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  #451  
Old 16-02-2017, 19:52
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

See that I have lost the five stars !? Been a good boy too !

Brian
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  #452  
Old 16-02-2017, 23:06
Scatari Scatari is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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See that I have lost the five stars !? Been a good boy too !

Brian
Not to worry Brian - you'll always be the number one star among the fans of this thread!!!
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  #453  
Old 17-02-2017, 00:56
Scratch Scratch is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Brian
I continue to be fascinated by your reports.
Here's one that has very good and comprehensive information about the aftermath - the grounding of Missouri in Jan 1950.

The incident: https://disasteroushistory.blogspot....-missouri.html

the recovery: http://www.hnsa.org/resources/manual...alvage-report/

I'm sure we have all encountered captains like Brown! Thankfully ship & bridge management practices have improved somewhat over the years!

Tony
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  #454  
Old 18-02-2017, 10:40
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Brian
I continue to be fascinated by your reports.
Here's one that has very good and comprehensive information about the aftermath - the grounding of Missouri in Jan 1950.

The incident: https://disasteroushistory.blogspot....-missouri.html

the recovery: http://www.hnsa.org/resources/manual...alvage-report/

I'm sure we have all encountered captains like Brown! Thankfully ship & bridge management practices have improved somewhat over the years!

Tony

Thanks Tony.... looking forward to reading them. My favourite Captain counts the strawberries !

Brian
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  #455  
Old 18-02-2017, 10:44
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Ooops gentlemen, the five stars are in the dark blue line at the top of the thread. My optician is The Warehouse !

Brian
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  #456  
Old 18-02-2017, 13:29
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Ooops gentlemen, the five stars are in the dark blue line at the top of the thread. My optician is The Warehouse !

Brian
Now I really am confused Brian

When I added my contribution to your thread rating the other day, the rating stars were gold/yellow on a blue background, within a box (2nd in from the right) ..... just as they are as I type this post today !!

Got me to wondering; if the screen appearance settings have anything to do with the colours on the forum?

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Last edited by harry.gibbon : 18-02-2017 at 13:42.
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  #457  
Old 18-02-2017, 15:05
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

It had 5 stars after I read Brian's post and still had 5 stars when I added my two penny worth of *****

Jim
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  #458  
Old 19-02-2017, 01:27
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

HMS KITE - (U-87) - LOSS

HMS Kite (U87) was a Modified Black Swan-class sloop of the Royal Navy once commanded by the famous U-boat hunter Captain Frederic John Walker. She was one of several ships of that class that took part in the famous patrol in 1944 in which six U-boats were sunk.

Sloops were originally distinguished by their sail pattern but the name had been adopted for warships smaller than a destroyer. HMS Kite was first of the Modified Black Swan class, specially designed to escort convoys..

On 15 August1944 Kite joined escort for Russian Convoy JW59 with destroyer HMS Keppel and sloops HMS Mermaid and HMS Peacock. Some sources record that Kite’s CO was a submariner in temporary command. It was in fact a normal transfer of command from HM Submarine Severn in May 1944.

The convoy was sighted by German reconnaissance planes on 20 August in the Barents Sea off the northern coast of Nazi occupied Norway. At this time Kite was escorting aircraft carriers HMS Vindex and Striker who were escorting the convoy.

On 21 August alerted U-boats found the convoy. Both Kite and Keppel were towing noisemakers astern. Kite’s was drowning out Keppel’s Asdic and she was asked to recover it. There was some difficulty doing this and the ship’s speed was reduced to assist. At this time (0640) a torpedo fired by U344 hit Kite in he starboard side amidships causing a huge explosion. A second torpedo followed immediately, exploding at the stern near the depth charges.

Most of the ship’s company were asleep in their hammocks in various stages of undress. The ship listed immediately and sank within 1-2 minutes. In that time about 60-70 of ship's company made it into the sea. One of the lookouts in Keppel reported an object in the water near HMS Kite but nothing was seen from the bridge. Keppell swept over the area without success and when HMS Mermaid and HMS Peacock arrived, she could commence recovery of survivors.

Time in oily Artic waters took its toll, hypothermia set in within minutes : only nine survivors were rescued by Keppel, the remainder being killed within the ship or had died from hypothermia.

At the subsequent board of inquiry all nine survivors were questioned. It had all happened within 1-2 minutes and there was little the survivors could recall other than how they escaped. Two of them reported seeing a conning tower briefly as the ship sank.

The board made a point of asking each one whether he was wearing a lifebelt and a piece of rope and whether they were requred by Standing Orders. There was no time to locate and put on lifejackets, and most were still undressed having been awoken from their sleep in the messdecks below . None had heared an order to abandon ship. She had listed immediately and began to sink, the ship’s company having only one minute to climb to the upper deck and enter the water. Two attempted to lower the port whaler, but the ship had listed too far making it impossible to launch.

About 60 men had made it into the water, most swimming but some clinging to Carley floats. Five underwater explosions (Kite’s depth charges) were heard as the ship sank and oil appeared on the sea surface. Some of the men remained within the oil because they found it to be warming but most suffered in the oil and died from suffocation

Two sailors on Carley floats reported seeing the conning tower of a submarine.

A sailor on watch on the bridge heard the two explosions and then saw depth charge racks and debris coming through the air from aft. He ducked down for safety and saw the OOW crouched down as well. The Captain arrived on the bridge and said "Have you sounded action stations yet?" but by that time the OOW had left and was in the water. Then the Captain used some foul language about Germans and went inside again.

One of Keppel’s officers said that they were not expecting U-boats within 30 miles? When they closed the survivors there were about 20-30 men floating in the water. There was great difficulty getting them out of the water and into the whaler. They were covered in thick oil, making them very slippery to grasp. It would have helped if they had been wearing ropes ends round themselves. . 14 men were rescued, of which 5 died within a few minutes.


The Findings

1. We have the honour to report that in accordance with instructions a Board of Inquiry consisting of the undersigned met at 1000 hours to-day, 9th September, 1944, at Navy House, Clarence Street, Greenock, to investigate the circumstances attending the loss of HMS Kite. We have considered the evidence given by the several witnesses and our opinion of the occurrence is as follows:-

2. At 2230 on the 20th August, 1944, HMS Keppel and HMS Kite were ordered to take station in the Starboard Quarter Sector of the Escort Squadron No.2. About midnight they investigated and depth charged a suspicious contact, but there was no result. HMS Kite was stationed 5,000 yards on the starboard bow of HMS Keppel .

3. Noisemakers were streamed in both ships. Keppel had hers tripped whilst those in Kite were in the rattling position.

4. About 0500/21 August Keppel requested Kite to trip her noisemakers which were causing interference with their Asdics.

5. About 0600 HMS Kite reduced to 6 knots to clear her port noisemaker which was wound round the towing wire. During this time the starboard unit was still in the rattling position.

6. From HFDF bearings, U-boats were known to be in the vicinity, but were not thought to be in the immediate vicinity. HMS Kite had one cruising watch closed up.

7. Wind was West by North, Force 3; weather, overcast; visibility, 7’ sea and swell, 22; course and speed, 050, 6 knots; Asdic conditions fair to poor. Temp Air 39 F, Sea 45 F.

8. About 0640 in position 73 01’ N 03 57’ E, HMS Kite was struck on the starboard side by two torpedoes; there was an interval of a few seconds between each one hitting. The first struck in the region of the break of the boat deck, and the second further aft in the vicinity of the depth charge throwers. The ship broke in two, and the fore part listed heavily to starboard whilst the stern floated away.

9. No Asdic warning of any sort was received on the Bridge prior to the explosions.

10. The actual time the ship floated cannot be accurately assessed, but it was undoubtedly for a very short period, of one to two minutes. One result of these explosions was that depth charges and throwers were hurled into the water, amongst other debris.

11. No orders were given to abandon ship, but those officers and ratings who could get up on deck took to the water almost at once. An attempt was made lto ower the port whaler, but this quickly proved impracticable. However, a certain amount of life-saving equipment, such as a Carley raft, Flotanets, timber and a life buoy floated off onto the water.

12. Shortly after abandoning ship there were four to five under-water explosions,

13. Two seamen both state that after taking to the water they saw a U-boat conning tower break surface for a very short period, about 150 to 200 yards on the starboard bow of the fore portion of their ship. This was not corroborated by any other survivors, though HMS Keppel's look-out reported an object in the vicinity of Kite at about this time which he thought was the conning tower of a U-boat. This was not seen by anyone else in HMS Keppel. From all the available evidence, it seems that about 70 to 80 of the Ship’s Company got out of the ship and into the water.

14. After the explosion the Captain appeared on the Bridge for a short period but was not afterwards seen in the water. The XO, Lt. X , and Sub Lieutenant Y. were seen to get into the water. Lieutenant Z., was picked up and died onboard HMS Keppel.

15. On observing the explosions HMS Keppel closed Kite’s position and carried out an A/S search, which, however, proved fruitless.

16. At 0736 Keppel stopped to pick up survivors whilst HMS Mermaid and HMS Peacock carried out operation observant round her. Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting survivors out of the water owing to the large quantity of oil about and the fact that few were wearing life belts, and none had lengths of rope secured round them. When the rescue work commenced there were about 30 men in the water, but these rapidly diminished, and only 14 were picked up, of whom 5 died within a few minutes.

17. FINDINGS We find that :-
(1) HMS KITE was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a U-boat on the starboard side at short range.
(2) There is no evidence to show that the magazine exploded.
(3) Although the second torpedo hit in the vicinity of the Starboard propeller, it is not considered that this torpedo was a ‘Gnat’ (noise seeker), as the ship’s speed of 6 knots was below the critical speed.

(4) Despite the poor Asdic conditions it is nevertheless considered that some warning should have been obtained from the Asdic Set. The loss of HMS Kite must, in some measure, be attributed to the unsatisfactory performance of the Foxer gear, which necessitated the ship steaming on a steady course at 6 knots.

(5) The explosions heard and felt by survivors in the water subsequent to the ship breaking in two, are considered to have been caused by depth charges separated from the throwers by the force of the second torpedo explosion. These charges were set to safe, but due to being separated from the throwers the primer ‘placer ‘gear would have come into action and the charges exploded at a considerable depth.

(7) No alarm was passed or orders given to abandon ship, but we do not consider that there was, in fact, time to do so.

(8) 217 men here lost their lives. The large loss of life must be attributed to the amount of oil fuel about, the low temperature of the water, and the fact that few of the Ship’s Company were wearing lifebelts. The orders regarding the wearing of lifebelts on deck seem to have been rigidly enforced, but the necessity for wearing them when below does not appear to have been fully brought home. Further, very few were wearing ropes ends secured round them.
RECOMMENDATIONS -

(a.) That once again attention be drawn to the necessity of wearing lifebelts and ropes ends secured round the body at all times. This also applies to the wearing of identity discs, which were not being worn by all survivors.

(b) That additional spare Foxer Gear be allowed to ships, so that when operating in positions where the risk is above normal and the escorts are likely to be the main target, they can cut away their Foxers, when they run foul, in preference to reducing to a low speed for considerable periods in order to disentangle them. It is considered that one additional spare set above the present allowance would be a reasonable increase.

Signed by the officers of the Board.

Notes:
1. Post World War II analysis of survivors showed that a life preserver is very little help to keep afloat. It was only in the late 1940’s and into the 1950’s that hypothermia was recognized as the real killer of many in-water survivors during World War II. Time staying conscious in Arctic water is considered 30-45 seconds – then http://www.hmskite.com/kiteboard1.html you cannot help yourself. Many didn’t remember being picked up. Not surprising – they were slipping into unconsciousness and were about to die. 5 did on deck on the Keppel.

2. HMS Kite Memorial
On 21 August 2004 - the 60th anniversary of Kite’s sinking - a memorial stone was unveiled in the Braintree and Bocking Public Gardens. Braintree District Council have also produced an Information Sheet on HMS Kite.

Reference: http://www.hmskite.com/kiteboard1.html
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File Type: jpg HMS Kite.jpg (13.9 KB, 18 views)
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  #459  
Old 19-02-2017, 10:06
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Many thanks for the submission on HMS Kite Brian. She has her own thread on the Forums here.

Jim
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  #460  
Old 19-02-2017, 16:09
Scatari Scatari is offline
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HMS KITE - (U-87) - LOSS

Another great post Brian - many thanks.
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  #461  
Old 20-02-2017, 08:23
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by jbryce1437 View Post
Many thanks for the submission on HMS Kite Brian. She has her own thread on the Forums here.

Jim
Thank you Jim,a rare treasure which I had not seen. I read the report of the board of inquiry and became quite emotional imagining the scenes. Those poor young men did not stand a chance and I felt for them. I thought that the board concentrated too much on the absence of life jackets and a length of rope.There are of course many 'What Ifs' but I won't go there. I thought 'everyone should know their story' and wrote my article.

Now I am so pleased to know that they were not forgotten, that they have been honoured,and that their story is permanently on show for all to see.

'They did not grow old ... but we will remember them'

Brian
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  #462  
Old 06-03-2017, 07:56
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USS FRESNO (LCS-27) - CHRISTENING DAMAGE

The Navy’s beleaguered littoral combat ship (LCS) program experienced another embarrassment this week, as its newest addition to the fleet suffered an 18-inch crack to its aluminium hull after being struck with a customary bottle of champagne during the vessel’s christening on Saturday.
Officials estimate the damage to the future Freedom-class USS Fresno (LCS-27) could be in the tens of millions.

“Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Fresno sustained a significant structural laceration this morning, as the result of having been targeted by a rotund foreign object,” read an official statement released by the Commander of Naval Surface Forces Pacific.

“Specifically,” the statement continued, “said object has been identified as a 2014 bottle of Korbel, which was wielded at a high rate of velocity against Fresno’s bow by the ship’s honorary sponsor, Emma Jean Devereaux.”

Devereaux has since been identified as “Little Miss Strawberry Patch 2016,” a 17-year-old rural Fresno County beauty pageant winner.

Sources report that Devereaux — who suffers from cerebral palsy, and is the pageant’s first disabled contestant to be crowned — was reduced to tears after unintentionally having set the Navy’s LCS program back untold millions of dollars by courageously finding the strength to tap a three-pound, $10.00 bottle of alcohol against the hull of a 3,500-ton, $362-million warship— only to see her efforts result in tragedy.

“This whole thing with the champaign bottle is really just a minor setback, and the ship will be seaworthy once she’s gone through some minor repairs,” said Cmdr. Lawrence McNeil, commanding officer of PCU Fresno.

“What really matters is that little Emma Jean — God bless her — found the strength to swing that bottle of Korbel, “This whole thing with the champaign bottle is really just a minor setback, and the ship will be seaworthy once she’s gone through some minor repairs,” said Cmdr. Lawrence McNeil, commanding officer of PCU Fresno.

“What really matters is that little Emma Jean — God bless her — found the strength to swing that bottle of Korbel, because the Navy is all about people before anything else.”

At press time, the Navy announced that it relieved McNeil from command of PCU Fresno, citing a "loss of confidence and ability to lead."



Read more: http://www.duffelblog.com/2017/03/ch...#ixzz4aX9yT9g6
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  #463  
Old 06-03-2017, 20:06
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Is it April 1st already?

LCS 27 has not yet been named, much less built. Since it is an odd numbered hull, it would be steel hulled Freedom Class ship.

Here is some info of the status of the Freedom Class.

http://lockheedmartin.com/us/product...mbat-ship.html
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  #464  
Old 07-03-2017, 05:23
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Duffleblog is a spoof (fake news) site, specializing in made-up ludicrous stories meant to cause great laughter.
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  #465  
Old 07-03-2017, 06:49
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Originally Posted by BlackBat242 View Post
Duffleblog is a spoof (fake news) site, specializing in made-up ludicrous stories meant to cause great laughter.

I hope somebody laughed - I did ! Sounded like a script for a 'Goon Show"
Read it out aloud with a funny accent and try not to smile!

Brian
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  #466  
Old 07-03-2017, 15:27
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Sorry, I had a Mr. Spock moment.
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  #467  
Old 15-03-2017, 08:12
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USS George Washington (CVN-73) – Fire - Report of Inquiry


About 0600 on 22 May 2008 an officer in the nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) smelled smoke below decks and suspected the source as being the ship's incinerator. After reporting to the bridge, he was informed that the incinerator was secured.

The ship commenced underway replenishment with USS Crommelin (FFG 37). At 0745 the Executive Officer on the bridge level reported seeing white smoke aft of the island .The OOD again requested the status of the ship's incinerator. EOOW found it was still in operation and ordered it secured. Before he could report to the OOD he received a report of white smoke in Squadron Ready Room in level 5. With a fire in an unknown space, fuel lines were closed and USS Crommelin made an ‘Emergency Breakaway’

During the morning fire parties frequently reported dense smoke and hot blistering bulkheads on every level. The source of the fire proved difficult to locate as no flames were found.

At approximately 0826, the personnel in Pump Room No.3 reported no fires in the pump room but that smoke was entering the space and their only exit route was blocked by dense smoke.. Two attempts to rescue them were unsuccessful because of heat and smoke.

At approximately 0825, power was lost to half the ship, including the exhaust fan of the Air Conditioning Machinery Room .The majority of Fire Fighting suits for that area were without liners because they were being laundered. The main broadcast system became unreadable.

At 0913, there was a loss of high pressure air to the SCBA recharge stations due to only one high pressure air compressor being online. A recharge station of mobile air compressors was established to recharge SCBAs. (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus).

Reports of smoke and heat were reported throughout the morning on various levels but no flames were found.

At 1227 the source was finally located in the unmanned exhaust space running through every level to the flight deck. Access manholes to the exhaust trunk were then opened and water sprayed into the openings. From then on the ship fought fires in various levels and spaces until 2016 when all were finally extinguished. Hands were then stood down from General Quarters.

During the initial post-fire inspection, consumed in the fire under the deck plates had been 90 one gallon cans of refrigerant compressor oil, and 5 five-gallon metal containers with unknown contents. Also found were approximately 12 cigarette butts in the inlet to the exhaust fan.

The ship staff investigations were compiled into a Preliminary Inquiry report. Further inquiries were ordered, including one by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy. The forensic expert report suggests several theories about the cause of the fire including self-heating, cigarette ignition of stored materials', and electrical failure igniting stored materials.

On 2 April the Chief Engineer had found refrigerant compressor oil stored below the deck plates in the Auxiliary Boiler Room. He ordered them to be taken to the Hazardous Material Division. His Engineering personnel began turning in the refrigerant oil to HAZMAT Division. However they only turned in only 256 of approximately 346 gallons. No details were recorded into the Hazardous Inventory System.

At approximately 0820, the bridge sounded General Quarters because the location of the fire could not be determined.

Between 0924 and 1300 several attempts were made to rescue the personnel trapped in No. 3 Pumproom but none were successful due to the excessive heat. They were finally rescued safely at 1330.

At 1545, the access cover to the exhaust space was removed and water was sprayed into the opening, resulting in a decrease of temperature . Extinguishing the fire in all spaces in all decks took another four and a half hours. At 2016 the ship secured from General Quarters. The ship's crew had fought the fire for approximately 12 hours. Thirty-seven sailors' were treated by the ship's medical personnel for minor injuries and only one person had burns.

The fires were out but o' sh*t the inquiries began.........

(..to be continued)
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  #468  
Old 22-03-2017, 01:34
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USS George Washington (CVN-73) – Fire - Report of Inquiry
Part 2


(continued)

Opinions (Summary)

The start of the fire and its magnitude was the result of a series of human acts that could have been prevented. Specifically:

a. The unauthorized storage of publications, clothing, refrigerant compressor oil and 5 containers of an unknown substance.
c. Smoking in an unauthorized space,
d. Failure to properly report smoke in a space where it was known that refrigerant compressor oil was improperly stored.
e. The evidence of cigarette butts strongly supports that a still-lit cigarette was the ignition source for the fire.

3. The refrigerant oil was the fuel source that contributed the most to the intensity of the fire.

4. The "chimney effect" created by the geometry of the' Auxiliary Boiler Supply and Exhaust space, and the exhaust fan resulted in a fire that grew quickly in intensity.

5. The placing of refrigerant compressor oil in a space ace violating the rules for storage of Hazard Materials.

6. The failure of HAZMAT Division to enter details into the Hazards Register allowed this material to remain unaccounted for a lengthy period of time.

7. A properly run zone inspection' program could have uncovered the improper HAZMAT stowage habits of Engineering personnel as well as the unauthorized smoking areas.

8. Several factors beyond the fire fighting crew's control contributed to the time it took to bring the fire under control:

a. No visible flames leading investigating teams to believe that the source of the fire was elsewhere.

b. The very large surface area of the Auxiliary Boiler Supply and Exhaust space created symptoms of the fire in multiple locations on multiple decks.

c. Because of the location of electrical distribution cables in the inaccessible space, even the finest fire fighting efforts by the crew would not have prevented most of the subsequent damage to the cables once the fire started.

9. Some weaknesses in DC and fire fighting training and proficiency had a direct impact on the time it took the crew to locate and bring the fire under control. Specifically:
a. The ship's Damage Control personnel were not proficient at sorting through the many reports of information on the location of the main fire.
b. No one correlated the continuing discharge of smoke as a symptom that the fire was in a ventilation system.

10. Because of the location of electrical distribution cables in the inaccessible space even the finest fire fighting efforts by the crew would not have prevented most of the subsequent damage to the cables once the fire started.

11. Some weaknesses in DC and fire fighting training and proficiency had a direct impact on the time it took the crew to locate and bring the fire under control. Specifically
a. The ship's Damage Control (DC) personnel were not proficient at sorting through the many reports for information on the location of the main fire.
b. After discovering the cans of refrigerant in the bilge of the Auxiliary Boiler Room, reasonable action was to have it removed and properly stored.
c. DC personnel took 50 minutes to make a ship-wide announcement of the fire’s location of fire once it was determined. Damage Control personnel did not organize a focused, coordinated effort to rapidly gain access for the application of fire fighting agents. e. DC Control was not proficient at simultaneously coordinating the fire fighting efforts and the rescue of personnel from Pump Room No.3.

12. Some improperly functioning or missing DC equipment, maintained by the ship's crew, impacted the crew's fire fighting and DC performance on 22 May 200B. Specifically:
a. Missing FFE liners in one repair locker resulted in burns to one individual.
b. Two inoperable/ineffective Portable Cutting Units delayed the recovery of individuals in Pump Room No.3.
c. Several personnel reported having to use handheld flashlights because of a shortage of FFE helmet lights.

13. While it is clear that weaknesses in DC and fire fighting training and proficiency contributed to the length of the time that the fires burned onboard George Washington it is impossible to determine the extra damage to the ship that could have been avoided iwithout these weaknesses.

14. External inspection, assessment, and evaluation reports on the training and readiness of the ship' from 12 June 2007 to 18 March 2008 consistently pointed to weaknesses in the Damage Control Training Team's (DCTT) ability to train the c

15. Some improperly functioning or missing DC equipment, maintained by the ship's crew, impacted the crew's fire fighting and DC performance on 22 May 200B.

16. If portable radios had been available it would have made it easier to coordinate fire fighting and damage control actions among a large number of teams.

17. Although the Chief Engineer and Damage Control Assistant ,inherited a weak DC organization they did not implement an effective plan for improvement

18. The XO, as per Navy Regulations is responsible for carrying out the CO's policies including maintaining good order and discipline in the command. The XO is also responsible for the implementation and oversight of the Zone Inspection program for exercises and training.

19. By Navy Regulations, the CO George Washington is ultimately responsible for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his command. He is specifically responsible for ensuring that periodic inspections of the spaces are conducted for material condition and cleanliness and that flammable materials are stored in a safe manner. Although this fire resulted from the willful, improper acts. of subordinates that were not directly under his control, the CO has the ultimate responsibility for command readiness and good order and discipline.

28 . Numerous crewmembers fought the fire for over 12 hours under extreme conditions of heat and smoke, some to the point of exhaustion. There was ample evidence of a ship-wide effort by the crew to save their shipmates and limit damage to their ship. The efforts to rescue three crew members trapped below the fire was particularly noteworthy.

Recommendations;

1. The authority for George Washington should:
a. Conduct a thorough assessment of the ship’s Damage Control program and the ability to train the crew.
c. Evaluate the need for additional unit level training and assessment of the George Washington crew in view of the pending transfer of approx. 900 sailors from USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63).

2. Commander, Naval Air Forces should ensure that
a. Direct turnover (DTO) material is properly tracked in the Hazard system..
b. Clarify FEP grading criteria to ensure individual areas that are unsatisfactory or require serious attention are not inadvertently downplayed because the aggregate grade is passing.

3. Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command should:
a. Add appropriate portable radios to the Allowance List for DC equipment for CVNs for use by Damage Control teams.
e. Add a secondary personnel escape route from Pump Room No.3 on George Washington and similarly configured•CVNs.
f. Investigate whether the current firefighting units meets design specifications for performance in high ambient temperatures.

4. The CO, George Washington, should:
a. Initiate a zone inspection program which should inspect all spaces, including voids, for unauthorized storage.
b. Direct ship-wide training in receipt, handling and storage of HAZMAT. (Hazardous Materials)
c. Direct ship-wide training on the ship’s smoking policy and authorized smoking areas.
d. Take appropriate corrective actions after the authorities’ assessment of the DC program.
e. Consider approving a HAZMAT in-use locker for work centers.
f. Recognize appropriate personnel directly involved in the rescue of the individuals trapped in the JPS Pump Room No.3 as well as others whose efforts to combat the fire were particularly noteworthy.

The Chief of Naval Operations directed the Judge Advocate General to carry out an investigation headed by the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The investigation determined that the likely cause of the fire was unauthorized smoking that ignited flammable liquids and other combustible material improperly stored in an adjacent space. The fire and the subsequent magnitude of the fire were the result of a series of human acts that could have been prevented. Specifically, the storage of 90 gallons of refrigerant compressor oil in an unauthorized space contributed to the intensity of the fire.

The fire, which occurred in an unmanned Auxiliary Boiler Exhaust and Supply space, took approximately 12 hours to extinguish due to the location and geometry of adjacent spaces and ventilation systems that created a chimney effect.

Thirty-seven Sailors were treated for minor injuries incurred during fire fighting efforts, with one Sailor requiring treatment for first and second degree burns. Approximately 80 out of over 3,800 total spaces aboard the carrier were damaged by the fire. The estimated cost of repairs to George Washington as a direct result of the shipboard fire was approximately $70 million.

Recommended that higher authority take action against 18 crew members (Named) for their failures to perform their duty.
Detach for cause XO for substandard performance.
Detach for cause CO for loss of confidence in the performance of his duties.

Reference: Command Investigation Report http://www.cpf.navy.mil/content/foia...estigation.pdf
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Old 22-03-2017, 16:05
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USS George Washington (CVN-73) – Fire - Report of Inquiry
Part 2


Recommended that higher authority take action against 18 crew members (Named) for their failures to perform their duty.

Detach for cause XO for substandard performance.
Detach for cause CO for loss of confidence in the performance of his duties.
Thanks for this Brian.

I assume that "detach for cause" means "Fire!"
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Old 23-03-2017, 10:28
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Missed sentence
Quote:
Originally Posted by Scatari View Post
Thanks for this Brian.

I assume that "detach for cause" means "Fire!"
Absolutely !!

Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Second Endorsement

"10. Commander. Naval Air Forces Pacific is directed to:
a. Relieve CAPT David Dykhoff, Commanding Officer USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73), initiate Detach For Cause proceedings and consider other disciplinary or administrative actions he deems 'appropriate.

b. Relieve CAPT David Dober. Executive Officer USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73), initiate Detach For Cause proceedings and consider other disciplinary or administrative actions he deems appropriate


http://www.cpf.navy.mil/content/foia...ndorsement.pdf



From Commander Naval Air Forces Public Affairs

NAVAL STATION NORTH ISLAND, Calif. (NNS) -- Capt. J.R. Haley, previously assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, has taken command of Washington. Haley commanded the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) from June 2005 to January 2008.

Capt. Karl O. Thomas, who has been serving as executive officer of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) since July 2007, has been reassigned as George Washington's executive officer.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=38840

Note: USS George Wawshingon had a previous fire in the ventilation system

Note: July 11, While operating in support of Operation Deny Flight, in the Adriatic Sea, black smoke is reported in one of GW's laundries. Fire crews quickly find out that the smoke is pumped into the space through the ship's ventilation system. Because of the unknown location of the fire the crew is ordered to general quarters and all inbound aircraft are diverted to shore bases in Italy. Shortly thereafter, flames are sighted on the aft starboard sponson and a fuel fire is located nearby. It takes almost one hour to extinguish the fire.

http://www.uscarriers.net/cvn73history.htm
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Old 30-03-2017, 11:51
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Naval Accidents 1945-1988

There were 1,276 accidents of the major navies of the world between 1945-1988 involving :

406 major surface combatants (not including aircraft carriers)
359 submarines,
228 aircraft carriers, (Total is 1392 not 1276 ? )
182 logistic support ships,
142 minor military ships,
75 amphibious warships

75 accidents were actual sinkings, military 60 and civilian 17 vessels

The accidents resulted in over 2,800 deaths, with U.S. and Soviet fatalities constituting about 65% of the total.

The majority of accidents occurred in :
Atlantic Ocean : 624, (or 49%), not including the Mediterranean Sea,
Pacific, Ocean :318 (or 25 %)
Mediterranean Sea :110 (9 %)
Indian Ocean :34

Of the 1,276 accidents, 799 have involved naval ships of the United States. Many hundreds more Soviet accidents are known to have occurred but due to inadequate data and excessive secrecy, their specific dates or circumstances cannot be documented.

This report concludes that there are some 48 nuclear warheads and 7 nuclear-power reactors on the ocean floor as a result of these accidents.

The accidents are divided into 12 major categories by cause :

Collisions: 456 documented cases, 190 between military ships, 184 between naval vessels and civilian ships,
51 collisions involving aircraft carriers. There have also been 36 confirmed snaggings by submerged submarines of fishing trawlers or nets, and 82 collisions by ships with docks during mooring or unmooring.

Fires: 267 documented major fires aboard ships, although many more are suspected as having taken place. In addition, hundreds of minor fires have occurred at sea, during ship construction and overhauls. These have by and large not been included in the chronology. Fires are by far the most prevalent cause of ship damage, but their regular occurrence precludes a comprehensive statistical analysis. According to official Navy statistics, from 1973 to 1983 there were an average of 148 fires per year on U.S. ships or at shore bases.

Groundings: 130 documented groundings of ships and submarines,
.
Explosions: 114 documented explosions and other ordnance mishaps, malfunctions on its surface vessels

Equipment failures: 98 documented accidents involving major material failures and equipment mishaps, not involving propulsion equipment.

Floodings: 48 cases since the early 1950s to 1986, the Soviet submarine force has experienced numerous, serious submarine casualties -- sinkings, propulsion failures, fires and navigational accidents.

Sinkings: 75 documented sinkings as a result of accidents, either of military ships, or civilian ships struck by military ships. This includes 27 sinkings of submarines.

Weather conditions: 14 heavy weather accidents, 65 documented accidents involving adverse weather conditions, affecting 107 different ships.

Propulsion accidents: 59 documented propulsion accidents involving engines or boilers, nuclear reactor accidents, and accidents involving the leaking of fuels or primary coolant water.

Ordnance accidents (non-explosive): 54 documented major ordnance accidents which did not result in explosions. These accidents relating mostly to the handling and movement of weapons, or misfired or aimed weapons.

Aircraft crashes on ships: 34 documented serious accidents on takeoff or landing from carriers or other surface warships. The greatest number of crashes occurred in 1981.

Floodings: 27 reported cases, mostly of submarines, mostly a result of open hatches and access panels.

Miscellaneous[ 80 miscellaneous accidents, involving ships capsizing and going adrift, gas leaks, ships hitting stray mines or torpedoes, friendly aircraft or ordnance striking ships, accidents involving civilian interference. 35% of all material mishaps occurred while ships were on the high seas, and 20% occurred in shipyards. The remainder occurred in or around ports. The human factor is apparent in errors related to equipment handling or poor command decision-making.

Nuclear Weapons Accidents
Since the 1950s nuclear systems have become commonplace aboard major surface warships and submarines.Naval nuclear weapons now (1988) number 15,000 to 16,000. It is difficult to calculate how many accidents have involved nuclear weapons because of secrecy but there is ample evidence of numerous. There are also approximately 48 warheads and 7 nuclear-power reactors on the bottom of the oceans as a result of accidents.

Air Accidents
In 1987, the Navy and Marine Corps had 74 "class A mishaps" , 51 by the Navy and 23 by Marine Corps aviation. In the 74 mishaps, 73 aircraft were destroyed and 66 personnel lost their lives. 50% of the mishaps in 1987 had pilot error as the primary cause factor. The 1987 rate contrasts with 1958, when 524 aircraft were destroyed in 1,106 accidents. During most of the 1960s, an average of about 300 aircraft were lost per year to non-combat related causes. This average fell below 200 in the 1970s.

Submarine Accidents
Since the end of World War II, there have been 359 major documented submarine accidents, 51 involving ballistic missile submarines and 311 involving attack and cruise missile boats.
At least 27 total submarine sinkings since 1945, including five Soviet, four U.S., three British, and four French submarines. 21 submarines have been lost at sea, while 6 have been salvaged in shallow waters
In the five-year period from 1983 to 1987, for instance, according to the Navy, there were 446 reported material damage mishaps in the submarine force, with a dollar loss of $36.8 million, and 475 operating days lost.

Sabotage & Arson
There are 31 documented cases of sabotage or arson causing major accidents, 19 of which occurred in the 1970s.
There are also other incidents in which disgruntled sailors have been involved in serious criminal incidents aboard ships that did not involve damage to equipment or the ship.

Drug Use
A number of incidents and accidents were connected to drug use by the ship's crew. e.g. In 1976, 37 crewmen were removed from a missile submarine because of a marijuana investigation. In 1981 the crash of a electronic warfare airplane while landing killed 14 and injured 48. This provoked a debate between House of Representatives and the Navy over whether drug use on board the carrier may have contributed to the accident. In 2009 the USN introduced a "zero tolerance." policy.

Suicides are also a serious issue. From 1983 to 1987, there were 31 suicide deaths in the U.S. submarine force (20 in the Atlantic Fleet, 11 in the Pacific Fleet), including suicide by one submarine officer.
Overall, the Navy lost 79 persons to suicide in 1986, an increase of 23% over the average number of suicides in the Navy between 1982 and 1985.
The rate of suicides rose from 9.2 per 100,000 in 1984 to 12.4 per 100,000 in 1987.

Miscellaneous Incidents
185 of the accidents involved civilian ships, while 377 of the accidents occurred in ports, or in harbor or bay areas immediately offshore.
A number of collisions and groundings have been the result of the navies' reluctance to rely on local harbor pilots, or other instances of poor cooperation with local authorities.
A number of miscellaneous incidents involved airplanes or practice ordnance ( (Missiles or artillery) which accidentally attacked civilian vessels, or land-based homes and businesses. e.g. practice missiles struck two civilian ships, bombs hit another, and a submarine collision killed 30.

The needs of the military for larger and larger training areas to practice their modern weaponry, and the encroachment of the civilian community on military and naval bases will surely grow as an issue of contention in the future.

Nuclear Accidents.
The 48 nuclear warheads and 7 reactors are sitting on the bottom of the oceans as a result of naval accidents
In an environment where naval accidents occur regularly, and where human mistakes, sabotage, suicide, and drug use are constant problems, the issue of nuclear weapons and reactor safety is an obvious one for a concerned public.
Many accidents are affected by the routine presence of nuclear weapons aboard ships and submarines, and the proliferation of nuclear propulsion.
Official secrecy about nuclear weapons is so ingrained that it impedes the flow of information necessary for public dialogue and debate. Ongoing debates about the environmental effects of nuclear accidents, or the safety of specific nuclear weapons, or nuclear reactors, or nuclear strategies, could go on forever with no resolution, with competing contentions voiced about levels of relative risk and ultimate safety.

(The paper then goes on detailing all 1276 accidents 1945 - 1988.)


Reference
Neptune Paper No. 3:
Naval Accidents 1945 - 1988
https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2...s1945-1988.pdf
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Old 30-03-2017, 16:56
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Naval Accidents 1945-1988


There were 1,276 accidents of the major navies of the world between 1945-1988 involving :
Amazing stats Brian - thanks for posting them.
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Old 31-03-2017, 05:01
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Salt View Post
Naval Accidents 1945-1988

There were 1,276 accidents of the major navies of the world between 1945-1988 involving :

(Total is 1392 not 1276 ? )


Of the 1,276 accidents, 799 have involved naval ships of the United States. Many hundreds more Soviet accidents are known to have occurred but due to inadequate data and excessive secrecy, their specific dates or circumstances cannot be documented.

(The paper then goes on detailing all 1276 accidents 1945 - 1988.)


Reference
Neptune Paper No. 3:
Naval Accidents 1945 - 1988
https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2...s1945-1988.pdf
As per the bolded line - I suspect the 1,276 accidents involved 1,392 ships/vessels - with those accidents involving multiple vessels still counting as one accident (for examples, JFK-Belknap or Melbourne-Voyager would each count as one accident).
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Old 31-03-2017, 09:47
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As per the bolded line - I suspect the 1,276 accidents involved 1,392 ships/vessels - with those accidents involving multiple vessels still counting as one accident (for examples, JFK-Belknap or Melbourne-Voyager would each count as one accident).
Brilliant thought ! Duh ! Thanks

Brian
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Old 14-05-2017, 05:22
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(Sorry for the long delay, have been in drydock myself ! )

USS Antietam (CG-54) - Grounding

USS Antietam (CG-54) is a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser forward on deployment to Yokosuka, Japan. The ship’s primary mission is to operate with aircraft carrier battle groups and surface action groups in extreme threat environments.

On 31 January 2017 Antietam came to anchor in Tokyo Bay where conditions included strong winds and tidal stream. A high wind warning was in effect, but winds did not appear particularly strong from the nearby shore that morning.

Some time later the crew observed that the ship was dragging anchor and got Antietam underway again. Shortly after, the crew felt the ship shudder and lost all propulsion power.

The ship is equipped with controllable pitch propellers — complex hydraulic systems that allow a ship’s commander to position the propeller blades to change the speed and direction of a ship without changing the rotation of the ship’s shafts. The shudder had been the ship grounding and damaging both propellers. All pitch control was lost and the ship could no longer manoeuvre.

The grounding did not result in any injuries to US or Japanese personnel, but the discharge of up to 1,100 gallons of hydraulic oil prompted environmental concerns.

USS Antietam was safely returned to Yokosuka Naval Base with the help of tug boats following the incident and continuing inspections showed that oil was no longer leaking from the ship.

An investigation was commenced to assess the full extent of the damage to the ship. Repair or replacement of the propellers would almost certainly require an extensive dry dock repair period.

The USN joined with the Government of Japan and Local Japanese Coast Guard in responding to the oil spill and minimal impact was made to the environment.

With ultimate responsibility for the safety and well-being of the ship and the lives of sailors, commanding officers are held to the highest standards of accountability and must have the full confidence of Navy leaders

On 1 March the Commanding Officer was removed from command of USS Antietam by the commander of Task Force 70 based on the initial findings of a command investigation into the grounding of the ship. While the investigation was still under review by leadership, sufficient findings of fact emerged during the investigation to warrant the relief of the commanding officer due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command the ship.

In the short interval since the grounding there does not appear to have been has been further information released by the U.S. Navy.

References:

US Naval Institute
https://news.usni.org/2017/01/31/cru...bay-spills-oil

https://news.usni.org/2017/03/01/uss...-investigation

‘Stars and Stripes’ , ‘Naval Today’ – official USN publications
Media various
Attached Images
File Type: jpg USS Antietam CG-54.jpg (1.77 MB, 11 views)
File Type: jpg USS Antietam controllable pitch propellers.jpg (83.6 KB, 19 views)
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