Dreadnought
18-09-2010, 17:49
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR: Supremacy of British Gunnery
Sir Julian Corbett, the celebrated naval historian wrote in his book “The Campaign at Trafalgar” (1910) ..
“It was a fair fight against foes worth fighting, and with no advantage on either side, except in the superior sea training and gunnery of the British.”
Is that actually the case? What were the factors leading to the British victory at Cape Trafalgar on October 21st 1805?
The Navies
In the period leading up to Trafalgar the Royal Navy had become the world’s superior sea power, dominating all of the navies of its adversaries, and being comprised of experienced and talented sailors. Ever since the naval reforms by Samuel Pepys in the 1640’s the Navy had been building on a system of hiring and promoting by talent, with officers being selected for ship handling abilities, knowledge and competence, rather than purely based upon their aristocratic credentials (although there was still a bias towards the upper class). A pool of highly competent, aggressively and ambitious naval officers had been developed so that if any one commander was removed a dozen others were waiting to take over. Something no opposing state could match. The British system of press gangs, although widely disappraoved of, proved effective in providing experienced seamen.
Whilst the French had also built up a structured rank and promotion system, the effects of the French Revolution saw the the largely isolated officer class being purged by the peoples committees. Most of the aristotic officers been exectuted, exiled, or had fled the country. New officers were largely drawn from the lower decks, merchant shipping officers and political appointees. Some of those were notably competent, but the previously institutional memory of the French navy had been destroyed. Villneuve himself was one of the few aristocratic officers to survive the Revolution, and by the time of Napoleon’s rule, other aristocartic officers who survived prison and exile were re-instated; but there was a still a shortfall. Officer training schools had only been established in the early 1800’s, and there had not been time for them to produce the trained officers desperately needed.
In the lower ranks, the well establish French system of conscription of sailors was often circumvented, and failed to provide experienced and competent seamen. In addition, the fighting capacity of the Fench navy was compromised as a result of the abolition of the specialist corps of gunners in 1793 as it was regarding as elitist. This left the French ships short of experienced and trained gunners. Even though the corps was later re-instated, many of the original members were dispersed and it would take many years to build build it up to it’s former efficiency.
At this time in Royalist Spain, which had once been the ultimate naval powerful force, the navy had been diminished, the country reliant on South American gold instead of developing industry and commerce. When that supply of wealth was cut off by pirates, privateers and the Royal Navy, the state collapsed, unable to afford a fleet of competent officers and men. The Spanish also relied upon conscription for its crews, and their were never enough experienced seamen, so any available men were conscripted. Because of the lack of funds, its ships spent little time at sea, so that the crews further lacked experience and training. Spanish officers wer aristocrats and fairly old fashioned in their outlook compared with the French and British.
Morale
Morale in the British crews was high. Winning was an expectation. At the beginning of Trafalgar, although crews were weary from the long patrols of the blockades, spirits were high. It is documented that some of the guns on Bellerophon had the words “Victory or Death” chalked on them in large letters. Such was the spirit in which the gun crews were set to do their work. Morale was further boosted by the presence of Nelson, a national hero, who was revered throughout the ranks.
The French hated the Spanish, who themselves did not trust the French. In Cadiz, prior to the Battle, there were frequent dockside brawls between the crews of the two nations, resulting in many injuries and several deaths. The Spanish Admirals regarded Villneuve as incompetent and. The French crews were ill disciplined and morale was weak. Spanish crews were widely acclaimed for their bravery, but recognised as poorly trained and inexperienced compared with the British. Morale was correspondingly low. Villeneuve was aware of the poor morale amongst the Spanish, and wrote ….
“It is very distressing to see such fine and powerful ships manned by herdsmen and beggars and having such a small number of seamen.”
Captain Maistral of the French ship Neptune was to have commented during the battle, when Santa Anna was engaged with Royal Sovereign “… that Santa Anna was not putting up a defence commensurate with her strength and … moreover that several men were hiding themselves outside the ship on the opposite side to the enemy …”
Villeneuve and a number of the French Captains also had reservations about their ability to win a close encounter gun battle with the British, and had agreed that there should be no hesitation to board the British vessels if circumstances permitted. The defeat at Aboukir Bay in 1798, and those previously at Cape St. Vincent (1797), Isle de Croix (1795), and at the “Glorious First” (June 1798), had convinced the Captains of the French and Spanish fleet that only a massive superiority of numbers would allow victory in a gun fight with the British.
To add to the problems of the combined fleet, Villneuve was short of provisions, and lacked funds to acquire them. Crews were ravaged by scurvy and dysentery, and men were beginning to desert whilst docked in Cadiz.
The differences in morale of the two opposing sides at Trafalgar certainly played their part in the final outcome of the battle.
The Ships
The comparison between the British, French and Spanish ships, has it’s basis largely in the use for which they were originally designed. The British and Spanish ships were more rugged, designed for use in the Atlantic. British ships tended to be cheaper to manufacture, but were durable and seaworthy; ideal for the long periods spent at sea, blockading the French and patrolling Britain’s extensive overseas commitments. The Spanish ships exhibited a better balance of size, durability, speed and firepower, and were generally regarded as the slightly better ships at the time. French ships were designed and built more for Mediterranean waters, and tended to be lighter, faster, and more manoeuvrable. They generally didn’t last as long as the British and Spanish ships.
During the Napoleonic Wars many French ships were captured as prizes and put into British service. It is interesting to note the reports of the need for more regular and expensive repairs compared with their British counterparts. Also, references to sagging decks and frames that were found to be cracked and broken. Also interesting are the comments on structural practices. British ships had their joints grooved and rebated, secured by a peg and reinforced with a futtock. The French equivalent was to butt the two members together and nail them in place. The use of nails was extensive in French building and was a major cause of failure. Nails would rust in place with the rust seeping into the wood greatly weakening it, and causing joints to separate. This was called nail sickness. Another very common reference is to the French using green timber rather than seasoned wood in the construction of their ships.
At the time of Trafalgar, the effect of months at sea had taken its toll on the British ships, with many needing attention. But their rugged construction meant that their overall condition was much better than that of the French ships, which, being less durable due to their structural weakness, and having spent so long being blockaded, were in relatively poor condition. The fifteen Spanish ships, on the other hand, were mainly in good condition, most of them having recently been newly fitted out.
One of the differences that gave Nelson a distinct advantage at Trafalgar, was that half the British ships in the fleet had copper plated hulls. Copper plating helped slow the spread of marine growth such as barnacles, which slowed ships down, and prevented damage inflicted by tropical ship worms. This meant that British ships did not have to be careened for cleaning as often and were thus able to spend longer periods at sea, which was necessary for imposing and maintaining the blockades outside the major ports of France and Spain. Admiral Collingwood, second-in-command at Trafalgar, once ‘kept the sea’ in this fashion for 22 consecutive months without ever dropping anchor. Supplies were brought to blockading fleets by smaller ships and loaded inboard through the lower deck gun ports. Being at sea for extended periods also gave the opportunity for regular gunnery practice at sea. See later section.
At Trafalgar, the smooth copper bottoms helped afford maximum speed, allowing the first fourteen of Nelson’s and Collingwood’s ships to get into action quickly and closely.
The Guns
The development of the smooth bore naval gun is covered in the article “Evolution of the British Naval Gun” here:
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6692 (http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6692)
At the time of Trafalgar, the British Blomefield gun was undoubtedly afforded the Royal Navy the best and most reliable cannon in the world. Better founded, lighter and stronger than those manufactured abroad. Because of their inferior founding, foreign guns were much more prone to accidental explosion. The French ship Redoubtable had an 18 pounder on her lower deck, and a 32 pounder carronade on her forecastle, both explode, wounding and killing a great number.
One significant technological advantage the British guns had was the use of the gunlock for firing. This innovation was first used by the Royal Navy in 1745. The gunlock was operated by pulling a lanyard, with the gun-captain standing safely behind the gun, beyond the range of recoil. It also enabled him to sight along the gun, which was not possible using the old linstock method of firing. (More details of these firng methods are covered in the linked thread abiove).
The British quickly adopted this method, and they were in general usage after the Battle of the Nile. By Trafalgar all of Nelson’s ships had cannon fitted with gunlocks. The French, however, were slow to introduce the new techonology and they were largely still using the older linstock method of using a smouldering match on the end of a staff to ignite priming powder at the touch hole. A flint-lock was, however, always liable to lose its flint, and many guns were fitted with double or even treble flints so that loss or breakage of flints would not stop firing. Until long after Nelson's death it was the rule for ships going into action to carry lighted matches in match tubs between the guns, for se if the flint-locks missed fire.
The gunlock undoubtedly greatly contributed to the ability of British gunners to load and fire much more quickly than the crews of its enemies.
One other advantage the British had was in the quality of their gunpowder. Gunpowder is a composition of saltpetre, charcoal and sulphur mixed in carefully determined proportions. The saltpetre can be any nitrate salt, but potassium nitrate is the best because it is the leat hygroscopic. Calcium and sodium nitrate more readily absorb water and cause the gunpowder to spoil more rapidly. The best quality potassium saltpeter came from India, and with the British control of the seas, it was monoplolised for use by the Royal Navy. The French were forced to use the nitrates present in low concentartions in stable floors, walls, cave deposits and other places where it was produced from animal wastes or bacterial action. The British too had perfected a method of producing even-burn charcoal by heating it in closed cylinders that vastly improved the manufacturing process. The consequences of these two factors, leading to better quality gunpowder, meant that the British cannon were able to fire shot some 15.3% further.
Gunnery Training & Expertise
Now to the widely acclaimed notion that it was the expertise of the British gunnery crews was a principal factor in the victory at Trafalgar, brought about by their rigorous and extensive training. It is true, that the crews were better trained than those of the French and Spanish, but the belief that there was relentless and consistent training may not be quite the case.
The Admiralty Regulations and Instructions of 1745 prescribed to the ship’s captain that ‘…he is to discipline the ship’s company frequently in the exercise of the great guns and small arms, to render them more expert in time of battle, and to set down in his journal the times he exercises them’.Indeed many of the more meticulous admirals translated the Regulations into Fleet Orders. However, while urging regular drill, the Admiralty gave no specific stipulations as to its frequency and content, which consequently varied from ship to ship.
There is the much quoted example of Collingwood, when in command of Dreadnought in 1804-05, that the crew had been ‘… so constantly practised in the exercise of the great guns, under his daily superintendence, that few ships’ companies could equal them in rapidity and precision of firing. He was accustomed to tell them, that if they could fire three well-directed broadsides in five minutes, no vessel could resist them; and, from constant practise, they were enabled to do so in three minutes and a half.’We are told that ‘whenever the weather allowed, Collingwood used to practise his men every day, …“in firing at a mark, a cask with a flag on it, which had been hove overboard and allowed to drift until it was at a suitable distance to allow for aiming to begin”’.
But such practice does not appear to have been widespread, and it is questionable how many ships practised their drills as regularly as the Instructions demanded. Live firing in practice seems to have been rare.
This inconsistency led the Admiralty, in 1756, to add an Additional Regulation that ..
“…as a remissness therein, by not exercising the men sufficiently often to render them expert in all particulars may be attended with very ill consequences to His Majesty’s service in times of action, all commanders are strictly enjoined to a punctual observance of the said article of their instructions and not to fail to set down in their journals the times they exercise their men.”
Even so, the wording of standing orders issued by some by Commanders-in-Chief still gave less enthusiastic officers a get-out. Lord Howe’s 1775 instructions ‘For the exercise of men at the great guns and small arms’ instructed that ‘The ships’ companies are to be exercised at all convenient times with the great guns and small arms until they become expert in the use and management of them.’
Clearly the use of the word‘Convenient’ was open to interpretation and the records of recorded gun drills in ships’ journals bear out varying degrees of compliance with the Admiralty expectations.
So far as the ships at Trafalgar, there is the account already mentioned of regular drill on Dreadnought when under Collingwood, and a lieutenant on Conqueror described how ‘our men… from constant practise had gained great quickness in the use of their guns’, but Midshipman George Sartorius declared of his ship, the Tonnant, that ‘She was one of the very few, perhaps one of the four or five, that had been constantly exercised at her guns.’
These observations are not designed in any way to question or deny the fact that the British gunnery was superior to that of the French or Spanish, but that on it’s own is not of the quoted “general excellence”, responsible for victory. The French and Spanish crews certainly did train, but the expectations of what they could be achieve was much lower than that of the British.
There is absolutely no doubt that the British rate of fire shocked their adversaries. Crews on Nelson’s ships were able to fire a shot, haul back into position for reloading, run out the gun, train, elevate, and fire again in ninety to one hundred seconds, almost twice as far as the opposition.
Tactics
Whilst there were no officially determined gunnery tactics at this time, Admirals developed their own views and approaches. But there were some fundamental differences between the preferred methods of naval gunnery between those of the British and of the French and Spanish.
As a general rule the French felt that the best way to disable an enemy ship was to destroy his means of manoeuvring. They therefore concentrated their fire on the masts and rigging, launching their broadsides on the upward roll of their ships. This fire policy often crippled the British ships, preventing them from pressing home their attack, but was less deadly to the crew. This tactic was hampered by the previously mentioned use of inferior gunpowder, and the fact that the use of the slow burning linstok often meant that their ships were further up the roll when the shot actually fired.
The British used the opposite tactic firing on the down roll into the enemy hulls, causing a storm of flying splinters that killed and maimed the enemy gun crews. These tactics were accentuated by the fact that the British tended to chose the weather gauge and the French the lee, so the tendency was for the French guns to be pointing high and the British low as their ships heeled in the wind.
These fundamental differences were illustrated well at Trafalgar. As the British approached the enemy line, the French attempted to fire into the rigging, using double shot to inflict maximum damage. This premature action failed, with shots falling short into the sea.
The British meanwhile held on, waiting to get into close quarters before unleashing deadly broadsides at point blank range. This tactic, whilst more dangerous to the attacker, was more likely to produce a quicker and more decisive result. “Point blank” range is the range at which the shot has a straight line trajectory from the muzzle to the target. In the case of a 32 pounder, this is about 600 yards. At Trafalgar however, the range at which Collingwood’s Royal Sovereign fired the first British broadside of the battle into the stern of the Spanish Santa Anna, was much much closer. Royal Sovereign had forced its way though gap between the Spanish all black ship and the French Forgueux, who’s bowsprit was almost touching Santa Anna. Collingwood released a triple shotted broadside which devastated the rear of the Spanish ship, killing hundreds.
The classic method of close encounter with optimum effect was to reserve broadside fire until running alongside. This kept the crew fresh and able to sustain a rapid rate of accurate fire long enough to overwhelm their opponent’s fire and drive the enemy crew from their guns, after which their casualties mounted until they either surrendered to save further punishment or they were too weakened to prevent a boarding party seizing possession. Rapidity of fire was of decisive importance, hence the importance of saving fire for as long as possible in order to preserve the strength of the gun crews for a sustained burst of rapid fire.Quick firing depends greatly upon the manual strength of
the gun’s crew to perform the necessary operations, and particularly that of running the gun out in the least possible time.
To intensify the damage caused by these close quarter salvoes into the enemy hulls, the British would reduce the velocity of the shot by either reducing the charge, or more commonly doubling, or even tripling the shot. This would have the effect of preventing the shot from passing straight through the ship, but instead, after penetration, ricocheting around the decks causing carnage and terror.
A quick and decisive battle was precisely what Nelson wanted, so the close quarter engagement was a pre-determined tactic, necessary to for victory of the larger, and more heavily gunned French and Spanish fleet.
Conclusion
There seems little doubt that victory at Trafalgar was undoubtedly achieved through the use and deployment of the British gunnery. Although not all went according to Nelson’s plan, the first stage of it achieved its aim. The first fourteen of Nelson’s and Collingwood’s ships broke the line and got quickly into close action, inflicting appalling damage on their opponents, even though suffering great damage themselves. Despite the difficulties of overwhelming the rear of the enemy line, it was again, down to the skill and resilience of Collingwood’s gunners to continue hitting hard until the rear of the British line came to their assistance.
So Corbett’s statement at the beginning of this post, whilst on the surface correct, hides many other factors that were important contributory factors to victory at the Battle of Trafalgar.
Trafalgar_1: List of ships at Trafalgar and their gun compliments.
I am pleased to have two signed limited edition prints (620 x 410 mm), hanging on the wall at home by the marine artist Richard Grenville. I attach scans of the publicity flyers.
Trafalgar_2: Titled “Royal Sovereign, First through the line” this shows Collingwood’s Royal Sovereign breaking the line behind the Spanish Santa Anna. The next ship through, Belleisle can be seen to the right of the picture.
Trafalgar_3: Titled “Victory’s Finest Moment” shows Victory breaking the line. The sails are being raised clear of the decks in preparation for firing the devastating broadside into the stern of Bucentaure.
I know not whether these prints are still available. Victory was a limited run of 1000, and Royal Sovereign of 500. I bought them from SAPI Art Publications in 2005. They are quite tremendous with stunning detail.
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Sir Julian Corbett, the celebrated naval historian wrote in his book “The Campaign at Trafalgar” (1910) ..
“It was a fair fight against foes worth fighting, and with no advantage on either side, except in the superior sea training and gunnery of the British.”
Is that actually the case? What were the factors leading to the British victory at Cape Trafalgar on October 21st 1805?
The Navies
In the period leading up to Trafalgar the Royal Navy had become the world’s superior sea power, dominating all of the navies of its adversaries, and being comprised of experienced and talented sailors. Ever since the naval reforms by Samuel Pepys in the 1640’s the Navy had been building on a system of hiring and promoting by talent, with officers being selected for ship handling abilities, knowledge and competence, rather than purely based upon their aristocratic credentials (although there was still a bias towards the upper class). A pool of highly competent, aggressively and ambitious naval officers had been developed so that if any one commander was removed a dozen others were waiting to take over. Something no opposing state could match. The British system of press gangs, although widely disappraoved of, proved effective in providing experienced seamen.
Whilst the French had also built up a structured rank and promotion system, the effects of the French Revolution saw the the largely isolated officer class being purged by the peoples committees. Most of the aristotic officers been exectuted, exiled, or had fled the country. New officers were largely drawn from the lower decks, merchant shipping officers and political appointees. Some of those were notably competent, but the previously institutional memory of the French navy had been destroyed. Villneuve himself was one of the few aristocratic officers to survive the Revolution, and by the time of Napoleon’s rule, other aristocartic officers who survived prison and exile were re-instated; but there was a still a shortfall. Officer training schools had only been established in the early 1800’s, and there had not been time for them to produce the trained officers desperately needed.
In the lower ranks, the well establish French system of conscription of sailors was often circumvented, and failed to provide experienced and competent seamen. In addition, the fighting capacity of the Fench navy was compromised as a result of the abolition of the specialist corps of gunners in 1793 as it was regarding as elitist. This left the French ships short of experienced and trained gunners. Even though the corps was later re-instated, many of the original members were dispersed and it would take many years to build build it up to it’s former efficiency.
At this time in Royalist Spain, which had once been the ultimate naval powerful force, the navy had been diminished, the country reliant on South American gold instead of developing industry and commerce. When that supply of wealth was cut off by pirates, privateers and the Royal Navy, the state collapsed, unable to afford a fleet of competent officers and men. The Spanish also relied upon conscription for its crews, and their were never enough experienced seamen, so any available men were conscripted. Because of the lack of funds, its ships spent little time at sea, so that the crews further lacked experience and training. Spanish officers wer aristocrats and fairly old fashioned in their outlook compared with the French and British.
Morale
Morale in the British crews was high. Winning was an expectation. At the beginning of Trafalgar, although crews were weary from the long patrols of the blockades, spirits were high. It is documented that some of the guns on Bellerophon had the words “Victory or Death” chalked on them in large letters. Such was the spirit in which the gun crews were set to do their work. Morale was further boosted by the presence of Nelson, a national hero, who was revered throughout the ranks.
The French hated the Spanish, who themselves did not trust the French. In Cadiz, prior to the Battle, there were frequent dockside brawls between the crews of the two nations, resulting in many injuries and several deaths. The Spanish Admirals regarded Villneuve as incompetent and. The French crews were ill disciplined and morale was weak. Spanish crews were widely acclaimed for their bravery, but recognised as poorly trained and inexperienced compared with the British. Morale was correspondingly low. Villeneuve was aware of the poor morale amongst the Spanish, and wrote ….
“It is very distressing to see such fine and powerful ships manned by herdsmen and beggars and having such a small number of seamen.”
Captain Maistral of the French ship Neptune was to have commented during the battle, when Santa Anna was engaged with Royal Sovereign “… that Santa Anna was not putting up a defence commensurate with her strength and … moreover that several men were hiding themselves outside the ship on the opposite side to the enemy …”
Villeneuve and a number of the French Captains also had reservations about their ability to win a close encounter gun battle with the British, and had agreed that there should be no hesitation to board the British vessels if circumstances permitted. The defeat at Aboukir Bay in 1798, and those previously at Cape St. Vincent (1797), Isle de Croix (1795), and at the “Glorious First” (June 1798), had convinced the Captains of the French and Spanish fleet that only a massive superiority of numbers would allow victory in a gun fight with the British.
To add to the problems of the combined fleet, Villneuve was short of provisions, and lacked funds to acquire them. Crews were ravaged by scurvy and dysentery, and men were beginning to desert whilst docked in Cadiz.
The differences in morale of the two opposing sides at Trafalgar certainly played their part in the final outcome of the battle.
The Ships
The comparison between the British, French and Spanish ships, has it’s basis largely in the use for which they were originally designed. The British and Spanish ships were more rugged, designed for use in the Atlantic. British ships tended to be cheaper to manufacture, but were durable and seaworthy; ideal for the long periods spent at sea, blockading the French and patrolling Britain’s extensive overseas commitments. The Spanish ships exhibited a better balance of size, durability, speed and firepower, and were generally regarded as the slightly better ships at the time. French ships were designed and built more for Mediterranean waters, and tended to be lighter, faster, and more manoeuvrable. They generally didn’t last as long as the British and Spanish ships.
During the Napoleonic Wars many French ships were captured as prizes and put into British service. It is interesting to note the reports of the need for more regular and expensive repairs compared with their British counterparts. Also, references to sagging decks and frames that were found to be cracked and broken. Also interesting are the comments on structural practices. British ships had their joints grooved and rebated, secured by a peg and reinforced with a futtock. The French equivalent was to butt the two members together and nail them in place. The use of nails was extensive in French building and was a major cause of failure. Nails would rust in place with the rust seeping into the wood greatly weakening it, and causing joints to separate. This was called nail sickness. Another very common reference is to the French using green timber rather than seasoned wood in the construction of their ships.
At the time of Trafalgar, the effect of months at sea had taken its toll on the British ships, with many needing attention. But their rugged construction meant that their overall condition was much better than that of the French ships, which, being less durable due to their structural weakness, and having spent so long being blockaded, were in relatively poor condition. The fifteen Spanish ships, on the other hand, were mainly in good condition, most of them having recently been newly fitted out.
One of the differences that gave Nelson a distinct advantage at Trafalgar, was that half the British ships in the fleet had copper plated hulls. Copper plating helped slow the spread of marine growth such as barnacles, which slowed ships down, and prevented damage inflicted by tropical ship worms. This meant that British ships did not have to be careened for cleaning as often and were thus able to spend longer periods at sea, which was necessary for imposing and maintaining the blockades outside the major ports of France and Spain. Admiral Collingwood, second-in-command at Trafalgar, once ‘kept the sea’ in this fashion for 22 consecutive months without ever dropping anchor. Supplies were brought to blockading fleets by smaller ships and loaded inboard through the lower deck gun ports. Being at sea for extended periods also gave the opportunity for regular gunnery practice at sea. See later section.
At Trafalgar, the smooth copper bottoms helped afford maximum speed, allowing the first fourteen of Nelson’s and Collingwood’s ships to get into action quickly and closely.
The Guns
The development of the smooth bore naval gun is covered in the article “Evolution of the British Naval Gun” here:
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6692 (http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=6692)
At the time of Trafalgar, the British Blomefield gun was undoubtedly afforded the Royal Navy the best and most reliable cannon in the world. Better founded, lighter and stronger than those manufactured abroad. Because of their inferior founding, foreign guns were much more prone to accidental explosion. The French ship Redoubtable had an 18 pounder on her lower deck, and a 32 pounder carronade on her forecastle, both explode, wounding and killing a great number.
One significant technological advantage the British guns had was the use of the gunlock for firing. This innovation was first used by the Royal Navy in 1745. The gunlock was operated by pulling a lanyard, with the gun-captain standing safely behind the gun, beyond the range of recoil. It also enabled him to sight along the gun, which was not possible using the old linstock method of firing. (More details of these firng methods are covered in the linked thread abiove).
The British quickly adopted this method, and they were in general usage after the Battle of the Nile. By Trafalgar all of Nelson’s ships had cannon fitted with gunlocks. The French, however, were slow to introduce the new techonology and they were largely still using the older linstock method of using a smouldering match on the end of a staff to ignite priming powder at the touch hole. A flint-lock was, however, always liable to lose its flint, and many guns were fitted with double or even treble flints so that loss or breakage of flints would not stop firing. Until long after Nelson's death it was the rule for ships going into action to carry lighted matches in match tubs between the guns, for se if the flint-locks missed fire.
The gunlock undoubtedly greatly contributed to the ability of British gunners to load and fire much more quickly than the crews of its enemies.
One other advantage the British had was in the quality of their gunpowder. Gunpowder is a composition of saltpetre, charcoal and sulphur mixed in carefully determined proportions. The saltpetre can be any nitrate salt, but potassium nitrate is the best because it is the leat hygroscopic. Calcium and sodium nitrate more readily absorb water and cause the gunpowder to spoil more rapidly. The best quality potassium saltpeter came from India, and with the British control of the seas, it was monoplolised for use by the Royal Navy. The French were forced to use the nitrates present in low concentartions in stable floors, walls, cave deposits and other places where it was produced from animal wastes or bacterial action. The British too had perfected a method of producing even-burn charcoal by heating it in closed cylinders that vastly improved the manufacturing process. The consequences of these two factors, leading to better quality gunpowder, meant that the British cannon were able to fire shot some 15.3% further.
Gunnery Training & Expertise
Now to the widely acclaimed notion that it was the expertise of the British gunnery crews was a principal factor in the victory at Trafalgar, brought about by their rigorous and extensive training. It is true, that the crews were better trained than those of the French and Spanish, but the belief that there was relentless and consistent training may not be quite the case.
The Admiralty Regulations and Instructions of 1745 prescribed to the ship’s captain that ‘…he is to discipline the ship’s company frequently in the exercise of the great guns and small arms, to render them more expert in time of battle, and to set down in his journal the times he exercises them’.Indeed many of the more meticulous admirals translated the Regulations into Fleet Orders. However, while urging regular drill, the Admiralty gave no specific stipulations as to its frequency and content, which consequently varied from ship to ship.
There is the much quoted example of Collingwood, when in command of Dreadnought in 1804-05, that the crew had been ‘… so constantly practised in the exercise of the great guns, under his daily superintendence, that few ships’ companies could equal them in rapidity and precision of firing. He was accustomed to tell them, that if they could fire three well-directed broadsides in five minutes, no vessel could resist them; and, from constant practise, they were enabled to do so in three minutes and a half.’We are told that ‘whenever the weather allowed, Collingwood used to practise his men every day, …“in firing at a mark, a cask with a flag on it, which had been hove overboard and allowed to drift until it was at a suitable distance to allow for aiming to begin”’.
But such practice does not appear to have been widespread, and it is questionable how many ships practised their drills as regularly as the Instructions demanded. Live firing in practice seems to have been rare.
This inconsistency led the Admiralty, in 1756, to add an Additional Regulation that ..
“…as a remissness therein, by not exercising the men sufficiently often to render them expert in all particulars may be attended with very ill consequences to His Majesty’s service in times of action, all commanders are strictly enjoined to a punctual observance of the said article of their instructions and not to fail to set down in their journals the times they exercise their men.”
Even so, the wording of standing orders issued by some by Commanders-in-Chief still gave less enthusiastic officers a get-out. Lord Howe’s 1775 instructions ‘For the exercise of men at the great guns and small arms’ instructed that ‘The ships’ companies are to be exercised at all convenient times with the great guns and small arms until they become expert in the use and management of them.’
Clearly the use of the word‘Convenient’ was open to interpretation and the records of recorded gun drills in ships’ journals bear out varying degrees of compliance with the Admiralty expectations.
So far as the ships at Trafalgar, there is the account already mentioned of regular drill on Dreadnought when under Collingwood, and a lieutenant on Conqueror described how ‘our men… from constant practise had gained great quickness in the use of their guns’, but Midshipman George Sartorius declared of his ship, the Tonnant, that ‘She was one of the very few, perhaps one of the four or five, that had been constantly exercised at her guns.’
These observations are not designed in any way to question or deny the fact that the British gunnery was superior to that of the French or Spanish, but that on it’s own is not of the quoted “general excellence”, responsible for victory. The French and Spanish crews certainly did train, but the expectations of what they could be achieve was much lower than that of the British.
There is absolutely no doubt that the British rate of fire shocked their adversaries. Crews on Nelson’s ships were able to fire a shot, haul back into position for reloading, run out the gun, train, elevate, and fire again in ninety to one hundred seconds, almost twice as far as the opposition.
Tactics
Whilst there were no officially determined gunnery tactics at this time, Admirals developed their own views and approaches. But there were some fundamental differences between the preferred methods of naval gunnery between those of the British and of the French and Spanish.
As a general rule the French felt that the best way to disable an enemy ship was to destroy his means of manoeuvring. They therefore concentrated their fire on the masts and rigging, launching their broadsides on the upward roll of their ships. This fire policy often crippled the British ships, preventing them from pressing home their attack, but was less deadly to the crew. This tactic was hampered by the previously mentioned use of inferior gunpowder, and the fact that the use of the slow burning linstok often meant that their ships were further up the roll when the shot actually fired.
The British used the opposite tactic firing on the down roll into the enemy hulls, causing a storm of flying splinters that killed and maimed the enemy gun crews. These tactics were accentuated by the fact that the British tended to chose the weather gauge and the French the lee, so the tendency was for the French guns to be pointing high and the British low as their ships heeled in the wind.
These fundamental differences were illustrated well at Trafalgar. As the British approached the enemy line, the French attempted to fire into the rigging, using double shot to inflict maximum damage. This premature action failed, with shots falling short into the sea.
The British meanwhile held on, waiting to get into close quarters before unleashing deadly broadsides at point blank range. This tactic, whilst more dangerous to the attacker, was more likely to produce a quicker and more decisive result. “Point blank” range is the range at which the shot has a straight line trajectory from the muzzle to the target. In the case of a 32 pounder, this is about 600 yards. At Trafalgar however, the range at which Collingwood’s Royal Sovereign fired the first British broadside of the battle into the stern of the Spanish Santa Anna, was much much closer. Royal Sovereign had forced its way though gap between the Spanish all black ship and the French Forgueux, who’s bowsprit was almost touching Santa Anna. Collingwood released a triple shotted broadside which devastated the rear of the Spanish ship, killing hundreds.
The classic method of close encounter with optimum effect was to reserve broadside fire until running alongside. This kept the crew fresh and able to sustain a rapid rate of accurate fire long enough to overwhelm their opponent’s fire and drive the enemy crew from their guns, after which their casualties mounted until they either surrendered to save further punishment or they were too weakened to prevent a boarding party seizing possession. Rapidity of fire was of decisive importance, hence the importance of saving fire for as long as possible in order to preserve the strength of the gun crews for a sustained burst of rapid fire.Quick firing depends greatly upon the manual strength of
the gun’s crew to perform the necessary operations, and particularly that of running the gun out in the least possible time.
To intensify the damage caused by these close quarter salvoes into the enemy hulls, the British would reduce the velocity of the shot by either reducing the charge, or more commonly doubling, or even tripling the shot. This would have the effect of preventing the shot from passing straight through the ship, but instead, after penetration, ricocheting around the decks causing carnage and terror.
A quick and decisive battle was precisely what Nelson wanted, so the close quarter engagement was a pre-determined tactic, necessary to for victory of the larger, and more heavily gunned French and Spanish fleet.
Conclusion
There seems little doubt that victory at Trafalgar was undoubtedly achieved through the use and deployment of the British gunnery. Although not all went according to Nelson’s plan, the first stage of it achieved its aim. The first fourteen of Nelson’s and Collingwood’s ships broke the line and got quickly into close action, inflicting appalling damage on their opponents, even though suffering great damage themselves. Despite the difficulties of overwhelming the rear of the enemy line, it was again, down to the skill and resilience of Collingwood’s gunners to continue hitting hard until the rear of the British line came to their assistance.
So Corbett’s statement at the beginning of this post, whilst on the surface correct, hides many other factors that were important contributory factors to victory at the Battle of Trafalgar.
Trafalgar_1: List of ships at Trafalgar and their gun compliments.
I am pleased to have two signed limited edition prints (620 x 410 mm), hanging on the wall at home by the marine artist Richard Grenville. I attach scans of the publicity flyers.
Trafalgar_2: Titled “Royal Sovereign, First through the line” this shows Collingwood’s Royal Sovereign breaking the line behind the Spanish Santa Anna. The next ship through, Belleisle can be seen to the right of the picture.
Trafalgar_3: Titled “Victory’s Finest Moment” shows Victory breaking the line. The sails are being raised clear of the decks in preparation for firing the devastating broadside into the stern of Bucentaure.
I know not whether these prints are still available. Victory was a limited run of 1000, and Royal Sovereign of 500. I bought them from SAPI Art Publications in 2005. They are quite tremendous with stunning detail.
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