command aircraft equipped with ASV radar was posing the risk of of losing the Battle of the Atlantic; and it was all down to a gruesome combination of beaurocracy, industrial muddle and the priority given to Bomber Command's H2S.[B][B][B]The cabinet decision ,headed by Churchill,to give Bomber Command's H2S first call on British radio and precision engineering industries' limited resources meant that Coastal Command had to wait interminably for it's 10" ASV MkIII[/B][/B][/B]- 1942 was awash with bottlenecks and teething problems .Only in August 1942 did the government decide to divert some ASV MkIII's into Leigh Light Wellingtons and it was not until December 1942 that this move was actually achieved and 1943 saw it first in action. The question here is -why- with the Battle of the Atlantic being on the verge of defeat- was Bomber Command given so much priority-not just months; but over a year- at this critical stage in the War-so much for Churchill' statement to the House-[B][B][B]"If the Battle of the Atlantic is lost-we have lost the war"???[/B][/B][/B] In the opening months of 1943 ,the looming crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic had consequently to be faced by without the benefit of aircraft equipped with 10cm ASV radar-fortunately this crisis was eased by the introduction by the USN of the Bogue class CVE.-the RN 's equivalent was the MAC Ship-a merchantman with a flight deck; but no hangers and which could carry four Swordfish aircraft. jainso31

In January 1943 the United States began delivering to Coastal Command, with the grudging acceptance of Bomber Command;VLR* Liberators equipped with SCR 517,the American equivalent of the British ASV Mk III.This device was US developed and built by the US radio industry.Coastal Command was thus saved from the Churchill backed radar for Bomber Command Campaign; and just in the nick of time,as the Battle of the Atlantic had yet to ease off. * Very Long Range PS. ACM Harris had convinced Winston that he could win the war by systematically bombing Germany. jainso31

To hasten delivery of these aircraft to Coastal Command squadrons the Mk.IIIA's kept their USAAF armaments; but by late 1942, they had been modified to fit standard GR.Mk.III armament. (for operations in the Atlantic or Bay of Biscay etc) The early models of the Mk.III aircraft were equipped with Mk.II ASV; but with the implementation of Metox (an ASV radar detection device) by the U-boat fleet in Sept of 1942, Mk.II ASV quickly became almost obsolete and in need of replacement... The answer existed in the urgent need by Coastal Command for the new centremetric Mk.III or Mk.V radar...introduced in April 1943. jainso31

Hi Jim, I once worked for HMG and spent a month at the Civil Service College at Sunningdale. This was early 1970s. One of the more senior lecturers, agewise, had a fund of true stories he used to illustrate points. One of these related to the earliest developments of Operational Management theories and practice. Early in WW2 the Coastal Command aircraft were spotting U Boats on the surface, were attacking but with a singular lack of success. Sometimes they carried depth charges, which they felt were set too deep, sometimes they carried bombs which exploded on impact but the sub had dived and they had no effect. The O and M boys were asked to use their new scientific approach to work out the most effective standard setting to have for either bombs or depth charges to increase the probability of achieving a 'kill'. They went away looked at U Boat dive times, time to depth, kill radii of depth charges, sizes of depth charges or bombs etc available and came up with a recommendation that all aircraft should attack with depth charges set to explode (memory is not exact at this point and I cannot recall whether 50' or 100' was selected. I think the latter) at a standard depth. This was reported to Coastal Command and sent out to the squadrons. The results were staggeringly effective. In the first week a submarine was sunk by a Sunderland. In the first month the total was three. Messages of congratulations were showered on the O & M team and their place in military equipment development and operational deployment and use assured for evermore. They did not admit, for at least 10 years, that the success rate achieved was at least 300% greater than their own best estimate of the likely success rate and that their analysis showed that the likely attack rate would be one per fortnight with a 33% kill probability. His point, that during a war luck is a major player so war should be avoided wherever possible, was well made. Cheers, Sandy McAuslan

Many thanks Sandy for the "at the sharp end" story-it is remarkable what extensive thought into a problem will produce-in this case beyond the think tank's best expectations. May 1941 tests revealed that a tail fin improved the accuracy of the depth charge when[B][B] dropped from any height up to 250 ft (76 m).[/B][/B] The fins had a reduced impact when dropped above this height. The 250 lb (110 kg) DC had to be within 9–33 ft (2.7–10 m) to be lethal;[B][B] operational records show the lethal radius was 19 ft (5.8 m). [/B][/B] The depth setting and detonation problems were solved by June 1942- as you have stated Sandy- and the 250 lb (110 kg) DC proved a formidable A/S weapon. jainso31

Sandy, there is a bit more on the Coastal Command Operational Research Section in the"[I]Convoy ONS-5: The Empire Strikes Back[/I]" thread, post #18 here: [URL]http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showpost.php?p=117451&postcount=18[/URL]

RAF Coastal Command were credited with sinking 108 Uboats in the period 1941-45, peaking in 1943 with 35 kills-further proof that 1943 was the year of the demise of the Uboat in the Atlantic. Sir Arthur (Butch) Harris AOC RAF Bomber Command is considered to have said that "Coastal Command was the biggest hindrance to winning the war" How wrong he was!!!:mad::mad: jainso31

Dear Jim You would probably enjoy John Winton's book "Ultra at Sea" which cover how Ultra decrypts went into the positioning of VLRs and their impact on the U-boat efforts. Mostly it is about the Battle of the Atlantic but also the Med is covered, and is primarily concerned with signal intelligence, as the name implies. Good insightful stuff that adds several more bricks to the wall of history. tim

Thank for the nod re."Ultra at Sea" by John Winton Tim-I shall look out for a good copy on Abebooks,where I usually shop. No sooner said than done:):) jainso31

In March 1943,Coastal Command introduced the the Mk III radar;and as more aircraft became available,the Tracking Room at the Admiralty and Coastal Command HQ jointly produced a scheme of operations using fixed systems of aircraft sweeps on a 24 hourly basis,which could be adjusted to cover the entire "Search Area",as the latest information from ULTRA came in.Two particular patterns of search areas were introduced codenamed Musketry and Seaslug. Once UlTRA had provided a starting datum point,it became almost certain that surfaced Uboats could be detected by radar.As Uboat speeds en route varied very little it became relatively easy for a patrol aircraft to cover the Uboat's course,even with slight variations.Thus ULTRA enabled patrol aircraft to concentrate their searches for both outward and inward bound Uboats. jainso31

Because of the afore mentioned innovations introduced by Coastal Command -the Uboats countered at the end of April 1943 by remaining submerged,only surfacing to recharge their batteries.This slowed them down considerably thus allowing Coastal Command more time to detect them.Result four boats sunk and three damaged. The boats were given additional AA armament in the way of quadruple 20mm flak pods and were ordered not to dive but to stay surfaced a fight it out with the attacker-this was an abyssmal failure-in May six boats were lost and several more were severely damaged.Then they were ordered into groups in order to bring concentrated fire on the attacker; but this was countered by the aircraft forming a scout group -one aircraft sighting and calling up the other two to make a concerted attack and so it continued -Move v Countermove. jainso31

[B]Before the TRIDENT Conference, Admiral Ernest J. King got control of A/S aircraft from the Army Air Force, arranging a trade of B-24s for comparable types. This enabled Slessor to make a deal with him to "borrow" one squadron.[/B]After attacks on ONS 166, the number of VLRs in Newfoundland finally increased. The commanding officer of 120 Squadron, Squadron Leader Bulloch, confirmed RCAF's ability to operate in the Air Gap, and in early March 1943, the number of B24's in Newfoundland increased (though it was not enough to equip 10 Squadron, RCAF, before 10 May), while 120 Squadron's strength doubled. [B]This put all of thirty-eight VLRs over the Mid-Atlantic Gap.[/B] [B]The arrival of 25th Antisubmarine Wing, USAAF, with its medium-range B-24s (equipped with H2S, probably built by Canadians), made it possible to free up Coastal Command VLRs without it. [/B]The growth in numbers of escort carriers meant "a dramatic increase of USAAF Fortresses and medium-range Liberators" could be based in Newfoundland. 25h Wing flew over the Bay of Biscay, where they sank one U-boat before being redeployed to Morocco. [B]Increasing availability of escort carriers reduced the hazard of the Gap. After a crisis in March which nearly had Churchill and the Admiralty abandon convoy altogether, the Mid-Atlantic Gap was finally closed in May 1943, when RCAF VLRs became operational in Newfoundland, by which time the Battle of the Atlantic was largely won.[/B] jainso31

Jim: Closing the coverage gaps by aircraft from land and sea bases was the critical game changer in the Battle of the Atlantic as the benefits of earlier strategies and tactics had reached their limits of success. Necessity was the mother of invention. Brian

Absolutely Brian-Experience had shown that surface escorts alone without air cooperation could not give security to convoys unless in overwhelming strength it was also clear that air escort unaided by surface vessels was also insufficient-it required a careful balance of the two; and once the mid Atlantic Air Gap was closed-the battle started to swing back in favour of the Allies. jainso31

[B][B]Long Range Liberators operated from either side of the Atlantic with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the US Navy from the west; and with the RAF from the east, [/B][/B]based in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Iceland, and beginning in mid-1943 from the Azores. These operations were dangerous, especially after many U-boats were armed with extra anti-aircraft guns, some even adopted the policy of staying on the surface to fight, rather than submerging and risk being sunk by ASW (anti-submarine warfare) torpedoes and depth charges from the bombers. jainso31

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