View Full Version : The Battle Of Matapan
The Sailor
19-01-2008, 22:32
The Battle of Matapan took place off the Western coast of Crete on 29th March 1941.
Under the command of Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippell, the cruisers PERTH, ORION, AJAX, and GLOUCESTER , then patrolling in the Aegean Sea, were ordered to a point off Gavdhos Island south of Crete.
The Italian Fleet, comprising one 15" battleship, six 8" and two 6" cruisers, plus seventeen destroyers, was conducting sweeps west of Crete trying to find the convoys. The Italians cancelled these sweeps and sent the cruisers to also rendezvous off Gavdhos Island. Unknowingly, our ships were sailing into a potential disaster.
At 7.45am PERTH sighted the 8" Italian cruisers, BOLZANO, TRIESTE, and TRENTO. At 8.12am the Italians opened fire . Our 6" cruisers were outranged and outgunned. The Italian fire was very accurate and they were closing rapidly. GLOUCESTER, who had received most of the shelling, opened fire and at 8.53 ORION started to make smoke to try and attract our battlefleet. At 9am the Italians broke off the engagement so our cruisers turned to shadow them.
Unfortunately, at 10.58am they ran into the new 15" Italian battleship, VITTORIO VENETO. They were now caught between the battleship and three Italian cruisers. VITTORIO VENETO commenced very accurate fire on our ships, firing ninety four 15" shells. However because the spread of shots was too wide, only slight damage was done to PERTH and ORION. Hopelessly outgunned ,our cruisers set up a huge smokescreen and turned south at full speed to try to escape. Our cruisers were now in a very dangerous position as the Italian battleship was driving them towards the Italian cruisers. At 11.27, just as disaster seemed about to strike, aircraft from HMS FORMIDABLE attacked VITTORIO VENETO and she broke off the pursuit.
PERTH and the others now turned to follow VENETO and, until the close of the battle later that night, acted in a shadowing capacity for the main battlefleet. An attack by FORMIDABLE's aircraft stopped the Italian cruiser POLA. The Italian admiral, not realizing the British Fleet was so close, ordered her sisters ships, ZARA and FIUME to go to her assistance.
At 22.10 the radar on HMS VALIANT detected the three cruisers at a range of only six miles. Illuminated by searchlights, the ships were pounded by 15" salvos from HMS WARSPITE and VALIANT at point blank range. The Italians lost the three cruisers and the destroyers, ALFIERI and CARDUCCI plus 2400 men.
Photos below PERTH, AJAX, ORION at Matapan
VITTORIO VENETO
HMS Formidible
Fairey Swordfish (torpedo bomber) from HMS Formidable
I would like to add some additional background material to the Battle of Matapan.
In March 1941 the passage of convoys from Africa, carrying the British expeditionary force to Greece, was causing the Germans some concern who put great pressure on the Italian Navy to do something about it to which the Italians reluctantly agreed.
The Italian naval cipher had been penetrated by Bletchley Park and on the 25th March a message containing the Italian Admiral Iachino's plans to disrupt the convoys had been intercepted, deciphered and sent to Admiral Cunningham in Alexandria.
For the Italians to be taken by surprise Cunningham had to lead his battlefleet to sea without alerting any of Alexandria's numerous enemy agents. To do this he kept the convoys running as normal, despite the risk, and kept to his normal in harbour routine.
He decided to lead his fleet to sea on the night of the 27th March. To cover his plans, on the afternoon he went ashore with a suitcase, giving the impression to prying eyes that he intended to spend the night ashore. He spent a few hours on the golf course in view of the Japanese Consulate whom he knew transmitted information to the Germans. To allay suspicions that the ensuing battle was the result of code breaking, an observation aircraft was dispatched to fly by the Italian fleet's known position, to give the impression that its discovery was by chance.
Everything worked well and in the end, surprise was complete. Cunningham was able (at 22.30 on the 28th) to draw within 3,000 yards of the enemy fleet (because he knew they didn't have radar). Switching on his searchlights the cruisers Zara and Fiume were illuminated and the enemy was caught completely by surprise with their guns still trained fore and aft.
A young Midshipman on the Valiant was mentioned in dispatches for his work in directing the searchlights. He was Prince Phillip of Greece.
Cunningham later payed a visit to Bletchley Park to thank personally those who were responsible for his victory. He was particularly interested in seeing the original text of the intercepted message.
Matapan was the largest fleet action since Jutland and ensured that the Italian navy was never again a force in the Mediterranean.
Don Boyer
11-10-2009, 04:20
These concise and well-written looks at European/Mediterranean battle actions are exactly why I enjoy this forum so much. Picking up on the "other ocean's" war, after many years primarily focused on the Pacific. Enlightening and enjoyable, thanks Sailor and emason.
sincerely,
Thanks for that Don.
I have always thought that Matapan does not nowadays receive the acknowledgement it deserves. After all it was probably the most significant fleet battle of WW2 fought in the European/African theatre with far reaching strategic consequences. It was decisive in eliminating, finally (after Taranto), the Italian navy as a force in the Mediterranean. It facilitated reinforcing the British army and Air Force in Egypt in the North African campaign, not to mention the Torch landings.
Other (more glamorous?) battles such as the River Plate and Bismark seem to gain more attention. Even though only a single enemy ship, albeit a big one, was involved (sunk) in each case. So far as I can recollect no film or television programme has ever been made about Matapan, nor a single book devoted to it. But I may be wrong about that.
If you look at the dates of posting and the number of viewings (for the length of time) on this thread you can judge the level of interest for yourself.
Don Boyer
11-10-2009, 18:19
A lot of actions in the Med aren't as well known as other battles. My main thing is that since I live out in the middle of the Pacific, I've just been absorbed by "Pacific firstitis" but I do have the volumes on the Atlantic and Med operations in WWII, one of the most enjoyable being ABC's biography. I joined this forum so I could learn more about parts of WWII I haven't been playing that close attention to.
Articles like yours are great for "getting up to speed."
Sincerely,
Thanks for that Don.
I have always thought that Matapan does not nowadays receive the acknowledgement it deserves. After all it was probably the most significant fleet battle of WW2 fought in the European/African theatre with far reaching strategic consequences. It was decisive in eliminating, finally (after Taranto), the Italian navy as a force in the Mediterranean. It facilitated reinforcing the British army and Air Force in Egypt in the North African campaign, not to mention the Torch landings.
Other (more glamorous?) battles such as the River Plate and Bismark seem to gain more attention. Even though only a single enemy ship, albeit a big one, was involved (sunk) in each case. So far as I can recollect no film or television programme has ever been made about Matapan, nor a single book devoted to it. But I may be wrong about that.
If you look at the dates of posting and the number of viewings (for the length of time) on this thread you can judge the level of interest for yourself.
I think David Thomas, who wrote a very good book on the Java Sea Battle, also wrote one on the Battle of Matapan. Unfortunately I have never been able to find a copy. Of interest to me as my father was on PERTH at the time. He recalls the 15" shells from Veneto sounded like a train going overhead.
Cheers
Bruce
Don, I too have ABC's biography but have been unable to find it since moving house. But I still have about a dozen boxes I have yet to search through, so I am still hopeful. When I do, I hope to post a fuller account of this important battle.
I joined this forum only a few months ago, and my inability to lay my hands on the books I need to check facts and contribute meaningfully is driving me NUTS!
It's good to know that there is interest in the Atlantic and Mediterranean operations from your side of "the pond". After all we were in it together.
Bruce, thanks for the info. If you ever find out more about the book mentioned please post the info on this thread. I would be very interested indeed.
It takes me so long to type a post that you posted yours while I was still typing my last post #7.
Bruce, thanks for the info. If you ever find out more about the book mentioned please post the info on this thread. I would be very interested indeed.
It takes me so long to type a post that you posted yours while I was still typing my last post #7.
Hi Bill,
Gave you the wrong author. Just looked in my tattered copy of "Java Sea Battle" and the book is called "The Battle of Matapan" by S.W.C.Pack. My book is dated 1971 so Pack's book must be around that time. Abebooks website has copies.
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?an=s.w.c.pack&sts=t&tn=battle+of+matapan&x=105&y=16
Cheers
Bruce
Don Boyer
12-10-2009, 00:50
Don, I too have ABC's biography but have been unable to find it since moving house. But I still have about a dozen boxes I have yet to search through, so I am still hopeful. When I do, I hope to post a fuller account of this important battle.
I joined this forum only a few months ago, and my inability to lay my hands on the books I need to check facts and contribute meaningfully is driving me NUTS!
It's good to know that there is interest in the Atlantic and Mediterranean operations from your side of "the pond". After all we were in it together.
I just moved into a new house a bit ago. First thing I did, wife like it or not, was put up five bookshelves - was determined not to be denied access!
I just joined the forum a while back also in order to upgrade my knowledge of the European operations during WWII and at the same time highlight some of the "joint" operations that took place in the Pacific which are never given their full due in the American popular histories.
Looking forward to many more good posts.
Sincerely,
Thanks for that, Bruce.
I have just been there and ordered a copy.
Cheers mate.
The battle of Cape Matapan is named after the headland at the southern extremity of the Peloponnese peninsular - the southernmost tip of Greece. The battle, or at least its opening actions, is also known in Italy as the Battle of Gaudo. Guado being a small island off the SW coast of Crete.
Background (simplified)
In 1939 the British government had guaranteed Greek independence (together with that of Poland and Romania).
On the 20th November 1940 the Italian army invaded Greece though Albania but the Greek army resisted strongly and pushed the Italians back into Albania and continued fighting there until mid January 1941 when a stalemate developed. On March 1st 1941 Germany concluded a Pact with Bulgaria who had a common frontier with Greece. Greece had previously stripped forces from its Bulgarian border to reinforce their army fighting in Albania, and was thus very weak there.
Churchill was fearful of a Turkey-Germany alliance and wanted to bring Turkey into an alliance with Britain instead. So, when it became obvious that Hitler was casting his eyes over the Balkans, and thus logically Greece, Churchill felt he had to support Greece to appear strong to Turkey. He was afraid that, if the German army reached the Greek-Turkish border, Turkey, for self protection, would ally themselves to Germany, thus opening a land route to the Middle East, Egypt and the Suez Canal.
Churchill had been offering British military help (in accordance with the 1939 guarantee) to the Greeks for months. The Greeks were reluctant to accept, because they feared that the size of the British force offered would not be strong enough to be decisive, but would be strong enough to provoke a Germans attack - and so it proved! With Greece now threatened on two fronts, they finally accepted the offer. Consequently, on 7th March 1941 Britain started sending an expeditionary force of over 50,000 British and Australian troops in convoys from Alexandria in Egypt to Piraeus in Greece in an operation codenamed "Lustre".
The presence of the British Army in Greece caused some anxiety to the Germans who did not want their right flank threatened during their preparations for their forthcoming attack on Russia. So they put great pressure on Italy to interrupt the passage of the British convoys as they were the only force in the area capable of achieving this, and promised air support to assist them.
It was essential for Britain to maintain control of the eastern Mediterranean. The army in Greece (and to a lesser extent Egypt) depended on these sea routes for supplies and thus their fate depended on it.
Prelude
The Italian naval cipher had recently been penetrated by Bletchley Park who could now read most messages. On the 25th March the Italian naval command (Supermarina) in Rome transmitted to the Italian commander in the Greek island of Rhodes a three line message – "Today 25th March is day X-3". The decrypted message was sent to Admiral Cunningham in Alexandria with an assessment from other intercepts indicating something was planned for the 28th March. The next day a message previously sent to the same person on the 24th March was finally deciphered instructing him to organize air patrols in the Alexandria, Crete and Piraeus area - the convoy’s route. The obvious conclusion was drawn - the Italian navy was going to attack the convoys on the 28th March. Although Cunningham now knew of their plans he did not know of the composition of the force to be used.
German dive-bombers had seriously damaged the aircraft carrier Illustrious in January (which was withdrawn for repairs in Malta) and their intelligence believed that Admiral Cunningham’s Mediterranean Fleet possessed only one operational battleship, the old Barham. Accordingly the Italians, whose battlefleet was crippled at Taranto, calculated that a force of heavy cruisers supported by the new battleship Vittorio Veneto would be sufficient to deal with the light British forces around Crete.
The Italian Admiral Iachino departed the port of Naples with the battleship Vittorio Veneto and four destroyers on 26th March and rendezvoused in the straits of Messina with three cruiser divisions from Brindisi (Commodore Legnani), Taranto (Admiral Cattaneo) and Messina (Admiral Sansonetti) en route to their destination of Crete. The promised German air cover did not materialize that day or the next.
For the Italians to be taken by surprise Cunningham had to lead his battlefleet to sea without alerting any of Alexandria's numerous enemy agents. To allay suspicions that the impending operation was the result of code breaking, an RAF Sunderland observation aircraft was dispatched from Malta to fly by the Italian fleet's position, to give the impression that its discovery was by chance. At noon 27th March the RAF flying boat found Sansonetti’s cruiser division 320 miles west of Crete, thus confirming their position.
Cunningham decided to lead his fleet to sea on the night of the 27th March and ordered Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell (who, based at Piraeus, was cruising in Greek waters with his light cruiser force) to rendezvous with him south of Crete at 06.30 on 28th March.
To cover his plans, on the afternoon he went ashore with a suitcase, giving the impression to prying eyes that he intended to spend the night ashore. He spent a few hours on the golf course in view of the Japanese Consul whom he knew transmitted information to the Germans. He returned to the Warspite under cover of darkness, and at 22.30 Cunningham’s fleet slipped out of Alexandria.
The Order of Battle
British
(Under Admiral Cunningham)
Three battleships: Warspite (flagship), Valiant and Barham.
One aircraft carrier: Formidable.
Nine destroyers: Greyhound, Griffin, Hotspur, Havock, Janus, Jervis, Mohawk, Nubian and HMAS Stuart.
(Under Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell)
Four light (6 inch) cruisers: Orion (flagship), Ajax, Gloucester and HMAS Perth.
Three destroyers: Hasty, Hereward, Ilex.
Italian
(Under Admiral Iachino)
One battleship: Vittorio Veneto (flagship).
Eight destroyers: Alpino, Bersagliere, Fuciliere, Granatiere, Grecale, Libeccio, Maestrale and Scirocco.
(Under Admiral Sansonetti)
Three heavy (8 inch) cruisers: Trieste (flagship), Trento and Bolzano.
Three destroyers: Ascari, Corazziere and Carabiniere.
(Under Admiral Cattaneo)
Three heavy (8 inch) cruisers Zara (flagship), Pola and Fiume.
Four destroyers: Alfredo Oriani, Giosuie Carducci, Vincenzo Gioberti and Vittorio Alfieri.
(Under Commodore Legnani)
Two light (6 inch) cruisers: Luigi di Savoia Duce Degli Abruzzi (flagship), and Guiseppe Garibaldi.
Two destroyers: Emanuele Pessagno and Nicoloso da Recco.
The First Cruiser Contact
On 28th March at 06.50 one of Iachino’s reconnaissance aircraft spotted Pridham-Wippell’s light cruisers, at some 50 miles distance, close to the island of Guado. Reasoning that they were a convoy escort (because he thought the battle fleet still in Alexandria), he sent Sansonetti’s heavy division on ahead to deal with them while the remainder of the fleet followed.
An hour later Formidable’s reconnaissance aircraft found Sansonetti’s heavy cruisers and destroyers south of Crete. Thinking at first that the reported sighting was that of his own ships, Pridham-Wippell continued his S.E. course. But soon after reported sighting the same ships off his port bow steering SW, and at 08.00 came under fire, most of which fell on the Gloucester. Outranged and outgunned by Sansonetti’s 8 inch cruisers he retired at speed to the south, making smoke, towards the advancing Cunningham to draw the Italians onto the battle fleet.
At 08.50 Iachino thinking that Sansonetti was moving too far away from his fleet and into range of land based aircraft, ordered him to return. Sansonetti broke off the pursuit and retired N.W. Pridham-Wippell reversed course and shadowed them at extreme range.
This played right into Iachinos hands, for instead of having to pursue Pridham-Wippell‘s cruisers away from him they were now being lured back to him. Taking the opportunity offered to him, Iachino devised a plan to trap him in a pincers movement, with the Vittorio Veneto as one jaw and Sansonetti’s heavy cruisers as the other.
At 11.00 the Orion sighted a battleship at 16 miles distance on the starboard beam to the north and thought it British until being straddled by 15 inch shells. At the same time Sansonetti turned his cruisers around and closed on Pridham-Wippell. Caught in the closing pincers, he immediately turned and made haste. Pursued by the cruisers to starboard and the battleship to port, his ships were fortunate to escape almost unscathed despite being the target of 94 shells from Vittorio Veneto's 15 inch guns for half an hour.
Cunningham did not need to be told what had happened. He had received Pridham-Wippell’s intercepted orders to his ships – "Make smoke by all available means", "Turn together to 180 degrees", "Proceed at your utmost speed".
To assist him (for the Vittorio Veneto had now closed the range to 12 miles), Cunningham ordered a strike against the battleship by Formidable's aircraft which, at 11.30, attacked Vittorio Veneto but failed to hit her.
However, Iachino was unable to gain on Pridham-Wippell because of the necessity of taking avoiding action, so discontinued the pursuit at 12.20 and retired to the N.W. in the direction of home.
At 12.30 Pridham-Wippell joined forces with Cunningham's main force.
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The Chase
Reconnaissance aircraft reported a third force of three heavy cruisers and four destroyers (Admiral Cattaneo) further to the North. It was now clear that most of the Italian fleet was at sea and Cunningham's forces outnumbered.
The two opposing fleets were more than 60 miles apart, and Cunningham’s old battle fleet was slow (22 knots) compared to Iachino’s modern ships (28 knots). Only by attacking the Vittorio Veneto by air could the Italian warships be delayed long enough for his slow battle fleet to intercept.
Cunningham therefore ordered another strike against the Vittorio Veneto. With their attention focused on the high altitude, land based, RAF bombers, the Italians failed to notice this second flight of torpedo bombers from Formidable flying at sea level. At 15.10 they obtained one hit on the stern of Vittorio Veneto causing flooding by 4,000 tons of water. With the stern noticeably lower in the water, the Vittorio Veneto slowed down but soon recovered to 19 knots. Further attacks by RAF aircraft and naval aircraft were ineffective.
A reconnaissance aircraft from Warspite reported at 19.30 the Vittorio Veneto steaming slowly N.W. closely screened by cruisers and destroyers.
At 20.00 torpedo bombers from Formidable attacked but failed to hit the Vittorio Veneto, but instead struck and disabled the heavy cruiser Pola bringing her to a standstill. Iachino, still unaware that Cunningham's battle fleet was at sea, made a fateful error at 20.15 by ordering Cattaneo to assist Pola by either taking her in tow or sinking her.
About the same time Cunningham, against the advice of his officers, decided upon a night action, but being still 60 miles from the Italian fleet and unable to overhaul them, sent Pridham-Wippell’s cruisers and a group of eight destroyers (under Captain Mack) ahead to regain contact.
The Night Action
Iachino skillfully evaded Mack’s searching destroyers by increasing speed and changing course - a tricky night time maneuver with that number of ships. But at 21.10 Pridham-Wippell’s flagship Ajax detected by radar a large vessel stopped dead in the water and reported it.
At 22.10 Valiant's radar picked up the same large contact at six miles range on her port bow. Thinking it might be the damaged Vittorio Veneto (it was actually the Pola), Cunningham turned his ships to close the position.
At 22.25 on a different bearing they detected by radar Zara and Fiume with one destroyer ahead and three astern. Ignoring the Pola, because it was going nowhere, Cunningham ordered Formidable out of line, changed course and closed to attack these new large contacts.
Knowing the Italian ships lacked radar, he closed to within 3,800 yards and visual contact of the Italian cruisers. At 22.30 search lights illuminated the Zara and Fiume (with their guns still trained fore and aft), and simultaneously Warspite fired a 15 inch broadside into Fiume. All three battleships then fired broadside after broadside into the two cruisers and reduced them to blazing wrecks in the space of a few minutes and finished them off with destroyers.
Two large destroyers (Alfieri and Carducci) were attacked by destroyers and sunk with torpedoes. The Alfieri, while already sinking, launched torpedoes which missed and returned gunfire against the attacking destroyers. The Carducci was hit by a battleship’s secondary 6 inch armament and finished off by destroyers. Later, at 04.10 Captain Mack’s destroyer flotilla found the Pola, took off survivors, and sunk the cruiser with torpedoes.
Shortly after this Cunningham ordered "All forces not engaged with the enemy" to retire to the northeast.
It was a decisive victory for Cunningham, but it might have turned out even better had he not sent that badly phrased signal. It seemed to imply that all those not actually fighting the enemy should withdraw to the northeast. While the message was not intended for his light cruiser squadron which was still in contact, Pridham-Wippell didn’t realise that at the time. He broke off his pursuit of the Vittorio Veneto and withdrew to the northeast to conform with his admiral’s apparent orders. By the time Cunningham had become aware of what had happened, it was too late. Contact had been lost and Iachino’s flagship and her accompanying warships had escaped.
The British destroyers then began picking up survivors of the ordeal. At daybreak, German bombers finally made their appearance and began to bomb the British ships involved in rescue operations. Cunningham transmitted in clear to Rome, advising the Supermarina where it could find more survivors of the battle, then left the area after saving some 900 sailors. An Italian hospital ship, the Gradisca, arrived later that day and was able to rescue an additional 160 sailors.
Casualties and Losses
The Royal Navy had four light cruisers lightly damaged and one torpedo bomber and its crew of three lost. (It is thought that this was the aircraft which launched the torpedo that struck the Vittorio Veneto)
The Regia Marina had one battleship heavily damaged; three heavy cruisers sunk and two destroyers sunk with the loss of 2,300 lives, including Admiral Cattaneo.
Aftermath
After Matapan, control of the eastern Mediterranean remained with the Royal Navy which proved essential when evacuating the expeditionary force from Greece, and later from Crete, without Italian naval interference, although many ships were lost to German air attacks.
After their defeat at Matapan, the Italian naval command lost all faith in German promises to protect their fleet from attack. The Regia Marina never again ventured into the eastern Mediterranean, conceding it to the Royal Navy.
While Taranto may have been a psychological shock, Matapan was the military defeat that finished the Regia Marina. The next time the Italian fleet came out in force was two years later, to surrender to Admiral Cunningham at Malta.
The Battle of Cape Matapan was the first aero-naval battle in history and the first in which radar was used.
Conclusion
Although Iachino’s fleet was superior in both number and quality of ships, Cuningham’s was superior in technology, techniques and organisation. Although not blameless, Iachino was disadvantaged by deficiencies in many areas, mainly beyond his control. Namely:-
1. Intelligence
Although the Italian cryptographers were reading some British naval codes, they often failed to draw the correct conclusions, and often just passed on the original message instead of an analysis and appreciation.
The Italians were informed by the Germans that they had put the two battleships Warspite and Valiant, and the aircraft carrier Illustrious out of action and only the old battleship Barham was seaworthy. In fact all three battleships were intact and Formidable had replaced Illustrious.
There was no reconnaissance by aircraft of Alexandria to confirm the presence or absence of the battle fleet. Otherwise Iachino would have known Cunningham’s true strength, the order of battle, and that they were now at sea.
It is difficult to reconcile the presence, in Alexandria, of Axis agents reporting the movements of the Royal Navy with the Regia Marina’s apparent ignorance of the warships harboured there!
2. Communications
There was no direct communication between the air force reconnaissance aircraft and any naval ship. Signals from reconnaisance aircraft went to the Superarareo (Air Force Command) who passed them to the Supermarina (Naval Command) in Rome, who in turn passed them on to the fleet at sea. Any request from Iachino took the reverse route. With the result that delays of up to 2 hours were normal. They could also be inaccurate, and sometimes went missing. Consequently, most reports were discounted by Iachino.
The British battle fleet was actually spotted at sea on the afternoon of the 28th March, but because the report took so long to reach him, Iachino ignored it, thinking it just reported his own fleet’s previous position - just as Pridham-Wippell had done earlier the same day.
3. Night fighting.
Had the Regia Marina paid more attention to the events of the previous months, they would have realized that the Royal Navy had no fears of fighting in darkness. As it was, their ships were not equipped for night fighting and no special night training was undertaken. Matapan, belatedly, opened their eyes.
4. Radar.
Although the principal of radar was well known, the Italians had not developed the theory into practice. This even surprised the Germans who provided them with some of their own sets.
5. Air cover.
The air cover promised by the Germans did not materialize until the 30th March – when it was all over. They Italians could not provide their own cover as they had no aircraft carriers due to pre-war politics. Mussolini thought of the Italian mainland "an aircraft carrier extending into the Mediterranean" and did not see the need for a real one!
Matapan was a startling and dispiriting wake-up call for the Regia Marina who, based on the actions off Calabria and Sardinia, had harboured the illusion that they were able to fight the Royal Navy on equal terms. Although the Italians had a fleet of modern ships they did not have a modern navy. Matapan was a disaster waiting to happen.
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astraltrader
29-10-2009, 22:16
Thanks very much for posting this excellent account Bill.;)
Thank you Terry, it's nice to have one's efforts appreciated.
I enjoyed doing it and learned a lot from the exercise. Not least that separating facts from fiction is very frustrating and time consuming, but ultimately rewarding. Simple things like the losses suffered by both sides. One account puts the Italian losses as five cruisers and seven destroyers! And that book is recently published and is on the bookshelves of W.H.Smith today.
I can't claim that my account is totally accurate. But it is as close to the truth as could get.
Did I read somewhere that you had posted an account of the same battle? I can't find it anywhere but would be very interested in reading it.
Thanks for your kind words.
Thank you Terry, it's nice to have one's efforts appreciated.
I enjoyed doing it and learned a lot from the exercise. Not least that separating facts from fiction is very frustrating and time consuming, but ultimately rewarding. Simple things like the losses suffered by both sides. One account puts the Italian losses as five cruisers and seven destroyers! And that book is recently published and is on the bookshelves of W.H.Smith today.
I can't claim that my account is totally accurate. But it is as close to the truth as could get.
Did I read somewhere that you had posted an account of the same battle? I can't find it anywhere but would be very interested in reading it.
Thanks for your kind words.
A very good summary of the action Bill - Well done. I wasn't aware of the German & Italian Intelligence side of it. I received my copy of Pack's "Battle of Matapan" yesterday so look forward to reading it.
Cheers
Bruce
in the mail yesterday so I will read it with interest
astraltrader
31-10-2009, 01:24
I thought I did as well Bill, but I cant find it either!
I also wrote a short piece on the next naval battle of note to follow the Battle of Matapan - the Battle of the Tarigo Convoy which took place on the 15th and 16th April 1941.
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=1141&highlight=tarigo
As I think I mentioned to Don Boyer recently I wish I had time to research and write some decent pieces but my duties as moderator do take up a fair bit of time on top of my other non-forum activities.
Still one cant do everything! I`m not complaining just being realistic!
Quite by accident, I came across this short clip taken (allegedly) during the Battle of Matapan.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXJgB1t-tk0
There are also some other clips of the RN in action, including Taranto.
Cheers emason
Note that at 0:35 in the youtube video, what looks like a splinter matress falls from the bridge because of the shockwave off the guns firing!
deebee47
16-12-2010, 19:36
Hi
I don't know if anyone out there is interested but I have a hand written account of the Battle of Matapan written by my father whilst serving on HMS Havock during the battle. There were originally six pages but alas, the first has gone missing over the years. However the remaining five pages give an extensive account of what happened from someone there. I have sent the original letter to the Imperial War Museum in London.
If anyone is interested please email me at info@blois.me.uk and I can send a copy.
Deebee47
INVINCIBLE
27-12-2010, 10:40
[QUOTE=emason;81185]The battle of Cape Matapan is named after the headland at the southern extremity of the Peloponnese peninsular - the southernmost tip of Greece. The battle, or at least its opening actions, is also known in Italy as the Battle of Gaudo. Guado being a small island off the SW coast of Crete.
Bill,
Well done - excellent - much enjoyed reading your post.
I read Pack's book sometime ago, still have a copy, but I did not find it an easy read.
Have spoken to Osprey recommending they produce a book on "Taranto and Matapan" and they are publishing one. Their style should make for a much easier read than Pack's.
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