TheDigger
12-02-2008, 08:27
The following is based on the efforts of the American Naval and Army Airforce in the Pacific during WW2
Carrier-based aircraft in World War II were responsible for sinking the greatest proportion of Japan’s combat fleet, including five battleships and 10 enemy aircraft carriers. It was land-based airpower, however, that was most effective against Japanese merchant shipping.
Land-based aircraft (through direct action and mines) sunk approximately 23 percent of the total enemy merchant ship tonnage sent to the bottom of the Pacific. Carrier-based aviation accounted for approximately 16 percent.
Yet these figures underestimate the contribution of land-based aircraft to the maritime fight. Land-based airpower also destroyed large numbers of barges and small vessels—of less than 500 tons gross weight—not counted in the totals. (Sea-based aircraft destroyed relatively few small ships because they spent little time patrolling the coastal waters and harbors.)
The Army Air Forces attacks compare favorably to the efforts of the other services—the AAF devoted less effort but dropped more bombs and sank a greater number of ships than the other services.
AAF’s Pacific forces flew 7,250 (1.5 percent) of their sorties to maritime interdiction and sank 265,360 tons of enemy shipping.
In comparison, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew 25,657 (9.9 percent) of their sorties against merchant shipping and sank 102,702 total tons.
The AAF sank 2.5 times the enemy tonnage with less than a third of the sorties devoted to the mission.
The disparity in relative effectiveness is magnified when you include Twentieth Air Force’s mine-laying campaign. Twentieth flew 28,826 sorties and delivered 9,875 tons of mines, which sank 287 enemy ships and damaged 323 others.
After April 1945, mines dropped by B-29s in Japanese harbors and inland waterways accounted for half of all enemy ships sunk or damaged.
This aerial mining crippled Japanese merchant shipping, denied damaged ships access to repair facilities, closed strategic waterways, and threw the administration of Japanese shipping into hopeless confusion
It would be interesting to find similar statistics for the European Theatre of operations I am sure Airpower accounted for a reasonable percentage of ship sinkings. In this theatre the percentage of land based aircraft sinkings to Naval Aircraft I am sure would be alot higher than the Pacific.
Carrier-based aircraft in World War II were responsible for sinking the greatest proportion of Japan’s combat fleet, including five battleships and 10 enemy aircraft carriers. It was land-based airpower, however, that was most effective against Japanese merchant shipping.
Land-based aircraft (through direct action and mines) sunk approximately 23 percent of the total enemy merchant ship tonnage sent to the bottom of the Pacific. Carrier-based aviation accounted for approximately 16 percent.
Yet these figures underestimate the contribution of land-based aircraft to the maritime fight. Land-based airpower also destroyed large numbers of barges and small vessels—of less than 500 tons gross weight—not counted in the totals. (Sea-based aircraft destroyed relatively few small ships because they spent little time patrolling the coastal waters and harbors.)
The Army Air Forces attacks compare favorably to the efforts of the other services—the AAF devoted less effort but dropped more bombs and sank a greater number of ships than the other services.
AAF’s Pacific forces flew 7,250 (1.5 percent) of their sorties to maritime interdiction and sank 265,360 tons of enemy shipping.
In comparison, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew 25,657 (9.9 percent) of their sorties against merchant shipping and sank 102,702 total tons.
The AAF sank 2.5 times the enemy tonnage with less than a third of the sorties devoted to the mission.
The disparity in relative effectiveness is magnified when you include Twentieth Air Force’s mine-laying campaign. Twentieth flew 28,826 sorties and delivered 9,875 tons of mines, which sank 287 enemy ships and damaged 323 others.
After April 1945, mines dropped by B-29s in Japanese harbors and inland waterways accounted for half of all enemy ships sunk or damaged.
This aerial mining crippled Japanese merchant shipping, denied damaged ships access to repair facilities, closed strategic waterways, and threw the administration of Japanese shipping into hopeless confusion
It would be interesting to find similar statistics for the European Theatre of operations I am sure Airpower accounted for a reasonable percentage of ship sinkings. In this theatre the percentage of land based aircraft sinkings to Naval Aircraft I am sure would be alot higher than the Pacific.