HMAS Canberra

[herakles]

This is a ship that had a magnificent career yet never fired a shot in anger. Which made her loss in WW2 all the more tragic.

Type County Class Heavy Cruiser
Displacement 9,850 tons
Length 630 feet (overall)
Beam 68 feet 4 inches
Draught 16 feet 3 inches (mean), 21 feet 8 inches (maximum)
Builder John Brown & Co Ltd, Clydebank, Scotland
Laid Down 9 September 1925
Launched 31 May 1927, by Her Royal Highness Princess Mary
Completed April 1928
Machinery Brown-Curtis Geared Turbines, 4 screws
Horsepower 80,000
Speed 31½ knots
Endurance 10,500 miles (11 – 14 knots)
Armament Main:
8 x 8-inch guns
8 x 4-inch guns
4 x 3-pounder guns
Complement 679 (710 as Flagship)

She was the second of 5 cruisers ordered by the Australian government and was commissioned two months after her sister ship HMAS Australia.

She first arrived in Australia in 1929 and spent the pre war years in conventional duties. She was at times, flagship of the Australian squadron.

At the start of war, she commenced patrol and escort duties in the Indian ocean. In one action, she retook ex Norwegian tanker KETTY BROVIG, which had been taken in prize the previous month by the raider ATLANTIS. Previously she had spent much fruitless time seaching for the ADMIRAL SCHEER.

When Japan entered the war, she was berthed in Sydney, having by then having sailed a remarkable 175,000 miles.

She continued escort duties until a refit brought her back to Sydney in early 1942. She was berthed alongside the cruiser USS CHICAGO on the night of the Japanese midget submarine attack on 31 May / 1 June 1942.

In August 1942, she took part in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi landings.

On the 9th August she was involved in the Battle of Savo. Within 2 minutes, she was struck by two torpedoes and much salvo firing. She was critically wounded by this and her crew ordered to abandon ship. The crew of Canberra suffered 193 casualties during the Battle of Savo Island, including her captain, Frank Getting. Nine officers and 65 ratings were missing believed killed. One officer (the captain) and nine ratings died of wounds. Ten officers, 96 ratings, and three civilian canteen staff were wounded.

She was ordered to be scuttled as she could no longer make enough steam or headway. And she took a long time to die.

Following her loss, the British government transferred HMS Shropshire to the RAN. She was renamed HMAS Shropshire. Franklin Roosevelt ordered the then under construction USS Pittsburgh to be renamed USS Canberra in recognition of the ship.

The wreck was re-discovered in 1992. This showed extensive damage and that all her guns were trained to port.

There is an impressive memorial in the city of Canberra just beside Lake Burly Griffin. Here is the speech given on the day of commemoration in 1981: http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/canberra/transcript.htm

[John Brown]

Good post Herakles

I once had Robert Ballards book 'The lost ships of Guadalcanal' which gave an account of the Battle of Savo island and included photos of the wrecks from the whole campaign. I must confess I hadn't realised that Canberra had never fired a shot in anger.

John

[The Sailor]

Nice post Herk. Old Canberra didn't get much glory, but there were other ships in the allied forces like that. It never seemed to happen.
Canberra was with her old mate USS Chicago that night off Savo Island.
They were together in Sydney Harbour when the Japanese midget subs attacked. Chicago was missed and the torpedo hit a ferry.
Australian ships and US Navy ships as mates were common in the Pacific theater. Like HMAS Perth and USS Houston. And HMAS Australia and USS Phoenix.
I guess pairing them up was a way of giving joint orders.

[BB60]

The HMAS Canberra had a namesake in the United States Navy, the USS Canberra, CA-70, a Baltimore class cruiser. It is the only ship in the US Navy named for a foreign capital (indirectly).

http://www.usscanberra.com/shiphistory.htm

[herakles]

I guess it goes to show just how favourably the Canberra was seen that the President took this most unusual step.

Of course having been named Canberra, it meant that Australia could not name any replacement ship by the same name.

[The Sailor]

Yes Herk, I see what you mean. They named one for us.

And Jeff, good site. Thanks.
Nice ship too.

[BB60]

Here's another well-named ship in the United States Navy. I guess we can get by with it, as he was half American.

http://www.navsource.org/archives/05/01081.htm

I wonder if 25% of the UK would think the ship is a myth?

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/04/2153628.htm

[herakles]

That news story attracted much comment. This ignorance I guess also explains why UFO's have such a following and why some norks think the Moon landings were made up.

I believe it's a tragic condemnation on the English education process. And it's even worse today as the teaching of history has been swallowed up by placing it in media studies or something like that.

If you think the examples given in that link are bad, consider that many English think the statue in Trafalgar square is of Nelson Mandela.

Then again, I'm also at fault. With all the kerfuffle about Heath Ledger, my reaction was to say: Heath Who?

[John Brown]

As BB60 has mentioned the USS Canberra being a Baltimore Class cruiser I thought we might all like to see what they look like.

John

[Bear]

A lot of stuff has come out about the Battle of Savo Sound with the declassification of embargoed US Naval documents in recent years.
For many years Canberra survivors were told that they should be ashamed of themselves as they had been taken by surprise and not got a single shot away.
The declassified papers suggest that the first projectile to strike Canberra was a torpedo from an American Destroyer. This hit her in her boiler rooms, resulting in a complete loss of power. She was dead in the water and unable to train her guns.
She was then quickly hit by about 25 salvos of 8-inch Japanese gunfire and at least one more torpedo--it is to be hoped Japanese this time.
While Canberra had an American destroyer alongside taking off her survivors, USS Chicago opened fire on them both.
Sub-Lieutenant McKenzie-Gregory was Officer of the Watch in Canberra at the start of this action. You will find a complete account at this web site
http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/
(You will also find enough interesting stuff to keep you busy for a number of weeks)
Bruce Loxton wrote an excellent book "The Shame of Savo" that is worth a read if you are interested in this subject.

[Bear]

I think the Americans named USS Canberra out of embarrassment. She commissioned not long after the Battle of Savo Sound.

[Norsky]

The US deserved to be embarrassed about Savo.

It was a major mess up. The Japanese force had been spotted by coast watchers. The Allied fleets knew they were coming.

Yet, they didn't expect action when it came. Why?

The biggest mistake was the assumption the Japanese force would hold its present reported speed, and arrive much later than it did. The Japanese unfortunately, did not cooperate, and increased speed to arrive around the midnight hour, or shortly thereafter.

I believe the Chicago was hit first, but for reasons never known, did not put out an alert about Japanese forces in the area. Then Canberra got hit.

The Japanese forces then moved north towards three US cruisers, still blissfully ignorant of their enemies being present.

Vincennes, Astoria and Quincy were lost due more to negligence than any other factor. At one point in the battle, the captain of Astoria ordered a cease fire, because it was thought friendly forces were mistakenly firing on them. At the very same moment, the officer in the main battery fire control was reporting Nachi class cruisers, and attempting to direct main battery fire when the cease fire order came.

They never knew until the shells were flying that Japanese forces were in the area.

[Bear]

There were two separate sightings by RAAF Hudson bombers as well. The information was sent to Canberra and then back to Fleet headquarters and took many hours to get to the fleet itself. One of the Hudson's pretty well reported the correct strength of the enemy and for some reason unknown RAAF intelligence reduced the numbers to a couple of cruisers and a destroyer.
To be fair to the RAAF, no one told them about the landings at Guadalcanal for 'security reasons'.

[Kevin Denlay]

The declassified papers suggest that the first projectile to strike Canberra was a torpedo from an American Destroyer. This hit her in her boiler rooms, resulting in a complete loss of power. She was dead in the water and unable to train her guns..

Do they only 'suggest' this (as some other authors have 'suggested'), or do they state it unequivocally?

And / or what US DD are they suggesting fired the torp?

I have read many many many versions/books of that battle over the years and am yet to be convinced of this supposed American torp hit. As a matter of fact I am far from convinced at all at this stage.

As far as I was aware the 'torp' controversy was more to do with the morning after and why they sank her (by torps from a US DD) rather than try to save her, which however, if one is/was aware of the overall tactual situation at the time, is no big mystery really, although still no doubt heart breaking for the Canberra crew/survivors.

Kevin

The following from the article on Macs Web Log link you gave. No mention of first hit being a torp here.

"At 0130 at a range of 6 miles, the Japanese sighted CANBERRA and CHICAGO. In CANBERRA we were approaching the Savo Island end of our patrol - I was very conscious of the fact that I had to call the Navigator at 0145. He wanted to fix our position prior to the scheduled course alteration at 0200.

I had just checked the chart table clock, It was 0143 (this time is still engraved in my memory) several incidents crowded in - an explosion almost due north, the Captain was called by the Principal Control Officer. The port lookout reported a ship ahead but neither the P.C.O. , the Yeoman of Signals nor myself could discern anything. PATTERSON on our port bow signalled to us by blinker tube. The action alarms were sounded and we assumed the first degree of readiness.
I called the Navigating Officer and the Gunnery Officer; the P.C.O. sighted 3 ships on our starboard bow and gave the alarm and the order to load the 8" turrets. The Captain quickly arrived to be first to reach the bridge. I sighted torpedo tracks approaching down the starboard side - the Captain ordered full ahead and starboard 35 to quickly swing the ship to starboard.

The Navigating Officer reached the bridge and told me he had the "Con", thereby taking over from me. The Gunnery Officer had taken over from the P.C.O. and moved to the Port enemy bearing indicator. Further torpedo tracks crossed the bow. Ahead, star shell were lighting up the scene and aircraft dropped flares to starboard. As I left the bridge, we again altered course.

I hurried to my action station in the fore control - there was an explosion amidships, we were hit on the 4" gundeck, the Walrus aircraft was blazing fiercely on the catapult. A shell exploded on the port side just below the compass platform and another just aft of the fore control.

The plotting office received a direct hit. The shell that demolished the port side of the compass platform mortally wounded the Captain, killed Lieutenant Commander Hole, the Gunnery Officer, wounded Lieutenant Commander Plunkett-Cole, the Torpedo Officer and severely wounded Midshipmen Bruce Loxton and Noel Sanderson. I had virtually been surrounded by shell hits but luckily remained unscathed. In the fore control standing alongside me, Able Seaman Oliver was hit from the explosion just aft of our position - he was given morphene but was a very sick young man.

The ship now lost power and took on a noticeable list to starboard. For CANBERRA, the war was over. Only 2-3 minutes had elapsed since the ship went to action stations."

[patroclus]

The only place where I have seen the theory expounded that the CANBERRA was hit by a torpedo from a US destroyer (USS BAGLEY) was in Bruce Loxton's book "The Shame of Savo". I had not heard of any "declassified US papers" referring to this matter. It would be interesting, if correct, because the theory could use some support!

Much earlier in this thread someone remarked that the CANBERRA had never fired a shot in anger. In March, 1941, she fired 215 of her 8" shells at the German supply vessel COBURG and some 4" at the KETTY BROVIG in the Indian Ocean. The CANBERRA fired at about 20000 yds, not being certain that the COBURG was not something more dangerous, and the consequent heavy expenditure of amunition attracted some unfavourable comment and is alleged to have influenced Burnett's conduct on the occasion of the meeting between the SYDNEY and the KORMORAN.

[Norsky]

Would a destroyer have been able to tow the Canberra?????

I don't think there were any large Allied ships left in any condition to do any towing.

Chicago was the only other cruiser left afloat, and she was damaged also.

If we generalize each cruiser at about 10,000 tonnes, the Japanese had sank or disabled 50,000 tonnes of warships in just a very short time, with only minor damage to their own fleet.

Not bad for one nights work.

As an aside, two US cruisers were disabled near Formosa (Taiwan) later on in the war, both loosing propulsion, as was the case with Canberra.

Almost in the back yard of the Japanese Empire at Formosa, these two cruisers were towed back and repaired. Of course, there were other cruisers towing them.

So it begs the question why scuttle Canberra? I do realize that there were insufficient forces present to counter another attack like the one from the night before.

But it seems the idea was not even considered.

[Tiornu]

"The Shame of Savo" is a fine characterization of the book, as it attempts to salve the author's sense of embarrassment for the seemingly poor performance of the Australian ship. No such salve is needed, but it hasn't stopped the author from imagining a vast conspiracy theory. At the heart of his thesis is the claim that gunfire could not cause the sudden and catastrophic power loss the ship experienced. This is demonstrably false. The hit diagram drawn by crewman Engineer Officer Commander O. F. McMahon shows at least three shells hits to the area of the fan flat, precisely the space indicated by Loxton as the key to a sudden and catastrophic power loss. It should be remembered that HMS Exeter was completely crippled by the first two IJN 8in shells that hit her; Canberra was a larger ship with a slightly different machinery arrangement, but she was also hit by 27 shells. There is nothing fantastical about the ability of these hits to cripple a lightly armored ship like Canberra.

[patroclus]

Would a destroyer have been able to tow the Canberra?????

I don't think there were any large Allied ships left in any condition to do any towing.

Chicago was the only other cruiser left afloat, and she was damaged also.
.

Both HMAS AUSTRALIA and USS SAN JUAN were available.

The main grouch on the part of the Australians was that the CANBERRA was ordered to be sunk whilst a major effort was made by the USN to save the much more seriously damaged USS ASTORIA. This latter effort was unsuccessful.

[Kevin Denlay]

I agree completely with Tiornu here, while there was no need for shame (well at least not among the crews, some of the higher ups had/have plenty to share all round) there seems to have been a search for a scapegoat re Canberra’s being knocked out so quickly.

Now without getting into why they choose to assist Astoria (although she was dear to the hearts of some Americans after all) and not Canberra; as for towing Canberra, pray tell, where we they to tow her too?

It was only day 2 after all, Tulagi was still in enemy hands, and in her waterlogged state towing her back to from whence the task force had come would have been a near impossible task (no matter what was accomplished later in the war). Besides, the tactical situation was that another Japanese attack was expected that night, and the commanders on the spot made the decision to scuttle. Monday morning quarterbacking of course may find alternatives but……………………….

As for how she developed such a list if not from a torp? Frank (in his exceptional book Guadalcanal, The Definitive Account) and others mention hits passing through Canberra from low on port side and coming out below the waterline to stbd. Given that even a very small hole will allow in an incredible amount of water (the deeper that hole is underwater, i.e. the more pressure), and these were no doubt 8” projectiles, it doesn’t take a great stretch of the imagination to envisage what the exit wounds may have looked like. (A 25mm/1" hole 10m/33ft below water - i.e. 2 bar/ata of pressure - will let in aprox 437 ltrs / 115 US gallons per minute! Given that 1 ltr equals 1kg/2.2 lbs, you do the math for just an hour of said small leak.)

Besides, in Ballard’s survey of the wreck he found no evidence of torp hole/s either and if IIRC commented on same.

As for shame though, well there is plenty some of the commanders on ships involved (and some not directly ‘involved’ in the battle itself per-se) should to be ashamed of that night, while on other ships their performance was exemplary.

.

[Tiornu]

I believe only one hit was assessed as scoring below Canberra's waterline, and all but one were to port. It's probably safe to say that the majority of hits came from 8in shells. Japanese 8in shells had absurdly long fuze delays, and they earned a reputation for passing through their targets. This maximizes the chances of submerged damage occurring on the unengaged side.
I am surprised if Ballard did indeed report a lack of torpedo damage in Canberra because the scuttling process involved a number of torpedoes--kind of a precursor to Hornet.
As related by Loxton, Canberra's crew responded in nearly textbook fashion upon sighting the enemy. I don't see anything they have to feel ashamed about. War is full of misfortune, and what more is there to say?

[patroclus]

Now without getting into why they choose to assist Astoria (although she was dear to the hearts of some Americans after all) and not Canberra; as for towing Canberra, pray tell, where we they to tow her too?

.



To the same place it was intended to tow ASTORIA - to Efate.

[Kevin Denlay]

To the same place it was intended to tow ASTORIA - to Efate.

And you believe she would have made it there, in the condition she was in?

[Kevin Denlay]

I believe only one hit was assessed as scoring below Canberra's waterline, and all but one were to port. It's probably safe to say that the majority of hits came from 8in shells. Japanese 8in shells had absurdly long fuze delays, and they earned a reputation for passing through their targets. This maximizes the chances of submerged damage occurring on the unengaged side.

As I said in previous it is reported that several shells came in from port and came out the stbd side beow waterline. What report/book states only one?

I am surprised if Ballard did indeed report a lack of torpedo damage in Canberra because the scuttling process involved a number of torpedoes--kind of a precursor to Hornet.

Pardon, too fast at the key board my end. Was supposed to state 'did not find multiple torp hits'....................

As related by Loxton, Canberra's crew responded in nearly textbook fashion upon sighting the enemy. I don't see anything they have to feel ashamed about. War is full of misfortune, and what more is there to say?

And again, as I stated in previous, that's right, the crews had nothing to be ashamed of, but in my opinion, and in many others more knowledgeable on the subject than I, some of the officers on several ships did have something to be ashamed of given their lack of preparedness and other omissions.

[patroclus]

And you believe she would have made it there, in the condition she was in?

It is possible. The USN found it hard enough to sink her! From the RAN's point of view, it would have been worth a try.

The Enquiry found that the list was at least partially caused by the flooding of the magazines.

Incidently, the Enquiry also decided that most of the shell hits were 5.5".

[Tiornu]

As I said in previous it is reported that several shells came in from port and came out the stbd side below waterline.
Sorry if I was unclear. There was only one hit from the starboard side. I'm not referring here to exit wounds.

Incidently, the Enquiry also decided that most of the shell hits were 5.5".
This would be quite surprising. There were only ten 5.5in guns in the battle. There were thirty-four 8in guns. Is there a copy of the Enquiry online?

[patroclus]

This would be quite surprising. There were only ten 5.5in guns in the battle. There were thirty-four 8in guns. Is there a copy of the Enquiry online?

No copy of the RAN report on line that I know of and Hepburn's USN report was classified "Secret". I do not know if it is now in the public domain.

I agree that the conclusions re the 5.5" hits is an improbable one. The RAN Enquiry also decided that the CANBERRA was not torpedoed. Rear Admiral Crutchley disagreed with the latter finding.

[Kevin Denlay]

It is possible. The USN found it hard enough to sink her! From the RAN's point of view, it would have been worth a try.

While it may have been theoretically possible to tow her there I don't think the IJN flyers would have 'allowed' it. After all, they killed little old Jarvis, a simple DD, on her way out of the battle area, just imagine what tempting a target Canberra crawling along at a few knots under tow would have made.

The Enquiry found that the list was at least partially caused by the flooding of the magazines.

And not the first instance where this has been caused by same. Damned if you don't, damned if you do.

Incidently, the Enquiry also decided that most of the shell hits were 5.5".

I was not aware of that 'finding'. Must say, cant quite see 5.5's passing through amidships. I mean, she was slightly armoured but not that light I would have thought.

[Tiornu]

The 5.5in guns did not have a genuine AP shell, so you'd need a complete dud to get through anything substantial, like a hull.

[Kevin Denlay]

Just asked the following question of a friend that was out with Ballard when he surveyed the wrecks off Guadalcanal, inc Canberra.

QUESTION

By the way, when you were out in G'canal do you recall if you guys saw any/many torp hits to Canberra?

REPLY

Nope.

We only saw shell holes in her port side. The fact that some of her forward superstructure had collapsed to starboard may well indicate a torpedo hit in the hull below that, but we did not think to drop below the main deck level on the starboard side to take a look, either there or amidships in the vicinity of the boiler rooms. Rich Frank and I regularly kick ourselves for not thinking to do so, as we had plenty of time with the ROV ("Scorpio") to do it.

[patroclus]

While it may have been theoretically possible to tow her there I don't think the IJN flyers would have 'allowed' it. After all, they killed little old Jarvis, a simple DD, on her way out of the battle area, just imagine what tempting a target Canberra crawling along at a few knots under tow would have made.




That may be an overly pessimistic view. The damaged CHICAGO, three destroyers, five minesweepers, six transports and five cargo ships departed at 1500 the following afternoon for Noumea. AUSTRALIA, HOBART, SAN JUAN and nine destroyers with eleven transports and cargo vessels departed at 1700, also for Noumea. I do not know the speed of advance of these forces but CHICAGO had been limited to 10 knots earlier in the day. They all reached their destination without air attack.

A little luck would be needed but it would have been worth a try.

[Kevin Denlay]

That may be an overly pessimistic view.

No, in my opinion that is simply a realistic view, rather than what I would class as a wishful thinking view. :)
I do not know the speed of advance of these forces but CHICAGO had been limited to 10 knots earlier in the day. They all reached their destination without air attack. A little luck would be needed but it would have been worth a try.

10 knots is a great deal faster than what a towing speed could have attained. So a lot more than a little luck would have been needed, something more akin to a miracle actually (to get either C'berra or Astoria towed to safety). The tow and the towee would have been sitting ducks to say the least.

[patroclus]

No, in my opinion that is simply a realistic view, rather than what I would class as a wishful thinking view. :)


10 knots is a great deal faster than what a towing speed could have attained. So a lot more than a little luck would have been needed, something more akin to a miracle actually (to get either C'berra or Astoria towed to safety). The tow and the towee would have been sitting ducks to say the least.



Well, it would not have been a picnic.

We are obviously not going to agree on this matter!

[Kevin Denlay]

We are obviously not going to agree on this matter!

That's affirmative! ;)

[SeaToby]

Someone mentioned the Americans blew it. Unfortunately the admiral in charge was British/Australian who divided the defensive forces, and then failed to be in the battle. Many of the British ships of the same class sunk quickly after a torpedo hit, US naval historian Samuel E. Morison doubts the Canberra would have lasted as long as she did with a torpedo hit.

Don't forget the Americans lost three heavy cruisers during the same battle, and a fourth had its bow blown off. Frankly, there is enough blame to pin on everyone involved. None of the allied ships were ready for battle. Give the Japanese a little credit for having exercised for night battles.

[patroclus]

Someone mentioned the Americans blew it. Unfortunately the admiral in charge was British/Australian who divided the defensive forces, and then failed to be in the battle. Many of the British ships of the same class sunk quickly after a torpedo hit, US naval historian Samuel E. Morison doubts the Canberra would have lasted as long as she did with a torpedo hit.
.

The decision to divide the force was taken by Rear Admiral Crutchley with reluctance and in the absence of a viable alternative and was approved by the Flag Officer in Command (American). Crutchley wasn't in the battle because he had been ordered to a conference by the American commander.

No British ships of this class were sunk by torpedo.

[Kevin Denlay]

Unfortunately the admiral in charge was British/Australian who divided the defensive forces, and then failed to be in the battle.

For the record, Admiral Crutchley was British not Australian, although he was commanding from an Australian ship at the time (HMAS Australia).

However, it seems he (and others on the scene that night) may still have been under the same ill-informed belief as the British Admiral Layton, of Singapore 'fame', who made what may well have been the least prophetic statement of the war when he signaled the Admiralty on 13 Feb 1942 that ".......Evidence is accumulating which seems to confirm pre-war impressions that Japanese ships do not take kindly to night fighting...............We should exploit this feature of Japanese to the utmost and our policy should be to seek night actions by every means..........................”.(Signal of 1302Z/13/2/42, Hostages To Fortune, page 29)

One would have thought that by then, over two months after HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse had been sunk by a completely underestimated Japanese air arm, that the powers that be may have came to realise that their prewar assumptions about the Japanese were, shall we say, inaccurate.

Some months later it seems they still hadn't quite come to grips with it.

It should come as no surprise then that we, the Allies, were completely unprepared that night off Guadalcanal.

Boy, did we learn the hard way. But learn we did!

[Norsky]

The racial stereotype for the Japanese / Asians was so prevalent pre-war from many Western powers.

Too many good men were lost as a result.

I do wonder, had the Kaiser's Imperial German Navy from WW I replaced the Japanese as the adversary here, and been updated, strengthened as had the Japanese Navy in the intervening years, would there have been the same racial stereotype mistakes made?

I do not think that would be the case. A European navy would not have received the same derision that the Japanese received.

[kookaburra]

The racial stereotype for the Japanese / Asians was so prevalent pre-war from many Western powers.

Too many good men were lost as a result.

I do wonder, had the Kaiser's Imperial German Navy from WW I replaced the Japanese as the adversary here, and been updated, strengthened as had the Japanese Navy in the intervening years, would there have been the same racial stereotype mistakes made?

I do not think that would be the case. A European navy would not have received the same derision that the Japanese received.

I do agree. The Battle of Tsushima should have earned the IJN greater respect pre-WW11.

Thanks too to all for the very informed discussion that has been taking place on this thread, which I've been following with great interest. I was looking for a way in, but could simply not match or add to the detail being given. K.

[dennis a feary]

Hallo all in the Colonies `down under'. Find here photo (not too good I am afraid) of your good ship HMAS CANBERRA taken in Aden 1941. Sadly lost in Coral Sea Battle.
Have a pic of HMAS AUCKLAND to post - will be looking for a place to put it !!

Sadsac

[kookaburra]

Hallo all in the Colonies `down under'. Find here photo (not too good I am afraid) of your good ship HMAS CANBERRA taken in Aden 1941. Sadly lost in Coral Sea Battle.
Have a pic of HMAS AUCKLAND to post - will be looking for a place to put it !!

Sadsac

Dennis, thank you for the pic of HMAS Canberra - I assume you've been celebrating the cricket! Well done England, comprehensively outplayed us for 4 1/2 of the five days for an historic Lord's victory. Flintoff today was awesome (BTW, my cricket moments on the 'Cruisers of Australia' thread have ceased due to a kind invitation to move them to Shore Leave - so it's not sour grapes). Anyway, I'd run out of appropriate pics of sinking Australian cruisers.

Dennis, I've done the best I can here to bring your pic of HMAS Canberra in Aden back out of the mists.

Ah... just one or two things for the record. Canberra was lost at the Battle of Savo Island, Aug 9 1942, not the Battle of the Coral Sea - she was not present there.

I assume from what you've said on the NZ thread that this pic was taken from HMS (neither HMAS nor HMNZS)
Auckland, an Egret Class sloop sunk in the Med 20miles north east of Tobruk on June 24, 1941.

Auckland and sloop HMAS Parramatta were escorting the petrol tanker Pass of Balmaha when they were attacked by three formations of German and Italian aircraft - 48 according to the Allied count. The planes concentrated on Auckland thinking she was a cruiser, and she was direct hit on the stern almost immediately and soon enveloped in flames, and hit by three more bombs according to the Italian reports.

The petrol tanker was near missed and disabled. Parramatta fought on downing several planes and eventually rescuing 162 survivors from Auckland who were being machine-gunned in the water. The destroyer HMAS Waterhen arrived and took Pass of Balmaha in tow almost to Tobruk, before being relieved by a Harbour vessel.

Well, that's it. Here's your pic again Dennis. Well done England.

[dennis a feary]

Well done Kookaburra, great `tidying up' !
Yes, re `Test'. England got fed up with `LETTING' the Ozzies win, so we thought about time we did `summat' - Er Hum !!
Re AUCKLAND being HMAS or HMNZS - well what can I say - I followed the caption on the photo - `believe `arf you see & nowt you `er' - should have followed that saying !!
The pic(s) were taken from BOTLEA a `Q' ship - more of her later.

Sadsac

[Kevin Denlay]

Here is another not so common (to me) pic of Canberra

[astraltrader]

I have your picture as well as others virtually identical to it - probably taken from the same ship.

[alanbenn]

Can't say I've noticed this shot of Canberra anywhere else so I'll post it here to provide a different shot of her.

Regards
Alan