USS Maine: The Start of the Spanish American War

[TheDigger]

USS Maine (ACR-1), the first ship of the United States Navy to be named for the state of Maine, was a 6682-ton second-class pre-dreadnought battleship originally designated as Armored Cruiser #1. Maine and Texas were unusual in that their armament was mounted en echelon, projected off to either side (Maine's forward turret was off to starboard and her aft turret to port; the arrangement was reversed on Texas). This severely limited their ability to fire on a broadside.

Congress authorized her construction on August 3, 1886, and her keel was laid down on October 17, 1888, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. She was launched on November 18 1889.

The sinking of the Maine on February 15, 1898 precipitated the Spanish-American War and also popularized the phrase Remember the Maine! In subsequent years, the sinking of the Maine has been an area of great speculation. The cause of the explosion that sank the ship is still a mystery that remains unsolved to this day.

The Maine spent her active career operating along the East Coast of the United States and the Caribbean. In January 1898, the Maine was sent from Key West, Florida, to Havana, Cuba, to protect U.S. interests during a time of local insurrection and civil disturbances.

Three weeks later, at 9:40 on the night of February 15, an explosion on board the Maine occurred in the Havana Harbor. Later investigations revealed that more than five tons of powder charges for the vessel's six and ten-inch guns ignited, virtually obliterating the forward third of the ship.

The remaining wreckage rapidly settled to the bottom of the harbor. Most of the Maine’s crew were sleeping or resting in the enlisted quarters in the forward part of the ship when the explosion occurred. Two hundred and sixty-six men lost their lives as a result of the explosion or shortly thereafter, and eight more died later from injuries.

Captain Charles Sigsbee and most of the officers survived because their quarters were in the aft portion of the ship. On March 28, the US Naval Court of Inquiry in Key West declared that a naval mine caused the explosion.

The explosion was a precipitating cause of the Spanish-American War that began in April 1898 and which used the rallying cry, "Remember the Maine!, To hell with Spain!" The episode focused national attention on the crisis in Cuba but was not cited by the William McKinley administration as a casus belli, though it was cited by some who were already inclined to go to war with Spain over their perceived atrocities and loss of control in Cuba.

Because of the uproar the sinking of the Maine caused in the United States, President McKinley demanded an immediate investigation into the cause of the explosions. A U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry arrived in Havana and began its investigation. Survivors and eyewitnesses testified for the court, and several navy divers explored the sunken ship, hoping to find clues as to what may have caused the disaster. All parties involved concluded without a doubt that the explosion of the forward six-inch ammunition magazines had caused the sinking.

Why those magazines had exploded, no one could determine conclusively, and doubt remains as to the exact cause to this day. There have been four major investigations into the sinking since 1898. From the four inquiries, two hypotheses have emerged: one, that a mine in Havana Harbor had exploded underneath the battleship, causing the explosion of the magazines; and two, that spontaneous combustion of the coal in bunker A16 created a fire that detonated the nearby magazines.

The day after the Maine was sunk in Havana harbor, Assistant Secretary to the Navy Theodore Roosevelt stated that “we shall never find out definitely” the cause of the disaster. Roosevelt's words have proved particularly enduring.

Without the video or audio evidence that experts have come to rely on when investigating disasters like this, the truth may never be known for certain.

Country (US)
Ordered: 3 August 1886
Laid down: 17 October 1888
Launched: 18 November 1889
Commissioned: 17 September 1895
Status: Sunk by explosion 15 February 1898
General characteristics
Displacement: 6,682 tons
Length: 319 ft (97 m)
Beam: 57 ft (17.4 m)
Draft: 22 ft (6.7 m)
Speed: 17 knots (31 km/h)
Complement: 374 officers and men
Armament: 4 × 10 in (250 mm) guns
6 × 6 in (150 mm) guns
7 × 6 pounders (3 kg)
8 × 1 pounders (0.5 kg)
4 × 14 in (350 mm) surface torpedo tubes

[Batstiger]

I came across a few glass negatives regarding the USS Maine so I thought I would refresh this thread.

Cheers, Bob.

[Linton]

The National Geographic magazine had an excellent article on the loss of the Maine.I think it would have been about 1998,but i just wish I had bought it.

[CGRET]

I was under the impression that the cause of the explosion was the coal bunkers as noted in the earlier post, The mine explanation was the least plausable of the two.


Regards
CGRET

[John Odom]

Great photos! The newspapers of the time make interesting reading. When I studied Philippine History in the Philippines, lo those many years ago, my teacher had photostats (literaly, white on black) copies of many of the US papers of the time.

[CGRET]

Here are some photo's of the Maine.

32792

32793

32794

32795

Regards
CGRET

[CGRET]

Good Morning,

For those who wish to see the actual footage of the Maine being salvaged, go to Google and then to more and select video. Type in the USS Maine in the search block. The video is very interesting to say the least.


Regards
CGRET

[Dreadnought]

I was under the impression that the cause of the explosion was the coal bunkers as noted in the earlier post, The mine explanation was the least plausable of the two.


Regards
CGRET

No so sure about that …. It is interesting ro look at some of the findings of the several inquiries, and to examine some of the theories a little deeper.

Lets look at the first theory that there was an internal explosion caused by the spontaneous conbustion of coal in bunker A16, and the resulting fire detonated the magazines that were nearby.

Points in Support:

Spontaneous combustion of coal was a fairly frequent problem on ships built after the American Civil War. Coal became oxidised when exposed to air, and began burning at 180 degrees. The theory of the internal explosion is that the heat generated from the burning coal transferred to the magazines causing an explosion. There are reports o several ships sustaining damage from coal bunker fires during the Spanish American war.

The explosion occurred around 9:40 p.m, and bunker A16 had not been inspected since 8 a.m. So there was plenty of time for a coal bunker fire to develop.

There were no accounts of anyone seeing a geyser of water thrown up during the explosion, which would have be expected if a mine had exploded underwater, and no one reported seeing any dead fish in the harbor, which again would have been expected if there had been an external blast.

The inward bending of the plates found by divers could have been caused by water displacement occurring at the same time the front of the ship was breaking away from the rear.

Points Against:

The Maine carried a type of bituminous coal (New Rivercoal) that rarely combusted.

Spontaneous combustion does not normally occur unless there is a heat source to speed up the process. Bunker A16 was not situated by a boiler or any other external heat source, and when it was inspected the morning of the disaster, the temperature was only 59 degrees Fahrenheit. The temperature sensor system did not indicate any dangerous rise in temperature on the morning of the last inspection. There were regular inspections of coal bunkers for hazards, as well as the implementation of precautions for preventing bunker fires, that were diligently carried out.

A number of witnesses stated that they heard two distinct explosions several seconds apart. If it had been simply a magazine explosion, only one blast would nave been heard. The only reason that two explosions were heard is if something besides the magazine had exploded, such as a mine.

When divers examined the bottom plates of the wreck, they reported that they were all bent inward. They also reported a large hole on the floor of Havana harbour.


----------oo0oo----------


As to the theory of the explosion being caused by a mine or torpedo; Towing torpedoes against ships was an old practice, and coud be achieved by just two men. These torpedoes were often crudely made from oil drums, boiler flues or any other metal container, packed with high explosive. They woud be mounted on wooden rafts that would float them just a few feet below the surface.

The theory that this method was employed was initated by the discovery of a tightly stretched rope running from near the floating dock, that was moored in the harbour, towards USS Maine, on the night before the explosion, and that the rope had disappeared the next morning.

It was very dark that bnight, and harbour was like a mill pond. It was speculated that two 12 foot skiffs, with two men in each, approached the the port side of the Maine, from the direction of Reiga to a range of about 300 yards where they stopped and dropped an anchor or weight to hold the torpedo. One boat then towed an uncoiling rope, taking a thousand foot radius about the stern of Maine, and then passing the rope under the ship’s hull. The Maine was only moored at the bow.

The skiff was then rowed towards the floating dock, and Casa Blanca, taking up the slack in the rope. When this was felt by those in the othe skiff waiting with the mine, they cut the anchor rope holding the mine, allowing it to advance towards Maine’s port side. The skiff’s, and their occupants, would have reached safety moments after detonation, which was achieved by a plunger, or by pulling a small line on a trigger. It would have been the plan to cut the rope so that it sunk to the bottom, leaving no evidence. However, this sems not to have been executed and the rope was found on the anchor chains of the floating dock.

[Dreadnought]

Continuing with the causes of the explosions on board the Maine .../

The Evidence

At 10.00 pm on the evening of the explosion Captain Sigsbee’s was just leaving the wrecked ship and was asked by reporters whether the magazines had gone up. He replied “It is impossible that the magazines could explode.” This was the only statement he ever gave on the matter. But this did beg the question as to whether the main forward magazine was still intact, something that, at the time, was not certain.

It was at daybreak the next morning, when the state of the Maine became clearer, that doubts were raised about the theory of the magazine explosion being the cause of the disaster.

Everything movable or wrenched apart had been thrown from the port side of the ship to the starboard side, which was inconsistent with the big magazine exploding. The aft end of the ship was canted to port, and slewed away as it would have been had it been impacted from that side.

Three men had been sleeping in a cutter moored to the starboard boom of the Maine, less than thirty feet from the large magazine, and escaped virtually unscathed. They would have surely been killed had it exploded. Another crew member had been sleeping over the forward six inch service magazine, and had also survived. Although his powder-holder was too far forward to produce the effects observed, it did suggest that it hadn’t exploded.

If the large magazine had indeed exploded, the whole of the water front at Havana would have been wrecked, and the Maine would have completely disappeared. Some filled, unexploded 10-inch powder cases had been brought up from the vicinity of the large magazine, and it was declared that it would have been impossible for them to explode without the magazine going up, and in any event, had they done so, the aft magazines would have exploded as well as those forward, and Maine would have been totally destroyed. In fact, no debris fell on upon the nearest point – the Machina wharf. The only sign on shore resulting from the explosion, other than in the line of post to starboard, were a few gas street lamps put out, and some mirrors broken. But in that port/starboard line, debris was thrown over a quarter of a mile into Casa Blanca.

Divers subsequently inspecting the wreck found that the floor of the big magazine, and large parts of the walls were almost intact. The 10-inch shells that had been stacked between the 10-ich powder-room and the reserve magazine were found to be unexploded, and had been thrown into the powder-room form left to right. There were also many of these shells in the loading room, just above the powder. Had it exploded, Havana’s waterfront would have been covered with fragments of them.

Both 10-inch and 6-in powder cases were found empty, burned and discoloured. Experts stated that they could have exploded, or might just have acquired this appearance due to an exterior force or fire. Some had clearly bee split open by pressure on the ends. This adds to suspicions of an interior explosion.

It was discovered that the reserve magazine (containing saluting powder) probably did explode, and that empty powder cases of both sizes were kept there. Experts stated that the ton of black powder stored there could not alone have so wrecked the ship. By this time the innocence of the big magazines had been thoroughly determined and it had been discovered also that there might have been a few loaded six-inch shells in the reserve magazine which would aid in the general destruction to some extent, and would account for some of the apparently exploded six-inch cases found.

The turret was found with its thin top unburned. Had the big magazine under it exploded the top would have been ripped open or blown to splinters.

Much of the fixed ammunition discovered in this magazine was immediately forward of the big ten-inch powder room, big-shell room and the reserve magazines. The second explosion was just between these and the six-inch service magazine away forward in the very eyes of the ship.

Most of the cartridges found were whole but some were exploded. All had primers in them: evidently some had been hit thereon and some had not. Much of the exploded six-pounder and one-pounder ammunition probably was what remained of the liberal supply of it that the alert Capt. Sigsbee had about the decks for ready use in case of a night attack. The fact was fixed that but little destructive force had come from the “fixed ammunition” magazine.

US Navy divers found that the bodies forward of the rear magazines were not mangled by the explosion, but all were, with arms up stretched toward the beams over their hammocks, in an evident effort to jump out. This seemed to confirm the double explosion testified to by passengers of the steamerCity of Washington. The men were caught by the rushing in of the water, then the big explosion broke up the ship, too quickly for them to more than reach upward.

-------oo0oo-------

The Other Theories

Other pieces of evidence also suggested that some of the other theories were misplaced:

The boiler explosion theory was finally dismissed, because the boilers under steam that night were found intact in the part of the ship that had remained in one piece.

The spontaneous combustion of coal theory was now completely thrown out, as the coal itself was found by divers
intact and unburned.

The gun-cotton explosion theory had been dismissed long before, as the gun-cotton was stored in the after, intact portion of the wreck.

The electric contact theory was not considered, because where the wires went through the coal bunkers the coal was found undamaged and no wires touched the magazines.

-------oo0oo-------

The Bottom Plate

A protruding plate was identified completely as being a bottom plate from the port side of the keel about frame No. 17 from the bow to the stern, and at about the ship’s second longitudinal and second fore and aft keel, counting from the middle of the bottom toward the port side. This plate and the corresponding plate of the Maine’s inner bottom were proved to have been driven upward by some tremendous force which could not have come from the interior of the ship, for into the same interior, as well as upward, had they been driven. They had, however, been close to the reserve magazine and the shock which tore them up seemed to have detonated the primers of the several boxes of loaded brass saluting cartridges which that iron room contained and that explosion seemed to have fired the ton of powder also stored there. Just such an occurrence would have given to the bottom plate its peculiar curl outward.

The discovery of the plates seemed to absolutely clinch all previous evidence that the Maine had been torpedoed or mined against the port bottom, well forward.

Position of the Ram

US Navy Divers confirmed that the Maine was broken in two from a blow against the port side. The ram was found out of line, and the Spanish divers found the starboard bow anchor just where it should be had the ship slewed about from a shock. The US Navy divers found the port bow anchor in its proper relative position. The peculiar direction of the intact portion of the wreck was then explained. The mooring chain aided in holding the ram and part of the bow in the original position, while other parts of the ship were blown off to one side. The Spanish divers found the Maine’s starboard bow intact from under the bow anchor to “the dead lights,” or within forty feet of the point of the ram. They claim to have found a big hole where the extreme bow and the ram ought to be.

[Dreadnought]

Let’s now move on to the results of the various inquiries.

Spanish Investigation Commission (1898)
Conducted by Del Peral and De Salas, collected evidence from officers of naval artillery who had examined the remains of Maine.

Finding: The explosion on the Maine was caused internally, probably due to an accident. Witnesses heard a sharp explosion (not dull concussion) and saw no geyser.

The conclusions of the report were not reported by the Amercican pres at the time.

The Samson Board of Inquiry (1898)
Headed by Captain William T. Sampson, United States Navy. Employed divers, photographic evidence, and eyewitness testimony.

Finding: The Mainehad been blown up by a mine, which in turn caused the explosion of her forward magazines. “The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maineupon any person or persons.”

They reached this conclusion based on the fact that the majority of witnesses had heard two explosions and that part of the keel was bent inwards. The official report from the board, which was presented to the Navy Department in Washington, D.C. on 21 March, specifically stated the following:

“At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel is bent at an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. [...] In the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship."

Vreeland Court of Inquiry (1911)
Headed by Rear Admiral Charles E. Vreeland, United States Navy. The reasons for this were the recovery of the bodies of the victims so they could be buried in the United States and a desire for a more thorough investigation. The fact that the Cuban government wanted the wreck removed from the harbour of Havana might also have played a role.

The US Army Corps of Engineers built a massive cofferdam, sank huge pylons, then pumped out seawater and exposed the wreck. The Vreeland team took and numbered pictures of the explosion area. Satisfied, they hauled the wreck out to sea and buried bodies at ArlingtonNationalCemetery.

Finding: The explosion of the magazines on the Maine was triggered by an external blast, but the damage to the ship was much more extensive than the Sampson Board had thought. The blast occurred further aft on the ship. The Vreeman Board also found that the bending of frame 18 was caused by the explosion of the magazines, not by the external explosion

Rickover Investigation (1976)
Began as a result of interest on the part of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (“father of the nuclear navy”), United States Navy. Mr. Ib S. Hansen of the David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and DevelopmentCenter and Mr. Robert S. Price of the NavalSurfaceWeaponsCenter volunteered to look at the evidence.Information was from the two official inquiries, newspapers, personal papers and information on the construction and ammunition of Maine.

Finding: The explosion of the magazines was caused by a coal bunker fire, which had heated the magazines to the point of explosion. “There is no evidence that a mine destroyed the Maine.”

National Geographic Investigation (1999)
National Geographic commissioned this study by Advanced Marine Enterprises which conducts warship design studies for the US Navy. This investigation, wascarried out to commemorate the centennial of the sinking of Maine, and computer modelling and heat transfer engineering studies.

Finding: "while a spontaneous combustion in a coal bunker can create ignition-level temperatures in adjacent magazines, this is not likely to have occurred on the Maine, because the bottom plating identified as Section 1 would have blown outward, not inward," and "The sum of these findings is not definitive in proving that a mine was the cause of sinking of the Maine, but it does strengthen the case in favor of a mine as the cause."



Maine_1:
Members of the Navy Court of Inquiry examining Ensign Wilfrid V. Powelson, on board the U.S. Light House Tender Mangrove, in Havana Harbor, Cuba, circa March 1898.

Those seated around the table include (from left to right): Captain French E. Chadwick, Captain William T. Sampson, Lieutenant Commander William P. Potter, Ensign W.V. Powelson, Lieutenant Commander Adolph Marix.

Original photograph copied from Uncle Sam's Navy, 12 April 1898.

NHHC Collection NH #46764

[Dreadnought]

After the Explosion

When the Maine went down on February the 15th 1898, the bodies of many of the 260 Americans killed were not recovered. In the following years, there were many representations to recover the bodies, and on May the 9th 1910, the United States Snate and House of Representatives passed legislation, directing the Secretary of War to raise and remove the Maine from Havana harbour, and to ensure the proper internment of the bodies in ArlingtonNationalCemetery. The legislation also directed that the ship’s mast be removed and erected at Arlington, near the victims who died in the disaster. The Cuban Government were to give their full co-operation in raising and removing the Maine; they wanted it removed, claiming it was an eyesore and a danger to shipping.

In order to allow for the removal of the remains of the ship, it was decided to build a coffer dam around the wreck and then pump out the water inside. This would allow the bodies to be recovered and removal of the debris so that hulk could repaired and refloated. It also allowed engineers to carry out a full inspection to once and for all ascertain what caused the ship to explode.

The conditions for the construction of the cofferdam were formidable. The average depth of the water around the wreck was about 35 feet. Below the bottom of the water was an additional depth of 30 feet of fluid mud. Below this mud, at a depth of approximately 65 feet was stiff clay. Below the stiff clay, at a depth of 98 feet to 118 feet was rock. Fortunately, the change in tide in the area was only about 18-inches. The wreck not only sunk in the 30 feet of water, but it also settled into the soft mud until the keel was no less than 42 feet below the water surface.

The engineers concluded that the cofferdam must have interior horizontal dimensions of 350 feet by 170 feet, and it must be capable of resisting the pressures developed by the differential levels of water and mud when the cofferdam was dewatered to a depth of fifty feet. With the great interior dimensions, interior bracing would be difficult and costly, so it was determined to design the structure to the extent that interior bracing could be reduced to a minimum.

The cofferdam was designed to consist of 20 component cylinders, each 50 feet in diameter, made of interlocking steel sheet piling, and placed nearly tangent to each other. To provide closure between the cylinders, short arcs of piling were driven adjacent to the cylinders, spanning horizontally from one cylinder to the next. These arcs were connected into the cylinders by using three way interconnecting piles. All interlocking sheet piling consisted of members 12 ¾“ wide. The piling was proposed to be 75 feet long, and to be driven into the stiff clay bottom. Then with the completed 50 foot diameter cylinders being filled with earth, it was proposed in design, and hoped, that each cylinder would be self-supporting against the external mud and water pressures. Because of the inconvenience of shipping the 75-foot lengths of pile, half of them were made up of 50 foot and 25 foot lengths, and the other half 40 foot and 35 foot lengths which would provide alternating locations of joints in the adjacent piles after the separate units were spliced together. The piling was manufactured and provided by Lackawanna Steel Company, and was guaranteed to stand a strain of 9700 pounds per lineal inch in the interlock connections.

It was pre-calculated that the piles should penetrate ten feet into the stiff clay, and extend 5 feet above the mean low water level. However, the piles penetrated deeper into the hard clay than expected, so it was determined to drive all steel piles to a depth so that 2 ½ feet of piling extended above the mean water level. Wood piles were then to be driven into the fill inside the cylinders along the inside face of the cylinder to extend the freeboard higher for protection against higher water levels caused by wave action.

Heavy equipment was required to proceed with the work. The Cuban government loaned the use of a 50-ton floating derrick, a pile driver, and a number of barges. Two other barges were purchased, and another borrowed from the United States Navy.

To begin the work of driving the piles to construct the cylinders, the location of all twenty cylinders were marked. A Timber pile was driven at the location of the centre of each cylinder. This pile supported a floating half circle form, which provided the alignment for the piles for the cylinder. The piles were then carefully driven vertically against this form.

The piling sections weighed 40 pounds per lineal foot. The first pile was driven on December 6, 1910. When the piles were set up to be driven, some of them extended as much as 40 feet above the water level, making it difficult to hold the steam hammer on the piles. False leads were improvised to aid in stabilizing these piles. During most of the pile driving operation, the wind was very strong and sometimes bent the piles as they initially extended way above the water level. The pile drivers used were two No. 3 Arnott steam hammers weighing 3700 pounds each, one Vulcan steam hammer with the weight of the hammer being slightly more than the Arnott hammer, and one Monarch steam hammer which also had a weight slightly more than the Arnott hammer. Occasionally piles while being driven encountered debris from the Maine, such as the foremast, a gun turret, and one of the MAINE’s large anchors. Pile driving was stopped until these items were brought to the surface. As the 50-foot diameter cylinders were finished, they were filled with earth to make them stable, and to provide the required overturning resistance to support the horizontal force of the proposed water level differential.

Very tough, hard, heavy clay from a shoal within a few hundred feet of the site of the cofferdam was used to fill the cylinders. The clay in the shoal was so stiff that the first dredge tried was unable to dredge the material. A 20-inch suction dredge was finally obtained and was able to dredge the clay. This dredge removed the clay from the shoal then deposited it inside the cylinders. An additional 24000 cubic yards of clay was placed around the outside of the dam.

To keep from distorting the cylinders, the fill was placed uniformly in them by moving from one cylinder to another, and by maintaining a uniform depth at all times around the cylinder. The stability of the cylinders was dependent on the solidity of the fill within them. The stiff clay, when dredged, mixed with water and required time to consolidate inside the cylinders. After a short time, the surface of the fill seemed firm, but there was still excessive moisture in the cylinders. It was determined that by pumping water from within the cofferdam in stages, then waiting for a time, the water inside the cylinders would also drain allowing further consolidation within the cylinders. The high water saturation of the fill proved to be a continuing problem in the operation, however, as all problems developed, the very capable and enterprising engineers in charge always arrived at a countering condition to solve the problems.

During the filling operations, several cylinders developed ruptures at some of the interlocking joints of the piles. These failures were repaired, and on June the 5th, 1911, with all twenty cylinders filled, the cofferdam was considered finished and ready for dewatering.

For dewatering the cofferdam, two electrically driven centrifugal pumps, one 8-inch and one 12-inch were mounted on floats within the dam, with their discharge hoses across the dam. The capacities of the pumps were 1800 gallons per minute for the 8-inch pump and 4200 gallons per minute for the 12-inch pump, against a 65-foot head of water.

The water in the cofferdam was lowered in successive stages of five feet, holding it for nine days to allow the cylinders to drain. The cylinders were not as stable as calculated because of the unanticipated water within the fill inside the cylinders. In an effort to further stabilize the cylinders, some of the fill from the inside half of the cylinders was removed and piled on the outside half of the cylinder. This also removed some of the pressure from the inside wall of the cylinder.

When the water inside the cofferdam was lowered by 15 feet, the dewatering was stopped and careful measurements of the tops of the cylinders taken. The measurements across the top of the dam, between cylinders F and P, gradually decreased by 32 inches. That meant that the cylinders were either tilting inward, or sliding inward. To counter this movement, 4200 cubic yards of stone was dumped inside the dam at the bottoms of the cylinders to form a stone toe inside the dam. By continuously monitoring the distance across the dam from opposite cylinders, it could be determined which cylinders were moving the most. Additional stone was added to the toe as necessary. Stone was also piled on top of the fill in the outer half of the cylinders to shift the center of gravity of the cylinder outward thereby providing more stability. The total volume of stone place in this operation was 14,900 cubic yards.

Because of the continuing movement of the cylinders, there was serious concern about the stability of the dam. This movement was much more than anticipated. No risks could be taken, so a system of bracing was used inside the dam to support the insides of the cylinders against overturning. These braces consisted of a series of 12” x 12” timbers, attached together, from cylinder wall to the side of the hull of the intact portion of the sunken ship. In the area of the forward portion of the ship, which was completely demolished, the bracing consisted of a series of 14’ X 14” timbers spanning the entire interior width of the dam, from cylinder to cylinder. These timbers were laterally braced along their lengths with wooden piles, and with anchor cables to portions of the wreck. To spread the load of these braces against the side of the cylinders, a mass of concrete, vertically supported by wooden piles, was placed between the braces and the wall of the cylinder.

With the stabilizing of the dam completed, removal of water and mud from inside the cofferdam continued. First the mud was hydraulic [liquid] enough that it could be removed by pumping, then it became more solid and had to be removed by other means. The mud around and on the wreck was removed by shovelling and sluicing. Some was removed in buckets. However, all mud was washed through screens to search for, and recover, human remains and personal belongings. The mud on and around the destroyed portion of the wreck was removed by derrick boat and dump boxes. Some mud inside the cofferdam was relocated to areas within the cofferdam where wreckage had been removed.

Pressure of water forced water through the interlocked joints of the cylinder piles. To counter this, wells were installed to a depth of fifty feet in the centre of the cylinders. By pumping the water from these wells, the leakage was abated.

Because the tops of the steel piles of the cylinders were only about 18 inches above the water level, the winds and adjacent moving boats allowed water to overtop the cylinders and enter the clay fill inside the cylinders. This water was detrimental to the stability of the cylinders. Holes were drilled through the cylinder walls on the inside of the dam to allow the water inside the cylinders to drain.

When designed, it was expected that there would be some yielding of the component cylinders, but it was hoped that the stiff filling inside would make them sufficiently stable. The cylinders displayed much more flexibility than had been expected. This was attributed to the plasticity of the filling inside the cylinder. The piles were apparently well anchored into the stiff clay at the bottom to resist against sliding of the cylinders. However, the cofferdam, as constructed and braced was adequate to resist the pressures of the mud and water adjacent to it.

Upon completion of dewatering the cofferdam, and the removal of the mud, the removal of the wreckage began. Forward of frame 41, which is slightly forward of amidships, the ship was completely destroyed. The after portion of the ship was intact. It was determined to place a temporary bulkhead across the ship at the point of the break, at frame 41. The debris of the forward portion of the wreck was cut up into pieces, then lifted out with derrick boats. The debris was loaded on barges, towed to sea, and thrown overboard. The maximum weight of any such piece was about 10 tons, and average weight about 2 tons.

The two 10-inch guns, weighing about 29 tons each, were lifted by a gin pole, then drawn up a greased incline to the top of cylinder E. These guns and parts of the turret were later placed ashore and given to the Cuban government to be incorporated into a Maine memorial in Havana.

The intact portion of the ship was to be bulkheaded and repaired to the extent necessary to allow her to float. A wooden athwartship bulkhead was constructed at frame 41. It was composed of a single thickness of 3-inch plank, placed vertically and supported against 10” x 10” horizontal timbers which were spaced to suit the water pressures. The 10” x 10” horizontals were backed by 10” x 10” vertical timbers spaced from 3 foot to 5 foot centres and braced to the framing of the ship, and to the boilers, and other points. The top of the vertical 3” planks were made flush with the main deck. The bottoms of the planks were spiked to a sill bolted to the bottom plating, and backed with concrete.

The horizontal timbers supporting the planks were x-braced. The joints between planks were caulked with oakum. All areas between planking and the steel hull were carefully made watertight. Additional bracing of the bulkhead was made by using metal tie rods, which also tied all components of the hull and deck together. The bulkheading was carried around the sides above the armour belt as far as the plating had been blown out. The resultant bulkhead was practically watertight.

On January the 26th of 1912, when the bulkhead was nearly completed, the water in the cofferdam was allowed to rise a few feet. To free the hull of the ship from the suction of the mud beneath, a series of holes six-inches in diameter were cut through the bottom of the ship next to the keel. A watertight flange was placed and connected at each hole. The opening was reduced to two inches, and a system of two inch piping was connected to each. Water pressure through these holes served to clear the mud under the ship as water was let into the cofferdam to float the ship. When the water in the cofferdam reached 19 feet, the ship broke away from the bottom and was floating. Temporary braces supporting the cofferdam either broke away, or were removed as the ship rose. As the water in the cofferdam was raised, pressure on the cylinders was diminishing.

After the intact portion of the wreck had been floated, the procedure of removing the piling and fill material was begun to allow an exit for the floated wreck. An opening was made in the easterly wall of the cofferdam. Removing the first piles of each cylinder was difficult, requiring an upward pull of from 160 tons to 240 tons to remove the first pile in each cylinder. The remaining piles pulled more easily. When the opening was made through the easterly wall of the cofferdam, the wreck was towed out stern first to decrease pressure on the temporary bulkhead.

On March the16th, 1912 at 2:00 p.m., amidst somber cannon salutes and tolling bells, the wreck was towed out to sea by a United States tug, Osceola, and steadied by two other tugs. A solitary figure remained on the wreck, dressed in a black suit. The figure was that of "Dynamite Johnny" O'Brien, an early arms smuggler/supplier for the Cuban Insurrectionists, adventurer, and now a respected member of the Corps of Port Pilots of Havana. A large U.S. flag was placed on a temporary mast, and the deck was strewn with roses. As the vessel moved, tens of thousands of silent people lined the waterfront. The Maine passed between an honour guard of American and Cuban vessels with crews at attention. As the vessel approached open water, the band on the USS North Carolina played somber music.

Maine was followed by the North Carolina, which held the flag-draped coffins of the 36 crewman who had been found aboard the Maine’s rusting hulk. The crewmens' remains were placed under the supervision of the their former chaplain, now monsignor, John Chidwick, who had presided over the funerals of their comrades fourteen years earlier. After having reached a point beyond the three-mile limit, the actual sinking was carried out in exact accordance with the prearranged plan. A party went aboard and opened valves in prearranged openings in the bottom, opened sluice gates in the temporary bulkhead, and five sliding gates in the bulkhead. It took nine minutes to perform this operation, and for the party to leave the ship.

The wreck disappeared into 620 fathoms of water 41 minutes after the opening of the valves and gates. As she went down to the ocean bottom, air pressure exploded the her decks and spray shot into the air.

At the location of the cofferdam, the remaining piles were pulled in 112 days. Additional wreckage of the ship was found, cut up, and removed. All fill material was removed, and the area dredged and carefully swept to a depth of 37.5 feet in the presence of representatives of the Cuban government and declared free of obstructions.

All work was completed by December the 2nd, 1912. The total cost of the project was $ 900,000. The total recovered remains of what was believed to be about 75 persons were buried at Arlington National Cemetery as directed.

In October 2000, Ernesto Tapanes, Paulina Zelitzky and other crew of the Exploramar Cuban team. On board the Cuban research vessel Ulises, discovered the well-preserved, but broken up, hull of USS Maine, three miles off the Cuban coast at a depth of 1150 metres.

Zelitsky's Toronto-based company, Advanced Digital Communications, had been working with Cuban scientists and oceanographers from the University of South Florida College of Marine Science on underwater exploration technology. Zelitsky and her colleagues weren't looking for the Maine, but practically tripped over it at 3,700 feet while testing their Exploramar scanning system.

Zelitsky took underwater video of the wreck that showed it in very dark water with a bluish tint, with the grey hulk of metal and various superstructure features, such as doors and hatches. It also showed the anchor chain, the shape of the propellers and the holes where the bow was cut off. There was a boiler lying next to the wreck, and what appeared to be coal strewn about.''


Maine_3: USS Maine Memorial at Arlington Cemetery. Photograph by Michael Bilodeau (http://www.panoramio.com/user/4733977?with_photo_id=50181029)

[emason]

Thank you Clive for a very interesting account of the raising of the USS Maine. I found it difficult to understand how so many "experts" could come to so different conclusions. It was as though they ignored half the evidence.

I love the technical detail of the building of the coffer dams. For some unknown reason, structures like bridges and dams being built always fascinated me.

Thanks once again.

[Don Boyer]

Really excellent posts by all, and the account of the 1911 salvage is really good, thanks to all.

For those who may be interested in more digging into the Maine tragedy, there is a really excellent old book out there -- "The 'Maine': An Account of Her Destruction in Havana Harbor" a personal narrative of Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, USN. T. Fisher Unwin, publishers, London 1899. The appendices include the full findings of the US court of inquiry, Ensign Powelson's report on the cause of the explosion, the findings of the Spanish court of instruction and a complete crew list of those aboard the ship along with a list of the deaths.

Written shortly after the events, the book presents one of the best "I was there" accounts of any tragic non-wartime naval event I've read.

Of course the true cause still remains a bit of a mystery. If it was a mine, why would the Spanish set themselves up for such a disaster, certain to bring war? Did the Cubans do it in order to cause just that? On the one hand the Spanish had the expertise to carry it off but lacked any real motivation during a time of peace when they had so many problems of their own. On the other, it's highly debatable that the Cubans could do it, but the motivation was certainly there. Or was it a coal fire or deteriorating powder? Personally, my own feelings tend to the latter, but then there is the matter of the fact that the Fates could not possibly have picked a worse time or location for such an event to occur -- which might go a long way to explaining why they were called "Fates." It's one thing for a tragedy like the explosion of HMS Vanguard to happen in Scapa Flow, but what if it had happened on a courtesy visit to a German port like during Kiel Week in 1912 or 13?

[Old Hoodoo]

The traditional theoretical causes of the Maine explosion have been discussed for years and have been covered in this forum. However I am requesting help on formulating the theory touched on by the Spanish in their report but completely ignored as far as tell by all inquiries I find out, that spontaneous combustion partially due to poor ventilation was the real "trigger". I am requesting focus ONLY on this "theory", any other questions can be answered by searching the forum.

What I see as the smoking gun of the Maine was the painting of coal bunkers B-4, B-5, and B-6 while the vessel was sitting in Havana harbor. During a period of Maine's inactivity, these bunkers and the shafts leading to them were "scaled" and painted. The process started 14 to 10 days before the explosion, no evidence of when the process ended is available, but the bunkers were still empty at the time of the explosion.

It is well known that ships had fires from paint related combustables before that time, either from spontaneous combustion of dryer or paint soaked rags,
sparks igniting fumes, etc, etc. Paint was violatile then, and very few safety protocols were in place other than keeping combustibles stored in a single place, in the case of the Maine, in the rear of the ship. The Spanish report mentioned such incidents as a possible cause of ignition, something that could have quickly communication to the magazine. I have never been satisfied with the the investigations done so far and my mind keeps coming back to those empty coal bunkers with curing wet paint....

Without I have tried to add up known facts about the lack of ventilation of the Maine without going off into assumptions. The process continues. I apologize if indeed I break my own rule about assumptions.

Facts:

1. Testimony by Charles Howell of the Maine states that the coal bunkers b-3,b-4,b-5 and b-6 were empty at the time of the explosion due to being scaled and painted in a process that started 10-14 days before the explosion.
2. There was cursory testimony that all paint was properly locked up in the stern of the ship.
3. Ventilation in ships of this era was relatively poor, the Maine was a very obsolescent design for pre-dreds, the first large steel warship made in America along with the USS Texas. It is well known the Texas had many faults, and although it was different in independent design than the Maine, the ships shared the same problems in that they were "experimental" and it was a constant process was needed on the Texas to get it fully operational. The Texas at best was an uncomfortable ship, being very hot in the lower decks...The Maine, it is well known, sat lower in the bow than the stern, even Captain Sigsbee mentioned this. It had a slight tilt forward. The Maine, like the Texas were relatively new "old" ships, with a very protracted and tortuous construction period. They were not "class" ships so there was no interchange of information when problems developed in one ship that could lead to corrections in other. Electricity was still relatively new in these type ships and the Texas and the Maine were the "experimentals" in electrifying bigger ships.
4. The Maine kept only the two aft boilers lit and in these the pressure was kept low. I have not yet studied much the ventilation systems of the Maine,
but I did run across testimony that suggested that ventilation to the bunkers was passive.
5. Ventilation was not helped by the fact that the Maine was stationary and also was not subject to breeze. The wind in Havana harbor died down to nothing at night.
6. Sigsbee kept the ship in a state of being ready for action on a 24 hour basis consistent with not irritating the Spanish. It was standard practice in these ships (and documented during the blockade of Santiago) to keep the portholes closed in case of torpedo/mines in order to minimize the risk of at least a fast sinking. It is not documented if Sigsbee went that far...at night it would have been more likely to keep the portholes shut as threats were more likely to occur.
7. There is significant documentation paint fume explosions through out the Maritime industry even today. Safety standards have obviously been improved but ignition still occurs.
8. Although paint materials can combust spontaneously in
9. Cork was used to seal doors in this period. I don't have enough information on how airtight were the magazines, the fact that they were inspected on a consistent basic shows that they generally had air transferring so any fumes and such in the forward part of the ship would tend to mix in the air. Cork, especially cork that is compressed and released a lot is not the most flexible material.
10. If the testimony can be believed and we all know that no one lies under oath :-) the coal bunker fire or explosion is highly unlikely to have occurred. It could have occurred, we are talking most likely sources of ignition.

Questions:

Are there any other "facts" that might support (or refute) the likelihood of a paint or other combustible spontaneously combusting or a spark from a cigarette, electrical switch, be possible or at least more likely than spontaneous combustion of coal?

Am I correct in presuming that coal dust would not have migrated to the magazine so even a dust explosion would be an unlikely igniter of the magazine?

If the Coal Bunker painting was being done over a period of time, does it seem likely that combustibles could have been kept in the bunkers while the work was still being done?

Would a combustible incident have been something the Navy did not want discussed in that period? Any internal explosion would suggest incompetency, negligence, mistake, or lack of knowledge...all embarrassing to the navy, but would that be enough to at least not want to explore other possible causes if a more palatable cause could be found?

We have all learned, but it was not so clear in 1898, that disasters often occur when something happens that would not ordinarilly trigger the disaster runs into a serious of conditions that then leads to the catastrophe. Could not have a cascade of conditions that combined to seal the Maine's fate, conditions that only occurred because of the Maine being positioned in Havana harbor?

Every time we have a disaster there is always immediate hysterical claims of sabotage or exterior causes...sometimes it is that, but usually it takes significant investigation by trained investigators to find the truth.

I am not arguing against the other theories, I want to try to refute or elevate this possibility. The mine and coal bunker theories have been discussed ad nauseum. I believe there are answers, but we have not gotten there yet, but I also believe that no truly unbiased investigation of the Maine explosion has yet occurred. I think the answer lies in history, we just have not dug deep enough yet.

Some people say that the Maine is history, that the cause of the explosion is not important today....I say the truth is always important, searching for the truth teaches us how to learn and apply the past to the future.

I don't think the history of the Maine is done yet. I'm asking for your help.

[Old Hoodoo]

I am having a tough time pinning down the secondary armament of the Maine.

Accounts differ:

Some say 7 6 pounders
Others, including Captain Sigsbee say 6 Driggs-Schroeder six pounders. I have yet to confirm the identity of the 6 pounder at Columbia, South Carolina state house (it's on the Gervais street side of the State house block, accross from the Supreme Court building. It is has been misidentified as a Mark III which would be a Hotchkiss, but the marking used to identify it is the ID stamped into the brass of the mount, which is indeed a Mark III (the weight stamping of 608lbs confirms this)-- both Hotchkiss and Driggs-Schroeders tubes weighed about 800 pounds. The actual markings of the gun have not been documented--(a good project).
I saw a drawing of the period (not the official constructors drawings) with eight six pounders Id'd.

There is less disagreement about the 1 pound RF guns...4 Hotchkiss and 4 Driggs-Schroeders....it was not uncommon to mix types, they fired the same ammo.

The NY Times a the time of the sinking says that the Maine had two revolving cannons and two gatling guns. It is HIGHLY likely that the Maine was not issued Colt M1895 (potato digger) Machine guns yet as most ships didn't get them until just before the war or just after it started.

Sigsbee says the armament was four "Gatling" "Machine Guns". He doesn't mention revolving cannon.

The Texas's armament is well documented from primary sources and it was a similar in size although of course not identical ship. 12 six pounders (10 Driggs-Schroeders, 2 Hotchkiss), I am embarrassed to say I can't remember off hand how many 1 pounder rapid fire guns but they were all Driggs-Schroeders, and 4 37mm (1 pounder) revolving cannon and two Colt 1895 Machine guns--she was issued two in April 1898, after the Maine explosion.

It would seem logical the Maine would have been issued some revolving cannon and would have had two rifle caliber Gatling guns (for a ship of the size of the Maine four rifle caliber Gatling guns would seem unlikely). The NY Times article is the only secondary source I have that specifically mentions the revolving cannon.

More proof is needed. The 1/48th constructor drawing of ships in this era normally can be relied on to show great detail even in the armament, allowing for identification, even to showing the difference in the breeches of the Hotchkiss and Driggs-Schroeders.
I think the plans of the Maine might still be in the national archives at College Park. That is where I found the USS Texas's plans some years ago. Unfortunately I do not have easy access to the repository area. One day the plans might be "Egooglized".

Anyone have access to non-secondary sources for the Maine? I have never studied her that closely. By non-secondary, I mean official reports relative to the armament (not generalizations), the original constructors plans--the ones drawn up after completion of the ship, or statements of individuals or companies involved with the armament. I consider Captain Sigsbee a secondary source as his information was provided post destruction of the Maine. Of course he might be right, I just don't know what HE meant when he stated "machine guns". Was he lumping the revolving cannon and Gatling guns together as they fired under the same principle, or was the Maine actually equipped with no revolving cannon with maybe an extra pair of gatling guns to supplement. The Maine, as designed as a armored cruiser might have had different armament needs than the only comparable ship the Texas.

[Don Boyer]

"The 'Maine': An Account of Her Destruction in Havana Harbor" (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1899) by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, USN. Appendix A, "Technical Description of the Maine," page 199:

"The secondary battery consisted of seven six-pounder Driggs-Schroeder rapid fire guns, four one-pounder Hotchkiss, four one-pounder Driggs-Schroeder and four machine guns (Gatling)."

If this helps any...the information in this appendix was drawn almost entirely from a paper by Chief Engineer A.W. Morley printed in the Journal of the Society of American Engineers, February, 1895 titled "Contract Trial of the United States Armored Cruiser Maine." Record copies of that journal exist in a lot of naval library sources and might provide even more detail if you can find it.

Regards,

[Old Hoodoo]

I apparently misread Sigsbee's information. I may have reversed the sources. Not having everything laid out in front of me and not having two screens makes it tougher (the curse of laptops...one step forward, half a step back). Early in the war the war the navy clearly listed the type of armament of each ship right down to the newly installed Colt Machine guns, the Maine was not on there of course. Assuming Sigsbee is correct, I am curious where that extra six pounder would be located with three on the front castle and three in the back. Maybe between the funnels? To me four revolving cannon would be "right" but I can see one fore and aft on top of center castle. I call them castles because the Maine reminds me of a Carrack.

[Don Boyer]

Based on my research on the USS Baltimore, the light guns such as revolving cannon and Gatlings were moved about as needed. I know for example on Baltimore the Gatlings could be mounted in the fore and main tops, on deck or on some of the ships boats depending on need, and they also had on board the gun carriages for those weapons for duty on shore. As to the secondary battery, The-Bluepring[dot]com has most plans from those steel navy ships available.

[Old Hoodoo]

"The 'Maine': An Account of Her Destruction in Havana Harbor" (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1899) by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, USN. Appendix A, "Technical Description of the Maine," page 199:

"The secondary battery consisted of seven six-pounder Driggs-Schroeder rapid fire guns, four one-pounder Hotchkiss, four one-pounder Driggs-Schroeder and four machine guns (Gatling)."

If this helps any...the information in this appendix was drawn almost entirely from a paper by Chief Engineer A.W. Morley printed in the Journal of the Society of American Engineers, February, 1895 titled "Contract Trial of the United States Armored Cruiser Maine." Record copies of that journal exist in a lot of naval library sources and might provide even more detail if you can find it.

Regards,

Brassey's 1897 says 8 six pounders, and the plans I have seen seem to confirm a six pounder bow stinger, but in don't see it in photos but at times the photos are hard to interpret. The builders model doesn't have it. So seven fits with two forward, two at the bridge an three aft. Thanks.

[Don Boyer]

That was the fit I came up with, looking at some rather fuzzy "deck plans" none of which agreed totally with each other, Alan.
Regards,

[Admiral Von Gerlach]

It is well known or was a while ago when more surviving naval officers of the steam era were around that coal can combust and did for some ships one being a British Armoured Cruiser which exploded from such while in port in the UK.

Sorry to not have more detailed info on this, havent thought about it for a long time and have been away from the forum for some time. I approve of your interest and you summarize the data well. I frankly believe the USS Maine was lost due to an internal explosion but it was used for political purposes.

[CGRET]

The cause of the USS Maine explosion as stated in earlier fact finding boards and another inquiry was held by Adm Rickover reopened the case. You can read the results here:

http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/navalbattles1800s/p/ussmaine.htm

Here is what the Library of Congress hold on file concerning the USS Maine. NOTE: in PDF format.

http://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/Maine.1898.pdf

Here are some construction and equipment arrangement details about the USS Maine:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Maine_(ACR-1)

Regards
charles

[cadillac811]

AL, Re your post #1 on the Maine explosion. Combustion of paint chips especially if left in a pile in an unventilated warship in the Tropics is quite possible. The paint breaks down and paints of the time were made up of inflamable chemicals. The temp below decks had to be over 100-110 degrees. I remember a while back a documentary on cable that put forth the theory that a fire in an ajoining compartment heated up the bulkhead enough so that the powder stored against the other side of the bulkhead smoldered and then caught fire. BOOM! It's entirley possible. I also remember reading that when the great liner RMS Mauratania (1907) was broken up that workers were shocked to find great heaps of flamable paint chips behind paneling, ceilings and bulkhead walls making her a literal fire trap. So it can happen. I look forward to more from you on this. Thanks, cadillac811

[patroclus]

I don't think the history of the Maine is done yet. I'm asking for your help.

Agreed. I can't offer any help but thank you for a very interesting post.

[jainso31]

Account 2: The explosion on the USS Maine was caused by an internal explosion involving the spontaneous combustion of coal in bunker A16. The fire caused by the combustion detonated nearby magazines.

Evidence Presented:

• spontaneous combustion of coal was a fairly frequent problem on ships built after the American Civil War. Coal was exposed to air, oxidized and began burning at 180 degrees. Heat transferred to magazines causing explosion.

• bunker A16 had not been inspected since 8 a.m. The explosion occurred around 9:40 p.m. There was ample time (12 hours) for a coal bunker fire to smoulder into a disaster.

• several other ships sustained damage from coal bunker fires during the Spanish American war.

• no one reported seeing a geyser of water thrown up during the explosion, a
common sight when mines explode underwater.

• no one reported seeing any dead fish in the harbor and these would have been seen if there had been an external blast.

• inward bending of the plates was caused by water displacement occurring at the same time the front of the ship was breaking away from the rear


http://www.dcte.udel.edu/hlp/resources/overseas/competing_evidence.pdf


jainso31

[CGRET]

If memory serves me i do recall a program where they simulated the coal bunker as it relates to the lay out of the ship. The end result was the coal ignited, thus verifying the cause.

Regards
Charles

[jainso31]

Talking about coal and spontaneous combustion-at one of the collieries that I visited pre the 1984 Strike-the management had made a long "cairn" shaped stack of lump coal as a reserve, out in the open air it 5ft high.15 ft wide and 30yds long.It caught fire within 2-3 weeks and this remember was in the winter.Being in the open it was easily extinguished; but the cairn had to be demolished; because it would have caught fire again.


jainso31