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Convoy PQ17 June 1942 World Naval Ships Forums Archive

Convoy PQ17 June 1942

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On the 27th of June 1942, PQ 17 set sail from it's starting point at Hvalfjord, Iceland for Murmansk and Archangel and the Kola Inlet loaded with vital war materials of every description for Russia's war on the Eastern front. A lot has been said about this ill fated convoy down the years and much bitterness still exists today between the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy about what happened. 25 vessels out of the convoy of 36 were lost to enemy action. It is said that most of the blame was to lie with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound who gave the order for the convoy to "scatter" and for the entire escort of Royal Naval ships to run off in search of non existant German surface ships. Here is the full story of what happened and is virtually the official view of the Merchant Navy. [url]http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/convoypq17.html[/url] The pics below shows a lookout on an Arctic convoy. The entrance to the infamous Kola inlet. A complete list and details of PQ 17 's ships that were lost. Although this was seemingly a Brirish convoy, few would know that 62% of the losses were from the US merchant fleet. [COLOR="Blue"][B]No flowers grow on sailor's graves[/B][/COLOR]
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you might like to have a look back at some of the realier posts on the SS Daniel Morgan re PQ17, the Russians (post on Belfast) also made a TV series about it. Did you by an chance know, or know of, Adm Tony Sinnert? or Alan Richmond? both of the RAN. all best forv 2008 tim

While researching my alma mater (the great St. Bees School of St. Bees, Cumberland :p) I discovered that the Commodore of PQ-17 was an Old St. Beghian. Captain John Charles Keith Dowding, R.N.R. (as he then was) was on ''River Afton'' when she went down, and eventually made his way with other survivors to Novaya Zemyla. He was for many years a senior officer with Orient Line, so I'm sure he would have had an antipodean connection. Harley

[CENTER][U][B][SIZE=3][B]Convoy PQ17 – 27 June to July 1942 [/B][B](Part 1)[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U][/CENTER] [CENTER][U][B][SIZE=3]　[/SIZE][/B][/U][/CENTER] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]Background[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]In June 1941 Germany invaded Russia. Two months later, the first convoy with war supplies for Russia sailed in August 1941. The decision to send supplies to North Russia, instead of by the far easier and more efficient southern route through Persia, was a political one dictated by the ever suspicious Stalin who, fearing that British influence in Persia would be strengthened should it be used, vetoed this route. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The wartime voyage to Murmansk and Archangel in North Russia took from ten to fourteen days, the route of which was, from a naval point of view, completely unsound. In winter the almost perpetual darkness, combined with atrocious weather of ferocious gales, ice, and fog for six months of the year made for appalling conditions. In summer the perpetual night was replaced by perpetual day which, if slightly better climatically, meant that there could be no hiding from the enemy. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Admiral Tovey wrote: "[I]The strategical situation was wholly favourable to the enemy. His heavy ships would be operating close to their own coast, with the support of powerful shore based air reconnaissance and striking forces, and protected, if he so desired, by a screen of U-boats in the channels between Spitsbergen and Norway. Our covering forces, on the other hand, if they entered these waters, would be without shore-based air support, one thousand miles from their base, with their destroyers too short of fuel to escort a damaged ship to harbour[/I]."[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Germans belatedly realized that a large volume of supplies was regularly being convoyed to the Russians by this means and took active steps to prevent it with air and U-boat attacks. From the first twelve convoys only one ship was lost, torpedoed by a U-boat, from the 103 ships which sailed. But after that losses started to mount, as German forces in Norway were strengthened.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]In April 1942 the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, warned the Defence Committee that geographic conditions in the Arctic were so heavily in the enemy’s favour that losses to the convoys might well reach a point where their running became an uneconomical proposition. In May 1942 he told Admiral King USN: "[I]These Arctic convoys are becoming a regular millstone around our necks. The whole thing is a most unsound operation, with the dice loaded against us in every direction.[/I]"[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Churchill was coming under increasing pressure from Washington and Moscow to continue the convoys. Roosevelt informed Churchill that at the end of April there were 107 ships destined for Russia, loaded or being loaded, and he wanted to see them being moved within the next month. Churchill replied that "[I]with the greatest respect, what you suggest is beyond our power to fulfil[/I]". Stalin urged Churchill to "[I]take all possible measures[/I]" to ensure supplies reached Russia during May as "[I]this is extremely important for our front[/I]".[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At the same time, Admiral Tovey (C-in-C Home Fleet) was advocating a [U]reduction[/U] in the number of convoys as the Arctic ice sheet had not receded far enough to route convoys beyond the range of German bombers. He recommended that, unless the enemy airfields in northern Norway could be neutralised, or until the months of darkness returned, the convoys should be stopped altogether. He warned that "[I]If they must continue for political reasons, very serious and heavy losses must be expected.[/I]" [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]But the political situation overruled Admiralty objections and the decision was taken to run a convoy, and so on 21 May 1942 the largest convoy to date with 36 merchantmen sailed from Reykjavik, Iceland. This was PQ16 which lost seven ships to aircraft and one ship to U-boats before they reached Murmansk on 30 May. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]It was obvious that, with the political situation unchanged and so many ships from the US and Britain assembling off Iceland, it was necessary to run another convoy. So on 4 June the decision was made to run convoy PQ17. Originally scheduled for 11 June, its departure was delayed by the lack of fleet escorts, returning from duties in the Mediterranean.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]British tactical Considerations[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [U][I][SIZE=2]General[/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]The convoy’s destination was usually Archangel and Murmansk in northern Russia. The only route took them between the northern coast of Norway and the Arctic ice sheet. In winter, the Arctic ice sheet extended southwards narrowing this passage, bringing the whole area within bomber range, with the darkness offering some protection but not against the furious winter storms. Conversely, in summer, the ice retreated northwards widening the passage until at its widest it was beyond the bomber’s range for a few weeks, but constant daylight and fine weather still favoured the bombers.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]When PQ17 sailed, the ice sheet had not retracted far enough north and the convoy’s route was still within bomber range. With perpetual daylight, it could be attacked at any time.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Admiralty and the C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, had several causes for anxiety. They not only had to guard against the threat to the Arctic convoys, but also against the possibility of a breakout by heavy German ships into the Atlantic, as the [I]Bismarck[/I] and [I]Prinz Eugen[/I] had done a year earlier, where the damage they could do to Allied ocean convoys was immeasurable. There was also the possibility that an attack on the convoy was to be a diversion for such a breakout.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Admiralty decided that the Home Fleet, based at Scapa Flow, could cover the western part of a Russian convoy’s passage to protect it against surface attack by enemy heavy units, while still being in a position to counter a breakout, provided that it was not lured too far eastwards and left the door to the Atlantic open. Consequently, they did not usually venture east of a point midway between Jan Mayen and Bear Island, about 10 degrees East. Nor did they approach too close to the Norwegian coast where they could be attacked by land based torpedo bombers, with the loss of the [I]Repulse[/I] and [I]Prince of Wales [/I]still very fresh in the memory. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]To fight a convoy through to North Russia, the Royal Navy had to provide three separate forces: [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]1) [U]A close escort[/U] of destroyers and small craft to defend against attacks by U-boats and by aircraft. This would accompany the convoy right through to its destination.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]2) [U]A covering force[/U] of from two to four cruisers to ward off attacks by the Germans’ large destroyers and cruisers. [[B]Note[/B]: Initially, these also went right through to Russia, but the repair facilities at Murmansk were so primitive and Russian co-operation so grudging, and following the loss of the cruisers [I]Edinburgh [/I]and[I] Trinidad[/I], they now turned around and left the convoys at Bear Island.][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]3) [U]A distant covering force[/U] of at least two battleships and a fleet aircraft carrier to meet the threat posed by [I]Tirpitz[/I] and the pocket battleships. [/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B]A Warning![/B][/SIZE][/B][/I] [SIZE=2]All German telegraph and teleprinter services to their bases in Norway passed through Sweden, and had been tapped into for some time by the Swedish Intelligence Service, who had broken many of their codes. Captain Henry Denham, the British Naval Attache in Stockholm had cultivated a close relationship with Major Tornberg and as a result, although Sweden was neutral, had often received intelligence him unofficially. On 18 June Captain Denham was given a piece of intelligence from this source so important that he sent a "Most Immediate" message to the Admiralty:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]"Following is German plan for attack on next Russian convoy:[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]1. Air reconnaissance to locate eastbound convoy when it reaches Jan Mayen. Bombing attacks will then be made.[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]2. Pocket battleships and six destroyers will move to Altenfjord, and Tirpitz and Hipper to Narvik area. Both these forces may be expected to operate once convoy has reached 6 degrees East. Simultaneous attacks when convoy on meridian of Bear Island by two surface groups supported by U-boats and aircraft. Graded A3"[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]This proved to be a remarkably accurate summary of Operation Roesselsprung, the German plan to attack PQ17, the next convoy to Russia.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Admiralty’s appreciation of German tactics against the convoy was that German heavy naval units would attack west of Bear Island (about 20 degrees East), while aircraft and U-boats would attack east of it, reasoning that it would be unwise of the Germans to mix their U-boats and warships in the same area on the same operation, for fear of scoring an own goal.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]German tactical considerations[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]Since the abortive British campaign in Norway, Germany was nervous of British ambitions in that area which was heightened by the raid on the Lofoten Islands in December 1941, because since the German invasion of Russia this had became an exposed northern flank, and if Norway were to be lost to the Allies, convoys to Russia could continue unmolested.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]So Hitler expected that Britain would attack Norway and, at the end of December 1941, stated that "[I]The German Fleet must therefore use all its forces for the defence of Norway. It would be expedient to transfer all battleships and pocket battleships there for this purpose[/I]". He ordered that all heavy German warships should be stationed in Norwegian waters and the torpedo bomber forces and U-boats considerably reinforced.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The[I] Tirpitz[/I] was moved to Trondheim in January 1942, and in February the[I] Scharnhorst,[/I] [I]Geisenau[/I] and [I]Prinz Eugen[/I] were withdrawn from Brest in France in the "Channel Dash" to Wilhelmshaven, but both[I] Scharnhorst,[/I] [I]Geisenau[/I] sustained mine damage en route and had to enter dock for repairs. On 20 February [I]Prinz Eugen[/I] and [I]Admiral Scheer[/I] sailed to join [I]Tirpitz[/I], but [I]Prinz Eugen[/I] sustained rudder damage when torpedoed by the submarine [I]HMS Trident[/I].[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][[B]Note[/B]: German Naval Group North had signalled U-377 on 22 February to act as a screen for [I]Prinz Eugen[/I] and[I] Admiral Scheer,[/I] "[I]which are transferring tonight or very soon from Bergen to Trondheim[/I]". This signal was intercepted and decrypted by Bletchley Park, and enabled the Admiralty to station [I]HMS Trident[/I] in the approaches to Trondheim where, the next morning, she torpedoed [I]Prinz Eugen[/I].][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 6 March [I]Tirpitz [/I]was ordered to attack convoys PQ12 and QP8, (Operation Sportpalast), but the signal was intercepted and the convoy diverted. The only ship they could find was a lone Russian merchantman which they sank, but not before she had reported the attack and her position. Her distress signal was received in Britain and the Admiralty informed. This enabled them to position the aircraft carrier [I]HMS Victorious [/I]to intercept the [I]Tirpitz[/I] on her return passage to Trondheim. [I]Tirpitz[/I] was attacked by torpedo carrying Albacores from [I]Victorious[/I], but suffered no damage.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]This air attack on the [I]Tirpitz[/I] made the Germans very cautious about deploying the battleship, and instituted a policy of not putting to sea if the presence of aircraft carriers or battleships was suspected. "[I]Therefore our own naval forces should be committed only after the enemy’s exact position and strength has been accurately and unequivocally ascertained by air reconnaissance, and when there is sufficient support by the Air force.[/I]" At the same time an aircraft carrier was ordered.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Following this, the Luftwaffe strengthened its long range reconnaissance, bomber and torpedo bomber presence in Norway, and the Kriegsmarine sent more U-boats and the [I]Admiral Hipper [/I]to join [I]Tirpitz[/I].[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]British preparations[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]Eastbound convoys destined to Russia were named after Commander P.Q. Edwards who was originally responsible for their planning, and became known as PQ’s convoys. Westbound convoys logically became QP convoys. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Admiral Tovey C-in-C Home Fleet would be informed every day about the latest Enigma intelligence regarding the Tirpitz and other surface ships, in the form of assessment summaries. But the First Sea Lord, Dudley Pound would exercise overall control of the operation as he felt that only the Admiralty (meaning the Operational Intelligence Centre - OIC) would have a complete picture. This arose from the time the[I] Tirpitz[/I] attempted to attack PQ12, when secret Enigma intelligence could not be transmitted to the C-in-C Admiral Tovey for him to assess the situation himself, so the Admiralty assumed control to position the Home Fleet to intercept the Tirpitz.[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]The Convoy[/I][/B] [/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2](Commodore Dowding)[/SIZE][/I] [SIZE=2]The convoy comprised of thirty six ships - nineteen American, twelve British, two Russian, one Dutch, one Norwegian and one Panamanian. They were carrying over 156,000 tons of cargo including 297 aircraft, 594 tanks, artillery, armaments and general war supplies. In addition, there were three British rescue ships, [I]Rathlin, Zaafaran, Zamalek[/I], which sailed with the convoy as part of it.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][I]The Forces[/I][/B][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Home Fleet had been reinforced on 4 April with the arrival of US Task Force 39, which was renamed Task Force 99. The escort and covering forces were the strongest that could be mustered at the time.[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2]Close Escort (Commander Broome)[/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]Destroyers ([I]Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Corvettes ([I]Lotus, Poppy, La Malouine,[/I] [I]Dianella[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Minesweepers ([I]Halcyon, Salamander, Britomart[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]ASW trawlers ([I]Lord Middleton, Lord Austin, Ayrshire, Northern Gem[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]AA ships ([I]Palomares, Pozarica[/I]),[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Submarines ([I]P614, P615[/I]).[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2]Close Covering Force - 1st Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Hamilton)[/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]Cruisers ([I]London, Norfolk, USS Tuscaloosa, USS Wichita[/I]),[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Destroyers([I]Somali, USS Wainwright, USS Rowan[/I]).[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2]Distant Covering Force - Home Fleet (Admiral Tovey)[/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]Aircraft carrier ([I]Victorious[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Battleships ([I]Duke of York[/I], [I]USS Washington[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Cruisers ([I]Nigeria, Cumberland[/I]), [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]14 Destroyers.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Eight British submarines ([I]Ursula, Tribune, Seawolf, Trident, Sahib, Sturgeon, Unrivalled, Unshaken[/I]), one Free French ([I]Minerva[/I]) and four Russian were positioned off the North Cape, and special air patrols arranged to report movement by [I]Tirpitz [/I]and other ships.[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2]Diversionary Operations[/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]In an attempt to divert the enemy surface and air forces, a dummy convoy, consisting of the 1st Minelaying Squadron and four colliers, escorted by the [I]Sirius, Curacoa[/I], five destroyers and a number of trawlers, was assembled in Scapa Flow for a week and sailed two days after the convoy. It sailed westabout the Shetlands and then eastward to 1 degree East, hoping to attract the attention of the German air reconnaissance and simulate a raiding force bound for Southern Norway (Operation ES). The Home Fleet sailed later the same day and adjusted its course to give the impression of covering this raiding force.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The only German reconnaissance of Scapa during the period of assembly apparently failed to notice this convoy, nor was it sighted on passage due to extensive fog. The operation was therefore repeated on 1st July, but again without success.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]German preparations[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]Grand-Admiral Raeder presented his plan, Operation Roesselsprung, for attacking the next Russian convoy (PQ17) to Hitler at Berchtesgaden for approval on 15 June, which in essence was:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]"[I]As soon as the convoy has been located by aerial reconnaissance, the Trondheim Group[/I] [Tirpitz and Hipper][I] will proceed to the northern exit of Altenfjord, refuel and wait for receipt of the codeword before executing the operation. The Narvik Group[/I] [[I]Luetzow[/I] and [I]Scheer[/I]][I] is to join forces with the Trondheim Group. The codeword will not be given without full approval from the Fuhrer. [/I][/SIZE] [I][SIZE=2][I]The main task is the rapid destruction of the enemy merchant ships. If necessary these should only be crippled and their sinking left to the U-boats and aircraft. It is primarily the task of the Tirpitz and Hipper to fight the escort forces, while the Luetzow and Scheer dispose of the convoy during this time[/I][/SIZE][/I][SIZE=2][I].[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]The operation will be executed only if reconnaissance has established with certainty that there is no risk of becoming involved with superior enemy forces[/I]."[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Raeder afterwards wrote: [I]"The Führer considers aircraft-carriers a great threat to the large vessels. The aircraft-carriers must be located before the attack and they must be rendered harmless by our aircraft beforehand." [/I]The only acceptable alternative to this would be if the carrier forces were found to be so far away there was no possibility of their intervening against the German ships,[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]The Forces[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I] [SIZE=2][U]Tronheim group (Admiral Schniewind)[/U][/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper,[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]5th and 6th destroyer flotillas ([I]Ihn, Lody, Galster, Riedel, Eckholt, Steinbrink[/I])[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2]Narvik group (Vice-Admiral Kummetz)[/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2][I]Luetzow, Admiral Scheer[/I], [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]8th destroyer flotilla ([I]Z24, Z27, Z28, Z29, Z30, Beitzen[/I])[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2]U-boats[/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-408, U-456, U-457, U-657, U-703[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Preliminary moves[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I] [SIZE=2]The U-boats U-255, U-408 and U-456 were positioned East of Jan Mayen Island to provide an early warning of the convoy’s approach. In addition, another group of U-boats (called Eisteufel or "Ice Devil") were positioned further East in the Denmark Strait. They were U-88, U-251, U-355, U-376, U-457, and U-657.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]When PQ17 was first sighted, the heavy ships would move from their bases at Trondheim and Narvik northwards to Altenfjord on the North Cape, and wait there until there is no possibility of meeting up with a heavy Allied force, whereupon they would sortie to attack PQ17.[/SIZE] [CENTER][FONT=Times New Roman]-----"-----[/FONT][/CENTER] [CENTER][FONT=Times New Roman]　[/FONT][/CENTER]

[CENTER][U][SIZE=3][B]Convoy PQ17 – 27 June to July 1942 [/B][B](Part 2)[/B][/SIZE][/U][/CENTER] [I][SIZE=2]　[/SIZE][/I] [SIZE=2][U][B]The Admiralty’s Instructions of 27 June 1942 to Admiral Tovey, C-in-C Home Fleet[/B][/U][/SIZE] [SIZE=2][[B]Note[/B]: CS1 refers to Hamilton’s First Cruiser Squadron.][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Your 13.55 22nd and 17.27 25th and my 02.21 25th [/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](a)[/B] After consideration of above telegrams and as Admiralty may be in possession of fuller and earlier information of movements of enemy surface forces than our forces will be and as you may not wish to break W/T silence it appears necessary for Admiralty to control movements of convoy as far as this may be influenced by movements of enemy surface forces.[B](b)[/B] Paragraph (a) will not prevent either C-in-C H.F. [Tovey], CS1 [Hamilton], Senior Officer of Escort [Broome] or Commodore of Convoy [Dowding] giving such orders regarding movements of convoy as local conditions may necessitate.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](c)[/B] Should Admiralty consider it necessary to reverse course of convoy, the time on which reverse course is to be held will be specified and it is to be understood that it is a temporary measure unless Admiralty give the order for convoy to return to Iceland.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](d)[/B] Admiralty may be unaware of weather conditions in the vicinity of the convoy and even though Admiralty may give the order for course of convoy to be reversed it is at the discretion of Senior Officer present with convoy to ignore the Admiralty order should the weather be thick.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](e)[/B] As Admiralty will be exercising control, it is essential that they should he kept informed not only of positions and movements of forces but also of any damage incurred. It is not intended above should be carried out when ships by breaking W/T silence would give away their position, but only when position of forces must be known to the enemy.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](f)[/B] Generally speaking the safety of the convoy from attack of surface ships must be met by our covering forces to westward of meridian of Bear Island and be dependent on our submarine dispositions to eastward of that meridian.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](g)[/B] The Admiralty will keep all forces as fully informed as possible of enemy movements.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](h)[/B] The movements of the Battle Fleet covering force will be at the discretion of C-in-C H.F., but it is not expected that this covering force will be placed in a position where it will be subject to heavy air attack unless there is a good chance of bringing [I]Admiral von Tirpitz [/I]to action.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](j)[/B] The movements of cruiser covering force will be at the discretion of CS1 subject to instructions from Admiralty or C-in-C H.F. It is not intended that cruiser covering force should proceed to eastward of Bear Island unless convoy is threatened by the presence of surface forces which cruiser covering force can fight. In any case it is not intended that cruiser covering force should proceed eastward of meridian of 25° East.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](k)[/B] Our primary object is to get as much of the convoy through as possible and the best way to do this is to keep it moving to the eastward even though it is suffering damage. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](l)[/B] Should the passage of the convoy be barred by a force including [I]Admiral von Tirpitz [/I]in weather of good visibility and to eastward of meridian of Bear Island there will be no alternative but to reverse course of convoy, anyhow for a time. This action may be taken by Admiralty, but if necessary C-in-C H.F. or Senior Officer of cruiser force or Senior Officer with convoy may give this order.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](m)[/B] Once convoy is to eastward of meridian of Bear Island circumstances may arise in which best thing would be for convoy to be dispersed with orders to proceed to Russian ports. It is at the discretion of either C-in-C H.F., Senior Officer of cruiser force or Senior Officer of escort or convoy to give this order.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B](n)[/B] CS1 pass to [I]Keppel [/I]and destroyers of escort and Commodore of convoy.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Time of origin: 01.57B 27 June 1942[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][U]　[/U][/B][/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]The scheduled route[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]The merchantmen assembled in Hvalfjord, on the west coast of Iceland, north of Reykjavik (20 degrees West). Upon leaving, they would sail north around Iceland, before changing course to the northeast heading towards Jan Mayen Island (5 degrees west), passing to the southeast of it. Continuing northeast to Bear Island (20 degrees East) then turning east to pass to the north of it at 75 degrees North. Continuing eastwards for several hundred miles before tuning southeast, and finally south to Murmansk (33 degrees East). A total distance of about 2,000 miles. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][U][B]Convoy PQ17 – the voyage[/B][/U][/B][/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 1[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2] (Saturday 27 June 1942)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Complete radio silence was ordered but ironically, it was this silence that told the Germans that the convoy was about to depart. For this first part of their voyage the convoy would be escorted by the minesweepers and ASW trawlers of the close escort.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 16.00 the 39 merchantmen of PQ17 sailed from Reykjavik but the [I]Richard Bland[/I] ran aground and had to return. They sailed north, passing up the west coast of Iceland then headed northeast, towards Jan Mayen Island. At this point the convoy formed up into its cruising formation – nine columns of four ships. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]When PQ17 sailed the Enigma intelligence about the strengths and dispositions of the U-boats and the GAF’s forces was excellent, and it included details of the arrangements made by the GAF for finding and shadowing the convoy. As for the German surface ships, the Home Fleet was informed that there was no evidence that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] had left Trondheim.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 2[/I][/B] [/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2](Sunday 28 June)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The ships of the returning convoy QP13 sailed from Archangel on the 26th and Murmansk on the 27th, and merged into a single 36 ship convoy of the 28th. [[B]Note:[/B][I] HMS Niger[/I] and five merchantmen were lost on 5 July from QP13 when they sailed into a minefield off Straumness, Iceland in poor visibility.][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][I][B][I]Day 3[/I][/B] [/I][/B](Monday 29 June)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I][I]Convoy position at noon – 16 degrees West[/I] [/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]05.00 The convoy ran into heavy ice, damaging the [I]Exford,[/I] [I]Grey Ranger[/I] and one other. The Exford and the other ship were forced to turn back. The [I]Grey Ranger[/I] was the escort's oiler, with her speed reduced to eight knots and unable face heavy weather, she was transferred to the fuelling position north-east of Jan Mayen in exchange for the[I] Aldersdale[/I].[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 08.00 the [I]Dianella[/I] and submarines P614 and P615 left Seidisfjord (east coast of Iceland) to join the convoy as part of the close escort, and at 15.30 the remaining close escort destroyers left Seidisfjord. At 17.00 the Home Fleet left Scapa Flow.[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 4[/I][/B] [/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2](Tuesday 30 June)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Convoy position at noon – 12 degrees West[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 12.00 the convoy was joined by the destroyers of the close escort. Later that day, the Admiralty sent the C-in-C and CS1 a further negative report: ‘[I]it appears from negative information that there was no movement of a main unit on the Norwegian coast on 27, 28 and 29 June[/I]’. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Luftwaffe conducted a very heavy air raid on Murmansk, rendering it unable to handle the ships of the convoy. Consequently, the convoy was rerouted to Archangel the next day.[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2]　[/SIZE][/B][/U] [B][SIZE=2][I][B]Day 5[/B] [/I][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2](Wednesday 1 July) [/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Convoy position at noon - 6 degrees West. (southeast of Jan Mayen Island)[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]02.00 The First Cruiser Squadron (CS1) departed from Seidisfjord.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 14.30, PQ17 was sighted by a German reconnaissance aircraft, and its report was intercepted in Britain. Shortly after this the convoy ran into the U-boat patrol line and was spotted at 15.30 by U-456 and at 16.00 by U-255. Several U-boats was seen by the destroyers. It was now known that the convoy was being shadowed by both aircraft and U-boats.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][I]　[/I][/B][/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 6[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2] (Thursday 2 July)[/SIZE] [I][SIZE=2]Convoy position at noon – 2 degrees East.[/SIZE][/I] [SIZE=2]The cruiser covering force CS1 arrived on station and took up a position to the north of the convoy.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]PQ17 and QP13 passed each other at noon, midway between Jan Mayen Island and Bear Island. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]PQ17 was still being shadowed by both aircraft and U-boats and, at 13.13 OIC warned them that the Luftwaffe had ordered a torpedo-bomber attack for 21.00. Unfortunately, they brought this forward to 18.00 and it took place before the convoy could receive the revised warning. This was the first attack by torpedo bombers, but there were no casualties.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Now the position of the convoy was known, the [I]Tirpitz, Hipper[/I] and accompanying destroyers left Trondheim for Vestfjord at 20.00, and [I]Luetzow, Scheer[/I] and five destroyers left Narvik for Altenfjord around midnight, but [I]Luetzow[/I] ran aground while leaving Narvik and was left behind. They were to remain at their destinations until the Home Fleet had been located. Both these movements were detected and reported to the Admiralty, although the mishap to [I]Luetzow[/I] was not.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]An RAF ice reconnaissance found that the passage north of Bear Island had widened, and it was suggested to Commander Broome (Senior Escort Officer in[I] Keppel[/I]) that the convoy should pass at least fifty miles north of it, but he preferred to stay in the low visibility on his original easterly route and to make ground to the east. Rear Admiral Hamilton of CS1 decided that a more northerly route was necessary and ordered Broome to alter course to pass 70 miles north of Bear Island.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 7[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2] (Friday 3 July)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Convoy position at noon – 12 degrees East.[/I][/SIZE] [I][SIZE=2]The Admira[/SIZE][/I][SIZE=2] [I]Scheer[/I] reached Altenfjord at 10.00.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 12.00 the regular and routine changing of the naval Enigma key occurred at this time, and for the next 32 hours, Enigma intelligence was unavailable until Bletchley had broken the new key.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Having failed to locate the Home Fleet during the day, the [I]Tirpitz [/I]and [I]Hipper[/I], instead of putting to sea, were ordered to Altenfjord to join the [I]Scheer[/I].[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][I][B]Day 8[/B][/I][/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2] (Saturday 4 July)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Convoy position at noon – 23 degrees East.[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]In the morning, the Home Fleet took up a covering position north-west of Bear Island, within air striking range of the convoy, the time thought to be the earliest at which a surface attack was likely to materialise. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 00.15 a German aircraft sighted CS 1’s force and reported that it included a battleship.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 05.00 the second aerial attack on the convoy was by a lone torpedo bomber hitting the [I]Christopher Newport[/I] which dropped out of formation. The crew were picked up by the rescue ship [I]Zamalek[/I], and the ship torpedoed by P614 and left in a sinking condition. But she didn’t sink, she was later found by U-457 which did finally sink her.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The[I] Tirpitz [/I]and[I] Hipper[/I] arrived at Altenfjord at 09.00 and were ordered to refuel their destroyers and torpedo boats immediately, but three destroyers ([I]Riedel, Galster, Lody[/I]) ran aground and took no further part. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 12.03 the Admiralty gave the CS1 discretion to continue east of the of 25° East limit ‘[I]should the situation demand it’[/I]. But the C-in-C Tovey, having received no intelligence to account for this change of plan, at once qualified the Admiralty’s instruction by ordering CS1 to return when the convoy was east of 25° E, or earlier at his discretion, unless the Admiralty assured him that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was not at sea. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 13.27 a U-boat sighted CS1’s force reporting it as ‘[I]heavy enemy forces’[/I]; and at 14.58 was ordered to shadow ‘[I]the[/I] [I]battleship formation[/I]’. Other U-boats were to attack these ‘heavy forces’. This false report had the effect of delaying the [I]Tirpitz[/I]’s departure, as the ‘heavy enemy forces’ might have been be the superior force it had been ordered to avoid. But by 14.55 the Luftwaffe had correctly reported that CS 1’s force consisted of four heavy cruisers with destroyers, and at 19.30 conducted a high level bomber attack but failed to hit anything.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Another attack an hour later by 25 torpedo bombers was more successful, hitting three ships. The [I]Navarino [/I]was sunk, the [I]William Hooper [/I]was damaged and later sunk by U-334;and the [I]Azerbaijan [/I]was damaged.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 18.00 Rear-Admiral Hamilton in CS 1 announced his intention of withdrawing his cruisers at 22.00. But at 19.30 the Admiralty, having heard that Enigma intelligence for the period to noon on 4 July had been broken, signalled him to the effect: "[I]Further information[/I] [I]may be available shortly. Remain with convoy pending further instructions[/I]".[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Enigma decrypts began to come in, amongst which was the alarming news that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] and [I]Hipper[/I] had arrived at Altenfjord at 09.00 that day and had been ordered to refuel their destroyers and torpedo boats immediately. Assuming the refuelling would take three hours; the whole group could have put to sea at noon and could reach the convoy at 02.00 the next day.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On the strength of the day’s intelligence, and in the absence of positive evidence that the enemy had not sailed since noon, the First Sea Lord Admiral Pound decided that it must be assumed that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] [U]had[/U] sailed; that for this reason, and on account of the threat from U-boats, CS1 should be ordered to withdraw, Assuming that the Tirpitz and others had sailed at noon, they could reach the convoy within the next five hours, the convoy should be scattered. The First Sea Lord was asked in vain to reconsider his decision. The Admiral’s orders were despatched.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The first at 21.11 addressed to the CS1 commander, Hamilton:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]"[I]Most immediate. Cruiser force to withdraw to westward at high speed."[/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The second at 21.23, addressed to the close escort commander, Broome:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]"[I]Immediate. Owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports[/I]."[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]To ‘disperse’ means to break formation and proceed independently to destination. On being questioned, Pound verified that he meant the convoy to ‘scatter’.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The third at 21.36 was sent, again to Broome:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]"[I]Most immediate. My 21.23B of the 4th. Convoy is to scatter."[/I][/I][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]This latter signal was intended merely as a correction of technical wording from "disperse" to "scatter", but as this was not known to the recipients, its unnecessary "[I]Most immediate[/I]" category gave an unwarranted urgency to the signal. Both Hamilton and Broome took these signals to mean that an attack by the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was imminent.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]It was Admiral Pound’s intention (or assumption) that the destroyers of the close escort would remain with the other escorts of the convoy. But with no Admiralty orders, and no provision made in the Admiralty Instructions for such a situation, the close escort commander, Broome in [I]HMS Keppel[/I], decided to concentrate his destroyers on Hamilton’s cruisers, signalling his escort force at 22.20:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]"[I]All escorts from Keppel:All convoy scatter and proceed to Russian Ports. Escorts, negative destroyers, proceed independently to Archangel. Destroyers join Keppel.[/I][/I][/SIZE][I][FONT=Arial][SIZE=2][FONT=Arial][SIZE=2]"[/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT][/I] [SIZE=2]This decision stripped the scattering merchantmen of their last hope of any protection - they were now on their own. When later, Hamilton queried Broome on his decision to join him, Broome did offer to return to help the scattered convoy, but by then it was too late.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 9[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2] (Sunday 5 July)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 07.00 the Luftwaffe finally found and identified the Home Fleet 500 miles from the scattered convoy. With no prospect of meeting superior forces, the codeword to launch Operation Roesselsprung was issued. The [I]Tirpitz,[/I] [I]Hipper[/I] and [I]Scheer[/I] began to leave Altenfjord with 7 destroyers and 2 torpedo-boats between 11.00 and 11.30, reaching the open sea at 15.00, expecting to attack PQ17 the next morning. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 17.00, the German battle group was spotted by the Soviet submarine K-21, which fired torpedoes and claimed a hit on[I] Tirpitz[/I], but there is no German record of this. At 18.16, it was sighted by an RAF reconnaissance aircraft; and at 20.29 [I]Tirpitz[/I] was spotted by the submarine [I]HMS Unshaken[/I] steering an easterly course off the North Cape, 300 miles from where the convoy had scattered.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At 22.19 the German ships were recalled; it subsequently emerged that they were ordered to do so when the Germans realised the extent of the damage that was being inflicted on the ships of the scattered convoy by U-boats and aircraft. Also, with a scattered convoy, the best they could hope to achieve was to sink the few individual ships they happened upon. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][I]　[/I][/B][/SIZE] [I][B][SIZE=2][B][I]Day 10[/I][/B][/SIZE][/B][/I][SIZE=2] (Monday 6 July)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Since the Enigma for the period from noon on 5 July to noon on 6 July was not broken until the morning of 6 July, the Admiralty’s signal to the Fleet announcing that the Germans had called off their operation was not sent until 13.17.[/SIZE] [CENTER][SIZE=2]-----"-----[/SIZE][/CENTER]

[CENTER][B][U][SIZE=3][B]Convoy PQ17 – 27 June to July 1942 [/B][B](Part 3)[/B][/SIZE][/U][/B][/CENTER] [U][B][SIZE=3]　[/SIZE][/B][/U] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]After scattering[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]At 22.00 on 4 July, convoy PQ17 ceased to exist as an entity. Although the order to scatter was intended for the merchantmen to proceed independently, human nature being what it is, they instead sought company, and many ships formed themselves into numerous small convoys, including the remaining escorts (corvettes trawlers etc.), ordered to ‘[I]proceed independently to Archangel’[/I]. Many of the escorts, not forgetting their purpose, rounded up and joined with merchantmen they met on the way, picking up survivors as they went. As Archangel was everyone’s ultimate destination, there were many such meetings. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 5 July the Admiralty signalled a warning: "[I]Most likely time of enemy surface attack now tonight 5th/6th or early tomorrow morning July 6th[/I]". A few hours later, at 02.30 on 6 July, they signalled again: "[I]Attack by enemy surface forces is probable in the next few hours. Your primary duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to the scene of attack to pick up survivors after the enemy has left.[/I]"[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]After these warnings, it was considered too dangerous to remain at sea, so many sought temporary refuge in the many fjords and bays of Novaya Zemlya, a 500 mile long elongated island separating the Barents Sea from the Kara Sea, curving from S to NE, about 1,000 miles northeast of Archangel. The Matochkin Straits, separating the northern from the southern parts of the island seemed an obvious place to hide as ships could anchor there hidden from the sea. [/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2]The escorts[/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]The corvettes [I]Lotus, Poppy, La Malouine[/I]: the minesweepers[I] Halcyon, Salamander, Britomart[/I]; the trawlers[I] Lord Middleton, Lord Austin, Northern Gem[/I]; the AA ships[I] Palomares, Pozarica[/I] (in fact all the escorts except [I]Ayrshire[/I] and [I]Dianella[/I]); the rescue ship [I]Zamalek[/I]; and the merchantmen [I]Benjamin Harrison, Ocean Freedom, Hoozier, Samuel Chase, El Capitan[/I], had all made for the same point. By 7 July, seventeen ships had accumulated there in Pomorskaya Bay in the Matochkin Strait.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The entrance to the Straits could easily be blocked, and with seventeen ships anchored in the bay they presented a large static target and, as some of the smaller ships had only just enough fuel to reach Archangel (their oiler [I]Aldersdale[/I] having been sunk), it was decided on 7 July to leave the bay and head south to Archangel at 11.00. A thick fog set in, causing many near collisions. The next day it was still foggy and they now ran into an ice field. The ships [I]Halcyon, Salamander, Britomart, Ocean Freedom[/I] and [I]Benjamin Harrison[/I] were separated from the convoy in the fog and ice. The [I]Benjamin Harrison[/I] returned to the Matochkin Strait, while the other four continued to Archangel.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 9 July 29 survivors in two small boats were picked up by [I]La Malouine[/I] on the way. At 20.00 the convoy was dive bombed and [I]Hoosier[/I] and [I]El Capitan[/I] were hit, to be sunk later by U-boats. The next day they were attacked by air, on and off for most of the day. Finally, at 18.00 on 11 July, they arrived at Archangel.[/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2]The Ayrshire[/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]Another small group comprising the trawler [I]Ayrshire[/I], and three merchantmen [I]Troubadour, Ironclad, [/I]and[I] Silver Sword[/I] had steamed north when scattered and took refuge in the broken ice from the Arctic ice sheet. To make themselves less obtrusive, they painted the ships with white paint. There they remained for several days until the ice movement threatened to crush them. Breaking out, they made for the north east coast of Novaya Zemlya, hiding camouflaged in the fjords as they made their way southwards. Upon reaching the Matochkin Strait on 11 July, they picked up thirty four survivors from the [I]Fairfield City[/I] and found the [I]Benjamin Harrison[/I] sheltering there. A few days later, the damaged tanker [I]Azerbaijan [/I]arrived.[/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2]The Empire Tide[/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]The CAM ship [I]Empire Tide[/I], after scattering set a course of NNE until she came to the ice sheet, and followed its edge until they reached 78 degrees North, then turned and made for Novaya Zemlya, sighting its northwestern coast on 6 July. They were lucky in having the Admiralty chart "Anchorages on the Coast of Novaya Zemlya[I]"[/I] showing a sheltered bay south of the Matochkin Strait which they made for, running aground on a reef at its entrance, and freeing themselves at high tide. Deciding that it would be safer to risk an all out dash to Archangel, they steamed southwards. On 7 July they sighted the [I]Alcoa Ranger[/I] ahead in obvious distress with three surfaced U-boats in attendance, one of which turned and made towards them. Swiftly turning hard-a-port they headed for Moller Bay, reasoning that it was better to run ashore than to be sunk. [/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2]The Winston-Salem[/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]The [I]Winston-Salem,[/I] after being attacked several times, sought refuge from the fog closer to land but had run aground south of the Matochkin Strait and stuck fast on a sandbank close to shore. She was found there by two boatloads of survivors from the [I]Olopana[/I] and one lifeboat from the [I]Hartlebury[/I] after having spent several days at sea. Five days later they were spotted by a Catalina which dropped a message to say help was coming. Soon after, two more boats of survivors from the [I]Washington[/I] arrived after spending ten days rowing and sailing, followed by another two from the [I]Paulus Potter[/I].[/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2]The Carlton[/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]The [I]Carlton[/I] was perhaps the unluckiest of the ships sunk. She was the first to be sunk at 05.20 on 5 July, and every one of her crew was taken prisoner by the Germans. Twenty three were picked up by seaplanes and flown to Norway. The other seventeen spent nineteen days at sea and, in a very distressed condition, reluctantly made landfall on the North Cape where they were taken prisoner. The spent the rest of the war as POWs.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]Rescue operations[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]The first ship to arrive at Archangel on 7 July was the corvette[I] Dianella[/I], who had taken Commander Broome’s order literally and headed straight to Archangel. Early the next day, after refuelling, they put to sea again to round up stragglers and look for survivors. As other escorts arrived at Archangel, they spent a few days on refuelling, replenishing and repairs, and returned to sea.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 16 July, an RAF Catalina from 210 Squadron, was flying from Lake Lakhta near Archangel, on an ice reconnaissance patrol of the Barents Sea. On their return, they spotted the [I]Empire Tide[/I] in Moller Bay, landed and spoke to the Captain. After taking off again they spotted the [I]Winston-Salem[/I], reporting their sightings to the Senior British Naval Officer in Archangel.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]That same day Dianella returned with sixty one survivors from the [I]Empire Byron[/I]. With the sightings from the Catalina, the corvettes [I]Lotus, Poppy [/I]and[I] La Malouine[/I] set out again on their a mission, heading north along the coast of south Novaya Zemlya. On 19 July they saw Russian tugs attempting pull the [I]Winston-Salem[/I] off and later found the [I]Empire Tide[/I]. Continuing to the Matochkin Strait they found the [I]Ayrshire[/I] with five merchantmen. Gathering all the ships from there they set forth south to Archangel, picking up the [I]Empire Tide[/I] on the way, but had to leave the [I]Winston-Salem[/I] to the Russian tugs.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 19 July, the [I]Pozarica, Leda, Hazard and Dianella[/I] left Archangel and headed north meeting the corvettes with their rescued ships on 23 July, and escorted them to Archangel, arriving on 25 July.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][U]　[/U][/B][/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]Convoy Casualties[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]From the thirty nine ships which left Iceland, three turned back, twenty four were sunk and twelve reached Archangel. Of the twenty four sunk, eight were by aircraft and sixteen by U-boat. Britain lost eight ships, the US lost fourteen, Panama and Holland lost one each. One hundred and fifty three lives were lost. [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Sunk on 4 July[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2][B]:[/B] [I]Christopher Newport, Navarino, William Hooper[/I].[/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2]Sunk on 5 July:[/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] [I]Bolton Castle, Carlton, Daniel Morgan, Earlston, Empire Byron, Fairfield City, Honomu, Peter Kerr, River Afton, Washington, Zaafaran.[/I] [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Sunk on 6 July:[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] [I]John Witherspoon, Pan Atlantic.[/I] [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Sunk on 7 July:[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] [I]Alcoa Ranger, Aldersdale, Hartlebury, Pan Kraft. [/I][/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Sunk on 8 July:[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] [I]Olopana.[/I] [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Sunk on 10 July:[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] [I]El Capitan, Hoosier.[/I] [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Sunk on 13 July:[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] [I]Paulus Potter.[/I] [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Lost to aircraft[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] (8)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Bolton Castle[/I] (GB), [I]Fairfield City [/I](US),[I] Navarino [/I](GB), [I]Pan Atlantic[/I] (US), [I]Pan Kraft [/I](US), [I]Peter Kerr [/I](US), [I]Washington[/I] (US), [I]Zaafaran[/I] (GB-rescue ship). [/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]Lost to U-boats[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] (16)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Alcoa Ranger[/I] (US) by U-255, [I]Aldersdale[/I] (GB-oiler) by U-457, [I]Carlton[/I] (US) by U-88, [I]Christopher Newport [/I](US) by U-457, [I]Daniel Morgan [/I](US) by U-88, [I]Earlston[/I] (GB) by U-334, [I]El Capitan[/I] (PAN) by U-251, [I]Empire Byron [/I](GB) by U-703, [I]Hartlebury[/I] (GB) by U-355, [I]Honomu[/I] (US) by U-456, [I]Hoosier[/I] (US) by U-376, [I]John Witherspoon[/I] (US) by U-255, [I]Olopana[/I] (US) by U-255, [I]Paulus Potter[/I] (HOL) by U-255, [I]River Afton [/I](GB) by U-703, [I]William Hooper[/I] (US) by U-334.[/SIZE] [B][SIZE=2][B]The survivors[/B][/SIZE][/B][SIZE=2] (12)[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][I]Azerbaijan[/I] (RUS), [I]Bellingham[/I] (US), [I]Benjamin Harrison[/I] (US), [I]Donbass[/I] (RUS), [I]Empire Tide[/I] (GB), [I]Ironclad[/I] (US), [I]Ocean Freedom[/I] (GB), [I]Rathlin[/I] (GB-rescue ship), [I]Samuel Chase[/I] (US), [I]Silver Sword[/I] (US), [I]Troubadour[/I] (NOR), [I]Winston-Salem [/I](US), [I]Zamalek[/I] (GB-rescue ship).[/SIZE] [FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=2] [SIZE=2][FONT=Times New Roman]　[/FONT][/SIZE] [/SIZE][/FONT][U][SIZE=2][B]Postscript[/B][/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]Following the dreadful losses to PQ17, the departure of PQ18, and thus that of QP14 was delayed for two months until some darkness returned to offer some protection, and stronger escorts could be assembled. This meant that all the escorts of PQ17; all the surviving merchantmen; and all the rescued crews, had to endure the hardships of Archangel, dwindling food stocks and medical supplies with boredom and lethargy for the next two months. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At the end of July, four destroyers, Marne, Martin, Middleton and Blakeney, arrived to replenish QP14 with ammunition and provisions. In the last week of August, the arrival of the [I]USS Tuscaloosa[/I] and three destroyers with supplies for the returning convoy was especially welcome as it heralded and end to their unscheduled exile. The [I]Tuscaloosa[/I] returned to Britain with some rescued seamen a few days later. On 13 September, QP14 finally sailed with 16 merchantmen from PQ17 and others that had been waiting for the return convoy. They also carried nearly a thousand survivors, both able bodied and injured, many of them amputees through frostbite.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 17 September they crossed with PQ18 whose escort of 17 destroyers and escort carrier [I]Avenger[/I] detached from the eastbound convoy and joined QP14. On 20 September at 05.30, the minesweeper [I]Leda[/I] was hit by two torpedoes from U-435 and sank shortly afterwards. At 17.50 the [I]Silver Sword[/I] was hit by two torpedoes from U-255 and sunk by gunfire from [I]HMS Worcester[/I]. A few hours later, [I]HMS Somali[/I] was disabled by a torpedo from U-703, and taken under tow by [I]HMS Ashanti[/I]. But, while still under tow, she was lost in a gale when nearly home.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Although the convoy was constantly shadowed by reconnaissance aircraft, there were no more attacks until 22 September when the [I]Ocean Voice,[/I] [I]Bellingham and[/I] [I]Grey Ranger [/I]were hit in quick succession by torpedoes, all from U-435. The [I]Bellingham[/I] sank quickly but the others had to be sunk by gunfire.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]QP14 arrived at Loch Ewe on 26 September. From those which arrived, there were only nine ships out of the thirty six which sailed in PQ17.[/SIZE] [FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=2][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=2]　[/SIZE][/FONT] [/SIZE][/FONT] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]A Russian tribute[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]In 1943, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London expressed his country’s gratitude to the men whose, courage had made possible the carriage of these vital war supplies to Russia:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]"[I]The Russian convoys are a Northern Saga of heroism, bravery, and endurance. This Saga will live for ever, not only in the hearts of your people, but also in the hearts of the Soviet people, who rightly see in it one of the most striking expressions of collaboration between the Allied Governments, without which our common victory would have been impossible.[/I]" [/SIZE] [CENTER][SIZE=2]-----"------[/SIZE][/CENTER]

Absolutely fantastic Bill - composed with your usual dilligence - thank you very much! My Dad was a Merchant Seaman (AB) during WW2 and did 2 Russian Convoys (not PQ17) he was very reticent to talk about it but he did say that he was well P-ed off by the cold and suspicious reception they got in Russia from the personnel (presumably malitia or military) they met when they were waiting for the return convoys!.

Watching a DVD of Pedestal , the convoy to Malta, one of the destroyer escorts was Ledbury. One of the convoy ships sunk it's survivors in the sea surrounded by burning oil, Ledbury sailed through the flames to rescue the survivors. When Ledbury's Captain was asked why he carried out such a dangerous rescue, his answer was " I was an escort for PQ17 & because we scattered & left the merchantmen to fend for themselves I was determined not to abandon them again". A real RN Captain , he certainly was.

[SIZE=2]Teuchter, your mention of the attitude of the Russians towards their British and American allies bring up a subject I deliberately avoided in my narrative. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]There is no doubt that the Russian's behaviour was alien to our understanding of how "friends" should behave to each other. Especially when the Allies were suffering losses they could ill afford, trying to deliver desperately needed armaments, free of charge, and is met by indifference at best and hostility at worst. Salt is rubbed into the running sore by the Russian's lack of interest in helping to protect the supply lines they considered vital to their own survival. I don't know if they ever provided escort ships, and many calls for air protection for the last part of PQ17's ordeal went unanswered. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]At a personal level, petty restrictions and deliberate obstruction were the norm, while in port, especially it seems towards officers. Armed guards were placed at gangways to warships, not to protect the ship's personnel, but to prevent officers leaving for the most trivial of reasons; two examples will suffice. An officer was once turned back because he was carrying a book; on another occasion Admiral Bevan, the Senior British Naval Officer, was not allowed to leave with his luggage, being prevented by the sentry pointing his loaded rifle at him.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]How does the expession go? "With friends like these . . . . . . "[/SIZE]

dear all, lets not do the Russians short on their dues; life was incredibly tough for them at the time, yes, much due to their own politics but in this they did not have much opportunity to exercise a vox pop. There is a huge residue of negative propaganda about the Russian "attitude" towards our blokes, and the Americans who lets not forget provided most of the merchantmen and crews, thanks to our respective governments specific attitudes towards communism. You need to read real accounts of crews who were there and sharing the apalling life conditions with their Russian counterparts to appreciate that the average "Ivan" was as much a victim as Jack. When it comes to memorialising the supreme sacrifice of those who were participants of "the worst journey in the World" the Russians beat the rest of us hands down; who gives medals to the veterans? who celebrates Victory Day every year in London with a legendary welcome to veterans? who paid for the new masts of HMS Belfast in grateful memory of the Arctic Convoys? Believe in Jack & Ivan, pour the politicians' hemlock OUT of your ears, not the reverse. This was hell without the fire, everyone who was sucked into its vortex deserves our everlasting thanks, not just the chaos of PQ17 but all PQs, QPs and the JWs et al. Them as was there, gave their best, from all nations, them as wasn't, measure their opinions carefully. tim
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[QUOTE=tim lewin;1724236]dear all, lets not do the Russians short on their dues; life was incredibly tough for them at the time, yes, much due to their own politics but in this they did not have much opportunity to exercise a vox pop. There is a huge residue of negative propaganda about the Russian "attitude" towards our blokes, and the Americans who lets not forget provided most of the merchantmen and crews, thanks to our respective governments specific attitudes towards communism. You need to read real accounts of crews who were there and sharing the appalling life conditions with their Russian counterparts to appreciate that the average "Ivan" was as much a victim as Jack. When it comes to memorialising the supreme sacrifice of those who were participants of "the worst journey in the World" the Russians beat the rest of us hands down; who gives medals to the veterans? who celebrates Victory Day every year in London with a legendary welcome to veterans? who paid for the new masts of HMS Belfast in grateful memory of the Arctic Convoys? Believe in Jack & Ivan, pour the politicians' hemlock OUT of your ears, not the reverse. This was hell without the fire, everyone who was sucked into its vortex deserves our everlasting thanks, not just the chaos of PQ17 but all PQs, QPs and the JWs et al. Them as was there, gave their best, from all nations, them as wasn't, measure their opinions carefully. tim[/QUOTE] Very eloquently put Tim and I for one am well aware of the hardships and appalling conditions the Russians had to suffer and take my hat off to them however as you say neither you or I were actually there during that time. Indeed on the few occasions through work that I have visited Russia (both in the Soviet days and since) I was quite impressed by the majority of the Russians I met both work related and socially. My Dad (actually my step dad) told me he had the utmost sympathy for the "ordinary" stevedores and dock workers who to him seemed more like underfed and overworked slave labourers - in fact he and his shipmates used to "smuggle" some of their personal rations and cigarettes to said labourers when the overseers were not looking However I am not talking about the "hemlock" of politicians in my post # 4 - I got my information from "the horses mouth" so to speak so I believe that I have indeed measured my opinion carefully! I am merely repeating the feelings of an ordinary man (though a very special one to me) who as an AB and went through the hardships and dangers of the Russian convoys and in whose humble (but none the less measured) opinion was less than enamoured by the hospitality (or lack of it) he and his shipmates received at the hands of our Soviet allies particularly from "officialdom" both military and civilian.

[CENTER][U][B][SIZE=3][B][SIZE=3]The Order to Scatter Convoy PQ17[/SIZE][/B][/SIZE][/B][/U][/CENTER] [SIZE=2][U][B]What Admiral Pound had to consider[/B][/U][/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Of the Russian convoys, PQ17 was perhaps unique in that it was known beforehand that the Germans planned to attack it with the most powerful battleship in the world, supported by two pocket battleships and heavy cruisers. At the same time attacks by U-boats and aircraft were the norm and were expected. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The initial movements of [I]Tirpitz, Luetzow, Scheer, Hipper[/I] and their destroyers on 2 July to bases further north confirmed their intentions, as predicted by Commander Denham from Sweden on 18 June. It was not known that [I]Luetzov[/I] had ran aground and was out of action, so potentially the convoy could be confronted by [I]Hipper (8x8" guns), Scheer (6x11" guns), Luetzow (6x11"guns), Tirpitz (8x15" guns)[/I] and umpteen large destroyers and torpedo boats.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 3 July, a sequence of indecypherable signals transmitted from 14.00 onwards, were cyphered with special settings which, from previous experience, indicated to the OIC (the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre) the commencement of a special operation by the main units.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The order for the German destroyers and torpedo boats to refuel immediately they arrived at Altenfjord at 09.00 on 4 July, was not known to the OIC until about 20.00 that same day. This meant that the battle group could have sortied as early as 12.00 that day, and had it done so, would already have been at sea for eight hours and could intercept PQ17 as soon as 02.00 the next day.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]On 4 July, German reconnaissance had not located the Home Fleet, and false reports of a battleship with CS1, were the reason the departure of the[I] Tirpitz[/I] battle group was delayed for 24 hours. This was due to Hitler’s restriction (regarding engaging equal or superior enemy forces) on the battle group’s movements; a restriction which was unknown to the Admiralty. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][SIZE=2][B]Why the order to scatter was given[/B][/SIZE][/U] [SIZE=2]At 21.00 on 4 July, the Home Fleet was too far away from the convoy to assist, and the cruisers of CS1 had already gone beyond their operational limit. What Admiral Pound had to consider boiled down in essence to the single question: [/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2][I]Was the Tirpitz at sea?[/I][/SIZE][/I][/U] [SIZE=2]It was the opinion of OIC that she wasn’t, based on negative intelligence alone. But it would only know for sure when Enigma indicated it, four to six hours after the event. The [I]Tirpitz[/I] had been ready to put to sea since 12.00, and there was no obvious reason why she should not have already done so.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][[B]Note:[/B] Communications in the Arctic are unreliable and signals can be missed. Because delays and uncertainties had been experienced with Enigma signals on earlier occasions, the OIC had warned Admiral Tovey on 23 May that ‘[I]movements of German units are not certain to be detected by this source[/I]’.][/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2][I]If the Tirpitz was not at sea[/I][/SIZE][/I][/U][SIZE=2], then the convoy could continue on its way. But it was known that she would put to sea at sometime soon, (that is why she was there) and when that news came, Admiral Pound would be confronted with exactly the same problem of what to do with the convoy. Alternatively, the convoy could be turned back to seek the protection of the Home Fleet, in fact paragraph ([B]C[/B]) in the Admiralty instructions to Admiral Tovey made provision for this.[/SIZE] [U][I][SIZE=2][I]If the Tirpitz was at sea[/I][/SIZE][/I][/U][SIZE=2], and OIC could not assure Admiral Pound that it wasn’t, what best to do with the convoy, with only its close escort for support, which could be attacked in as little as five hours time by the German battle group? The convoy was under constant surveillance from U-boat and aircraft, and could not avoid the encounter even if it were turned around, as it was too slow and too far away from the protection of the Home Fleet. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]In making his decision, Admiral Pound had to consider that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] could have sortied from 12.00 onwards, and because no one could assure him that it was [U]not[/U] at sea, came to the conclusion that that it was safer to assume that she was at sea than to assume she wasn’t. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Therefore, there was only one course of action he could take – scatter the convoy - as the alternative was its annihilation. He would have been very aware that the scattered convoy would now have to take its chances against the U-boats and aircraft. But he must have thought this was the lesser of the two evils, and by issuing the order before the threat materialised he hoped to give the merchantmen a better chance of survival.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]If PQ17 had not been scattered[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]If Admiral Pound had not scattered PQ17 when he did, the convoy could have continued on its route to Archangel subjected to the usual attacks by aircraft and U-boats. But once the [I]Tirpitz[/I] had sortied and passed the Allied submarine lines, as it did, there was nothing that could stop it intercepting the convoy. There would probably have been some heroic and futile resistance from the escorts, but it is difficult to predict a result other than annihilation of the convoy. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]With a threat of this magnitude approaching, the convoy would have to be scattered. If Admiral Pound didn’t give the order, Commander Broome surely would. Scattering the convoy twenty four hours later than it actually was, having steamed another 200 miles eastwards, would give the convoy far less sea room in which it could disappear and hide. The ships would be limited to the north by the Arctic ice and to the east by Novaya Zemlya; there would have been no escape.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]　[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]The "scattering" tactic[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]Convoys were initiated because the highest shipping casualties were from unescorted ships sailing alone being sunk by U-boats. The best protection from U-boats is offered in a convoy, provided the escort is strong enough to meet the threat. But when the threat comes from an overwhelming superior [U]surface[/U] force, the choice is between staying together and facing total annihilation, and scattering with a chance of survival for some.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2][SIZE=2]This would indicate that convoying is not suitable when faced with an attack by a superior surface force. It just means that when the attacking force finds one ship, it finds them all and makes total annihilation more probable. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2][B][U]　[/U][/B][/SIZE] Scattering is a legitimate convoy tactic to be employed against a greatly superior surface force. It was done successfully when the 37 ships of convoy HX84 from Halifax were suddenly attacked by [I]Admiral Scheer[/I]. The Captain of the auxiliary cruiser [I]Jervis Bay[/I] ordered the convoy to scatter, then steered his ship towards the [I]Scheer[/I] to draw its fire, and give the convoy time to scatter. Only five merchantmen were lost by this tactic.[/SIZE] [U][B][SIZE=2][B]Afterthoughts[/B][/SIZE][/B][/U] [SIZE=2]One decrypt which gave an indication that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] may not have sailed by noon, was summarised in an Ultra signal at 21.10. Timed at 11.30, it had informed the U-boats that no German surface ships were in their operational area and that any heavy ships encountered would be the enemy’s, and were to be their main target. The assumption that the [I]Tirpitz[/I]’s destroyers and torpedo-boats would not have completed refuelling until about noon had already been made, and this intelligence did not change the situation.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]This signal has been quoted as proof that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was not about to sail, but all the signal meant was that at 11.30, the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was not at sea as she was still in Altenfjord. As the U-boat’s operational area was over 300 miles from Altenfjord (if one assumes the operational area to be within 50 miles around the convoy), even if the [I]Tirpitz[/I] sailed at 12.00, it could not be in their area for at least another 12 hours. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]It is now accepted that the decision to scatter PQ17 was wrong, but only with hindsight. Had it not been for aerial reconnaissance mistaking a heavy cruiser of CS1 for a battleship, the [I]Tirpitz[/I] would probably have sortied as soon as her destroyers had refuelled. Had it done so, Admiral Pound’s order would have been the only one possible that could have given PQ17 any sort of chance.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Knowing now that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was not at sea, the only way PQ17 could have been saved was by turning it back immediately, as it would then have had time to reach the protection of the Home Fleet. But when one considers the political pressure that was brought to bear to sail PQ17 in the first place, then perhaps turning it back would have been equally unacceptable. When ordering PQ17 to sail, Churchill had said that even if only half got through it would be worthwhile.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Not since Admiral Jellicoe turned the Grand Fleet away from a torpedo attack at Jutland has an Admiral of the Royal Navy been so roundly criticised for a decision he made. Seldom has the perils of having to make life and death decisions based on incomplete information been more vividly demonstrated. [/SIZE] [CENTER][SIZE=2]-----"------[/SIZE][/CENTER]

Yet again thanks for that Bill

Still trying to track down which convoy my father's old ship The Northern WAVE (designated Trawler) took part in,only see references to other "Northern" vessels.Was given book titles earlier that mightve helped but thus far have not obtained. (there is no date to help- on the photo I have of my father with injured crew member(s) in Murmansk hospital. derek-L/Norfolk

[quote=oldsalt;1724184]Watching a DVD of Pedestal , the convoy to Malta, one of the destroyer escorts was Ledbury. One of the convoy ships sunk it's survivors in the sea surrounded by burning oil, Ledbury sailed through the flames to rescue the survivors. When Ledbury's Captain was asked why he carried out such a dangerous rescue, his answer was " I was an escort for PQ17 & because we scattered & left the merchantmen to fend for themselves I was determined not to abandon them again". A real RN Captain , he certainly was.[/quote] [SIZE=2]Keith, that would be Lieutenant-Commander Roger Hill, who said of PQ17:[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]"[I]I have always felt that, as the merchant ships were going to almost certain destruction, then we should have gone back and taken the same chance and we would have got some of them to Archangel. Even though we probably have lost the destroyers as well once the oiler (Alderdale) was sunk - still we would have tried[/I]. [I]It has haunted me ever since that we left them to be destroyed[/I]"[/SIZE]

My brother started Russian convoy trips in 1943, later than PQ17, but the experience was horrendous; there was no diagnosed 'post traumatic stress disorder' in those days, but he could not sit still, stand still, or sleep without nightmares. He smoked till his fingers were totally stained and walked incessantly. He could not at that time talk about his experiences, but his nightmares woke me in the adjacent bedroom and he could talk about his nightmares and fears, although not his experiences. We can have no idea what that sort of experience was like, or what it did to people. My cousin was torpedoed, rescued by a destroyer, which was in turn torpedoed so he died on Russian convoy. Edna

You mentioned Roger Hill of the Ledbury and his rescue of the survivors on Operation Pedestal, here is a painting by John Hamilton on that rescue; i will try to scan it better later. There is, was, a Ledbury Association which i was in contact with a while back, they came to the Malta Memorial dedication. Ledbury completed the war and was later scrapped. tim
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This is just general about Russian Convoys and not particularly PQ17 it is from the BBC Europe News website today. [url]http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14723483[/url] Lots of film of action and also of the commemoration ceremonies in Archangel. Nobby_N

A couple of random notes on the convoy; when i was trying to raise the funding for the Last Witness project for the replacement of the masts for HMS Belfast (part of the distant covering force for PQ17 with destroyers including Ashanti) i was actually running an economic development project in Azerbaijan. My immediate point of contact in the Govt there was the minister for economic development. I told him the story of the tanker Azerbaijan and the heroism of her crew and asked if his country might like to be a part of the project. He imediately called the minister of shipping and asked if the Azeri Marine had a ship called after their country, when the reply came back, "no", he agreed to participate. Unfortunately before he could fulfill on his agreement he was replaced and there was no possibility to recover the position with his successor. The Azerbaijan was a Msokva class tanker built in the mid 1920's. She was attached to PQ17 with a full Russian crew, half of which was female. The Russians have long maintained equality of the sexes in their industry. In the case of the Azerbaijan the ancient 4" gun which was her only defence was entirely crewed by girls. The ship was carrying a full cargo of linseed oil for military boot making from the USA. As Bill reports she was attacked by torpedo bombers and actually hit by one of them with the usual huge explosion, massive water erruption and came to a stop. A large contibngent of the crew, all men, immediately decided that she was done for and would, at any second, blow up and sink, so they lowered the only boat and pulled away as fast as they could, Meanwhile the girls kept banging away with their four-iron and are attributed with bringing down one of the bombers. On seeing that that their ship was not sinking, the bombers had dispersed, the chaps in the boat pulled back and asked to be helped back aboard. The Captain lent over the rail and threatened them with his revolver telling them that they were deserters and could row back to Russia. They were later picked up by another ship (Poss Zamalek) and the Az regain her equalibrium, raised steam and chugged onward back to Russia where she arrived to great appreciation and medals all round. I managed to get the original reports of this incident from the Russian archives which need to be balanced by the somewhat more laconic British ones but the story in undoubtedly true and another of those cameo accounts of the nightmares of war, it deserves to be remembered now and then. I do not know what befell the errant seamen, but i would not like to have been in their shoes when they got back to Kola. tim

Thanks for that Tim - I remember my Dad telling me that some of the Russian ships had women in their crew.

Women played a major role in the Russian forces at the time, there is an account of the repairs being made to either Edinburgh or Trinidad in Kola in which all of the work and welding is done by women. There was also a wing of biplane fighters flown by women called the "Night Witches" who would use the extra lift of their aircraft to glide up to lagered German tanks or troop formations in the dark, bomb/strafe them and then fly away on full power. If you go to a Russiam city on Victory Day, May 9th, you wil see lots of old girls with as many medals as the old men. all very best tim

This pic doesnt really belong to PQ17 but i searched for Scapa Flow (mods help?) and got this thread; between PQ17 and 18 came the Pedestal convoy not allowing much time off, the home fleet destroyers were kept on steam at Scapa at the time so the only distraction was sailing and sport. Here is a pic of my father at 22 with others from the wardroom of Ashanti climbing the vents on the bottom of the hulk of the Derflinger, note the angle of the camera! Lewin is in the middle.
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Great photo Tim

[SIZE=2]While researching the PQ17 and Spitsbergen stories, I came across several mentions of Catalinas of 210 Squadron. Intrigued by this and what they were doing there, I dug a bit deeper.[/SIZE] [CENTER][B][SIZE=2]-----"-----[/SIZE][/B][/CENTER] [CENTER][B][SIZE=2][B][U]PQ17 and 210 Squadron[/U][/B][/SIZE][/B][/CENTER] [SIZE=2]210 Squadron of RAF Coastal Command was primarily an anti U-boat squadron, but also had Arctic reconnaissance duties. Operating from Sullom Voe in the Shetland Islands with their Catalina flying boats, they covered the area from Greenland to Franz Josef Land, or from 25 degrees West to 55 degrees East, and as far north as 78 degrees. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]When on reconnaissance duties, only armaments for self defence were carried as the space normally occupied by depth charges was required for extra fuel tanks. One of their many reconnaissance functions was to report on the state and extent of the Arctic Ice sheet so that it would be known how far north convoys to and from Russia could be routed away from German aircraft based in northern Norway. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]One such flight, by Catalina ‘P’ captained by Flight Lieutenant Healy, was combined with reconnaissance for Operation Gearbox in Spitsbergen. Taking off from Akureyri, Iceland, on 26 June, the Catalina achieved all its objectives, even destroying a Ju88 at Spitsbergen on the way. They returned at 23.30 the next day, having been airborne for over 24 hours. It reported the ice sheet had retreated further than previously thought, enabling PQ17 to sail 70 miles north of Bear Island.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Another flight by Catalina ‘N’, captained by Flight Lieutenant Potier, took off 14.00 on 13 July to deliver ammunition, packages and messages to Spitsbergen, arriving there at 00.30 the next day. Taking off again, they tracked the ice sheet eastwards as far as they could, then turned south for Archangel at the limit of their endurance, keeping a lookout for survivors of PQ17. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]They spotted five lifeboats together with about forty survivors aboard, but as the sea was too rough to attempt a landing, they dropped food and cigarettes wrapped in a May West lifejacket. They reached their destination at Lake Lakhta, near Archangel at 13.40 on 14 July, and reported their sightings to the Senior British Naval Officer.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The next day they took off again at 16.30 to complete their survey of the ice sheet. When that was done they turned south and flew along the south western coast of Novoya Zemlya and, at 07.30 on 16 July, spotted the CAM ship [I]Empire Tide[/I] in Moller Bay. They landed and spoke to the captain and found that there were also 42 survivors from other ships there. [/SIZE] [SIZE=2]Resuming their southbound flight they soon saw another ship aground, the [I]Winston Salem[/I], and exchanged messages with it without landing. They arrived at Lake Lakhta and landed at 14.00, from where they reported their sightings. The same day, the corvettes [I]Lotus, Poppy[/I] and [I]La Malouine[/I] sailed from Archangel, rounded up the merchantmen (except the [I]Winston Salem[/I]) and rescued all survivors.[/SIZE] [SIZE=2]The Catalina took off the next day and returned to Sullom Voe, having been airborne for 63 hours in five days.[/SIZE] [CENTER][SIZE=2]-----"------[/SIZE][/CENTER]

Bill-thank you for "a tale well told"as usual -an excellent study!!:cool: A remarkable story of courage,determination and selfless devotion to duty ;but for the Catalina's captain and crew's efforts; many of the men mentioned would certainly have perished. jainso31

Dear All, Next Wednesday 27 June sees the 70th anniversary of the departure of pQ17, much has been written about this illstarred convoy that accounts for a third of all losses of Arctic convoys. One of my much admired correspondents is Robin Owen, now 90+ but then a young officer serving under Roger Hill in Ledbury (Hunt). Here is a memory from Robin. Ledbury and most of the home fleet destroyers went directly from PQ17 to Malta to cover Pedestal in August and then back to Russia with PQ18 in September, Ledbury went into Immmingham for PQ18 for a short refit but the rest of 1942 was full-on no respite convoy duty. After Pedestal, when Ledbury so bravely went into the inferno to rescue the sailors from Waimarama, Roger Hill was promoted to comand a Fleet destroyer, but Robin stayed on with Ledbury, the ship survived the war. tim
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I haven't quite got the hang of the search-thingy on this forum, so I apologise if I have made a double-post, but Sid Kerslake, the coxwain on one of the armed trawlers escorting PQ-17, has written an excellent book about his experiences. Naval-history.net has published parts of this book, including the whole chapter on PQ-17; [url]http://www.naval-history.net/WW2Memoir-RussianConvoyCoxswain.htm[/url] Again, thanks for an excellent thread

Extracted by courtesy of Wikipedia Hi Tim-just enlarged Ledbury's actions during this perilous convoy (PQ17) [B][B]The Convoy Commander, Jack Broome, ordered Ledbury, HMS Leamington and HMS Poppy to ‘...take all possible action to keep U-boats down.[/B][/B] Ledbury was one of the ships chosen to stay behind to tend to, and if necessary scuttle, the torpedoed ship and they themselves could have been an easy target to any submarines; however, none of the U-boats had maintained contact with the convoy. [B][B]The next front action for Ledbury came later on that day, at 08:20, when the destroyer began signalling, ‘Eight air torpedo-bombers 210 degrees, five miles’, and then two minutes later, ‘for eight read ten’. Suddenly after Ledbury’s signals, all the escorts seemed to be blinking morse-signals at once. T[/B][/B]he loudspeakers were booming, ‘Bombers approaching . . . there’s six of them . . . there’s twelve . . . there’s eighteen . . . good God, there’s twenty-five!’ The anti-aircraft ship lurched forward and altered course to head off the attack. Commodore Dowding signalled Keppel to ask if the convoy should make an ‘emergency turn’; but it was deemed too late for such a manoeuvre, since half the ships would most likely miss the signal altogether and Broome flashed back, ‘I do not think it worth it.’ [B][B]The developing air attack spotted by Ledbury turned into a blitz of the convoy, with Luftwaffe aircraft being shot down over the formation, and one plane crashed into the sea about four thousand yards from the destroyer USS Wainwright, on the convoy’s starboard bow. The crash occurred not far from Ledbury and seamen on board saw four German airmen climbing out into a rubber dinghy with the bomber sinking soon after. The pilot, Lieutenant Kaumeyr, and his three crewmen were picked out of their dinghy by Ledbury. The attack however, continued and throughout the fierce fighting the escorts distinguished themselves by screening the merchantmen from many attacks, especially U-boat sorties; Ledbury alone had sighted seven.[/B][/B] PS Kerslake's book was a very fine read.Thanks William. jainso31

Thanks Jim, i beleive Roger Hill wrote a book as well but cannot recall the title? I keep in touch with Robin Owen, a young Lt. in Ledbury in those days, and he is a fount of direct memories. There a a few "Leds" left still. In the Ch.4 "Convoy" film (I can lend you a copy if you send me a pm, Roger Hill is interviewed about his memories of PQ17 and how much those imediate memories affected his actions on Pedestal. Very brave people.... tim I will find a copy the The Cox' book

My take on this event is as follows and here I quote Bernard Ireland from his book "The Road to Russia" "viewed in retrospect,the battle for PQ17 was a classic example of both sides being unwilling to commit their capital ships.However big ships apart,the withdrawal of Hamilton's cruisers just may somehow be justified; but to pull out the close escort and ordering the convoy to scatter was a catastrophic mistake. The close escort ,consisted of six destroyers,four corvettes,four anti aircraft trawlers,three fleet minesweepers,two anti aircraft ships and two submarines was fairly substantial.IF the merchant ships had been allowed to stay together with this escort around them,PQ17 could have conceivably have fought it's way through the Uboats and enemy aircraft ahead of them with a reduced loss rate. As it was not to be,PQ17 was massacred,the reputation of the Royal navy was damaged for decades to come (here we are still talking about it) and a severe strain was put on Anglo-American relations". jainso31

[QUOTE=tim lewin;10034794]Thanks Jim, i beleive Roger Hill wrote a book as well but cannot recall the title? [/QUOTE] Destroyer Captain.

many thanks Jon, i watched the Ch4 film about Pedestal, the following month, again last night in which he is interviewed and expresses very forthright sentiments about PQ17, which incidentally was going on right now 70 years ago. tim

[QUOTE=Teuchter;1724896]Yet again thanks for that Bill[/QUOTE] Hello My Father was on the merchant ship Bolton Castle. He is still alive at 89 years old. He has written his memoirs. He was in an open life boat for 10 days in the arctic circle and rescued by a Russian ship, then spent 3 months in a Russian hospital. He became a captain and migrated to Australia in 1962. He says the PQ17 convoy was used as a lure for the Tirpitz. This he discovered more recently and he is disgusted that there was so much suffering. His name is John Wardle. Lesley

Hello Lesley and welcome to the Forum, we hope you will find much to interest you here. Regards to your father. Jim

Regarding the order for the convoy to scatter-it is not unjust to see in all this a combination of Pound's old fashioned naval authoritarianism and his well known stubborn single mindedness-coupled with a lack of imaginative insight into the enemy's mind. Tovey and Denning,both rightly concluded that the Germans would not hazard the Tirpitz in waters where she might encounter British heavy units. Nor did the language of the signals,with their tone of imminent emergency, do Pound any credit as a leader in a crisis. jainso31

[quote=lesley s;10051538]Hello My Father was on the merchant ship Bolton Castle. He is still alive at 89 years old. He has written his memoirs. He was in an open life boat for 10 days in the arctic circle and rescued by a Russian ship, then spent 3 months in a Russian hospital. He became a captain and migrated to Australia in 1962. His name is John Wardle. Lesley[/quote] Hello Lesley, you might be interested in this account of the [I]Bolton Castle[/I]'s sinking, taken partly from "The Destruction of Convoy PQ17" by David Irving. [B][U]The sinking of MV Bolton Castle[/U][/B] [I]Bolton Castle[/I] was a British 5,203 ton DEMS ship. with heavy armament which included a 4-inch anti-submarine gun, a Bofors, and four Oerlikon and four light machine-guns. On Sunday 5th July 1942, at five o’clock, the lookouts sighted a lone Junkers 88 flying high above them at some 13,000 feet. [I]Bolton Castle[/I]’s gunners prepared to man their Bofors guns, but held their fire when it seemed that the aircraft had not noticed them. But the Junkers went into a dive, and swooped down on the [I]Washington[/I], its bombs landed about fifteen yards off the ship’s starboard quarter; the ship was shaken but undamaged. [I]Bolton Castle[/I]'s Captain John Pascoe knew that it would not be long before more German aircraft arrived. He ordered [I]Bolton Castle[/I]’s lifeboats to be swung out but not lowered; if the worst came to the worst, he would have perhaps only a few minutes to supervise getting seventy seamen and gunners safely into them. He also summoned his boatswain and carpenter, and confided in them that he expected the ship to be sunk within the next few hours; they were able to make an unobtrusive additional check that the lifeboats were properly provisioned with food and water. Half an hour later, it was obvious that his forethought had been justified; a starboard lookout reported that several more Junkers 88s were approaching. One aircraft swooped on the [I]Washington[/I], its bombs lifting her hull partly out of the water. Several other aircraft followed at once. The ship’s crew counted twenty-one bombs hitting the sea near them. [I]Washington[/I]’s steering gear was knocked out, the ship began to take water and Captain Richert gave orders to abandon ship. The aircraft now turned their attention to the [I]Bolton Castle[/I], attacking not from one direction but from several, and from different altitudes. Captain Pascoe resigned himself to his fate; he made no attempt to take evasive action. An aircraft dived out of the sun at them, and dropped a stick of bombs right on the ship. The second of the three bombs penetrated No. 2 hold, containing hundreds of tons of cordite. For a moment [I]Bolton Castle[/I] forged on, ignoring the direct hits; the ship did not shake, and Pascoe did not even hear the detonation as the bombs exploded in the hold. But as he looked through the bridge windows, the world suddenly went green: a brilliant flash blinded him and he heard a roar lasting some seconds, like a mighty waterfall. The cargo of cordite had ignited – not as an explosive with shattering violence, but ‘like a giant Roman candle’. From [I]Washington[/I]’s lifeboats, they saw the mushroom cloud where [I]Boston Castle[/I] had stood, barely a quarter of a mile away; but as the cloud drifted away the British ship was still there. The heat had melted the steel hull, and the hatch cover had vanished. The bridge windows buckled, twisted and melted away in the heat. Pascoe went forward and leant over the gaping hole where the cordite had been stacked. The hold was empty, but he could hear the sound of water rushing blackly in below. The order to abandon ship was given. After taking to the lifeboats, the survivors of both the [I]Washington[/I] and [I]Bolton Castle[/I] were approached by the [I]SS Olopana[/I] to rescue them, but its offer was refused by the survivors of both ships on the grounds that they didn't want to repeat their experience in another ship that was certain to suffer the same fate. Captain Pascoe has since stated that nothing was farther from his mind at that time than the desire to board another merchant ship in those seas. Thus the ship-wrecked seamen elected to drift in the Arctic ocean in open boats rather than once again set foot aboard an unescorted Allied merchantman. [[B]Note:[/B] [I]Olopana[/I] was itself sunk three days later.] Soon the two lifeboats had drifted apart, as one had a sail and the other an engine. As the days had turned into weeks an empty lifeboat was seen on which its stern was painted [I]SS El Capitan[/I], Panama, and it appeared to have been abandoned in haste. In it were discarded clothes and a half-eaten biscuit, and in the provision lockers the incredulous Pascoe found large stocks of food, liquor and drums of fresh water. There were even compasses, charts, a gun, fishing nets, lines and reels. Marvelling at the munificence of the Panamanian Mercantile Marine, Pascoe transferred the stores to his own lifeboat, and increased the water ration to one cupful per day. Some days later one lifeboat was found by Russian minesweeper, the other independently reached the North Russian coast.

The Imperial War Museum have an audio recorded interview with a DEMS gunner aboad [I]Bolton Castle[/I], in which he describes: "[I]Recollections of period as DEMS gunner aboard Bolton Castle during Convoy PQ17 in Arctic, 1942: drafting to ship in Glasgow after one trip in Salacia, 6/1942. REEL 2 Continues: character of convoy; order for convoy to scatter, 4/7/1942; sinking of ship by German aircraft; conditions in lifeboat; reasons for refusal to go on board Olopano; decision of captain to head southwards; rescue by Russian minesweeper. Period ashore in Russia, 1942: hospitalisation in Polyarnoe and threat from German air raids; further details of survival in lifeboat; treatment by Russians in Polyarnoe; transfer aboard Deer Lodge from Polyarnoe to Archangel; return to GB aboard HMS Onslaught and his role shell-loading during action with German ship;[/I]" [URL]http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80021393[/URL] Unfortunately, it is not available on-line at the moment, but hopefully soon will be.

Further to my previous post #37, the interview is now on-line from the same link. Within the link, there is a panel to the right, entitled "Associated people and organisations" in which there are links to another dozen or so eye-witness interviews. All these interviews are sound only, and are remarkable for their matter of fact delivery.

I can only fully agree with jainso31 in his post 35. Since any forms of the military/naval organisation were established there were commanders. "The commander shold take responsibility for any failure of his own decision or failure of his subordinates" . HM Navy punished with a death penalty one of his admirals for (apparently doubtful) cowardice in one of the battles in XVIIIc so the rule of responsibility at war was also known to the British military for ages. Besides his personal weak sides Adm Pond violated number of basic "immortal" Nelsonic rules that were established and proudly held by the HM Navy: "if you do not know what to do follow the voice of canons", "the warships are safe in the bases but they were not built for that reason". Actually what the "distant covering" force (two BBs plus aircraft carrier) was kept for is difficult to understand if they were also ordered to withdrew and ordered not to cross some boundaries due to the "threat of u-boats and air" - giving any German surface forces a free hand in action. Before the PQ17 there were couple of instances when hopelessly outgunned ships were able to stop a superrior force and the British did not give up - untill their ships sunk (HMS Jervis Bay, early convoy battles in the Mediterranean Sea). Commander Rope forced the German heavy cruiser to withdraw with 5000t of water in hull after ramming it with his destroyer. HMS Acasta scored a torpedo hit before being sunk - and also forced German heavy cruiser to withdraw. The most important lesson - sinking of Bismarck was also forgotten - just one torpedo hit and a shell in fuel tank sealed her loss - she was crippled and waited for final destruction. There were no actions without dangerous reaction of weak opponent. Some discussions suggest that Adm Pond has been made sort of scapegoat and try to cottonball his wrong decision with plenty of "buts/ifs". He is not scapegoat: his was the one who gave the order and he is only one to be blamed. This a rule of war and military. Capt Hill says that after the PQ17 there were number of fist fights among the allies - Americans and British for the words like "the British got yellow and left the convoy". On one of the USS heavy cruisers the emotions was so bad that a special letter was issued to the crew explaining them circumstances, requesting being disciplined and believing the British and American can get along in order to victory. In this context I am strongly against blaiming the RN as whole for the disaster with words the sort of "RN left the convoy for distruction". Those on the sea fought hard and pushed hard. The lesson of PQ17 was not lost and the RN showed their best side in action of Sherbrooke and almost suicide determination in Pedestal. To improve morale and to have a feeling of action see one of the memories from the HMS Sheffield just passing the wreck of the German destroyer F.Eckholt when Adm Burnett says to the cruiser captain "ram the blighter !" Regards, g.

[quote=greendragon;10057838] Actually what the "distant covering" force (two BBs plus aircraft carrier) was kept for is difficult to understand if they were also ordered to withdrew and ordered not to cross some boundaries due to the "threat of u-boats and air" - giving any German surface forces a free hand in action. g.[/quote] Hello GD, It is important to remember that the distant covering force was a strategic, not a tactical force, and as such had two objectives: 1. To provide a strong force to counterract an attack on the convoy by heavy German units west of Bear Island. The area east of Bear Island was was a dead end at that time of year due to sea ice, and to venture further east would risk being bottled up in the Barents Sea by Uboats and torpedo bombers. At this time the Royal Navy was very stretched and losing some of its heavy units to save a few merchantmen would have had strategic implications for little tactical advantage. 2. To prevent a breakout by heavy German units into the North Atlantic, which was of the greatest concern. Remember that PQ17 was only a year after the [I]Bismarck[/I]'s attempt to break out which had tied up almost the entire Home Fleet and Force H of the Mediterranean Fleet. There was also the possibility that an attack on the convoy was to be a diversion for such a breakout. The distant covering force covered the western part the convoy’s passage against surface attack by enemy heavy units, while still being in a position to counter a breakout, provided that it was not lured too far eastwards and left the door to the Atlantic open, through which German heavy units could pass. With this in mind, they did not usually venture further east than about 10 degrees East, or midway between Jan Mayen and Bear Island. With the loss of the [I]Repulse [/I]and [I]Prince of Wales[/I] still very fresh in the memory, nor did they approach too close to the Norwegian coast from where they could be attacked by land based torpedo bombers.

The world has changed so much that even a Leading Seaman based on board an internet forum does not hesitate ask annoying questions and worse have doubts in what the Admirals say about distant past!:) As someone said this subject would be controversial forever and the results would be satysfying or not us here and others somewhere else. The value is also mostly limited for nowadays nothing of this kind would happen (?). New challenges are mostly overcome with help of EW and all the other so much supporting tech changes, much better organized higher staffs systems, targetting process and numerous higly trained specialists on different fields of warfare. This makes the decision making proces much more realiable and closer to reaching the objectives of an operations. That's theory. Actually then and now the human factor - the commanders and their attitude to the operations, will to press hard will not be changed. If the will of a figting men is lashed by superiors victory can not be achieved. Comparing RN actions in time of Naopoleonic wars and before up to WW II the "oak" navy performed might be said much better. Their captains just fought. They have almost never hesitate and most important they never been kept on lash by the then Admirality. The orders were simple: "destroy, burn, sink or take prize". No radio message " scattered", "withdrew" The lack of comms was a positive factor we may say. The peak of this was in Nelsons' time - "no captain will be penalized for attacking a superior force". Actually the same attiude of the then old admirality. There was a case (as in Naval Cronicles) when a captain of the RN frigatte atacked a ship of the line (French ?) lost battle and HM ship. He was tried and sentenced not quilty for the loss and awarded with a sword, whatever. The most important signal was made - the intet is FIHGT! Adm Pound attitude was apparently defensive and priorities not properly aimed. He also kept hold on all the brave commanders that wished fight if occasion appeared or simpler because being forced to fight. In ordering withdrawal of the escorts, Adm Pound showed also hard to believe mistrust to his ship commanders. As I have mentioned before he forgot that then recently his weaker ships fought excellent battles and fulfilled thir tasks of fighting ships RN. The arctic convoys were not the "millstones around his neck". This was agreed much above his head and his was the task to make the political will to be executed. That was priority. I agree that heavy losses - also among the RN capital ships was a factor that would cause some to be more cautious with employment of the fleet. But in summer 1942 - and it is also forgotten - Britain, plus her small crew of alliances was not longer alone: the USofA was in the war, learning fast, being angry and winding up their massive economy to war purposes. On the 07 DEC 1941 war was won by the Allies. The purposes of the covering forces as explained by Bill here still doesn't make to much sense to me. Why the Germans would attack convoy West of Bear Island risking the battle with the RN HF and denying themselves support of Luftwaffe and U-boats while Tirpitz MAIN task was destroying supply convoy to Russia and would do it easily closer to its bases?? The Channel dash and loss of of Bismarck were clear signs that the Germans gave up the idea of strangle the British with their surface heavy ships. Two most fighting Admirals (Tovey and Fraser?) of the HF were sure the Tirpitz wouldn't attack the convoy so a raid on Atlantic was also out of question. Thanks Bill for answer, Regards, g.

Posted here by kind permission of the author Cdr RAC Owen OBE RN via member Tim Lewin-to whom I am indebted. [B][B]Written and published by Commander Robin A C Owen OBE RN February 2002[/B][/B] [B][B][B]CONVOY PQ 17, JULY 1942[/B][/B][/B]. I was present at this action, on the bridge of[B][B] HMS LEDBURY[/B][/B] under the command of Roger Hill. On approaching the Barents Sea, the convoy was heavily attacked by the German Air Force and U-boats. Due to faulty intelligence the Admiralty wrongly believed that German naval ships including the new battleship[B][B] TIRPITZ[/B][/B], had left the shelter of the Norwegian fjords and were about to intercept the convoy. [B][B] If this happened, the convoy escort would be outgunned, possibly sunk or driven off and the convoy of about fifty helpless merchant ships destroyed. [/B][/B] At the time, on LEDBURY’s bridge, we knew only that we were to reverse course, abandon our station as one of the close escorts and join the cruiser squadron some miles distant. Our designed maximum speed was 24 knots, several knots slower than the cruisers and fleet destroyers we were supposed to rejoin but now rapidly receding to the west. At any moment we expected to see the masts of the TIRPITZ appear over the eastern horizon, followed by salvos of fifteen inch shells. The telegraphs were put to Full Ahead, the captain sent below for the Chief and urged him to squeeze all the revs he could. The boiler fans roared, the funnel paint began to blister and in the flat calm sea, low sea temperature and a high barometer, he actually got one and a half knots more than had been obtained on our acceptance trials in the Solent six months earlier. But the rest of the fleet was still getting away from us. There now occurred a dramatic incident. Two days earlier we had rescued three German airmen whosThere noe plane had been shot down while attacking the convoy. One had been shot in the hand and our doctor had had to amputate his shattered finger. The Germans had not been placed under any restraint while on board and with the ship at Action Stations they had been assigned to first aid and catering duties. Roger Hill now sent for them to be brought on to the Bridge. Through one of our officers who spoke German, he told them exactly what was now likely to happen and that since everyone in the ship was at equal risk he expected them to assist in their own and others’ survival. They were emphatic that none of the German big ships were at sea or likely to be. But we never knew whether they had any actual knowledge of their navy’s intentions, or whether it was mere defiance, or maybe just the contempt of airmen for their navy. [B][B][B]The German Navy did not appear but the convoy was almost totally destroyed, giving rise to much controversy, blame and, for David Irving twenty eight years later, heavy libel damages. Back in Scapa Flow, a military police escort removed our passengers. They had had several lucky escapes. [/B][/B][/B] Additional Note June 2006 Stewart Reed, son of L/Sig Harry Reed, with whom I have been in touch for several years has emailed me some photos of the rescue of the German airmen on 04.07.42. The last paragraph of the original App 1 above outlines what happened but, as an eye witness, I can provide more details. On this date at Arctic midsummer there was continuous daylight and as PQ 17 approached the vicinity of Bear Island, German air attacks hardly ceased. They were often preceded by a German reconnaissance plane, a large amphibian Blohm & Voss, called the "shad”, that persistently circled the convoy just above the horizon transmitting radio homing signals to the approaching high level and torpedo bombing force. Air Defence of the convoy attempted to shoot down this "shad" and after several attempts using the CAM ship's Hurricane fighters, it was seen to catch fire and fly close enough to the escort for us to get a shot at it with our 20mm Oerlikon before it crashed. LEDBURY then went Full Speed in the flat calm sea to try to rescue any survivors. As we came up with them, the plane had sunk and the four were in their inflatable dinghy. As Roger Hill manoeuvered the ship close, most of our crew gathered on deck to watch this often- rehearsed "survivors" drill being done for real. To encouraging shouts of "Pull Up My Hearties", "Give Way Together" and a few more ribald, the Germans were hauled up the scrambling nets and dumped in wet oily heaps on the iron deck.. [B]They were then turned over to the Sick Bay crew to wash them down, put them in dry survivors clothing and for Surg Lieut John Nixon RNVR to examine them[/B]. [B][B]My place of duty was with Roger Hill on the Bridge and the Doc soon appeared to say that the Pilot, Flt Lieut Kaumeyer had a badly injured hand but the others were unhurt. [/B][/B] He was taken to the Wardroom, also the Action Operating Theatre and prepared for treatment. The other crew members were put into spare billets in one of our seaman's messes, given food and somewhere to sleep. Nixon and his Sick Berth Attendant, as described above then operated on the injured pilot. The patient was accorded the usual facilities for his rank in the Wardroom, with a camp bed to sleep on in one corner. He and his crew were free to move about the ship with a seaman "Minder". The rest of their passage back to Scapa Flow was uneventful and they proved model passengers. Nixon told me many years later that he had remained in touch with his former patient after the war. jainso31

Although it was Admiral Pound who transmitted the order for PQ17 "to Scatter"- initially the word was "disperse"-as Pound was very sick at the time with a brain tumour- I doubt very much that it was HIS decision. Can anyone throw some light on how this decision was reached-I do know that the first signal was for the Covering Force to withdraw; because of "unfounded" suspicion that the Tirpitz was out-there was no evidence of any kind that the battleship had moved, other than shifting berths.!!! There is a school of thought that Churchill wanted a break from supplying Russia by convoy; and it was he who masterminded the Scatter order and to cover his tracks wanted scapegoats- other than FSL Pound of course. jainso31

Jim, the [I]Tirpitz [/I]didn't just shift berths, it moved its base from Trondheim to Altenfjord, as per the pre-arranged plan: "[I]As soon as the convoy has been located by aerial reconnaissance, the Trondheim Group [Tirpitz and Hipper] will proceed to the northern exit of Altenfjord, refuel and wait for receipt of the codeword before executing the operation[/I]." On 18 June Captain Denham sent this intelligence from Sweden to the Admiralty: "[I]Following is German plan for attack on next Russian convoy: 1. Air reconnaissance to locate eastbound convoy when it reaches Jan Mayen. Bombing attacks will then be made. 2. Pocket battleships and six destroyers will move to Altenfjord, and Tirpitz and Hipper to Narvik area. Both these forces may be expected to operate once convoy has reached 6 degrees East. Simultaneous attacks when convoy on meridian of Bear Island by two surface groups supported by U-boats and aircraft. Graded A3[/I]" There was more than a suspicion of German intentions; [U]it was known beforehand what the plan was, and the movement of the heavy units to Alenfjord confirmed the intelligence[/U]. The initial movements of [I]Tirpitz, Luetzow, Scheer, Hipper[/I] and their destroyers on 2 July to bases further north confirmed their intentions, as predicted by Commander Denham. It was not known that [I]Luetzov[/I] had ran aground and was out of action, so potentially the convoy could be confronted by [I]Hipper[/I] (8x8" guns), Scheer (6x11" guns), [I]Luetzow [/I](6x11"guns), [I]Tirpitz[/I] (8x15" guns) and umpteen large destroyers and torpedo boats. Indeed, the codeword to launch Operation Roesselsprung was issued. [I]Tirpitz, Hipper[/I] and [I]Scheer[/I] left Altenfjord with 7 destroyers and 2 torpedo-boats between 11.00 and 11.30, reaching the open sea at 15.00, expecting to attack PQ17 the next morning. I think Admiral Pound had more than enough reason to issue his badly worded order.

Thank you for your interest and input Bill.I am aware of the capital ships move from Trondheim to Altenfjord; but am still uncertain as to their intentions in the ultimate. At 2031 a German signal had been intercepted from Adm. Comm. Gr.Nth stating "no own forces in operational area.Position of heavy enemy group not known at present, but is main target for Uboats when encountered"Denning was convinced that the German Admiral would consider "that it was an unjustifiable risk to commit our only worthwhile surface force to attack the convoy at present" Although Raeder had ordered the movement of the heavy ships to northern Norway.Hitler consistently refused to allow them to go to sea to attack the convoy, until and unless; the whereabouts of the British Main Force had been fully established. However ,despite this evidence "Father (Pound) had made his mind up" and sent out the signals at 2111.2113 and 2123. jainso31

[quote]I am aware of the capital ships move from Trondheim to Altenfjord; but am still uncertain as to their intentions in the ultimate. [/quote]Their intention was to attack PQ17 in execution of "Operation Rosselsprung". I would have thought that was obvious. [quote]At 2031 a German signal had been intercepted from Adm. Comm. Gr.Nth stating "no own forces in operational area.Position of heavy enemy group not known at present, but is main target for Uboats when encountered" Denning was convinced that the German Admiral would consider "that it was an unjustifiable risk to commit our only worthwhile surface force to attack the convoy at present"[/quote]Denning's opinion is what it is - an opinion and not evidence. [quote]Although Raeder had ordered the movement of the heavy ships to northern Norway.Hitler consistently refused to allow them to go to sea to attack the convoy, until and unless; the whereabouts of the British Main Force had been fully established.[/quote]Which, when it was, the order was given. [quote]However ,despite all yhis evidence "Father (Pound) had made his mind up" and sent out the signals at 2111.2113 and 2123.[/quote]What evidence?

That is all very well Bill; but what evidence do you have that "the German ships were at sea at the time of the order to scatter" I certainly have not seen any such evidence- otherwise I would never have raised the issue regarding the origin of the decision to scatter PQ17. While I am at it-a fair question-why was it necessary for scapegoats to be found and brought to book??? jainso31

The German battle group wasn't at sea at the time and I never intimated that it was. I have previously (in post #12) fully laid out the background to Admiral Pound's decision, and have no wish keep repeating myself. I will gladly discuss any point of it, but it must be read in the whole to obtain a balanced view. It is all very well to condemn his decision with the wisdom of hindsight, but what you have to consider was what was [U]known[/U] at the time. What do you think the result would have been had that order not been given?

My thanks for your patience Bill-I wish it to be known at this juncture that it is most certainly not my intention to call your account of PQ17 into disrepute -your account is as good as any I have read. However;regarding this whole affair there are too many questions which remain unanswered; by even the most eminent of naval historians. Should you wish- I will set them out; but I have no wish to be tedious jainso31

According to Correlli Barnett in his book "Engage the Enemy more Closer" p722 Admiral Pound reported to the War Cabinet on 1st August in regard to the PQ17 disaster.His version of events was somewhat disingenuous.He alleged (according to the minutes of the meeting) that the Admiralty had information on the night before the order to disperse was given that [B][B][B]the Tirpitz having eluded our submarines and would[/B][/B][/B], if she continued on her present course,be in a position to attack the convoy the following morning.Of the three forms of attack air,Uboat or surface ships,Pound stated that the most dangerous would come from a surface ship attack-hence the order to scatter. jainso31

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