View Full Version : The Battle of the Falkland Islands 1914
The Sailor
16-01-2008, 08:23
Fresh from his success at the Battle of Coronel, off the southern coast of Chile, where the Germans outgunned the British, sinking British Admiral Cradock's flagship in the process, Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron - whose primary target was merchant and troop shipping in the South Atlantic - sped towards Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands. His intention was to raid the British radio station and coaling depot there.
Unbeknownst to Spee however, a British squadron, including two fast, modern battle cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, were at that same time coaling at Port Stanley, sent by First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher to reverse the British defeat at Coronel.
Each of the British battle cruisers were fitted with eight 12-inch guns, whereas Spee's Scharnhorst and Gneisenau each had 8.2-inch guns. In short, the British cruisers were significantly more powerful than Spee's - and Invincible and Inflexible were accompanied at Port Stanley by six other cruisers, all under the command of Vice Admiral Sturdee. These were the armoured cruisers Canarvon, Cornwall and Kent; two light cruisers, Bristol and Glasgow; and an old vessel, Canopus, presently grounded at Port Stanley and used as a form of make-shift fortress.
Spee began his attack on 8 December 1914, intending to subsequently refuel north at the Plate Estuary. Whilst aware of shipping in the area, he mistakenly assumed them to belong to the Japanese navy.
With his crew battle-weary and his ships out-gunned, the outcome was seemingly inevitable. Realising his danger too late - and having missed the golden opportunity to shell Sturdee's fleet while in port - Spee and his squadron dashed for the open sea, but at 10am were pursued by the British. Realising that he could not hope to outrun the fast British battle cruisers, Spee decided to bring about an engagement just after 1.20pm.
Despite initial success by Scharnhorst and Geneienau in striking the Invincible (commanded by Edward Bingham), and in then resuming a hasty escape, Sturdee managed to bring his powerful cruisers within extreme firing range some forty minutes later.
Four German cruisers were sunk, with Spee's flagship Scharnhorst sinking rapidly first, followed by Gneisenau, Nurnberg and Leipzig.
Ten British sailors died during the battle, while none of the British ships were badly damaged. However 2,200 German sailors were killed or drowned in the encounter.
The only German ship to escape was the light cruiser Dresden, which roamed at large for a further three months before its captain surrendered off the Juan Fernandez Islands on 14 March. Evacuating his ship, he then scuttled it by detonating its main ammunition magazine.
As a consequence of the battle, German commerce raiding on the high seas was brought to an end. Just as significantly, Sturdee's success was taken as a tremendous morale booster by the British, entirely reversing the earlier setback at Coronel.
herakles
16-01-2008, 08:34
An interesting post Sailor.
It sure was a great victory.
The Sailor
16-01-2008, 10:06
Yes well after the shocking loss at the Battle of Coronel earlier, the British public must have been very pleased with the turn of events.
culverin
16-11-2010, 19:58
The battle as such was to prove far more arduous for Sturdee than he could have originally foreseen.
Invincible and Inflexible expended an excessive number of shells to achieve their contribution to the victory, which allied to their poor fire control was only won by their slightly superior speed and not simply their larger guns.
Von Spee was rather rash in his decision to venture to the South Atlantic and any actions with RN armoured cruisers, as at Coronel, could have possibly been repeated by him.
Surely he must have been aware before arriving at the Falkland Islands he was likely to meet this new superior force, so what possessed him to proceed to almost total annihilation, or did he doubt the abilities of Sturdee and his 2 battle cruisers.
I am convinced Von Spee knew something and was certain he would be able to counter this newly arrived threat, or was it simply the Germans believed the possibility of superior forces ever being dispatched at such short notice as laughable.
culverin
17-11-2010, 20:21
Throughout this rather protracted action and despite the favourable weather conditions a serious issue that manifested itself in both Invincible and Inflexible was the appalling distraction caused by smoke from each of the ships three funnels.
This is beautifully illustrated by the right hand picture in # 1 here, where it must have been purgatory for those in the fighting top bearing in mind the extraordinary heat emanating upwards from boilers being worked so hard, so consider things in the boiler rooms which would have been equally dire. There were also many alterations in course and speed throughout, not conducive for good gunnery.
The situation in Scharnhorst and Gniesenau would have been equally bad, but they also had the terror of 12'' shells eliminating their lives, slowly.
These German crews would now understand the same futility that had befallen the Good Hope and Monmouth so recently at Coronel.
I feel sorry for Admiral Craddock.
His flagship Good Hope was nothing special, many of Monmouths guns were suscepitible to interference from sea spray - Monmouth was thin skinned for an armoured cruiser.
Canopus could only make 12 knots and only had practice rounds to shoot with :rolleyes:
Otranto was nothing more than a large object for German gunners to aim at.
HMS Glasgow was arguably Craddocks best ship but she could not be expected to tackle a pair of armoured cruisers.
The Falklands battle rendered armoured cruisers obsolete.
Scharnhorst + Gneisenau couldnt run from Invincible/Inflexible, couldnt hurt them and couldnt withstand their 12 inch guns.
I believe there had been a half hearted plan (pre-war) to replace Scharnhorst with Moltke in the Asiatic fleet.
That would have made the Falklands battle more intresting - assuming the British still only send Invincible and Inflexible.
Moltke's shooting was pretty good at Jutland and if she can inflict some nasty damage quickly on one of the British BC's...........
culverin
18-11-2010, 19:31
# 1 picture of Invincible.
Although the flagship, identification during the 2 ships Falkland endeavour was straightforward as Invincible had still not had her fore funnel raised in an attempt to reduce the dire smoke issues which had plagued her for so long. This work was finally done in Jan 1915 whilst refitting at Gibraltar, 4 years after her 2 sisters. Note also the funnel bands have gone as with all RN warships post Aug 1914, she originally carried 1 white on each, and no more of the discredited anti torpedo nets, which were still carried at this time by many RN front line units.
culverin
25-11-2010, 18:22
Expenditure of 12" shells by the two RN battlecruisers was.
Invincible.
128 APC, 259 CP, 126 HE, 513 total.
Inflexible.
157 APC, 343 CP, 161 HE, 661 total.
80 rounds per gun, 640 in total, was the peace time standard, which clearly illustrates Inflexible was somewhat in excess of this.
Fortunately the war time allocation was raised to 110 per gun or 880 in total, which is still 75% for Inflexible, not hugely impressive in the circumstances.
The total number of hits on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau is uncertain, probably 35 - 40 combined, in addition to which neither had the luxury of replenishing those shells used after their victory at Coronel, consequently their ability to reply effectively was seriously diminished by this lack of shells of all calibres unless they had registered some fortunate early hits, which alas they did not. Their loss was inevitable but the valiant efforts of the two crews ensured their names be enshrined in German folklore.
patroclus
25-11-2010, 20:03
At the ranges at which the battle was fought, the lack of Directors in the battlecruisers would not have improved their performance, given the visibility problems.
German shell usage was quite profligate at Coronel considering most of the action took place at 7000-5500yds. The German armoured cruisers fired:
Scharnhorst 637 shells, 422 21cm (234 AP, 188 HE). 215 15cm (67 AP 148 HE)
Gneisenau 442 shells, 244 21cm (all AP). 198 15cm (all HE).
After the battle Scharnhorst had 360 21cm shells left (245 AP and 115 HE), while Gneisenau had 530 21cm shells left (types unknown). Before the Falklands Spee equalised the 21cm shells between the ships, Gneisenau transferring 85 (probably all HE) to Scharnhorst, to give both ships 445. Scharnhorst also had 195 21cm steel practice shells. I expect Gneisenau had a similar amount.
The large amount of practice shells seems quite unusual in wartime, but makes perfect sense if you consider that Spee sailed from Tsingtao on a south seas cruise in June 1914 well before any threats of war and with crew training planned - the SS Patrica had bought out 1600 crew replacements to Tsingtao in early June, including a new CO for Gneisenau, KzS Maerker. Accounts of Spee's voyage mention gunnery practices being carried out while transiting the Pacific, which suggests even more practice shells were originally carried.
The armoured cruisers each had around 1100 15cm shells at the Falklands.
Dave
patroclus
25-11-2010, 20:39
From Pochhammer's account, the German cruisers did not run out of ammunition at the Falklans battle although GNEISENAU's forward 21 cm turret emptied its shell room and difficulties were experienced in resupplying it because of battle damage.
Fortunately the war time allocation was raised to 110 per gun or 880 in total, which is still 75% for Inflexible, not hugely impressive in the circumstances
Dont think it matters too much, she destroyed the threat of Von Spee and restored British pride/morale.
I dont suppose Inflexibles shooting was any worse than Tigers in the North sea.
culverin
26-11-2010, 20:44
Granted, the means justified the end, however Sturdee was a man with considerable cruiser experience and had previously been chief of the Admiralty war staff. Although the preparations to the 2 battlecruisers before their departure was thorough, this time also enabled the Admiral time to immerse himself in the likely forthcoming scenarios, and the opportunity to prove this warship type was fit for purpose.
Do not forget Fisher was back too, these ships were his brainchild and the better they performed the greater would be his justification in the type in the first place. The gunnery aspect would be closely scrutinised on their return home with all manner of analysis taking place.
Maybe, and i stress maybe, had either of the battlecruisers suffered serious damage here, then the cordite issues may have been addressed, valuable lessons learned and appropriate measures taken. The battle of Heligoland Bight on 28 Aug proved little from the battlecruiser point of view.
In all an exraordinary endeavour with the desired and expected result.
culverin
27-11-2010, 19:38
HMS Nestor was amongst 8 RN destroyer casualties at the battle of Jutland taking a number of 5.9" hits before sinking, the majority of her crew surviving the ordeal.
Her commanding officer was Commander the Honourable Edward. B. S. Bingham, amongst those survivors and interned after being rescued by the Germans.
He was Executive officer of Invincible at the battle of the Falkland Islands and in 1916..
as CO of Nestor and for his actions was to be awarded the Victoria Cross.
patroclus
27-11-2010, 19:59
Bingham's book, "Falklands, Jutland and the Bight" is an interesting read but not very instructive.
culverin
28-11-2010, 12:29
HMS Nestor was amongst 8 RN destroyer casualties at the battle of Jutland taking a number of 5.9" hits before sinking, the majority of her crew surviving the ordeal.
Her commanding officer was Commander the Honourable Edward. B. S. Bingham, amongst those survivors and interned after being rescued by the Germans.
He was Executive officer of Invincible at the battle of the Falkland Islands and in 1916..
as CO of Nestor and for his actions was to be awarded the Victoria Cross.
This should read executive officer of Invincible, not commanding officer.
Von Spee came much closer to winning this battle than appears in most accounts. Clearly he missed his best opportunity when he did not attack Sturdee's ships when they were coaling with little steam up. Unfortunately for the Germans, Captain Maerker of Gneisenau did not trust the observation of Busche, his chief gunnery officer, who reported tripod masts in the roadstead of Port William. If these ships were just Queen Class battle ships, surely the East Asiatic could outrun them. In the battle at sea, according to Dannreuter, chief gunnery officer of Invincible, three German shells hit the ship but did not detonate: one hit the top of A turret, one pieced the hull fore, and another pierced the hull below the waterline under P turret, breaknig up against the interior armor wall of the handling room. Invincible came so close to meeting the fate she suffered at Jutland.
As I said in my introduction to the forum, I've just written a book about Graf Spee and the flight of the East Asiatic Squadron.
Eric Dorn Brose
Fresh from his success at the Battle of Coronel, off the southern coast of Chile, where the Germans outgunned the British, sinking British Admiral Cradock's flagship in the process, Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron - whose primary target was merchant and troop shipping in the South Atlantic - sped towards Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands. His intention was to raid the British radio station and coaling depot there.
Unbeknownst to Spee however, a British squadron, including two fast, modern battle cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, were at that same time coaling at Port Stanley, sent by First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher to reverse the British defeat at Coronel.
Each of the British battle cruisers were fitted with eight 12-inch guns, whereas Spee's Scharnhorst and Gneisenau each had 8.2-inch guns. In short, the British cruisers were significantly more powerful than Spee's - and Invincible and Inflexible were accompanied at Port Stanley by six other cruisers, all under the command of Vice Admiral Sturdee. These were the armoured cruisers Canarvon, Cornwall and Kent; two light cruisers, Bristol and Glasgow; and an old vessel, Canopus, presently grounded at Port Stanley and used as a form of make-shift fortress.
Spee began his attack on 8 December 1914, intending to subsequently refuel north at the Plate Estuary. Whilst aware of shipping in the area, he mistakenly assumed them to belong to the Japanese navy.
With his crew battle-weary and his ships out-gunned, the outcome was seemingly inevitable. Realising his danger too late - and having missed the golden opportunity to shell Sturdee's fleet while in port - Spee and his squadron dashed for the open sea, but at 10am were pursued by the British. Realising that he could not hope to outrun the fast British battle cruisers, Spee decided to bring about an engagement just after 1.20pm.
Despite initial success by Scharnhorst and Geneienau in striking the Invincible (commanded by Edward Bingham), and in then resuming a hasty escape, Sturdee managed to bring his powerful cruisers within extreme firing range some forty minutes later.
Four German cruisers were sunk, with Spee's flagship Scharnhorst sinking rapidly first, followed by Gneisenau, Nurnberg and Leipzig.
Ten British sailors died during the battle, while none of the British ships were badly damaged. However 2,200 German sailors were killed or drowned in the encounter.
The only German ship to escape was the light cruiser Dresden, which roamed at large for a further three months before its captain surrendered off the Juan Fernandez Islands on 14 March. Evacuating his ship, he then scuttled it by detonating its main ammunition magazine.
As a consequence of the battle, German commerce raiding on the high seas was brought to an end. Just as significantly, Sturdee's success was taken as a tremendous morale booster by the British, entirely reversing the earlier setback at Coronel.
Yes, but did Dannreuther state that he believed a shell detonating in "A" gun house, or a shell detonating outside "Q" handing room would have been catastrophic? And most importantly, at the end of the day, they weren't.
Simon
No, Dannreuter does not refer to the possible catastrophic effect of these shells, saying only that "curiously enough the three 8.2-inch shells that did the most damage did not burst." While at the end of the day it's quite true that Invincible did not go down, rather the German ships instead, you tell me: what do you think would have happened had all three shells detonated? I think this is useful speculation, for the Battle of the Falklands is usually cited as justification for Fisher's battle cruiser concept, when actually luck, not the concept, seems to have played a great role.
Yes, but did Dannreuther state that he believed a shell detonating in "A" gun house, or a shell detonating outside "Q" handing room would have been catastrophic? And most importantly, at the end of the day, they weren't.
Simon
I'll have an answer for you by Thursday evening, as by then I will have checked the Falkland Islands information at The National Archives.
I'm assuming that your point is that it's lucky those shells didn't detonate. If I followed the "luck line", I could just as easily say that it's lucky the German shells hit in the first place. One could also say the British were lucky to turn the German armoured cruisers into flaming hulks.
The concept of a battle cruiser, boiled down, was to be able to catch anything smaller than it and have an overwhelming superiority. Two British battle cruisers caught up with and destroyed two German armoured cruisers. People may criticise all they want the supposed tardy manner in which "Invincible" and "Inflexible" did this, but they did actually do it. The non-detonation of German shells is a statistical anomaly which is a footnote to history (a relatively obscure one at that).
Simon
culverin
06-12-2010, 19:58
I also briefly raised this in my # 13, para 3.
It didn't happen so nothing was learnt.
designeraccd
06-12-2010, 22:37
Looking at the pic of Invincible spewing those huge clouds of hot, noxious funnel smoke in post #1 on this thread makes one shudder at the conditions for any of the crew in the machinery spaces, decks and fighting tops!
I've sailed on the S.S. Badger (East to West and vice versa over Lake Michigan) numerous times with her coal fired boilers, and the few times the funnel smoke has curled down to deck level were very unpleasant. She can't hit the speed Invincible was steaming and firing at so the fumes were relatively tolerable. Gas mask time!!! DFO :eek:
People may criticise all they want the supposed tardy manner in which "Invincible" and "Inflexible" did this, but they did actually do it.
Exactly, who cares if their shooting was a bit shoddy - they did the job and eliminated the threat of Von Spee's squadron
Let's try to avoid sarcastic remarks, okay? On a serious note, I don't think luck had anything to do with the fact that Invincib le was hit twenty-two times by the German ships. After all, Von Spee's gunners had twice won the Kaiser's Cup for the best markmanship in the Imperial German Navy. And yes, the battle cruisers used their speed to catch up with the East Asiatic, but then in the first two stages of the battle they closed to under 12,000 yards, which helps to explain why so many German shells hit. Later in the battle Sturdee kept his distance and fired accurately when the wind took the smoke out of his gunners sights. This was fortunate, but not lucky, for Von Spee thad acked southwest--a tactical error.
I'll have an answer for you by Thursday evening, as by then I will have checked the Falkland Islands information at The National Archives.
I'm assuming that your point is that it's lucky those shells didn't detonate. If I followed the "luck line", I could just as easily say that it's lucky the German shells hit in the first place. One could also say the British were lucky to turn the German armoured cruisers into flaming hulks.
The concept of a battle cruiser, boiled down, was to be able to catch anything smaller than it and have an overwhelming superiority. Two British battle cruisers caught up with and destroyed two German armoured cruisers. People may criticise all they want the supposed tardy manner in which "Invincible" and "Inflexible" did this, but they did actually do it. The non-detonation of German shells is a statistical anomaly which is a footnote to history (a relatively obscure one at that).
Simon
patroclus
07-12-2010, 20:19
The BCs were unpracticed at firing at the ranges used during this battle. On the voyage from Abrolhos to the Falkland Islands Sturdee had used up half a day practicing firing at 12000 yds (the range at which, for good reasons, he wished to fight) and this was a greater range than had ever been used by the ships in battle practice.
I rescently picked up a copy of Geoffrey Bennets Coronel and the Falklands to read up on this and am finding this discussion fascinating. My great Grandfather served on HMS Kent during this action so it has some personal impact.
By the way, Dannreuter's battle report is printed in its entirety in Richard Hough's The Pursuit of Admiral von Spee, pp. 171-175.
It seems strange to refer to these three unexploded shells as an obscure statistical anomaly. The worst potential damage was probably from the shell that "entered the side 10 feet below the water line below "p" turret and just below the side armour. This shell made a large hole and broke up against the internal armour round "P" handling room." Another "struck the armour forward and on the water line and flooded the two bow compartments." I still believe it is useful to speculate whether Invincible would have stayed afloat had these shells detonated. An 8.2-inch AP shell can do massive damage.
I'll have an answer for you by Thursday evening, as by then I will have checked the Falkland Islands information at The National Archives.
I'm assuming that your point is that it's lucky those shells didn't detonate. If I followed the "luck line", I could just as easily say that it's lucky the German shells hit in the first place. One could also say the British were lucky to turn the German armoured cruisers into flaming hulks.
The concept of a battle cruiser, boiled down, was to be able to catch anything smaller than it and have an overwhelming superiority. Two British battle cruisers caught up with and destroyed two German armoured cruisers. People may criticise all they want the supposed tardy manner in which "Invincible" and "Inflexible" did this, but they did actually do it. The non-detonation of German shells is a statistical anomaly which is a footnote to history (a relatively obscure one at that).
Simon
VirtualF
08-12-2010, 16:34
"The worst potential damage was probably from the shell that "entered the side 10 feet below the water line below "p" turret and just below the side armour. This shell made a large hole and broke up against the internal armour round "P" handling room." Another "struck the armour forward and on the water line and flooded the two bow compartments." I still believe it is useful to speculate whether Invincible would have stayed afloat had these shells detonated. An 8.2-inch AP shell can do massive damage."
Im going to ask to ask what may seem a dumb question. If the 8.2 shell broke up against the internal armour round "P" turret then surely the armour has done its job? If it had pierced the armour and not exploded then thats a whole different scenario,but the armour appeared to have done what it was meant to?
I believe that HMS Kent had a far more close shave when she had a cordite fire in one of her ammunition hoists,from what I can remember reading,it was only the quick thinking actions of her crew that saved her.
Maybe others can help here, for I am not expert enough to know the exact layout of the ship. The debate about battle cruiser armour usually refers to the armor belt of the hull. This particular shell hit under that belt and entered the interior of the ship. The handling room had its own armour wall around it, and this is where the shell broke up. But if it had detonated there, then what?
Yes, the Kent had a close call which you describe accurately.
"The worst potential damage was probably from the shell that "entered the side 10 feet below the water line below "p" turret and just below the side armour. This shell made a large hole and broke up against the internal armour round "P" handling room." Another "struck the armour forward and on the water line and flooded the two bow compartments." I still believe it is useful to speculate whether Invincible would have stayed afloat had these shells detonated. An 8.2-inch AP shell can do massive damage."
Im going to ask to ask what may seem a dumb question. If the 8.2 shell broke up against the internal armour round "P" turret then surely the armour has done its job? If it had pierced the armour and not exploded then thats a whole different scenario,but the armour appeared to have done what it was meant to?
I believe that HMS Kent had a far more close shave when she had a cordite fire in one of her ammunition hoists,from what I can remember reading,it was only the quick thinking actions of her crew that saved her.
VirtualF
08-12-2010, 18:58
Maybe others can help here, for I am not expert enough to know the exact layout of the ship. The debate about battle cruiser armour usually refers to the armor belt of the hull. This particular shell hit under that belt and entered the interior of the ship. The handling room had its own armour wall around it, and this is where the shell broke up. But if it had detonated there, then what?
Yes, the Kent had a close call which you describe accurately.
I've just looked through my copies of Oscar Parkes "British Battleships" and Janes "Fighting ships of World War One".Both seem to show that the "Invincibles" had a rather shallow 6 inch belt which tapered to 4 inches at the ends.The barbette "had an armoured thickness of 7inches down to belt level,below which it was only 2 inches" (Parkes).This doesn't include coal bunkers that were strategically placed to provide additional protection.
Now I need some help with this but ill give it a go! If the shell is an above water hit it's going to have to defeat 7 inches of barbette armour at least,if it's a below waterline hit it's could still hit the 6 inch belt depending on how deep the hit is.If it hits below the belt its going to have to defeat the 2 1/2 inch armour at the bottom of the barbette,but looking at the schematic in both Oscar Parkes book and Janes it would have to be a pretty deep hit and ? travel a fair distance underwater?.Seeing as the ranged closed I don't know what the chances of that are.
In Massie's "Castles of Steel" mention is made of "a nasty hole that flooded a coal bunker along side "P" turret at the waterline level" and in Parkes that "the front plate of the fore turret was hit,but the 7 inch armour was not penetrated".Now if the one hit mentioned in "Castles of Steel" is the same that you are talking about I would venture to suggest that the armour did what it was supposed to by breaking the shell up.
I bow to those of greater experience and knowledge but thats my take on it!
Regards Vf
samarasra
18-01-2011, 15:58
My grandfather served on Canopus during The Battle of the Falklands and referred briefly to the battle in a diary he kept at the time. Does anybody have any photos or details of the crew at that time. He was in the merchant navy and joined as a Royal Naval Reserve.
BALTICSUBS
21-01-2011, 08:37
Just a wee comment from Fisher in Feb 1916.
I was always being told at the Admiralty that things could not possibly be done, but they were done ! The same arguments appear to hold the field again. I was informed that the " Invincible " (or " Inflexible ") could not leave Devonport (to attack von Spees squadron) for two days after the day appointed because of some defect in the brickwork of her boilers, but she went, and I have not heard since of any ill result! Had those two days been lost, Von Spee would have been missed by two days at
the Falkland Islands and many things would have been changed.
Having done some research and writing on Graf Spee, Coronel, and the Falklands (Eric Dorn Brose, Death at Sea, Amazon) it never ceases to amaze me how great the element of fluke was: the what ifs just pile up. As for Sturdee being dispatched in haste to the South Atlantic, it did have the negative effect of not allowing time for completion of new fire control, which contributed, along with other factors (see previous posts) to bad shooting in the battle--but Sturdee still won of course. But consider this. Captain John Luce of HMS Glasgow convinced Sturdee to change plans and leave a day earlier from coaling on the last leg of the sail to Port Stanley. Had Surdee not allowed himself to be talked into doing this, by my reckoning he would have steamed into Port William, the outer harbor, just about the same time that Spee was raiding on December 8th. Sturdee was very low on coal, Spee was not. Perhaps Spee would have avoided combat and gone along his way home and Sturdee would have missed his chance? Just a what if.
captain cave man
25-01-2011, 10:25
An interesting post Sailor.
It sure was a great victory.Yes a Great Victory for the finest Navy in the world,in my opinion we were nearly caught with our pants down though.If Admiral Von Spee had taken a risk and attacked the all the Big guns were coaling or in Port,could of been a different result.The Fact the Canopus opened fire with her 12 inch guns and possibly changed his mind,seemed to me we had alot of eggs in one basket,but in glory the Royal Navy Bathed in glory that day,any one agree with why didnt Von Spee Attack,He had nothing to lose after all he had seen what was there and must have known he would lose doing a runner just a humble opinion
The captain of the Gneisenau did not believe his spotter, who reported seeing battle cruisers in Port William (the outer harbor). He believed these ships were more likely older battleships like Canopus, but still wanted to attack them. Von Spee overruled, believing he could outrun the older ships and save precious shells. He ordered his two raiders to rejoin the squadron. Only some hours later did his officers realize that the ships now chasing them were indeed battle cruisers. Had Von Spee known this earlier I suspect he would have attacked the British while coaling because he would have guessed he had no chance to outrun these ships, so attack and Copenhagen the enemy.
patroclus
25-01-2011, 22:49
Having done some research and writing on Graf Spee, Coronel, and the Falklands (Eric Dorn Brose, Death at Sea, Amazon) it never ceases to amaze me how great the element of fluke was: the what ifs just pile up. As for Sturdee being dispatched in haste to the South Atlantic, it did have the negative effect of not allowing time for completion of new fire control, which contributed, along with other factors (see previous posts) to bad shooting in the battle--but Sturdee still won of course. But consider this. Captain John Luce of HMS Glasgow convinced Sturdee to change plans and leave a day earlier from coaling on the last leg of the sail to Port Stanley. Had Surdee not allowed himself to be talked into doing this, by my reckoning he would have steamed into Port William, the outer harbor, just about the same time that Spee was raiding on December 8th. Sturdee was very low on coal, Spee was not. Perhaps Spee would have avoided combat and gone along his way home and Sturdee would have missed his chance? Just a what if.
The story of Luce's conversation with Sturdee has become part of the folklore associated with the battle. Strangely enough, it is not mentioned by Hirst and seems to have only surfaced at a later date.
Apart from Hickling's account, what is the authority for this conversation?
Hickling is the only source as far as I know. It seems reliable, however. Richard Hough (The Pursuit of Admiral Spee) trusts it and places it in the context of Sturdee's odd lack of urgency over the two weeks prior to reaching Brazil. So I wouldn't say the story is part of the "folklore."
patroclus
26-01-2011, 20:10
Hickling is the only source as far as I know. It seems reliable, however. Richard Hough (The Pursuit of Admiral Spee) trusts it and places it in the context of Sturdee's odd lack of urgency over the two weeks prior to reaching Brazil. So I wouldn't say the story is part of the "folklore."
Sturdee is often taken to task for lack of urgency but he had to proceed at an economical speed after leaving St. Vincent in order to have enough coal in hand to be able to fight an action at any time, as he had no accurate knowledge of the position of von Spee nor of the other German raiders at sea in the Atlantic. He took care not to arrive at the Abrolhos and the Falkland Islands with empty bunkers.
mandrake079
27-01-2011, 10:02
Hickling is the only source as far as I know. It seems reliable, however. Richard Hough (The Pursuit of Admiral Spee) trusts it and places it in the context of Sturdee's odd lack of urgency over the two weeks prior to reaching Brazil. So I wouldn't say the story is part of the "folklore."
Hickling served in HMS Glasgow at both Coronel and the Falklands so could be regarded as a primary source for this, but the notion that a junior officer would have first-hand knowledge of Sturdee saying "But dammit Luce, we're sailing the day after tomorrow..." stretches credulity a little unless Captain Luce was especially informal in his relations with his subordinates.
In his later book on the Melbourne/Voyager accident, Hickling reports conversations on the bridge of Melbourne in inverted commas, as though he had been there with a tape recorder, so it's possible that he wasn't too fussy about the important distinction between what was actually said, and what might have been said.
Hickling's papers are in the Imperial War Museum, so I'll have a look at those when I'm down there (probably) next month. If anyone has a copy of 'Sailor at Sea' could they please post a bit more detail about Hickling's account.
Ted
I've just looked over Hickling's Sailor at Sea. Luce does indeed seem to have been very informal with his officers while still keeping his authority. Anyway my assumption has always been that Hickling heard from others what was said, perhaps from the Number One in the wardroom. Also, while I haven't served at sea it seems logical to me that Luce would have left word with his NUmber One and the officer of the watch why he was leaving the ship, why he was going to the flagship.
mandrake079
27-01-2011, 20:50
I've just looked over Hickling's Sailor at Sea. Luce does indeed seem to have been very informal with his officers while still keeping his authority. Anyway my assumption has always been that Hickling heard from others what was said, perhaps from the Number One in the wardroom. Also, while I haven't served at sea it seems logical to me that Luce would have left word with his NUmber One and the officer of the watch why he was leaving the ship, why he was going to the flagship.
Thank you for looking. I suspect you're absolutely right that Hickling knew about this because it was being talked about onboard, and it's possible that Luce actually told his officers what he had done. But I still have difficulty with Hickling's account because I can't imagine Luce repeating "But dammit Luce..."etc, verbatim to his officers even if those were the actual words used. So I suspect Hickling may have invented suitable dialogue to embellish the story, which I also believe he did when writing about Melbourne/Voyager.
I'm not imputing any sinister motive here - invented dialogue is quite common; some bits of Richard Hough's The Fleet That Had to Die read more like 'Hornblower' than history. But it's still making stuff up and, if that's what's happened here, it tends to diminish Hickling's value as a reliable source.
I'm going to have a look at Hickling's papers to see if there's any more detail there, and I'll post anything I find.
patroclus
27-01-2011, 23:06
The following is the relevant section from "Sailor at Sea":
He sent for Thompson: “Number One, I am rather exercised about this delay; I think I’ll go over and try and persuade the Admiral to sail earlier”. In Some trepidation he went over to the Flagship.
“I hope you don’t mind me coming over, sir, and please don’t imagine I am questioning your orders, but thinking it over I do feel we should sail as soon as possible”. “But dammit, Luce, we’re sailing the day after tomorrow, isn’t that soon enough for you? Anyhow, why didn’t you raise the point yesterday?”
“Perhaps, sir,” said my Captain diplomatically, “I was at fault; I didn’t make myself clear enough as to the situation ashore at Stanley. Alladyce is very worried and thinks the Germans may invade anytime, and I agree with him. When I left Stanley with CANOPUS he felt that the Navy was abandoning them to their fate”.
“There’s CANOPUS now, she’s gone back”.
“Yes, sir, but she’s immobilised; she can’t help much if the Germans land out of range of her guns, at Port Fitzroy for instance. The Falkland Islands Volunteers, shepherds for the most part, , are of little use against landing parties covered by their ships’ guns”.
Sturdee paced up and down his day cabin. He looked up. “Do you think Alladyce knows we are coming to his rescue?”
“No, sir. In the interests of security I imagine he’s not been told”.
“Very well, Luce, we’ll sail tomorrow”, the Admiral said somewhat reluctantly.
I agree with Mandrake that Hickling's habit of putting words into the mouths of historical characters is rather off-putting.
Sturdee is often taken to task for lack of urgency but he had to proceed at an economical speed after leaving St. Vincent in order to have enough coal in hand to be able to fight an action at any time, as he had no accurate knowledge of the position of von Spee nor of the other German raiders at sea in the Atlantic. He took care not to arrive at the Abrolhos and the Falkland Islands with empty bunkers.
I think Sturdee should indeed be taken to task. His orders were to get into the South Atlantic, which Churchill described as "the most critical point." Sturdee was not worried about running into Graf Spee underway. Even after arriving off brazil on November 26th he assumed the German squadron was still in Chilean waters, that is, not yet around the Horn. This lack of urgency is what flabbergasted Luce. Anyway, Fisher certainly expected Sturdee to make great haste. As for German raiders in the Atlantic, London at this point was only concerned with Karlsruhe, a light cruiser, which, as it turned out, had already blown up.
As for doubting Hickling's account of what Luce and Sturdee said, I've taught history for 35 years, including methodology classes, and it strikes me that many historians are far too conservative, way too skeptical, when it comes to accepting the veracity of evidence. Yes, we must be skeptical, but come on, does anyone still doubt that Luce got Sturdee to hurry? The rules of evidence in history have to be strict, but we are not trying a capital murder case here--there the rules of evidence have to be super-strict.
patroclus
01-02-2011, 02:10
I think Sturdee should indeed be taken to task. His orders were to get into the South Atlantic, which Churchill described as "the most critical point." Sturdee was not worried about running into Graf Spee underway. Even after arriving off brazil on November 26th he assumed the German squadron was still in Chilean waters, that is, not yet around the Horn. This lack of urgency is what flabbergasted Luce. Anyway, Fisher certainly expected Sturdee to make great haste. As for German raiders in the Atlantic, London at this point was only concerned with Karlsruhe, a light cruiser, which, as it turned out, had already blown up.
.
At this period, there were two German ships conducting cruiser warfare in the Atlantic - KARLSRUHE amd KRONPRINZ WILHELM. KARLSRUHE's whereabouts was not known to the Admiralty but the KRONPRINZ WILHELM had been active off the coast of South America and was last reported on 28th October when she captured a French ship about 150 miles north of the Plate. It was thought she or the KARLSRUHE might have been using Rocas Reef as a base and Sturdee reconnoitred that area on his crossing from St. Vincent to Abrolhos. On the leg from Abrolhos to the Falklands he spread his squadron in the hope of catching her or any other German vessel.
The assumption that von Spee was still on the west coast of South America was made by the Admiralty in signals received by Sturdee at the Abrolhos and reinforced by other inteligence reports received through Port Stanley Radio on the way south.
The principal reason for Sturdee proceding at economical speed was to conserve coal in case he had to chase an enemy and fight an action (the coal consumption of his BCs being very heavy at high speeds - something like 790 tons per day). He did proceed at the slightly higher speed of 15 kts from UK to St. Vincent but had less concern for his bunkers as he was most unlikely to have to fight at the Cape Verdes! When he arrived at the Falklands he still had enough coal in the BCs to fight if he had to (and this could well have happened). Some of his cruisers had triple expansion engines and a slower speed helped to conserve them.
As for doubting Hickling's account of what Luce and Sturdee said, I've taught history for 35 years, including methodology classes, and it strikes me that many historians are far too conservative, way too skeptical, when it comes to accepting the veracity of evidence. Yes, we must be skeptical, but come on, does anyone still doubt that Luce got Sturdee to hurry? The rules of evidence in history have to be strict, but we are not trying a capital murder case here--there the rules of evidence have to be super-strict.
I have doubts about this approach to history - too many "historians" adopt a sloppy approach to evidence and fail to test secondary sources. No one is suggesting that Hickling invented the Luce/Sturdee story but it would be very reassuring if there was some independent confirmation that it was correct and not just wardroom gossip :D
At this period, there were two German ships conducting cruiser warfare in the Atlantic - KARLSRUHE amd KRONPRINZ WILHELM. KARLSRUHE's whereabouts was not known to the Admiralty but the KRONPRINZ WILHELM had been active off the coast of South America and was last reported on 28th October when she captured a French ship about 150 miles north of the Plate. It was thought she or the KARLSRUHE might have been using Rocas Reef as a base and Sturdee reconnoitred that area on his crossing from St. Vincent to Abrolhos. On the leg from Abrolhos to the Falklands he spread his squadron in the hope of catching her or any other German vessel.
The assumption that von Spee was still on the west coast of South America was made by the Admiralty in signals received by Sturdee at the Abrolhos and reinforced by other inteligence reports received through Port Stanley Radio on the way south.
The principal reason for Sturdee proceding at economical speed was to conserve coal in case he had to chase an enemy and fight an action (the coal consumption of his BCs being very heavy at high speeds - something like 790 tons per day). He did proceed at the slightly higher speed of 15 kts from UK to St. Vincent but had less concern for his bunkers as he was most unlikely to have to fight at the Cape Verdes! When he arrived at the Falklands he still had enough coal in the BCs to fight if he had to (and this could well have happened). Some of his cruisers had triple expansion engines and a slower speed helped to conserve them.
I have doubts about this approach to history - too many "historians" adopt a sloppy approach to evidence and fail to test secondary sources. No one is suggesting that Hickling invented the Luce/Sturdee story but it would be very reassuring if there was some independent confirmation that it was correct and not just wardroom gossip :D
I have a mixed reaction to your reply. I did not know that another German "warship" was possibly in Sturdee's path. So your reply was informative, and thanks. This forum is a very valuable one, and I am glad I joined. However, Patroclus, ask yourself this: what do you suppose Fisher thought about what Sturdee was doing? Admittedly, Fisher was often off the charts with what he said and did, but he was right to doubt that Sturdee was the man for this mission, which was to hurry south to block Von Spee from causing trouble in the trade routes. Did it make sense to slow down and deploy in a sweep for one light cruiser and/or an armed merchant cruiser, especially when the East Asiatic boasted two armored and three light cruisers?! You seem to be so proud and above things with your skepticism as a "historian," but it would be better to reserve your skepticism, to keep your powder dry, for the right situations in history.
As for Hickling, he must be rolling over in his grave. It would be reassuring if "historians" did not attempt to reduce his account to nothing more than wardroom gossip while at the same time contradicting themselves by saying no one really doubts the veracity of the story. It is sloppy history when "historians" confuse skepticism with cynicism.
Nigel999
01-02-2011, 21:01
Regarding post 1#. From memory I believe the picture of INVINCIBLE was taken from GLASGOW , and INVINCIBLE was making 22 knots at the time.
The photo was taken on the chase for Spee.
As already stated, this action was entirely what the BC was designed for...not for taking its place in the line of battle.
Again from fairly thin memory, I seem to recall that the gallant Kit Craddock , knowing that he was in dire straits, actually buried his personal awards (medals etc) in the grounds of government house , Port Stanley. I'm pretty sure that Luce was the witness and source of the event.
On Ebay , some while ago, were some postcards showing sailors ashore in the Falklands , on 27th October 1914, they were noted as from MONMOUTH/GOOD HOPE / either/both ships . Cannot be sure now...happy smiling faces.
I did bid, strongly , but lost out. This was some years ago, the fact I still recall it , perhaps shows the regret at not securing them.
Cheers, Nigel
patroclus
02-02-2011, 10:26
I have a mixed reaction to your reply. I did not know that another German "warship" was possibly in Sturdee's path. So your reply was informative, and thanks. This forum is a very valuable one, and I am glad I joined. However, Patroclus, ask yourself this: what do you suppose Fisher thought about what Sturdee was doing? Admittedly, Fisher was often off the charts with what he said and did, but he was right to doubt that Sturdee was the man for this mission, which was to hurry south to block Von Spee from causing trouble in the trade routes. Did it make sense to slow down and deploy in a sweep for one light cruiser and/or an armed merchant cruiser, especially when the East Asiatic boasted two armored and three light cruisers
Fisher was a grand hater and he hated Sturdee, mainly because of the latter’s association with Beresford. If Fisher doubted Sturdee’s suitability for the job then he shouldn’t have appointed him, no matter how convenient it may have seemed to him and to Churchill.
The speed of advance of the squadron on the Abrolhos-Falklands leg was not related to the search for the KRONPRINZ WILHELM as spreading his squadron did not affect the speed. He was heading in that direction and took the normal action, under the circumstances, of covering as much sea area as possible.
You seem to be so proud and above things with your skepticism as a "historian," but it would be better to reserve your skepticism, to keep your powder dry, for the right situations in history.
This sentence contains more heat than light.
As for Hickling, he must be rolling over in his grave. It would be reassuring if "historians" did not attempt to reduce his account to nothing more than wardroom gossip while at the same time contradicting themselves by saying no one really doubts the veracity of the story. It is sloppy history when "historians" confuse skepticism with cynicism.
Hickling spent 40 years in the RN – I don’t think he would be at all fazed. This matter of Hickling’s story started out in post #36 as a simple query as to whether there was any other authority for the Sturdee/Luce conversation and that is what it remains, in spite of distractions. There is always cause for enquiry when a story surfaces 50 years after the event. As no one has come up with a suggestion, and there are some knowledgeable people on this Forum, it is probably reasonable to conclude that Hickling is the only known source.
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