BATTLLE OF TASSAFARONGA-A Lesson in Naval Tactics

[jainso31]

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/tassafaronga.htm

The Battle of Tassafaronga, see link above-sometimes known as the 4th Battle of Savo-incredibly resulted in a fourth defeat for a USN heavy cruiser force.The lessons of the previous three encounters with the IJN had,somehow,not been fully learned.Four USN heavy cruisers were torpedoed and sunk, with a resultant heavy loss of life. Just what went wrong this time??

jainso31

[Hank]

I'll address this one, but not directly, as I believe the whole "Island Hopping" strategy of the Allied effort to have been an also-ran as far as operational planning.

Let us consider a few facts here. The Allies had access to Japanese intentions through the breaking of codes. This fact was kept so secret that many of the operational planners who could have used the information were unaware of its existence. Through the miracle of hindsight I propose the following.

Allow the Japanese to build their forces in the Solomons and Gilbert Islands to whatever level they want, let them fill those islands with every resource they can muster. They wanted to move on Australia. Place every Allied resource in a position to prevent an effective move in that direction by the Japanese.

When a certain point in Japanese concentration of effort on those Southern Pacific islands is reached commit submarine and naval aviation to blowing away those Japanese transports moving nortward, empty. Given that sailing times and positions were known, to a great extent, by the Allies it would have been possible to stage attacks and still maintain an effective defensive line.

The end result would have been the isolation of a great part of Japanese ability early in the game, with inability to either withdraw it or supply it.

regards

[jainso31]

Hi Hank-not sure where you are going with "the what if theory"but with "sailing times known and attacks made acccordingly whilst maintaining a defensive line".This is what was happening; but with the wrong tactics and nothing to with strategy.The line astern approach to battle with no picket DDs was completly out of date.
That being said Hank- may I say thank you for interest and input

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

Actually, the US force had learned. They weren't in the previously unimaginative line astern. Four destroyers were detached as a portside van force. They probably should have been separated from the five cruisers further but they were separated. Because they were separated, they were able to fire torpedoes fairly early in the action. Unfortunately, they were wasted; they were all fired at the nearest Japanese destroyer, Takanami. That destroyer, because it was nearest and so the biggest (maybe only) blip on the radar, also drew the gunfire of all five cruisers. This was massive overkill. However, this is getting ahead of the story; let's backtrack a bit.

The Japanese sighted the US force first despite US radar. The probable reason for this is that the Japanese were between the US force and Guadalcanal. Therefore, the blips of Japanese force were lost in the ground returns from the island. Although they got the first sighting, the Japanese didn't do as well as usual. Usually, they fired off a massive barrage of torpedoes that hit US ships before the US ships even knew that they were in a battle. This time, only one Japanese DD (Naganami) fired her fish. She was very successful, however, she hit two US cruisers, Minnesota and New Orleans. This disrupted the US formation and, three minutes later, another Japanese DD (Kuroshio, undisturbed by gunfire because everyone had been targeting only the one DD) fired a spread which eventually got two hits on Northampton and sank her. Another three minutes later, two more DDs fired torp spreads and eventually got a hit on Pensacola (the two DDs were Kawakaze and Suzukaze, Suzukaze probably got the hit).

That last hit was only 18 minutes after the first torp had been fired and 12 minutes after the US gunfire started. This was a very quick battle and the result was determined by that first torpedo spread. It hit the two leading heavy cruisers in the US line and the three behind them had to dodge around them as they slowed. As I mentioned earlier, this disrupted them and basically ended the possibility of effective US offensive action before the Japanese retired behind their later torpedo spreads. By the way, you mentioned that four cruisers were lost. Actually, only one was lost although three others were badly damaged; Japanese long lance torpedoes were nasty. The Japanese only lost that one DD that everybody targeted. This wasn't so much faulty doctrine as the fact that every other Japanese ship was about 50% farther away. This DD was thus the biggest threat and so was targeted first. That first torpedo spread hit only two minutes after the US ships opened fire. If that confusion after the torp hits hadn't occurred, the US ships may have resolved their issues and spread their fire among more targets. As it was, from then on, the US ships were basically only scrambling targets, maneuvering to try to keep themselves safe from any subsequent torpedo spreads. Most of the undamaged US ships ducked around Savo Island. After that first three minutes of US gunfire, there was no other gunfire by either side.

The US force was thus more unlucky than guilty of faulty doctrine. If you want a battle where they were guilty, Kolombangara eight months later on July 13, 1943 is a good candidate. By this time, US forces had had some victories and had resolved most remaining doctrine issues (CICs were helping). Nevertheless, in this battle, the US force behaved abysmally. The Japanese fired 42 torpedoes and retreated. The Allies (the force include the British cruiser Leander which was almost sunk by a torp hit) fired 10. The US cruisers pounded the Japanese CL Jintsu to bits before she could leave (25 US torps were wasted, being fired at the sinking hulk). While the US force was still worried about that hulk, the Japanese destroyers had reloaded their torpedo tubes and returned, firing 32 more fish. They got a hit on two cruisers and sank the DD Gwin. The Allied force had lost discipline in getting overly involved with the foe that they had already dealt with successfully and so were wide open to a subsequent sucker punch.

[jainso31]

Thank for your learned input keith-I can see that i have erred many times-but I will learn.

jainso31

[John Odom]

The Long Lance torpedo was perhaps the most advanced and successful Japanese weapon of the war. It took a heavy toll of our ships while our forces were firing duds.

[Old Salt]

The cruiser Leander torpedoed at Kolombangara was of course Royal New Zealand Navy, not British. When you see the size of the hole caused by one Long Lance torpedo, the damage control effort was really remarkable. She was able to make it back to Tulagi and NZ for temporary repairs, then on to US for permanent repairs.

[jainso31]

To return to the original theme of this thread.We have the relatively inexperienced Adm Wright USN versus the experienced and battle hardened Adm.
TanakaIJN.The plan was to have 4-5 USN Destroyers some 12000 yds in front of the cruiser Task Force;but this was reduced to an ineffective 4000yds. Additional destroyers could not conform to the agreed plan, because they were latecomers; and were not briefed.Wright was tardy in replying to his lead destroyers; which were ready to launch their torpedoes; and opened fire instead on the nearest radar target-a Japanese picket destroyer.
As the 8" cruisers opened fire successively in their orderly line-they wittingly or unwittingly lit up their positions like a fairground-they were all using ordinary cordite shells.Tanaka gave a signal order to his his destoyers in the rear-advance and launch their Long lance torpdoes,which they did with dexterity and quickly drew back again.This short lived melee accounted for all four cruisers-one the Northampton would sink,whilst the other three would be out of the war for a year undergoing repairs.
One Japanese destoyer sunk gave the wily Tanaka a satisfying victory.

jainso31

[Hank]

One particular issue here interests me, as it was experienced by Allied naval forces elsewhere throughout the war . Keith mentions the effect of Radar transmission ground returns in obfuscating the picture that might have been provided had the destroyers bearing the SJ/SN equipment been positioned further offshore. Regards

[jainso31]

Hank this link is about USN radar in general during WW2-perhaps you can work out the "best" ranges of each

jainso31




http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Radar_WWII.htm

[Old Salt]

Radar produced in NZ was used in the Pacific theatre .. it was mobile and fitted on the back of a truck for land use. I shall look out the details. HMNZS Arbutus was the Fleet radar repair ship in the Solomons area.

Brian

[Keith Enge]

Hank,

The effect of spurious ground radar returns hiding enemy ships isn't really a function of the absolute distance from that shore. Instead, the primary factor is the relative distance to the enemy and to the shore. Therefore, to get a better solution, the enemy has to cooperate. If, on the other hand, they hug the shore, there really isn't much that could be done with the radars then available.

This problem tended to disappear later in the war for two reasons. One was that the later radars tended to be PPI (plan position indicator). These are the type of radar with which we are currently familiar; you see a top-down 2-D view centered on your ship. With this, you have an automatic plot of the battle and thus can more easily determine what are ships and what is land. Without a PPI radar, plotting has to be done by hand which results in delay and sometimes errors too. Second, the plotting without PPI was problematic at this time because of the lack of CICs (combat information center). Without these dedicated areas of the ship where all situational data could be collected and assessed, the commanders were forced to make decisions without having all of the available facts with which to make them.

By the way, ground returns weren't the only problem. The classic example is the "battle of the pips". On July 27, 1943 west of Kiska in the Aleutians, a US task group fought a battle against radar "ghosts". They fired 518 14" battleships and 487 8" heavy cruiser shells. Their "target" was radar returns that were the "second time around". Unusual atmospheric conditions bent the radar over the horizon to bounce off some far away unseen island. By the time that the radar pulse returned to the ship, another pulse had already been sent. The radar then thought that the old pulse return was from the new pulse instead. Thus, the range to the island seemed to be half of what it actually was and the ships fired on it (knowing that there wasn't an island at that short range so it must be a ship). This sort of thing happened other times and to other navies too but this one lasted longer than any other and had heavier forces (two BBs and three CAs).

[jainso31]

Keith- many thanks for your learned reply to the radar query-I'm sure Hank will appreciate it too.

[jainso31]

Much has been talked about in this thread; but the issue of "a Lesson in Tactics"has been largely brushed aside.eg a USN torpedo attack delayed for so long, that when it was carried out it far far too late.The USN cruiser line presenting a perfect target for IJN ships guns; and of course the Long Lance torpedo danger at relatively short range.Perhaps a reappraisal is called for.

jainso31

[mikebatzel]

On it's surface, the plan of battle seems sound. The van destroyers delivering a torpedo attack and clearing the area for cruiser fire. Why Wright chose to open fire while the torpedoes were launched is beyond me. To take away any lesons from the battle Wright would have had to believe he had suffered at the hands of the enemies destroyers. Believing the Japanese were at to great a distance (a theme cited in the US destroyers failed torpedo attack) to launch torpedoes, the ones that decimated his forces must have come from submarines operating in the area.

Wright thought he had done much better than he had. The battle may have furthered the debate over the use of flashless powder, but in my opinion giving Wright the navy cross for this action does not help motivation for improvement

[jainso31]

Mike -you astonish me -Wright got the Navy Cross for this woeful action- beats me-other than a morale booster.The loss of USN one heavy cruiser and three more for a year, smacks of incompetence.:mad: Did they kick Wright
upstairs ,do you know??

jainso31

[mikebatzel]

jainso31, Wright was transferred to a shore command after the battle. Later in the war he was given command of cruiser division 4 before again being transferred to another shore command. Eventually he ended up in charge during the Port Chicago disaster.

[jainso31]

Thanks-Mike, that sounds about right.Your next investigation concerns Kolombangara

jainso31:cool:

[Don Boyer]

Over and above any errors of judgement made in the tactics of this battle on the American side, there is one factor that looms large: the US Navy just could not get it's collective head around the fact that the Japanese had a torpedo that was simply amazing in performance characteristics compared to any other torpedo in the world. (I'm not a torpedo expert, but I've heard that torpedoes of similar total capabilities in other navies didn't show up until the 1960s).

This battle is a clear example of this denial at work...because of the extreme range, the destroyers couldn't have delivered those torpedoes, it must have been submarines. Enough holes in enough ships finally provided the convincing proof, but it wasn't easy.

One wonders why this reluctance to admit to the capabilities of the Long Lance (an American term, the Japanese navy never called it that) lasted so long.

I have never yet run across any historical article stating that this torpedo was ever looked at and analyzed by experts. It is clear we captured several of them in the long Guadalcanal campaign, yet one finds not one historical article that these were sent back to Pearl or, more importantly, to the Bureau of Ordnance for a thorough look-see that would have made the torpedo's capability rather obvious, as if punching holes in ships from unbelievable ranges wasn't proof enough. And I would bet a small fortune -- say $.50 -- that if any did reach the legendarily inept BuOrd it was disdainfully dismissed and shoved in a corner. After all, the fleet didn't need to know anything about it, and it was oxygen-powered, much to dangerous to imitate or even bother with.

In all the years I've been reading up on the battles of the era, any background on what happened to the Long Lances we got our hands on has never emerged, not even in the recent book on the American torpedoes and their long and troubled history.

[mikebatzel]

jainso31, if your interested, Captain Crenshaw on Maury wrote a book about the battle

http://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/B004Q1TY4W/ref=mp_s_a_5?qid=1308069687&sr=8-5

And another on the Maury's time in the Solomons

http://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/1591141435/ref=mp_s_a_1?qid=1308070785&sr=8-1

[jainso31]

Don- NOW HERE THIS-to quote S E Morison's "The Two Ocean War p279"-"one(Long Lance torpedo) had been salvaged early in 1943 and analyzed by the Bureau of Ordnance,but these findings had not even reached Admiral Halsey.Had Ainsworth had been apprised of it's capacity,he would never have closed to 10000 yards before opening gunfire,or manoeuvered his cruisers in enemy torpedo water."I think your 50 Bucks are safe-just!;)

jainso31

[jainso31]

Thanks for the tip Mike re. useful books. As it is Amazon I will investigate.:)

jainso31