Erich Bey & the Narvik Battles

[sons of anzac]

When you look at it the first battle resulted in

3 x destroyers lost
* Type 36 destroyer sunk (Schmitt)
* Type 36 destroyer constructive total loss (Heidkamp) with Kommodore Bonte KIA.
* Type 36 destroyer constructive total loss (Roeder)

4 x destroyers damaged
* Type 34 destroyer damaged - 7 hits (Thiele)
* Type 34A destroyer damaged – 5 hits & 1 boiler out (Arnim)
* Type 36 destroyer – engines seized but repaired later (Kunne)
* Type 36 destroyer damaged- magazine flooded (Ludemann)

3 x destroyers undamaged
* Type 34A destroyer – fully fuelled (Koellner)
* Type 34A destroyer- fully fuelled with Commander 4th Flotilla Erich Bey (Zenker)
* Type 34A destroyer- low fuel (Giese)

Following refuelling from Jam Wellem (an impressed merchant vessel acting as an oiler) first:

•Navy Group West orders Zenker & Giese to sail 10 April
•Bey orders Thiele & Kunne out on 10 April but sights British ships 2205 hrs and returns to harbour, not sighted by British

11 April finds:
* Zenker, Koellner, Ludemann & Kunne ready to sail and refuelled.
* Thiele & Giese alongside Jan Wellem seeking repair and Arnim trying to repair nearby.

12 April final nail in coffin
* Koellner & Zenker badly damaged hitting submerged rocks.

It would be very interesting reading the German navy ‘after action’ reports on the Narvik debacle. I remain mystified how Erich Bey could escape censure / sacking over his timidity in not sailing his available destroyers when ordered after the first battle. Not only was his inaction unremarked upon, he was awarded the Knights Cross for his leadership during the battles. I understand that the Knights Cross was also awarded in recognition for unit actions and the medal should be seen as reward for the unit rather than the individual but his reputation seems to have remained unsullied. Weird.

[patroclus]

Other accounts say that Bey took out ZENKER and GIESE on 10th April but understandably turned back when he sighted the superior British blockading force.

What is your source for Bey ordering THIELE and KUNNE out on 10th April?

[sons of anzac]

Other accounts say that Bey took out ZENKER and GIESE on 10th April but understandably turned back when he sighted the superior British blockading force.

What is your source for Bey ordering THIELE and KUNNE out on 10th April?

Whitley "Destroyer!- German Destroyers in World War Two" 1983 Arms and Armour Press, Lionel Leventhal Ltd, London ENG p126.

According to Whitley Bey ordered them out to scout around. What they were supposed to do after scouting around he does not say- they were fit enough to also get away if so ordered.

As I said it would be interesting reading to actually see what was going on on each of the ships that were possibly fit to sail. What were they thinking? Were they offering opinion to Bey to get out of there no matter what or advising him to stay?

I do think Bey took the easy option of turning back when the sighted the British force- his ships were not sighted and at least in the open sea they could have manouvred to get away and towards friendly aircover. Why only 2 ships and not the 4 capable of getting away? He knew he was turning back into a trap from which there was no escape? Was Bey promised aircover to force the British away and it didnt eventuate? Things just dont quite add up- something is missing.

[patroclus]

Whitley states quite clearly that Naval Group West ordered Bey to break out with ZENKER and GIESE, and he endeavoured to do so. Presumably NGW intended the other destroyers to remain at Narvik. There was no mention of THIELE and KUNNE breaking out. We don't know why Bey turned back (except that he was confronted by a superior force). He had a long way to go to get clear of the fjord and there was plenty of time for the British ships to sight him had he continued on his way. Whitley and others have criticised him for returning but I have some doubts as to the justice of this.

[sons of anzac]

As I said I'm curious- what was going on in their heads? There were 7 destroyers still afloat- 4 x operational and fully fuelled and 3 non x operational. Apart from Bey as the now senior officer devolved to him since Bonte was KIA, there were atleast 7 captains of ships there. In the historical record so far no mention is found of their thoughts at this stage- I'm assumimg the Kreigsmarine conducted an inquiry after the battle- what did the captains think?

* Only 2 ships were ordered out by NGW not the 4 that were operational- was NGW aware 4 were available? If not why not? If not why didnt Bey inform NGW when the signal was received? What was the point of 2 going and not 4?

* Bey ordered Theile & Kunne out to scout around who were the other 2 operational destroyers- what were they supposed to do when 'scouting' finished? Did he advise them to break out too if circumstances arose? Alternately were they to remain and try to protect the cripples? if so, seems a senseless order in the circumstances.

* The Luftwaffe had made operations for the RN close to Norway within aircraft range very difficult. Was there any promise of air cover to force the RN away? Might make sense of the Bey and the KM ships staying in Narvik area waiting for that to happen.

As I said, something is missing. It would be interesting to know if any KM inquiry papers still exist and what they say....................

[tjstoneman]

Führer der Zerstörer (Bey) made a report after the loss of all ten Kreigsmarine destroyers; a copy in the original German is held in the Naval Historical Branch.

A good reference is the recently-published book by Geirr J Haarr The German Invasion of Norway April 1940 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2009).

On the evening of 10 April, ZENKER and GIESE saw PENELOPE and two patrolling destroyers off Tranøy and wisely withdrew, knowing they would have had to steam the length of Vestfjord in the face of what they could assume would be a significant RN presence. THIELE and KÜNNE, both damaged during the engagement with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were apparently ordered to search Ofotfjord (according to Whitley’s book) – the former had damage to a boiler room, fire control and one gun whilst the latter needed work on her engines, so presumably wouldn't wish to fight their way out. During 11 April, KOELLNER and KÜNNE completed repairs and refueling; LÜDEMANN also completed damage repairs. However, all Bey’s surviving ships had expended large amounts of fuel and ammunition. That evening, two of the four ships in the best condition (ZENKER and KOELLNER) ran aground on the evening of 11 April.

Luftwaffe support would have been difficult; at that stage, the German-held airfields were still far to the south (Trondheim to Narvik is some 450 miles) and there was no significant air threat to RN forces off North Norway until much later in the campaign.

[sons of anzac]

Führer der Zerstörer (Bey) made a report after the loss of all ten Kreigsmarine destroyers; a copy in the original German is held in the Naval Historical Branch.

A good reference is the recently-published book by Geirr J Haarr The German Invasion of Norway April 1940 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2009).

On the evening of 10 April, ZENKER and GIESE saw PENELOPE and two patrolling destroyers off Tranøy and wisely withdrew, knowing they would have had to steam the length of Vestfjord in the face of what they could assume would be a significant RN presence. THIELE and KÜNNE, both damaged during the engagement with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were apparently ordered to search Ofotfjord (according to Whitley’s book) – the former had damage to a boiler room, fire control and one gun whilst the latter needed work on her engines, so presumably wouldn't wish to fight their way out. During 11 April, KOELLNER and KÜNNE completed repairs and refueling; LÜDEMANN also completed damage repairs. However, all Bey’s surviving ships had expended large amounts of fuel and ammunition. That evening, two of the four ships in the best condition (ZENKER and KOELLNER) ran aground on the evening of 11 April.

Luftwaffe support would have been difficult; at that stage, the German-held airfields were still far to the south (Trondheim to Narvik is some 450 miles) and there was no significant air threat to RN forces off North Norway until much later in the campaign.

That would be a good book- I'll try and pick up a copy. I know the DD's were all almost out of ammunition.

Apart from Bey I wonder if the destroyer commanders submitted reports on each ship that were included in his main report? Hmmm, might try a bit of digging when I get some spare time.