Convoy PQ17 June 1942 - World Naval Ships Forums Archive (Page 2)

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Convoy PQ17 June 1942 - World Naval Ships Forums Archive (Page 2)

Convoy PQ17 June 1942 (Page 2)

Posts 51 to 59

[QUOTE=jainso31;10106987]According to Correlli Barnett in his book "Engage the Enemy more Closer" p722 Admiral Pound reported to the War Cabinet on 1st August in regard to the PQ17 disaster.His version of events was somewhat disingenuous.He alleged (according to the minutes of the meeting) that the Admiralty had information on the night before the order to disperse was given that [B][B][B]the Tirpitz having eluded our submarines and would[/B][/B][/B], if she continued on her present course,be in a position to attack the convoy the following morning.Of the three forms of attack air,Uboat or surface ships,Pound stated that the most dangerous would come from a surface ship attack-hence the order to scatter. jainso31[/QUOTE] Arguably what Pound [I]should[/I] have done was what Cunningham did do 18 months later in similar circumstances that led to the Battle of North Cape: inform the commanders at sea (Tovey, Hamilton, Broome) of the intelligence appreciation and allow them to act according to their best judgement. Convoys attacked by superior surface forces were successfully defended during the war: HX.106 in Feb '41, 2nd Battle of Sirte in March 42 and Battle of Barents Sea in Dec '42 being examples; other instances such as HX.34 in November 1940, when HMS Jervis Bay was sunk, were less happy. It all depended on local conditions, which Pound was unable to judge sitting in the Admiralty in London.

According to my reading of the issue you raise Daniel-The CIO Denning had prepared a signal for Adm Tovey, for him to act upon, indicating that the latest intel gave the German heavy units as being still in Altenfjord at 1200;he took it to Pound for approval; but was too late to prevent the fateful signals being sent. jainso31

[QUOTE=lesley s;10051538]Hello My Father was on the merchant ship Bolton Castle. He is still alive at 89 years old. He has written his memoirs. He was in an open life boat for 10 days in the arctic circle and rescued by a Russian ship, then spent 3 months in a Russian hospital. He became a captain and migrated to Australia in 1962. He says the PQ17 convoy was used as a lure for the Tirpitz. This he discovered more recently and he is disgusted that there was so much suffering. His name is John Wardle. Lesley[/QUOTE] Hello Lesley My Uncle survived this sinking in the other lifeboat. I would love to get a copy of your Fathers memoirs and or contact your Father to see if he remembers my Uncle Kind regards Michael Mills

Quote lesley "He says(that his father said) the[B][B] PQ17 convoy was used as a lure for the Tirpitz.[/B][/B] This he discovered more recently and he is disgusted that there was so much suffering". The scattering of PQ17 was a dreadful mistake by the FSL (Pound) BECAUSE he was convinced that the Tirpitz was out; but he also WITHDREW all the heavy cover which had been sent to meet such a threat. Not a lure IMO; but quite inexplicable!!??? jainso31

By decimating PQ17,the Germans had achieved more than was at at first apparent.They had deprived the Russians, not only of the cargoes that were lost in the event; but also of several convoys in the remaining months before winter closed in again. PQ18 was run,but only to abate Stalin's anger;after that all convoys ceased until after winter,when they once more became a feasible operation of the war.The German operation The Knight's Move had touched the lines of Anglo-Soviet communications at a sensitive jont and just at the right time to cause maximum discord between the Allies and Russia. There was one consolation for the Allies when the convoys were finally resumed-the ominous PQ cypher replaced by JW.In December there were two convoys JW55a and JW55b.The German Fleet intervened in the running of JW55b,and once again fumbled and ultimately ran to the fury of Hitler. jainso31

I recently watched Clarkson's BBC docu about the PQ 17 and I'm mystified. The Allies not only had four heavy cruisers but also two new, fast battleships and one carrier. Tirpitz while individually much bigger than the opposing battleships would not have had a chance against both. The n-square law puts the odds at four to one and that isn't even including the carrier.

The scattering of PQ17 was a dreadful mistake by the FSL (Pound) BECAUSE he was convinced that[B][B][B] the Tirpitz was out; but he also WITHDREW all the heavy cover which had been sent to meet such a threat. Not a lure IMO; but quite inexplicable!!???[/B][/B][/B] Admiral Tovey CinC Home Fleet and Admiral Hamilton CinC 1CS both wanted to fight; but the order from the FSL was adamant-Leave the area!!! [B][B]Admiralty's Instructions of 27th June 1942 [/B][/B] h)The movement of the Battle Fleet covering force will be at the discretion of CinC Home Fleet,but it is not expected that this covering force will be placed in a position where it will be subject to heavy air attack unless there is a good chance of bringing Admiral von Tirpitz to action. j)The movements of the cruiser covering force will be at the discretion of CS.1 subject to instructions from the Admiralty or CinC HF.It is not intended that the cruiser covering force should proceed to eastwards of Bear Island unless the convoy is threatened by the presence of surface forces which cruiser force can fight.In ant case it is not intended that the cruiser covering force should proceed eastwards of meridian of 25 degrees east. jainso31

There is much misunderstanding of the purpose of the heavy distant cover. The Admiralty’s appreciation of German tactics against the convoy was that German heavy naval units would attack west of Bear Island (about 20 degrees East), while aircraft and U-boats would attack east of it, reasoning that it would be unwise of the Germans to mix their U-boats and warships in the same area on the same operation. From post #40: [quote]It is important to remember that the distant covering force was a strategic, not a tactical force, and as such had two objectives: 1. To provide a strong force to counterract an attack on the convoy by heavy German units west of Bear Island. The area east of Bear Island was was a dead end at that time of year due to sea ice, and to venture further east would risk being bottled up in the Barents Sea by Uboats and torpedo bombers. At this time the Royal Navy was very stretched and losing some of its heavy units to save a few merchantmen would have had strategic implications for little tactical advantage. 2. To prevent a breakout by heavy German units into the North Atlantic, which was of the greatest concern. Remember that PQ17 was only a year after the Bismarck's attempt to break out which had tied up almost the entire Home Fleet and Force H of the Mediterranean Fleet. There was also the possibility that an attack on the convoy was to be a diversion for such a breakout. The distant covering force covered the western part the convoy’s passage against surface attack by enemy heavy units, while still being in a position to counter a breakout, provided that it was not lured too far eastwards and left the door to the Atlantic open, through which German heavy units could pass. With this in mind, they did not usually venture further east than about 10 degrees East, or midway between Jan Mayen and Bear Island. With the loss of the [I]Repulse[/I] and [I]Prince of Wales[/I] still very fresh in the memory, nor did they approach too close to the Norwegian coast from where they could be attacked by land based torpedo bombers.[/quote]If they ventured further east, the Arctic ice sheet would force them southwards, bringing them within aircraft range from Norway. At the time the [I]Tirpitz[/I] and the other heavy units put to sea, the distant covering force was 500 miles to the north west and in no position to offer assistance. It should also rememered that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was not alone. Potentially the convoy could be confronted by [I]Hipper[/I] (8x8” guns), [I]Scheer [/I](6x11” guns), [I]Luetzow[/I] (6x11”guns), [I]Tirpitz[/I] (8x15“ guns) and a dozen or so large destroyers and torpedo boats.

[QUOTE=emason;10121921]There is much misunderstanding of the purpose of the heavy distant cover. The Admiralty’s appreciation of German tactics against the convoy was that German heavy naval units would attack west of Bear Island (about 20 degrees East), while aircraft and U-boats would attack east of it, reasoning that it would be unwise of the Germans to mix their U-boats and warships in the same area on the same operation. From post #40: If they ventured further east, the Arctic ice sheet would force them southwards, bringing them within aircraft range from Norway. At the time the [I]Tirpitz[/I] and the other heavy units put to sea, the distant covering force was 500 miles to the north west and in no position to offer assistance. It should also remembered that the [I]Tirpitz[/I] was not alone. Potentially the convoy could be confronted by [I]Hipper[/I] (8x8” guns), [I]Scheer [/I](6x11” guns), [I]Luetzow[/I] (6x11”guns), [I]Tirpitz[/I] (8x15“ guns) and a dozen or so large destroyers and torpedo boats.[/QUOTE] Yes I agree Bill-having now read the Admiralty's Instructions and why there were limits to the travel of distant covering forces; and also in light of what you say distance wise vis a vis Home fleet and Tirpitz and Co's start position -Home Fleet were in no position to offer support. jainso31

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