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  #526  
Old 19-09-2017, 16:31
FlankDestroyer FlankDestroyer is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by Kevin Denlay View Post
To get an idea (that is if there are any other land lubbers here) just how close the fore-guns can 'point aft of abaft' , the below plan of the arcs of the fore-guns on the cruiser HMS Exeter (68) give some idea of what it may have been like on the bridge / inside the superstructure when fired at that angle! Red and green dots show max aft angle of #2 and #1 turret respectfully.

And fired at that angle they were, as that is exactly, repeat exactly, how they were found pointing on the wreck of Exeter when discovered in 2007 in the Java Sea (long before she disappeared into the hands of illegal salvagers that is, but that’s another story.)

And if you go to this page here, post 26, you will see HMS Tiger with her even bigger guns pointing in a similar direction. Ouch.
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forum...2#post10169342
x
x
Ouch is right and that is painful. Yes that is exciting on the bridge!

Guns pointed abaft the beam makes for decidedly unpleasant conditions on the bridge. Much more so than in the mounts themselves! Additionally when the guns/mounts/turrets are trained that far aft besides the blast etc. there are still more factors to consider for the bridge team. For instance will the train limit stops or firing cut out systems actually work and will you destroy your own bridge? And if the safety systems function properly will you therefore stop engaging the enemy as your guns stop firing? Should the bridge team maneuver and clear/open the firing arcs and hazard formation integrity and or risk collision. And of course none of this is done is isolation as the enemy is likely maneuvering for their own tactical advantage to open or close the range to suit their battery.

So going back to Grosser Kreuzer's question re whether flash was a contributory factor to the collisions that occurred. Yes smoke. flash, shock and debris all impact a bridge team's performance and this is even before you potentially take fire. Whether in training or combat, warship watch officers have a lot to consider besides point to point seamanship.

Last edited by FlankDestroyer : 19-09-2017 at 16:46.
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  #527  
Old 26-09-2017, 11:32
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Old Salt Old Salt is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

(This is my 100th. article in this thread I shall be taking a break for a while sorting major changes in our lives)

HMS Barham v HMS Duchess - Loss

The declaration on of war on Germany in September of 1939, had been the signal for a flotilla of nine 'D' Class destroyers to leave their Chinese port, with the instruction to set sail for the 'friendly' waters of the U.K. with "the greatest possible speed".

It had been a rare experience, an impressive and morale - boosting sight for the crew of the "Duchess", as they had steamed away in single file and at thirty knots, heading for refueling at Singapore On they had gone at break-neck speeds, beyond Colombo, Aden and into the Suez Canal. the other shipping had been halted to ensure the flotilla's unimpeded progress to Malta. . Here , three of the destroyers -- "Duchess", "Dainty", and 'Delight" -- were detailed to escort the Battleship "Barham" from Gibraltar to Scotland. Apart from their high speed the battleship and her escorts followed the usual pattern of submarine - avoidance by zigzagging, making it difficult for an enemy submarine to obtain a 'fix' on the ship.

It had been a lightning trip -- perhaps the fastest East - West passage ever recorded and morning gloom of a 12 December 1939 morning, she zigged and zagged her way towards the Mull of Galloway, only nine miles distant and almost home.

The majority of the crew were asleep below, the guns’ crews had been secured, leaving just one junior seaman on watch at each turret. He was the 'communication number', the sailor on watch each gun. As junior ratings, they had been given the icy, early morning duty and envied their gunnery mates their chance to go below into the warmth of the mess.

At 0400 the watches began to change. Only another hour of this would see them home and dry. Ships were blacked out and the absence of moonlight made it a coal-black night. The lookout on ‘A’ gun forwards saw a sickening large shadow and HMS Barham crashed into HMS Duchess with such force that she was almost cut in half.

HMS Duchess did not stand a chance; the impact of the collision was so devastating that she capsized in position 55º19'N, 06º06'W,, giving those on board little time to flee as she started to sink. Then her depth charges exploded, killing 124 of her crew including her Commanding Officer, who was stuck in his sea cabin when the sliding door jammed. Survivors would always remember the cold, misery and confusion .and the anguish of seeing entombed sailors shouting from tiny portholes. Arms and heads waving out of portholes too small to escape as the ship disappeared beneath the waves, taking her entombed crew with her.

The "Barham" and her other destroyer escorts, lowered boats and survivors began to shout as their chances of survival were diminishing for every minute left in that icy waste. Barham’s boats were frantically searching for survivors in the icy water. Many had perished from hypothermia, and only 23 few lucky ones survived from her crew of 160, a loss of 137 brave souls.

A satisfactory explanation was never given for the incident. Since that day, however, ships have had escape hatches built into their sides, to prevent the fate that befell many of the "Duchess'" crew.

References

The Death of a Duchess by Wendy Middlemas
A Sketch of the past DR. Dr Caroline Potternavy http://en.gravatar.com/carolinelpotter
Wiki
Navy–Net navy.net.co.uk/Net
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  #528  
Old 26-09-2017, 14:52
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jbryce1437 jbryce1437 is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by Old Salt View Post
(This is my 100th. article in this thread I shall be taking a break for a while sorting major changes in our lives)
Many thanks for your stirling contributions to this thread Brian, all much appreciated. Enjoy the break but hurry back

Jim
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  #529  
Old 26-09-2017, 17:39
Scatari Scatari is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by Old Salt View Post

(This is my 100th. article in this thread I shall be taking a break for a while sorting major changes in our lives)


HMS Barham v HMS Duchess - Loss
Thanks for another great post Brian.

Not quite sure what you mean by ships having "escape hatches built into their sides?"

Hope the "major changes" are positive ones.
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  #530  
Old 26-09-2017, 18:19
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Thanks for another great post Brian.

Not quite sure what you mean by ships having "escape hatches built into their sides?"
Most of the old frigates and destroyers that I remember had escape hatches, usually from living spaces, as per attachment. Most current ships do not even have scuttles (portholes) in the hull, never mind escape hatches.

Jim
Attached Images
File Type: jpg escape hatches.jpg (349.0 KB, 27 views)
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  #531  
Old 26-09-2017, 18:35
Scatari Scatari is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by jbryce1437 View Post

Most of the old frigates and destroyers that I remember had escape hatches, usually from living spaces, as per attachment. Most current ships do not even have scuttles (portholes) in the hull, never mind escape hatches.

Jim
I wasn't aware of this at all Jim ... there certainly were no such hatches (at least in Canadian ships) by the time I joined the navy.

Many thanks for contributing to my continuing education!
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  #532  
Old 26-09-2017, 19:05
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

If you look at this video, around 1min 38secs, rotate the camera round and you will see a wheel valve (looks like a red colour) to the port bulkhead of the mess, above the hammock netting. The wheel valve was to open the escape hatch, which was about twice the diameter of a normal scuttle.

Jim
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  #533  
Old 26-09-2017, 19:11
Scatari Scatari is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by jbryce1437 View Post
If you look at this video, around 1min 38secs, rotate the camera round and you will see a wheel valve (looks like a red colour) to the port bulkhead of the mess, above the hammock netting. The wheel valve was to open the escape hatch, which was about twice the diameter of a normal scuttle.

Jim
Thanks Jim.
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  #534  
Old 26-09-2017, 19:51
Kevin Denlay Kevin Denlay is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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Originally Posted by Old Salt View Post
At 0400 the watches began to change. Only another hour of this would see them home and dry. Ships were blacked out and the absence of moonlight made it a coal-black night. The lookout on ‘A’ gun forwards saw a sickening large shadow and HMS Barham crashed into HMS Duchess with such force that she was almost cut in half.
Great wrote up OS!!

Shades of HMAS Voyager and HMAS Melbourne!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melbou...ager_collision
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  #535  
Old 05-10-2017, 23:49
Jock3 Jock3 is offline
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

You really couldn't make this up if you tried!
Here is the early aircraft carrier HMS Campania slowly sinking in the River Forth in 1918.
Evidently she broke her moorings off Burntisland in a force 10 and collided with the battleship HMS Royal Oak. She then next smacked into the battlecruiser HMS Glorious puncturing her hull, resulting in her sinking 5 hours later.. All her crew were picked up
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File Type: jpg Campania sinking.jpg (349.8 KB, 21 views)
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  #536  
Old 06-10-2017, 16:23
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Default Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

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You really couldn't make this up if you tried!
Here is the early aircraft carrier HMS Campania slowly sinking in the River Forth in 1918.
Evidently she broke her moorings off Burntisland in a force 10 and collided with the battleship HMS Royal Oak. She then next smacked into the battlecruiser HMS Glorious puncturing her hull, resulting in her sinking 5 hours later.. All her crew were picked up
You will find an account of the sinking and the same photo in #209 on this thread. Other photos of her in this post.

Jim
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  #537  
Old Yesterday, 10:09
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Cool Re: Warship Collisions, Groundings, Fatal Events

HMS ENDURANCE - FLOODING

In 2007 Fleet Command were tasked to study deploying HMS Endurance to the South Atlantic for 18 months. Their recommendations were approved including a manning regime whereby key personnel would return to UK as the programme permitted others to be rotated to leave on a 1 in 3 basis. An additional Engineer Officer would be appointed.

The voyage to Antarctica proceeded in 2008, carrying 38 civilian passengers. On 21 October the Engine Room was accidentally flooded by dumping hot water into the bilges. This incident was well handled.

On 21 November, XO took command, the Engineer Officer rejoined with the additional EO. The Deputy EO went on leave plus two Departmental Chief Petty Officers.

On 14 December there was a flood in the Engine Room caused by a double bottom lid not being fitted correctly

Prior to 16 Dec water production was less than normal, with consumption greater carrying the additional passengers? It became necessary to restrict water usage and methods to improve water production were required. The decision was made by the Acting Services Manager to clean all strainers in the system. The strainer at high level was suspected of being blocked.

On 16 December a start was made to clean the strainers in the high level. The air hoses were disconnected and the strainer lid removed. During the reassembly the air control lines were incorrectly reconnected before the strainer lid had been replaced. A remotely operated valve opened and seawater poured into the Engine Room through the open strainer. The valve was unable to be closed and the strainer lid could not be replaced against the pressure of the incoming seawater. A major flood was underway which almost resulted in the near loss of the ship.

The opening of the valve was caused during the assembly of the strainer by a failure to fully isolate the compressed air supply to those lines. A number of contributing factors were: absence of trained maintainers, failure to implement a safe work system, unsatisfactory engineering practice, and design shortfalls in the valve control system. Externally the provision of engineering and management assurance for a unit conducting an unusually long deployment in a remote and challenging environment was insufficient and the significance of previous incidents suggesting poor engineering management were not recognized.

The ship was headed away from land to give more time to combat the flood. ‘Emergency Stations’ were called and a ‘Mayday’ signal was sent by VHF. The main aerial had a defect which prevented other sets from working. A call was put through to Admiralty at Northwood advising the situation.

An aggressive attack was made with all pumps connected but the output was less than the incoming seawater, assessed as 1000 m3. . Internal communications between the E.R., the bridge and Damage Control HQ were difficult throughout. The strainer lid was now in the bottom of the flooded Engine Room and could not be found, even by three brave but risky attempts by divers.

Secondary flooding now occurred in the shaft tunnel and stability concerns were now grave with the ship beam on to the seas and rolling 25° each way. Motion was eased somewhat when a roll reduction tank high in ship was emptied of water.

Additional secondary floods were now beyond the boundaries fore and aft. A burst pipe in the forward hold was soon bandaged but now a backflow was pouring into basins in the bathrooms. No more pumps were available so spare hands and passengers were set to work bailing. A secondary flood at the Gym required a concrete box to stem the flow. Electric cables had to be cut to seal the opening and two ratings received electric shocks.

The ship was now drifting towards the land and a lighthouse was contacted to ask a cruise liner to close and assist. Unfortunately the ship would be aground before it arrived.

The starboard anchor was let go with nine shackles of cable. This slowed the drift somewhat but changed the direction of drift towards nearby banks. Fortunately the starboard anchor took hold to stop the drift and the port anchor was now also let go.

Overnight assistance was received from the Chilean Navy and two tugs were on their way. Both ship’s helicopters were used by day to transfer pumps, drinking water and salvage equipment. A Chile SAR helicopter was in attendance and evacuated 15 civilians.

At 1115 next day 17 December a tug arrived and the towline was passed. Both anchor cables were cut as there was no power and the tow was commenced with the ship yawing 90 each way. The second tug arrived and made fast, steadying the tow and the journey to Punta Arenas was made without problems.

Once alongside the main salvage effort commenced to restore watertight integrity and prepare for onward tow.

Investigation Report

The investigating board found the Causal Factors were air lines being incorrectly installed. Contributing factors were faulty defect analysis- the evaporators were performing at full capacity and it was not imperative to clean strainers. A lack of fresh water was no reason to clean high level strainers. System knowledge was inadequate and the importance of restoring balance system for trim was not necessary. The knowledge and practice of drills was inadequate and Engineering Dept. Standing Orders are sparse and lacking detail. Both Heads of the Services Section were absent on leave, their relief onboard was unaware of the systems. Poor engineering standards were applied to cleaning the high strainer and no-one appreciated the effect of misconnecting the air lines. Engineering standards were known to be poor and there was no risk management made about the risky cleaning of high level strainers.

Feasibility study had identified risk as financial risk only.

Other issues

In general ship’s staff were very positive about the support provided by external agencies.
The difficulty in maintaining the flood boundary should not be under estimated, particularly in a ship rolling in excess of 25° either side. Deck interfaces and workshop doors were not watertight by design

The ship was designed to survive flooding of one compartment and this she did

The requirement to isolate open systems at watertight bulkheads was not implemented.
Once the bilge pumps in the ER stopped, there was lack of capacity to remove water from this space. As flood water rose the ship lost all electrical generation.
Although DC action was commendable and saved the ship, some of the actions taken highlight a lack of awareness of risk management which could have caused fatalities.
END had not sent the required departure conditions to the Platform Team.
The SAT C aerial was known to be defective which delayed the provision of GMDSS

Learning from other incidents across the fleet appears to be ineffective.

Conclusions

a. The flooding was a result of valve Vv 1113 inadvertently opening during the cleaning of the high level seawater strainers whilst its lid was off. Valve actuation was caused by the air control lines being incorrectly installed.
b. It was not necessary to clean any sea inlet strainers to improve fresh water production.
c. It was not necessary to clean the high level sea inlet strainer at this time
d. The control lines to valve Vv 1113 were incorrectly installed.
e. The request and subsequent approval to undertake the high level strainer were both ambiguous.

Key contributing factors were:
The absence of a suitably trained maintainer
The inability to maintain consistent and satisfactory engineering standards.
A lack of maintenance procedure to support strainer cleaning
A failure to effectively identify and mitigate the risks involved in high level strainer clean
Recognition of END isolated and extended deployment location had not been factored into the Manning Situation
Design and installation of control air lines to Vv 1113 fall far below accepted standards.
The design shortfalls of control air lines to VV1113 had existed since 2004 but had never been reported to the Platform Team
Onboard documentation to support maintenance of the Fresh Water is adequate but the routines are inadequate.
Had the ship’s anchor not taken hold of the only shallow patch that END happened to drift over there was a very real possibility that the ship would be lost.
Overall the actions of ENDs ship’s company to recover themselves from their precarious situation were commendable.

Recommendations

2 pages are devoted to the ship, FOST, COSCAP, Chief of personnel, NCHQ, recommendations for Platform Team Leader, PORFLOT,
Recommendation that finding of this inquiry be forwarded to all.

Discussion

Very satisfactory DC response by the ship’s company in challenging conditions together with the fortunate proximity of the suitable anchorage led to successful recovery of situation. Excellent support was received from Chile and the RN in UK.

Source Report of Investigation :

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/...AD..._endurance.pdf
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