German Yorkshire Coast Raids 1914/1915

[qprdave]

Report from The Times referring to the new chapter in the German Naval History

Published 23rd October 1922

[steve roberts]

Hi Dave.A Very interesting read.Easy with the knowledge of hind-sight.One of Scheer's ruses just before Jutland was to leave the regular Capital Ships radio operators ashore,to fool us into thinking the HSF was in port.As the operators "Fists" were well known to the Admiralty.
Regards Steve.

[red devil]

Every Sept I go to Scarborough for an Army Reunion (1rtr) and there are details of these raids in Scarborough Castle.

[emason]

I notice that the supposed targets for these raids was "the bombardment of the coastal defences".

Well, I suppose that the old ruined Whitby abbey could have been mistaken for a coastal battery, but to miss the batteries and hit Hartlepool town centre is just poor shooting.

[jainso31]

Bill -they were aiming at the Whitby coast Guard Station, which they regarded as a legitimate target.They would seem to be shooting indiscriminately and I would judge this as a poor performance by major units of the German High Seas Fleet.They got put paid to the second time round, at Dogger Bank.Another example of German "frightfulneess".

jainso31

[BALTICSUBS]

Am I seeing only criticism of the performance of the German High Seas Fleet here as this seems a common theme? But the criticism should go both ways.

Is frightfulness us being frightened or the Germans being frightened?

Re Dogger Bank the Germans deserve to be criticised for not following their normal routine of rowing orders to their ships, and instead used wireless giving the British the advantage. But Dogger Bank was not another raid on the British coast as suggested here.

In reality Dogger Bank was an embarrassment for the RN and more of an example glaring problems within their camp in successfully closing off an action with the German heavy ships, and this was glossed over to cover these problems by gloating over Blucher. Yes they picked off the odd ball Blucher, badly damaged Seyditz, but these were caused by a couple of lucky shots at the start of the action.

The truth is they knew exactly when and where the Germans would be and still got it wrong, they met them rather than positioning themselves to cut them off, then they signalled their way out of the engagement to let the Germans get away.

After their initial hits, the Germans outgunned the British, and we know the stupid consequences to remedy this problem which let to disaster at Jutland. So put paid, the Germans learnt a few lessons in ammunition handling at Dogger bank, the RN learnt nothing and paid the price in May 1916 and they were put paid.

As for Frightfulness, losses at Jutland and then when the Germans advanced again in August 1916 two more British cruisers were lost leading Jellicoe to say he was not going to offer battle when they came out again. He said he could not guarantee another Jutland would not happen again, worried about the strengths of the German destroyer force, worried about mines, worried about torpedoes from U-Boats, worried the German battlecruisers were superior, worried Zeppelins gave the Germans a scouting advantage, worried about the underwater protection of his big ships, worried, worried, worried, worried. Worried and frightfulness all in one.

We tend to forget the generation of people in England at this time grew up with the knowledge of Naval invincibility, and no one could raid their coasts, no one could inflict more damage on their ships in a big battle, but not being able to crush this upstart navy or large parts of their heavy ships was not how the script was supposed to be written after 30 years of Fisher building it up and spending vast amounts of the counties budget on the Grand Fleet. No wonder he said they failed him at Jutland.

[mandrake079]

Am I seeing only criticism of the performance of the German High Seas Fleet here as this seems a common theme? But the criticism should go both ways.

Is frightfulness us being frightened or the Germans being frightened?

...

In reality Dogger Bank was an embarrassment for the RN and more of an example glaring problems within their camp in successfully closing off an action with the German heavy ships, and this was glossed over to cover these problems by gloating over Blucher...So put paid, the Germans learnt a few lessons in ammunition handling at Dogger bank, the RN learnt nothing and paid the price in May 1916 and they were put paid...


The attacks on Scarborough and Whitby were examples of 'frightfulness' to a population not yet inured to the concept of 'total war' in the sense that they contraved the extant Hague Convention on naval bombardments which prohibited attacks on undefended town and ports. The Germans tried to justify themselves in retrospect by pointing to the presence of minor military installations, but there's little doubt that these attacks contravened the spirit if not the letter of the Convention.

It's also interesting to note that there was less criticism of the Hartlepool bombardment; the London Chronicle commented "So far as the Hartlepools are concerned, no complaint can be made of the enemy's action."

But BALTICSUBS is right to highlight British failure to learn lessons. Although the real German plan was to entrap a sub-unit of the Grand Fleet (in which they nearly succeeded), the British were partially forewarned and had set an ambush of their own. This failed, mostly because of a combination of bad weather and bad luck, but there were also significant lapses of command, control and communications and, most of all, initiative. Most important were Beatty's wrongly-addressed order to his light cruisers which caused Commodore Goodenough to deliberately break contact with German cruisers that he was actually engaging at the time; and Rear Admiral Arbuthnot's refusal to open fire on the same Germans a few minutes later without a direct order from the Vice-Admiral who had not seen them.

These were harbingers of similar mistakes that would be made at Dogger Bank and especially Jutland, but they were not adequately addressed at the time. Beatty tried to foist blame onto Goodenough without addressing his own staff's shortcomings (this was the first of the three battles that Beatty later said his flag lieutenant had lost for him), and nothing was done about Arbuthnot who eventually went down with the Defence, to no great purpose, at Jutland. It's arguable that the minor success at Dogger Bank a few weeks later deflected attention from the wider issues highlighted during the East Coast raids.

There are good accounts of the raids in Robert Massie's Castles of Steel and James Goldrick's The King's Ships Were at Sea.

[patroclus]

; ..........and Rear Admiral Arbuthnot's refusal to open fire on the same Germans a few minutes later without a direct order from the Vice-Admiral who had not seen them.

These were harbingers of similar mistakes that would be made at Dogger Bank and especially Jutland, but they were not adequately addressed at the time. Beatty tried to foist blame onto Goodenough without addressing his own staff's shortcomings (this was the first of the three battles that Beatty later said his flag lieutenant had lost for him), and nothing was done about Arbuthnot who eventually went down with the Defence, to no great purpose, at Jutland.........



Dreyer, Arburthnot's Flag Captain in the ORION, believed that Arburthnot's impetuosity at Jutland was caused by his remorse at his failure to open fire in the earlier incident.

[CE REYC]

This thread has sailed away from the Yorkshire coast and on to the Dogger Bank and Jutland. Whatever the rights and wrongs of those battles and the mistakes made by THE Royal Navy, the nerxt time the German fleet came out was to surrender!!!

[mandrake079]

... the nerxt time the German fleet came out was to surrender!!!

Completely untrue. The High Sea Fleet conducted two major offensive sorties after Jutland. The first, on 18/19 August 1916, was intended to repeat the earlier strategy of a coastal bombardment to draw out and entrap units of the Grand Fleet. The Grand Fleet, forewarned by radio intercepts, also sailed to set its own trap. No fleet encounter took place because the British were delayed following the sinking of the light cruiser Nottingham by U-52, while the High Sea Fleet diverted to chase the Harwich Force which a Zeppelin had incorrectly identified as heavy ships.

The second was on 23/24 April 1918, when the High Sea Fleet sortied to intercept the routine Scandinavian convoy and its battleship escort. German intelligence was faulty, however, and there was no convoy off the coast of Norway at the time. German communications security had improved and the British had no intimation of the deployment until it was nearly over, and although the Grand Fleet put to sea, it was unable to intercept.

And, though Beatty's carefully stage managed ceremony has engendered a proud memory of the German fleet surrendering to the Royal Navy , this contains a large element of 'spin'. In fact, the High Sea Fleet did not surrender to anyone, but was interned under the terms of the Armistice until its fate could be decided at a peace conference. The fleet was supposed to be interned in a neutral port, but no-one was willing to accept it, and the British therefore offered Scapa Flow, possibly with a view to staging some kind of 'victory' event.

Good accounts of all this are to be found in Paul Halpern's A Naval History of World War I (Routledge 2003).

[Kevin123]

Thanks for posting that report Dave, I haven't seen that before. My grandfather was wounded on HMS Hardy at that time, I've posted his wound certificate on another thread and it's dated 16th December. It left him with scars on his chest and arm. Is there any way I could find out the damage report on HMS Hardy at that time. Kevin.

[mandrake079]

Thanks for posting that report Dave, I haven't seen that before. My grandfather was wounded on HMS Hardy at that time, I've posted his wound certificate on another thread and it's dated 16th December. It left him with scars on his chest and arm. Is there any way I could find out the damage report on HMS Hardy at that time. Kevin.

These might be what you're looking for. They're from Hardy's Narrative of Events which is contained in the Harwich Force Pack in the National Archives (ADM 137/2084). I 've got the full Narrative (9 pages) if you're interested.

Ted

[Kevin123]

Thanks Ted, I'll have to show my dad that. My grandfather was William Goulding who is mentioned as being severely wounded. He actually served 28 years in the RN and died in 1961. This is his certificate. Kevin.

[BALTICSUBS]

This thread has sailed away from the Yorkshire coast and on to the Dogger Bank and Jutland. Whatever the rights and wrongs of those battles and the mistakes made by THE Royal Navy, the nerxt time the German fleet came out was to surrender!!!

OK, this same old chestnut shows up again.

Strangely it was the Grand Fleet that was the cause of England being in such a quagmire of a situation in 1917/1918 and a situation that should be pointed out. It was actually the build-up of this Fleet that almost lost the war for them, rather than winning it for them as was their purpose.

Their boasting of having a navy capable of taking on the next two largest navies combined was the flaw. Everyone knows the great numbers of Capitol ships were the reason it was impossible for the German HSF to take them on one for one, hence the tactics they were employing to draw in parts of the GF such as the coastal raids. But these tactics alone, which as Jutland showed, could slowing wear down numbers of RN ships but would not do the job in the time required, something knew had to be done to go on the attack that would avoid the whole numerical superiority of the RN. “Corbett felt that superior concentration thus not only deterred the weaker opponent from seeking battle but presented him with an opportunity to attack his enemy’s exposed national lines of communication. Corbett felt that superior concentration of naval forces created yet another serious problem. The greater the concentration of a fleet, the more difficult it was to conceal its whereabouts and movements”

So with the knowledge the Germans decided to counter the British war on their trade by switching to U-Boats. Britain was far more vulnerable to sea trade attack than was Germany. So when they unleashed the U-Boats in 1917 the Grand Fleet was as useful as HMS Victory at Portsmouth, and for 2 reasons. They failed to crush the German HSF when they had their chance, and we must remember good old Jackie Fisher said they failed him at Jutland and he was right, and it was the power of the German HSF which enabled the U-Boats to wage their war around Britain. They protected the passages the U-Boats used out to the sea lanes around British, they were the iron fist sitting behind the minesweepers clearing the way for the U-Boats, and the GF was powerless to stop this.

So once the switch occurred all the money from our budget that had been spent on these Dreadnoughts seemed a waste when what they needed was a navy of smaller ships, destroyers, submarines, trawlers, minelayers. The ships designed to protect the GF while at sea were now sailing around hunting for U-Boats. We were lucky the Germans did not have enough U-Boats as they proved their point beyond any doubt, and luckily some bright spark finally worked out convoys were not such a bad thing, and of course, the joining of the war by the USN supplied many more of the desperately needed smaller ships.

I’m afraid the GF was humbled in WW1, they were not value for money and did not get the result in which their millions were spent and sent us broke and spirally downwards from the world stage. So you can see why the likes of Beatty would want to portray a surrendered German Fleet when simply they were actually interned and undefeated. Beatty & Jellicoe had the opportunity to sit themselves beside the great Nelson, but let it slip.

Having relatives in smaller ships, they always said they should lead any RN Victory Parade for WW1 as it was them that did all the work.