Extracted from A Record of the First
Commission of HMS Ajax April 1935 to August 1937 on the Mediterranean and
America and West Indies Stations.
The
War In Abyssinia And The Fleet
Concentration
A brief account of the circumstances leading up to the
Italy-Abyssinian War and an outline of the campaign is of interest to most
of us, in view of the relation, which these matters had to our movements
during the Commission.
In the latter part of the last century, the Italians, who were far
behind Britain and France in the “race for Africa,” first cast
covetous eyes at the cool and fertile highlands of Abyssinia.
Eritrea to the north and Somaliland to the south, they already
possessed, but these colonies, though providing several ports and a great
length of coast line, were low lying and unhealthy, and therefore
unsuitable as outlets for the growing Italian population.
The Italian expeditionary force, which pushed on
conquest bound into Tigre, the northern province of Abyssinia, met with
intial success in 1895, but it, miscalculated the strength of the
Abyssinian people and the difficulty of keeping lines of communications
open in that mountainous country.
In 1896 an army of 120,000 Abyssinians, commanded by the great
Emperor Menelik, surrounded the entire Italian force at Adowa and
inflicted a crushing defeat upon the invaders.
This called a halt to Italian colonial progression and a treaty was
signed fixing the boundaries of the Abyssinian “Empire.”
Nearly forty years later, Italy, whose prestige had suffered a
damaging blow, was to seek revenge.
The rise of Mussolini with his Fascist regime saw Italy grow
rapidly in power during the post war years.
By the end of 1934 it was apparent that the Duce intended to start
his programme of colonial expansion by the conquest if Abyssinia, which he
regarded at Italy’s destiny, according to a number of bombastic public
utterances made to the Black shirts.
In December 1934 a clash occurred at Wal Wal, a watering place for
tribesmen on the boundary between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, over
the delimitation of the frontier. Hundreds
of casualties were inflicted on both sides in spite of the presence of an
Anglo-Ethiopian boundary Commission.
This led to threats and demands for compensation on the part of
Abyssinia and relations grew worse and worse.
At the beginning of 1935 Mussolini started to pour soldiers,
labourers and war material into Eritrea and Somaliland via the ports of
Massawa and Mogadiscio respectively.
Soon vast Italian armies, merchandized to the highest degree and
supplemented by large numbers of aeroplanes, were assembling on the
northern and southern frontiers of Abyssinia.
A continuous stream of Italian troop ships and transports passed
through the Suez Canal crowded with regulars and Black shirts vociferously
acclaiming “Il Duce.” No
attack could be made until the autumn, as the rains render all highways in
Abyssinia impassable between the months of June and September.
Heedless of world opinion, Mussolini pushed on his war preparations
and on 11th September 1935 Britain gave her dramatic lead to
the League of Nations by concentrating her fleets in the Mediterranean,
with an eye to “Military Sanctions.”
We all know, only too well, how Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria and
Haifa were prepared for war during that hectic and uncertain autumn when
Italy, enraged at Britain’s action, seemed on the point of attacking her
as well as Abyssinia.
At the end of September the long awaited blow fell and, on the
trifling pretext of a frontier incident, Marshal De Bono, with an army of
150,000 men, started to advance into Abyssinia from the north, while
Marshal Graziani with a smaller army advanced from the south.
The Italians made rapid progress into the plains of Ogaden in the
south during the first few days, aeroplanes proving effective in the open
country, but a waterless desert checked their advance.
The northern advance was also successful and within a fortnight
Italy was celebrating the fall of Adowa, scene of her humiliation.
Southwards towards Addis Ababa pushed De Bono’s army and Makale
was the next town to fall. There the advance was halted by desperate Abyssinian
resistance, in which the Emperor Haile Selassie himself bore a part, aided
by the increasing mountainous character of the country.
A drive by Graziani northwards towards Harrar to cut the countries
only railway was unsuccessful and by the end of 1935 the situation was a
virtual deadlock. Italian
aeroplanes and mechanized force were, for the moment unable to prevail
against the elusive, guerrilla tactics adopted by their opponents.
Italy’s position at this time, with economic sanctions applied
against her by the League of Nations, was not favourable.
The arrival of Marshal Badoglio to replace De Bono in the supreme
command was an indication that Mussolini was dissatisfied with the
progress of the war. It was
soon apparent that the most strenuous efforts were to be made to achieve
decisive results before the rain commenced in May.
Large scale offensives were launched simultaneously open north and
south fronts in January 18936 and, for the first time in this campaign,
mustard gas was dropped by Italian aeroplanes over a wide area on the
northern front. The
Abyssinians, totally unprotected against gas, were soon on the retreat and
Italian columns made spectacular advances to Gondar and Lake Tana in the
northwest and to the shores of Lake Rudolf, along the frontier of Kenya,
in the southwest.
During February and March the Abyssinian forces held out
desperately against the main attack by Badogilo’s northern army, but
gradually they were driven back.
With the fall of Magdala in April, the route lay open to Addis
Ababa, which the Italians reached a few days later, their mechanized
columns moving swiftly once the main mountain barriers were passed.
The capture of Addis Ababa on 5th May meant the end to
all organised resistance, on the part of the Abyssinians.
Harrarm Diredawa and the remaining unconquered area along the
railway line were soon taken.
The railway had not been cut during the whole campaign, and had
remained the only line of communication between the capital and the
outside world.
By the end of May nearly the whole of Abyssinia, except the western
province, was under Italian control, including Lake Tana, the source of
the Blue Nile, whose water is vital for the irrigation of Egypt and the
Sudan cotton fields.
It’s an ill wind that blows no one any good and the sudden end to
this struggle brought the finish of sanctions and the British Fleet was
able to disperse at the beginning of June and return to its normal
stations.
The Base Defences
Early in September 1935 many Naval, Military and R.A.F. units
suddenly found themselves “under orders.”
Owing to the special issues of tropical clothing, junior officers
and men knew that they were destined for a warm climate, and as our
relations with Italy were strained because of Mussolini’s aggressive
attitude towards Abyssinia, it was generally surmised that this
destination was somewhere between Malta and Aden.
Whether Great Britain was clenching her mauled fist primarily in
support of the League of Nations, or whether she considered her Imperial
Communications were threatened, it s not the object of this article to
consider.
The majority of these units found themselves at Alexandria, and
very soon that large commercial port contained a bigger concentration of
naval and other units than has been seen since the Great War.
The period immediately preceding the completion of our naval
concentration at Alexandria, and the installation of anti-aircraft,
underwater and coast defences-when the tension with Italy was at its
height was most critical, and it is doubtful if many of us have considered
what might have happened.
Great Britain was unprepared for war; the Mediterranean fleet was
cruising in the Eastern Mediterranean and its only base for repairs,
stores, and communications, etc, was Malta, which would have been
untenable in the event of war with Italy.
It was possible, too, that our line of communication through the
Central and Western Mediterranean would be so severely interfered with,
that the establishment of another base for the Fleet father East would be
impossible. More and more
dependent does a modern fleet become on a well-equipped and well-defended
base, yet the possibility of the Mediterranean fleet having to operate
from one or more unequipped and undefended anchorages loomed very large at
this period.
Alexandria was most conveniently situated from a
geographical point of view and lent itself fairly easily to defence by
coast artillery and underwater defences; the installation of A.A. defences
was simplified by the fact that the anchorage was situated at very nearly
the maximum range of the nearest Italian air base; attacking aircraft were
therefore limited to a direct approach, along which topographical
conditions allowed the main effort of the ground defences to be
concentrated.
The first personnel for defences of Alexandria arrived on 14th
September 1935 in the transport Neuralia and consisted of 250 Royal
Marines and 600 Army ranks; the Royal Marines consisted of the Landing and
Transport Company of the M.N.B.D.O., and the Army units of one A.A.
battery R.A. one Searchlight Company R.E., with their necessary R.C.’s,
R.A.M.C. and R.A.O.C. detachments. The
tractors, lorries, guns and searchlights arrived shortly afterwards in
S.S. Bellerophon, which had been hurriedly loaded by the troops, at
Portsmouth, before sailing. The
R.M. unit was known as H.M.S. President III-one of the few “ships”
ever commissioned and commanded by a R.M. Officer. The force was quickly disembarked from Neuralia, which
returned home, and the troops were temporarily quartered in H.M. Ships
Woolwich and Resource, and at Mustapha.
The object of this force was to provide A.A. defences ashore at any
anchorage, which the commander in Chief might require for use by the
Fleet-A.A. defence, had priority over all other shore defences.
The force was capable of loading, transporting across country,
installing and maintaining these A.A. defences wherever they might be
required.
Preliminary work was immediately commenced on reconnoitring battery
positions, preparing gun pits, buildings O.P.’s selecting camp sites,
etc, for the defences of Alexandria, the equipment and personnel for which
were known to be arriving in the near future.
On 26th September 1935, H.T. Lancashire arrived at
Alexandria with the royal Naval personnel for the installation of
underwater defences, Port War Signal station, 1,400 royal Marines, and
additional Army details under the command of a Brigadier R.M.
This force was known as H.M.S. President IV, in which President III
was ultimately absorbed to form the “Base Defences, Mediterranean.”
The R.M. units in Lancashire included 6-inch, 4-inch and pom-pom
coast defence batteries, an AA battery and Searchlight Company together
with additional transport personnel, a Workshop Section, and the necessary
administrative units. The
store ships S.S. Atreus and Bencruachan arrived shortly afterwards.
Heavy tractors, trailers, gun transporters and lorries were soon to
be seen passing to and fro along the streets of Alexandria; camps sprang
up almost overnight in widely separated areas, and guns and searchlights
began to arrive at their pre-arranged positions.
Few of the personnel of the fleet ever realised to what extent
Alexandria was finally defended; the following gives a very brief idea of
the layout of the defences:
6-inch battery at Agami with coast defence searchlights.
6-inch battery at Ras-el-Tin with coast defence searchlights.
4-inch battery at Mex with coast defence searchlights.
Pom-pom battery at Shirou with coast defence searchlights. The requirements of A.A. shore defences call for dispersion
of the 3-inch two gun sections, and they were disposed in a narrow eclipse
round Alexandria, Mustapha, Silsila, Ras-el-Tin, Mex, Agami, Dekhela and
along the southern shore of Lake Mariout.
The Searchlight positions were even more scattered, and there were
approximately 20 of these, each commanded by a corporal and 12 men. Two at least of these positions were supplied daily with food
and water by camel transport owing to the nature of the ground.
Listening ports in connection with these defences were situated as
far distant as Mersa-Matruh and Burg-el-Aeabe.
In addition to these defences at Alexandria, personnel of the Base
defences were absent in connection with the installation of coast defences
at Mersa-Matruh, Haifa, Port Said, Suez and Port Sudan, and its
Headquarters in Lancashire was therefore dealing at this period with a
very large area.
Reserve ammunition and stores of the Base Defences were
concentrated in store huts at Dekhela, where a R.M. guard of 150 men was
continuously maintained.
The maintenance of communications, and the daily administration of
units so widely dispersed was naturally a big problem; nearly 300 miles of
telephone cable was laid in Alexandria alone, and the motor-transport
drivers and their vehicles were called upon for continuous hard work.
As time progressed, permanent hutments and cookhouses were erected
in most of the larger camps, and these began to take the form of small
towns rather than the hastily erected encampments, which appeared
initially. Canteens were
established in all camps, and every little comfort that the ingenuity of
the officers and men could devise was added to make life easier.
The two great enemies were insects and sand, and although these
were very troublesome in the early days, they were fighting a losing
battle when the camps were finally evacuated in July 1936.
The order for evacuation was received in the camps on 9th
July 1936, and within four weeks every man, gun, searchlight, lorry, etc,
was once again in England.
Throughout the period of strained relations with Italy certain
units of the defences were ready to sail at short notice to any other
anchorage which the Commander in chief might require for the use of the
Fleet and which would require defences.
These units were known as the “Port X force,” and the majority
of their stores remained in S.S. Bellerophon and Bencruachan; 150 of the
personnel of this force were continuously embarked in H.T. Lancashire for
maintenance purposes, and the remainder were always ready for immediate
embarkation.
To the majority of the personnel in the Fleet the “Base Defences”
called to their mind a white ship-the Lancashire-which rarely went to sea,
and contained a large body of Royal Marines who had nothing to do.
I hope that this very brief description of the Base Defences will
help to dispel that idea, and also emphasize the fact that ship are of
little value in war, however efficient they and their ships companies may
be, unless they have a well defended base from which to operate.
