The Dardanelles Campaign

[qprdave]

Here is a report of the Admirals dispatches for the Attack on the Dardanelles in 1915.


Taken from The Times Archive Published 3rd May 1919


Dave

[astraltrader]

A brilliant account Dave - thank God all the enemy shells did not work properly!

[steve roberts]

Hi Dave.Thank you very much for than report.What a fiasco it all turned out to be in the end.Thanks to the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, who were against it in the first place.It all seemed to get blamed on Churchill.It's a miracle he got back into political power.The Army considered the Western Front to be the Main Show and considered this just a sideline diversion from the main effort.Thanks Again...Steve.

[Derek Dicker]

Hi, very interesting, a distant relation of my, I think my grandmothers brother or close relative was serving with the ANZAC and lost his life during this disaster of a campaign.

Derek (Bunts)

[John O'Callaghan]

Hi Dave! It's good to find information on the Dardenelles campaign. Here in Australia it is a defining historical event with the ANZAC legend being born and respcted throughout Australia and New Zealand. I have visited the Gallipoli battlefields and for an Aussie (though born in Ireland) it is a form of pilgrimage. I recently discovered I had two Great Uncles who were serving in an Irish Regiment and were on the River Clyde at Cape Helles.They both survived and later served in France. After the war with 'The Troubles' in the partition of Ireland it became unpopular to have served in the British forces so their service was rarely mentioned in family circles. Such a damn shame! I have recently been trying to put together information on the amphibious side of the Dardenelles operation. If anyone has anything of interest on the landings, boats and smallcraft.plans and orders etc. I would appreciate any leads as I also have an interest in Amphibious Warfare generally.
Cheers John O'C.

[Wellbran]

Originally Posted by John O'Callaghan

Hi Dave! It's good to find information on the Dardenelles campaign. Here in Australia it is a defining historical event with the ANZAC legend being born and respcted throughout Australia and New Zealand. I have visited the Gallipoli battlefields and for an Aussie (though born in Ireland) it is a form of pilgrimage. I recently discovered I had two Great Uncles who were serving in an Irish Regiment and were on the River Clyde at Cape Helles.They both survived and later served in France. After the war with 'The Troubles' in the partition of Ireland it became unpopular to have served in the British forces so their service was rarely mentioned in family circles. Such a damn shame! I have recently been trying to put together information on the amphibious side of the Dardenelles operation. If anyone has anything of interest on the landings, boats and smallcraft.plans and orders etc. I would appreciate any leads as I also have an interest in Amphibious Warfare generally.
Cheers John O'C.

My Grandad was there with HMS Goliath they were shelling the Turks but also helping with landing craft which my Grandad was supervising as a Petty Officer, I have 3 photos of him at the time, i am working on a small web site but its early stages yet but I will put them there later, and a link here in future. grandad survived the goliath sinking.

[BALTICSUBS]

It was a bit rich to blame the whole failure on Churchill, he did say something on the lines of 20 odd steel balls on chains ruined his career. The Turks saw the way the ships would come in and swing around, so they just placed mines in this area of which they were not swept.

In 1917 at the height of the U-Boat menace, he seems to still have an axe to grind with the navy, after being on the western front and then rejoining politics as munitions minister, he wrote a damming letter about the RN not taking the battle to the Germans, which he concluded that if they were not going to fight then their guns and crews would be better used on the Western Front. He wanted them to revert to the successful traditions of previous victorious RN methods, which was a close blockade as at that time he said their methods of distant blockade had not worked and they could lose the war to the U-Boats, it is amazing his career did flourish but like him or not, he was certainly the right man in round 2.

Originally Posted by BALTICSUBS

It was a bit rich to blame the whole failure on Churchill, he did say something on the lines of 20 odd steel balls on chains ruined his career. The Turks saw the way the ships would come in and swing around, so they just placed mines in this area of which they were not swept.

Perhaps not the whole failure but .....

Our minesweepers used civilian crews and they weren't prepared to take the serious risk demanded of them.

The combined British/French attack on the Dardanelles was a fiasco. The Brit commander had the idea that they could stop German subs by throwing nets over them.

March 18 is still celebrated by the Turks - the day they humbled the British navy.

[jainso31]

The first British line opened fire from Eren Köy Bay around 11:00. Shortly after noon, de Robeck ordered the French line to pass through and close on the Narrows forts. The Ottoman fire began to take its toll with Gaulois, Suffren, Agamemnon and Inflexible all suffering hits. While the naval fire had not destroyed the Ottoman batteries, it had succeeded in temporarily reducing their fire. By 13:25, the Ottoman defences were mostly silent so de Robeck decided to withdraw the French line and bring forward the second British line as well as Swiftsure and Majestic.
But the Allied forces had failed to properly reconnoiter the area and sweep it for mines. Aerial reconnaissance by aircraft from the seaplane carrier HMS Ark Royal had discovered a number of mines on the 16th and 17th of March but failed to spot the line of mines laid by the Nusret in Eren Köy Bay [14]. On the day of the attack civilian trawlers sweeping for mines in front of line "A" discovered and destroyed three mines in an area thought to be clear, before the civilian crews withdrew under fire. This information was not passed on to de Robeck and thus, the catastrophe began to unfold. At 13:54, Bouvet—having made a turn to starboard into Eren Köy Bay—struck a mine, capsized and sank within a couple of minutes, killing 639 crewmen. The initial British reaction was that a shell had struck her magazine or she had been torpedoed.

The British pressed on with the attack. Around 16:00, Inflexible began to withdraw and struck a mine near where Bouvet went down, killing 30 crewmen. The battlecruiser remained afloat and eventually beached on the island of Bozcaada (Tenedos).
Irresistible was the next to be mined. As she began to drift helplessly, the crew were taken off. De Robeck told Ocean to take Irresistible under tow but the water was deemed too shallow to make an approach. Finally at 18:05, Ocean struck a mine which jammed the steering gear leaving her likewise helpless. The abandoned battleships were still floating when the British withdrew.
A destroyer commanded by Commodore Roger Keyes returned later to attempt either to tow away or sink the stricken vessels but despite searching for four hours, there was no sign of them.

jainso31

[jainso31]

With Winston Churchill having (as First Lord of the Admiralty) succeeded in securing War Cabinet backing for action in the Dardanelles , he lost no time in implementing a blueprint for a purely naval bombardment of the Dardanelles Straits in February 1915.

A purely naval bombardment of the Straits had long been recognised in professional naval circles as a most difficult undertaking. Some eight years earlier, in 1907, a British study had concluded that an attack upon the Straits was feasible only so long as the operation was a combined naval/ground undertaking.However Churchill, impatient for action, demanded that Sir Sackville Carden - the British naval commander in the Mediterranean - provide him with a proposal for a naval-only offensive upon the Straits. Carden obliged - although without appending a personal endorsement of the plan - and it was this plan that Churchill brought to the British War Cabinet in mid-January 1915.

The Straits - 65km in length and 7km in width aside from 'The Narrows' where the banks were as little as 1,600 apart - were overlooked by steep and heavily fortified cliffs (the Gallipoli peninsula to the northwest and the coast of Asia Minor to the south). Navigation through the wildly varying current was additionally deemed problematic.

Carden's plan was three-fold. He recognised that simple bombardment of the overlooking Turkish fortresses was impractical. For one thing, naval artillery could not be expected to achieve the necessary steep trajectory required to knock out the forts.He proposed instead that the forts' outer guns should first be neutralised via long-range gunfire, the battleships out of effective range of the fortress guns. This accomplished an Allied fleet would progress further up the Straits (to The Narrows) to enable medium-range artillery to destroy shore batteries while minesweepers wiped out probable minefields blocking their path. The final phase envisaged the destruction of the inner forts Success would provide a path to Constantinople, thereby knocking Turkey out of war, and - importantly - open a supply lane to the Sea of Marmora and Britain's ally Russia.Such was Carden's plan. Grave problems remained. Even should the naval bombardment prove successful the absence of ground troops would prevent the British from gaining command of the shorelines - and in the absence of supplies from the shore the naval fleet would necessarily have to return home to refuel and restock.

Nevertheless Churchill's plan was formally approved by the War Cabinet at the end of January 1915. The British war minister, Lord Kitchener, ordered that the only available division of infantry be placed in readiness should the naval endeavour prove successful. The First Sea Lord, Admiral John Fisher, was initially mute in his opposition to the exercise (in which he had no faith), but his opposition was to grow over time and ultimately lead to both his and Churchill's resignation.Meanwhile the French government, in the form of incoming naval minister Jean Augagneur, was reluctant to cede the possibility of a purely British naval success in the Mediterranean.

Ignoring professional advice therefore Augagneur committed four French pre-dreadnoughts to add to the British fleet. He further came to an understanding with Churchill that should the expedition give signs of failure the 'demonstration' would be abandoned without loss of prestige.Churchill was optimistic however. A previous demonstration of naval force by Carden on 2 November, using long-range guns (and ordered by Churchill), had inflicted notable damage upon the outer Turkish forts - chiefly as a consequence of lucky targeting. Nevertheless it served as encouragement to Churchill - and, to a lesser extent, to Carden.

Churchill set a date of 19 February for the opening of the naval bombardment. The combined British and French fleet consisted of the new battleship Queen Elizabeth, 3 battlecruisers, 16 pre-dreadnought (including four French vessels), 4 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 6 submarines, 21 trawlers plus the seaplane carrier Ark Royal. Overseeing the effort was Carden.

Pounding the outer fortresses Cape Helles and Kum Kale from long-range on 19 February the British and French attack proved ineffective in the face of an efficient Turkish defensive system and poor Allied gunnery, although greater damage was inflicted than the bombarding naval forces realised. Unbeknown to the Allies the Turkish defenders were also critically short of ammunition.
A renewed bombardment from closer range the following week (following a pause for adverse weather), on 25 February, was similarly unsuccessful. While the outer forts were themselves seized by marines the Allied force could not effective silence the 24 Turkish mobile batteries that poured shellfire from the heights and served as highly effective protection for the elaborate minefield defence set in place in The Narrows.

Without neutralising the minefield the fleet could not move forward: and without destroying the mobile batteries the minefields were adequately protected. While stage one of Carden's plan had therefore been accomplished serious difficulties impeded an advance to the second stage.
Still, the relative lack of progress of the first two naval bombardment attempts did not deter Churchill from ordering Carden to try again, this time via a determined effort to force The Narrows and remove the minefield threat. This duly took place on 18 March 1915 amid heavy failure.In the meantime plans were afoot in London for the despatch of an expeditionary ground force under Sir Ian Hamilton, thereby fully committing Allied resources to the region.



http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles...lles_feb15.htm

jainso31

[jainso31]

ADDENDUM TO THE ABOVE

The British plan for 18 March was to silence the defences guarding the first five minefields, they would be cleared overnight by the minesweepers. The next day the remaining defences around the Narrows would be defeated and the last five minefields would be cleared. The operation went ahead without the British or French becoming aware of the recent additions to the Ottoman minefields.

The battleships were arranged in three lines, two British and one French, with supporting ships on the flanks and two ships in reserve.

Battle lines of 18 March

Line A HMS Queen Elizabeth Agamemnon Lord Nelson Inflexible
French Line B Gaulois Charlemagne Bouvet Suffren
British Line B HMS Vengeance Irresistible Albion Ocean
Supporting ships HMS Majestic Prince George Swiftsure Triumph
Reserve HMS Canopus Cornwallis

The first British line opened fire from Eren Köy Bay around 11:00. Shortly after noon, de Robeck ordered the French line to pass through and close on the Narrows forts. The Ottoman fire began to take its toll with Gaulois, Suffren, Agamemnon and Inflexible all suffering hits. While the naval fire had not destroyed the Ottoman batteries, it had succeeded in temporarily reducing their fire. By 13:25, the Ottoman defences were mostly silent so de Robeck decided to withdraw the French line and bring forward the second British line as well as Swiftsure and Majestic.


jainso31

[jainso31]

Throughout the morning of February 19th, Admiral Carden concentrated his bombardment upon these forts at long range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he had silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced six ships to closer range in the afternoon, and then the reply came in earnest, though the shooting was poor.At sunset he withdrew the ships, though Kum Kali was still firing. In evidence, he admitted that "the result of the day's action showed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight."

It was a lesson repeated time after time throughout the campaign. The big naval shells threw up stones and earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm. But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether on earthworks or trenches, usually disappointing. For naval guns, constructed to strike visible objects at long range with marvellous accuracy, have too flat a trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which devastates earthworks and trenches.It was with heavy howitzers that the Germans destroyed the forts of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this obvious difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill's expectation of crushing the Dardanelles defences by the big guns of the Queen Elizabeth and the Inflexible was frustrated.

Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and heavy sea (a common event at this season, which might have been anticipated), Admiral Carden renewed the bombardment on February 25th, employing the Queen Elizabeth, Irresistible, Agamemnon, and Gaulois.The Queen Elizabeth, firing beyond the enemy's range, assisted in silencing the powerful batteries on Cape Helles, and though the Agamemnon was severely struck at about 11,000 yards' range, the subsidiary ships Cornwallis, Vengeance, Triumph, Albion, Suffren, and Charlemagne stood in closer, and by the evening compelled all the outer forts to cease fire.



http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...s_nevinson.htm

jainso31

[jainso31]

In late March 1915, three Royal Navy E-class submarines - E-11, E-14, and E-15 - were sent out from England to join the armada assembling in the eastern Mediterranean to support the forthcoming invasion. From Australia, came another E-class boat, AE-2, procured in England less than a year earlier and manned by British officers and a half-Australian/half-British crew. Of these units, E-11, commanded by LCDR Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, and AE-2, under LCDR Harry Stoker, were sidetracked briefly in Malta for repairs.

Thus, E-14 and E-15 were the first to arrive at the Allied naval base at Mudros on the Greek island of Lemnos, 50 miles west of the entrance to the Straits, in mid April. By the time Nasmith and E-11 arrived at Mudros on 18 April to complete their repairs, E-15, under LCDR T.S. Brodie, had already been lost in an unsuccessful attempt to "run" the Dardanelles on the night of the 16th, when she ran aground under the Turkish guns at Kephez Point. Brodie and three of his crew were killed outright, and the rest were captured.

Stoker and AE-2 arrived at Mudros on 21 April and after one attempt cut short by a breakdown, entered the Dardanelles at 0300 on the morning of 25 April, only a few hours before the initial Allied landings on Gallipoli. Proceeding at periscope depth to avoid the Turkish searchlights, Stoker crept up to the minefields, where he was spotted and fired upon. He dived under the mines, as mooring lines scraped against AE-2's hull, and returned to periscope depth near the Narrows, where he managed to torpedo a Turkish gunboat before going aground under the enemy guns near Canakkale and then again on the opposite shore. Extricating his boat both times, Stoker succeeded in dodging patrol boats and artillery fire until well north of the Narrows, where he decided to put AE-2 on the bottom to lie low for the rest of the day. Surfacing at 2100 that evening, he sent a radio message to the Allied command to report his success in penetrating the Straits.

Stoker's report came at an opportune moment for British General Sir Ian Hamilton, commanding the Gallipoli operation. The landings of the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) at what would later be called ANZAC Cove on the Aegean coast across the peninsula from the Narrows had not gone well, and the on-scene commanders were recommending an immediate evacuation.
It was only the news that AE-2 had penetrated the Straits that hardened Hamilton's resolve and caused him to order the ANZAC force to dig in and persevere. They would remain at ANZAC Cove for eight months. AE-2 entered the Sea of Marmara early on 26 April and proceeded to harass Turkish shipping, initially avoiding attack by hostile escorts.


http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87...rdanelles.html


jainso31

[sons of anzac]

I can recall reading something years ago that opined that despite the losses of ships and personnel the only way to succeed was to force the Dardanelles and get to Constantiople via the sea. A land campaign would probably become bogged down and that by sea was the only way to force a decision. It would take ready acceptance of losses and a determined CinC willing to press on regardless. The author stated that many of the Turkish forts and batteries were running low on ammunition and that further Allied engagement would nullify them allowing the minesweepers to clear the forts. I think they cited Turskish ammunition availability to back up their opinion.

If they had got through despite increased naval losses, landed and captured Constantinople would Turkey have surrendered? What other possibilities?

[jainso31]

Difficult question SOA-there were so many variables;and what ifs.
Let's not forget, Gallipoli was a gamble, and on that was supposed to rest with the Navy. Like any gamble, you have to decide when to cut your losses. The stakes were high - the idea, as has been noted, was that the British and French navies would collectively show up outside Constantinople, and that this would frighten the Ottomans into submission. Would that work? Who knows. ???
We should also remember that the landings were to silence the guns, disable the defences, and allow the Dardanelles to be swept of mines. This would then allow the navy to pass through and do its original job. Of course, by the end of the campaign, there was 'mission drift', aims became blurred, the navy stood off, and the Brits, Anzacs and French troops left to take the hill that was in front of them.???
IF everything had gone according to plan, then the 'two feet on the peninsula' would have allowed the blue jackets to get on with it....?

jainso31

[jainso31]

THE BOMBARDMENT FLEET PUT TO THE SWORD

Mr. Churchill, though striving to restrain his impatience, strongly urged Admiral Carden to press forward the naval attack with the utmost vigour. In a telegram of March 11th he wrote: "If success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may be decided, and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak... We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognize clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support."

To this Admiral Carden replied that he considered the stage for vigorous action had now been reached, but that, when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be opened at once, so as to secure communications.

On March 15th Mr. Churchill, still anxious not to allow his impatience to drive him into rashness, telegraphed again that, though no time was to be lost, there should be no undue haste. An attempt to rush the passage without having cleared a channel through the mines and destroyed the primary armament of the forts was not contemplated.

The close cooperation of army and navy must be carefully studied, and it might be found that a naval rush would be costly without military occupation of the Kilid Bahr plateau. On these points the Admiral was to consult with the General who was being sent out to take command of the troops. To all of this Admiral Carden agreed. He proposed to begin vigorous operations on March 17th, but did not intend to rush the passage before a channel was cleared. This answer was telegraphed on March 16th. But on the same day the Admiral resigned his command owing to serious ill-health.

Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in command, was next day appointed his successor. He was five years younger, was, of course, fully cognizant of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though strongly urged by Mr. Churchill to act on "his independent and separate judgment," and not to hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying on the prearranged scheme was not so much his confidence in success as his fear lest a withdrawal might injure our prestige in the Near East; and, secondly, his desire to make the best he could of an idea which he regarded as an order."The order was to carry out a certain operation," he said, "or to try to do it, and we had to do the best we could." If the ships got through, he, like many others, expected a revolution or other political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he saw that transports could not come up, and that the ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora for more than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run the gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral Duckworth did in 1807.

In his telegram accepting the command, however, he made no mention of these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing the minefields after silencing the forts.Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very first day after receiving his command (March 18th) he undertook the main attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favourable - no mist and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively.

The first blow was given by the four most powerful ships - Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson, and Agamemnon - which poured heavy shell at long range into the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, while the Triumph and Prince George bombarded Fort Dardanus on the Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it upon the Peninsula.This bombardment lasted from about 11 a.m. till 12.30 p.m., and all six ships found themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied positions upon both shores.

At about 12.30 the second squadron, consisting of the four French ships, came up into action, advancing beyond the former line in the direction of Kephez Point. Though suffering considerably (chiefly owing to their inability to manoeuvre in such narrow waters, thus presenting very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy's guns), the ten ships maintained the bombardment for about an hour (till nearly 1.30). The enemy's forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many of them, at all events, had been destroyed.

Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six British ships (Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Majestic, and Albion), were brought up, with the design of advancing first through the Narrows, so as to insure a clear passage for the greater ships which made the first attack.At the same time the four French ships, together with the Triumph and Prince George, were ordered to withdraw, so as to leave more room for the rest. During this manoeuvre, all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire again, their silence having been due, not to destruction, but to the absence of the gunners, driven away by the gases or terror of our shells.

Most of the ships suffered, and as the Bouvet moved down channel with her companion ships, she was struck by three big shells in quick succession. The blows were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting in her magazine, or to a torpedo fired from the Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty report said, to a mine drifting down the current.In two or three minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, carrying nearly the whole of her crew to the bottom. The cries of the men dragged down with her, or struggling in the water as they were swept downstream, sounded over the strait.At 2.30 the bombardment of all the forts was renewed, but they were not silenced. At 4 o'clock the Irresistible drew away with a heavy list. Apparently she also was struck by a mine adrift; but she remained afloat for nearly two hours; and nearly all her crew were saved by destroyers, which swarmed round her at great risk to themselves, since they offered a crowded target.A quarter of an hour after she sank, the Ocean was struck in a similar manner (6.50 p.m.) and sank with great rapidity. Most of her crew, however, were also saved by destroyers near at hand. Many of the other ships were struck by shells.

The Inflexible and Gaulois suffered especially, and only just crawled back to be beached, the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit Island. At sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved once more that, in an attack upon land forts, ships lie at a great disadvantage. In this case the disadvantage was much increased by the narrowness of the waters, which brought the ships within range of howitzer and other batteries hidden upon both shores, and also gave special opportunity for the use of mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored right across the channel in successive rows.

Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at once. Perhaps he thought that English people are given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship. Admiral de Robeck shared this view. I t was suspected at the Admiralty that the ammunition in the forts was running short, and, at a much later date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said: "If the English had only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles, they could have got to Constantinople; but their delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy was not to blame. The British military leaders decided in favour of a land attack.
ANSWER TO SONS OF ANZAC'S QUESTION

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. III, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923


jainso31
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...s_nevinson.htm

[sons of anzac]

Ah ha! Thankyou kind sir.

[jainso31]

THE LANDINGS AT HELLES &ANZAC

It was increasingly clear that ground support was required. A month's pause in operations was undertaken pending preparations for Allied landings at Helles and Anzac Cove.

Some 18,000 French colonial troops were despatched to the region on 10 March - prior to the attempt on The Narrows - and on 12 March Lord Kitchener appointed Ian Hamilton (a former protégé) as regional Commander-in-Chief responsible henceforth for the success of the expedition, accompanied by a force of 75,000 comprised largely of untested Australian and New Zealand troops.

Preparations for a Ground Offensive

Hamilton, unsure of the appropriate strategy, sought advice from de Robeck and agreed on 27 March to a straightforward invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula.Preparations for the Allied landings were not auspicious, and were distinguished by hesitation, indecision and confusion. Meanwhile Turkish defences were further boosted by the arrival of ground forces around the Straits. As a measure of the extent of German influence over Turkish policy regional command was placed in the hands of Liman von Sanders.Liman brought with him approximately 84,000 troops which he dispersed to strategic locations around Gallipoli. As it transpired however Liman's careful positioning of his men was found wanting once Hamilton actually launched his attack on the southern peninsula: Hamilton chose to attack where the Turkish concentration was as its weakest.

Landings at Helles and Anzac Cove, 25 April 1915

The landings were initiated on 25 April 1915 but were largely mismanaged. But for the relative weakness of Turkish strength on the southern peninsula the whole operation might well have been thrown back into the sea.As it was heavy casualties were incurred at those locations where Turkish defenders were available in any force. Even so two beachheads were established by Hamilton's force, at Helles on Gallipoli's southernmost tip (led by Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston), and further up the coast near Gaba Tepe - the latter soon to be renamed Anzac Cove in honour of the Australian and New Zealand corps who bore the brunt of operations in the area (led by the rather more competent Sir William Birdwood).

In the landing at Anzac Cove, the first wave went ashore from the boats of three Formidable-class battleships; HMS London, HMS Prince of Wales (1902) and Queen. The second wave went ashore from seven destroyers. In support were HMS Triumph, Majestic and the cruiser HMS Bacchante as well as the seaplane carrier HMS Ark Royal and the kite-balloon ship, HMS Manica from which a tethered balloon was trailed to provide artillery spotting.

The landing at Cape Helles was spread over five beaches with the main ones being V and W Beaches at the tip of the peninsula. While the landing at Anzac was planned as a surprise without a preliminary bombardment, the Helles landing was made after the beaches and forts were bombarded by the warships. The landing at S Beach inside the straits was made from the battleship Cornwallis and was virtually unopposed. The W Beach force came from the cruiser HMS Euryalus and the battleship HMS Implacable which also carried the troops bound for X Beach. The cruiser HMS Dublin and battleship Goliath supported the X Beach landing as well as a small landing to the north on the Aegean coast at Y Beach, later abandoned.


http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...s_nevinson.htm

jainso31

[jainso31]

The Dardanelles Commission was established by the British government in the wake of the failed Dardanelles and Gallipoli expeditions of 1915.

During the course of 1916 witnesses of both expeditions were duly interviewed although the commission's final report was not issued until 1919.

Inevitably the report concluded that the undertaking - chiefly spearheaded by then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and led by Sir Ian Hamilton - was ill-planned and poorly executed, with the difficulties of the operation consistently underplayed, a state of affairs exacerbated by government procrastination and delay (which led to criticism of the late Lord Kitchener).

In addition to noting the personality clashes between military command personnel the commission also highlighted the often critical shortage of artillery and shells.

Perhaps inevitably given the wide-ranging nature of the report, implicating political and military figures alike, the commission's conclusions were widely regarded as insipid, and such censures as were issued were not considered serious.

jainso31

[Sandy McAuslan]

Hi Jim,
Do you know if there had been any succesful sweeping of a defensive minefield at an earlier date? I have always been under the impression that sweeping in enemy waters was a very different proposition to sweeping an enemy offensive minefield in ones own waters. Also were the Turkish fields only made up of contact mines? My understanding was that at Gallipoli they were.
Can anyone comment on what would have been the status of a British civilian seaman who was sweeping mines, whose vessel was sunk and who made it ashore to be captured? Would he have been equivalent to a civilian who had taken up arms and therefore be liable to be shot? I must admit that before reading this thread I had been unaware that the British minesweepers were civilian manned.
One last thought, so far, the French were suggested to have participated through 'National Pride'. Is this a veiled suggestion that their national interests, economic and Imperial, would have been prejudiced by their not being a major player? The French were certainly interested in Lebanon and Syria and the Suez Canal was 50% theirs - witness the Suez fiasco of the 1950's and I seem to recall that a Ferdinand de Lesseps was a major Canal figure. That said do we know the extent, if any, to which they contributed to the 'planning' which went into the operation?
Cheers,
Sandy McAuslan,

[jainso31]

Sandy
MINESWEEPING

Little progress was made clearing the minefields. The minesweepers, commanded by Carden's chief of staff, Roger Keyes, were merely un-armoured trawlers manned by their civilian crews who were unwilling to work while under fire. The strong current in the straits further hampered the sweeping process. This lack of progress by the fleet strengthened the Ottoman resolve which had wavered at the start of the offensive. On 4 March, raids on the outer defences were resisted, leaving 23 British marines dead.

Queen Elizabeth was called on to engage the inner defences, at first from the Aegean coast near Gaba Tepe, firing across the peninsula, and later from within the straits. On the night of 13 March, the cruiser HMS Amethyst led six minesweepers in an attempt to clear the mines. Four of the trawlers were hit and Amethyst was badly damaged with 19 stokers killed from a single hit.

On 15 March, the admiralty informed Carden that they agreed to his plan for a further all out attack by daylight, with the minesweepers operating under the direct protection of the entire fleet. Carden was taken ill the same day, and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral John de Robeck. A gunnery officer noted in his diary that de Robeck had already expressed misgivings with the likelihood of being able to silence the Ottoman guns by bombardment, and that this view was widely held on board the shipIn his telegram- Roebuck accepting the command, however, he made no mention of these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing the minefields after silencing the forts.Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very first day after receiving his command (March 18th) he undertook the main attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favourable - no mist and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively Also see #16


OPERATIONAL PLANNING
I can find no evidence of French involvement in the initial planning for this operation.

jainso31

[Glowworm]

This week marks the anniversary of the loss of the submarine HMS E.14. In May 1915 E.14 had achieved fame for a patrol in the Marmara for which her commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander E C Boyle RN received the Victoria Cross.

After the formal end to the Dardanelles Campaign, a naval squadron was retained in the Aegean to keep the Goeben safely bottled up and to generally harass the Turks. The force consisted of two pre-dreadnought battleships and an Inshore Squadron of monitors and destroyers.

On 20 January 1918, while the battleships Agamemnon and Lord Nelson were absent, the Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim (formerly German battlecruiser SMS Goeben), the light cruiser Midilli (formerly German light cruiser SMS Breslau)sortied out through the Narrows. The monitor HMS Raglan and other members of the Detached Squadron of the Aegean Squadron were attacked and Raglan was sunk with the loss of 127 lives. The monitor M28 was also sunk in the same battle. However on their return Midilli and Yavuz Sultan Selim ran into a minefield; Midilli sank and Yavuz Sultan Selim was badly damaged.

Believing that Yavuz Sultan Selim was hiding in the Narrows- she had in fact gone aground, the British resolved to send a submarine in and sink her. Two submarines were available E.2 (Lt P S Bonham-Carter RN) and E.14 (Lt Dr G S White RN. E.14 was chosen because unlike E.2 she had two bow tubes and her crew was the more experienced.

On 27 January White sailed from Mudros but on arriving off Nagava, found that Yavuz Sultan Selim had been refloated and towed away. With nothing left to do, she reversed course to make her way out. On the way down the Narrows, she fired at a large merchantman. However eleven seconds after leaving the tube, the torpedo exploded prematurely causing significant shock damage in E.14. The lights went out and the fore hatch sprung causing flooding. The submarine was also blown to the surface, where she was engaged by Turkish shore batteries but, as the pressure hull was intact, White dived and continued his passage out.

But it was not to be. E.14 continued to take on water, the battery was giving off chlorine gas, the air was foul, so White decided to surface and get out as best he could. Off Kum Kale E.14 was hit by fire from shore batteries. With no hope of escape, White headed his submarine towards the shore to give his ships-company a chance of safety. Unfortunately, White was killed in the attempt, as were the majority of his crew. There were only seven survivors: Lt Cdr White was not among them.

On 24 May 1919 it was announced that Lt Cdr White was to be posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for his conduct, thus making E.14 the first "Double VC" boat.

In June 2012 E.14's wreck was discovered by Turkish divers. She is is largely buried in sand, only 7 m of the coral-encrusted bow with a shell hole, remaining visible. The photo shows her bow and port hydroplane.

[Glowworm]

Addition- the Turkish government are committed to preserving E.14's status as a protected war grave.

[patroclus]

Originally Posted by Sandy McAuslan

Hi Jim,
Can anyone comment on what would have been the status of a British civilian seaman who was sweeping mines, whose vessel was sunk and who made it ashore to be captured? Would he have been equivalent to a civilian who had taken up arms and therefore be liable to be shot? I must admit that before reading this thread I had been unaware that the British minesweepers were civilian manned.
Sandy McAuslan,

An interesting point. However, I do not think that the crews were civilians. Were they not RNR/RNVR under a T124 Agreement?

The operations of the Allied Navies at the Dardanelles is discussed here: http://www.worldnavalships.com/forum...?t=1964&page=4

[jainso31]

Of the eight lines of minefield drawn across the strait, five lay between Kephez Point and Chanak. Day and night our mine-sweeping trawlers were engaged upon them, and considerable praise must be given to the courage and endurance of their crews, who for the most part had been North Sea fishermen before the expedition.

Their service throughout, whether for mine-sweeping or transport, was of very high value. It almost justified the remark made to me by a skipper whom I had met before on the Dogger Bank: "If the Kaiser had knowed as we'd got trawlers, he would never have declared war!"

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...s_nevinson.htm

jainso31