Rennell Island: Guadalcanal Endgame

[jainso31]

The Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal and the Battle of Rennell Island began in Tokyo on 26th December 1942,when the Imperial GHQ agreed on the withdrawal of all troops on Guadalcanal.In addition to the troop withdrawal by destroyer transport in phases;all available aircraft were to establish an air superiority camaign on 28th Jan.1943.
In response to intelligence reports and to protect the withdrawal of the 2nd Marine Division,Adm Halsey,deployed the full array of
US naval power in the South Pacific.Near sunset on 29th Jan.,a carrier group built around Enterprise headed for a rendezvous with the Saratoga group.
TF 67 of 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers made for an intersection with Adm Lee's TF64 of 3 battleships and 4destroyers.in front of these units sailed two other groups.TF62.8 consisted of of 4 transports and 4 destroyers. R/Adm. R C Giffen (ex Operation Torch) commanded TF18 of 6 cruisers,destroyers and jeep" carriers.To meet a 2100 rendevous with the newly formed Cactus Striking Force of 4 destroyers under command of Capt, R Briscoe,Giffen detached the jeep carriers and upped his speed to 24kts.This showed Giffen's inexperience in Pacific waters by depending on his own AA batteries.
Giffen's formation was designed for submarine defence but was very weak in AA defence.By 19.20, the Wichita radar plot was jammed with incoming enemy aircraft and 16 a/c commenced their attack.Giffen remained hell-bent on meeting the rendezvous and altered neither course nor speed and even ceased zig zagging.This made it easy for the attacking japanese a/c,which laid rows of white flares along each side of TF18 and dropped clusters of red and green float lights to communicate speed and force composition.The first Japanese strike failed to cause damage but the second put two torpedoes into Chicago, seriously damaging it -Wichita was hit by a dud.
Louisville took Chicago in tow and was later relieved by tug Navajo.
The rest of the TF18 hauled off off to the east,stripping Chicago of any AA support including Wichita.As a result only 4 Wildcat fighters remained to guard Chicago.in the melee of trying to protect Chicago they were lost to her for a short time. In that time two more torpedoes were put into her and she sank.
The Japanese CAP did prevent US ships from approaching the japanese evacuation area and 10-12000 japanese troops were success fully evacuated although 2 Jap DDs were sunk and several damaged.
This is part of the report made by Lt.Cdr P H Jacobsen USN Rtd
Comments are invited as to entire outcome of this engagment.


jainso31i,

[Don Boyer]

Ike Giffen's handling of this short battle was considered inept, to use the kindest term applied to this action. He was operating with an Atlantic mind-set in the Pacific and paid the price. As usual, this kind of battle thinking was rewarded in the navy by lack of promotion to the highest sea and shore command levels, which speaks for itself as to the results of the battle. Chicago need not have been lost at all.

[jainso31]

Many thanks for your crisp starter to this last battle of Guadalcanal.You echo my thoughts- when I read this report by a USN officer, who was obviously sceptical of R/Adm Giffen's rather "astonishing"tactics.I agree the Chicago's loss was a "poor show"all round.
What about the unhindered evacuation of the Japanese Garrison-I expected carnage with the array of ships that Halsey had put together. ??

jainso31

[jainso31]

Further to the above-the attack on Chicago delayed the first run of the OPERATION KE destroyer transport evacuation force until the 1st of Feb.
However, it kept TF18 and the Cactus Striking Force from their intended sweep up the Slot and left them trying to stop the first run of KE evacuations.
2nd-4th Feb.saw 15 Betty's covering the sea around Guadalcanal.Weather and excessive range frustrated Japanese attempts to attack the strong naval detachments,including carriers,in the area;but the Japanese 11th Air fleet kept the US ships from interfering with the destroyer evacuation programme.
As previously stated up to 12000 Japanese soldiers disappeared off the island unnoticed.
Quoted Jacobsen addendum.
How did this event leave the balance of naval power in the pacific.??

jainso31

[jainso31]

The close of the Guadalcanal Campaign marked the turning point in the Pacific War.From that point forward there was no question that the initiative rested with the US.After six months of bitter fighting,Japan's last offensive in the Pacific had ended,finally,in defeat.
The cost of the campaign was staggering .For 2500 sq miles of jungle,tall grass and sluggish streams- the Allies had paid the cost of-2 Fleet Carriers,8 cruisers,14 destroyers and numerous smaller craft and aircraft.Over 6000 lives were lost -1600 USMC and soldiers,the rest-there is still no exact figures; are USN officers and men.
In their efforts to hold the island,Japan lost 2 battleships,1 carrier,4cruisers,12 destroyers and more than 23000 officers and men.
America could replace their losses,as horrifying as they were.
Japan,simply,could not.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Extracted from an Official Report on the Loss of USS Chicago

Cruisers of 10,000 tons and larger standard displacement ,
including CA' s and CL' s , a r e of such s i z e and design that a single
torpedo hit should never result in their sinking. Up to the time of
preparation of this report , ten have suffered single torpedo hit s and
all have survived. Their chances of surviving two hits are good, provided.the hits are reasonably spaced and provided liquid ballast ing is followed.
To da t e four c ruisers of this s ize have been hit by two tor -
pedoes, of which MINNEAPOLIS (CA36)* survived and CHICAGO probably would have . The loss of QUINCY (CA39)** wa s due to the combined effects of the two torpedoe s plus at l e a s t 36 known proj e c t i l e
hits . NORTHAMPTON (CA26)*** remained a float over three hours after damage , and might have been saved if circumstances had permitted early limitation of progressive flooding.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Given what has been said in this thread.How was the balance of US seapower in the Pacific after this seeming debacle ie.the needless sinking of the USS Chicago
Better,worse or the same???

jainso

[Don Boyer]

Fortunately, by the time this battle took place, the unnecessary loss of a heavy cruiser did not really swing the pendulum much in regard to ship superiority at sea. For one thing, the USN had about gotten the picture that using heavy cruisers in these waters wasn't exactly a good thing and was pouring in the new Cleveland class light cruisers as fast as they got to the combat zone (the first eight all served in the Guadalcanal campaign or its follow-up operations up the Solomons chain). The heavies were being relegated, if you could call it that, to the fast carrier escort role which was about to expand enormously with the influx of Essex and Independence class carriers just then starting. By this time, by a narrow margin that was expanding daily, the USN had better ships and more of them available. The Japanese, having recognized Guadalcanal as a lost cause (finally) was not committing any warship larger than a destroyer to the area, so the US had the edge.

Given all this, the lack of detection of the Japanese evacuation plan seems a bit out of place. I think maybe there was a bit of the old "We've got it in the bag" syndrome and a bit of slacking off after months of terrifying close-in combat on the part of the American command and they just did not pursue active intelligence or commit ships and aircraft to scouting for trouble when maybe they should have. Thus the Japanese were able to pull off another of their reverse banzai charges relatively unhindered.

[jainso31]

Thanks Don for another of your erudite appraisals of a situation, that at the time caused more than just a "stir"in the USN heirarchy ; and here I quote from an internet source :-

"Numerous errors of judgment contributed to the loss of Chicago. Admiral Giffen had been so obsessed with keeping his rendezvous that he left his escort carriers behind. He had also been so concerned with the threat from Japanese submarines that his ships steamed in poor formation for defense from an air attack. American fighters lacked any coordinated fighter direction and thus could not mount an effective defense when Chicago was threatened. One historian labeled the mismanaged affair tactical ineptitude of the first order.

Giffen's superiors, especially Halsey and Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, were irate over the loss of Chicago. Halsey, who had been frantically trying to assemble sufficient forces near Guadalcanal to blunt the Japanese offensive, described the loss of Chicago as a blow at any time, and just now we felt it with special severity. Halsey had succeeded in stopping the enemy, but he knew that he needed every ship, every Marine, every aircraft to maintain momentum. The loss of a cruiser, especially when occasioned by command mistakes, made his task more difficult.

Nimitz had already been angered, even embarrassed, by earlier American naval losses in the Solomons. The Battle of Rennell Island did not help matters. At first, he intended to include a harsh condemnation of Giffen in his official report, but he eventually watered down his remarks, stating that the loss of Chicago was especially regrettable because it might have been prevented. However, Nimitz ordered that word of the cruiser's sinking be withheld from the public. He also vowed in a staff meeting, If any man lets out the loss of the Chicago, I'll shoot him!"

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Quite true, Halsey would not have been overjoyed at the loss of a cruiser still needed for possible battle. However, the situation in February of '43 was not the situation of August '42, and the loss of Chicago, regrettable and unnecessary, was not the blow it would have been earlier.

As to Nimitz, the nice thing about being a four-star Admiral in command is that you can issue official reports that are mild in their condemnation, but on the other hand the rank gives one enormous latitude for rewarding such conduct behind the scenes, particularly from one who had headed the Bureau of Navigation, responsible for all naval personnel issues. Giffen's climb up the career ladder stopped the day the Chicago went down, regardless of any official paperwork floating about. Nimitz, sometimes noted as being a bit soft on those who had made mistakes, was quite capable of taking care of these situations out of the limelight and in a manner that did not publically char the offending officer, which was something Nimitz felt wasn't necessary during wartime where we had enough problems as it was.

Nimitz, as a young officer, had been disgusted by the very public tiff between Sampson and Schley following the Spanish-American war, and made it a rule to take care of these nasty personnel situations in a less public manner that did not reflect upon the navy as a whole. It was one of the things that made him a great officer and commander.

[jainso31]

"Quite true, Halsey would not have been overjoyed at the loss of a cruiser still needed for possible battle. However, the situation in February of '43 was not the situation of August '42, and the loss of Chicago, regrettable and unnecessary, was not the blow it would have been earlier"

My reply was."that at the time caused more than just a "stir"in the USN heirarchy" As you point out the relevance of Aug.1942 and Feb.1943
and I accept that judgement Don.

The Battle of Rennell Island, however was not one of the war's conclusive encounters in the Pacific. It occurred at a time when American forces appeared to have swung momentum in the Solomons in their favor and to have halted the Japanese advance in the South Pacific. Any setback, no matter how small, could have been seen as a threat to the success of the American war effort.

jainso31

[ivorthediver]

Post !

I am amazed at the ease in which the IJN managed to secrete away that amount of troops ....one can only applaud the organisation that went into that

10-1200 troops thats no mean feat in any ons book ....their own Dunkirk but done quietly