‘Niitakayama Nobore’ -The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Attack on Hawaii. 7 December 1941

[battlestar]

G'Day All

This is an unedited version of an article I wrote that was Published in the Australian Navy League Magazine 'THE NAVY' in the Oct-Dec 2011 Issue.

(Note, I know there are threads on this forum written about the attack on Pearl Harbor, I hope you enjoy this as well.)

On this day (Hawaiian Time) People around the world pause to consider one of the defining events of the 20th Century.

Battlestar

‘NIITAKAYAMA NOBORE’

(‘Climb Mount Niitaka’)
The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Attack on
Oahu, Hawaii. 7 December 1941

By Ian Johnson

On 27 January 1941, as the diplomatic crisis between Japan and the United States of America continues to slowly worsen after Japan joined Germany and Italy in September 1940, information reaches the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, of possible plans by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) for a surprise attack of Hawaii and the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. Concerned, Ambassador Grew wires Washington the information, only to learn that most of the US Military Commanders dismissed in the information, believing if the Japanese were to attack any American target, it would be against Manila in the Philippine Islands. The warning went unheeded.

The diplomatic crisis came to a head when U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following Japanese expansion into French Indochina (Vietnam) after the fall of France, the Vichy Government allowing 40.000 Japanese troops into the country. Diplomatic exchanges between the USA and Japan continued right until the day of the attack, yet the Japanese Government had decided by the end of November that war was inevitable.

On 2 December 1941 (Tokyo Time), a coded message, the words ‘Niitakayama Nobore’ (“Climb Mount Niitaka”) was sent to all IJN units. Approaching the International Date Line from the west at that time were six Japanese aircraft carriers, AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU, along with over ten escorts and supply ships. Receiving this signal Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi, went to his cabin onboard his flagship, the aircraft carrier AKAGI, and opened a set of top secret documents, which told him, and those that opened the same order throughout the fleet, that on 8 December (the 7th on the Pearl Harbor side of the International Date Line) Japan would be going to war with the United States, Britain, and Holland. Mount Niitaka was, at the time, the tallest mountain under Japanese control, on the island of Formosa, now Taiwan.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941 (Hawaiian Time), just after midnight off the island of Oahu, Hawaii, five I class submarines, I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 of the Imperial Japanese Navy began Operation AI, a first strike against military targets of the United States of America on Oahu, with the primary objective the destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet located at Pearl Harbor. The five I class submarines, that had left Japan on 18 November, now launched one Ko-hyoteki class (Type A) midget submarine each 10 nautical miles (19 kilometres) from the only entrance to Pearl Harbor.

This was the beginning of the first battle between Japan and the United States on this day, which, President Franklin D. Roosevelt would, the next day in Washington DC, to proclaim December 7, 1941, "A Date Which Will Live In Infamy".

Operation AI was the largest of six attacks that would, within an 8-hour period on Monday, 8 December 1941, occur against British, and American targets in the Pacific and herald Japan’s entry into the Second World War. Only the attack on Hawaii took place on the other side of the International Date Line on Sunday 7 December. Viewed in Japanese Standard Time on December 8, Units of the Imperial Army of Japan began landing in Malaya at 0205hrs, the attack on Hawaii at 0318hrs, attacks on the Philippines began at 0700hrs, Guam at 0725hrs, while Wake Island and Hong Kong saw their first Japanese attacks begin at 0900hrs. For the IJN, there would be few failures on this day, but those that occurred, especially during Operation AI, would haunt the Japanese for the rest of the war.

One of the failures by the IJN was to confirm the locations of the two American aircraft carriers based in the Pacific, the USS LEXINGTON (CV-2) and USS ENTERPRISE (CV-6). At midnight on 7 December, both carriers were returning to Hawaii after sailing to American outposts with much needed war supplies, the LEXINGTON from Midway Island, the ENTERPRISE returning from Wake Island.

At 0200 hours, over two hundred and fifty miles north of Oahu, the AKAGI and the five other aircraft carriers had begun to prepare for the attack. This carrier strike force, known as the Kido Butai, had departed northern Japan on 26 November after more than a year’s planning and training for Operation AI. Their crews got over four hundred aircraft ready onboard the six carriers, ready to launch them south.

The five midget submarines were making their way towards the harbor when at 0342hrs, a minesweeper, USS CONDOR (AMc-14), operating with another minesweeper USS CROSSBILL (AMc-9) near the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy, saw a submarine periscope poking out of the water. A contact report was sent at 0357 hrs and received by the destroyer USS WARD (DD-139), who’s crew went to battle stations to began hunting for a possible submarine. Thirty-eight minutes later WARD stood down from the search after nothing was found. At 0458hrs the anti-submarine boom gate was opened to permit the two minesweepers to enter the harbour, but for unknown reasons the boom gate was left opened for the next three hours, which allowed the midget submarines easy access into Pearl Harbor.

At 0600hrs, ENTERPRISE, now just 200 miles south west of Oahu, launches eighteen aircraft on a scouting mission to clear the way for the “Big E” before they were to land at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor a couple of hours later ahead of ENTERPRISE’S arrival later that day.

Two hundred and twenty miles north of Oahu at 0605hrs, the Kido Butai began to launch the 1st strike wave of 183 aircraft. Commanded by Captain Fuchida Mitsuo, the first strike wave was divided into three groups. The first group consisted of Ninety aircraft, forty Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with torpedoes, along with fifty Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armour piercing bombs. This group was the main strike against the naval base, with any capital ships located there their target. The second group of fifty four Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs were to attack the airfields at Wheeler Field and Ford Island, while the third group of forty five Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters were assigned to strafe aircraft on the ground at Wheeler Field and Ford Island, as well as the airfields at Kaneohe, Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Barber’s Point, as well as providing air cover for the 1st strike wave.

Commander Genda Minoru, who’s planning of the attack on Hawaii led to this moment, watched as Nakajima B5N Kate bombers took off from AKAGI loaded with specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes with and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water. This was a lesson learned from the Royal Navy’s successful carrier raid on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, which, like Pearl Harbor, was a shallow harbour.

At 0630hrs, while waiting for a Harbour Pilot, crew from the General Stores Ship USS ANTARES (AKS-3) spotted a submarine conning tower behind the ship. This was reported to the WARD, which saw and engaged the Ko-hyoteki class midget submarine with its four-inch gun, before finishing it off with a depth charge attack at 0653hrs. This was the first IJN vessel sunk by the USN in World War II.

Commander Fuchida flying in a Nakajima B5N Kate bomber leading the 1st strike wave directs his pilots to home in on local Hawaiian radio station on Oahu. As the Japanese aircraft continue towards Oahu, they begin to appear on the screen of the U.S. Army’s Opana Radar Station, at Opana Point near Oahu’s north coast. The outpost’s SCR-270 radar detected a flight of unidentified aircraft bearing 132 miles north of Oahu and closing at 0702hrs by operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard. After a few minutes confirming the contact, Private Elliott phones the Intercept Center to report a large formation of aircraft approaching Hawaii from the north. Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, in charged of the lightly manned Intercept Center this Sunday morning, presumed the contact was six B-17 bombers that were scheduled to arrive from the mainland on this day. Lieutenant Tyler told them "Well don't worry about it."

Onboard WARD, they had detected another submerged target, the destroyer began a depth charge attack. Just over three minutes later oil was spotted 300 yards astern where the depth charges were deployed. By 0707hrs WARD lays claim to sinking two of the five midget submarines launched seven hours earlier.

Two hundred miles north of Oahu the launch the 2nd strike wave by the Kido Butai had begun at 0715hrs. Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu, 168 aircraft headed towards Oahu, and like the 1st strike wave, divided into three groups. The first group of fifty four Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs, were to attack the airfields at Kaneohe, Ford Island, Hickam, and Barbers Point. The second group of eighty one Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs were to follow up the attack on the naval base and any undamaged capital ships left after the first attack. The third group of thirty six Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters were to provide air cover for the 2nd strike wave, as well as attack Barber’s Point, Ford Island, Hickam, Wheeler, Ewa and Kaneohe.

A reconnaissance seaplane launched at 0500hrs from the heavy cruiser CHIKUMA, hidden in clouds as it flies over Oahu at 5000 feet, reports to AKAGI that the main American fleet is in Pearl Harbor at 0735hrs and that the Lahaina anchorage was empty, but also informed AKAGI that the American aircraft carriers are not there.

By 0740hrs the pilots of the 1st strike wave can now see the North Shore of Oahu, at the same time Opana Radar Station loses the incoming aircraft on radar 20 miles off coast of Oahu due to interference caused by surrounding hills. No warnings were issued, no phone calls made. The Japanese aircraft begin to deploy for attack. Commander Fuchida orders the attack on military bases on Oahu at 0749hrs.

As Commander Fuchida’s aircraft head for their targets, they notice that there are no enemy aircraft in the sky, even as they fly over Oahu they had not been intercepted by American fighters, nor lashed with anti-aircraft fire from the ground. Fuchida realises that they had caught the Americans unprepared. At 0753hrs Fuchida sends the code phrase to AKAGI and VADM Nagumo that they have achieved maximum strategic surprise, the phrase, "TORA TORA TORA" (Tiger, Tiger, Tiger)

Throughout Oahu, as the Japanese flew overhead, nearly everyone on the island was waking up to a Sunday morning. At the Pearl Harbour Naval Base and other military installations, they were at weekend staffing levels, most of the battleships moored had only a quarter of their crews aboard, most were in downtown Honolulu enjoying liberty. All military installations were preparing for morning colours at 0800hrs, the raising of the National Ensign to begin a new day, when the sound of aircraft began to grow louder. Then, on ships and at airfields around Oahu, sailors, solders, and airmen began to see aircraft begin their attack. It was 0753hrs.

At 0753 hrs eight A6M Zero fighters from SORYU and twenty seven D3A Val dive bombers from ZUIKAKU began to bomb Wheeler Army Airfield was lined with rows of P-40 Warhawks and P-36 fighter aircraft, none of which were in bunkers, but standing wing tip to wing tip to prevent sabotage. This made them perfect targets for the Val dive bombers and Zero fighters. The Val dive bombers struck first, destroying hangers workshops, supply dumps and other facilities, then, when the dive bombers were done, the Zero fighters flew in and conducted three strafing runs against the parked American fighters, setting them on fire. The Japanese pilots watched as the Americans on the ground tried to push aircraft out of the way of those that were now burning, but that just made them targets for the continually strafing fighters. Also strafed was the Scholfield Army Barracks, located next to Wheeler. With Wheeler Field in flames, SORYU’S Zero fighters then headed south west.

At approximately 0755hrs at least fourteen A6M Zero fighters from AKAGI, KAGA and HIRYU begin to strafe the planes on Marine Corps Air Station Ewa Field, while overhead other Japanese planes are seen flying over Ewa Field on their way to Pearl Harbor. Joined later by SORYU’S eight Zero fighters, they strafed the Air Station and any aircraft visible. At the same time Kaneohe Naval Air Station came under attack by eleven A6M Zero fighters from ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU, strafing the thirty three PBY Catilinas that were moored there for ten minutes before withdrawing.

For the first few minutes of the attack, as chaos reigned on the ground, pilots and their bombardiers had an easy path to the moored fleet, no anti-aircraft fire nor enemy fighters block their attack runs, but that moment quickly past as the sailors onboard every ship in the harbour cracked open weapons and ammunition lockers and began to fire back at the Japanese attack.

Seventeen D3A Val dive bombers from SHOKAKU began to bomb Hickam Army Air Field and Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor on Ford Island, in the middle of Pearl Harbor. Their targets are the aircraft parked on the aircraft apron.

At 0755hrs The first torpedo attack begins, Ninety Nakajima B5N Kate bombers from AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, and HIRYU, armed with torpedos, along with nine D3A Val dive bombers from SHOKAKU attack the battleships moored at Battleship Row. Over the next two hours the prime targets of the attack, the battleships USS TENNESSEE (BB-43), USS WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48), USS NEVADA (BB-36), USS OKLAHOMA (BB-37), USS ARIZONA (BB-39), USS CALIFORNIA (BB-44), USS MARYLAND (BB-46), with USS PENNSYLVANIA (BB-38) in Dry Dock No.1, along with the rest of the fleet, would be subjected to the most violent attack America had seen since the Civil War. Yet it would be with the first twenty minutes of the attack that the most damage was done.

0757 hrs. Twenty six B5N Kate bombers from AKAGI and KAGA start their torpedo runs. Coming from the south east, they target the battleships along Battleship Row. OKLAHOMA was the first to be hit, with one of nine torpedos that would hit her during the attack. Moments later, the CALIFORNIA receives the first of two torpedo hits portside, her crew began counter flooding to keep the ship level and afloat. Yet as this was happening the crew of the NEVADA still managed to raise the flag at 0800hrs. A second torpedo hits CALIFORNIA. WEST VIRGINIA took nine torpedo hits, including two from one of the two remaining Ko-hyoteki class midget submarine that managed to enter the harbour, before she sinking. OKLAHOMA suffers from multiple hits, and the battleship began to heel 45 degrees to port, finally capsizing at 0810hrs. NEVADA was hit by a torpedo in the port bow, and with burning oil now floating towards her, NEVADA got underway at 0830hrs.

At 0800 two groups of American aircraft flew into Oahu airspace not knowing of the ongoing attack. The B-17’s Lt Tyler had been expecting from the mainland were arriving at Hickam Field, while eighteen aircraft from ENTERPRISE were arriving from the southwest to Ford Island. Both groups were fired on by both sides, with several aircraft shot down as some make their way to other airfields.

Then the nine D3A Val dive bombers from SHOKAKU began their bombing runs against Battleship Row. ARIZONA was hit by a bomb on her No.4 Turret at 0805hrs, as was the Repair ship USS VESTAL (AR-4) moored outboard ARIZONA. At 0806hrs another bomb struck ARIZONA, hitting the forward magazine. ARIZONA detonated, wrecking the ship and sinking her. Then, as SHOKAKU’S Vals, along with AKAGI and KAGA’S Zero’s withdraw from Battleship Row, they attack Ewa Field before heading north.

At 0817 the destroyer USS HELM (DD-388), which had just made it out of the harbour, spots a Ko-hyoteki class submarine attempting to escape. The midget submarine had, since being released by her mother submarine, tried to enter the harbour only to run aground on the sea floor near the entrance. After freeing itself, the midget submarine, hearing the attacks by the WARD against the two other midget submarines, attempted to escape via the east side of Oahu, but had ran aground on a reef in Waimanalo Bay, the midget submarine had just freed itself when the HELM attacks, forcing the midget submarine back on the reef. Both crewman got out but only one, Ensign Sakamaki Kazuo, making it to shore and was promptly captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war in the USA.

Over Bellows Field, a lone Zero from SHOKAKU strafes the buildings and tents at 0830hrs. Five minutes earlier, one of the B-17’s crash lands on the runway.

At 0839hrs a second Ko-hyoteki class submarine was spotted by the seaplane tender USS CURTISS (AV-4). After signalling the threat to the underway destroyer USS MONAGHAN (DD-354), CURTISS opened fire with her 5 inch gun, hitting the midget submarine in the conning tower. The midget submarine fired her torpedos at the CURTISS, missing the seaplane tender before MONAGHAN conducted a depth charge attack and sank the midget submarine four minutes later.

While aircraft from the first wave began the journey back to the Kido Butai, 0855hrs saw the 2nd strike wave led Lieutenant-Commander Shimazaki Shigekazu begin their attack. By now, American defences, those not already destroyed, were now ready to respond with anti aircraft fire. Kaneohe Naval Air Station had eight Zero’s from HIRYU strafe the base before heading for Bellows Field, followed immediately after by eighteen Kate dive bombers from SHOKAKU bomb the base, destroying Hanger 1. Ten minutes later Fighters from SORYU who were providing air cover, then proceed to attack, but one was shot down by ground fire, and another damaged but it maked it back to its carrier. Out of thirty seven aircraft, nearly all PBY Catilinas, thirty three were destroyed, and the base is over eighty percent destroyed. Eighteen servicemen were killed.

0900hrs. Eight Zero’s from HIRYU arrive at Bellows Field, where two P-40 Warhawks were beginning to launch. Both Warhawks were quickly shot down, and the Zero’s begin strafing the airfield and causing damage to buildings and damaging several aircraft.

0902 hrs the second wave arrives at Battleship Row, with thirty four Val dive bombers from SORYU and HIRYU beginning their attacks. Their escorts, nine fighters from KAGA, strafe Hickam Field, then Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, before heading north to Wheeler Field. Nine Kate dive bombers from SHOKAKU also attack Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor with 550lb bombs. Eighteen Val’s from AKAGI attack, going after the oiler USS NEOSHO (AO-23), a floating dry dock and MARYLAND, as well as several building on Ford Island.

Twenty six Val’s from Kaga were the last to attack, hitting WEST VIRGINIA and MARYLAND, before diverting the strike to target the underway NEVADA. The Val’s hit NEVADA with at least five bombs. Onboard NEVADA, her senior officer aboard, Lieutenant Commander Francis Thomas, realising that if the NEVADA sinks in the harbour entrance, it could block off the base to the ocean, orders the battleship be beached, which it did at Hospital Point at 0920hrs.

0910hrs, Marine Corps Air Station Ewa Field is attacked again, this time by Val dive bombers from HIRYU and AKAGI. While the Val’s strafe the base, four of their number were shot down by two P-40 Warhawks that survived the first wave of attacks on Wheeler Field. The damage at Ewa was thirty Two Aircraft destroyed and fifteen damaged, along with five dead and thirteen wounded.

0915hrs, Wheeler Field Army Air Base, Seven Zero’s from KAGA strafe Wheeler and Schofield Barracks on their return leg. Fifteen minutes later sixteen of KAGA’S Val’s also strafe the base, but two are shot down by the same two P-40 Warhawks that had just returned from Ewa and had refuelled before launching again. Out of the one hundred and forty two aircraft at Wheeler Field, forty two were destroyed and fifty six badly damaged.

0935hrs. After being missed in the attack, the light cruiser USS ST LOUIS (CL-49) got underway in the harbour, and when she made the harbour entrance at 1000hrs the cruiser was at 22 knots when two torpedos were spotted astern, fired by the last surviving Ko-hyoteki class submarine, which briefly surfaced and was fired on before escaping.

The first Japanese aircraft began to return to their carriers at 1000hrs, as did damage assessment reports. By 1100hrs the attack on Oahu is over. A solitary Japanese aircraft remains circling over the smoking ruins of Battleship Row. Commander Fuchida assesses the damage his aircraft caused before flying north to rejoin the Kido Butai. The American death toll would come to 2,331 military personnel, 2107 Navy and Marines, 233 Army, with 48 Civilians killed, mostly by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas. 1109 were wounded during the attack, 710 from the Navy and Marines, 364 Army, and 35 Civilians.

The United States Navy battleship losses were major. The OKLAHOMA took nine torpedo hits and capsized. Only 32 of her crew survived. CALIFORNIA was struck by two torpedoes and hit by a bomb, but despite damage control efforts she sank three days later. Like OKLAHOMA, WEST VIRGINIA suffered nine torpedo hits, but was sunk by the end of the attack. TENNESSEE was struck by two bombs and was damaged by oil fires from ARIZONA, but it remained afloat. MARYLAND took two bomb hits and had light to moderate damage. PENNSYLVANIA suffered moderate to heavy damage in Drydock 1. Although beached by the end of the attack NEVADA is repaired and modernised, and rejoins the fleet by the end of 1942. ARIZONA is a total loss. The hit on her forward magazine and the massive explosion that followed broke the ship’s back and she quickly sank, taking over 1,100 of her crew with her.

The USN also lost USS UTAH (AG-16) and USS OGLALA (CM-4), while the light cruiser USS HELENA (CL-50) and USS RALEIGH (CL-7) were both hit by a torpedo. VESTAL, moored alongside ARIZONA, was heavily damaged. The seaplane tender CURTISS was also damaged, while the destroyers USS CASSIN (DD-372), and USS DOWNES (DD-375) were destroyed while in Drydock 1, while in floating drydock YFD 2, USS SHAW (DD-373) took heavy damage when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.

169 American aircraft were destroyed. Ninety eight USN aircraft, thirty two from Marine Corps Air Station Ewa Field, twenty six from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, thirty four from Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and six aircraft from ENTERPRISE. The US Army Air Corps lost seventy seven aircraft, including twenty from Hickam Army Air Field, forty two from Wheeler Army Airfield, and four from Bellows Army Air Field. 150 aircraft were damaged, 128 Army Air Corps, 31 Navy.

Just after noon, several surviving American aircraft fly north in search for the enemy fleet, but after two hours come up empty. On Hawaii the panic has set in. Hawaiian Governor Poindexter announces a state of emergency the over radio, while the Army orders local radio stations off the air. Meanwhile, the local population, already rattled by the attack, begin reporting sightings of enemy troops landing on Oahu, all of which turn out to be false. Honolulu police arrived at the Japanese embassy to find the staff burning documents. Governor Poindexter, after talking advice from the military and President Roosevelt regarding martial law, signs the martial law proclamation at 1625hrs and is put into effect.

Just after 1300hrs Commander Fuchida lands on board AKAGI, where he quickly joins a major discussion between several Japanese junior officers, including Commander Genda, and VADM Nagumo and his staff, on the possibility of launching a third, and even if time allowed, a fourth strike, against Oahu in general and the actual naval base in particular. Both Genda and Fuchida wanted the third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's infrastructure as possible. But has time dragged on, Nagumo had other concerns. The refuelling oilers were already heading north, and, even with Fuchida damage assessment Nagumo was still worried about a possible counter strike against the fleet. Another concern was not knowing where the American carriers were, he was sure they knew from the attack where the Kido Butai now was, were they rushing to attack?

As the discussion on board AKAGI continued, others were not waiting. Onboard the SORYU and HIRYU, which formed the 2nd Carrier Division under Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, were preparing the returning aircraft for a third strike when, as the last aircraft had returned, at 1630hrs signal flags were sighted on carrier AKAGI, Nagumo had made up his mind, the risks were too great, and it would be dark soon. He ordered the fleet to withdraw. RADM Yamaguchi was shocked, but obeyed the order, the Kido Butai turned north to begin the voyage back to Japan.

At 0041hrs on 8 December, just over twenty for hours after the beginning of Operation AI, the Imperial Japanese Navy received a signal from the surviving Ko-hyoteki class submarine. The message stated that the midget submarine might have caused damage to one or more large warships inside Pearl Harbor after its attack. But after this signal, the Ko-hyoteki class submarine was never heard from again.

Operation AI was over, Japanese losses were light, with 55 Japanese airmen and 9 submariners killed, with one submariner captured. Twenty nine aircraft were lost in the attack, nine in the first attack wave, twenty in the second, with another seventy four damaged by antiaircraft fire while all five Ko-hyoteki class (Type A) midget submarines were lost.

The inability by Commanders Genda and Fuchida to convince VADM Nagumo to continue to attack Oahu had far reaching effects. Although the battleships, other vessels, and the airfields were badly damaged, nearly all of Pearl Harbor's infrastructure remained intact. The biggest failure of the day was that these facilities such as repair shops and supply depots were undamaged, allowing the USN and the Army to recover on Oahu far quicker than anyone thought.

But it was the failure by the Kido Butai to destroy three particular American targets, two listed on the attack order, the third was not, that would at first hurt, then ultimately defeat Japan. The first was not attacking the huge Fuel Farm on Ford Island at Pearl Harbour. The Fuel Farm was intact after both strikes, and with it intact, the Americans could continue to operate from Oahu, using that fuel to launch strikes against Japanese targets far quicker than planned.

The second failure was in not locating the aircraft carriers LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. If a third strike had taken place, there was a chance that ENTERPRISE, which was now heading for Oahu in response to the attack, would have been spotted either by Japanese submarines or aircraft, which VADM Nagumo would have then attacked, and with the airpower of the Kido Butai’s six carriers, would have sunk the ENTERPRISE and her escorts. By this time, LEXINGTON, coming in fast from Midway, might have been spotted as well and sunk. If this had happened, the only US carrier left in the Pacific would have been USS SARATOGA (CV-3), which was approaching the west coast at the time of the attack. With only one carrier left, it would have been used in a defensive role off the US west coast and Panama Canal. Even with the loss of one carrier on the day, it would have put US war plans back at least a year, allowing the Japanese to fortify their positions and build more carriers, making the Pacific campaign longer and harder. In reality LEXINGTON was lost at the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942. SARATOGA survived the war only to be sunk during the Atomic Tests at Bikini. ENTERPRISE became the Japanese ‘bogyman’. Apart from Coral Sea, the Big ‘E’ would fight in every major naval battle in the Pacific, sinking several Japanese carriers and hundreds of other ships and aircraft before being damaged by a kamikaze attack off Japan in May 1945, five months before the end of the war. ENTERPRISE was by then, the most decorated ship in the USN with twenty Battle Stars.

The Japanese did not see the third failure, and this was due to Japanese strategic thinking. The Japanese Navy, from the top downwards, believed in the World War One thinking that battleships, not aircraft carriers or submarines, would fight the ultimate battle in the Pacific. The Japanese use of submarines was mostly in a support role, ie: reconnaissance, supply, transport. The failure to attack any part of the USN’s submarine force, wether it was the submarines themselves or the submarine base, with repair shops, weapons stores and the headquarters of the USN’s submarines, would ultimately lead to the destruction of Japan’s supply lines, and bring the Japanese economy to its knees. The use of the USN’s submarine force as an offensive force brought transportation of oil and raw materials to a mere trickle, with most the USN’s submarine operations directed from Submarine Headquarters at Pearl Harbor. But the Submarine Headquarters had one other group based there who’s work would lead to some of the USN’s greatest victories. In the basement of Submarine Headquarters was the cryptanalytic unit under Commander Joe Rochford, who’s breaking of the Japanese naval codes led to the USN’s Midway victory and much of the Submarine Force's success.

Even one of these failures was costly. All three gave the USA breathing space and a chance to plan for the war ahead. In the words of Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, later in the war, if they had destroyed the naval bases infrastructure, "serious operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year" and in his opinion "it would have prolonged the war another two years."

It also changed USN tactics. Without its battleships, and seeing what carrier based attack aircraft could do to such ships, the aircraft carrier, by default, became the first line of offence, within three years the battleships would become escorts to the new queens of the sea, the aircraft carrier. It was a lesson that the originators of the attack on Oahu, the Imperial Japanese Navy, never seemed to fully grasp.

In a quote from later in the war, the commander of Carrier Division 5 (ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU), Rear Admiral Tadaichi Hara, summed up Japanese opinion about Operation AI. "We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war." Events were to prove him correct.

Remembering Peral Harbor, Lest We Forget.

[jainso31]

I have read your article assiduously; and I have to say battlestar, it is without doubt an excellent viewpoint on the Day of Infamy-it certainly is a well researched piece, which I enjoyed reading; and I commend you for the effort that you have put into it.
My sincere thanks for sharing your work with us.

[Richtea]

May I also echo Jim's sentiment's
BZ
Regards
Richard

[Teuchter]

Me too!!

[KizmeRD]

Thanks Battlestar - very much enjoyed reading your article.
mb

[Don Boyer]

Outstanding summary and analysis...well done and a very worthy addition to the forum's growing "file" on the Pearl Harbor attack, it's prequel and its aftermath.

Because of the nature of the attack, and the violence without warning, the event caused enormous "panic" in the US both within the government and in the media. The death toll, not admitted to until much later, was also a shock to the United States, as was the sudden realization that the Japanese were not the cartoon characters portrayed on the editorial pages of American newspapers. but tough, well-trained and (for the time) well equipped fighters with an agenda that didn't include playing fair.

Yet, just a year later, a hard look at the facts showed only three war vessels of any value permanently lost, Pearl Harbor was the mightiest base in the Pacific, the Japanese carrier force that attacked Pearl shattered to ineffectiveness within six months, and Japan's Army and Navy not up to modern standards of warfare on any level other than hand to hand combat, although still dangerous and certainly willing to fight.

The shock of Pearl Harbor, despite the death and destruction, delivered the needed message to America at large that a policy of appeasement and "America First" in the face of genocidal dictatorships and imperialist expansionists was not going to cut it.

Thanks, Ian, for such a succinct posting of how we got into that mess...very appreciated.

[BlackBat242]

The only problem being that your account fails to mention the second midget sub that grounded outside the harbor and was later found with both torpedoes still inside... a fact which makes impossible the later "one fired two torpedoes at West Virginia & Oklahoma, one fired both torpedoes at Curtis and one fired torpedoes at St. Louis".

There were 5 subs, 3 were found with both torpedoes still inside, which leaves only 2 possible attacks, not the 3 your report lists.

name - sunk by - location - notes

I-16tou: unknown - unknown - fired at St. Louis, remains found 2009, this has to be the sub that radioed the evening of Dec. 7.
This is the only possible candidate for the alleged attack on West Virginia.

I-22tou: Monaghan (DD-354) - inside PH - fired torpedoes at Curtis but missed. One torpedo ran aground on Ford Island and the other hit a pier off Pearl City. Monaghan rammed and then depth-charged the sub. The wreck was recovered shortly after the attack and later in the war was used as fill during an expansion of the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base. The hulk was dug up in the 1960's but reburied almost immediately.

I-20tou: Ward (DD-139) - three to four miles off Pearl Harbor in about 1,200 feet of water - found 28 August 2002 with both torpedoes inside.

I-18tou: mechanical failure/depth charged - inside the Keehi Lagoon next to (but not in) Pearl Harbor - found 13 June 1960 with both torpedoes inside.

I-24tou (#19): captured - aground outside - both torpedoes inside.


Since the crew of St. Louis saw at least one torpedo explosion against the coral of the channel as she left Pearl Harbor some 25 minutes after the last IJN aircraft left, then this has more credibility than the theory that this was not a torpedo explosion and that that sub torpedoed WV (and possibly Oklahoma)... a theory which is based almost entirely on a smudge on a blurry photo which has been interpreted as a midget sub in a place that the documents found in the captured I-24tou (#19) specifically said they were to avoid until at least 2 hours after the time the photo was taken.

There is no possibility that the same sub could have done both, since one of the main "evidences" of the theory you put in your report as fact is that two torpedo tracks appear to lead back to that smudge... this would leave no torpedoes to cause the torpedo tracks and explosion witnessed by a considerable number of sailors aboard St. Louis.