Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

[jainso31]

This was the last night engagement in the SW Pacific between ships of the USN and the IJN; before the main naval confrontation moved on to the vast spaces of the Central Pacific,where carriers would reign supreme.
Although most of the lessons of previous disasterous night engagements had undoubtedly been learned; and now put into practice- but there was a problem with the new US 6" gun cruisers guns in this decisive victory.There may have been seversl reasons for this.

jainso31

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...gusta_bay.html

[Malcolm12hl]

While this was undoubtedly a US victory, I have always viewed it as an opportunity missed for a far more decisive result. The Japanese were hampered by three factors: the ad-hoc nature of the task force which had been thrown together immediately before the battle; an appalling performance by its usually reliable recce float-planes, and a shortage of destroyers (an increasing problem due to the steady attrition of the previous 12 months). Radar-controlled gunfire fatally damaged the SENDAI early in the battle, but as Hara's eye-witness account makes clear, she continued to attract heavy afire well past the time when she was a blazing wreck. The only other American success was a destroyer which had already been crippled in a conclusion. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the American task force commander was fixated on keeping his cruisers out of the way of Long Lance torpedo attack. It is important to remember that the the USN had lost the HELENA to three torpedo hits at Kula Gulf in June, and then had seen ST LOUIS, HONOLULU and HMNZS LEANDER all crippled by torpedo hits at Kolombangara a week later.

[jainso31]

malcolm12hl
Many thanks for opening this thread - I have to agree with your comments regarding the Japanese failings. However the performance of the new 6" guns of the USn cruisers must have been cause for great concern ie.20 strikes out of 4000 shells fired is appalling. Can you advance any reason for this; and if known, how was it rectified. Look forward to hearing from you again.
PS The TF commander's fixation with keeping clear of Long Lance attack; may well have something to do with his inaccuracate gunfire
jainso31

[Don Boyer]

One has to agree that the shooting of the 48 6" guns of these first four Cleveland-class cruisers to get into combat action was not of the best. I can easily see how the then somewhat known capabilities of the Japanese Long Lance torpedo could influence a commander to stay the heck away from them, with detrimental effects on gun laying and fire control. The Long Lance had a disturbing tendency to sink whatever it hit and they technically had better range than the 6" gun. While the light cruisers maneuvered superbly as a group, hitting things consistently was not their forte that night.

The Japanese showing was far poorer overall. Adm. Omori's inability to get into the battle and the two heavy cruisers not contributing much at all had serious effects on the battle. This poor showing by the battle-hardened Imperial Navy ships was worse than the poor showing by the American cruisers. Radar fire control and effective direction of the 6" guns by the officers involved was not good on the American side and as usual, the tactical control got strung out in a confused night battle.

Once again, the Japanese turned away from battle when things didn't look good for them, regardless of whether that was the actual fact, and once again the American ships stuck it out until they couldn't find anything to shoot at. The American destroyers were used more effectively in this battle than in previous showings, due in large part by being commanded by the best destroyer squadron leader there was.

Much more could have been accomplished by the American side in this battle, and the same could be said for the Japanese. While the Long Lance torpedo heavily influenced American actions, no such concerns affected the Japanese, yet they failed to close in for the kill from fear of losing ships, the great tactical error of many Japanese battles in the early days before it became evident that even if they didn't closely engage, they were going to lose their ships anyway.

[jainso31]

Don-my thanks for your expert input-I agree with your thinking entirely.
a) the "respect" paid to the Long Lance torpedo and
b)the excellent deployment of the USN destroyers.
The 6" gun inaccuracy had me baffled, until I looked up "Problems With 6" US naval guns".The range used WAS on the cusp of Max.Effective Range; and thus salvo "spread" was enlarged. I further found out that 1943 6" naval gun AP shells were fitted with Mk11 BDF (Base Detonated Fuses)which were liable to corrosion; which caused them not to detonate.This was recognised and the later Mk 21 BDF AP shells was dipped in liquid Bakelite, which eliminated the corrosion.Before that, some Mk11 AP shells were recalled.
Taking all these possibilities into account, may go some way to explaining 20 hits out of 4000 shells fired. What do you think Don??

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

I agree...the 6" shooting was pretty poor, as was obvious by the fact that so few of the Japanese ships were lost facing 48 of these guns. I was not aware of the problems with the 6" gun, but it isn't surprising considering that most serious US weapons testing at the time occurred in the heat of combat rather than the peacetime gun range, unlike the Japanese, who tested the heck out of everything in realistic conditions prior to the war.

To me, the biggest failings of the battle have to go to the Japanese though -- if they weren't being hit, why did they maneuver their way out of the battle with so much striking power still available to them? I've come to the conclusion that Japanese Admirals, with a few notable exceptions, had an inherent conservatism that militated against doing the thing they so often portrayed themselves as doing...fearless warriors charging into battle, swords drawn, ready for individual combat and all that twisted Bushido BS they talked about all the time pre-war. It was imbued in all of them that their numerical inferiority militated against risking ships, a Catch 22 if every there was one. Tip Merrill was very lucky he wasn't facing Raizo Tanaka in that battle.

(For those interested, the "Code of Bushido" as promulgated primarily by the most nationalist and xenophobic elements of the Imperial Japanese Army pre-war, and imitated by the Imperial navy, bore little resemblance to the ancient Way of the Warrior of Japanese history, it was a bastardized version designed to motivate the troops into slavishly following the Imperial Army's desire to control Japan the way they saw fit, using it as a instrument of propaganda rather that as a tool of education and enlightenment, as was it's predecessor from the days of the sharp sword. Following this semi-mystical BS, the Imperial Army came within an inch of destroying the very country they were attempting to make into a world power.)

[jainso31]

Thanks Don for your viewpoint-with such a deluge of shells-duds though they may have been,I'm not surprised the Japanese were manoevring about.
I've read about Raizo Tanaka and I take your point and the bastardisation of the Bushido Code.
I think the most salient feature of this little engagement was that Merrill ,at least,had learned from previous night fighting mistakes and acted accordingly.

jainso31

[Malcolm12hl]

There does seem to have been a fairly widespread lack of aggressiveness among Japanese flag officers - a lot of this had to do with being brought up in a very rigid and hierarchical service tradition. In Omori's case, I do feel some sympathy for him, as he thought he might be up against nine heavy cruisers, his subordinate admiral's ship was knocked out at the very beginning of the engagement, and his destroyers performed terribly. When he disengaged, he had lost sight of the enemy, and given that he believed he was up against a much larger force than he was, it is at least understandable that he didn't take a risk.

[jainso31]

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/ba..._kula_gulf.htm


Thank you for that Malcolm-as you say Omori may well have considered that he was up against a much heavier force than was the case-if he was judging the fury of the salvos of 48 shells at least, at times.I noted somewhere that these 6" batteries were so rapid firing that they were likened to machineguns.
I thought it worth mentioning that Adm. Merrill had a much more successful shoot in Kula Gulf in March; but with the range reduced to 12000yds, which of course invited Japanese torpedoes.See link above.

jainso31

[John Odom]

The perversion of Bushido by the pre-war militarists is a hot topic in Japan, at least among the high school teachers of Japanese History that I have talked to..

[jainso31]

How interesting John -would you care to expand on this topic of "perversion of Bushido by pre- war militarists" please.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Tip Merrill's plan was to stay as far away from the Long Lance torpedoes that he chose to stay at a distance of 18000 to 20000 yds from the Japaneses line. The 6" gunfire from his cruisers must have therefoe been affected by:-
a)extreme range and
b)violent manoeuvres by those ships
I take this point from the answers given in the Kormandorski Islands battle-
does this still "hold fair"

jainso31

[mikebatzel]

Originally Posted by jainso31

How interesting John -would you care to expand on this topic of "perversion of Bushido by pre- war militarists" please.

jainso31

jainso31, this is a passage that may help with what John meant.

From Flyboys:

"Samurai were shrewd strategists and tacticians. Samurai fought to win, to protect their lives and the lives of their compatriots. There was no concept that death in battle was a sound strategy. Mass suicide was never part of Bushido. A true Samurai would agree with the U.S. Army General George Patton that 'no one ever won a war by dying for their country. They won by making the other son-of-a-bitch die for his!' In an effort to make warriors out of the entire male populace, the Spirit Warriors (the modern Japanese Imperial Army officer corp, referred to as "Yamato damashi" or "Attack Spirit" for their rigid, suicidal emphasis in warfare, trying to instill the "Third-Force" concept of men and weapons combined with the "spirit," that western armies presumably lacked, could overcome superior technology and fire power...) distorted the essence of Bushido and began to peddle a bastardized version that taught a cult of death. This twisted version focused not on the sublime personal standards of honor among samurai, but one based on blood and guts of death. The Japanese Army field regulations of 1912 systematically stated the Spirit Warriors' strategic doctrine for the first time...In the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, many Japanese troops had surrendered , served as POWs, and later been welcomed back to Japan with open arms. But as the Meiji leaders passed, the new crop of Yamato damashi boys (JIA officers) decreed that it was absolutely forbidden to withdraw, surrender, or become prisoner of war..."p. 37-38.

Hope this helps.

[jainso31]

Thank you mike -for expanding on the subject of the perversion of Bushido-the original and the revised versions were completely at odds with each other.I accept Patton's doctrine that "no war was won by people dying for their country"-whether he put this into practice vis a vis his own men is not proven.
However I should still want to hear whether USN gunnery was affected by long range and violent manoeuvering??

jainso31

[jainso31]

As a postscript to the foregoing-a comment about the engagement in general.
Merrill had kept his cruisers safe from Japanese torpedoes ,but he had much cause for dissatisfaction.The destroyers had put in a lacklustre performance.Burke had disappeared for an hour ,and Austin suffered one mishap after another; and then appeared on the scene of action inflicting little damage except against cripples.Merrill is said to have remarked "It is regretted that both destroyer divisions should have attacked the same enemy group.It was intended otherwise"
Once again radar-controlled gunfire proved largely ineffective- except against the first ship targeted.although range,speed and radical manoeuvres also affected accuracy.The four cruisers fired over 4500 six inch and 700 five inch rounds and only about twelve of these were hits.
All of the Japanese and many of the American shells that did hit a target were duds.
PS Please feel free to comment on any aspect of this thread.
jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Mikebatzel makes a critical point about interpreting Japanese actions during the Pacific War. The "code of Bushido" as promulgated by the Japanese Army's senior officers post Russo-Japanese war was NOT the "Way of the Warrior" as written down by the sword-masters of the past, many of whom were quite noble and well-educated men in addition to wielding swords for Emperor and Shogun.

The Imperial Army, lacking both nobility and broad education for the most part (with notably exceptions, of course) developed a perversion of that ancient code intended to glorify the "Yamato race" (as exemplified by the stalwarts of the Imperial Army, not Yoshimura-san, the citizen in the rice paddies or factories) and the idea of the Japanese race as culturally and morally superior to all those around them, and therefore rightfully in a position to become the masters of the world. All the "bushido" crap put out by the Imperial Army (and subscribed to by many in the Imperial Navy) was specifically written to glorify the Imperial Army as the correct entity to be managing the Imperial estate and determining how the Japanese populace should live their lives.

As a result, one of the key elements in Japanese defeat was this very code, which was also a key element in the brutality of the Japanese toward prisoners of war as well as in the high death tolls once the US and Commonwealth came to grips with them.

After some 50 years of reading up on Japan and particularly the Japanese Army's controlling factions in the Imperial government of the 20th century, the only terms -- sadly -- that seem to cover the situation are "obdurate stupidity" and those are the kindest terms I can come up with.

There were great field officers in the Imperial Army, but the ruling clique, be they generals or field grade officers or the so-called "hot-heads", collectively failed the entire nation through enormous ego and hubris that failed to recognize reality, much preferring to rely on some vision of a mystical fighting power that would save the nation when the failure of the Army was obvious from the start.

They had been messing with China starting in 1931, were officially at war from 1937 and in 1945 were even farther away from solving the "China Incident" than they had been to start with. That's failure to an enormous degree, particularly when their refusal to let go of the failed Chinese adventure led directly to forcing them to choose going to war with the one nation that was absolutely capable of defeating them while at the same time trying to conquer China and keep a wary eye on Soviet ambitions in the east.

Most unfortunate for all was that the Imperial Army's designs did not represent the will of the Japanese people; they had no voice in the government at all, and had nothing but the propaganda of the Imperial Army on which to rely for their view of the world stage. The end result was the incineration of hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens when the battlefield ended up being the major cities of Japan, and not the hills of Okinawa or the rice paddies of China.

To be remembered above all else is the fact that the Imperial Japanese Army bears TOTAL responsibility for that state of affairs coming to be. They could have chucked the whole thing after Saipan, but their own code of Bushido would have made that choice and enormous loss of face for the Imperial Army, and as history has shown, the Imperial Army far preferred the total destruction of the state over their own loss of face in front of the Emperor.

They even preferred the idea of killing the Emperor and his advisers over surrender. Had it not been for the iron will of the senior general, who accepted the Emperor's order to cease and desist, that might have happened, and the third, fourth and fifth atomic bombs, all in the pipeline, would probably have been delivered until the message got across.

[jainso31]

My thanks to you Don for the extremely interesting overview of the Code of Bushido, as applied in WW2;along with your examination of the Japanese ruling class's psyche.
This sort of "thinking" produced the thick headed obduracy, which ultimately brought them to the brink of extinction.

jainso31