Battle of Savo Sound: Midway Reverse?

[jainso31]

This seemingly "small" action between a joint USN/RAN naval force against
an "equal" IJN naval force seems riddled with controversey.Problems with command structure,communications and dare I say it-negligence, led to a
complete debacle for the Allied Force.
I would like to hear from interested Forum members about What went Wrong/Right and what was the end result.

jainso31







http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/worldwari1/p/battle-of-savo-island.htm

[Tiornu]

I think the books mentioned in the other thread would serve well--the Morison and the O'Hara. Hornfischer just came out with a Guadalcanal book that a lot of people like, though I haven't seen it.

[jainso31]

Tiornu
Thank you for your pointers re.further reading,which I shall look into.I must confess to being a bit disconcerted that you referred me to an assortment of books, when all all that I ask is a response to the questions posed- which I hope are up for discussion.If the problem lies with the original post-please tell me.
http://www.ww2pacific.com/savo.html
Regarding this thread, as it stands,it was taken from the internet and having read it -it seemed reasonable in content, so I used it - the action described was a debacle,unless anyone sees it differently.
R/Adm Critchley was heavily critisised for a) leaving his command without notice and b)for his inffective deployment of his ships, which allowed the Japanese to get close, without being picked up by radar.there were also other contributory factors.

jainso31

[Hank]

I can't fault Admiral Grutchley for making the decisions he did preceding the Battle of Savo Sound. The Attacking force under Vice-Admiral Mikawa changed their tack after being spotted by a Catalina. The second sighting of the Japanese task force, after the task force had returned to its original heading, indicated to the Allies that the Japanese were steaming much slower than they actually were.
Two Japanese ship launched floatplanes were identified as friendly by the Allies and these radioed position and strength to Mikawa.
The engagement occured at night, the height of the fighting occurring after 10:30 pm.
U.S. submarines on station in the area were the winners, both in relaying vital information and in scoring hits.

[jainso31]

Thanks Hank-this setback then, seems to have been the result of poor nightfighting skills on the part of the Allied warships,a misfortune that the radar pickets were ateaming the "wrong" way and that Mikawa held all the cards-fortunately he did not opt to go all the way and destroy the transports.

jainso31

[Hank]

Vice-Admiral Mikawa did not care to stay in the area past sunrise and risk the threat of carrier aviation, though his command in conference voiced the will to stay to a man.

[jainso31]

So in a nutshell the IJN had had a resounding victory, enough being enough;home is
the sailor, home from the sea-to fight another day.My sincere thanks for the interest Hank.


jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Probably the biggest problem with Savo was simply that the US Navy, and by that I mean commanding officers and commanders who give the orders placing ships in harms way, were simply not battle-ready in their thinking. This more than anything allowed a group of cruisers to steam about in almost peacetime manner with guns not ready and dispositions of pickets not thorough. There were many other similar points of unprepardness. The Japanese, on the other hand, were quite prepared and ready for battle. If they made any mistake, it was in not finishing the job, although with an American carrier known to be about, the potential for being caught in daylight returning from battle would have loomed large in the minds of Mikawa and his staff.

Savo was a lesson that needed to be learned, sad as was. The navy quickly got better but still were not ready for a superb torpedo skillfully deployed by cruisers and destroyers in many subsequent battles. One thing that can be said is that the navy, despite unprepardness or poor tactical thinking, never turned away from any engagement.

[jainso31]

Thank you Don for your interest and valuable input.Having subsequently read Donald Macintyre's "Battle for the the Pacific"-who in point of fact, makes the very same observation as your good self; I can only say that it was to take quite a while for the USN to become sufficiently adept at nightfighting, to take on the IJN at this sort of engagement.

jainso31

[emason]

R/Adm Critchley was heavily critisised for a) leaving his command without notice and b)for his inffective deployment of his ships, which allowed the Japanese to get close, without being picked up by radar.there were also other contributory factors.
jainso31


Rear Admiral Crutchley, did not leave his command. He left his ship at the behest of Admiral Turner to confer with other commanders to decide on a plan of action following Vice-Admiral Fletcher's unilateral decision to withdraw both his aircraft carriers, leaving the transports and their covering force without air protection before the transports had completed unloading the supplies essential for the US Marines ashore, thus jeopardising the whole operation.

Crutchley's decisions and conduct at the time was later commended by Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, with "I deem it appropriate and necessary to record my approval of the decisions and conduct of Rear Admiral R.K. Turner USN and Rear Admiral V. Crutchley RN. In my judgement those two officers were in no way inefficient, much less at fault, in executing their parts of the operation. Both found themselves in awkward positions and both did their best with the means at their disposal."

You can hardly blame Crutchley for the inexplicable negligence of the picket destroyer USS Blue which, despite having centimetric radar and innumerable pairs of eyes, failed to see five Japanese heavy cruisers, the nearest of which, Vice-Admiral Mikawa's flagship Chokai, passed within three miles of her. The Chokai had visually spotted Blue from six miles!

[jainso31]

Thank you Bill for your viewpoint on this particular matter.I think that I ought to point out that I did not say "he left his command"; rather that "he left his command without notice" The end result of this conduct was a) he took no part in the battle and b)it fell to the senior captain in Chicago to assume command but; that ship was the first to fall; thus ensuing chaos.
I have no doubt whatever that USN Chief Adm King swept the whole affair under the carpet by absolving both Turner and Crutchley.
DD Blue was ,in my opinion,highly negligent in this affair; and it would not be the last time that she would fail miserably in her duty.-this being at Cape Esprance, where she was less than alert again and was torpedoed and sunk.
I have left link to Adm Crutchley's Obit.wherein, there is mention of Savo.

jainso31


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Crutchley

[emason]

Jainso, thanks for your acknowledgement. I must say that you seem eager to blame Rear Admiral Crutchley for the whole disaster.


The end result of this conduct was a) he took no part in the battle and b)but; that ship was the first to fall; thus ensuing chaos.

I don't know what you mean by "left his command without notice" as you put it. Admiral Turner knew about it as it was he who summoned him to the meeting, and that is the primary reason he was absent from the night action. What was Crutchley supposed to do, ignore his Admiral's order?

Captain Bode in the Chicago certainly knew about it because he was ordered to take command of the patrol by Crutchley in a signal sent from the flagship Australia. Further evidence of Bode knowing was in a conversation between Bode and Captain Getting of the Canberra as to which ship should now lead. So it did not fall to the senior captain in Chicago to assume command; he was ordered to take command. So who was it that Crutchley should have given notice to?

The first ship to be attacked and disabled was the Canberra, not the Chicago.


I have no doubt whatever that USN Chief Adm King swept the whole affair under the carpet by absolving both Turner and Crutchley.

I am quite certain that Admiral King never gave anyone false praise. He rarely gave anyone due praise! Far from "sweeping everything under the carpet", King, dissatisfied with the reports of his Admirals, commissioned Admiral Hepburn to inquire into the loss of the four heavy cruisers.

Hepburn found that the fundamental cause of the defeat was surprise; the causes of which were, in order of importance:-

1. Inadequate condition of readiness on all ships to meet sudden night attack.
2. Failure to recognise the implications of the presence of enemy planes in the vicinity prior to attack.
3. Misplaced confidence in the capabilities of the radar installations on Ralph, Talbot and Blue.
4. Failure in communications which resulted in the lack of timely receipt of vital enemy contact information.
5. Failure in communications and standard practice resulting in in failure to give timely information of the fact that there had been practically no effective reconnaissance covering eneny approach during the day.

　

[Don Boyer]

Adm Crutchley had very little to do in the battle, as he was not senior in command. Turner was a hot-headed martinet at the best of times. His conduct as Chief of the War Plans Division in Washington before Pearl Harbor had a lot to do with the unpreparedness and lack of coordination between code breakers and those who needed that information. However, he became the best amphibious commander out there later on, despite his terrible temper. His conduct at Savo left a lot to be desired re ensuring preparedness for night action, etc.

Ghormley was not the commander needed in the South Pacific, and his timid and lackluster performance caused his relief, to be replaced by Halsey, who was exactly what the situation called for. Immediately on taking over, Halsey sent his subordinate sea-going admirals into battle and stopped the Japanese cold, twice, and with inferior forces in the first battle. It got both admirals killed, but that's the kind of prices combat extracts when you engage the enemy.

Fletcher not standing by the landing force with carrier cover was an error, but again, had little effect on the night battle at Savo.

[jainso31]

Bill-my understanding of this affair comes from what I glean from others; and no, I am not eager to blame Crutchley for the whole disaaster.
His Obit. says that Crutchley was heavily critised for leaving his command and for ineffective deployment which allowed the Japanese to get close without being picked up by the radar.
I have no Knowledge of signals being sent from Australia to Chicago to inform Captain Bode of his new duty.
As far as King's involvment -yes I believe he absolved Turner and therefore also Crutchlley.You may very well know more about Adm King than I do; but to say he never gave false praise is quite an assertion.
I would however, like to thank you for all your input and expertise in matters naval.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Don-my grateful thanks for your learned comments.
I did not set out to deliberately malign any commander; but to set in motion a train of discussion about the Why's and Wherefore's of this sorry affair.
My information came from various sources, including Donald Macintyre's "War in the Pacific" plus what I read and used from the Internet

jainso31

[emason]

Jainso, just a final word on the matter:

His Obit. says that Crutchley was heavily critised for leaving his command and for ineffective deployment which allowed the Japanese to get close without being picked up by the radar.

On the question of his deployment. The fact that the two westward picket destroyers (Blue and Ralph Talbot) were both seen by from Mikawa's flagship, meant that the pickets should have seen the Japanese cruisers, which also came within the radar range of both pickets. Therefore the pickets were in the right place and Crutchley's deployment was correct. The failure to detect the enemy cannot be laid at Crutchley's doorstep.
　

[Don Boyer]

After the passage of so many years, there is no reason not to call 'em as we see them in regard to the competency of various commanders. Mistakes were made by the greatest and smallest in abundance during the war and these become more obvious over time. We here on the forum, thrust in similar circumstance would do no less. None of us on the forum are likely to agree on all cases, and that is as it should be.

Just a little note for accuracy in passing. The Battle is always referred to in US sources as the Battle of Savo Island, a small active volcano separating the two western passages into what became known as "Ironbottom Sound" between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands.

[jainso31]

Bill,Don-thank you both for the interest that you have shown.I do appreciate
the angst that I may have caused- by raking over the ashes of old battles and events;but as a seeker of knowledge, I do feel it is my right to do so on this Forum.As I have said before -it is not my intention to malign anyone in these affairs; but rather to "open the can of worms" and invite discussion.
On this note I would like to step away from the Battle of Savo Island and let this matter rest.

[emason]

Jainso, there are many ways at looking at a battle and its participants, and probably no two people will see it he same way. This is what initiates discussion and hopefully rational analysis, with each party convinced that their view is the correct one and arguing their corner robustly. Just look at Jutland with its Jellicoe admirers versus Beatty admirers - they will never agree; the Germans still claim it was they who won and the British still do likewise! This is particularly true when the outcome is not clear cut, or when the causes of the victory/defeat are complex. The Battle of Savo Island being an example of the latter, where everything went wrong for the Allies.

In the case of this particular battle, just about everyone contributed in varing degrees to the tactical defeat. (But it was after all a strategic victory in that the operation succeeded overall .) I think that the defeat was such a shock that almost immediately, everyone started to cover their backsides and point fingers at everyone else before all the facts were known.

Unfortunately for Rear Admiral Crutchley (and Admiral Turner) he seemed the obvious scapegoat. After all it was his responsibility to provide the early warning system, and the enemy penetrated the screen undetected. Therefore he must have deployed his ships in the wrong place, mustn't he? It seems an irrefutable argument, and even later when the facts became better known, the mutterings continued. It seemed that everyone who played a part was in denial. That is why Admiral King found it necessary to take the unusual step of absolving Crutchley and Turner publicly, (and probably with half an eye on inter-Allied relations).

So yes, it is true that Crutchley was criticised at the time for his deployment, but as has been shown, unjustly so. I think it is unfortunate that this misleading item found its way into his obituary without qualification, especially when it was shown to be untrue 70 years ago. Once something is put in writing it is there forever, however inaccurate.

Finally, thank you Jainso for raising such an interesting subject.

[jainso31]

Thank YOU Bill for your highly clinical approach to this debate-I sincerely hope to learn from it; but I doubt that I shall ever become the historian that
you have become.

jainso31

[lizard]

One of the enduring mysteries of the Battle of Savo Island , is the loss of HMAS Canberra , hit by both sides ?

[jainso31]

Perhaps this statement taken from the original introduction to this thread will explain:-

These flares immediately silhouetted the cruisers CANBERRA and CHICAGO and the Japanese opened fire with all weapons. CANBERRA being the lead ship received almost the full force of the Japanese barrage and was immediately put out of action. CHICAGO was also badly damaged but still operational.

After rendering the Southern Screening Force ineffective the Japanese continued their sweep around Savo Island splitting into two columns and approached the Northern Screening Force at high speed.

Again complete surprise was achieved with just as devastating results. The Japanese ships opened fire on the American ships at very close range and in a short space of time the cruisers QUINCY and VINCENNES were sunk with ASTORIA being badly damaged. During this part of the action the Japanese flagship CHOKAI received hits which damaged her operations room and killed a number of personnel. Being unaware as to the location and strength of the remaining Allied naval forces the Japanese did not press home their advantage and commenced to withdraw. On their way passed the outer screening destroyers the Japanese engaged and damaged the RALPH TALBOT.

Dawn was to reveal to the Allies the full extend of the battle. The Japanese had sunk the cruisers QUINCY and VINCENNES; and the cruisers CANBERRA and ASTORIA, and destroyers RALPH TALBOT and PATTERSON were badly damaged.

Admiral Turner ordered that CANBERRA be abandoned and sunk if she could not raise steam. Once all survivors had been evacuated, SELFRIDGE fired 263 5-inch shells and four torpedoes into CANBERRA in an attempt to sink her. Eventually a torpedo fired by the destroyer ELLET administered the final blow.

jainso31