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  #476  
Old 25-05-2017, 17:38
Scatari Scatari is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

None of Old Salt's usual superb narratives here, just some rather frightening photos of the grounding of the Federal German navy's minehunter Gromitz in Norwegian waters in 2007:

https://www.firdaposten.no/lokalnytt...98929?start=16

Amazingly she was salvaged and is still in service today!
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  #477  
Old 27-05-2017, 09:35
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Nice one Tim ! No words required . Except perhaps from the CO wondering about farming , real estate, undertaking etc.

Brian
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  #478  
Old 03-06-2017, 12:19
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) – Fire 1981

On 26 May 1981 USS Nimitz (CVN-68) was operating off the eastern Florida coast in position 30º29’3” N, 080º22’0” W, course 160º speed 5 five knots during the second dog watch.

It was a particularly dark night, with a moderate breeze, slight seas with thin clouds above, no visible horizon, heavy haze at lower altitude and thunderstorms moving toward Nimitz. This combination was producing problems for aircrew in the landing cycle.

At 2124 a Marine EA-6B Prowler No. 610, a twin-engine, four-seat, electronic warfare aircraft was launched with pilot plus two ECM officers onboard to participate in an electronic jamming exercise. On completion the aircraft returned to Nimitz, entering the glidepath. 610 called ‘Ball’ at 2332 on sighting the optical landing lights. The landing approach became unsafe, 610 was waved off and ‘boltered’, increasing power to rejoin the end of the landing queue.

The flight deck was delayed by launching for 20 minutes and all waiting aircraft were told to conserve fuel. At 2343 Prowler 610 reported “Bingo’ (Fuel critical = less than 1000 lbs of fuel remaining) and was ordered to land. Re-entering the glidepath the pilot called ‘Ball’ and commenced final approach to landing. At 2350 the aircraft was ¾ mile out from landing, but above the glidepath, to left of centre and approaching too fast. The pilot applied power caused 610 to flatten approach & reduce rate of descent but crossed the centerline drifting right. [The next two paragraphs are redacted from the report. One source reports the LSO (Landing Signal Officer] calling “Power, Power” indicating that the aircraft was too low.]

610 crossed the stern of the flightdeck to right of the centerline missing the arrester cables and struck the tail of an SH-3 helicopter, continuing on to hit three Corsair A-7E tanker aircraft, a tow tractor and three F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft before coming to rest on the port edge of the flight deck. An intense fuel fire erupted which was promptly attacked by the ship’s firefighting teams. The fire was fed by a continuous flow of JP-5 fuel from the punctured tank of an F-14 aircraft that had just been refueled. The flight deck fire fighting systems prevented the fire from spreading and the fire was contained in an area of about 4000 square feet.

The EA-6B itself exploded near aircraft loaded with live ordnance, killing the crew and sending a “fireball” rolling across the flight deck, which cooked off 20 mm ammunition, spewing fragments into the men on deck. Sailors bravely and immediately plied hoses onto the inferno as the CO ordered left 30º rudder, altering the ship’s course about 90º to come out of the wind and force smoke away from the hose teams.

The three F-14 aircraft involved in the fire were each configured with one AIM-7F Sparrow missile, one AIM-9L Sidewinder missile, one AIM-54 Phoenix and 20mm target practice ammunition. Throughout the fire, numerous hoses were trained on the missiles to keep them cool. At 0020, about 28 minutes after the fire began, it was believed “out” and the order was given to move into the area to start on the clean up

As the sailors approached the scene, a Sparrow missile warhead detonated within the debris, an unexpected slow cook-off reaction of the explosive in the warhead. This explosion killed two crewmembers, injured seven and rekindled the fire, making a 12-inch long by 24-inch wide by 3-inch deep depression in the flight deck. Two more Sparrow warheads and one Sidewinder warhead detonated after the first explosion. In all, fourteen sailors were killed and thirty-nine were injured in this accident. Three aircraft were destroyed and nine were damaged. The cost to repair the material damage from this accident was over $100 million. The destroyer USS Moosbrugger (DD-980) was the pilot rescue (planeguard) detail, and her helo joined two from Nimitz to search throughout the night for survivors. They only recovered some aircraft wreckage.

Moosbrugger also refueled one of the carrier’s helos during the ordeal. All three helo aircrew performed superbly, including one that landed on Nimitz’s fantail at the edge of the wind envelope during the height of the fire, a dangerous maneuver which observers said could not be done under the circumstances, – until sailors persevered to aid their shipmates.

Nimitz passed through several rainstorms through the nightmare, however, the merits of avoiding increased wind over the deck offset difficulties imposed by the rain and the captain chose to keep way on to reduce wind interference.

The fire destroyed three F-14A Tomcats and one EA-6B Prowler, damaging two Tomcats, nine Corsair IIs, one F6 Intruder, three S-3 Vikings and one Sea King helicopter. The Naval Air Rework Facility at Jacksonville assisted with repairing eight A-7Es damaged by the fire, one of which was extensively damaged.

The human cost was also great: 3 Marines killed on board the Prowler, 11 from the ship’s company died and a further 48 Sailors and Marines were injured. The ship’s medical department initially treated the casualties, evacuating 21 of the more critically hurt to the Navy Regional Medical Center at Jacksonville , Fla. , which issued a “total recall” of all staff to respond to the emergency. Four of the most severely burned men went on to the burn unit at Brooke Army Medical Center at San Antonio, Texas.

A long Navy investigation determined that a combination of “environmental, mechanical and human factors” caused the Prowler’s loss. Attention from the crash was diverted somewhat towards drug usage. Forensic testing conducted found that several members of the deceased flight deck crew tested positive for marijuana. The responsibility for the accident was placed on the deck crew. The official naval inquiry stated that the accident was the result of drug abuse by the enlisted crewmen of the Nimitz, despite the fact that every death occurred during the impact of the crash, none of the enlisted deck crew were involved with the operation of the aircraft, and not one member of the deck crew was killed fighting the fire.

As a result of this incident, President Ronald Reagan instituted a "Zero Tolerance" policy across all of the armed services—which started the mandatory drug testing of all US service personnel. In another report, however, the Navy stated that pilot error, possibly caused by an excessive dosage of a cold medicine in the blood of the pilot may have degraded the mental and physical skills required for night landings."

Nimitz returned to Pier 12 at Norfolk on the 28 May to repair damaged catapults, getting underway for additional training two days later. The CO later awarded one distinguished service medal, 11 meritorious service medals and numerous other awards to Sailors and Marines for their heroic firefighting efforts.

References:

http://www.insensitivemunitions.org/...on-explosions/

http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/19/us...marijuana.html

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase...t.php?id=77226

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/F...-6B_crash.jpeg

.
Attached Images
File Type: jpg USN Prowler EA-6B.jpg (81.2 KB, 6 views)
File Type: jpeg USS Nimitz (CVN-68) flight deck after 1981 EA-6B crash.jpeg (743.8 KB, 32 views)
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  #479  
Old 03-06-2017, 16:37
Surfgun Surfgun is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

The 1980's USN, from the Nimitz to the Iowa, blame was placed on enlisted personnel. It was definitely time for officers to stop placing blame elsewhere.
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  #480  
Old 06-06-2017, 09:23
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

I had to read that twice : and check with every reference I could find ! Beyond belief ! After interviewing over 400 people ? Quite simple to me, the pilot crashed his plane. I will never understand why a simple investigation report gets so diverted,complicated and lengthy. Have done a few myself as junior, but once senior officers have done the Staff Course it seems to take two paragraphs to say 'Yes' or 'No' and I grimace when signing it !
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  #481  
Old 06-06-2017, 20:44
FlankDestroyer FlankDestroyer is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Old Salt....did you find the actual Navy Report or just reports on the accident from third parties.

Looks from your references that the Secretary of the Navy attributed the primary cause of the CVN-68 accident to be the pilot/flight crew not the Flight Deck team.

It is common in these investigations to investigate every possible factor in an accident so Flight Deck procedures would also have looked at closely as you would expect. Usually there are many factors which contribute to the scope of these accidents above and beyond the initial error.

So many things have to work for safe carrier aviation. It is amazing to me that for the most part it is so routine.
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  #482  
Old 08-06-2017, 10:47
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Quote:
Originally Posted by FlankDestroyer View Post
Old Salt....did you find the actual Navy Report or just reports on the accident from third parties.

Looks from your references that the Secretary of the Navy attributed the primary cause of the CVN-68 accident to be the pilot/flight crew not the Flight Deck team.

It is common in these investigations to investigate every possible factor in an accident so Flight Deck procedures would also have looked at closely as you would expect. Usually there are many factors which contribute to the scope of these accidents above and beyond the initial error.

So many things have to work for safe carrier aviation. It is amazing to me that for the most part it is so routine.
Hi
The bulk of my article was taken from the formal report of investigation. This of course is too large to attach in this Forum. But I apologise that I neglected to list the references for it.

Firstly go to the JAG website :

http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/jagm...stigations.htm

From the index of cases select the incident:

http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/inve...20MAY%2081.pdf

Page 39 records an opinion that pilot error was the cause but reading through to the 9th.endorsement,that records that there were many and varied causes.
At that point I completed my account of the accident. In the report there is no mention of the crew taking drugs, other than cough medicine. I could find no further official reports following on. except a long saga between Navy and Congress over drugs. That is outside the scope of this thread . I therefore skimmed through and commented briefly to give our members some later resolution.

I apologise if I have got it wrong, please enlighten us. I have to rely on Captain Google ! Although of course I was part of the Melbourne/Evans collision and inquiry.

Regards
Brian
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  #483  
Old 08-06-2017, 20:26
FlankDestroyer FlankDestroyer is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Salt View Post
Hi
The bulk of my article was taken from the formal report of investigation. This of course is too large to attach in this Forum. But I apologise that I neglected to list the references for it.

Firstly go to the JAG website :

http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/jagm...stigations.htm

From the index of cases select the incident:

http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/inve...20MAY%2081.pdf

Page 39 records an opinion that pilot error was the cause but reading through to the 9th.endorsement,that records that there were many and varied causes.
At that point I completed my account of the accident. In the report there is no mention of the crew taking drugs, other than cough medicine. I could find no further official reports following on. except a long saga between Navy and Congress over drugs. That is outside the scope of this thread . I therefore skimmed through and commented briefly to give our members some later resolution.

I apologise if I have got it wrong, please enlighten us. I have to rely on Captain Google ! Although of course I was part of the Melbourne/Evans collision and inquiry.

Regards
Brian
Thanks for the links. These official accident reports are most always very comprehensive. My experience with JAG investigations is that nobody is spared.

Your comment in the third paragraph from the bottom of your summary of the accident report was "The responsibility for the accident was placed on the deck crew." This gave me the impression that the Flight Deck crew was primarily responsible and I do not think that was the case as indeed likely pilot error started the chain of events.

That was the cause of my confusion. I have no enlightenment to share beyond fighting the flight deck fire was certainly out of the hands of the A-6 flight crew after the crash so perhaps the crash responders and leadership could have performed better in a perfect world. Certainly the flight deck crew were not responsible for the accident just perhaps a victim of the tragic consequences.

I think your summaries make good lessons learned and are very instructive. Thank you. I would say as a matter of course aircraft accident investigations and follow on JAG inquiries were enormously valuable to the fleet both to reinforce existing protocols and in developing new standard procedures and equipment. Unfortunately some new rules seem to be written in blood! As bad as this accident was I believe CVN-68 actually was better prepared because of the thorough review of accidents on flight decks of US Carriers in the late sixties during very high tempo operations off Vietnam.

Your final note about the Melbourne/Evans collision and inquiry is particularly telling to me. I lost a schoolmate in that collision. That case study is still taught today to young future USN Officer of the Decks about to go out and operate in the vicinity of aircraft carriers.

Thanks again.
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  #484  
Old 14-06-2017, 02:55
Surfgun Surfgun is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Article: USCGC McCulloch, a former Asiatic Squadron warship that was lost in collision with a steamship in 1917.
https://www.navytimes.com/articles/c...ulled-from-sea
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  #485  
Old 27-06-2017, 12:41
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Quote:
Originally Posted by Surfgun View Post
Article: USCGC McCulloch, a former Asiatic Squadron warship that was lost in collision with a steamship in 1917.
https://www.navytimes.com/articles/c...ulled-from-sea
Thanks for that, Surfgun, a tragic story from 100 years ago, and we are still having the same collisions and loss of life today. That is one reason why I have continued this thread.

Brian
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  #486  
Old 27-06-2017, 13:01
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

The Loss of USS S-51 (SS-162)

On the [i]The Loss of USS S-51 (SS-162)

On 24 June 1922, USS S-51 (SS-162), a fourth-group S-class submarine, was commissioned. She was homeported in New London, Connecticut, just up the coast from where she was built at the Lake Torpedo Boat Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut. S-51 operated normally and uneventfully until the night of 25 September 1925. What follows are excerpts from a history of S-51 written by the Ships’ Histories Section of the Naval History Division.

“It was a clear starlit night with bright moonlight…. S-51…had exchanged positions and routine information—this was the last communication anyone had from S-51. According to the survivors, the routine aboard the boat was normal….

“On the City of Rome [a merchant steamer], …a lookout sighted a clear white light about five miles off the starboard beam at 2203; although he continued to watch this light and noticed that it seemed to be drawing closer, he never again mentioned it to the officer of the watch.

About three minutes later, the captain of the City of Rome, John H. Diehl, a veteran of nearly forty years in the merchant marine, came to the bridge; he too saw the light to starboard and remarked upon it…, but then moved to the port side of the ship to allow his eyes to adjust to the dark…and remained there a crucial seventeen minutes. The light continued to draw nearer.

“At approximately 2223, Captain Diehl, his eyes now accustomed to the dark, returned to the starboard side of the bridge and looked at the light again; it seemed to be growing brighter, as if it were coming nearer, and he gave the order ‘Better starboard a little’ to give the other ship more passing room. Then a red light showed next to the white, and Diehl yelled ‘Port, hard aport, the fellow is showing a red light!’ simultaneously blowing a series of short blasts on the ship’s whistle to indicate danger. S-51 had apparently realized that the steamer was not going to yield right of way and had put her rudder hard right to avoid collision….

“…With a terrible grinding of metal, City of Rome pierced S-51’s hull amidships, leaving a wound seven feet long and five to six feet high through which the sea poured in and began to fill the submarine. There was no panic below decks in the dying ship. The three survivors, thrown from their bunks by the force of collision, testified that as they waded through the rapidly deepening water in the compartments, they saw members of the crew helping each other through the hatches and attempting to secure the watertight doors….

S-51 went to the bottom less than a minute after the collision; her clocks were stopped at 2225. Officers and crew other than the three survivors had apparently managed to get out, for only twenty-three bodies were recovered from the hulk of the ship. [There was a total of 36 men aboard.] The survivors testified that they had seen several others, the exact number impossible to determine, swimming around and calling for help.”

City of Rome lowered a lifeboat and rescued three survivors, but apparently did not realize that she had sunk a submarine and “that there might still be men alive in the sunken boat, trapped in an airtight compartment and waiting for rescue. When the survivors were questioned and Captain Diehl learned it had been a submarine, he didn’t think of going back to mark the place as clearly as possible so that rescue efforts could begin immediately.”

City of Rome notified her owners of the tragedy at 0010 on the morning of 26 September; the sub base in New London had no idea that anything was wrong until a message arrived via Western Union at 0120. Ships were immediately dispatched to the scene of the sinking, but the position supplied by the City of Rome was incorrect.

S-51 was finally located, by a search plane whose crew noticed an oil slick and bubbles on the water’s surface, at 1045. “Ships converged on this spot, hoping that some of the crew might yet be alive within the hull. They hovered silently over the spot, listening intently, but could not hear any sound. The first divers reached the submarine [which lay in about 130 feet of water] at 1318, almost fifteen hours after the collision, but got no response to their tapping along the hull.” The twenty-three men remaining aboard the sunken sub were declared dead.

A court of inquiry convened by the Navy in the months after the disaster laid the blame for the sinking squarely on the shoulders of Captain Diehl, but he was later declared not guilty on civil charges of negligence and failure to stand by the sinking submarine when it was revealed “that the running lights on the S-class submarines…did not conform to the requirements of international law.” The Second District Court would later split the responsibility, blaming S-51’s running lights and City of Rome’s failure to take proper care to avoid collision for the sub’s loss.

S-51 was brought to the surface on 5 June 1926, nearly nine months after her sinking. There had been some hope of refitting her for further service, but the damage proved to be too great. The remains of the lost Sailors were removed and the hull was stripped. On 4 June 1930, the Borough Metal Company of Brooklyn, New York, purchased the hulk for $3,320.

US Submarine Museum http://ussnautilus.org/blog/the-loss...s-s-51-ss-162/
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Last edited by Old Salt : 27-06-2017 at 13:08. Reason: Delete repeated paragraph
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  #487  
Old 12-07-2017, 11:58
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

USS STICKLEBACK (SS-415) - Loss

USS Stickleback (S-415), a Balao-class submarine was commissioned on 29 March 1945, and managed only a two-day war patrol before the cease-fire was declared in mid-August. Less than a year later, she was decommissioned. The Korean War brought the boat back into action; after the conflict ended she changed jobs again to take part in training operations.

On 28 May 1958, USS Stickleback was in the Hawaiian Islands waters, and commenced an antisubmarine warfare exercise with the destroyer escort USS Silverstein (DE-534) and a torpedo retriever boat. The following afternoon, the boat was completing a simulated torpedo run on Silverstein. As Stickleback was going to a safe depth she inexplicably lost all power and broached just 600 feet ahead of her former target. Silverstein threw her engines into reverse and turned hard to port, but she was unable to stop or change course fast enough. She rammed the submarine, tearing a large hole in her port side.

The submarine USS Sabalo (SS-302), the destroyer escort USS Sturtetvant, and the submarine rescue ship USS Greenlet (ASR-10) arrived shortly at the scene and embarked the entire crew of the submarine.

All ships present attempted to pass lines beneath Stickleback to hold her up, but to no avail as compartments filled. Just before 1900, the boat sank beneath the waves, coming to rest in close to 11,000 feet of water.

It was established that just before the noon meal was served, all power was lost in the submarine, she took on a tremendous down angle and started descending rapidly. Emergency lights went on and main ballast tanks were blown. The blow went on for a long time and it was getting critical that there was enough air left to surface. A stop valve was slammed open (instead of slowly equalizing pressure) stopping motion downwards but causing the boat to rise sharply towards the surface.

“All hands forward” was piped, a red flare was ordered to be fired and the Collision Alarm was sounded. The submarine hit the surface and within about 30 seconds was rammed by the Silverstein on the port side at the bulkhead between the Control Room and the Forward Battery Room. The collision caused the boat to heel sharply to starboard and knocked everyone down.
Back on their feet, the crew rigged all compartments for collision and flooding. Looking through the deadlight in the watertight door, water was rising fast in the Control Room. About four maybe five minutes after the collision the word was passed to ‘abandon ship’.

The men in the Control Room, Sonar, and Radio escaped through the Conning Tower and dogged the lower hatch after them. Having been ordered forward there were eight crewmen in the Forward Battery en route to the Torpedo Room. With watertight doors now shut and dogged they were trapped and screaming to be let out. The door was opened to let them out and then shut and dogged behind them.

Silverstein was holding her bow in the gash, Stickleback's bow was still dry, and everyone in the Forward Torpedo Room went out through the Escape Trunk Hatch and made their way aft of the sail. USS Greenlet ASR-10 came alongside to starboard and began hooking up air hoses. Later when Silverstein backed out of the boat, she took on a port list and started sinking down by the bow.

A diver donned a Scuba rig and went to survey the damage. He dove down to the bottom of the boat, entering through the ballast tank on the flooded port side. Looking over the damage he saw the Wardroom curtains dangling out of the gash in the pressure hull. He returned onboard and reported what he had seen to the submarine's CO.

The CO ordered all the crew to remain onboard Greenlet. He then sent the last message using Stickleback’s call sign: it was actually sent from Greenlet. It reported the position of the boat, all crew survived, and loss of everything except pay records and the Deck Log. The Battle Flag were also saved.

At 18:57 on 29 May 1958 the bows sank, the stern went up with the screws, rudder, and stern planes sticking out: then she was gone.

There was a Court of Inquiry at the Submarine Base on the loss of the boat. (I cannot locate the report.) However, one crewman has recorded that they were all concerned about what was going to happen to the CO. As it turned out he made out OK and after the Court of Inquiry the crew presented him Stickleback’s battle flag. There were sad farewells as the crew were posted off to other boats.

References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Stickleback_(SS-415)
ussnautilus.org/blog/the-loss-of-uss-stickleback-ss-415/
http://www.submarinesailor.com/histo...lebackLoss.htm
www.oneternalpatrol.com/uss-stickleback-415.htm
etc.
Attached Images
File Type: jpg sticklebackrescue1.jpg (36.1 KB, 28 views)
File Type: jpg Stickleback from Sabalo.jpg (69.5 KB, 22 views)
File Type: jpg Sabalo closes Stickleback.jpg (97.2 KB, 22 views)
File Type: jpg USS-Stickleback-415a.jpg (24.7 KB, 20 views)
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  #488  
Old 12-07-2017, 17:04
Fazza Fazza is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings , Fatal Events

There are some inaccuracies in this account.
Firstly, the ship approached and departed Lord Howe Island at Reduced Specials, with an enhanced Bridge team, the DC state raised to 3Y, the focsle party closed up and an extra pair of hands in the MCR. Full SSD were not considered appropriate.
Secondly, there was a man on the echo sounder reporting soundings for both arrival and departure. You can hear him on the tapes.
Thirdly, the CO and NO did consult the chart when agreeing their plan of action before he 'swapped' with the XO ashore. Their discussion focused on the options for recovering the shore party by helicopter, not the subsequent final recovery. In that sense, the discussions between CO, XO and NO were consistent.
The OOW fixed the shop when they turned off the Navtrack to recover the helo. At the next alteration of course, he started by ordering a course of North, which was what he had agreed with the XO. The NO then suggested that 320 would be fine as this was the reciprocal of the Navtrack and was what he had agreed with the CO was a suitable course for the earlier evolution. His mistake was not to look at the chart before making this recommendation, but in his defence the OOW had conduct of the navigation from the time they weighed anchor and the navigator was on the bridge solely to ensure that the flying operations were conducted safely.
In my opinion, The reason for the grounding was that they did not properly consider the overlaying of flying operations on pilotage and reapportion responsibilities accordingly.
The charts did not help either: the single chart was essentially a 'map of the world' with LHI in one corner of it. For pilotage around the island, you had to swap to an insert on the same chart, which has Wolf Rock on the right hand extremity of the insert. Why? Nobody in any hydrographic office ever expected anyone to close LHI from the SE. It meant that the navigational plan for departing the anchorage moved off the insert well before the ship ever reached Wolf Rock; on ththe bigger scale chart it was a tiny speck which was, in fact, obscured by a pencil line from a radar fix placed on the chart by one of the bridge team.
Always worth checking the facts before plagiarising someone else's reports...

Last edited by Fazza : 12-07-2017 at 17:09. Reason: Typography
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  #489  
Old 12-07-2017, 19:34
Scatari Scatari is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings , Fatal Events

Quote:
Originally Posted by Fazza View Post

There are some inaccuracies in this account.

Always worth checking the facts before plagiarising someone else's reports...
It would help if you indicated to which post you are referring - having scrolled back through the thread, it would appear to be post #134 (July 2014) about HMS Nottingham's grounding in July 2002.

Further, your comment concerning "plagarising someone else's reports" is rude, insulting and completely uncalled for. Brian (Old Salt) is a highly respected member of these forums who dedicates untold hours of his own time researching these incidents and presenting them to us. He always acknowledges his sources and is the first one to admit it should he make a mistake in his postings. Your comment is completely unwarranted and does not reflect the positive tone which we strive to maintain on these forums.
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  #490  
Old 12-07-2017, 21:46
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Scatari View Post
It would help if you indicated to which post you are referring - having scrolled back through the thread, it would appear to be post #134 (July 2014) about HMS Nottingham's grounding in July 2002.

Further, your comment concerning "plagarising someone else's reports" is rude, insulting and completely uncalled for. Brian (Old Salt) is a highly respected member of these forums who dedicates untold hours of his own time researching these incidents and presenting them to us. He always acknowledges his sources and is the first one to admit it should he make a mistake in his postings. Your comment is completely unwarranted and does not reflect the positive tone which we strive to maintain on these forums.
Absolutely spot on.
For a first post to the Forum, without an introductory post or completing the Profile page, the post does nothing to explain which post is being referred to nor does it explain where the contradictory information can be found.
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  #491  
Old 13-07-2017, 10:17
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings , Fatal Events

Quote:
Originally Posted by Fazza View Post
There are some inaccuracies in this account.
Firstly, the ship approached and departed Lord Howe Island at Reduced Specials, with an enhanced Bridge team, the DC state raised to 3Y, the focsle party closed up and an extra pair of hands in the MCR. Full SSD were not considered appropriate.
Secondly, there was a man on the echo sounder reporting soundings for both arrival and departure. You can hear him on the tapes.
Thirdly, the CO and NO did consult the chart when agreeing their plan of action before he 'swapped' with the XO ashore. Their discussion focused on the options for recovering the shore party by helicopter, not the subsequent final recovery. In that sense, the discussions between CO, XO and NO were consistent.
The OOW fixed the shop when they turned off the Navtrack to recover the helo. At the next alteration of course, he started by ordering a course of North, which was what he had agreed with the XO. The NO then suggested that 320 would be fine as this was the reciprocal of the Navtrack and was what he had agreed with the CO was a suitable course for the earlier evolution. His mistake was not to look at the chart before making this recommendation, but in his defence the OOW had conduct of the navigation from the time they weighed anchor and the navigator was on the bridge solely to ensure that the flying operations were conducted safely.
In my opinion, The reason for the grounding was that they did not properly consider the overlaying of flying operations on pilotage and reapportion responsibilities accordingly.
The charts did not help either: the single chart was essentially a 'map of the world' with LHI in one corner of it. For pilotage around the island, you had to swap to an insert on the same chart, which has Wolf Rock on the right hand extremity of the insert. Why? Nobody in any hydrographic office ever expected anyone to close LHI from the SE. It meant that the navigational plan for departing the anchorage moved off the insert well before the ship ever reached Wolf Rock; on ththe bigger scale chart it was a tiny speck which was, in fact, obscured by a pencil line from a radar fix placed on the chart by one of the bridge team.
Always worth checking the facts before plagiarising someone else's reports...
Fazza.

Your post leaves me at a loss for words, with the possible exceptions of ‘exceedingly' and 'rude’.

My article was a précis of the official Report of Inquiry, approved by the CinC RN., freely available on the Web. Please read it. Be very careful using the word ‘plagiarism’, fortunately I care not, but it can be an expensive word.

Some chapter and verse for you to ponder:

1. The navigational dangers and reliability of the charts of Lord Howe Island are adequately recorded. With those limitations extra care was required but not given .(Para 7)

2. More caution was required using the 778BU depth sounder in depths of under 20 metres .Not given. (Para 8)

3. Serious omissions in the anchorage plan (Para 13)

4. SSD were not closed up. for anchoring (Para 14)

5. CO gave different instructions to XO and NO (Para 19)

6. No proper navigational departure plan, danger of Wolf Rock was ignored. (Para 20)

7. No SSD closed up, radar not operating. (Para 21)

8. Poor conduct and supervision of navigation. (Para 22 & 23)

9. .Inadequate navigational safety precautions to recover helo (Para 24 & 25.)

10. Poor bridge management, confused control of ship, no supervision of fixing.(Para 26)
.
11. Distracted OOW did not sight the rock until 100 yards away, N.O..…20 seconds before grounding
etc.etc.

(In sailor’s terms, there was one b**** nasty solitary rock in a large bay … they managed to hit it: Scarce attention was paid to navigational safety, the reliability of the chart etc. when making and executing the plan. There are no excuses, only negligence.)


Brian
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  #492  
Old 13-07-2017, 10:19
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Tim and Jim

Thank you for your kind remarks, much appreciated.

Kia Kaha
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  #493  
Old 19-07-2017, 01:40
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Plus there is a thing called the Pilot, which makes specific mention of Wolf Rock and its dangers. Have been to Lord Howe in ships on a couple of occasions; it was certainly something we were well aware of.
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  #494  
Old 19-07-2017, 12:35
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Plus there is a thing called the Pilot, which makes specific mention of Wolf Rock and its dangers. Have been to Lord Howe in ships on a couple of occasions; it was certainly something we were well aware of.
Thanks for that, quite correct. The chart is only a pictorial view of the region, the Sailing Directions( Pilot) for that region describes the coastlines, dangers etc. and recommends the best and safest routes. Both must be consulted when planning a passage

Pilots for the complete world are published by the (British) Admiralty

NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) publish Coastal Pilots for the coastal waters of USA.

NGA (National Geospatial Intelligence Agency produces charts and Sailing Direction for the whole world. They are also available for download from : http://msi.nga.mil

Navigational information is freely shared between nations and many maritime nations produce their own language charts and publications.

(Many of us ancient mariners will be thinking that charts are paper : these days most are digital and are used on computers screens via ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System)

(But I digress from the thread of 'nasties'.

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  #495  
Old 31-07-2017, 14:04
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

TYPHOON COBRA

On 17 December 1944, the ships of Pacific Fleet Task Force 38, comprising 7 fleet and 6 light carriers, 8 battleships, 15 cruisers, and about 50 destroyers were operating 250 - 300 miles east of Luzon in the Philippine Sea.

Having just completed three days of heavy raids against Japanese airfields in the Philippines the fleet was attempting to refuel its ships, especially the lighter destroyers with small fuel tanks. Although the sea had been becoming rougher all day, the nearby cyclonic disturbance gave relatively little warning of its approach. As the weather worsened it became increasingly difficult to refuel, and the attempts had to be discontinued. Despite warning signs of worsening conditions, the ships remained in their stations. Worse, the information given to Admiral Halsey about the location and direction of the typhoon was inaccurate. On December 17, the Third Fleet unwittingly sailed towards the heart of the typhoon.

On 18 December, the small but violent Typhoon Cobra overtook the Task Force near the center of the storm. Ships were buffeted by extreme seas and hurricane force winds gusting to 120 knots (140 mph; 220 km/h) with very high seas, torrential rain and barometric pressures as low as 26.8 in Hg (907hPa).

Damage to the fleet was severe with some ships rolling more than 70º. Three destroyers, Spence, Hickox, and Maddox, had nearly empty fuel stores (10-15% of capacity) and lacking the stabilizing effect of the extra weight were relatively unstable. Hull and Monaghan were of the older Farragut-class having been refitted with over 500 long tons (510 t) of extra equipment making them top-heavy. Spence, Hull, and Monaghan either capsized or were sunk after water flooded down their smokestacks and disabled their engines. Without power, they were unable to control their heading and were at the mercy of the wind and seas. Hickox and Maddox pumped seawater into their empty fuel tanks, adding enough stability to ride out the storm with relatively minor damage. The three destroyers went down with practically all hands. 790 officers and men were lost or killed, with another 80 injured.

Fires occurred in three carriers when planes broke loose in their hangars and 146 planes on various ships were lost or damaged beyond economical repair by fires, impact damage, or by being swept overboard.

Many other ships of TF 38 suffered various degrees of damage, especially to radar and radio equipment which crippled communications within the fleet. Several carriers suffered fires in their hangars and 146 aircraft were wrecked or blown overboard. Nine ships— including one light cruiser, three light carriers, and two escort carriers—suffered enough damage to be sent for repairs.

Rescue efforts

The fleet was scattered by the storm. The destroyer escort Tabberer encountered and rescued a first survivor from Hull while itself desperately fighting the typhoon.. Shortly thereafter, she rescued many more survivors. Tabberer 's CO directed that the ship, despite its own dire condition, begin boxed searches to look for more survivors.Tabberer eventually rescued 55 survivors in a 51-hour search, despite repeated orders from Admiral Halsey to return all ships to port in Ulithi. She picked up 41 men from Hull and 14 from Spence before finally returning to Ulithi after being relieved by two destroyer escorts.

Despite disobeying fleet orders, Tabberer ‘s CO was awarded the Legion of Merit by Admiral Halsey, and Tabberer's crew each were awarded Navy Unit Commendation ribbons (the first ever awarded).

After the fleet had regrouped, ships and aircraft conducted search and rescue missions. The destroyer Brown rescued the only survivors from Monaghan, six in total. She additionally rescued 13 sailors from Hull. Eighteen other survivors from Hull and Spence were rescued over the three days following Typhoon Cobra by other ships of the 3rd Fleet. The destroyer USS The Sullivans (DD-537) emerged from the storm undamaged and began looking for survivors before returning to Ulithi on Christmas Eve. In all, 93 men were rescued of the over 800 men presumed missing in the three ships, and two others who had been swept overboard from the escort carrier Anzio.

Investigation

While conducting operations off the Philippines, the Third Fleet remained on station rather than breaking up and running from the storm. This led to a loss of men, ships and aircraft. A Navy court of inquiry was convened on board the USS Cascade at the Naval base at Ulithi. Admiral Nimitz, CINCPAC, was in attendance at the court. The inquiry found that though Halsey had committed an error of judgment in sailing the Third Fleet into the heart of the typhoon, it stopped short of unambiguously recommending sanction.

In January 1945, Halsey passed command of the Third Fleet to Admiral Spruance (whereupon its designation changed to "Fifth Fleet"). Halsey resumed command in late-May 1945. In early June 1945 Halsey again sailed the fleet into the path of a typhoon, Typhoon Connie, and while ships sustained crippling damage, none were lost on this occasion. However six lives were lost, 75 planes were destroyed, with 70 more badly damaged. A second Navy court of inquiry was convened. This time the court suggested that Halsey be reassigned, but Admiral Nimitz recommended otherwise due to Halsey's prior service to the Navy. Halsey remained in command of Third Fleet until the cessation of hostilities.

Typhoon Cobra delivered the Navy’s worst “defeat” of World War II, capsizing three destroyers, damaging 12 more ships, destroying 150 planes, and killing 793 men and inflicted more damage on the Navy than any storm since the hurricane at Apia, Samoa in 1889. In the aftermath of this deadly storm, the Pacific Fleet established new weather stations in the Caroline Islands and, as they were secured, Manila, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In addition, new weather central offices (for coordinating data) were established at Guam and Leyte.

USS Monterey

On that day, Lieutenant Ford was gunnery officer on the USS Monterey (CVL-26 ). Winds over 100 knots (190 km/h;120 mph) produced 40-70 foot waves and the ship rolling 25 º caused Ford to lose his footing and slide toward the edge of the deck. Only the two-inch steel ridge around the edge of the carrier prevented him from falling overboard. At the height of the storm, several fighter planes tore loose from their cables, collided into one another, igniting aircraft gas tanks, and setting the hangar deck ablaze. Flames sucked into the air intakes leading to the lower decks, spreading the fire inside the ship Ford, serving as General Quarters OOD was ordered to go below to assess the raging fire. He did so safely, and reported his findings back to the ship’s CO.

Admiral Halsey had ordered Monterey’s CO to abandon ship as the carrier blazed from stem to stern “We can fix this,” the CO stated. With a nod from the CO, Lt. Ford donned a gas mask and led a fire fighting team below. All the while aircraft-gas tanks exploded as hose handlers slid across the burning decks. First order of business was to carry out the dead and injured. Hours later, he and his team emerged burned and exhausted, but they had put out the fire.

After the fire, Monterey was declared unfit for service. Historical documents credit Ford’s courage for ensuring that nearly all his men survived to take part in the Battle of Okinawa . He was promoted to Lt.Cdr. On October 3, 1945, and was released from Navy duty on June 28, 1946. Entering politics , he became a congressman for 25 yrs, Vice President in 1973 replacing Spiro Agnew, and the 38th President of the United States in 1974-77 following the resignation of Richard Nixon.

Named in his honour, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is the lead ship of her class of United States Navy supercarriers.

References
:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typhoon_Cobra_(1944)
http://www.history.navy.mil/research...mber-1944.html
http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=79
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Gerald_R._Ford
etc.
Attached Images
File Type: jpg USS Cowpens (CVL-25) Typhoon Cobra 1944.jpg (53.4 KB, 25 views)
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  #496  
Old 01-08-2017, 04:44
Spoz Spoz is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Not sure it is the "Navy's worst defeat" - that would have to go to the Battle of Savo Island (3 USN and one RAN heavy cruiser lost for no gain) I would think! But even in our Navy, one of those lessons on when to disobey orders, partlcularly relating to the ballasting and the rescues by Tabberer. One wonders about Halsey, he did seem to have a bit of a gift for not making the best of decisions.
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  #497  
Old 01-08-2017, 18:12
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Ballasting was/is always a CO decision and not about the Task Force Commander although replenishment schedules factored in. Dare I say sustained operations in the Pacific while fighting a World War only complicate the scenario.

Fueling Destroyers when the weather is really rough can be problematical to say the least. There was no safe harbor to steam to. Risking fuel oil contamination and all maneuverability due to ballasting and the subsequent loss of fires or potentially turning turtle just before you are going to ballast anyway with real fuel is a tough call. Numerous attempts at refueling only made the dilemma worse.

Even the Spence which was a larger Fletcher Class succumbed in the typhoon. Who knows but they may have even dropped a boiler off line just to save fuel and risked loosing fires even without water in the fuel? In the Pacific during high tempo operations fuel is always a problem,

Modern US Destroyers have automatic compensation systems so these lessons were hard won.
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  #498  
Old 13-08-2017, 23:37
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

As a RFA veteran of six Fishery Protection patrols off Iceland, I can certainly agree with your comments.If a frigate must fuel we would stream a hose astern and watch with some trepidation as the line was grapplled and the the hose hauled onboard. Watching the gyrations of the Type14 we always reckoned their guys deserved a medal. Those ships were certainly not designed for operations in that area/weather.

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Old 14-08-2017, 00:48
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Quote:
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Not sure it is the "Navy's worst defeat" - that would have to go to the Battle of Savo Island (3 USN and one RAN heavy cruiser lost for no gain) I would think! But even in our Navy, one of those lessons on when to disobey orders, partlcularly relating to the ballasting and the rescues by Tabberer. One wonders about Halsey, he did seem to have a bit of a gift for not making the best of decisions.
Well, Savo Island was a bad defeat, though I think Pearl Harbour was somewhat more so, no?

As for Halsey, he has been the victim of a tremendous amount of "Monday Morning Quarterbacking", especially among his contemporaries jealous of his popular fame; one should treat most accounts with a degree of skepticism. Spruance and Nimitz are, for some reason, never held to account for the blood-baths at Tarawa, Palau and Iwo Jima, which rival Passchendaele for their pointless slaughter.
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Old 14-08-2017, 06:17
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

Quote:
Originally Posted by Gwyrosydd View Post
Well, Savo Island was a bad defeat, though I think Pearl Harbour was somewhat more so, no?

As for Halsey, he has been the victim of a tremendous amount of "Monday Morning Quarterbacking", especially among his contemporaries jealous of his popular fame; one should treat most accounts with a degree of skepticism. Spruance and Nimitz are, for some reason, never held to account for the blood-baths at Tarawa, Palau and Iwo Jima, which rival Passchendaele for their pointless slaughter.
Tarawa, Palau and Iwo Jima may rival Passchendaele for pointless slaughter but the magnitude of the slaughter in no way compares with the butchery on the Western Front.

495,000 casualties from both sides at Passchendaele killed and wounded
7,850 at Tarawa, 20,700 at Palau and 41,500 at Iwo Jima.
Sickening yes, comparable no.
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