HMS Victoria & HMS Camperdown Incident [Archive]

Commodore Armiger

06-02-2008, 13:24

George Tryon was born on 4th January 1832 and entered the navy at the age of 16. He saw action in the Crimean war between 1854 and 1856. In 1861 he was given command of the first British ironclad, HMS Warrior, which post he held until 1864. In 1867 he was Director of Transport during the Abyssinian campaign.

Between 1874 and 1881 he held several commands on the Indian and Mediterranean stations. From 1884 to 1887 he was Commander in Chief of the Australian station and was knighted in 1887. In 1891 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean fleet.

Tryon was a legend in his own lifetime, having a strong personality that overawed all those who served under him. One officer wrote 'Most people felt no use arguing with George Tryon and that it was better to acquiesce quietly'. It seemed that most of his officers just wanted Tryon to tell them what to do, rather than risk making a mistake in front of him. Tryon realised this, and made attempts to encourage initiative. One of his methods was his own signalling system known as TA, which involved Tryon raising his TA signal and then the fleet following the flagships movements, rather than the usual system of signals and acknowledgements involved in manoeuvring. The Times newspaper called TA 'unsound in theory and perilous in practice'.

On the Mediterranean station, Tryon's second in command was Rear Admiral Sir Hastings Markham. Markham did not apparently enjoy working with Tryon. The problem was largely due to Markham being incapable of following the constant stream of tests from his superior. Tryon was never slow to criticise Markham, but the Vice Admiral was no bully.

On 22nd June 1893, the fleet left Beirut for exercises. Tryon flew his flag in Victoria, and the 11 predreadnoughts included Sanspareil, Collingwood, Nile and Camperdown, which led the second column with Markham on board.

In the afternoon, Tryon decided to reverse his 2 columns. 'I shall form the fleet into columns of two divisions, six cables apart [6 cable = 1200 yards] and reverse the course, by turning inwards', he told Staff Commander Thomas Hawkins-Smith. The combined turning circles of Victoria and Camperdown were 1600 yards, or 8 cables. Hawkins-Smith realised this, and suggested to Tryon 'It will require at least eight cables for that, sir'. Tryon agreed 'Yes, it shall be eight cables'. But soon after, Tryon gave instructions to his flag lieutenant, Lord Gillford, he said 'Will you make a signal to form columns of divisions line ahead, columns disposed abeam to port. And make the columns six cables apart'. Notably, Tryon gave Gillford a piece of paper with the figure '6' on it.

Gillford left without further comment, and had the necessary flags raised. Soon enough, all the other ships had acknowledged the signal, except Camperdown. Hawkins-Smith noticed the signal that had been raised and asked Gillford 'Haven't you made a mistake? The admiral said the columns were to be eight cables'. Gillford showed him the piece of paper with '6' on it, and Hawkins-Smith went to see the admiral, who told him 'Leave it at six cables'.

The fleet was sailing at 9 knots towards the Syrian coast, and action was required soon to avoid grounding. Tryon appeared on the bridge and noticed Camperdown had not acknowledged the signal. He ordered 'What are you waiting for?' to be raised. This was a public rebuke, and Markham would have to obey. As Camperdown turned, Victoria's commander, Captain Archibald Bourke remarked to Tryon 'We had better do something, sir, we shall be too close [to Camperdown]'. As the ships closed, he added 'We are getting too close, sir! We must do something, sir! May I go astern?'. Tryon replied quietly 'Yes, go astern'. 'Full speed astern, both screws.' ordered Bourke, and ordered watertight doors closed.

Tryon shouted to Markham 'Go astern, go astern', but there was nothing that could be done and Camperdown's ram bow ripped 9 feet into Victoria. Just before impact, Tryon received Markhams reply to Tryon's questioning signal 'Because I did not quite understand your signal'.

The other ships started to lower boats, but Tryon believed his ship was not badly damaged and ordered them to stop. Victoria was listing to starboard, and the forecastle was underwater, with water coming down the barbettes. Within 5 minutes of impact, the bows were 15 feet under water. Within 15 minutes of the collision, Victoria had capsized and vanished beneath the surface, taking Tryon and 357 of her crew with her. One notable survivor was John Jellicoe, future commander of the Grand Fleet.

After holding a ceremony, Markham ordered a return to Malta. The court martial was held there and concluded that Tryon was responsible for the sinking, but regretted that Markham had not effectively questioned the order. It seems likely that Tryon had made a deliberate mistake in the hope that Markham or another officer would question it, but the sinking destroyed his reputation created during a career of unparalleled achievement.

Written by Andrew Cashmore

herakles

06-02-2008, 13:33

A most remarkable man it seems. In a time when he could be.

This: "Tryon had made a deliberate mistake in the hope that Markham or another officer would question it" - is however not the mark of a competent leader. Especially with so much at stake.

Perhaps toward the end of his career he might have suffered some problem to cause this?

A most interesting post in every way Commodore.

Harley

06-02-2008, 13:41

I have Penrose-FitzGerald's biography of Tryon, and he does seem a remarkable man. However it would seem that far too many people mark the incident as somehow indicative of the Royal Navy past present and future (well-read readers will perhaps guess I'm not a fan of Gordon's "The Rule of the Game"). I would not have liked to have been at the Court-Martial on Malta, that's for sure.

Harley

RCN

10-04-2008, 11:36

"Admirals in Collision", Richard Hough, 1959. A well written account of the collision & its aftermath,

Bryan

RCN

10-04-2008, 11:38

What some of Tryon & Markham's contemporaries thought...............

Batstiger

10-04-2008, 12:05

It's funny you should post this thread, I came across this yesterday.

Bob.

RCN

10-04-2008, 12:30

HMS Victoria has fascinated me for many yrs, & would love to find a Naval LS named to her!

Am away for a couple days but will post more pics when I return,

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 14:37

Here is a period photo of HMS Victoria taken at Fort Ricasoli in Malta.

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 14:40

& here are some of the photos & illustrations of Victoria's sinking,taken from "Admirals in Collision".

This photo is of the Victoria's 111 ton guns being fired.

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 14:45

This illustration appeared in the "Graphic" & was published 3 wks after the disaster, is considered quite accurate.

RCN

12-04-2008, 14:50

Here is the photo Bob posted earlier in the thread of the Victoria's last few seconds. This is probably the only photo actually taken the day of Victoria's sinking & was taken by the Staff Surgeon of HMS Collingwood. The ship on the left is HMS Nile, second in line after Victoria.

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 14:58

The screws of Victoria continued to turn as she sank. Many of the men abandoning ship via the stern were killed by the rotating screws.

& the aftermath of the sinking. The engraving is not 100% accurate, as Rear Admiral Hasting's Flagship (the ship on the right of the illustration) - HMS Camperdown - was quite far down in the bows as a result of the collision.

Both illustrations from the "Graphic"

RCN

12-04-2008, 15:11

Here is another contemporary engraving of the final moments of HMS Victoria. This illustration appeared in the Daily Telegraph Jun 5/97.

Vice Admiral Tryon is shown in the inset.

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 15:22

On the 100th Anniversay of the Victoria disaster The Daily Telegraph ran a full page commemmorative article - this scan is taken from that article, & gives a illustrative account of what happened & how it happened:

RCN

12-04-2008, 15:31

& from the same article an illustation of the various evolutions & how they played out,or might have played out :

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 15:40

There were approx 200 survivors of the Victoria disaster. Here is a CDV of one of them --- Stoker James Curran. His diary was discovered in 1997 & excerpts of it were printed in the "Daily Telegraph" article of Jun 5/97.

Curran's naval career came to an end after the disaster. He had been a prior Army deserter & when this was discovered he was discharged from the RN after completion of the Victoria court martial on 12 Aug '93. Cause of discharge was: "Fraudulant entry". He had only 1 year's service in the RN.

However, he must have made a fairly good living afterwards appearing at various "myrioramas" relating in vivid detail his "11 minutes of fame"!

Bryan

RCN

12-04-2008, 15:44

Excerpts from Curran's diary................

RCN

12-04-2008, 15:58

Another day I will relate story & some photos of the ship forever to be associated with HMS Victoria - HMS Camperdown,

Bryan

astraltrader

12-04-2008, 19:28

Very good information and illustrations RCN. Thanks very much.

herakles

12-04-2008, 22:11

This has been a most interesting and entertaining thread. I've enjoyed all the posts and have learned a lot. Stars needed here!

astraltrader

13-04-2008, 02:54

Just thought I would add these. The first one is a slightly different take on the picture RCN used in #9. The second is from a painting of Victoria executed by one of the better 20th century marine artists - [W]. Fred Mitchell...

RCN

13-04-2008, 14:11

Those Images are very nice Terry.

Victoria & her class seemed so top heavy to me, & with those huge guns not surprised she went down so quickly.

As a postscript - following the collision, a court martial, as required when one of HM Ships were lost, was convened in Malta. All of the Victoria survivors were present for the court martial, as was of course Admiral Markham & many of the other Captains in the fleet that day. Altho it was not Markham that was "on trial", (rather it was Captain Bourke, Captain of HMS Victoria) he was initimately involved in the proceedings & was permitted to "defend' himself. Markham was judged as follows:

"....although it much to be regretted that Rear Admiral Markham did not carry out his intention to semaphore the CinC his doubt of the signal, it would be fatal to the best interests of the service to say he was to blame for carrying out the directions of his CinC..."

Markham was effectively acquitted but his RN career was effectively ended.
He was permitted to finish out his last few months of his appointment as second in command, then he was placed on half pay. He was never appointed to a seagoing command of responsibility again, altho he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Nore for a period prior to retiring officially in 1906. Markham died on Oct 28. 1918.

Bryan

RCN

13-04-2008, 14:34

Best to read first the thread on HMS Victoria:

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?p=9370#post9370

HMS Camperdown was a Battleship of the Admiral class, launched in '85 & completed in '89. She was slow in completion & commissioning due to the delay in producing her huge 13.5" guns. She was initially flagship of the Mediterranean fleet until Apl '92. She then returned to UK to become Flagship of the Channel sqdn. She then returned to the Med to become flagship of Rear Admiral Hastings Markham, 2nd in command of the Mediterranean fleet. Flagship was HMS Victoria, Vice Admiral George Tryon, Commander in Chief.

It was Camperdown's fate to be leading the second column of ships on 22 of June 1893, off Tripoli, just prior to the fleet's being 'secured' for the evening hours.

The subsequent story is related in the HMS Victoria thread above.

Here is a photo of HMS Camperdown as flagship of Vice Admiral A. Hoskins.

more to follow.......................

Bryan

astraltrader

13-04-2008, 14:37

Interesting postscript to the story RCN. Do you think from what you have studied about this case that it was a fair judgement?

RCN

13-04-2008, 14:44

When HMS Victoria & HMS Camperdown collided that afternoon the effect was immediate and fatal to Victoria & the photograph attached illustrates why:

HMS Camperdown was a bow ram equipped battleship, & this ram did exactly what it was intended to do that fateful day. It penetrated into Victoria's starboard ide on the starboard side approx 6 feet, & about 12 feet below the waterline, the resulting opening being approx 100 square feet. Seawater immediately rushed into Victoria resulting in an immediate list, & made worse by the fact that all of her gun ports, watertight doors, scuttles, & ventilating systems were open due to the heat that day. It took approx 11 minutes for Victoria to sink.

The photo below shows the bow ram of HMS Polyphemus. Camperdown's ram would have been similar to this.

Bryan

RCN

13-04-2008, 14:54

The first two photos show the damage Camperdown suffered on that afternoon.
She is in drydock in Malta & repairs to her took until September.

She was only kept afloat by the very quick action of her Carpenter & his crew who built a temporary bulkhead to stop the seawater pouring into her.
She settled quite rapidly by the head & the second photo illustrates her down by the head that afternoon. Her metacentric height was reduced to virtually nil & she was very fortunate it was a calm day or she would have sunk, but likely slower than Victoria.

RCN

13-04-2008, 15:00

Camperdown survived the collision & remained in service for quite a while afterwards.
Of all of the ships in the Med fleet that fateful afternoon Camperdown survived the longest. She was a guardship for several years before being converted in 1908 to a Submarine depot ship based at Harwich. She was getting quite old by that time tho & was finally declared surplus & sold for scap in June 1911.

Bryan

Commodore Armiger

13-04-2008, 15:47

Harley

13-04-2008, 16:40

There were a number of reasons for rams on ships, least of all after decades devoid of major naval actions was the Battle of Lissa in 1866;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Lissa_%281866%29

Both the Austrians and the Italians used ramming tactically during the battle with mixed results, and not unnaturally it had a considerable effect on naval construction in the years to follow.

And the Royal Navy's breech-loading monsters were exactly that - monsters. They were very slow to reload and train, and there was then no calculated system of firing other than spotting the fall of shot to a couple of thousand yards at most - and that was the situation around the world until the end of the 19th century.

Harley

Commodore Armiger

13-04-2008, 17:02

True, ramming must have seemed an attractive option in the 1860s when the evidence of the American Civil War suggested that, even at point-blank range, the naval guns of the day (massive though they were) could not be guaranteed to penetrate even the primitive armour available.

But by the 1880s both guns and armour had improved considerably, though there had been no naval actions of any consequence wherein they might be tested. So one may hypothesise that both Admirals and naval constructors considered that a ram (and the tactics that follow from the possession of such a weapon) was still a value-for-money alternative.

Unfortunately, as the events we have been considering revealed, the design of the vessels utterly failed to take account of the consequences to hull integrity of the rammer (in this case Camperdown) of even a 5 knot ram (nothing like the speed that Adm Tryon would have expected of his ships in action against an enemy fleet).

Harley

13-04-2008, 17:11

RCN

13-04-2008, 18:03

I am fascinated to learn that, despite ramming her victim at scarcely more than walking pace, Camperdown was only saved from sinking by the heroic efforts of her carpenter and his team. What in heaven's name were the naval constructors of the time thinking of when they designed these tubs?

PS: You had better explain megacentric height to the laymen before any of them turn turtle and sink.

well first off I have made an error. I should have said METACENTRIC & here is the def:

Metacenter
The metacentric height (GM) is the distance between the center of gravity of a ship and its metacenter. The GM is used to calculate the stability of a ship and this must be done before it proceeds to sea. The GM must equal or exceed the minimum required GM for that ship for the duration of the forthcoming voyage. This is to ensure that the ship has adequate stability.

When a ship is tilted the center of buoyancy of the ship moves. If vertical lines are drawn through these centers they meet. The point where these lines cross is the metacenter.
In the diagram to the right the two Bs show the centers of buoyancy of a ship in the upright and listed condition and M is the metacenter. The metacenter is considered to be fixed for small angles of heel however at larger angles of heel the metacenter can no longer be considered fixed and other means must be found to calculate the ship's stability.
The metacenter can be calculated using the formula BM=1/V
Where B is the center of buoyancy, I is the moment of inertia of the waterplane in meters4 and V is the volume of displacement in metres3

RCN

13-04-2008, 18:13

I thank of of the conrtributors for their candid comments.

These battleships were huge & sometimes too top heavy - viz: the HMS Captain disaster of 1870.(& thats another topic I would like to get to soon)

The weight of the massive breech loading guns (approx 110 tons per gun)was unbelievable, so the top hampers were overloaded what with everything else that was on the freeboard. Naval gunnery was undergoing many changes in the latter Victorian period as was ship construction - & it all culminated in HMS Dreadnought of 1906-07. (some would say in the later Super Dreadnoughts). Some of these ship were not only experimental but just plain dangerous, but I think they have to be viewed in the light of the times.

Of course it took Admirals & Captains to run these huge monsters & when a Flag Admiral like Tryon got in absolute control of them, & I do say absolute as that is what Tryon was - his word was effectively unchallenged - very very few officers had the nerve or desire to challenge him - incidents like the Victoria disaster were bound to happen. Who know how many "near misses" occured in the Victorian Edwardian navy???

Bryan

RCN

13-04-2008, 18:18

I've only read about the Victoria-Camperdown incident in passing before, but now I'm perusing William White (Director of Naval Construction)'s report on the sinking. The way Camperdown pierced Victoria's hull at such an angle, then the two ships sterns swinging together can't obviously be good for the structural integrity of the the ramming ship and one can only assume that in an actual battle no-one would contemplate ramming in such a way. One can only assume that the builders wouldn't desire such a course of action also.

Harley

Had Victoria & Camperdown remained locked together after the collision & Camperdown had not gone astern as Tryon immediately ordered (via megaphone), Victoria might have been saved. They were in sight of ashore, & it was dead calm & the water was relatively shallow - the damage might have been contained on both ships & its possible Victoria could have been beached in time. Its one of the "what ifs" of naval history!.

Bryan

RCN

13-04-2008, 18:27

I think something else has to be mentioned here for the benefit of those not aware of the Victorian Naval mentality. This disaster just did not just happen - it was, in a way, planned, or foretold.

At that time Officers were trained in the absolute obedience of orders & initiative was stifled. A Fleet Admiral's word was absolute law & very very few senior (or junior) officers dared question a CinC IF he valued his career.

Tryon was what amounted to the Naval "god" of his time. He was an awesome figure with an extremely strong personality who's word was law, & he was respected by both officers & men. He was one of the most forward looking admirals of his time.
If Tryon gave an order he expected it to be obeyed without question, & he was not the only admiral of his time to have this kind of power.

Both his Flag Lieut & his Staff Commander on HMS Victoria attempted to correct his 6 cable order at the time of issuance, & both were overruled. Both knew there would be a collision if the 6 cables pennant was permitted to fly. Captain Bourke was also well aware the two ships were bound to collide & he too tried to tell Tryon, actually as the maneouver was being carried out. I can only try to imagine what was going thru Bourke's mind as the two ships approached each other - to see your command vanish in front of your eyes & be powerless to change it must have been absolute anguish for him!

Read "The Rules of the Game" & you will understand...................

Bryan

Commodore Armiger

13-04-2008, 21:01

1) Just read RCN's definition of metacentre which makes gobbledegook seem sensible! I expect it would make more sense with the missing diagram.

2) Harley: While I accept that the Victoria/Camperdown incident was of course an accidental collision rather than a deliberate ram carried out in accordance with some naval textbook (if indeed such a document was ever published), it is hard to imagine that in battle the captain of a potential victim would allow his vessel to present itself as a text-book target if still able to manoeuvre. A glancing blow is statistically more likely than a blow within 10 degrees of bow to beam. So the aggressor would always be at risk of not ramming "just right", at best losing way and having to go astern, possibly damaged and taking in water - and all the while under fire!

With the passing of the age of sail, every captain's aim was to maintain the ability to manoeuvre and avoid unnecessary damage. For a capital ship deliberately to compromise those imperatives as well as to throw away any advantage it might have in range and throw weight of its big guns is frankly lunacy. But then as we have learnt, Admirals in those days were not to be argued with, and if Tryon and his like said that capital ships needed rams, then they got them and woe betide any young whippersnapper who argued along the lines that I have.

Harley

13-04-2008, 21:28

Lack of tact and the assumed air of superiority aside, when Gordon sticks to the events of 31 May-1 June 1916 "The Rules of the Game" is a good history history of the Battle of Jutland - not the best because quite frankly an authoritative account of the battle has yet to be written.

He's on damnably shaky ground with his "flashback" chapters to the Victorian navy, and in my opinion he tried too hard to "join the dots" on two separate puzzles. His whole case for the view of the Royal Navy as an organisation based on blind obedience is based on his selective summary and as far as I am aware no one else has written on the subject in the past dozen years, except to parrot his line in General Histories as if he had conclusively proved his case, which in my opinion he has not.

Back to "Camperdown" suffering such egregious damage, having just read the comments of the man who designed the ship, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby backed up by the then DNC, WIlliam White, it seems fair to say that had Camperdown been prepared for ramming, i.e. actually had her watertight doors shut her flooding would have been nowhere near as severe.

Harley

Harley

astraltrader

13-04-2008, 22:42

What I asked might well seem to have an obvious answer, however I am taking into account the vastly different perspectives along with morals and values that would have been applied during this court-martial.
I just wondered if bearing all that in mind you felt it was a fair judgement?

RCN

14-04-2008, 14:53

Yes its a fair question & I think anyone who has read of the Victoria disaster would have some kind of opinion on the matter. I think any answer that a person might have tho has to be tempered with the situation in the Victorian Navy of the time. Its easy at this distance to pass judgement on both Tryon & Markham, but you have to look at them in THEIR time & judge them if you will, in that context.

Tryon was well aware of the risk he was running. He knew it would take a minimum of 8 cables to perform the maneouver safely (actually some references state 8 1/2 cables would have been a safer distance - these huge B/S had large turning circles, even with use of opposite screws to assist). When Tryon formulated his order Staff Commander Hawkins-Smith told him: "that will require at least 8 cables Sir", & Tryon agreed. When the signal was hoisted Tryon was cautioned then again by Flag Lieut Gillford that 6 cables was unsafe, but he stated at that time - "leave it at 6".

So my feeling is Tryon knew exactly what he was doing. He was a master at the art of Naval evolution & made his name & reputation on this, so he knew the risk he was running.

What I think Tryon was doing was testing Markham. This was their first big evolution together as a fleet. Markham was no match for Tryon -- in personality -- not intellect -- Markham was a brilliant man & had a scientific mind as well. He held the Arctic discoveries medal, so he was no automaton as many senior Victorian naval officers were. Markham could not stand up to Tryon, Tryon's personality was too strong for him. Both Tryon & Markham knew this. They had come into contact in the past (during the '88 maneouvers) & Tryon had made a virtual fool of Markham, so no doubt Markham's appointment as 2 i/c of the Med fleet was to be a challenge for both of them.
& Tryon was a product of his time. He had spent his entire career preparing for command (& had he lived he would likely have made 1st Sea Lord) he was used to command & used to being obeyed without question, very very few senior officers had the courage to stand up to, or question, Tryon.

What did Tryon expect of Markham that afternoon??? We will never know for sure. Tryon took that to Dave Jones locker with him. Like Jutland, there will always be speculation & it will go on forever. There will be no "be all, end all" firm answer to this question.

As I have pointed out in my Camperdown thread, Markham's career was ruined as a result of that afternoon. I dont think that was fair, & altho I am not a particular great fan of Admiral Charles Beresford, I do agree with his statement:
"another man was cruicified alive for another man's blunder'.

Admiral Jackie Fisher, who I am a fan of, stated : "If I was Admiral Markham I never could hold up my head again."
This is, in my belief, unfair to Markham - it was easy after the fact for other officers to judge, as it was easy to judge Jellicoe after Jutland, & Fisher never was a man to forgive or mince his words. He called a spade a spade & ruined a lot of officer's careers in the process.

So I guess I have to say in answer to yr question, that, No, Markham was not treated fairly. Acording to the mores of the time a scapegoat was needed & Markham fit the bill to a "T".

Bryan

RCN

14-04-2008, 15:02

Here are photos of 3 key figures of that day.

Flag Lieut Lord Gillford, & Capt Maurice Bourke, both of HMS Victoria. Both survived the sinking altho Guillford died 5 yrs later. Bourke died of consumption (TB) in '00.

Staff (Navigating)Commander Hawkins-Smith photo is also shown. He survived & died several yrs later.

As an afterthought - one of the survivors of Victoria was Commander Jellicoe - He was Commander of Victoria but he had Malta fever & was in bed when the collision occured & had to be assisted off the ship, or he would not have made it.

Bryan

astraltrader

14-04-2008, 15:04

Thank you very much Bryan - you have confirmed exactly what I feared had happened.
Markham was never going to escape from being the right man in the wrong place!

RCN

14-04-2008, 15:16

[QUOTE=Commodore Armiger;9414]1) Just read RCN's definition of metacentre which makes gobbledegook seem sensible! I expect it would make more sense with the missing diagram.

QUOTE]

Not mine - wikepedia. I only had an idea of what it was - I forgot to attach the diag!

Bryan

herakles

14-04-2008, 15:24

Hmmmm.

It seems to me that there's 20/20 hindsight being used here.

It always a truism that if the decision of the Commander works, he's a hero. If it fails, he's hung out to dry.

RCN

14-04-2008, 15:27

Hmmmm.

It seems to me that there's 20/20 hindsight being used here.

It always a truism that if the decision of the Commander works, he's a hero. If it fails, he's hung out to dry.

No doubt Jellicoe was very much well aware of that at Jutland. He had experienced the Victoria disaster!

Bryan

bob shayler

24-04-2008, 19:59

Hi Brian,
In Jellicoes account of his experince of the collision, he said:
At the time of the collision, he was lying in his cabin with a fever of 103 degrees where he had been for a week, ill with disentry. He felt the shock and realizing something drastic had happened, put on a pair of trousers and a coat and went on deck where he supervised the launching of the boats.
He found that Camperdown had cut right into his ship and although all watertight doors had been closed, they were sinking fast.
He had hardly started at his task when the ship heeled right over and capsized. She went down about 8 minutes after the collision.
Jellicoe went over the side but was sucked down some way before coming to the surface again. He stated that many men were killed as they fell onto the ships propellors which were still working as the ship went over.
He, himself was rescued and later, finding his temperature had returned to normal stated that 'the ducking must have done him good'.
A great man,
regards,
Bob

RCN

26-04-2008, 13:56

Jellicoe was very sick with what at the time was referred to as 'Malta Fever'. They of course had no idea where the fever came from, but was subsequently discovered that it was got by drinking contaminated goat's milk - no pateurization in those days!

Two officers were quite sick with it the day of the collison - Commander Jellicoe & Mid Gambier. As stated above, Jellicoe's temp was quite high & he was very unsteady on his feet. Surgeon Ellis (Victoria's Surgeon) went to his cabin & got him dressed with the aid of Jellicoe's servant. Jellioce was subsequently got up on deck with assistance & got off safely.
Mid Gambier too was able to be dressed & out of his cabin (actually Adm Tryon's spare cabin) with assistance from his Marine servant, but was not seen on deck did not survive.
There was also a Stoker Petty Officer with a broken leg (sustained during the collision by the avalanche of shifting coal) who was gotten out of the sick bay but did not survive.

Jellicoe recovered quickly & was able to participate in the resultant court martial.

Bryan

HMS Bergamot

25-05-2008, 08:14

The wrecks of almost all of the sunken battleships invariably sink upside down. It is believed that the weight of the top hamper rolls them over. Not the Victoria though. She is stuck vertically, bow down, in the bottom mud.

Have a look at http://www.oz.net/~markhow/pre-dred/victoria.htm for an almost bizarre look at a lost era.

Regards,

HMS Bergamot

25-05-2008, 08:19

There is also

http://www.divernet.com/cgi-bin/articles.pl?id=2273&sc=&ac=d&an=

to look at for a detailed description of the discovery.

Harley

25-06-2008, 13:35

The other day I bought "Admirals in Collision", and in all honestly I was not impressed. As someone who has read biographies of both Tryon and Markham, I was not impressed by his characterisations of either of the two admirals. The one of Tryon was uneven, while that of Markham did its best to play him down as totally uninspired, which is simply not true. His account of the disaster itself is competent, but then again he essentially lifts most of the necessary details from William Laird Clowes "The History of the Royal Navy", Volume VII. It has to be said the pictures are good though, and were worth my paying $8.50 for the book.

The account of the Court-Martial is rather shoddy, and in light of some of Hough's unreferenced conclusions downright libellous, effectively claiming a cover-up had taken place and then implying Tryon of believing Markham to be utterly incomptetent (his explanation of the exclamation "It's all my fault" uttered by Tryon).

I am always struck by so many of these historians from the mid-twentieth century, with the opportunity to meet so many figures of history in their twilight years (for example Hough talking to the last-known survivor of the disaster), and then people like Hough blow it by producing biased tracts in place of solid history.

In conclusion, I can only recommend that people wanting to know about the disaster go to http://www.archive.org and search for Clowes History of the Royal Navy and download Volume VII. While Clowes obviously wants to protect the name of Tryon he remains far more objective than Hough or for that matter Gordon in "Rules of the Game".

If anyone wants I can supply them with a PDF journal which contains the official report made from the proceedings of the "Victoria" Court-martial by Assistant Controller of the Navy William Henry White. I've been transcribing it onto my website but without the numerous diagrams which I cannot upload it's not quite the same.

Harley

RCN

02-07-2008, 13:59

The other day I bought "Admirals in Collision", and in all honestly I was not impressed. As someone who has read biographies of both Tryon and Markham, I was not impressed by his characterisations of either of the two admirals. The one of Tryon was uneven, while that of Markham did its best to play him down as totally uninspired, which is simply not true. His account of the disaster itself is competent, but then again he essentially lifts most of the necessary details from William Laird Clowes "The History of the Royal Navy", Volume VII. It has to be said the pictures are good though, and were worth my paying $8.50 for the book.

Harley

I have read it at least three times now & really enjoy the book. My copy is the 1st Ed of1959. Its probably the best account of the disaster, but no doubt someone will come along sometime down the line somewhat & write a 'new' version tho.

I dont think we (or any author for that matter) can judge these Admirals BY THE STANDARDS OF OUR TIME - the whole social structure of that time was vastly different than our time. & no doubt both Tryon & Markham were products of their upbringing & the society in which they lived & moved in. Tyron & Markham were not even of the same class - they moved in different circles & had different concepts on how 'things should be'. Markham did not even want to be in the Navy, he preferred to engage in more scholarly pursuits & I dont think he was a 'happy camper' as a Flag Officer. He was not cut out for the role & he certainly did not have the strong forceful personality that Tryon had (for better or worse). Perhaps if he had things might have turned out quite differently that fateful afternoon.

So the mix of these two different personalities in the same fleet was bound to cause problems down the line, even if the disaster had not taken place.

Another example of 'clashing personalities' among Flag officers was that of Vice Adm Charlie Beresford & Rear Adm Percy Scott in the Channel fleet in '08. This time tho a potential collision was avoided as Scott used his own initiative when a similar maneouver was ordered by Beresford.

Bryan

Benbow

04-08-2008, 15:30

HMS Victoria

The worlds only 90degree vertical shipwreck.

Some interesting facts and photos.

http://www.oz.net/~markhow/pre-dred/victoria.htm

Benbow

04-08-2008, 20:44

Discovery story of the Victoria Wreck which is vertical from the seabed.

http://www.inspired-training.com/hms%20victoria.htm

http://www.oz.net/~markhow/pre-dred/victoria.htm

damocles

11-09-2009, 22:55

I read 'admirals in collision' and liked it. I didn't feel Hough was pushing too hard in making his case, rather that he underplayed saying exactly who he felt was at fault.

As to Markham the scapegoat:
Markham was never on trial. I don't recall now exactly which account said what (I also read Gordon and clowes), but the definite conclusion I gained was that Markham was determined to press for his own trial in the belief it would exhonerate him. On the other hand, the prosecutor supposedly was furious that he had not been permitted to press the case against Victoria's crew as much as he wished, and was certain that the failures to carry out commands, or get their story straight, amongst Camperdown's officers (including Markham) would have led to them being found guilty of something, had they ever been tried. Markham had to be talked out of demanding a trial, probably not so much for his benefit as because no one wanted the matter to carry on. The court was completely stacked to get the desired result, an acquittal for Bourke and Victoria's crew.

On this reading Markham was not the scapegoat and got off lightly. He admitted he turned his ship onto a collision course with Victoria with not the least idea how a collision could be avoided. This was contrary to standing orders that his primary duty at all times was to safeguard his ship, which Hough says Tryon had only just re-issued, specifically stating that dangerous orders were not to be carried out. Hough argued that TA, Tryons system ordering captains to work on their own initiative, was in effect at the time of the accident, though no one except Tryon seems to have realised that he had never cancelled it from a previous day. The trial demonstrated that no one on Camperdown could decide what to do. Markham's story of what he believed Tryon would do (turn outside him) was ridiculous in the face of his other testimony that he was watching Victoria's manoeuvering closely and watched her do an extra tight turn. he did not really have the defence which Bourke and Victoria's officers did, that they had challeneged Tryon's orders to his face and he had confirmed them. Markham was the top man on his own ship and it was his responsibility.

Markham was guilty of allowing the accident to happen, as he could and should have prevented it. Tryon no doubt felt responsible, because he was. His failure was in misjudging Markham's ability, and also in trusting his officers not to do something really stupid. I don't know at what point the accident became ultimately unavoidable, and Tryon ought to have been watching as that point approached so he could intervene: obviously he wasn't. The testimony says he was watching the other ships behind Victoria to see how they followed on, which apparently was what he normally did. I don't know if this is relevant, but collisions between ships do not seem to have been entirely uncommon, and this might have been a factor, that he did not appreciate the damage a collision would cause. This would have been particularly true if Markham had even used absolute maximum helm as Victoria did. Then there would have been a more glancing collision because both ships would have been further round.

Tryon was not an ogre. Fitzgerald's biography is full of little hints about him gathering intelligence and being interested in talking to all his officers and getting their confidence. (this stuff was still secret when he wrote the book). It seems more a case that everyone trusted him to have arranged a safe outcome so they didn't need to bother. I don't believe Markham would have suffered even if he had turned away from the other column (although turning outside Tryon seems the best choice to have made). Certainly he would not have been courtmartialled for disobeying orders, as Beresford claimed. He had several safe choices. What Tryon would have crucified him for was taking the one course he believed would end in collision.

I am not clear how much reversing one screw would reduce the turning circle, but the turn on emergency maximum helm (rather than normal maximum) was about 6 cables which might on a good day bring the two ships side by side touching at the end. So if either had also applied reverse screw, presumably no collision would have taken place. This analysis is complicated by the other ships coming on close behind, which narrowly avoided ploughing into the backs of Victoria and Camperdown.

Tryon's query of why his order was not acknowledged has been interpreted as annoyance or impatience, but it might be he meant it. Asking Markham whether he had figured out how to do the impossible safely. The delay obviously meant markham had been thinking about it. Markham said 'yes', and Tryon let him get on with it.

I don't get the impression Markham was a brilliant handler of ships. He seems to have been much more interested in exploration and used the navy to help him do this. While Tryon might have passed the time devising strategy, Markham was writing about his exploration trips.

Harley

12-09-2009, 12:25

"His failure was in misjudging Markham's ability, and also in trusting his officers not to do something really stupid."

You're definitely taking Hough's line there with that statement. And it absolves Tryon of doing "something really stupid", not trusting his own officers who queried his initial order, and giving a direct order which endangered the safety of two of his ships which incidentally went against his standing order. THAT, was his failure. Not Markham's.

God only knows what Lady Markham made of Hough's book when it came out, with its tasteless suggestions at the end of what Tryon thought of Markham as the disaster unfolded.

Simon

Gone Asiatic

12-09-2009, 13:23

This incident is most interesting and is an example of what can happen when no one is willing to challenge a head strong coersive leader.

In the mid 1980s a USN DDG steamed into Sagami Bay her C.O. in a hurry to conduct a 5" gunnery exercise to certify SRF repairs prior to returning to homeport Yokosuka. Sagami Bay was/is not an authorized gunnery area, yet when he ordered the gun mount trained and fired on a bearing, no one dared question the commanding officer`s orders - he was not in the habit of tolerating anyone questioning his decisions. All the rounds landed within a few hundred yards of a white hulled Japanese Maritime Safety Agency cutter (in broad daylight).

COMDESRON FIFTEEN relieved the C.O. of command that very day before the line handlers were secured from sea and anchor detail.

Harley

12-09-2009, 15:33

Swift work by the Commodore then. Presumably the CO of the DDG was an O-5? If noone contradicted him can you imagine if an O-9 such as Tryon was involved.

Simon

damocles

12-09-2009, 21:06

What Tryon did on that day was entirely consistent with his past behaviour. he set his captains unexpected manoeuvers and refused to answer questions until afterwards, when he was happy to discuss what they had done. Somewhere there is a comment from Markham about not understanding Tryon's previous exercises, but finding they made sense afterwards.

The first issue here is whether Tryon went nuts, or whether he was doing something sensible. I see no reason to think he was nuts. He set the same problem a few years earlier (to Tracey, was it, anyway someone who was on the courtmartial panel, which means the panel must have known about it). On that occasion tracey did nothing until it was too late to turn, so Tryon cancelled the order. Tryon had years since that occasion to think about this order and realise if it was stupid or not. He set the same test to markham. He thought it made sense, and he was a pretty good admiral. His officers queried it, it would seem he wavered in his resolve to set the problem, but he stuck with it. I'm not sure what exactly went on there and don't see how we can know. Tryon might have been testing his own offciers too, letting them talk and try to persuade them to see if they would come up with the answer. Or he might genuinely have been unsure whether to set Markham the test. It was not a new test, so again I find it difficult to believe Tryon seriously wavered in believing it was a reasonable problem to set a competent officer. We don't know what Tryon would have said had he survived, but I rather think he knew perfectly well it was dangerous and was pleased that his officers had seen this and asked him to change the order. So far so good, really, from his point of view. Confirmation that naval officers would understand that a danger existed and want to do something to avoid it.

Tryons position was different to Markhams re giving dangerous orders. tryon's objective was to train his fleet by setting them navigation and signal problems. If he was someone who believed that in wartime ships would get inappropriate orders and would have to disobey them, then the only way to practice this would be to set it up. To give some orders which must be disobeyed so they get the idea. Obviously it can't be a 'safe' order, or there would be no reason to disobey it. So the difficulty is to give a dangerous order safely. Obviously can't tell anyone what you are doing. Tryons reaction after the collision was that he couldn't believe the damage was as bad as it was. This might have been shock, but it might suggest he underestimated the worse-case risk, should there be a collision. But this may also not have been his particular fault. Others were also surprised how fast the ship sank.

His orders in setting up a carefully controlled training situation were not per se dangerous or foolish, although he failed in making it 'carefully controlled'. But the actual setup and orders seem to me reasonable. There was an 'out' to the collision course which he had set for his own ship, that markham's ship would turn away. It was intended to test Markham. Markham accepted the order. Both Markham and his flag captain had independent responsibilities to safeguard their ship (not to mention anyone else on duty). This was stated at the courtmartial. Either one of them should have refused to drive Camperdown into Victoria. Two chances to prevent the collision. This is probably what one of the other captains meant when he commented at the trial of afterwards (was it Noel?), that had it not been camperdown and her incompetent captain but rather Markham's normal flagship, things would have turned out differently.

This may be Hough's view, but i don't see what is unreasonable about it. It makes more sense to me that Tryon acted logically with an unforseen outcome than that he suddenly became utterly incompetent and reckless after years of being rather good at his job. Clever chap, but didn't understand that someone else might not be clever enough to understand the problem he had been set. I have no info and havn't read the trial transcript, but it would not surprise me that Markham's statement at the trial that he believed Tryon would turn outside him was a lie. Something made up afterwards when he did realise that he should have turned outside Tryon, but obviously could not say that. He and his captain scratched their heads, could not see how anything except a collision was going to happen, and did exactly as the orders said.

qprdave

25-09-2009, 13:34

The Times Report in the inquiry

damocles

29-09-2009, 00:21

Interesting find. Reading between the lines, it seems to say that although it was too late to close watertight doors by the time the collision was obvious, it would not have been too late to close all the gunports and doors on deck level. If they had been closed, then when the water got up to them it couldn't have got in that way also and the ship would not have capsized, perhaps not even sunk, but anyway done so slower and people trying to escape may have stood a better chance. It throws a slightly different light on the actions of the crew trying to save the ship after the accident. The court martial specifically declined to comment on why the ship capsized.

The admirallty seem to have understood this also. They issued two memoranda of their position. First they deallt with confirming the courtmartial result which dealt with the actions of the officers, and then two days later commented on the physical steps which someone might have taken to save the ship without relating it in any way to actual people. Is that back to front?

qprdave

29-09-2009, 18:41

I am surprised that there wasn't any rules during close manouvres, such as these, that ensured that the ship wasn't, as called in my time, at least State 2 Condition Yankee.

damocles

30-09-2009, 20:42

I think you might say that Tryon was right, the navy wasn't ready for wartime emergency conditions. Easier said than done to put these things right.

Dreadnought

01-10-2009, 16:56

I thought this thread would benefit from a post explaining how the signal flags played their role in the disaster.

These are the comments of Captain Barrie Kent FFIAV FFI RN

“If the correct procedure (reading of flags) was not followed, disaster could result. In 1893 the British Mediterranean Fleet was being manoeuvred by the C-in-C, Admiral Tryon, prior to anchoring off Beirut.

The admiral was a great innovator and manoeuvring expert and loved testing his captains with new ideas . Like most admirals of the time, he had a beard, looked pretty fierce and was both feared and respected by more junior officers.

His second-in-command was Rear Admiral Markham, who commanded the 2nd Division. The C-in-C’s plan was to reverse the course of the fleet by each Division wheeling inwards, then turning together towards the anchoring position. At the start the two columns were 6 cables (1,200 yards) apart, and as the ship’s turning circles were about 4 cables, this was too close to carry out the proposed manoeuvre. To be safe the columns needed to be at least 10 cables apart, that is twice the diameter of the turning circles plus at least two cables. The staff pointed this out to the admiral, rather diffidently, but he said “Leave it as it is”. Despite their misgivings, the staff assumed that he knew what he was doing and no doubt had something clever up his sleeve.

So up went the two hoists, one telling the 1st Division to wheel to port, the other for the 2nd Division to wheel to starboard.

Other ships hoisted their ANSWER pennants at the dip, but kept them there while they checked what the signals meant. They all realised that the manoeuvre appeared to be impossible, but like the admiral’s staff they assumed their much respected admiral had a solution, and one after the other the ANSWER pennants went close up. Except in the Camperdown, where Admiral Markham and his flag captain still pondered what to do. However, the C-in-C, tired of waiting, had the Camperdown’s identification pennants hoisted, a standard method of issuing a rebuke for tardiness in obeying orders, and at the same time had his Yeoman signal by semaphore “What are you waiting for?”. This so unnerved Markham that he ordered his ship to go ‘close up’, the flagship’s signals were executed, and the two leading ships started turning towards each other.

Inevitably disaster struck, Camperdown rammed Victoria, and within twenty minutes the flagship had sunk with the loss of some 400 men. Admiral Tryon himself was drowned, his last words said to have been “It was all my fault”. Well it was, but the disaster would have been avoided if the other ships had refused to hoist their ANSWER pennants close up.
Could anything else have been done? Obviously Admiral Tryon’s staff should have insisted that the manoeuvre was unsafe, and the Captains of both the Victoria and Camperdown should have refused to put their helms over, but of course in those days it wasn’t easy to argue with such a senior officer. If Admiral Markham had been quick off the mark, he could have turned his Division to port, the signal 2 BLUE perhaps (Turn together two points to port), and then back to starboard (BLUE 2) as soon as they were out to a safe distance.

The only explanation seems to be that Tryon had a mental aberration, in some way confusing the mathematics of the manoeuvre.

The accident happened mid-afternoon. Back in Malta, Lady Tryon was holding a reception at Admiralty House, and at about the same time several guests were surprised to see the Admiral coming down the stairs...”

I have produced the three diagrams attached, to show the signals in question and how the planned manoeuvre failed. (clearest in magnify mode)