TheDigger
10-01-2008, 11:26
General Information
The heavy cruiser HMAS Australia is a warship that distinguished itself in combat throughout World War Two. The Australia fought in the Battle of the Coral Sea as well as in the Battle of Savo Island. In the last year of the Pacific War it saw action during the return to the Philippines ( Leyte Gulf ) as well as during the invasion of Luzon ( Lingayen Gulf ) during both of which actions it was badly damaged by Japanese aircraft.
It is speculated that HMAS Australia was damaged by a Kamikazi attack, the following comments gathered suggests that this was not part of a pre meditated attack but may have been a spur of the moment by an injured Japanese pilot.
The Japanese first used suicide attacks on warships in the Allied fleet supporting the American landings on Leyte in the Philippines.
On October 21st, 1994 the Reuters World Service reported on a memorial service held aboard the guided missile destroyer HMAS Brisbane stating: “…veterans mourned the victims of the first organized attack by Japanese Kamikaze pilots.” The service was held at sea off the Philippines on “the spot where a Kamikaze plane crashed into Australia ’s bridge on a suicide mission on October 21, 1944 .
These are but two examples of the claim that the aircraft which crashed into Australia mortally wounding her Captain and killing or injuring nearly one hundred members of her crew was a Kamikaze – part of an organized and officially ordered use of suicide tactics.
This is to be distinguished from individual instances where a Japanese pilot might spontaneously choose to sacrifice himself by crashing into an enemy target (“Jibaku”) usually occasioned by his aircraft having received severe battle damage. Such instances were far from rare.
The claim that Australia ’s attacker was part of an organized Kamikaze attack – indeed the first such attack – is not new. The claim was long ago memorialized in the official histories of World War Two naval operations of both Britain and Australia.
The first Kamikaze mission was flown on October 21st from Cebu and included two bomb carrying Zeros in the Kamikaze role and one escorting Zero (five other Zeros had been destroyed on the ground earlier in the day). This mission took off at 1625 hours. One Kamikaze and the escort Zero later returned without sighting a target. Lt. (j.g.) Yoshiyasu Kuno failed to return from this mission. No Allied loss or damage has been associated with this mission nor did American fighters claim any victims that afternoon. Cebu sent out the second official Kamikaze mission early on October 23rd. This consisted of two Zeros. Neither returned and no Allied loss or damage can be associated with this attack.
Finally, on October 25th several Kamikaze units sortied from Mabalacat, Cebu and Davao . An American escort carrier was sunk and others damaged. This success and the resultant publicity was the occasion for a great expansion of the Kamikaze effort within Japanese naval air units. The Japanese Army air units soon followed. According to renowned Japanese aviation historian Dr. Yashuo Izawa the Army’s first organized suicide attack came on November 5th, 1944. Type 99 (Val) dive-bombers first joined the Navy’s Kamikaze effort on October 27th.
THE ATTACK ON HMAS AUSTRALIA
The preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf began on October 17th followed by the main landings near Tacloben on Leyte Island on the 20 th. Australia was part of a force of four cruisers and six destroyers covering the landings. Two of the cruisers as well as two of the destroyers were Australian. Dawn of October 21st found these ships close to Leyte prepared to deliver fire support or cover the operations then going on offshore.
At the first light of dawn a small group of aircraft appeared out of the dark of the western sky from the direction of Leyte Island . About 0600 hours HMAS Shropshire engaged these aircraft with her anti-aircraft batteries as they flew near the ships but they were soon lost in the half-light. At 0605 lookouts on the Australia saw one of the attackers diving at an angle of ten to fifteen degrees from about 2,000 yards astern.
The stern approach blocked most of Australia ’s eight barreled pom-poms. One, which broke through the safety stops, managed to get off a few rounds. A single 40mm gun and a pair of single 20 mm guns took the attacker under fire and scored hits. The aircraft, identified as a “Val”, hit the foremast with its wing root and crashed into the sea. Burning gasoline rained onto the bridge and small explosions occurred.
There is some disagreement among the accounts of observers. Some thought the attacker carried no bomb and the crash was deliberate. Others saw a bomb drop and hit close to the ship without exploding. The Captain of Shropshire said only one aircraft attacked. Most witnesses agree at least four attacked with three shot down and possibly a fourth. The consensus seemed to be that the attacker was a Val but reports of cannon fire and wing guns are at variance with this identification.
The attack on Australia took place more than twelve hours before Lt. (j.g.) Kuno took off on the first organized Kamikaze mission. This leaves the question, if Kuno did not attack Australia and it was not an organized Kamikaze mission, who attacked Australia and what was their mission?
THE JAPANESE ATTACK
The Japanese navy sent out some of its few available aircraft on search missions on October 21st. They found nothing until the afternoon when a task force including aircraft carriers was reported 60 miles east of Suluan Island.
The Japanese Army was not intent on seeking an aircraft carrier striking force. The warships and transports near the invasion site were suitable targets for them. Records of the 4th Air Army report only sixteen Japanese Army air force sorties over Leyte Gulf that day. Seven were by fighters (five Type 1 fighters and two Type 3 fighters) and nine were by light bombers or assault aircraft. These latter included two missions by three and six aircraft respectively.
The attack on Australia was almost certainly carried out by army light bombers, Type 99 assault bombers (Ki 51s) of the 6th Flying Brigade (FB). Six Type 99 assault planes (Allied code name Sonia) took off from San Jose on Mindoro Island approximately 275 miles west northwest of the invasion site at Tacloben on Leyte Island . The returning planes reported that a transport ship was set on fire. Three bombers failed to return. Two were reported to have caught fire. Failing to return was 1/Lt. Dai Morita and Sgt. Teruya; W.O. Seo and Sgt. Ishikawa; and, Sgt. Itano and Ldg. Pvt. Sekizawa.
The Sonia aircraft involved in this attack bear a superficial resemblance to the Navy Val dive-bomber. Both are single-engine, low wing monoplanes with a fixed undercarriage. The fixed undercarriage was the most characteristic feature of both types. In the southwest Pacific Sonias were not infrequently misidentified as Vals. The poor visibility at the time of the attack could have aided in such a misidentification just as the Japanese might have mistaken a cruiser for a large transport ship.
The low angle attack, reported in one case as ten to fifteen degrees, seems more characteristic of an army glide bombing attack than navy dive-bombing. The Australia ’s assailant was reported to have been on fire when it hit. According to Japanese sources two of the bombers that were lost caught fire. Moreover, three Japanese bombers were lost. Australia ’s gunners claimed three aircraft.
Although the Japanese report is far from explicit, W.O. Seo was reportedly killed in his aircraft, which may distinguish him from the two aircraft said to have caught fire. If this conjecture is correct, either 1/Lt. Morita or Sgt. Itano is the pilot most likely to have crashed Australia .
Available Japanese records strongly suggest Australia ’s attackers were Type 99 assault bombers of the 6th FB. Allied information, even misidentification of Val and Nate aircraft in the area, tend to bolster the story which the Japanese records reveal.
So there we have it the HMAS Australia was by all accounts not the victim of a Kamikazi Attack but an organised boming attack by the Army and not the Navy.
Kamikaze Statistics
By the end of World War II, the IJN had sacrificed 2,525 kamikaze pilots, and the IJA had lost 1,387.
The number of ships sunk is a matter of debate. According to a wartime Japanese propaganda announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, suicide attacks accounted for up to 80 percent of the U.S. losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. In a 2004 book, World War II, the historians Wilmott, Cross & Messenger stated that more than 70 U.S. vessels were "sunk or damaged beyond repair" by kamikazes.
Official US sources put the toll much lower. According to a U.S. Air Force webpage:
Approximately 2,800 Kamikaze attackers sunk 34 Navy ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4,900 sailors, and wounded over 4,800. Despite radar detection and cuing, airborne interception and attrition, and massive anti-aircraft barrages, a distressing 14 percent of Kamikazes survived to score a hit on a ship; nearly 8.5 percent of all ships hit by Kamikazes sank.
Australian journalists Denis and Peggy Warner, in a 1982 book with Japanese naval historian Seno Sadao (The Sacred Warriors: Japan’s Suicide Legions), arrived at a total of 57 ships sunk by kamikazes. However, Bill Gordon, a US Japanologist who specialises in kamikazes, states in a 2007 article that 49 ships were sunk by kamikaze aircraft. Gordon says that the Warners and Sadao included eight ships that did not sink. His list consists of:
three escort carriers: USS St. Lo, USS Ommaney Bay, USS Bismark Sea
14 destroyers, including the last ship to be sunk, USS Callaghan on July 29, 1945, off Okinawa
three high-speed transport ships
five Landing Ship, Tank
four Landing Ship Medium
three Landing Ship Medium (Rocket)
one auxiliary tanker
three Canadian Victory ships
three Liberty ships
two high-speed minesweepers
one Auk class minesweeper
one ocean tug, USS Sonoma, the first ship to be sunk, on October 24, 1944, off Leyte
one submarine chaser
two PT boats
two Landing Craft Support
one Landing Craft Infantry (Large)
The heavy cruiser HMAS Australia is a warship that distinguished itself in combat throughout World War Two. The Australia fought in the Battle of the Coral Sea as well as in the Battle of Savo Island. In the last year of the Pacific War it saw action during the return to the Philippines ( Leyte Gulf ) as well as during the invasion of Luzon ( Lingayen Gulf ) during both of which actions it was badly damaged by Japanese aircraft.
It is speculated that HMAS Australia was damaged by a Kamikazi attack, the following comments gathered suggests that this was not part of a pre meditated attack but may have been a spur of the moment by an injured Japanese pilot.
The Japanese first used suicide attacks on warships in the Allied fleet supporting the American landings on Leyte in the Philippines.
On October 21st, 1994 the Reuters World Service reported on a memorial service held aboard the guided missile destroyer HMAS Brisbane stating: “…veterans mourned the victims of the first organized attack by Japanese Kamikaze pilots.” The service was held at sea off the Philippines on “the spot where a Kamikaze plane crashed into Australia ’s bridge on a suicide mission on October 21, 1944 .
These are but two examples of the claim that the aircraft which crashed into Australia mortally wounding her Captain and killing or injuring nearly one hundred members of her crew was a Kamikaze – part of an organized and officially ordered use of suicide tactics.
This is to be distinguished from individual instances where a Japanese pilot might spontaneously choose to sacrifice himself by crashing into an enemy target (“Jibaku”) usually occasioned by his aircraft having received severe battle damage. Such instances were far from rare.
The claim that Australia ’s attacker was part of an organized Kamikaze attack – indeed the first such attack – is not new. The claim was long ago memorialized in the official histories of World War Two naval operations of both Britain and Australia.
The first Kamikaze mission was flown on October 21st from Cebu and included two bomb carrying Zeros in the Kamikaze role and one escorting Zero (five other Zeros had been destroyed on the ground earlier in the day). This mission took off at 1625 hours. One Kamikaze and the escort Zero later returned without sighting a target. Lt. (j.g.) Yoshiyasu Kuno failed to return from this mission. No Allied loss or damage has been associated with this mission nor did American fighters claim any victims that afternoon. Cebu sent out the second official Kamikaze mission early on October 23rd. This consisted of two Zeros. Neither returned and no Allied loss or damage can be associated with this attack.
Finally, on October 25th several Kamikaze units sortied from Mabalacat, Cebu and Davao . An American escort carrier was sunk and others damaged. This success and the resultant publicity was the occasion for a great expansion of the Kamikaze effort within Japanese naval air units. The Japanese Army air units soon followed. According to renowned Japanese aviation historian Dr. Yashuo Izawa the Army’s first organized suicide attack came on November 5th, 1944. Type 99 (Val) dive-bombers first joined the Navy’s Kamikaze effort on October 27th.
THE ATTACK ON HMAS AUSTRALIA
The preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf began on October 17th followed by the main landings near Tacloben on Leyte Island on the 20 th. Australia was part of a force of four cruisers and six destroyers covering the landings. Two of the cruisers as well as two of the destroyers were Australian. Dawn of October 21st found these ships close to Leyte prepared to deliver fire support or cover the operations then going on offshore.
At the first light of dawn a small group of aircraft appeared out of the dark of the western sky from the direction of Leyte Island . About 0600 hours HMAS Shropshire engaged these aircraft with her anti-aircraft batteries as they flew near the ships but they were soon lost in the half-light. At 0605 lookouts on the Australia saw one of the attackers diving at an angle of ten to fifteen degrees from about 2,000 yards astern.
The stern approach blocked most of Australia ’s eight barreled pom-poms. One, which broke through the safety stops, managed to get off a few rounds. A single 40mm gun and a pair of single 20 mm guns took the attacker under fire and scored hits. The aircraft, identified as a “Val”, hit the foremast with its wing root and crashed into the sea. Burning gasoline rained onto the bridge and small explosions occurred.
There is some disagreement among the accounts of observers. Some thought the attacker carried no bomb and the crash was deliberate. Others saw a bomb drop and hit close to the ship without exploding. The Captain of Shropshire said only one aircraft attacked. Most witnesses agree at least four attacked with three shot down and possibly a fourth. The consensus seemed to be that the attacker was a Val but reports of cannon fire and wing guns are at variance with this identification.
The attack on Australia took place more than twelve hours before Lt. (j.g.) Kuno took off on the first organized Kamikaze mission. This leaves the question, if Kuno did not attack Australia and it was not an organized Kamikaze mission, who attacked Australia and what was their mission?
THE JAPANESE ATTACK
The Japanese navy sent out some of its few available aircraft on search missions on October 21st. They found nothing until the afternoon when a task force including aircraft carriers was reported 60 miles east of Suluan Island.
The Japanese Army was not intent on seeking an aircraft carrier striking force. The warships and transports near the invasion site were suitable targets for them. Records of the 4th Air Army report only sixteen Japanese Army air force sorties over Leyte Gulf that day. Seven were by fighters (five Type 1 fighters and two Type 3 fighters) and nine were by light bombers or assault aircraft. These latter included two missions by three and six aircraft respectively.
The attack on Australia was almost certainly carried out by army light bombers, Type 99 assault bombers (Ki 51s) of the 6th Flying Brigade (FB). Six Type 99 assault planes (Allied code name Sonia) took off from San Jose on Mindoro Island approximately 275 miles west northwest of the invasion site at Tacloben on Leyte Island . The returning planes reported that a transport ship was set on fire. Three bombers failed to return. Two were reported to have caught fire. Failing to return was 1/Lt. Dai Morita and Sgt. Teruya; W.O. Seo and Sgt. Ishikawa; and, Sgt. Itano and Ldg. Pvt. Sekizawa.
The Sonia aircraft involved in this attack bear a superficial resemblance to the Navy Val dive-bomber. Both are single-engine, low wing monoplanes with a fixed undercarriage. The fixed undercarriage was the most characteristic feature of both types. In the southwest Pacific Sonias were not infrequently misidentified as Vals. The poor visibility at the time of the attack could have aided in such a misidentification just as the Japanese might have mistaken a cruiser for a large transport ship.
The low angle attack, reported in one case as ten to fifteen degrees, seems more characteristic of an army glide bombing attack than navy dive-bombing. The Australia ’s assailant was reported to have been on fire when it hit. According to Japanese sources two of the bombers that were lost caught fire. Moreover, three Japanese bombers were lost. Australia ’s gunners claimed three aircraft.
Although the Japanese report is far from explicit, W.O. Seo was reportedly killed in his aircraft, which may distinguish him from the two aircraft said to have caught fire. If this conjecture is correct, either 1/Lt. Morita or Sgt. Itano is the pilot most likely to have crashed Australia .
Available Japanese records strongly suggest Australia ’s attackers were Type 99 assault bombers of the 6th FB. Allied information, even misidentification of Val and Nate aircraft in the area, tend to bolster the story which the Japanese records reveal.
So there we have it the HMAS Australia was by all accounts not the victim of a Kamikazi Attack but an organised boming attack by the Army and not the Navy.
Kamikaze Statistics
By the end of World War II, the IJN had sacrificed 2,525 kamikaze pilots, and the IJA had lost 1,387.
The number of ships sunk is a matter of debate. According to a wartime Japanese propaganda announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, suicide attacks accounted for up to 80 percent of the U.S. losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. In a 2004 book, World War II, the historians Wilmott, Cross & Messenger stated that more than 70 U.S. vessels were "sunk or damaged beyond repair" by kamikazes.
Official US sources put the toll much lower. According to a U.S. Air Force webpage:
Approximately 2,800 Kamikaze attackers sunk 34 Navy ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4,900 sailors, and wounded over 4,800. Despite radar detection and cuing, airborne interception and attrition, and massive anti-aircraft barrages, a distressing 14 percent of Kamikazes survived to score a hit on a ship; nearly 8.5 percent of all ships hit by Kamikazes sank.
Australian journalists Denis and Peggy Warner, in a 1982 book with Japanese naval historian Seno Sadao (The Sacred Warriors: Japan’s Suicide Legions), arrived at a total of 57 ships sunk by kamikazes. However, Bill Gordon, a US Japanologist who specialises in kamikazes, states in a 2007 article that 49 ships were sunk by kamikaze aircraft. Gordon says that the Warners and Sadao included eight ships that did not sink. His list consists of:
three escort carriers: USS St. Lo, USS Ommaney Bay, USS Bismark Sea
14 destroyers, including the last ship to be sunk, USS Callaghan on July 29, 1945, off Okinawa
three high-speed transport ships
five Landing Ship, Tank
four Landing Ship Medium
three Landing Ship Medium (Rocket)
one auxiliary tanker
three Canadian Victory ships
three Liberty ships
two high-speed minesweepers
one Auk class minesweeper
one ocean tug, USS Sonoma, the first ship to be sunk, on October 24, 1944, off Leyte
one submarine chaser
two PT boats
two Landing Craft Support
one Landing Craft Infantry (Large)