HMAS Perth 1936-1942

[The Sailor]

This post is carrying on from the mention I made in my earlier post 'HMAS Nizam', about a survivor of HMAS Perth who I met at the Nizam memorial service at Augusta far to the south of Perth.
I will call him by his first name Peter here in these lines.
When I spoke to him after the service, I said that I had an amatuer interest in WW2 history and I asked if he could make time to talk to me about his experiences. He then asked my wife and myself to afternoon tea at his home the following week.
On the day, we met Peter and his wife in his vege garden, where he was setting up a strong fence. It's to keep the kangaroos out of my lettuce patch he explained.
Later over tea, we started to talk and I got his story.
He was an 18 year old ordinary seaman on HMAS Perth and after the battle of the Sunda Straight and Perth had sunk, he was picked up by the crew of a Japanese destroyer and taken to Changi prisioner of war camp at Singapore.
Later he was to take part in the great 'speedo', including hellfire Pass, and moved through a series of camps as the railway progressed northwards through Thailand.

I then asked "What it was like day to day in the camps"?
My wife and I where alarmed and felt ashamed when he burst into tears. His wife said it was OK and comforted him until he composed himself. Peter then said that in the three and a half years of captivity by the Japanese, not one day in that time did he feel safe. Never was there an announcement that today was the Emperor's birthday and it was a rest day or whatever. He said that every day you thought it was to be your last and that when you saw night come, it seemed to be a miracle. Every day for over 1000 days, you woke with the thought that today was the day you would be murdered.

I then asked my favourite question that always makes me more curious than anything else.
"What was it like on the last day"?
He said that they were in a camp in southern Johore state Malaya and although there was no announcement by the Japanese and they had no radio or anything, they all felt that something had happened.
The Japs were standing in groups muttering and the violence had slackened off a bit.
On the 18th of August 1945, a lone Dakota flew over the camp and a single parachute appeared.
On reaching the ground, he was found to be a Major in the British Army.
He unclipped his parachute and drew his service revolver and advanced on the group of gaping Jap guards. He said "Drop your weapons, you are all under arrest". The Japs dropped them.
Peter said that it was the bravest act he had ever seen and probably the bravest act of the war.
Later they searched the camp and found years of Red Cross parcels of food and medicine in sheds.

Now there are guys on here that seem to be able to find out anything, and I'd sure like to know that Major's name.

The Battle of Sunda Straight is well documented in these sites below:
http://www.microworks.net/PACIFIC/battles/sunda_strait.htm

http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/sunda_strait.html

The photo of HMAS Perth a Leander class light cruiser is how she looked when she was lost.
A plaque in St Johns church Fremantle commemorates her loss and every year on the anniversary a service is still held there.

[kc]

Great post.

It's memories like this that make this forum worthwhile. Can't imagine the feeling of waking up to 'safety' the day after. :)

[herakles]

Yes, the last day must have been frightful. Very well portrayed in the ABC series "Changi". Here I mean the real ABC, not the American one.

I too have met survivors from Perth. And been told some thrilling stories of her numerous exploits.

I was attending the 60th anniversary of the battle for Greece/Crete in 2001 and they attended too. As of course Perth played a major part in the Med then. Along with HMAS Adelaide if my memory serves me.

There should be a section for articles on the Australian navy in this forum. There is much to tell.

;)

[The Sailor]

I have asked Kc to do it for us Richard and he said he will get around to it soon with other stuff.

[herakles]

In 1941, HMAS Perth was somewhere near the USA when a very secret message was received that the Germans were going to move a large number of engineers etc. from South America back to Germany. They were to be transported to Florida, taken overland to San Francisco then shipped to Germany on board a Russian merchant ship.

Accordingly, Perth patrolled to find the ship and stop her. She was detected and Perth gave chase but the freighter slipped into American waters, thinking they were safe there. Appreciate the Americans were neutral at the time. Undeterred, Perth followed until intercepted by the Americans and ordered out into international waters.

So she hastily sailed to Panama, disguised herself to sail through the canal, then beat up the east coast and sat and waited out of San Francisco - in international waters.

In due time the Russian ship was found and Perth moved in and demanded they stop. The Russian captain chose to ignore this advice and only when Perth fired a warning salvo and informed the captain that the next one would be aimed at him, did he agree. The Germans were duly transferred and the Russians allowed to continue.

This caused a significant international incident as Russia too at the time was neutral. Their complaints were however ignored.

[The Sailor]

That's fantastic Herk. I have never heard this before. So did they take all the Germans back to Oz?
Although in her ship's history, she was in the West Indies and Panama there is no mention of this action.
See below


http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/ships/perth1.html

[herakles]

I don't think this story is listed anywhere due to its sensitive nature. It was told to me by a member of Perth's crew.

I don't know where the Germans were taken.

[The Sailor]

I think I remember something about this now. I'm now sure I heard it before.
I am going to see if I can find anything on it.

Later. I have looked at all I can see and no luck Herk. I am going to e-mail an ex navy guy in the US that I know to see what he can turn up at that end.

[herakles]

I think I remember something about this now. I'm now sure I heard it before.
I am going to see if I can find anything on it.

Later. I have looked at all I can see and no luck Herk. I am going to e-mail an ex navy guy in the US that I know to see what he can turn up at that end.

Any success with your enquiries yet Sailor?

[herakles]

I was interested to see on the Australian news tonight that new support troops have been carried to Dili, East Timor, by HMAS Perth. These troops are to give added support to the crisis there that was caused by the shooting of the President and the PM.

[astraltrader]

Sailor and Herk - I have a pretty comprehensive library of naval reference books but can find nothing at all about this as of yet. Would be very interested to see any subsequent information discovered about this. Fascinating.

[The Sailor]

In fact I sent an e-mail to my US Navy friend the same day Herk. He answered that there is nothing known about that incident over there.

Glad to see HMAS Perth still active up there.

[herakles]

I was told this story by one of the sailors who was on-board at the time. We had met during the 60th anniversary of the fall of Greece/Crete, where HMAS Perth played such a pivotal role. Several ex crew members had attended and shared many of the reminiscences.

I agree that the story is extraordinary but it seemed to me to be so detailed as not to have been made up.

If it is true then there has to be a record of it somewhere. It maybe in Australian archives and it's possible it is still under a banning order. I just don't know.

[herakles]

Readers interested in all of the above should also read the posts at:

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=1606

[herakles]

I am posting this for the interest of members. Originally printed in the Naval Historical Review - June 1974 Edition


Statement by the Minister for the Navy (the Hon. Norman J.O.Makin, M.P.) in the Australian House of Representatives, 2nd March 1945

THIS RECONSTRUCTION of the Java Sea Battle, and of the subsequent engagement in Sunda Strait in which HMAS Perth was lost, is based on reports compiled by the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board from a variety of sources. The heavy Allied losses in the Java Sea Battle, and the fact that the only Australian ship taking part was sunk a day later, has made the task of compiling the reports long and complicated.

Fortunately, new light has been thrown on the subject by four of the personnel of HMAS Perth who were rescued from a Japanese transport which was torpedoed while en route from Singapore to Japan late last year.

These four are the only personnel of Perth in Allied hands. Their story, coupled with information pieced together from other sources, indicates that the Australian cruiser fought her two last actions with a courage and tenacity worthy of her gallant war career and of the high tradition of the Navy.

Of the Allied force which took part in the Java Sea Battle, the only ships which survived were four American destroyers. It has now been established that Perth herself sustained neither damage nor casualties in that action; but with the United States cruiser Houston she was sunk in the early hours of 1st March 1942 in Sunda Strait.

The Allied ships in the Java Sea Battle totalled two 8-inch gun cruisers (HMS Exeter and USS Houston), one 6-inch cruiser (HMAS Perth), two 5.9-inch Dutch cruisers (HNMS De Ruyter and Java), and nine destroyers (HM Ships Electra, Encounter and Jupiter; US ships John D. Edwards, John D. Ford, Alden and Paul Jones; and HNM Ships Kortenaer and Witte de With).

It has been estimated that the initial Japanese force comprised five cruisers and 13 destroyers. One enemy 8-inch cruiser and one destroyer probably were sunk by gunfire and another 8-inch cruiser and a destroyer were damaged.

On the evening of 26th February, the Allied ships sailed from Sourabaya, under command of Admiral Doorman, RNN, flying his flag in HNMS De Ruyter. Their objective was to intercept a Japanese convoy reported to be approaching north-eastern Java.

One of USS Houston’s gun turrets had already been put out of action by enemy air attack, but she sailed with the remainder of the force, and acquitted herself with distinction in the subsequent engagements with the enemy.

Enemy air attacks on the following morning were unsuccessful, and in the afternoon the Japanese cruisers and destroyers were sighted. The Allied force at once increased speed to engage the enemy, and the 8-inch cruisers of both sides opened fire at 30,000 yards. The light cruisers and destroyers followed suit as soon as range permitted.

Perth’s second salvo hit a Japanese destroyer, and the enemy flotilla retired into a smoke screen. When the smoke cleared, one enemy destroyer was on fire, and she is thought to have sunk. At that stage, too, Perth came under very heavy fire from the rearmost of the Japanese heavy cruisers.

About an hour later, HMS Exeter was damaged by an 8-inch shell, but was furnished with a smoke screen by Perth and destroyers. The Dutch destroyer Witte de With, screening Exeter, beat off a Japanese destroyer, scoring hits with two salvoes.

In the meantime HNMS Kortenaer, torpedoed amidships, broke in two and sank within a few minutes.

The flagship then led the cruisers in an attempt to get behind the enemy and attack his transports, and the Allied destroyers launched a counter-attack.

In bad visibility, HMS Electra probably scored hits with four salvoes on an enemy destroyer; but Electra herself was hit and stopped. Her guns were silenced one by one, and she sank about 6 p.m.

HMAS Perth, emerging through the smoke, was unsuccessfully attacked with torpedoes by enemy destroyers, and then joined issue with a Japanese 8-inch cruiser. The Australian ship’s opening salvoes scored direct hits and subsequent salvoes also found their mark. When her target was last seen she was on fire and stationary, with her bows in the air. She probably sank.

Darkness had fallen when HMS Jupiter was torpedoed on the starboard side. She was immobilised by the attack, and sank about four hours later.

Throughout the night, enemy aircraft shadowed the Allied force. But shortly before midnight Perth had another success when she scored hits with at least two salvoes on an enemy cruiser.

At this stage double disaster met the Allies when HNMS De Ruyter (flagship) and Java were lost - apparently as a result of torpedo attacks.

With the Allied cruiser strength reduced to his own ship and the damaged Houston, and knowing that the enemy still had at least four cruisers and 12 destroyers (besides the force, other than the initial one, which had entered the area) and a strong air reconnaissance, the Commanding Officer of Perth (Captain H. M. L. Waller, DSO, RAN) had no alternative but to order what remained of the striking force to withdraw.

HMS Encounter and the damaged Exeter succeeded in reaching Sourabaya, as had the four American destroyers and the Dutch destroyer Witte de With. Exeter and Encounter sailed from there on the night of 28th February, en route for Colombo, but the last message from them came next morning, when Exeter reported that she had sighted a force of enemy ships.

Witte de With was bombed and sunk in Sourabaya harbour.

Meanwhile Perth and Houston threw off the enemy by a feint, and reached Tandjong Priok (Batavia) on the morning of 28th February.

After embarking fuel and additional firefighting equipment and rafts, as well as 4- inch ammunition, the two ships sailed together that night, to endeavour to pass through the confined waters of Sunda Strait during darkness, en route for Tjilatjap.

About 11.30 p.m. - some three and a half hours after leaving Tandjong Priok - HMAS Perth signalled that she had sighted a destroyer near Sunda Strait. Later she amplified that signal to one cruiser.

That was the last message received from Perth or Houston. From that stage, the story is taken up by the four Perth personnel who have been interrogated.

The action was fought at night, and, naturally, the four survivors’ story is concerned primarily with what happened on board their own ship. It bears out the conclusion which had been drawn by the Naval authorities: that the two ships were sunk in a surface action against numerically superior enemy forces. It also substantiates the assumption originally arrived at by all who know the Navy’s ways: that Perth and Houston sold themselves dearly, and went down fighting to the last.

It was after 11 p.m. when one of Perth’s lookouts reported a dark object on the starboard hand, and a few minutes later the Australian cruiser’s for’ard turrets opened fire.

The action lasted about one and a half hours. The numerical strength of the enemy is indicated by the fact that enemy gunfire came from several bearings, and that at some stages Japanese destroyers passed so close to the cruiser that they could be engaged with machine-guns.

Apart from making the maximum use of her gunfire, Perth was able to fire eight torpedoes during the action; four to port and four to starboard. The exact effect of these could not be gauged, but next morning three enemy transports and one converted aircraft carrier were seen down by the stern and practically beached.

Despite the overwhelming strength of the enemy, Perth was not hit until about 20 minutes after she opened fire. The first shell to strike her passed through her forward funnel and exploded, carrying away a seaboat and doing considerable damage to the port pom-pom and flag deck.

Thereafter she suffered numerous hits, losing her aircraft and its catapult and crane, as well as the starboard pom-pom on the flag deck.

About that time, and with only 10 minutes between them, two torpedoes struck the ship on the starboard side, the second in the forward engine-room.

Some time later, a third torpedo hit was received - this time on the port side, aft.

From the time of the first torpedoing, Perth was hit repeatedly by gunfire from several bearings, and she finally sank at 35 minutes after midnight on the morning of the first of March.

USS Houston is reported to have sunk shortly afterwards.

The fate of Captain Waller is not known. He is reported to have been seen on the bridge, uninjured, after the second torpedo struck the ship. He gave the order: ‘Stand by to abandon ship’; and later: ‘Abandon ship; every man for himself’.

HMAS Perth had a distinguished career in this war. She began her good work in the West Indies and carried it on in the Middle East, where Allied soldiers from Greece and Crete knew and admired her fighting qualities. Captain Waller and his men brought that heritage with them when they went into action in the Java Sea Battle and in the darkness of Sunda Strait. And it was a heritage which they did not betray. In both these actions they left their mark on the enemy, and their ship went down fighting against overwhelming odds.

The rescue of four of Perth’s ship’s company from the Japanese has at last thrown some light on the cruiser’s last heroic action. It is a story of unflagging courage and devotion to duty. Though its end is tragedy, it is a story of which Australia and the Allies may well be proud.

[alffox]

Your letter re the PERTH brings back memories of 1967. I live in Essex, England and had just read a book by Ray Parkin called "Out of the Smoke" - I was so moved and interested by the book that I contacted the publishers and wrote to Ray Parkin who then in 1967 lived at 50 The Boulevard, Ivanhoe 3079, Victoria. Australia. He took the time to write me a very pleasant letter which I will copy to you if you so wish. Since then I believe he wrote another book and having checked on AMAZON.co.uk I believe there is a trilogy of books by Ray. Not sure if he still survives but I still have his letter dated 5th December 1967. Contact me on alffox@talktalk.net or alternatively I can place the two pages on another thread later.

alffox

[Bear]

I've got something driving me nuts at present. I'm researching the loss of HMAS Perth 1 as part of a book I'm writing.
Somewhere some time ago I came across a reference that said that the intelligence people in Batavia knew that the Japanese invasion force was steaming in to land its forces at Bantam Bay before Perth and Houston left Tandjong Priok on the evening of the 28th of February. This vital information was not passed on to Captains Waller RAN and Rook USN at the final briefing before they sailed. Every history book I own and every serious internet site I look at tells me that the intelligence information was that the Japanese were still many miles away from Bantam Bay, which is in the approaches to Sunda Strait. In other words the intelligence was wrong. What I read some time ago was that the intelligence given was not up-to-date, which was inexcusable.
I am usually very good about cataloging my references, but not this time.
If anyone has information about this somewhat obscure piece of Australian Naval history, I'd appreciate it.
Thanks

[spruso]

Hi Bear,

I have had an interest in PERTH1 for over 60 years as my father relatives served on her. I recently provided some advise for Ian Pfennigwerth when writing his excellent book called "The Australian Cruiser Perth 1939-1942".

I know Ian did extensive research for this book and on page 220 he states.
Neither captain had been given any recent information about the Japanese Western Invasion Force.

All accounts I have read state that the belief was that the Japanese were at least 50 away from Sunda Strait at the time Perth aand Houston left Batavia. There may have been more recent information available but the situation was such a shambles in Java at that stage that it was just not passed on in time.

I would be very interested in the outcome and source of your research in this matter.

My website on HMAS Perth. http://www.perthone.com/perth.htm

Cheers
Bruce

[sons of anzac]

Havent heard that one but maybe try tracking it 'sideways'- who may have located the IJN convoy? Probably airforce / navy patrol planes, rather than navy at that stage of events although possibly a allied submarine spied them. Are there any worthwhile official records or memoirs of senior officers invovled at that stage.

I have to say its been a long, long time since I've read anything on the campaign leading up to the loss of the NEI.

[Bear]

Thanks to both for your replies. I have read Ian Pfennigwerth's excellent book along with several others. Pfennigwerth's is indeed excellent.
Bruce, I have been to your web site a number of times and it is both interesting and informative.
It was Dutch reconnaissance aircraft that seem to have supplied the erroneous information that the Japanese invasion fleet was still 50 odd miles away from Sunda Strait.
It is annoying me that I read somewhere during my research that while Waller and Rook were being given their orders and an assessment of Japanese movements, somewhere in the same building intelligence analysts were in receipt of the information that the invasion fleet was close to Bantam Bay. Obviously if Waller and Rook had known that, they would not have run directly for Sunda Strait and straight into a vastly superior force.
This may of course be wrong, but I would like to follow up the source if I can find the wretched thing.
I'll keep you informed if I discover anything.
Cheers.

[Kevin Denlay]

...............................intelligence analysts were in receipt of the information that the invasion fleet was close to Bantam Bay. Obviously if Waller and Rook had known that, they would not have run directly for Sunda Strait and straight into a vastly superior force.


Re above Bear, even if they had known they didn’t have a lot of choice though did they? Wherever they turned there were more Japanese task forces that had swept all before them, so they were literally trapped between a rock and a very hard place. Still that doesn’t excuse the intelligence blunder if correct which, had they known the actual circumstances, would at the least have prepared them for what they were about to face.

Now with regards your book, I off course look forward to reading it when published. If I may ask, is it on the NEI campaign in general, certain battles there or covers a larger scope of the war?

And re Pfennigwerth's book. It is nice to see he did not continue the fallacy that appears in so many books/maps re the action (i.e. that Perth and Houston either passed through or were 'inside' Bantam Bay, as they certainly did not / were not at any time). Unfortunately he has the actual sinking position for the two ships wrong and I am not sure I agree with his placement of all the Jap transports inside Bantam Bay (map page 222 his book). Still a very good book on Perth!

[Bear]

I think if Waller had known about the invasion force that he would have chosen to stand further out to sea and made a full-speed charge to try to force the Straits instead of going across the mouth of Bantam Bay as he did.
Lombok Strait was in the hands of the Japanese after the invasion of Bali on February 19, so that was not an option. The four US destroyers that survived the Battle of the Java Sea escaped down Bali Strait, although they did encounter Japanese destroyers on their way through.
My book is about all ships lost on operational service by the RAN since inception. It is a massive research project and I am less than a third through the 1st draft after more than a year. It is very rewarding.
The 'Battle of Sunda Strait' is mis-named as at no time were either Perth or Houston in the Strait, although shortly after the battle some of their survivors were when they were carried around St Nicholas Point and down Sunda Strait.
The story of their survival or not is well documented by Katrhryn Spurling in her book 'Cruel Conflict--the triumph & tragedy of HMAS Perth'. She is a fine writer, although she puts too much credence into oral history without cross-referencing at times. Some of the stories sound like the stuff you could/can still occasionally hear at the bar of an RSL or Naval club. On the whole her book is well worth a read.
I'm fascinated by the NEI campaign. While there are so many stories of blunders by High Commands of all countries during WW2, I think this one is paramount. There is no equivocation to my mind, Perth was sacrificed to stupidity, incompetence, real politic or the incredibly confused situation that prevailed in that theatre of war.

[Kevin Denlay]

I think if Waller had known about the invasion force that he would have chosen to stand further out to sea and made a full-speed charge to try to force the Straits instead of going across the mouth of Bantam Bay as he did.

Agreed. My inference was somewhat of a rhetorical question and just meant to imply that Sunda Strait was the only option left to him at that time of his leaving Tanjong Priok.

[spruso]

Hi Bear,

This is a supplement from the London Gazette 20th feb 1948 regarding RAF operations at the time. (You may have seen this) I believe they were under command of the Dutch Airforce at the time.

Cheers
Bruce

London Gazette Supplement 20th Feb 1948
Section IV.
Bomber Operations 27th February to 1st March.

529. Meanwhile the situation on the west side
of Borneo had not developed so clearly. Invasion
forces had been suspected in the Natuna
or Anambas Islands and possibly at Muntok
on ,Banka Island. Reconnaissances had failed
up to 26th February to clarify the situation.

530. On the 27th February, a small convoy
with escort was located about 50 miles south
of the southern tip of Banka Island steaming
slowly on a north-easterly course. This might
or might not be part of an invading convoy
" marking time " before turning south towards
Western Java.

531. On the 28th February about noon, the
situation became clearer. A convoy was
sighted at that hour approximately 100 miles
north-east of Batavia steaming on an easterly
course at high speed. It consisted of n transports;
one cruiser and three destroyers were disposed
some 30 miles to the south and on a
parallel course. Another and larger convoy
was located to the north-west: strength, course
and speed were not clear. Both were at a
distance which would make landings possible at
two- points in western Java about midnight.
\
532. The moon was one day past full, wind
off shore, ideal conditions for landing. All was
evidently set for simultaneous landings—one at
the eastern end of Java probably just west of
Sourabaya, and two at the western end of Java
in the vicinity of Batavia.

BOMBER OPERATIONS 27x11 FEBRUARY
TO IST MARCH.

533. To revert to the night of 27th/28th February. It then appeared that the major threat would develop against Eastern Java. It was therefore decided to move No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron (9 Vildebeestes and 1 Albacore) at once to Madioen (near Sourabaya) to cooperate with American B.17's in resisting it. No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron arrived at Madioen on the afternoon of 28th February, and during the night 28th February/1st March earned out two sorties per aircraft, the first against transports, the second against landing barges. The first attack entailed a long search because reconnaissance information with which they had been briefed proved inaccurate. A convoy of 28 ships was eventually found 5 miles off the Coast, north of Rembang, some 100 miles west of Sourabaya. Most pilots claimed hits on transports, and execution amongst the barges. Subsequent reports received from American H.Q. in the area stated that attacks had been most successful and that No.36 (T.B.) Squadron had sunk .8 ships—the Americans themselves claimed 7 others: but it has not been possible to verify this seemingly very high rate of success. On completion of the second attack. No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron returned direct to Tjikampek, less three aircraft which had been shot down including that of the C.O., Squadron Leader J. T. Wilkins, an outstanding leader who was unfortunately killed. Each aircrew of this squadron, operating from a strange aerodrome, thus carried out two night attacks in 24 hours, involving over 15 hours flying in open cockpits—an excellent achievement.

534. In the meantime, during 28th February, the threat to western Java had crystallised (para. 531) in the form of two Japanese convoys approaching from the north with the evident intention of landing on 'both sides of Batavia.

535. All available Blenheims and Hudsons were directed against that convoy, which was approaching the beaches eastward of Batavia. During the night 28th February / 1st March, 26 Blenheim and 6 Hudson sorties were carried out against it from Kalidjati. The first attack found it 50 miles north of Eritanwetan, a point on the north coast about 80 miles east of Batavia: it was steaming south at high speed. Weather conditions were bad and by this time only one narrow strip was serviceable on the aerodrome. Not all pilots were sufficiently well trained to cope with the conditions: of those that were, some carried out three sorties each. There is no doubt that attacks were successful and were pressed home from a low level with great determination. When attacks began, 15 ships formed the convoy: early on 1st March, only 7 were seen anchored off the disembarkation beach which was at Eritanwetan. At least three, perhaps more of its ships, are believed to have been sunk. The larger figure may be an exaggeration, as other Japanese ships were seen on 1st March lying off some miles N.W. of the main convoy.

536. Disembarkation at Eritanwetan began at about 0100 hours on 1st March and continued during the rest of the night, despite a number of attacks by our aircraft while landing was in progress.

537. During the night, the Dutch AO.C., General van Oyen, advised Air Vice Marshal Maltby that the bomber force at Kalidjati would be more favourably placed for opposing the enemy landings if it remained there than if it were withdrawn to aerodromes further inland amongst the hills. He did not appear to have much confidence in the weak detachments of Dutch Home Guard which were watching the river crossings on the roads leading from the enemy landing at Eritanwetan to Kalidjati, a distance of more than 50 kilometres. But he placed more reliance upon the Home Guard of about 1,000 strong, supported by about 10 armoured cars, which were located at Soebang, a town on the road leading to the aerodrome. He also stated that a Dutch battalion at Cheribon had been ordered to counter-attack the landing. The British A.O.C., therefore, decided to keep the bomber force at Kalidjati where it was best placed to resist the enemy.

538. It was decided to " stand down " bombers at Kalidjati at the end of the night's operation because —
(a) Crews had been on a stretch for 36 hours, standing by during much of the night of 27th-28th February, and then operating at high pressure throughout late afternoon and the night of 28th February-1st March. They had worked splendidly, had achieved good results, and needed a rest.
(b) There would be plenty for the crews to do at high pressure for several days to come.
(c) Previous experience had shown that Blenheims and Hudsons were particularly vulnerable if employed in the cloudless conditions which prevail during the mornings at this season, because the Japanese normally provided their landings with strong Navy ' 0 ' fighter cover. It was therefore decided to employ bombers daily during the late afternoons (when cloud cover could be relied upon) and under cover of darkness, and to use all available fighters, which could look after themselves, to continue the opposition during the cloudless mornings.

[Bear]

No, I hadn't seen it, and thank you so much for that, Spruso. 5:31 supports that the intelligence was at least in the system that the landing force would be off Bantam Bay before midnight on the 28th.

[RADDA7]

Hello im new on here but am very intrested in the HMAS Perth my knowlege of ships you could write on a postage stamp.The Perth holds my intrest due to me doing my family tree I came across a relative Arthur Lindsay Stirk who served on the Perth and lost his life like so many others he was a stoker.I have heard there is a photo of him which i am trying to locate i belive it was in an Australian news paper at one point.if anyone could help me out there i would be very greatful here is what i already know about Arthur Stirk.He was born Guilford west Australia 1920-1942 had a street named after him in kalamunda,his nick name was lofty as he was over six feet tall and had brown eyes as said above he was a stoker on the Perth.Anyway Bear have you read out of the smoke by Ray Parking you probably have but he seemed to say that they were hung out to dry that they had no chance against all those Japanese destoryers but that the ABDA where meant to do as much damage as they could and that captain Waller was very frustrated at how the battle was managed.

Kind regards
RADDA7

[Kevin Denlay]

Welcome aboard RADDA7.

You may want to inquire here re your relative if you have not already done so.

http://www.hmasperth.asn.au/

[RADDA7]

WOW! thank you Kevin I have not come across this site have added it to my favourite and will have a good look at it when the kids leave me alone ha ha.

Many thanks
RADDA7

[RADDA7]

No sadly I belive Ray Parkin past away in 2005,im near the end of the book out of the smoke and indeed there are another two books that Ray wrote.Not only is it amazing what they all went through but its also unbelivable how great a writter Ray was.I got two of the books off ebay and by the looks of them they are 60's original,I would be intrested in seeing Ray's letter but will understand if you dont want to share it .

Kind Regards
Rob

[Bear]

G'day Radda7

The National Library is putting up back copies of all Australian newspapers published since papers began in this country on the web.
You may find the newspaper photo you mentoned here:

http://newspapers.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/home

Goodluck with your quest.

[RADDA7]

yes thanks Bear found this site the other day not come a cross arthur yet but did come across another Stirk working in a school,on another site i found out that Arthur Stirk enlisted in the Navy at Fremantle.

RADDA7

[spruso]

Bit of a longshot this: In late 1941, after her return to Australia from the Med, PERTH had a new catapult fitted which required modifications to the aircraft crane.

I have been asked by a modelmaker what the crane modifications were. I don't know. Would anyone know if this modification was a "one off" or a particular type of catapult required crane modifications when fitted to Leander and Modified Leander Cruisers?

Cheers
Bruce

[sandy1000]

I recently read Andrew Lambert's book "Admirals" where he describes the lives of a number of British Admirals, including Fisher, Beattie and Cunningham and in the chapter on Cunningham he says that the captain of HMAS Perth was relieved of his command for his reluctance to evacuate troops from Crete.

Can anyone add to this?

Reading the history of the Perth it says that 1188 troops were picked up at Crete and that the Perth was damaged by bombing and that no mention is made of a change of Captain.

[patroclus]

This was Captain Sir Philip Bowyer-Smith RN. He took command of PERTH from Captain Farncomb RAN on 6th June, 1940. Bowyer-Smith was previously Naval Attache at Rome. Upon leaving PERTH he became Director of Radio Equipment at the Admiralty.

The episode in question was the evacuation of troops from Kalamata (southern Pelopponese) on the night of 28th April, 1941, when PERTH (Senior Officer), PHOEBE, DECOY, HASTY, NUBIAN, HERO, HEREWARD and DEFENDER were scheduled to evacuate some 7000 men but the mission (less HERO) was abandoned by Bowyer-Smith "prematurely", leaving 6000 men to face captivity. Cunningham considered it "an unfortunate decision".

[spruso]

No that is incorrect. Sir Phillip Bowyer Smyth remained in command of PERTH until 1st Sep 1941, well after she returned to Australia.

The incident you are refering to was probably the evacuation of troops from Kalamata in Greece. Bowyer-Smyth sent HMS HERO in toward Kalamata to check the port. HERO then reported that the port was occupied by the Germans. Based on the information available to him at the time, (somewhat confused), he decided not to risk the ships under his command and abandoned the evacuation.

Cunningham apparently notified Bowyer- Smyth that he was "very disappointed".
The matter semmed to rest there.

Bowyer-Smyth was a very respected Captain and loved by the crew of PERTH.

Cheers
Bruce

[patroclus]

No that is incorrect. Sir Phillip Bowyer Smyth remained in command of PERTH until 1st Sep 1941, well after she returned to Australia.

The incident you are refering to was probably the evacuation of troops from Kalamata in Greece. Bowyer-Smyth sent HMS HERO in toward Kalamata to check the port. HERO then reported that the port was occupied by the Germans. Based on the information available to him at the time, (somewhat confused), he decided not to risk the ships under his command and abandoned the evacuation.

Cunningham apparently notified Bowyer- Smyth that he was "very disappointed".
The matter semmed to rest there.

Bowyer-Smyth was a very respected Captain and loved by the crew of PERTH.

Cheers
Bruce

Lambert's statement that Bowyer-Smith was "immediately relieved of his command" is not accurate but after his relief in PERTH he was never given another command at sea.

[spruso]

Noel Saenger of the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust has sent me an email to let me know that the original aircraft crane from HMS Amphion/HMAS Perth is still in existence at Cockatoo Dockyard in Sydney.

The crane is to be restored.

The crane was built in UK in 1933 and fitted on HMS Amphion. HMS Amphion was purchased by the RAN and re-named HMAS Perth in July 1939.

In late 1941 the crane was removed (& replaced) from HMAS Perth as part of a refit. It was then moved to Cockatoo Island Dockyard and erected with a new base on Southern Apron near Camber Wharf, Sydney NSW.

In 1962 the crane was removed to the Dockyard's shore depot near Balmain Power Station where it served as depot crane till 1991. It was dismantled and removed from Balmain depot in 1992 and brought to Cockatoo for safekeeping.

The crane is rare, as there may be no others or perhaps very few remaining anywhere.

Would anyone know who built the aircraft cranes for the Modified Leanders?

I have asked Noel to let me know when restoration begins and what is to be done with the crane. I have enclosed a photo below. The little shed on the side looks like it was added by the dockyard staff.

Cheers
Bruce

[Seerauber]

I have just finished reading Mike Carltons wonderful book "Cruiser" devoted to HMAS Perth- how about a "Waller for VC" campaign - he certainly deserved it.

[cheapchippy]

ONE DAY AFTER ANOTHER
Incidents In The Life Of A Naval Rating
By "Tarpaulin"

Different ships, different long splices; which is as much as to say that it takes all kinds to make a world. But, by and large, one long splice is very like another; and there is a strong family resemblance in the lives of naval ratings, in whatever class of ship they may happen to serve.

There are, of course, amenities in the larger ships which are lacking in the smaller, but there are compensations on both sides. And, among ships of the one class, personal idiosyncrasies of reigning deities may be responsible for the long splice which is our measuring stick having its strands tucked in a different manner.

It was the fact that Able Seaman Jobbings felt called upon to comment on the shortcomings of "The Bloke" in comparison with the virtuous "Jimmy the One" of his previous ship, which was the cause of his attendance at "The Bloke's" table for request men and defaulters and not as a requestman.

Though his red hair had something to do with it also. Picture a large, low ceilinged, spotlessly clean apartment, its sides of shining white enamel paint, its floor-covering highly polished. Wooden tables, scrubbed as white as a hound's tooth, are spaced athwart ships, slung from steel rods suspended from the deckhead. Also suspended from hooks in the deckhead by lying fore and aft are rows of hammocks, spaced their regulation distance of 18 inches apart. Most of them have a human occupant, and a man of medium height could walk underneath them with a slight inclination of the head. You are in the messdeck of a modern cruiser in the Royal Australian Navy, and the slanting rays of the sun shining through the ports indicates that it is early morning.

Through a small loudspeaker in the bulkhead peals a bugle call, followed by the twitter of a bos'un's pipe. "Show a leg there, show a leg." The Navy is rich in tradition, and in this traditional morning call comes an echo from the days of Nelson, when women were allowed to sleep aboard the ships, and at the morning exhortation stuck a stockinged leg over the side of the hammock to indicate their sex and its privilege of remaining in while the tarpaulins rolled out to commence their day's duties. The stockings, tradition has it, were red.

It 5.30am, 0530, for Navy time runs the full 24 hours from midnight to midnight. 0000 to 2400 and our modern tarpaulins tumble out and lash up and stow their hammocks, while the black list men, sinners under punishment who have been turned out half an hour earlier, are fallen in and marched away to work.

The virtuous remain, to smoke their pipes and drink hot "ki." If you have never tasted "ki," that rich Navy cocoa, made from a solid cake of chocolate, which has arrowroot biscuit and Epsom salts mixed with it, you have not supped of nectar.

Despite the soothing effects of this draught, Able Seaman Jobbings remains colour con- scious. Strange, but while with his copper-coloured hair he responds quite cheerfully to the nickname of "Bluey," call him "Red" and he sees that colour vividly. So, when the regulating petty officer,interrupting him in his discussion of the virtues of the "Jimmy the One" on his-last ship by telling him to get a move on in the lashing and stowing of his hammock, leads from words to words by addressing him by that hated name, there is trouble.

As a result, as, "Out Pipes" sounds at 0555, Able Seaman Jobbings is run up to the quarterdeck for the ship is in harbour for report to the officer of the watch. And that gentleman, in turn, instructs him to appear at the Commander's table at 1030. Able Seaman Jobbings is going to 'have'an opportunity of further enlarging his views of "The Bloke."

Meanwhile the daily life of the ship is well under way. There is fun mixed up with the work, for this is a happy ship, and your Tarpaulin is a cheery soul with a rich sense of humour. And he is companionable. His habit ot striking up a special friendship with another with whom he shares his cleaning rags in this housemaid work of which there is so much aboard ship has given us another phrase, that of 'parting brassrags," as indicating that two friends have fallen out.

The morning advances. Decks are scrubbed, brass cleaned, awnings respread, guns uncovered. And, at 0705, it is "Cooks to the galley," with "Breakfast and clean" and "Pass dress of the day" at 0720. Breakfast, brought along in shining metal kids by the cook of the mess, and eaten at the spotless, hanging tables in the messdeck, is, as to his main dish, sausages, this morning, the favourite "bangers" of the Navy. There is tea, and bread, and butter, and jam, for your Naval rating feeds a sea-born appetite well on full and plenty of wholesome food of good variety.

Menus are changed daily, so that the "bangers" of today will be the eggs of tomorrow. And there are hot meat and vegetables at dinner at midday, 1200, tea and bread and butter and jam at tea at 4 p.m., 1600, and a meat meal again at the 7 p.m. supper, 1900 hours, in Navy time.
Breakfast concludes with "Out Pipes" at 0810, and the routine of the day marches on with exercises, divisions, prayers, and physical drill, to the 1030 stand easy.

Able Seaman Jobbings, alas, cannot enjoy this amenity. His presence is desired at the Commander's table. Here, with cap off as a sign that he is a defaulter and not a requestman, he listens to his crime recounted by the regulating petty officer, while the officer of the watch gives his version of the affair. The whole sad story is told, including Able Seaman Jobbing's request to the regulating petty officer to "Thank mother for the rabbits; they were lovely." The criminal is asked if he has anything to say, and "The Bloke" delivers sentence. "Four days' Number Eleven." The Master-at-Arms repeats the sentence. Then "Cap on, left turn, double march."

Able Seaman Jobbings is a Black List Man," with extra work and curtailed meal hours for four days.
The day marches on to "Evening quarters. Tea. “Libertymen to clean" at 1600. Able Seaman Jobbings, he is no libertyman, but must pay heed to "Black list men fall in" at 1700. And he plays his part in the cleaning of mess decks and flats for rounds, which take place at 2100, or 9 p.m.

And when at last the ship drifts into slumber and the day ends with "Pipe Down" at 2200, 10 p.m., he can console himself with the thought that tomorrow, beginning for him at "Call Black List Men" at 0500, will bring a day in the life of a naval rating that is, in his case at least, half an hour longer than that of his fellows. And, doubtless, he will think lovingly of "The Bloke" as he realises that.

Evidently life agrees with the boys of the Navy, judging by those pictured, ratings of H.M.A.S.Perth.

Caption beneath the attached photograph

.................................................. .................................................. ....

Ive transcribed this from The Mercury [newspaper],Wednesday 24th,1940.
I cant remember Number Elevens in my time but do recall receiving Number Nines after being caught drinking beer in my cabin late one night in Recruit School:D.

The phrase of 'parting brassrags," as indicating that two friends have fallen out is also interesting.

According to Wikipedia, the word tarpaulin originated as a compound of the words tar and palling, referring to a tarred canvas pall used to cover objects on ships. By association, according to one theory, sailors became known as tarpaulins and eventually tars. I was of the belief that the word "tar" was derived from hair being tarred back in a small ponytail.

Perhaps both are true; Im happy to stand corrected.;)

[ollie]

Hornfischer, James D. (2006). Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR's Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors. New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 9780553803907. OCLC 69680190.

Please check this book out. Its about the HMAS Perth and the USS Houston which fought side by side in the Sunda Straits. Its very good. It not only covers the sea battle but what happened to the crews of the two ships with that "infamous" railway. I believe that there is a plaque commerating the Houston next to the one for the Perth in Melbourne.

Ollie

[RADDA7]

Hi Ollie

yes i belive the plaque says in memory of the crews of H.M.A.S Perth and U.S.S Houston(CA 30) STILL ON WATCH IN SUNDA STRAIT

[LouCoatney]

Perth was the first cardstock model ship I designed using CAD, after my then-13 year old son Robert taught me how to use it. Here she is at 1/700 scale, with someone else.

88040

Down in St. Louis, some years ago, I ran an on-the-floor naval wargame hypothesizing a Battle of the China Sea, if those Australian Brewster fighters had been able to provide Prince of Wales and Repulse with fighter cover and had they not been sunk.

I had to put Hood in Repulse's stead - this was long before Repulse came out from Tamiya and then Trumpeter - and included USS Boise and Perth.

We used my (comparatively simple) Naval Action naval miniatures rules. I was the Japanese commander - a couple of Kongos and heavy cruisers and plenty of Long Lance carrying destroyers - and Ray Runge and Andrew Waller were the Allied commanders.

I followed Japanese daylight doctrine and launched shoals of torpedoes, but the cagey Allies danced out of range every time, and I then lost the battle.

I noticed Perth led the Allied battleline at every turn, and when it was over Andrew said his older brother Richard was actually the naval wargamer in the family. I felt like the troll who had been knocked off by the younger billy goat. :o

Lou Coatney, http://www.coatneyhistory.com

[RADDA7]

Thats great Lou never tried cardstock models before but looks very good in your photo :)

[astraltrader]

Please gentlemen we have a designated section for posts about modelling

[Graham Barnes]

Hello,

Not modelling news, but for those interested, I believe there is also a plaque and tree dedicated to PERTH and HOUSTON at Arlington National Cemetery in Wash. DC--I have been there and seen it, and also have photos of its dedication ceremony sent to me by one of the organizers.

[airlana]

I have just finished reading Mike Carltons wonderful book "Cruiser" devoted to HMAS Perth- how about a "Waller for VC" campaign - he certainly deserved it.


ABC Radio had a replay today of an interview with author Mike Carlton.

It's truly a wonderful interview. A couple of good laughs and to be honest, a few moments with a tear in my eye and a lump in my throat.

Runs for about 50 minutes, so make yourself a cup of coffee beforehand and enjoy.

Originally recorded at the Brisbane Writers Festival in September, it's still available for listening on ABC website.

http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/09/21/3017609.htm?site=brisbane

Ash/airlana
.