HMS Sheffield D-80

[The Sailor]

HMS Sheffield was a Type 42 guided missile destroyer, which was launched in June 1971 and was commissioned for service in February 1975.

Type 42 destroyers were designed to provide a naval fleet with defences against an attack from the air. Each Type 42 destroyer was fitted with Sea Dart surface-to-air missile systems.

As the Task Force fleet approached the Falklands, the Sheffield and other ships like her provided protection for the larger ships such as the ‘Hermes’ and ‘Invincible’. If these ships had been successfully attacked, the Task Force would have been severely weakened and there would have been the possibility that the whole venture might have been called off. HMS Sheffield took it in turns to be on the outer perimeter of the Task Force and was, therefore, the first line of defence. She was also, therefore, the first in line for attack when she was on this so-called picket duty.

On May 4th, 1982, Sheffield was suddenly hit. It was only when Sheffield’s Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed on the deck of HMS Hermes that any specific information was gathered.

The Exocet missile that hit HMS Sheffield had been fired from a French-built Super Étendard. The pilot, Captain Augusto Bedacarratz, had launched his Exocet when only six miles from the Sheffield – to all intents, this represented point blank range. The ‘rule book’ stated that an Exocet would be launched at a ship from 45 miles away and from a reasonable height. In this sense a 965 radar would pick it up. This Exocet was launched and flew just above sea level and was not picked up by radar until it was too late to react. The Sea Dart missile system was also generally not overly good at picking up sea skimming missiles. The crew had just 5 seconds warning that a missile was incoming.

The Exocet caused great damage to the Sheffield. It hit 8 feet above the water line and tore a gash in the Sheffield that measured 4 feet by 10 feet. The missile’s burning rocket motor set fire to the Sheffield and sufficiently damaged the ship’s electricity generating systems to prevent anti-fire mechanisms from working effectively. The Sheffield’s water main had also been ruptured. The combination of lack of electricity and water meant that there was no way that the fires could be contained.

A decision was taken to scuttle the ship and this was duly carried out, though it is probable that the rough seas would have done this.

Twenty men had been killed in the attack – an attack that gave the Task Force due warning that it was a vulnerable entity.

‘HMS Sheffield’ is now a recognised war grave.

[John Brown]

Good post sailor

I am posting the following comments based on my memory of the events as they were reported nearly 26 years ago so am open to contradiction: The reason for the plane nor the missile being picked up on Sheffields radar was because the system was actually shut down at the time. Sheffield was transmitting messages to London and the radar was interferring with the signal. Whatever actually happened it is pretty certain that the Capt. Sam Salt, was held partly responsible for the disaster as he was the only C/O of a sunken British ship not to have received an individual commendation. There will, however, be discussions for many years to come on what actually happened that day.

Frightening to think of the damaged caused to a modern warship by a missile that didn't even explode.

Regards...John

[The Sailor]

But John, doesn't this paragraph kinda explain it?

The Exocet missile that hit HMS Sheffield had been fired from a French-built Super Étendard. The pilot, Captain Augusto Bedacarratz, had launched his Exocet when only six miles from the Sheffield – to all intents, this represented point blank range. The ‘rule book’ stated that an Exocet would be launched at a ship from 45 miles away and from a reasonable height. In this sense a 965 radar would pick it up. This Exocet was launched and flew just above sea level and was not picked up by radar until it was too late to react. The Sea Dart missile system was also generally not overly good at picking up sea skimming missiles. The crew had just 5 seconds warning that a missile was incoming.

And once again after all the UXBs that Digger has mentioned, why didn't it explode? It appears that six miles wasn't enough to arm the missile. More good luck.

[John Brown]

Hi Sailor

The paragraph in your post does indeed give a feasible explaination of the events surrounding Sheffields sinking. However, it is not the only version of the events so which one are we to believe? If the planes had closed to within 6 miles before launching their missiles then blaming an inadequate radar system might be justified. If, however, the radar system was turned off at the time, that is a different kettle of fish. Having just done a little reading to refresh my memory, some versions of the attack state that the missiles were launched at a range of around 30 miles and should have been picked up if the radar was operating. Another said that a contact was picked up at a range of 60 miles but not acted upon. This would indicate that the radar was functioning but raises the question of why no action was taken.

I do not know which version is correct but, as already mentioned, the treatment of Capt Salt post sinking indicates there was more to Sheffields demise than an excellently executed attack by the Argentinian pilots.

Regards...John

[The Sailor]

Capt. Salt said during the hearing: "The missile had a devastating effect. It hit the centre of the ship, the centre of all operations - mechanical, detection, weaponry.

'It came in at six feet above the water level, damaged two large compartments and, when inside the ship, exploded outwards and upwards."

Within 20 seconds the centre of the ship was filled with black, acrid, pungent smoke. The explosion wiped out lighting and broadcasting systems, and also smashed the fire-fighting main.

Describing the ship's company's efforts, he said morale was incredibly high and team work was exceptional. "I'm sure every captain would say that his ship's company was the best, but I know that mine is."

"Obviously it is a tremendous disappointment to lose your ship, but all the men I have spoken to are remarkably cheerful, philosophical and determined about the future."

In addition to the 20 men who died in the ship, 24 were injured, one - CMECH John Strange of Gosport - seriously. The injured and the 242 other survivors were transferred to other ships in the Task Force, including HMS Hermes.

The Sheffield herself, gutted and deformed by her still -burning fires, lingered on for six more days. She was taken in tow but finally sank outside the Exclusion Zone on May 10, becoming an official war grave.

The body of one of her dead was recovered and committed to the sea from HMS Hermes.

ROLL OF HONOUR:
John Wodhead (40) Lt Cdr. Stubbington
David Balfour (37) Lt Cdr. Grayshott, Hindhead
Richard Emly (36) S/Lt Havant
Brian Welsh (34) MAA. Gateshead
Kevin Sullivan (35) WEA1. Porchester
Anthony Egginton (35) WEA1 Purbrook
Michael Till (35) ACWEMN. Stubbington
Barry Wallis (26) WEMN2 Portchester
Anthony Norman (25) POWEM(R) Gosport
David Briggs (25) POMEM(M) Lee-on-Solent
Robert Fagan (34) POCK Stubbington
Allan Knowles (31) LMEM(M) Gosport
Tony Marshall (31) LCK Gosport
Adrian Wellstead (26) LCK Stubbington
David Osoborne (22) CK Portsmouth
Andrew Swallow (18) CK Bembridge, Isle of Wight
Kevin Williams (20) CK Gosport
Neil Goodall (20) CK Enfield, Middlesex
Darryl Cope (21) CA Stourport

[herakles]

And it was a French made missile too!

I understand that much damage and death aboard Sheffield was due to the extensive use of plastics which deteriorated quickly in the heat. And that modifications were insisted on later because of this.

[The Sailor]

I don't know about plastics Herk but it sounds reasonable. In airliners it is the toxic fumes from burning plastic that is the biggest killer. There is virtually nothing available to take the place of plastic that can be coloured and moulded to suit a decor'. It will be a problem until they can come up with a non flammable substance.

Back to the Sheffield. I remember seeing the news back in 1982 and following the war. I remember them saying as Captain Salt said that the decks glowed white hot because the superstructures of many modern warships at that time were made of aluminium and it burnt like hell when a hit occurred.
I'd be interested to know if Britain and the US stopped using aluminium in ship construction after the Falklands war.
Maybe someone might know?

[herakles]

I've researched this idea about aluminium.

From what I've read, it's very true.

Aluminium is one of the ingredients of thermite, which burns so hot it cannot be extinguished, even by liquid nitrogen.

And I gather this problem was a major factor with the Columbia space shuttle disaster.

4Al + 3O2 → 2Al2O3

This article discusses the loss of Sheffield:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Sheffield_(D80)

and this article answers the question of the use of aluminium in ships as well as the reasons for loss of life:

http://www.sheffieldhistory.co.uk/forums/lofiversion/index.php/t460.html

[Draconis]

Read this:

http://www.alfed.org.uk/files/Fire.pdf

It says that HMS Sheffield had steel superstructure and there was no burning aluminium. It seems aluminium i still used in warship building. The leaflet is dated to 2004 July.

[herakles]

Yes Draconis. My point exactly.

[AlZictorini]

Sailor

Your Quote "It appears that six miles wasn't enough to arm the missile". Missiles don't (like bombs) need distance to arm them, they are armed by the pilot before he straps himself into the aircraft, hence when it hit the Sheffield it should have gone off - I can only suggest it was a faulty missile (thank goodness)!

[herakles]

Did it really matter?

Yes, thank Buddha it was faulty. At least many of the crew stayed alive.

But something had to be seriously wrong with Sheffield's design for such dreadful damage to be caused by an unexploded bomb.

[astraltrader]

From what I can remember the initial impact of the missile immediately destroyed the ship's onboard electricity generating systems and fractured the water main, preventing the anti-fire mechanisms from operating effectively, and thereby dooming the ship to be consumed by the raging fire.
On editing this after having reread the thread - I realise that this point was originally mentioned by the Sailor - in which case I concur!

[AlZictorini]

Quite right Herk

The picture attached shows how the heat was conducted throughout the ship. After the conflict, the RN went through a major fire/battle damage re-think. Aluminium was cut back on new designs, clothing had to be flame retardant, simple things like chipboard tables became sheet metal lined. Fire fighting became second nature, and now you are allowed to venture anywhere around ship (men died on the Sheffield because they where not allowed in the Wardroom Area, when they ventured in there in the smoke, they became lost and were overcome) to familiarise yourself. The Navy did learn from their mistakes!

[Hookie]

But something had to be seriously wrong with Sheffield's design for such dreadful damage to be caused by an unexploded bomb.

Very pertinent.

Speed and the energy of the collision causes friction. Result immense heat. Enough probably to cause aluminium and certainly plastics to burn. Maybe this was the Achilles heel? Just the thoughts of a layman.

Regards
John

[Uncle Albert]

I think you'll find that Capt Hart-Dyke, skipper of the Coventry did not receive any commendation and I don't think he got any further commands. Capt Salt was exonerated of all blame and he was immediately given another command (HMS Southampton, my last ship).
I must add that type 42s did not have any aluminium superstructure. The main early warning radar had been switched to standby while the satcom was being used because the radar interfered with the satcom signal. I also understood that the exocet warhead did not explode but because the missile had only flown a short distance, there was a lot of fuel left to burn and that is what caused such a huge and immediate fire. The starboard fire main was broken by the missile impact, the fwd auxiliary machinery room was destroyed, the conversion machinery room where all the odd electrical supplies for radar, weapon systems, gyros etc etc were produced was also destroyed, the gyro itself was destroyed and the fire destroyed the computer room and went up into the ops room and main communications room.
As a pure aside, Sheffield was returning from a long trip abroad, and was at Gibraltar on her last rabbit run before returning to the UK after eight months away. She had quite a few problems such as the aft diesel generators were defective, and as the missile took out the fwd diesels, she had no power to fight the fire. The Rover gas turbine emergency pump had been swamped by the high seas flooding the quarter deck and was difficult to start.
In my twenty five years in pusser, there were very few officers I would have followed without question but Sam Salt was one.

[alanbenn]

Sam Salt was my last commander prior to his move to Captain the Sheffield, I had volunteered for the sheffield being a Barnsley lad and had already fitted some equipment aboard her.

I have spoke to sam salt on several occassions after the falklands conflict and to many mates who were at the falklands. Her Radar was switched off for maintenance at the time the initial attack took place, she received messages from other ships that missiles were incoming, but as already mentioned they were launched from close range and she had no way of averting a direct hit. One of my friends had said they were even firing rifles at the thing as it approached. The ensuing fire was made worse by the toxic fumes from the electrical wiring systems, a fault also apparent in the guided missile destroyers like Hms Fife which I served aboard. The design has now been changed.
Sam eventually became an admiral at whitehall, now retired and was living on the Isle of wight when I last met him there. I have not heard of him since moving north 5 years ago. He was a true matelots captain, ex submariner and you couldn't wish to meet a nicer gent. I was pleased he was exonerated of all blame in the enquiry that took place and I know he took it very personally of the men that were lost under his command.
Like many before him he no doubts goes over and over those moments and wonders if he could have done things differently.

Realistically we were never going to win the war without casualties, our losses were well below those first anticipated.

Regards
Alan

[Adam Joe Lawton]

I was a Junior Seaman on Sheffield in 1982. I can tell you all exactly what happened, how and why if you want to know.
Yours Aye
Joe Lawton

[astraltrader]

Welcome to the forum Adam.

Of course we would like to know more about what happened.

Here is the place and thread to send us your account.

I look forward very much to reading it!!

[Polycell]

It should be remembered that at the time of the Falklands debacle that Exocet was used by us Brits and could have been misconstrued by ECM radar as 'friendlly'.
This view was banded about the fleet when the Sheffield initially got struck by this missile.

[Richh]

Read this:

http://www.alfed.org.uk/files/Fire.pdf

It says that HMS Sheffield had steel superstructure and there was no burning aluminium.

Quite. Aside from anything else, Capt Salt's report of decking "glowing white hot" is a giveaway. As anyone with experience of aluminium welding will tell you, it doesn't glow when it gets near melting point, it simply melts. Looks a lot like mercury once liquid.

As such, reports of the ship's structure glowing from the heat of the fire tells you that the plates concerned must have been steel.

Edit: I've been lurking here for years and am quite surprised to see that this is my first post, so hello all. :)

[MelQuick]

I met a couple of survivors from HMS Sheffield at Dunsfold when I was carrying out trials on the Sea Harrier.

Mel

[let go aft]

I've researched this idea about aluminium.

From what I've read, it's very true.

Aluminium is one of the ingredients of thermite, which burns so hot it cannot be extinguished, even by liquid nitrogen.

And I gather this problem was a major factor with the Columbia space shuttle disaster.

4Al + 3O2 → 2Al2O3

This article discusses the loss of Sheffield:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Sheffield_(D80)

and this article answers the question of the use of aluminium in ships as well as the reasons for loss of life:

http://www.sheffieldhistory.co.uk/forums/lofiversion/index.php/t460.html

If you wish to see the effect of aluminium catching fire look at website which shows USS Belknap following collision with the jfk 60 + picshttp://t-ags-32.smugmug.com/

[harry.gibbon]

It should be remembered that at the time of the Falklands debacle that Exocet was used by us Brits and could have been misconstrued by ECM radar as 'friendlly'.
This view was banded about the fleet when the Sheffield initially got struck by this missile.

Fred, I have tried to put your post out of my thoughts, but keep coming back to the issue that you raised ... I understand the system employed by Exocet but can not at this stage reconcile the 'misconstrued by ECM radar as friendly' bit!!

Are there any references to which I might refer further?

Little h

[steve roberts]

Hi Little h.I think this story was a myth.According to David Brown's book 'The Royal Navy and the Falklands War' Sheffield had her radars switched off,while using stallite comms.She was warned by HMS Glasgow who had detected the Super Entards 'Agarve' Radar about 25 miles from Sheffield,on recieving the warning Sheffield immediately switched her radar back on,but by the time the 'Bogeys' were picked up when they popped up to fire the Excocet,it was too late for Sheffields 'Sea Dart' missiles to lock on.There was only time for a main broadcast"missile Attack-hit the deck" before the missile struck.
Regards Steve.

[harry.gibbon]

With respect Steve, that is just exactly the difficulty I have .... were/are the commentators making reference to EW [Electronic Warfare] in a confused way about:-
an active ECM [Electronic Counter Measure] issue ...
a passive ESM [Electronic Support Measure] issue ...
or
an active Radar issue ...

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=l-DzknmTgDUC&pg=PR18&lpg=PR18&dq=ESM+or+ECM&source=bl&ots=2rhNGZnfJj&sig=NgaMakhfUmeI8RPZn3Jo4kNgPmQ&hl=en&ei=Zaj5S_qdKIey0gT2ucjpBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CCYQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=ESM%20or%20ECM&f=false

Little h

[Polycell]

With respect Steve, that is just exactly the difficulty I have .... were/are the commentators making reference to EW [Electronic Warfare] in a confused way about:-
an active ECM [Electronic Counter Measure] issue ...
a passive ESM [Electronic Support Measure] issue ...
or
an active Radar issue ...

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=l-DzknmTgDUC&pg=PR18&lpg=PR18&dq=ESM+or+ECM&source=bl&ots=2rhNGZnfJj&sig=NgaMakhfUmeI8RPZn3Jo4kNgPmQ&hl=en&ei=Zaj5S_qdKIey0gT2ucjpBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CCYQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=ESM%20or%20ECM&f=false

Little h
OK I admit defeat! Remember I'm an ex submariner and our IFF was called Warner so I'l just call it IFF and re write what I said and substitute ECM for IFF.
But as I said the word going around the submarine world in 82 was that Sheffield had mistakenly identified the Exocet as friendly. My story was backed up by my buddy an RMech who was serving on Sheffield when she was hit. He said nothing about radars being down due to maintenance but.....sorry like a lot of us we rely a lot on what we are told and as my source was someone who was actually on the ship.
Fred

[harry.gibbon]

Cheers Fred, no worries mate,it was just that I had an inclination it may have been a terminology issue.
Now one wonders if anyone knows if there was a 'squawking' issue or perhaps a miss-read or miss-construed emission emanating from the launch a/c or the exocet itself.
One thinks of the 'reports' that helo pilots offered their a/c as decoys or a source of confusion to the missile.

Little h

[Polycell]

Cheers Fred, no worries mate,it was just that I had an inclination it may have been a terminology issue.
Now one wonders if anyone knows if there was a 'squawking' issue or perhaps a miss-read or miss-construed emission emanating from the launch a/c or the exocet itself.
One thinks of the 'reports' that helo pilots offered their a/c as decoys or a source of confusion to the missile.

Little h

Thanks Harry.

[JacktheGunner]

Hi Guys here is my tuppence worth - Shef had put 992 into stand-by (Target Indication) Radar the 965 was also in Stand-by due to Scot squirting - the item Fred spoke about where the Submariners thought UK GWS 50 (Exocet) could not be differentiated with the french supplied AM 39 is not true, as the AM 39 is air-launched not ship launched and have 2 different target indicators to detect and validate tracks prior to launch. Sorry fred - I had another mate on Onyx and he said the same thing when I was in Neptune after we came back from down south.

Sorry that's all I can say on this forum about it.

Jack the Gunner.

[Mike_H]

This had been a most interesting discussion about the Exocet hit on the Sheffield.

However, it should be appreciated that Exocet is a fire and forget anti-ship cruise missile requiring pre launch target data being programmed into it. The inertial navigation system flies the missile to a set location where the radar seeker head in turned on for the final phase where it searches for a target ship, during the flight the height above the sea is controlled by a radio altimeter, and can depending on wave height be as low as 8 feet. The radar seeker head once locked onto a target then navigates the missile to hit the intended target amidships. Exocet has a delay proximity fuse and does not detonate on impact. The loud “Clump” or thud heard on Sheffield (and Glamorgam later in June 1982) was the part discharge of the kinetic energy of the missile hitting the side of the ship. The conical head pierces the thin steel plate and the pressure sensors activate the delay proximity fuse, causing the High Explosive fragmentation warhead (165kg) to detonate inside the ship.

Exocet does not sink ships but disables them. Another feature of Exocet is that the missile carries its own oxidiser so there is an incendiary effect which causes widespread damage.

Do remember that 15 RN ships, that went down to the Falklands were Exocet armed. Had the Belgrano not been sunk by Conquerer, then a Surface Action Group comprising of Glamorgan and 2 Amazon class frigates would have been detailed off to deal with her and the engagement would have been with Exocet. (Ship launched version the MM40)

Having studied a number of sources of information, written an article on the attack for a branch of the World Ship Society and read a number of books on the subject, and from my own gen that I picked up when I was in the RNR in the late 1970's, I do not agree with the statement that the Exocet was fired at 6 miles (Nautical). Indeed this is not confirmed in interviews by the pilots that carried out the attack and there is also a technical reason that need to be considered.

What is also not mentioned and I would have expected it to be said is that the attack aircraft would have been seen launching these missiles certainly at 6 miles, and could have been easy prey to the 4.5inch Naval Guns. Now no Super Etendards (SuE) were lost in the conflict.

A technical reason is that the radar seeker heads on the Exocet missiles themselves would have had insufficient time to activate, so would not have locked-on to a target, in this case the Sheffield. Also remember that it was reported that a second Exocet was seen ditching into the sea about half a mile away from Sheffield, it ran out of propellant. This suggests that the missiles were fired from a greater distance of 6 miles (nautical).

Remember the two Exocets were being tracked by Glasgow in her ops room, Glasgow, had already gone to action stations when the first set of Agave radars in the search mode were observed on the EW screen at 45nmi, bearing 240 degrees. After 2s (3 sweeps) the Agaves were switched off. This was broadcast to the fleet using Link 11. The Agaves were re-acquired at 40nmi bearing 238 degrees, in the lock mode. Glasgow immediately fired chaff, with the OOW on the bridge being instructed to adjust the speed of the ship relative to the wind speed.

Now pilot interviews of that event (Captain de Frigata (Lt Cmdr) Oscar Bedacarratz and Lt A Mayora) have confirmed that the AM39 air launched version of Exocet were launched from a distance of 20 nautical miles, which at the time, was the maximum range for the AM39 version of Exocet. They were firing at a target or radar echo on the screen(s) of the Agave radars in the SuE. They were also not going to hang around to see what they had hit, and descended back down to 50ft on a course of 160degrees away from the RN task force.

The incoming Exocets radar seeker heads would have activated in flight and the warheads primed for detonation. The radar seekers would be operating in the active mode and searching for a target. It is known that the missiles seeker heads were active as they were being tracked on EW in Glasgow, with one missile heading towards Sheffield, who did not deploy chaff to lure or seduce the Exocet away from it as was the case with Glasgow.

The arming circuit a safety feature on missiles etc. would have primed the warhead for detonation after a set time interval (i.e. dead-time) had elapsed. In the case of Sheffield, the Exocet did not detonate, as is stated in the Board of Enquiry Report and from various pictures taken of the ship.

There were a number of salvage visits in the 6 days she was afloat and the photographs, indeed films show that this was the case. Possible reasons for non detonation are that the missile fragmented on its way in due to the shallow angle that it shruck the ships side, another reason is that the pilot programmed the wrong delay fuse setting when the data transfers took place.

Sheffield sank whilst she under tow, in the TEZ, by Yarmouth, in an area of rough sea caused by slow flooding through the missile hole in her side. In spite of orders being given to shore up the hole in the starboard side where the missile hit. She was destined for South Georgia where I am given to understand a full examination of the ship would have taken place.

Apart from Atlantic Conveyor which was reportedly hit by two Exocets, and it is a mute point as to whether or not they detonated, the only other RN ship to be hit by and Exocet and survive was Glamorgan. which was hit by a MM38 Exocet fired from an improvised land based launcher. This missile did detonate, it was seen by the ARA launch crew who fired it, crew on Glamorgan saw it detonate, including the SeaCat missile that was fired towards it (which did nothing as it was in dead time) with the whole series of events being recorded by an Argentenian film crew! It is viewable on Youtube!

I have heard a similar comment that the Exocets fired by Argentina did not carry warheads! Indeed I do not think that the crews of Glamorgan would be of that view nor Atlantic Conveyor either.

My 50p worth

Mike_H:)

[Navaleye]

The accepted launch range was about 20 miles using Glasgow's radar plot. You are correct about the Surface Action Group and Belgrano. The tactic would have been to disable her two escorts with Sea Skua leaving Exocet for the cruiser. 3 or 4 would do the trick. The escorts could then be mopped up with gunfire assuming they hadn't surrendered.

[ObiWanRussell]

The ship launched version of Exocet in service with the RN was the MM38, not the MM40. The latter is an improved version that is launched from a more compact Harpoon like tube rather than the bulky box of the earlier missile. The RN never aquired any MM40s, instead Harpoon was selected and fitted to newer ships.

[Navaleye]

Quite true. Both the RN and the ARA had MM38. The RN version had the NATO spec seeker whereas the ARA models had the export spec seeker which de-tuned.

[Navaleye]

For those who had not know, Sam Salt
died of Cancer earlier this year. He was held in great regard by all those who served with him.

[harry.gibbon]

For those who had not know, Sam Salt
died of Cancer earlier this year. He was held in great regard by all those who served with him.

Navaleye,

I posted his passing in the Forum Obituaries section in Dec 2010, see:-

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showpost.php?p=86557&postcount=1

Little h

[Mike_H]

I was advised by one of the crew members, (Navigation Officer) that the Glamorgan had, at that time (1981) the improved version of Exocet, the ship-launched MM40 version whose development started in 1976 and was to be a replacement for the MM38. The MM40 development was completed in 1980, and full scale production began in 1981. Glamorgan had 4 MM40 missiles loaded in late 1981. These were to be used in a test firing exercise in 1982. As she was part of a fleet of Warships that were exercising off Gibraltar in March 1982 this fleet was all diverted to the Falklands Conflict.

The MM40's were loaded into the cannisters, located in the position of the old B gun turret. One must remember that the MM40 has undergone a series of enhancements with Block 2 and more recently Block 3 versions being available. The latter versions are housed in "pipe" shaped cannisters now, and possess superior subsystems than the earlier versions of MM38 and MM40. The MM38 is not made anymore.

It was in 2002 when the last Exocet armed RN ship was decommissioned and the whole RN exocet arsenal was disposed of. Its replacement was the US McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) Harpoon RGM84 system has take its place. The Harpoon missile is similar but it has a larger 222kg warhead compared to Exocets 165kg. ie. more bang per buck!

Do remember that these missiles have a shelf life and become time expired after a set period of time. Which tends to suggest that they have internal battery packs like most computers do!

Mike_H :)

[Navaleye]

No that is not correct. The RN only took deliveries of MM38. They were box launched versions with a range of 20 miles or so. MM40 came quite later and was not adopted by the RN, who went for Harpoon due to it's longer range and larger warhead. The first examples appeared on the T22 batch 3s, followed by the T23. The CMS on the T45s is already equipped for Harpoon and they can be equipped easily which is likely when one undertakes it's first APT(S) next year, likewise Phalanx.

As the shelf life of MM38 approached they were mostly used as CIWS targets. I recall launching 4 in 30 seconds to test the Goalkeeper system on a Dutch frigate. They all got splashed.

I should add that this was under strict test conditions.

Not all RN ships with the box launcher were actually fitted with MM38. They made useful stowage space for all sorts of stuff :-)

[Mike_H]

No that is not correct. The RN only took deliveries of MM38. They were box launched versions with a range of 20 miles or so. MM40 came quite later and was not adopted by the RN, who went for Harpoon due to it's longer range and larger warhead. The first examples appeared on the T22 batch 3s, followed by the T23. The CMS on the T45s is already equipped for Harpoon and they can be equipped easily which is likely when one undertakes it's first APT(S) next year, likewise Phalanx.

As the shelf life of MM38 approached they were mostly used as CIWS targets. I recall launching 4 in 30 seconds to test the Goalkeeper system on a Dutch frigate. They all got splashed.

I should add that this was under strict test conditions.

Not all RN ships with the box launcher were actually fitted with MM38. They made useful stowage space for all sorts of stuff :-)

I do agree with you, as the MM40 is a significantly longer missile at 5.8m whereas the MM38 was 5.2m, same diameter of 0.35m though. That would have needed the cannister to be resized! One way to find out is at the Navy records and museum at Portsmouth. Or the ships log books which I understand are at the PRO Kew. I have a feeling that my sources memory banks are creaking somewhat from 30 years ago in 2012! However thank you for the correction.

I am aware that the remaining exocets were sold back to the manufacturers (now MDBA) in 2003, just after the last ship to carry them was decommissioned (The Type 22 Batch 1's?)

Mike_H:)

[Navaleye]

The two systems regularly get confused especially on sites like Wikipedia. MM38 was only ever considered an interim weapon and was replaced when the US finally got their act together with Harpoon. I believe the last ship to carry them was HMS Coventry.

[glojo]

What a terrible, terrible event and I guess it is fair comment when folks say that when we go to war we MUST expect casualties.

I am very aware that we have members of the crew of this proud warship on this forum, I am aware of that and would very respectfully like to ask a few questions to try to clarify a few of the rumours that are circulating.

Was Sheffield on the outer perimeter and acting as an early warning to the fleet with the responsibility of detecting incoming enemy aircraft?

Prior to the incoming aircraft\missile being detected or maybe the warning from Glasgow, were the crew at defence watches or action stations?

I apologise if these questions cause upset as this is not my intent.

Unfortunately we can play war games until the cows come home. It is not until we get down and dirty that we learn some really costly lessons.

I think someone looked over us during that conflict and how lucky were we that the majority of conventional bombs failed to arm?

To all those that fought in that campaign I salute your courage. The Royal Navy might not have been the biggest Navy at that time in history but by God we let the World know we still had a heart of oak! :o:)

Yours very sincerely
John

[Navaleye]

She was one of three T42s keeping picket duty up threat of the CVBG. By unfortunate luck, she was blind and deaf at the time and got hit. The full story has not been officially disclosed but many know it. The lessons were learned at the cost of 20 lives.

[Mike_H]

Using the SATCOM in a T42 should not affect the radar one bit. But what it does was to mask the signals on the UAA1 display (Electronic Warfare ESM). This had the effect of making SHEFFIELD 'deaf' not blind. A filter in the circuit (Approx cost £100-00) would have solved this.

I was advised that the "992" was operating, with two Air defence operators locating two contacts at approx. 20nmi. Track labels were generated and the contact was advised to the Ops Room CPRI. The track was handed over to the gun control team who took over the track (so in theory the 4.5inch would have been used- but why no chaff?) up until impact. However I suspect other issues came into play as the ship was not at action stations, there was a depletion of certain key staff in the ops room prior to the hit, there was also a problem of ghost contacts in the area where the ships were operating.

Was Sheffield on the outer perimeter and acting as an early warning to the fleet with the responsibility of detecting incoming enemy a aircraft?
Prior to the incoming aircraft\missile being detected or maybe the warning from Glasgow, were the crew at defence watches or action stations?
SHEFFIELD was one of five Type 42s that were part of the Royal Navy Task Force sent to the Falkland Islands during the Falklands Conflict, she was on the morning of 4th May 1982, at defence watch, in a second degree state of readiness, not at action stations, on the southerly picket station, GLASGOW was in the middle, COVENTRY on the northern picket station. The Sea Dart Screen consisted of SHEFFIELD (On southerly picket) GLASGOW in the middle and COVENTRY to the north. They were some 20nmi from the carriers BULWARK and INVINCIBLE. The second ring of defence or Escort screen consisted of ALACRITY, YARMOUTH, GLAMORGAN and ARROW. 10nmi from the Carriers, a missile barrier at 5nmi was: FT AUSTIN, RESOURCE and OLMEDA. The Carriers had their own goalkeepers BROADSWORD and BRILLIANT, Type 22’s armed with the SeaWolf missile system.

I think someone looked over us during that conflict and how lucky were we that the majority of conventional bombs failed to arm?
Not so. As the incoming Argentinean Aircraft were coming in at low level, so that they would not be detected by radar and be potential targets for Sea Dart. It is in part because of this that the bombs were being delivered at the wrong height so they did not have time to arm correctly i.e. they were still within dead time as the fuse in the bomb had insufficient time to prime for detonation. (ARDENT took a relentless pounding with eleven bomb hits, six did not explode, five did, no ship of her class of any era would have been able to endure such an attack). The 1000lb iron bombs were procured from the UK before the Falklands conflict. In the case of the attack on Coventry in that attack the bombs 4x1000lbs were dropped at the correct height. So they armed properly, with two detonating with catastrophic effect.

Of the four bombs dropped, COVENTRY was hit by three of them just above the water line on her port side. One of the bombs supposedly exploded underneath the computer room, destroying it and the adjacent operations room, incapacitating more or less all the senior officers. The second supposedly went through the Forward Engine Room, exploding under the Junior Ratings Dining Room where the First Aid Party was positioned and immediately the ship listed to port. Detonation of the second bomb was the cause of further damage, breaking the forward and aft engine room bulkhead, resulting in the creation of a large open void in the ship to unmanageable flooding. The ships design with multiple watertight compartments meant that two hits almost anywhere else would have meant that the ship could have survived. Sadly it did not. Within 20mins COVENTRY was abandoned and finally capsized, some of her crew, 19 were lost and 30 injured, shortly after this COVENTRY sank. The third bomb did not detonate and the other missed. The Board of enquiry Report is available on the MoD website for viewing.

I do recall that a retardation device was fitted to some of the bombs dropped by the Argentine aircraft.

I hope that this answers your questions John.

Mike_H:)

N.B. I was advised that there were similarities with the SHEFFIELD and the USS STARK in the 1991 tanker war. The Stark was hit by 2 AM39 exocets. One failed to detonate, the other did detonate. Again a Board if Inquiry report is on the internet.

[Navaleye]

Lots of good questions, but perhaps I can shed some clarity on a few points.

At the start of the conflict, the task force had 3 T42s available, Coventry, Glasgow and Sheffield. These were joined much later by Exeter and Cardiff and also the one T82, Bristol. Unfortunately many of the problems of the T42 were far from resolved by May 82 and had defect lists as long as your arm even after 3 months alongside. Updates to software had to be supplied on C-90 cassette tapes (remember those?). The T42s were not designed for high threat environments and many of the lessons that made them the good AAW platforms they are now were learned the hard way.

In the case of the Stark, IIRC, the second Exocet passed through the damage area created by the first and exited the ship without exploding. The export version as a fairly basic centroid homing head, but that does not make it ineffective.

Unfortunately, SCOT did interfere with most systems and it's use in combat zones was curtailed until appropriate measures could be introduced 3 or so years after.

[glojo]

I think someone looked over us during that conflict and how lucky were we that the majority of conventional bombs failed to arm?
Hi Mike,
I think you misunderstood my comment. I was fully aware of the arming issue but thank God the Argentinian pilots were not!

Regarding my two questions,
I thank you both very much for the very frank answers and they need no comments whatsoever.

My only hope is that we have all learned from this.



From rock and tempest, fire and foe,
Protect them wheresoe'er they go

Yours most sincerely,
John

[Mike_H]

Lots of good questions, but perhaps I can shed some clarity on a few points.

In the case of the Stark, IIRC, the second Exocet passed through the damage area created by the first and exited the ship without exploding. The export version as a fairly basic centroid homing head, but that does not make it ineffective.

Close, but having read the USN Board of Inquiry report, it was the first AM39 exocet that hit the ship and failed to detonate and the second one detonated. Once the fires were put out a team removed the warhead from the first exocet. This missile fragmented, on passing into the ship, with pieces of it passing through the ship exiting the starboard side. The warhead was located on the second deck at frame A172, and removed. The second detonated inside the ship as it is designed to do.

Both AM39 exocets were fired from the same platform an Iraqi Mirage F1 jet configured to carry exocet. No chaff was deployed by the Stark, the CIWS was is the standby mode. Stark was in International waters at that time and was not in Iranian or Iraqi waters at all.

Mike_H:)

[paulus]

Using the SATCOM in a T42 should not affect the radar one bit. But what it does was to mask the signals on the UAA1 display (Electronic Warfare ESM). This had the effect of making SHEFFIELD 'deaf' not blind. A filter in the circuit (Approx cost £100-00) would have solved this.

I was advised that the "992" was operating, with two Air defence operators locating two contacts at approx. 20nmi. Track labels were generated and the contact was advised to the Ops Room CPRI. The track was handed over to the gun control team who took over the track (so in theory the 4.5inch would have been used- but why no chaff?) up until impact. However I suspect other issues came into play as the ship was not at action stations, there was a depletion of certain key staff in the ops room prior to the hit, there was also a problem of ghost contacts in the area where the ships were operating.


SHEFFIELD was one of five Type 42s that were part of the Royal Navy Task Force sent to the Falkland Islands during the Falklands Conflict, she was on the morning of 4th May 1982, at defence watch, in a second degree state of readiness, not at action stations, on the southerly picket station, GLASGOW was in the middle, COVENTRY on the northern picket station. The Sea Dart Screen consisted of SHEFFIELD (On southerly picket) GLASGOW in the middle and COVENTRY to the north. They were some 20nmi from the carriers BULWARK and INVINCIBLE. The second ring of defence or Escort screen consisted of ALACRITY, YARMOUTH, GLAMORGAN and ARROW. 10nmi from the Carriers, a missile barrier at 5nmi was: FT AUSTIN, RESOURCE and OLMEDA. The Carriers had their own goalkeepers BROADSWORD and BRILLIANT, Type 22’s armed with the SeaWolf missile system.


Not so. As the incoming Argentinean Aircraft were coming in at low level, so that they would not be detected by radar and be potential targets for Sea Dart. It is in part because of this that the bombs were being delivered at the wrong height so they did not have time to arm correctly i.e. they were still within dead time as the fuse in the bomb had insufficient time to prime for detonation. (ARDENT took a relentless pounding with eleven bomb hits, six did not explode, five did, no ship of her class of any era would have been able to endure such an attack). The 1000lb iron bombs were procured from the UK before the Falklands conflict. In the case of the attack on Coventry in that attack the bombs 4x1000lbs were dropped at the correct height. So they armed properly, with two detonating with catastrophic effect.

Of the four bombs dropped, COVENTRY was hit by three of them just above the water line on her port side. One of the bombs supposedly exploded underneath the computer room, destroying it and the adjacent operations room, incapacitating more or less all the senior officers. The second supposedly went through the Forward Engine Room, exploding under the Junior Ratings Dining Room where the First Aid Party was positioned and immediately the ship listed to port. Detonation of the second bomb was the cause of further damage, breaking the forward and aft engine room bulkhead, resulting in the creation of a large open void in the ship to unmanageable flooding. The ships design with multiple watertight compartments meant that two hits almost anywhere else would have meant that the ship could have survived. Sadly it did not. Within 20mins COVENTRY was abandoned and finally capsized, some of her crew, 19 were lost and 30 injured, shortly after this COVENTRY sank. The third bomb did not detonate and the other missed. The Board of enquiry Report is available on the MoD website for viewing.

I do recall that a retardation device was fitted to some of the bombs dropped by the Argentine aircraft.

I hope that this answers your questions John.

Mike_H:)

N.B. I was advised that there were similarities with the SHEFFIELD and the USS STARK in the 1991 tanker war. The Stark was hit by 2 AM39 exocets. One failed to detonate, the other did detonate. Again a Board if Inquiry report is on the internet.

Mike,

I am not sure where you are getting your information from but for starters only 3 Type 42’s deployed south in 82 – HMS Sheffield, HMS Coventry and HMS Glasgow. The others deployed later during the war. I served aboard HMS Coventry in 1982; I was in the Ops Room when she was hit, which is located above the Computer Room and I can confirm the Computer Room was hit with those within not surviving. Enough said.

I don’t know where HMS Bulwark comes into play – she never deployed south in 82. The only carriers that deployed were HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible.

[tim lewin]

For the 25th anniversary of the Falklands Conflict Trinity College of Music composed a Requiem which had its premiere in the Chapel at Greenwich followed by a reception in the Painted Hall. I am now in the planning stages of repeating this in May next year fro the 30th anniversary; if any of you would like to come to this please let me know and i will make sure you will be invited, i think i posted pics of the last event on the forum. I will write this up properly soon, need to fix the actual day and organise the sponsorship but i am now confident we will do it. Admiral Lord West has already accepted to join, he was captain of Ardent at the time....
The last event had some 200+ attendees, 99% veterand of the Services and was sponsored by Stena, this time we aim for 400+
Trinity now occupies King Charles Court at Greenwich Old Royal Naval College.
Tim

[Mike_H]

Paulus,

Thanks for your comments but I was giving the total number of Type 42's that were involved as per the listings in the naval-history.net web site. As we both know CARDIFF and EXETER joined the conflict at a later dates.
WRT my incorrect inclusion of BULWARK instead of HERMES. I was at the time researching these two ships for a separate paper for a WSS article that I am writing, and got them transposed, when I was replying to the original question. Well spotted!

[spider webster]

UAA1 was a good piece of ears for the ships to detect anything transmitted by RADAR. This kit comprised of two sets of antenna, alarm sensors (cotton reels) and bearing (mushrooms). Although SCOTT had a pencil beam transmitting to the sattellite the power of it caused it to effect the UAA1 depending on the ships bearing. Therefore transmitting on SCOTT made the ships deaf on this frequency. Memory fading now but I think the word puffball was called when an exocet was detected on UAA1 giving the ship an early warning.
Filters were fitted on the cables coming down from the UAA1 aeireals but with these fitted it just meant that you could just see nothing on the screen instead of the noise from SCOTT. I dont think the filters were switchable so even when SCOTT wasnt transmitting the UAA1 would have still been deaf on this frequency. I thought these filters were fitted down the Falklands but not sure about this. Argentina had type 42's so will have been aware of this problem also.

[Mike_H]

When the Type 42s were being built there was IIRC concern about the construction costs, of which a substantial part of these costs was due to the electronic kit within them. Political intervention, caused a rethink in their design and the Batch 1 Type 42s were a much shortened version of what the Batch 3's were. The former being poor sea keepers so I have been told. This penny pinching approach was probably the cause of a number of design problems that later became apperent after the exocet hit on Sheffield. I was told that for a £100 an additional filter could have been inserted into the statcom circuit to over come the problem described. No doubt others who served on Sheffield will have their own stories but she was the first build of her class.

WRT the ARA Type 42s Hercules and Santimisa Trinidad, these were, almost identical to the RNs Type 42s. With one built in the UK and one a contract build in Argentina itself. When the first batch of Super Etendards (SuE) were received (an a similar number of AM39 exocets) in November 1981, the ARA as part of an exercise carried out simulated attacks on them. This was to develop the stealth tactics of secrecy and surprise. Additionally simulated exocet launches were made against these ships and the launch profiles being checked by using a vector analyser, an important piece of kit used to test exocet missiles, that the ARA possessed.

[astraltrader]

A selection of Sheffield pictures from my Falklands files....

[spider webster]

I think the filters were fitted on the uaa1 recievers not on the scott. I remember fitting these up inside the mast just under the bearing head.
Even if the filters were fitted the uaa1 would have still been deaf on this frequency, it was the transmitting of scott that caused this. This would only be relevant if exocet transmitted on this frequency anyway.

[harry.gibbon]

Bearing in mind that filters were fitted to the EW system and if we are talking about AM39 Exocet, then surely when any indication of a Super Etendard radar was detected, wouldn't it have been wise for the Satcom system to cease/interrupt transmission until any Exocet threat had dissappeared!!

In the 60's when the Blue Parrot radar of a Buccaneer was detected in the EWO, a bell would be activated from there and rang in the Ops Room and evasive action initiated pending the possibility of a strike. Similar activity took place when a submarine periscope ranging radar was detected.

It is extremely sad that fellow sailors lives were lost due to shortcomings in equipment and presumeably long lost habits much practised on exercise in some 20 years previously.

Little h

[spider webster]

I remember similar in ops room down the falklands with codewords shouted out dependant on what had been detected. I think it was a number of things that stopped the esm from picking anything up, scott transmitting, low angle of the transmitting dish and bearing the ship was on. Thats if the super etendard radar was within this range that scott was blinding esm on.

[Silvergiraffes]

I know I am a relative newcomer to the site but I feel I have something to offer on this topic.

I was 'down south' in 82 but didnt arrive until May 25th. I was a PO Golly on Bristol so EW and dealing with the threat was a major part of my job. On the way south we were briefed over and again about the Sheffield incident.
The basics as stated above are true, the task force did know an attack was in progress, agave radar (code name 'Handbrake') had been intercepted by Glasgow and air raid warning red was called, Most ships were at action stations, certain things would have happened (Crash stop Scot) being one of them. After a short period the AAWC (Anti Air Warfare Commander) decided the threat had gone elsewhere and the threat was changed to air raid warning yellow. Transmissions were free on Scot which Sheff decided to use (others decided to play safe and leave Scot off). The UAA1 did indeed suffer massive interference from Scot was 'deaf/blind' and I include blind because the operator can look at the screen and 'see' radars being displayed as well as listening to them. The filters at that time were fixed, so if deployed they would have cut out the interference from Scot but all they did was to leave a big dark whole in the frequency spectrum. And yes it was just where a lot of threat radars operated. And we all know what happened from there on in.
Just my opinion but I reckon all the exocet hits could have been avoided.
Sheff has been well documented, the group should have stayed at Air Raid warning red, action stations and stayed silent on scot. Once Agave had been intercepted ships should have been deploying chaff, altering course and many other actions.
Atlantic Conveyor - The ships in the group did detect the Agave and did take the right actions, chaff was sewn and the warships turned the correct way. Sadly the chaff did its job and decoyed the missile away, but the missile found the AC. If merchants were fitted with chaff this could have been avoided. This was done at later deployments.
Glamorgan - All ships in the task force had received info of an exocet battery being deployed ashore (in a car park if my memory serves me right), and were given the lat and long of the lauch site. Were all advised the draw the max range of the Exocet on the charts and put them into our computer systems, this was supposed to be a 'no go' area. Somehow Glam went through this area and was hit accordingly.
Overall Exocet was a pretty simple missile that was really not too difficult to defeat as long as the initial warnings of attack were interecepted and the correct action taken.
By the way the code name for the radar on the exocet head was 'Eyewater' very apt!!

[Silvergiraffes]

By the way Little H - In your day it was a bell - in mine it was (and I think still is) a whistle...

Many a time I have blown the whistle and shouted 'Blue Parrot', or 'Puffball' and so on.

I was on watch EWD (Electronic Warfare Director) the day AC was sunk. I had briefed by lads over and again about codewords, they were displayed all over the threat board in the Ops room. And how did I find out about the attack? I was off head set, walking over to the air plot when I heard a Radar Plotter lean over to his oppo and say 'here, whats a Handbrake'?

[ludsie]

Its terrible that the missile got through the defences of the fleet. I have heard the story about the scot comms system interfering with the radar or vice versa

[Silvergiraffes]

These days the EW kits are all fitted with either switchable filters or a much cleverer system to make sure that sort of thing does not happen again. Mind you with so many different transmitters and receivers in ships solving the interference problem must be a nightmare.

[Mike_H]

Excellent Pictures Astraltrader. Well done for putting these on this thread. Looking at at all the pictures it confirms that the warhead of the AM39 exocet missile that hit the ship did not detonate. Interestingly this is confirmed by the BOI that sat in June/July 1982 at Portsmouth.

The details, have been made available under the 2000 Freedom of Information Act, are here: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9D8947AC-D8DC-4BE7-8DCC-C9C623539BCF/0/boi_hms_sheffield.pdf Please note some of the report has been edited out.

However, the fire caused by the unexpended propellant from the exocet was the cause of many fires onboard Sheffield, made worse by the presence of flammable materials (pvc cable sheaths etc) in fitting out the ship. I include in this last comment the No 8s working rig which was polyester/cotton based.

Whilst Cardiff had identified two Agave radar sweeps, warned the fleet on Link 11, gone to action stations and deployed Chaff, Sheffield had not gone to action stations, nor deployed any chaff. Indeed had chaff been deployed perhaps the situation would have been different.

With AC this STUFT was hit in the stern area, whilst in the process of turning during the attack on 25 May 1982. Indeed the chaff deployed by the RN ships did the trick, although it is a mute point again that AC was hit by two exocets and again did the warheads detonate? The BOI report is here:
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/EC14467A-DFAF-4030-BDFB-9E1AAF00205E/0/boi_atlanticconveyorpt1.pdf Again some of the report has been edited out.

Glamorgan was unlucky in carrying out NGS against targets in the Port Standley area, when she strayed into the area where the Exocet Land based launcher that the Argentine Navy had built from scratch, was positioned. Programming the missiles (MM38) took a long labourious time, as this was being done without direct inputs from Radar, although an Army RASIT radar was used to give range in thousands of yards, and bearing. The ITB, or Instalación de Tiro Berreta, was a Fred Carno, Argentine equivalent of a shore based battery launcher. The exocet was programmed via a made up electronics board of fixed signals rather than a stream of data pulses. The firing circuit consisted of a button and a 9V battery! But it worked.

When the missile was fired it was being tracked on radar both in the Ops room and bridge. The Navigation officer, on the bridge gave the hard a starboard order as the ship was moving at speed. The ship had turned though some 30 degrees when the missile hit the port quarter spermwater, causing the delay proximity fuse to wind down, exploding across the flight deck, then plunging into the hangar where a fully fuelled and armed Wessex MkV was, which exploded. Interestingly Glamorgan was the only RN ship in the Falklands Conflict which was hit by an exocet that detonated.

For those of us that speak spanish, its development is detailed in the following youtube film made in 1983. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8Ch5zBQShQ At time position 3:44 the missiles are shown being fired. These are actual events as a film crew was on the Falklands with the ITB crew being directed by Cmdr J Perez, who devised the electronics part of the ITB, features in the film itself.

Interestingly when the conflict was over, 6 MM38 Exocet missiles in their cannisters were found at various locations in the Port Standley area. Had the crane not failed, maybe more MM38 exocets would have been fired?

[harry.gibbon]

SilverGiraffes and Mike H,

Many thanks for your recent posts which I have found to be most informative.

I shall dwell upon the contents of same for a little while yet before making further posts on the subject.

Thanks again.

Little h

[Silvergiraffes]

On a somewhat lighter subject I thought I would share a couple of anti exocet methods our ship trained for but thankfully never had to use.

As a last resort, if 'soft kill' measures had failed we planned to use the 4.5 inch gun to try to stop the missile. Not a direct hit of course, the plan was to pump as many shells into the sea as possible as close to our own ship as possible, hoping to create a 'curtain' of water to deflect the missile.

We also planned to use the 'Ikara' anti sub missile against manned bombers. No chance of hitting the aircraft of course but the theory was that if we put up enough smoke and flames it might put the pilots off..

Our 'brace brace brace' procedure was almost comical. The supply officer came up with:
On the command 'Brace brace brace' - put both hands on a horizontal surface (desk etc) and bunny hop taking the body weight with both arms until the 'all clear' order was given. The theory was that a lot of knee and leg injuries were caused by vibrations through the metal deck, therefore if we had our feet off the ground when the missile/bomb struck we would be less likely to suffer lower limb injuries. Of course we would have suffered the odd broken arm here and there but that was considered less dangerous. Looking back I dont think anyone really took it seriously but I am pretty sure he meant it.