Littoral Combat Ships [Archive] - World Naval Ships Forums

designeraccd

24-03-2009, 11:15

Oh joy...another LCS has been "purchased", from a Naval Blog............

The Navy Buys USS Fort Worth (LCS 3)
The Navy has purchased another Littoral Combat Ship, the USS Fort Worth (LCS 3). From the DoD Contract announcement today.

Lockheed Martin Corp., – Maritime Systems & Sensors, Baltimore, Md., is being awarded a contract for LCS FY09 Flight 0+ ship construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support. As this award represents Phase I of a competitive two-phased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships, the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time. LCS Class ships are networked, agile, and high-speed surface combatants with versatile warfighting capabilities optimized for littoral missions. LCS is optimized for flexibility in the littorals as a system of systems that are both manned and unmanned, and mission reconfigurable. LCS focuses on three primary mission areas: Littoral Surface Warfare operations emphasizing prosecution of small boats, Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare and Littoral Mine Countermeasures. LCS also possesses inherent capabilities to execute other missions such as: Joint Littoral Mobility; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Joint Special Operations Force support; Maritime Interdiction Operations; Homeland Defense; and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection. Work will be performed in Marinette, Wis. (63 percent); Moorestown, N.J. (12 percent); Washington, D.C., (11 percent); Clearwater, Fla., (4 percent); Baltimore, Md., (4 percent); Arlington, Va., (3 percent); Brunswick, Ga., (2 percent); and Eagan, Minn., (1 percent), and is expected to be completed by Dec. 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-09-C-2303).
Note the actual cost is not released. Chris Cavas raises a few points in Navy Times.

The contract award announced March 23 uses funds appropriated in fiscal 2009, although the contract re-uses the hull number of the 2006 ship. Such a practice is unusual, in that the hull number is also considered an account identification number for bookkeeping purposes.

Revised acquisition costs for each of the first two ships have yet to be revealed by the Navy, and discussion of the new contract costs for LCS 3 and LCS 4 won’t be revealed until after the next round of contract awards, to be conducted for the fiscal 2010 ships, according to a Navy spokesman.

“The amounts will be released when the fiscal 2010 competition is over,” said Lt. Cmdr. Victor Chen, a spokesman for the Navy’s acquisition team.

The Navy plans to ask for three more LCS ships in the 2010 budget request, with two ships going to the competitor offering the best terms.

All the new LCS ships are referred to by the Navy as “Flight 0+” ships, with minor modifications over the initial, Flight 0, ships.

This really is creative contracting by the Navy. Apparently it is very easy for the Navy to avoid the cost discussion regarding the Littoral Combat Ship, they simply don't tell anyone how much it costs. I also note there is no mention whether this is a cost plus or fixed cost contract. With a phase II contract in the mix, I wonder if it matters?

Can someone fill me in. If both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics know they are going to build at least 2 ships, why do we expect cost savings on the third ship?

can we at least get an update by someone what a Flight 0+ Lockheed Martin LCS is? What are the changes?

designeraccd

24-03-2009, 20:01

MORE thoughts on LCS type ships, from another Naval Bog............

Streetfighter, LCS and the small warship problem
.

"Streetfighter

As of mid-2001 the Office of Naval Research was considering construction of a Littoral Combat Ship with a displacement of 500 to 600 tons. The LCS would have a draft of about three meters, an operational range of 4,000 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of 50-60 knots. The cost per ship might be at least $90 million.

The Streetfighter would be a smaller, very fast ship (part of the more general Streetfighter concept), that could compete successfully with the enemy for control of coasts and littoral waters. These ships are envisioned as costing less than 10% as much as current Battle Force ships, while comprising more than 25% of the total number of surface combatants [that is at least 25 but no more than 50 units].

The President of the Naval War College, Admiral Art Cebrowski, and others such as Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, have advocated the deployment of larger numbers of smaller ships to operate in “harm’s way” in littoral waters. Cebrowski and Hughes talk of “tactical instability,” where a navy is unwilling to risk its ships because the fleet is constituted principally of small numbers of expensive ships. They propose “re-balancing the fleet” by supplementing the currently planned large surface combatants with the procurement of smaller ships."
(source Globalsecurity.org)

Well, this intent turned into two prototypes for a LCS that are rather fast frigates and cost hundreds of millions of $.
The Swedes meanwhile built their Visby corvette (photo) - much slower than the Streetfighter concept, but otherwise quite similar. I have a problem with the Streetfighter/LCS speed requirements anyway. Hughes attempted to make the argument for high speed in his book, but didn't convince me.

The question of many smaller and really affordable ships to balance the big ship fleet of the US Navy as well as for naval actions close to shore ("littoral combat", "brown water") is a popular discussion topic.

Most who discuss this don't seem to start at a FAC (fast attack craft) as basis. They're usually unwilling to shed much firepower in comparison to frigates.
The proposals of individuals (usually free of any real calculation of volumes and weights) often end up as mini AEGIS cruisers with the capability of an Álvaro de Bazán class frigate (5,250 ts full) in a corvette-sized hull (usually imagined as 1,500 to 3,000 tons ).

It would be possible to start at proven FAC designs, adding merely some ASW (anti submarine warfare) equipment as used in helicopters - but this approach doesn't seem to be enticing enough.

The basic tactical idea of Cebrowski and his staff was likely to build ships that are not valuable (and thus not capable!) enough to be targeted by a SSK (modern conventional submarine) or an elaborate air attack.
Such ships would get lost in major naval warfare (as is actually absolutely normal, too many people seem to have forgotten about this) without much loss of life - the crew would be small.

The desire to have a powerful ship (even though as small as possible) looks like an almost primitive instinct to me.
Power is actually NOT desirable for such a design.
Power costs money, thus reduces quantity - and turns the ship into a juicy target, probably even ruining instead of bolstering its survivability.

Attackers have to think twice whether they will spend their surprise effect and resources at sinking ships even if they cannot reduce the enemy's offensive potential by doing so.

It's always possible to add some offensive power, to mount better sensors or to add longer-ranged air defense, maybe a helicopter pad ... but the inability to settle with a low power unit inevitably leads to big ships - ships that cannot meet the demand for "many + cheap" units.

I already mentioned the approaches that use a FAC or frigate/destroyer as starting point for morphing a design into a "smaller" combatant to beef big ship-heavy fleets.

I've got a different approach
(the subject really kept me occupied for a while):

I kept my old decoy/CIWS small boat idea and mated it with the screening small ship idea as Cebrowski and Hughes (who btw wrote an interesting book).

My starting point was the German mine-weeping drone of the "Seehund" (seal) class. It's a proven drone that provokes and survives mine hits using acoustic and magnetic simulation equipment. That design weighs in at 100 tons and has no crew (can be manned, though).

This is what I would add:

- a radar jammer
(some missiles can home on the jamming and I would prefer them to home on this boat than on a frigate or larger ship)
about 200 kg

- several decoy launchers like SRBOC
(infra-red and radar decoys, possibly also acoustic decoys against torpedoes)
about 1,000 kg for 18 loaded SRBOC tubes

- a close-in weapon system against missiles, close aircraft and guided glide bombs
(to increase survivability and to exploit CIWS firepower far ahead of the real warship, also self-defence against very small surface targets like speed boats)
about 7,000 kg (if Vulcan Phalanx and a few RAM tubes were combined)

- basic ESM system
(to detect enemy radars and radio communications)
about 500 kg

- towed radar decoys
(really just a rubber dinghy with simple 90° radar reflectors)
about 100 kg

- a dipping sonar as used by helicopters
(to complicate enemy sub operations)
about 500 kg

- a lightweight multi-function radar, possibly one of the Sea Giraffe family
(to complicate enemy air operations and to support aerial surveillance radars)
less than 1,000 kg including mast and console

- an infra-red scanner for air search, this weighs almost nothing but is short-ranged
(to detect radar stealth objects in the air and for air search during radar silence)
about 50 kg

- two 324mm lightweight torpedoes /w tubes
about 800 kg

- 18 kts cruise speed
(in order to cruise with the fleet)
? tons for much stronger propulsion and electrical system

- a two-way datalink, involving satellite communications
(to make good use of all this with remote control)
about 200 kg

- volume & weight for a crew of about 6-12 (incl. emergency equipment)
? tons

The CIWS, cruise speed requirement and crew seem to cause the greatest addition of weight, but it looks as if such a boat could be restricted to 250 tons.

It's a pain in the ass of the enemy because of its scouting and deception capabilities. It's difficult to hit even though it has no strong SAM armament. It's not be part of the fleet's main strike capability.
It's useful, but the enemy would waste time and resources on its destruction. The purpose of defensive power of a fleet - buying time for the offensive power to do its job - seems to be served if the enemy attacks such small warships.
The enemy might choose to evade it - in that case it would aid the friendly defense by adding depth / early warning.
A nice dilemma.

A little bit larger and more capability (especially more offensive capability) would lead to a design similar to the Swedish Stockholm coastal corvettes (380 tons), the predecessors of Visby.

I began at a mine sweeping drone and moved up to FAC-sized craft, almost up to a coastal corvette. The end result fills a tactical niche instead of packing a big ship into a small hull. The actual tactical value and seaworthiness of such a small craft would need to be tested in experiments and maneuvers - it's impossible to determine for a single thinker.

Sven Ortmann

P.S.: Some sources tell about 1,200 tons as planned "Streetfighter" displacement.
I wasn't even able to find a line drawing or artist's impression for the Streetfighter concept, it seems as if it was primarily a discussion topic by the office for force transformation.
Admiral Cebrowski: R.I.P.

CGRET

25-03-2009, 00:52

Again these are very costly ship's to operate in the Lottoral theater of operations. Given the current procurement program problem's one wonder's why the contract was permitted to allow the building of the other's. The whole idea was as i understand it was to development 2 opposing design's and have a operational evaulation period to see which design would best fit into the navy's brown water fleet ops.

Tactically steve idea's have merit. The street fighter concept as noted could be an alternative to the costly LCS, "if" the procurement problems can iron out.

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

25-03-2009, 14:52

Buying more of an over priced, under armed and unproven design (oh and let's not forget LATE delivery...)...with her "competitor" in the water but not "moving"....just BRILLIANT! Talk about dumb! DFO :mad:

Blaydon

25-03-2009, 16:56

I can't understand this build first decide later type of operation why not choose a design from the drawing board then make it work rather than make rival designs, than buy them all and build some then have a logistical nightmare of a class of only say 2 vessels.

designeraccd

25-03-2009, 18:56

Yup, it worked so well with the SSN Leonard P. Lipscombe, too...a one off semi-dud that was never repeated! Must give credit to our Pentagon: NEVER LEARNS, IMhO. What the heck, its only my tax $$$ being wasted, again/still...........DFO :eek::mad:

CGRET

25-03-2009, 20:43

Kev,DFO,

I would agree that they should be based on the design concept considering what computer anomation can do these day's. I'm beganing to wonder if those personel in charge of procurement at DOD are still stuck in the 40's!

Regards
Charles

Blaydon

06-04-2009, 15:23

In the uk the request for proposals is put out and is answered by parties interested with a full design and supporting data created at the bidders expense. These are then assesed by an expert pannel to see if they meet requirements and then a contract is awarded. Then the item is built and made to work.

The MOD do not fund multiple different designs from their limited budget and so are not left with useless losing designs in service which have huge support costs and no commonality.

Why is it so different over there?

designeraccd

09-04-2009, 12:43

More THOUGHTS on LCS program, from a blog...........

Some Thoughts on the Littoral Combat Ship
This has been getting some discussion in the comments, might as well get a topic going on the blog.

From this Navy Times article discussing the USS Independence (LCS 2).

That said, LCS crews will live unlike other sailors. Ship’s company numbers 40, and a mission crew and air detachment bump the complement to 76. Officers and chiefs will live two per stateroom, each with its own head. Enlisted sailors will bunk four per stateroom, also each with its own head, bringing the shipwide head total to 32.

Enlisted racks are built with ample headroom, providing space to add a third bunk to each stack of two if it’s determined later that more crew members are needed. That would scale rack space up to 99.
Let me confirm a few things. LCS-1 can scale to 100. For both ships, extra berthing requires slight modifications to the galley, and LCS-1 would require some additional plumbing modifications as well. It is important to remember the lower crew requirement was mandated to the contractors by the Navy.

As I was looking through the images provided with that article, I noted the welds on the floor seen in this photo. LCS-1 is exactly the same, but it was tiled. Also, that bridge is much bigger.

I'm going through all the data I collected while on Freedom and have accumulated regarding Independence. I know from personal experience with the tape measure I took onboard there is plenty of room in the LCS-1 hanger for 2 H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts, and the same is true for LCS-2 based on all the documentation I have, but there is a catch with Freedom.

The requirements document required the LCS to carry a minimum of 20 mission stations that breaks down like this:

2 Aviation type 1
2 Sea Type 1
2 Sea Type 2
1 sensor
3 weapons stations
9 Type 1 support stations (20 foot TEU)
1 Type 2 support station (10 foot TEU)
If you add an additional H-60, you have to also add capacity for an additional Aviation type 1 station. That is easier said than done, the Aviation type 1 modules would in theory, want to stay on the same deck as the aviation zone. On Freedom this could potentially be put where the current Captains boat is located, because as I understand it that boat is going away. I have no idea how this could be designed into LCS-2, but if it could be places in the mission bays below deck, LCS-2 has a lot more space down there than LCS-1 does.

I don't think I have made this sufficiently clear in the past. The Littoral Combat Ships, and I speak from personal experience being on USS Freedom (LCS 1), have a ton of room for growth. When Chris Cavas and I would wonder around the ship together, we would both keep bringing up just how much space that ship has. These ships were built to grow, and can do that.

Am I critic of the Littoral Combat Ships? Yep. I love the concept, the Navy needs this platform for many reasons. The Navy needs the LCS to move the unmanned systems football down the field. The Navy needs the LCS because the Navy needs hybrid sailors (what I would rename littoral warriors!).

The Navy also needs the LCS for a reason no one ever brings up. Today's US Navy knows fleet deployment in the context of deploying a ship without the need for a tender. The Littoral Combat Ship is going to institutionalize the idea (whether they are ready or not!) that platforms need a tender. In the case of the LCS, the LCS itself is the tender for the unmanned systems. People either dismiss or have not considered the long term value of this cultural change, because if you fully think it through, you would recognize why the LCS concept is very similar to sustaining smaller patrol and coastal vessels from the sea. Ultimately, the LCS moves the mothership concept a considerable distance down the field. The USS Langley analogy means something...

Am I excited about 55 of these ships? Not really, at least not yet. 20-30 makes a ton of sense in my mind, replace the minesweepers because the capabilities added are well worth the costs. This is a learning curve, committing to 55 ships before we even know whether or not we have the concepts right is premature. It could be said committing to even 20-30 before the concept has been fleshed out in premature.

Yes, the costs of buying the LCS far outweighs any costs saved not buying the ship and starting some new program. I am very comfortable with the idea the LCS is a way to start small with motherships. If the Navy gets other stuff out of it with speed, so be it, but ultimately I don't see speed being a considerable factor in the vessel, and won't be surprised if during the evolutionary development process of the platform the speed gets reduced as a cost savings measure.

Ultimately, the Littoral Combat Ship is a technology, not a littoral strategy. The littoral strategy discussion needs to happen, because when it does the LCS will start to make more sense, because it will be discussed in context as an unmanned systems mothership supporting a littoral network for providing security during peacetime and exploiting the littorals during wartime. It does not matter to me that the Littoral Combat Ship is really not built well to operate in the littorals, since it will operate over the horizon and deposit its unmanned payloads into the littoral, nor a combat ship since it is a barely armed logistics ship. The name has no meaning to me, that can be someone elses parochial soapbox.

I think it is going to be very interesting whether the Navy asks for any changes to LCS-3 or LCS-4. I hope they do, and I hope Congress supports them. The learning curve for motherships and littoral warfare is going to be very steep, and if one day the culture in surface warfare becomes more open to the generation of new ideas, getting the contractors comfortable with evolutionary design changes early in the process would be a good thing.

CGRET

10-04-2009, 17:25

I am not sure wether I would support his view point's on the LCS program considering the cost per unit! There is no mention or inference of a price reduction as further unit's are built. Given the current enviroment in the DOD, the LCS program may in the end be cut or greatly reduced.

Another thing that struck me while reading this article was that this has all the making of the early sixes when the USN stated that missile's not gun's were the way of the future. The future concept are far as weapon's and there employment has come full circle.

Myself I think the design is novel in concept, but not a new design either. It's cost per ship is not condusive to the current economic enviroment. Moreover the ship/design has not proven it's operational capabilities/survivbility. It may turn out be nothing more than a fast target in combat operations.

Regards
Charles

Blaydon

10-04-2009, 17:36

The thing is what is needed is not a high cost stealth warship but a moderately capable one that can be sortied in numbers in this environment so what is needed is a better equipped coast guard cutter rather than a scaled down zumwalt.

designeraccd

10-04-2009, 18:43

It strikes me that there are numerous designs, in production, all over the world that could provide proper INSPIRATION for what the USN does need: IMO...neither of the 2 "designs" built are the answer....except to ENRICH their builders! DFO :rolleyes:

Blaydon

10-04-2009, 18:46

some of the scandinavian designs for corvettes maybe.

OR something like a MEKO 200 or A69 or the Eilat class made by Ingalls

CGRET

10-04-2009, 19:10

DFO,Kev,

I would agree that the USN need's to look at the european design's that very well may suite the future needs, at a much lower cost per unit. By not taking advantage of the current design's in use may very well be short -sighted, and costly.

Regards
Charles

Blaydon

10-04-2009, 19:30

Something in the 1000 to 2000t bracket with a 76mm some AA missile fit and an ASW helicopter.

Commodore Armiger

11-05-2009, 10:16

For those who haven't been following the Littoral Combat Ship story too closely, here's an amateurs' guide from the BBC:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/5304963/Warship-of-future-revealed-by-US-Navy.html

CGRET

11-05-2009, 16:32

One wonder's given the current QDR if this type is going to survie the current reductions now going through the administration.

Regards
Charles

Blaydon

11-05-2009, 16:41

I think the USN (Wrongly in my opinion) have nailed their colours to the mast on the LCS they will allow a reduction in carriers, the scrapping of the Zumwalt and probably the new LPD but they will hold onto the LCS.

Personnaly I think both the LCS and Zumwalt are just what the Navy do not need.

Their need is for a large number of small manouverable ships with reasonable systems able to operate as well in coastal zones as well as in blue water and packing a reasonable punch. They need also the ability to project power over a distance and then if needed put men on the ground to complete the military objective.

They need to keep the carriers, increase the fleet train and amphibious forces and invest in a large number of corvette size vessels to do all the show the flag/low level combat tasks which will free up the destroyers and frigates to concentrate on fleet defence and ASW tasks.

CGRET

15-05-2009, 04:53

Kev,

You are correct! With the other loss of the Perry Class the Navy will be out of the brown water operations. The Perry Class was the idea plateform for that operation, considering they are close to the current Hamilton Class Coast Guard Cutters. I think the Navy is going to regret the decision to decomission that class for the LCS!

Time and world event's will dictate wether the Navy will decom one of there carriers. Considering the ops tempo and restricted availability periods. Moreover "if" Congress will let the Navy.

Regards
Charles

kookaburra

15-05-2009, 06:24

A little oblique to topic, but just on the question of building the right fleet for the future, I found this survey-based article on waning support for al-qaida in Muslim societies interesting (and encouraging).

While I still have grave worries about Pakistan (I spent a lot of time there, reporting from the middle of this in the 1990s), I think I tend to agree with the author's central proposition that al-qaida has almost had its extremely nasty day.

The piece is from the U.K. originated Open Democracy, a site I take as brain-food but don't always keep abreast of as I should. Its main luminary is Paul Rogers but this is from another specialist, Fawaz A. Gerges. Hope it shows here as I intend, and if not I'll post a copy directly...

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/al-qaida-today-the-fate-of-a-movement

CGRET

15-05-2009, 18:24

Kook,

I would agree with your comments on al-qaida. Also recent event's in Pakistan do have some trouble some trends. Hopefully they can control al-qaida in it's moves to take control of area's not controlled by the army. Let's hope they can push them back towards the northern territories.

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

21-05-2009, 12:26

More thoughts on this high priced, POS............from a blog:

All Ahead Slow on LCS

The Littoral Combat Ships is a new type of high-speed surface combatant with interchangeable warfighting mission modules optimized for littoral or coastal missions. The ship is designed to defeat asymmetric anti-access threats including mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft.

LCS consists of a seaframe that is outfitted with reconfigurable payloads, called Mission Packages that can be changed out quickly. Mission Packages are supported by special detachments that operate and maintain manned and unmanned vehicles and sensors to counter mine, undersea, and surface threats. There are currently three types of focused Mission Packages that provide potent combat capability in specific warfare areas: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). The ship will operate one package loaded at a time, but can swap to a new package in 1-4 days.

The first two ships, USS Freedom (LCS 1) and the future USS Independence (LCS 2), have very different and distinct designs. The Lockheed Martin design (LCS 1) is a high-speed semi-planing steel and aluminum monohull. The General Dynamics design (LCS 2) is an all-aluminum trimaran with a slender, stabilized monohull.

LCS is a warhship, designed to conduct combat operations. It is capable of sustaining combat damage and still perform its mission. To accomplish this, LCS was designed and constructed to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Naval Vessel Rules (NVR). LCS was the first application of NVR to a surface combatant. NVR essentially replaces military general specifications used in past surface combatants.

As a surface combatant, LCS will be crewed by U.S. Navy sailors and officers. LCS is a leap forward in automation and reduced manning. The core ship (seaframe) has a crew complement of 40. The Mission Package brings a maximum of 35 personnel, including up to 20 personnel in the aviation detachment. Total berthing aboard LCS is 75.

Team Ships FAQ - accessed 5/21/09
That typo in the second to last paragraph, fourth word, is an ironic example of exactly how much of a mess the Littoral Combat Ship program has become for the Navy. The LCS is a far cry from a warship in the historical context, so it is appropriate the word warship gets misspelled in the Navy's own description. I personally think that this description for the Littoral Combat Ship does more damage to the platform than it helps, indeed I find the entire narrative of the US Navy regarding the LCS program to be intellectually dishonest. This narrative, if it still exists in five years, will be why the Littoral Combat Ship is the Navy's greatest shipbuilding failure since the 120 gun 34 gun USS Pennsylvania.

Converted from the collier USS Jupiter (AC-3) beginning in 1920, USS Langley (CV-1) was commissioned in March 20, 1922. The Navy had already flown aircraft off the deck of a ship, but on October 17m 1922 Lieutenant Virgil C. Griffin piloted a Vought VE-7 from her decks. This is a momentous occasion in US Naval history, the age of the aircraft carrier for the US Navy was born. Nine days later Lieutenant Commander Godfrey de Courcelles Chevalier made the first landing on the USS Langley (CV-1) in an Aeromarine 39B.

In January the following year, USS Langley (CV-1) conducted flight operations and tests in the Caribbean Sea for carrier landings. Five months later the ship steamed up to Washington DC to give a demonstration at a flying exhibition before civil and military dignitaries. In 1924 the nations first aircraft carrier participated in several maneuvers with other ships and did several other demonstrations for dignitaries before departing for the Pacific at the end of 1924.

For the next twelve years the USS Langley (CV-1) operated in the Pacific training with other fleet units, conducting experimentation, and developing a pilot training program at sea. Operational models, doctrine, and tactics were developed as the aircraft carrier was prepared as a platform to screen the battle line. The USS Langley (CV-1) served as an aircraft carrier until October 25, 1936 when the ship was converted into a seaplane tender.

Despite the long innovative development of the aircraft carrier, five years and two months after the USS Langley (CV-1) was retired as an aircraft carrier, the Japanese Navy demonstrated the utility of the aircraft carrier to the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 6, 1941. In other words, despite conceptual development, conversion, evaluation and experimentation of this very innovative, but complicated technology the US Navy never developed an effective concept of operations for aircraft carriers prior to WWII. The US Navy struggled to understand where the aircraft carrier fit in the fleet, and ultimately the Japanese showed us. With that said, what the US Navy did do is stick with aircraft carriers as a technology, and had not only built but had mastered the construction of the very complicated technologies of aircraft carriers allowing us to build several modern aircraft carriers during WWII.

I believe USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) represent the USS Langley (CV-1) of the 21st century. I believe that in the 21st century, motherships for manned and unmanned underwater, surface, and aviation systems will be as important as aircraft carriers were in the 20th century. I believe these distributed, sometimes expansive offboard system empowered networks will influence the littoral battlefield and determine who controls the seas.

I see unmanned systems as the dominate warfighting approach towards controlling the maritime battlefield in the 21st century, just as I see manned systems as the dominate peacemaking approach on the maritime battlefield in the 21st century. Motherships, with the ability to deploy both manned and unmanned systems, represent the emerging capability of our time on the maritime battlefield. I believe sea control in 21st century warfighting will require dominance above and under the sea, but 21 century sea control for peacemaking will require a sailor present at the point of contact with the population on the sea.

The Littoral Combat Ship is an innovative, complicated, small modular mothership that introduces the Navy to the technical, logistical, operational, tactical, and doctrinal challenges of the 21st century mothership concept. Just as the USS Langley (CV-1) was a far from perfect aircraft carrier, both LCS designs are far from perfect motherships.

Cost

One of the most cited items of complaint for the Littoral Combat Ship is the cost. For months I have been searching for answers to a few questions: Where did the number $220 million for the hull come from, and where did the number $180 million for the modules come from. The Navy is so wildly wrong on the estimates for both hull and module that I never believed these figures were produced from a technical evaluation of cost. In my search for the truth, it turns out the answer is as I suspected, both figures were a wild ass guess.

Several sources have confirmed to me the way the Littoral Combat Ship estimate of $220 million was reached was that during a visit to Odense Steel Shipyard, ADM Vern Clark asked the shipbuilders how much HDMS Absalon (L16) cost. The answer was $440 million. When the Littoral Combat Ship was developed as a ship about half the size of the Absalon class, Clark used the number $220 million as the estimate for the platform. Half the size meant half the cost, and the number was apparently never questioned. Unfortunately, HDMS Absalon (L16) costs a hell of a lot more than $440 million, because $440 million was the estimate at the time of the contract with Odense Steel Shipyard, and basically included only the hull. $440 million was the estimate for a hollow shell, but became the driving number for $220 million which was supposed to include all of the systems and the hull of the LCS.

Today the LCS cost is still largely unknown. While Congress has established a $460 million cost cap, there is no guarantee this cost cap can be achieved for the hull regardless of how many are built. The mission modules are also very immature, and as such have enormous potential for long term problems. The Navy intends to spend the next five years testing USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2), and the odds that the mission modules of today will look the same in five years is very slim.

The LCS Is Counter Culture

The Littoral Combat Ship is more complicated than people give it credit for, as several aspects of the Littoral Combat Ship represent the antithesis of naval ship development. The engineering for modularity is both new and complicated. The Littoral Combat Ship is a test case for a lot of automation intended to reduce the crew size of ships. The Littoral Combat Ship is a test case for high speed on small crew conventional warships, and has an overly complicated CODAG engineering plant highly dependent on automation as a result. The engineering challenges of the hull are only part of the problem, almost none of the pieces intended to make up the mission modules includes a mature technology. The crew scheme, the doctrine for operating the ship, the concept of operations for the ship type, and the logistics of the mission functions and the hull types are all challenges yet to be fully developed.

The US Navy is a blue water Navy, and the US Navy has not developed a littoral strategy that includes ships intended to operate in the littoral since WWII. During both Korea and Vietnam, the US Navy leveraged vessels either designed or evolved from WWII era ship designs, with small ships like the Asheville class, Pegasus class, and Cyclone class being the rare exceptions. Among the exceptions, only USS Typhoon (PC-5) has served in the Navy consecutively for more than 15 years.

I am often struck by how critics misunderstand how the Littoral Combat Ship represents something so unique in US Navy culture that we haven't seen anything like it in over 5 decades. This is a relatively small ship being developed specifically for the littorals intended to serve longer than just 2 decades. It seems to me that critics too easily dismiss or fail to recognize just how foreign it is that the US Navy would operate a small vessel for any meaningful period of time. I'm not saying that corvettes won't happen, but the suggestion the US Navy will build small platforms for the littoral simply because someone else does is crazy talk, it is completely against the US Navy culture and will require a major mindset adjustment.

Where is LCS Going?

Critics of the LCS suggest the US Navy should be building safe, proven hulls instead of the wild combination of capabilities represented in the Littoral Combat Ship. I only disagree with one aspect of that line of thought, the whole idea of "instead." The rest of the world is building nice, safe ~3000 ton hulls with designs that are decades old and barely innovative. FREMM is nowhere close to as flexible as the Littoral Combat Ship in terms of modularity, and comparing the Absalon to the LCS in terms of systems support demonstrates pure ignorance. Absalon has space, but it takes a lot more than space to support unammned systems. No question FREMM and Absalon are excellent ship designs, but there is nothing truly innovative about them, and they cannot support flexible, interchangeable modular payloads.

Innovation is the bane of contracting, indeed contracting by nature is a risk averse exercise that draws criticism at a rate consistent with the level of risk involved. The LCS is a combination of several innovations including modularity, unmanned systems, smaller crew size, automation, and speed. I personally don't think all of these combination's add up to a 'littoral combat ship' nor even a ship with well designed requirements, but I appreciate the fact the Navy needs to get all of these innovations into the future fleet (thus to sea). The only way that happens is to build a few Littoral Combat Ships and see what they can do.

Other than the LCS, right now the US Navy has nothing on the chalkboard smaller than the DDG-51s, and nothing on the chalkboard that can act as a mothership smaller than the LPD-17. If the LCS was canceled today, what would the US Navy build? MSC ships like T-AKE or JHSVs? I'll take more Littoral Combat Ships instead. The QDR is going to hopefully change what goes on the chalkboard, but even that will take a few years. For now, the Littoral Combat Ship is an excellent way to move ahead with mothership development in my opinion.

Change the Narrative!

The Navy needs to change the narrative for the LCS. There are at least 5 very difficult years ahead of the Littoral Combat Ship where testing and evaluation will be conducted. It is intellectually dishonest every time a flag officer claims to know what the LCS is, or what it can do. The fact is, nobody knows what the LCS will be or what it will do well, or do poorly. Anyone suggesting the Littoral Combat Ship is going to be excellent at some specific task in 2009 is basically the fool suggesting what the aircraft carrier is going to mean to the 20th century back in 1923. Nobody in 1923 knew how the aircraft carrier was going to influence naval warfare, the predictions were much more generic. Nobody in 2009 knows for sure how motherships are going to influence naval warfare, we can only make generic predictions.

The Littoral Combat Ship program is likely to be the most innovative and influential development for surface warfare in the first half of the 21st century, a unique opportunity for today's surface warfare community to be the pioneers in how surface warfare will operate in the 21st century. The layers of awareness in the maritime domain that motherships will enable, the networked capabilities motherships will empower for the both the warfighter and peacemaker, and the development of the concept of operations for motherships will all combine to influence the way surface warfare will command the sea in the 21st century.

The Littoral Combat Ship itself is almost certainly going to be looked back on through the prism of history in the same context we now look at the USS Langley (CV-1) and see a poorly designed aircraft carrier. But that isn't how we look at the USS Langley (CV-1) today, is it?

I hope the Navy continues with the LCS despite the critics. I also hope the Navy slows down with the LCS and develops a new narrative central to innovating towards a conclusion without attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole. The LCS is not a solution to anything other than challenging assumptions, innovating motherships and associated technologies, and developing a new concept of operations for surface warfare.

Sure appears to be a HIGH PRICED, under armed "solution"......IMhO...DFO :eek:

CGRET

21-05-2009, 20:08

I would say that nobody is against the overall concept, it's the timing/costs of these projects that comes into question along with the overall demise of the Fleet due to the QDR and the economic downturn of the economy!

What is striking the LCS as a "ship" as NOT proven itself as a asset to the fleet and yet the USN is continuing to build these ships. What ever happen to building a prototype and using that for the basis "if" in fact the "ship"?, can prove it's design concept in the real world of naval operations!

It's a sad state of affairs when the USN build's a class of ship and commission's that class without it even been proven.

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

22-05-2009, 21:22

Aw now let's not be logical about this! The apparent ineptitude of this project along with many other gold plated wonders is truly sad, and of course contributes very little to the defense of the Country........DFO :(

Blaydon

22-05-2009, 22:00

Charles you are correct the various systems modules are still in a very early state of development and how well they can or will integrate with the ship is still open to question. This could result in four prototype warships at huge cost with no correctly operating systems. This could mean a lot of money down the drain due to this method of procurement.

designeraccd

30-05-2009, 11:51

Oh too TRUE........

The Navy’s new littoral combat ship (LCS) is the poster child for everything wrong with Navy shipbuilding, from GovExec:

When Rep. Gene Taylor, chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, talks about the Littoral Combat Ship, you almost expect to see steam come out of his ears. “To call the LCS troubled would be an understatement,” the Mississippi Democrat says. The program was conceived in 2002 to deliver a high-speed, easily maneuverable ship that could perform a range of missions in coastal areas, giving the Navy an edge on what strategists believe are the most likely future maritime battlegrounds.”A look at the plan from just two years ago [shows] we should by now have at least four ships delivered, three more nearing completion from a fiscal year 2008 authorization, six more under contract from a fiscal year 2009 authorization, and today we should be discussing the authorization of six more ships for fiscal year 2010,” Taylor lectured two senior admirals during a March 10 hearing.”The fact of the matter is that this program has so far delivered one ship – one ship,” a frustrated Taylor repeated.

Specifically, here is what went wrong:

Lockheed Martin, with little shipbuilding experience, got the first contract and began work at the Marinette Marine shipyard on the Menominee River in Wisconsin. There were a number of problems from the outset. First, in an effort to save time, the Navy and contractors decided to begin construction of the lead ship before the design was complete, a decision that would prove fatal to both schedule and cost commitments.As contractors were adapting a commercial design for military use, the service was overhauling its shipbuilding codes, establishing rules that essentially would preclude the use of most commercial standards for warships. What’s more, the Navy exercised little oversight at the shipyard. A decade of outsourcing had decimated the service’s in-house engineering and acquisition workforce. By the time Lockheed delivered the first ship in September 2008, the cost had more than doubled.General Dynamics encountered similar problems building the second ship in Alabama, for which the Navy expects to take delivery this summer. In both cases, design changes during construction racked up enormous costs.

Basically the same story with every new warship design under construction, changes made after the contract has been signed and building begun. Not to sound as frustrated as Rep. Taylor, but they will do it again, and again, and again…

Numbers mean everything for small escort type warships, and decades-long procurement policies, especially in wartime when equipment becomes obsolete very quickly, can no longer be tolerated.

Let's see: 2002-2009= 1 ship in 7 years. From 1940-1945 the USN built the mightest FLEET the world had ever seen...oh, in 5 years. What Industrial base, WHAT "leadership"??? PATHETIC. Adding insult to injury: this yard DID have a good reputation, BEFORE Lockheed bought them!...DFO

designeraccd

31-05-2009, 15:08

More on LCS.........

ANOTHER CONFUSED ADMIRAL

OK, let's assume, for the purposes of discussion, that VADM Barry McCullough, who is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, is not an idiot, but has just been badly advised. He is quoted in Inside Defense as saying: “You don’t have a realistic view of what the cost will be, the recurring expense, until about the fifth ship of any type,” he said. “That doesn’t mean five LCS’s, that means five of each kind. And that’s pretty much where you figure out what the recurrent cost is going to be.”

Wrong. Any experienced and capable shipbuilder can estimate the cost of the ships it builds, including the shape of the "learning" curve, assuming that the design has been properly developed. If they couldn't, they would never be able to bid for fixed-price contracts - e.g., all commercial work - and would be out of business. This includes all three LCS builders - Marinette, Bollinger and Austal - and Austal's prime contractor, Bath Iron Works. (It doesn't include Lockheed Martin, who got out of shipbuilding in the 1980s after realizing that it was altogether too difficult for them.) If you have been told otherwise, Admiral, you have been misinformed.

There are two principal reasons that the LCS costs are still shrouded in confusion. First, the Navy is still making endless design changes - just ask Colonna's, where LCS 1 has spent most of this year so far and where she will practically be living for the rest of the year: Admiral, you and the Navy's acquisition executives need to stop all this messing around, freeze the designs and let the shipbuilders get on with building the ships. Second, the Navy (and the Congress) have unrealistic expectations regarding cost: if you want to come in under the cost cap, you need to eliminate some of the bells and whistles. Finally, if you could restructure these contracts so as to make the shipbuilders the prime contractors, so much the better.

Good grief, when Secretary Lehman said the other day that the Navy looks incompetent, he wasn't kidding. May 30, 2009.

CGRET

31-05-2009, 18:51

It would appear so after reading your post! The whole area of ship building for USN is being put into question by congress and rightly so.

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

01-06-2009, 22:00

It just keeps getting better and better with these things..........NOT! :mad:

LCS #2 at over $700 million
2009 June 1
by Mike Burleson Navy Times reports:

The estimated cost of the first of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships rose a modest $6 million over the past year, but the price tag to complete the second LCS jumped $68 million, putting the ship over the $700 million mark, Pentagon budget documents show.
The price to build, outfit and deliver the Freedom (LCS 1) now is $637 million, up from last year’s estimate of $631 million. The ship was delivered to the Navy last September and commissioned in November, but the service and shipbuilder Lockheed Martin will continue to complete the warship well into 2009, as intended.
The price tag for the Independence (LCS 2), however, is pegged by the Navy at $704 million, up from last year’s mark of $636 million.
I imagine to the Navy $6 million is “modest” but could get you a Stiletto without the frills. Remember some of us in comments were predicting the LCS would go up to $1 billion or more by the next decade? Pretty steep for a low-end frigate if you ask me.

Time for a second-look at the corvette Admiral Roughead.

CGRET

01-06-2009, 23:34

I would say someone needs to review the contract and see where the flaw's are! Or better yet maybe they should outright cancel due to excessive cost! Someone in DOD, heads need to roll over this very project. Way to expensive, and cost keep going up??? Not a fair deal at all...

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

02-06-2009, 13:32

It just gets to be a even "better bargain".........:mad:

LCS-2 Now +$252,000 per Ton
It feels like Groundhog Day for the Littoral Combat Ship program.

Keep in mind; we only have several more years of trial and error for these ships before they actually make a deployment. Chris Cavas has the report.

The estimated cost of the first of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships rose a modest $6 million over the past year, but the price tag to complete the second LCS jumped $68 million, putting the ship over the $700 million mark, Pentagon budget documents show.

The price to build, outfit and deliver the Freedom (LCS 1) now is $637 million, up from last year’s estimate of $631 million. The ship was delivered to the Navy last September and commissioned in November, but the service and shipbuilder Lockheed Martin will continue to complete the warship well into 2009, as intended.

The price tag for the Independence (LCS 2), however, is pegged by the Navy at $704 million, up from last year’s mark of $636 million. The ship is still under construction at Austal USA in Mobile, Ala., under subcontract from General Dynamics. Initial sea trials are expected to take place this summer, with delivery scheduled for later this year.
With LCS-2 now +$252,000 per ton, assuming 2784 tons, the USS Independence is more expensive per ton than any ship under construction by the US Navy, including a $2.5 billion DDG-51 or a $3.5 billion DDG-1000, and I'm overestimating the costs of both the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 with those estimates.

I don't see how $460 million price cap is in any way realistic. I also still don't see any realistic discussions of the Littoral Combat Ship from anyone inside the Navy.

With the competition competing both designs head to head for awhile, I'm curious how many of each design would need to be purchased at once to reach the $460 million cost cap per ship. I also don't see how Bob Work's suggestion to evolve the design in Blocks will in any way reduce the price of the ships, particularly when static designs are what allows one to estimate costs effectively.

This program is treading water, and as of right now is a small 4 ship program of technology demonstrators. The Navy needs a credible plan regarding the Littoral Combat Ship, because everything the Navy and the Industry is saying about this platform further erodes not only the credibility of the program, but the credibility of leadership.

designeraccd

11-06-2009, 13:46

HONESTY...D.C. style............

When 'Smile and Nod' Goes Bad
When I read Dana Milbank's article in the Washington Post this morning, the first thing i thought about was the hearing I sat in discussed in The Post Oceanic Navy written by my friend Claude Berube, which can be read on the Small Wars Journal. He described a House hearing in March, one I attended and saw for myself, that sounded a lot like what Dana Milbank is reporting. The word is parochial.

One can sense the sarcasm and frustration overflowing in this Washington Post article. I highly recommend reading the article if you haven't, because once you read the first page, I know you'll read the second page which gets to the two exchanges with Alabama Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala) I want to highlight. This is the first.

Alabama's Shelby followed that with a bit of lobbying for the Army aviation school at Fort Rucker. "This is an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now," he said.

"Having visited Fort Rucker, it's clear that the schoolhouse needs to be expanded and modernized," Gates replied.
Funny answer. Interesting if true, because despite all the happy talk of education that one might hear in Washington DC, this might be the only time DDESS schools comes up in testimony the entire FY10 budget year. Damn I love Gates, not only does he advocate to fund the State Dept., but he plays the role of DDESS superintendent when necessary too.

Anytime ADM Mullen is acting in his role as CJCS for the wars, I think Mullen is excellent. With that said, anytime Mullen is speaking for the Navy, he doesn't do the Navy any favors.

Shelby also coaxed Mullen to praise Alabama's very own littoral combat ships. "Could you tell us here the advantages that the Navy will gain once the service begins to utilize the LCS?" he asked.

"Okay," Mullen obliged. "I need the LCS at sea, deployed today. . . . It offers unique characteristics in terms of speed and mobility and . . ."

"Also firepower," Shelby added.

"And firepower," Mullen agreed.
Sigh. ADM Mullen is a former Chief of Naval Operations who knows the Littoral Combat Ship so well, he signed off on the construction of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. He is currently serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest ranking military officer in the United States. Maybe we should just pretend ADM Mullen is ignorant about the LCS, instead of acknowledging Mullen is being dishonest in front of a Senator, telling that Senator exactly what he wanted to hear.

Firepower on the LCS? When a 4 star Admiral is obviously dishonest about a controversial platform in a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing about the capabilities of a program more than 300% over budget, as LCS-2 is, for the purposes of telling a Senator representing his district exactly what he wants to hear, and what you want him to believe, so he will fund your program...

What are people supposed to think? What does this say about the Navy? What does this say about the LCS? What does this say about everyone in OSD, the Senate, the House, the Executive branch, and the Navy who stands quiet when they know this is clear dishonesty? It is impossible to assume that Mullen, the CNO who was so intimately involved in the development of this system, is either ignorant regarding the 'firepower' of the LCS, or actually believes the 57mm and RAM represents firepower.
No amount of spin can fix the image of a controversial ship obviously discussed dishonesty in a widely read article in the Washington Post. The LCS earns every bit of skepticism and criticism it gets.

CGRET

12-06-2009, 00:24

Maybe someone needs to ask the million dollar question, Why is the cost keep going up and still NOT one is at sea proving it's capablilities and maybe even an assist to the fleet? The Navy is pooring all of it money into this design, for what? Is the design capable of holding it's own? Has it proven anything as of this date? The only thing it has proven is it's upward cost!

If this keeps up the USN will not have a proven plateform for the brown water ops(Littoral) any time soon. Then as always the US Coast Guard will have to use it's Hamilton Class Cutter to fill the void, moreover these cutter are at the end of there service lives and are in of another major overhaul if they expect these cutters to last until the USN can get it's act together!

Regards
Charles

Blaydon

12-06-2009, 17:43

The cost keeps going up because the design hasn't been frozen so they keep changing it even whilst they are trying to build it which is just plain stupid.

The fact is these two concepts are both overpriced and late and were in my opinion not ideal designs for their intended task.

They need smaller cheaper and with a decent capability and a design that can be mass produced.

The threat in littoral waters has not changed significantly since the second world war. This remains conventionally powered submarines and small fast craft so we need a small vessel with a good sonar suite an ASW weapons system and helicopter and a reasonable number of small/medium size guns and maybe some harpoons.

These capabilities should not cost 700 million a pop.

I know these guys don't like anything less than cutting edge wonder ships but when are they going to admit they have made a mistake here.

CGRET

12-06-2009, 18:10

Kev,

I would agree with your comments 100%!

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

13-06-2009, 00:05

A quick look thru JFS shows quite a few modern designs that are proven, cost effective and armed with far more than 1 "hi-tech" 57mm popgun; any of these would appear to have much more capability, if not speed, than these 2 OVER priced lumps the USN has yet to put in service..........what a CROCK! DFO :eek::mad::mad:

designeraccd

14-06-2009, 17:02

This would $eem to $um it up.........unfortunately.........DFO :eek:

CGRET

07-07-2009, 03:40

LCS 2 begins 3 day sea trails.

50561

The link below will give the full story.

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/07/navy_lcs2_sea_trials_070209w/

Regards
Charles

CGRET

09-07-2009, 15:48

Here are some photo's.

5070850709

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

19-07-2009, 11:21

LCS Alternative: Cyclone class Patrol Vessel
Not my idea this time, but from the Death and Taxes blog, an updated version of a proven shallow water patrol ship:

What the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard need is an enlarged and upgunned version of the PC-1 Cyclone class of vessels. The Cyclone class was built using proven technology and was relatively inexpensive to acquire. They have provided solid service to both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard…A slight expansion in the design would allow them to be armed with a 30mm or 35mm version of the Bushmaster (Bushmaster II and Bushmaster III) along with a much more capable anti-aircraft weapon like the Rolling Airframe Missile launcher.

Here is my favorite quote:

The design and the weapons are “off the shelf” technology, so there would be no need for costly and doubtful experimentation that would delay delivery and drive costs through the roof.

Like the failed LCS class. Off the shelf is a mantra we continually preach at New Wars. No need for a revolutionary breakthrough in technology, just give us sound hulls and lots of them, with a mind at how the pirates and terrorists using standard technology are running rings around us most everywhere.

From a Naval Blog: OBVIOUSLY way to logical, cost effective and just plain useful to be viable "inside the Beltway".......DFO :rolleyes:

davep

19-07-2009, 15:27

way to sensible an idea for politicians, it seems to make sense to them that they pay for unproven new designs that come in well over budget and still have teething problems. rather than buy proven developed systems that work and that can be updated and refined a lot cheaper.
but then the big defence contractors wouldnt be able to keep fleecing governments out of money then!

CGRET

19-07-2009, 15:40

You know, I would agree with the comments made!

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

19-07-2009, 15:45

Funny...thought you might! However, me too...as my OPINION of the 2 LCS "designs" isn't printable! POS's...... DFO :mad:

CGRET

19-07-2009, 18:55

Well think about it. 1. These ships are made of Aluminum. 2. What happen's when it get's really hot? 3. I have my doubt's as to wether it could stop any round's.

Basically a fast moving target!

Regards
Charles

davep

19-07-2009, 20:37

to answer the question about aluminium they just need to ask the rn, we can tell them how the type 21's burned thanks to aluminium construction.
i believe the current school of thought isnt for it to stop a round but for it to pass straight through and explode on the other side.
but then i'm just a sailor from the tuperware part of the fleet:)

CGRET

19-07-2009, 20:44

davep,

I am a brown water sailor myself, USCG. But i have seen the effects of it burning as well, not fun! But if you were to hit these ships with a 50 caliber, a bushmaster it would leave these ships in a less than desirable position!

Regards
Charles

designeraccd

21-07-2009, 23:52

Well somebody needs to provide TARGETS; to bad it looks to be the USN, with va$t amount$ of TAX dollar$$$$$$$$$$$$$......DFO :mad:

CGRET

22-07-2009, 01:59

Well maybe the Pirates will do that for us, if they are deployed. But in these ships will sail but with out the defense modules, pity they may get sunk in the run by an AK-47 or a 30-06 in the right place.

Regards
Charles

mustang ali

12-10-2010, 11:27

governments never learn, what next building "Red October"

BTW Davep what part of Dunfermline do you hail from, I'm originally from Dunfermline

designeraccd

20-11-2010, 06:10

one BLOGGERS opinion.............

Shipyards, Tea Leaves and the LCS: Austal is gonna winby Craig Hooper on November 19, 2010

As the Navy works to cajole a lame-duck Congress into approving the Navy’s proposal to build 10 variants of each LCS model, it is interesting–and potentially educational–to observe the shipbuilders who have skin in this fight–the recently divorced General Dynamics/Austal team, and the Marinette/Lockheed team.

Marinette Marine: Puttin’ on a show!

In Wisconsin, Marinette, after a premature shipyard celebration, is, as the prospects for the LCS “dual buy” get increasingly uncertain, resorting to a bit of theater, imposing a two-day shipyard furlough as they move the PCU Fort Worth into place for a scheduled December 4 launch. And, just to make things hit home even harder, the yard’s President has announced that 200 workers (or so) will be given a longer layoff on December 4, just before Christmas. Or just before Congress closes up shop. They’re blaming the delayed LCS contract:

After appearing at a St. Norbert College event in De Pere Tuesday morning, Marinette Marine CEO Richard McCreary said the layoffs are mainly due to the delay in the expected littoral combat ship contract with the US Navy.

“Originally LCS was supposed to be awarded last July, then it was August, then it was September, and obviously we’re in November marching into December.”…

…Even though the company’s president says they’ll try to bring back workers as fast as possible, having this happen around the holidays makes it tough.

“Any time in December, that’s going to cut people’s holiday pay out, which for us averages to like ten days or something like that. So not only will they be going on unemployment before Christmas, they’ll be taking a huge cut in pay also,” pipe fitter John Semrau said.

That’s leading to some pushback that gives a little insight on how Marinette strained to get LCS-3 done. Marinette is having trouble finding steady work for it’s shipbuilders (their NOAA Fishery Research Vessel is only getting started and the Alaska Regional Research Vessel is suffering design problems):

That same person posted, “The management brought in 70-100 contractors so they could have the LCS (littoral combat ship) 80 percent complete when it hits the water, and now I’m going to lose my job because of this.”

McCreary confirms the company brought in subcontractors for two months to help with the Navy combat ship. He argues the company has to abide by the Navy’s schedule and get the work done by the ship’s launch date, which is December 4th.

Even worse, it looks as if Marinette’s corporate parent, the Italian-government-sponsored Fincantieri, is still not delivering on their long-promised $100 million-dollar investment in shipyard modifications–which is going to cause problems for Marinette’s planned bid for the LCAC(X) or ship-to-shore connector.

From this distance, Marinette looks more than a little hollow. A Potemkin shipyard, so to speak.

Austal: We’re a little to busy to talk.

In the south, Austal, buoyed by the JHSV contract and in the midst of work on the LCS-4, isn’t saying anything. Rather than talk layoffs, the company is simply projecting strength, and hiring people.

It isn’t even celebrating. Rather than celebrate, the company joined Alabama officials the other week to open a massive, $12 million dollar Maritime Training Center. A short walk away from Austal’s brand-new ship manufacturing center, the new facility is, basically, Austal’s clubhouse–a way to sift for good workers and hone the skills of the workers already on site.

General Dynamics: Bath crushing some sour grapes:

The only public comment coming from the Independence Class side of the house is the sour grapes flowing from the Bath shipbuilding unit of General Dynamics. After trying to work around the Navy’s original RFP, General Dynamics took the risk of cutting relations with Austal, with the intention to serve as the second-bidder for the follow-on LCS contract of 5-10 hulls.

If the split buy goes through, the Bath yard gets left out in the cold (though I strongly suspect that the DDG-1000 and DDG-51 margins are going to be far higher than what might have come from the LCS contract).

Maine’s Senator Susan Collins has taken up the case, and helped restrain Congressional enthusiasm for the split-buy plan:

The Navy proposal “represents an unexpected reversal of its procurement plans” and would make it unlikely that Bath Iron Works could compete for the construction of the ships, said Collins, a Maine Republican who serves on the Armed Services Committee.

And though General Dynamics hasn’t officially said anything about the split-buy, it has pointedly (and rather hurriedly) announced the shut-down it’s LCS design center of excellence (even though the facility was slated for a shut-down months ago):

“The work (in that building) primarily involved LCS design, which we’re really no longer involved with in a big way, so the folks who were out there are now moving back into other areas of the company,” BIW spokesman Jim DeMartini told The Times Record this week…

…DeMartini stopped short of saying there would be no layoffs as a result of the demise of BIW’s involvement in the LCS program, but he said moving out of the Industrial Parkway facility is not a sign of job cuts. He said the employees who were working there are primarily being moved to buildings where work on other ship programs is taking place.

It doesn’t feel like there is any love lost here.

Conclusion: Marinette in trouble.

So…with this information, what does it tell us?

I think the split buy is going to have a hard time.

If the dual-buy dies in Congress, and the Navy pulls the trigger on a downselect, I don’t think LCS-1 is going to win. I hold to my original assessment. LCS-1 may win on cost, but I don’t see it winning a contest and a re-compete. But I am an optimist.

Frankly, I wonder just how prepared Marinette Marine actually is for the contract. Is that yard ready to grow to take this 10-ship fabrication contract? I don’t see it….Where (and when) will the shipyard recapitalize? Where will it find trained people? In short, where’s the manufacturing sinews? Given the contractual timelines, I don’t see it.

Even worse for Marinette, if the split-buy dies in Congress, given Marinette Marine’s work-flow hiccups, the shipyard is in serious trouble. In the event of an expensive and lengthy legal contest, the workers that built the LCS-1 and 3 are gonna go away. Even if LCS-1 wins under the original RFP, delay kills Marinette’s LCS workforce.

Even with the split-buy, that yard looks like it is on the verge of loosing the nucleus of their LCS workforce. Add in any delay, those workers are pretty much gone. Good-bye. See ya.

Austal, on the other hand, has a new yard, a complete training center—and lots of work ready to sustain trained workers in the event of a contested contract. The shipyard is set out with sufficient space to grow, and once the LCS contract gets inked, Austal can simply pull out some blueprints and grow–a simple glance at low-rez overhead imagery can show you that they’ve already pre-prepped building sites for their yard growth.

So, with this in mind, I’m getting somewhat concerned about the LCS-1 variant. I don’t think Marinette has the stuff to pull off a 10-ship contract in a timely fashion. Austal does. And should the LCS dual-buy devolve into an LCS duel over contracts, I favor Austal’s chances. They can hunker down and fight without fear of loosing their work force.

At some point, that manufacturing strength speaks for itself.

Hopefully Congress–and the Navy–agree.

In my oh so humble OPINION: save the money; DUMP both designs: and build a WARship that is cost effective, ARMED for combat and with enough strength to absorb battle damage but still fight....say like the @ 2/3 size WW 2 USN Fleet Destroyers could and did! DFO :eek::(

Gone Asiatic

20-11-2010, 09:46

I agree totally!

Blaydon

08-12-2010, 12:36

Save everyone the trouble bin them all and buy a small fleet of Visbys with the money.

designeraccd

10-12-2010, 11:39

More on these pathetic, UNDER armed, OVER priced..."warships"........

Friday, December 10, 2010
Littoral Combat Ships: Acqusition Strategies and Construction Revelations

If you have been wondering what is going on with the Littoral Combat Ship program, it turns out the US government and US Navy has been working hard to insure there is plenty of information. In a span of 24 hours there was a new report from the Government Accountability Office and Ronald O'Rourke put out no less than 3 updates to the Congressional Research Service report Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress - the latest being the second report issued dated December 8th.

Lets start with the dual-purchase acquisition strategy first. Ronald O'Rourke's latest CRS report has incorporated both the GAO report and further information provided by the Navy that outlines a great deal of the issues that were brought up last week by Sean Stackley at the launching of the USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) regarding costs. I quote in full some new sections from the CRS report.

Enough Time for Adequate Congressional Review of Navy Proposal?

Regarding the first item above—whether the timing of the Navy’s proposal provides Congress with enough time to adequately assess the relative merits of the down select strategy and the dual award strategy—it can be noted that this is the third time in the history of the LCS program that the Navy has presented Congress with an important choice about the future of the LCS program late in the congressional budget-review cycle, after Congress had completed its spring budget review hearings and some of its committee markups. The first instance was in mid-2002, when the Navy submitted an amended request to Congress for FY2003 funding to get the LCS program started using a rapid acquisition strategy. The second was in September 2009, when the Navy announced its proposed down select strategy for the LCS program (see the discussion of this issue in following section on the down select strategy). In light of the third instance—the Navy’s proposal in November 2010 for using a dual-award strategy rather than a down select strategy—a potential issue for Congress are the implications for the LCS program and congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs in general of proceeding with the LCS program in part on the basis of policies originally presented as proposals to Congress late in the congressional budget-review cycle, after Congress had completed its spring budget-review hearings and some of its committee markups.

Potential Relative Ship Procurement Costs

Regarding the second item above—the potential relative costs of the down select and dual-award acquisition strategies—the Navy estimates that procuring LCSs under the dual-award strategy would cost $1 billion less through FY2016 than procuring them under the down select strategy. SURE IT WILL.

Under the down select strategy, shipyards competing to become the second LCS builder could include yards that currently build other ships for the Navy, such as, possibly, General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, or General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA. If such a yard were to be selected under the down select strategy to become the second LCS builder, it could reduce the cost of other Navy ships being built at that yard by more fully spreading the fixed overhead costs of that yard. It is not clear whether the Navy’s estimated $1 billion savings accounts for a possible reduction in the cost of other Navy ships that might be realized under the down select strategy through more full spreading of shipyard fixed overhead costs.

Potential Combat System-Related Investment Costs

Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the down select strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could be offset by potential additional costs under the dual-award strategy for developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system for the two LCS designs. Developing a new common combat system for the two LCS designs might cost tens of millions of dollars. Procuring replacement combat systems for LCSs could cost tens of millions of dollars per ship. Removing an LCS’s existing combat system and installing a replacement system could cost several millions of dollars per ship.[/B

If, for example, the Navy decided to develop a new common combat system for both LCS designs, developed that new system at a one-time cost of, say, $30 million, procured 24 copies of that system at a recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them on the first 24 LCSs (i.e., LCSs 1 through 4, plus the 20 ships to be awarded under the dual-award strategy’s two 10-ship block-buy contracts) at a recurring installation cost of, say $5 million per ship, the total cost would be $1,350 million.

If, as another example, the Navy decided to adopt one of the two existing LCS combat systems as the common combat system for both designs, adapted that existing system for the other LCS design at a one-time cost of, say, $10 million, procured 12 copies of that system at a recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them on 12 of the first 24 LCSs (i.e., the LCSs originally built or to be built with the other combat system ) at a recurring installation cost of, say $5 million per ship, the total cost would be $670 million.

[B]Regarding the Navy’s intentions regarding the currently different combat systems on the two LCS designs, a November 29, 2010, press report states that “the Navy intends to keep separate the combat systems of the Lockheed and Austal USA versions of the Littoral Combat Ships for its dual buy strategy, but will ‘procure the tech data package to allow for consideration of [a] common combat system in the future,’ according to Navy spokeswoman Capt. Cate Mueller.” The report also quoted an industry official as saying that the Navy is likely “still strategizing as to how they’re going to single up on a combat system.”

Potential Relative Life-Cycle Operation and Support (O&S) Costs

Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the down select strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could also be offset by potential additional life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs of operating significant numbers of two different LCS designs. A December 8, 2010, GAO report states: “According to the Navy, [estimated savings in LCS procurement costs under the dual-award strategy] would be offset, in part, by an additional $842 million in total ownership costs, which the Navy equates to a net present value of $295 million.” The GAO report also states:

Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate supporting the dual award provides details on the costs to operate and support both designs. However, since little actual LCS operating and support data are available to date, the Navy’s estimates for these costs are currently based on data from other ships and could change as actual cost data become more available. These estimates are also based on new operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that have not been fully developed, tested, and implemented. For example, the Navy has not yet implemented a comprehensive training plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost more or less than the training costs currently accounted for by the Navy.
Potential Relative Risks

Regarding the potential relative risks of the down select and dual-award acquisition strategies, the GAO report states that “a second ship design and source provided under the dual award strategy could provide the Navy an additional hedge against risk, should one design prove problematic.” A converse argument might be that monitoring the construction of two very different LCS designs could place increased demands on the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) capabilities for on-site monitoring of the construction of Navy ships, which might increase the chances of the Navy not detecting in a timely manner construction-quality problems that might occur in one or both LCS designs. BUT WHEN BOTH DESIGNS ARE "PROBLAMATIC"? then what

If you have not read the GAO report, believe it or not the GAO report shines a very favorable light on the dual-purchase strategy the Navy is currently seeking as the more responsible way forward. I also recommend reading the 4 page statement by the Navy included at the end of the GAO report. The $2.9 billion savings that Sean Stackley claims is saved is explained in more detail in that statement as follows:

With the production start-up costs for both versions already retired, and proposals provided that reflect stable design and planning, stable production, learning curve performance, and long term vendor agreements, the acquisition savings for a dual award is projected to be $2.9 billion (Then Year (TY)) through FY 2016, as measured against the President’s Budget (PB) 2011 request. Of these savings, approximately $1 billion (TY) is directly attributable to the dual award alone. Some of these savings are used to fund the additional FY 2012 ship. The savings enable the Navy to strengthen the total shipbuilding plan as well as enabling procurement of an additional LCS in FY 2012.

This makes some sense if we are discussing only construction costs. Clearly there was going to be savings from the competition of two designs, and savings of $1.9 billion per ship comes in at a savings of $100 million per ship. That makes sense to me if the Navy budgeted Littoral Combat Ships at $600 million and was able to get bids at $500 million per ship. I do believe the Navy budget factored risk putting the price near $600 million, and I also believe because we are talking about mostly empty warships with very little sophistication in comparison to a warship with a missile launcher or AEGIS, that the shipbuilder could still profit at an average cost of $500 million - if the Navy believed they had achieved design maturity and did not expect large numbers of additional change orders. On that last point, the Navy statement at the end of the GAO report discusses those specific issues.

First this:

Both shipbuilders are already realizing significant production efficiencies on the two ships currently under construction as a direct result of capital investments that were not in place for LCS 1 and LCS 2. Additional savings are anticipated for future ships from further facility upgrades that will be self-financed by industry, with support from state and local governments. To date, all facility improvements have been completed on cost and schedule at both shipyards.
Then this:

Many of the technical issues noted in the August 2010 GAO Report already have been addressed in the program. Specifically, in several instances the GAO notes cost risk as a result of design changes still occurring in the program. In fact, both LCS designs are now stable. Design change from the lead ship has been incorporated in the follow ships as part of their baseline and subsequent change activity has been minimized. At current change level, a few percent, change activity on this program is improved upon historical shipbuilding performance. There is no evidence that follow ship change order budgets will not be adequate to address any necessary changes that may occur during execution of the block buy. For example, the LCS 3 recently launched at 80 percent complete, at which point the change order budget is less than 50 percent expended. LCS 4 has expended only 4 percent of her planned change order budget at 45 percent construction complete. This substantially improved level of completeness at launch, the low rate of expenditure of change order budget, and the attendant improvement in cost and schedule performance by both shipbuilders is a clear indication that out-of-sequence work and design change activity have been contained. LCS 3 launched on December 4th at approximately 80 percent complete, as compared with LCS 1, which was barely 50 percent complete at launch. LCS 3 is also under budget and on schedule. LCS 4 is showing similar improvements over LCS 2.
Where are the PAOs when it comes to shipbuilding, and can we get those folks a cell phone? There are a number of items in this statement that nobody knew anything about, despite being the questions asked every day about a program no one outside the tiny LCS bubble is excited about.

For example, what design changes have been incorporated into follow-on ships? Did the design changes impact the size of the crew that could be supported on LCS? If it did, what is this new number for each ship class? What about the design changes necessary for the Independence class required so that the ship can actually deploy stuff out the back door? I'm looking at pictures from the launch of USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), and I still see a warship designed to take on small boats with machine guns that has a bridge fully exposed with glass windows. There have been concerns regarding the first of class ships being overweight - will this issue be discussed by the Navy?

LCS 3 is under budget and on schedule? That's good to know, but why did we have to wait for a statement included in a GAO report to learn this? LCS 4 has expended only 4 percent of her planned change order budget at 45 percent construction completion? Again, this is great news, will someone please release the shipbuilding PAO who appears to be gagged and tied to a chair.

Bottom line: it still leaves USN with VERY EXPENSIVE, underarmed 3000 ton "targets"...that US taxpayers must pay for...good grief! :mad: DFO

NASAAN101

11-12-2010, 20:05

Guys,
That is a wild looking ship! what is it or she???
Nikki

designeraccd

11-12-2010, 22:39

An overpriced, late 3000 ton TARGET.............DFO :eek:

designeraccd

16-12-2010, 13:54

and now this..............

Navy Getting its LCSs for Xmas?

By John Reed Tuesday, December 14th, 2010 8:05 pm

Top U.S. Navy officials today made their case before the Senate Armed Services Committee today for buying both classes of Littoral Combat Ship as the deadline for Congress to grant the service permission to buy the ships fast approaches.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, repeatedly stressed that the dual by of 20 LCSs from both Lockheed Martin and Austal USA would save the service $2.9 billion over the next five years and allow the purchase of 10 ships from each class versus the 19 single class ships as previously planned.

The officials were speaking during a Dec. 14 hearing that was called by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., as the Senate this week considers an omnibus spending package that includes permission for the Navy to buy both classes of LCS.

That $2.9 billion could be redirected toward other shipbuilding programs while the Navy would get the “flexibility” of having two types of LCS with complementary skill sets, the service officials repeatedly said. COMPLIMENTARY? They both appear to be underarmed, virtually unprotected...TARGETS; that are OVER priced, too! DFO :eek:

Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley was also on hand for the effort, telling lawmakers that, based on Navy calculations that even account for production troubles, each ship would cost between $440 million to $480 million under the plan to buy both classes under a fixed price contract.

However, this deal will only be possible if the service is allowed to act before the end of the year due to cost increases associated with work stoppages at the LCS shipyards, Roughead told reporters after the hearing.

“What are the impacts of the work stoppage, what happens to the workforce?” said Roughead.

“In my case, as I look at the ships that are coming along, how long do I hold a crew in a training period,” added the admiral. “If the ships are delayed I have to retrain them and they go to another ship or another station”

If the service isn’t allowed to buy both ships this month, it will have to move ahead with plans to purchase one class of ship as originally planned, according to the CNO.

“That’s the point that we find ourselves at right now,” said Roughead.

Mabus echoed Roughead’s comments when asked if the service would consider buying both classes of ships after the Dec. 30 deadline if the cost of buying both ships hikes.

“It’s either we get the authority [to buy both] or we downselect” to one ship, said the secretary.

Still, McCain was not convinced that the program, which suffered numerous delays and cost hikes over the last decade, will live up to the sea service’s fiscal projections. He urged lawmakers to continue studying the details of the Navy’s dual buy well into the new year.

“I’ve never, in the 20-something years that I’ve been a member of this committee, approved a program where I don’t know what the cost is,” said McCain. He was referring to the fact that Navy officials cannot reveal the pricing information they received from both bidders due to contract regulations.
“I understand that the two very generous offers have now been extended to December 30 and I see no reason why those two very generous offers could not be extended to January or February or March so that this committee could at least address the concerns that the [Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office] and the Congressional Research Service have raised.” added the Senator.

He was referring to officials from the GAO, CBO and CRS, all of whom said they could not get a truly accurate read on the likely cost of the split buy without seeing the price of the bids. However, the chance of anyone outside of the Navy seeing that data is very unlikely, said Roughhead.

The officials from GAO, CBO and CRS also voiced concern over the prospect of increased costs from training crews, providing maintenance and upgrading two ship types.
While McCain remains unconvinced of the service’s need to buy both class of LCS, committee chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., backs the plan, saying he believes it will foster competition, keep costs down and help stabilize the shipbuilding industry throughout the 55-ship lifespan of the program.

Yes, and the good tooth fairy is coming, too; the US tax PAYER is about to get rolled yet again....DFO :rolleyes::rolleyes:

designeraccd

20-12-2010, 11:14

from the NAVY TIMES..........

Analysis: Navy mum on multiple LCS system issue
By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer
Posted : Sunday Dec 19, 2010 14:01:06 EST

One of the drawbacks of the Navy’s push to continue to build both littoral combat ship types is that each features a unique combat system — the combination of sensors, weapons and software that is at the heart of any modern warship.

To speed development, each design team was allowed to develop its own system. Lockheed came up with COMBATSS-21, in some ways a lightweight derivative of the Aegis combat system built by the company and fielded on nearly 80 cruisers and destroyers. General Dynamics’ Advanced Information Systems developed an entirely new system for its design, a system the company claims more closely embodies the open-architecture concept espoused by the Navy for virtually all its new computer systems.

Each combat system requires its own support pipeline: maintenance and parts chains, training programs, and operational characteristics. Even if the Navy had picked one, it would still have been unique in a fleet that has striven for homogeneity and relative simplicity.

Navy officials downplay the impact of fielding separate systems and claim competition will hold prices in check. But sooner or later, whether today’s management team supports both combat systems or not, an official will come into office who sees the dual-system setup as wasteful and unsupportable. When that happens, the ships with one of the systems will likely be taken out of service — years before they’re used up — and probably made available for foreign military sales.

The Navy reportedly has a plan to deal with the dual combat systems, but it’s not saying what it is, possibly because officials lack the authority to discuss details of a dual-ship buy. While a number of congressional staffers and analysts have been briefed on the plan, they’ve been sworn to secrecy. Even among those who have been briefed, there are concerns that this is an issue the Navy needs to address publicly before the buy-both-designs plan can be approved.

Creating a third system
So, what is the Navy’s plan for the combat systems? Sean Stackley, the service’s top weapons buyer, gave some clues in September 2009, when he announced the service would have a competition to buy only one of the designs. As a key factor in the strategy to keep a lid on cost growth and perhaps drive prices down, the Navy would compete multiple elements of each LCS design, including the combat systems, weapons and engines. Eventually, the service wants to purchase the technical package both for the design and for the combat system, thus allowing other companies to bid for construction.

After sailors have a chance to put each LCS combat system through its paces, the service will begin to choose the various elements of each system. Those elements will be incorporated into what would become, in essence, a third combat system. Another competition would then be held for that, allowing companies such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon or even Saab to bid as the combat system integrator.

Under this scenario, a third system might be developed in time to begin incorporating the new, one-size-fits-both combat system into the later ships of each company’s 10-ship buy. Even if the new system isn’t ready by then, it could become a key element in follow-on ships, beginning with the 25th LCS in 2016.

What would become of the earlier ships featuring individual combat systems is not yet clear.

The WORST, for taxpayers, of all possibilities?? DFO :eek:

Surfgun

22-12-2010, 00:30

10 more of each class of LCS has been approved.http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/12/navy-LCS-Senate-vote-web-122110/

designeraccd

22-12-2010, 10:55

they certainly were...the US TAXPAYER...gets it, again. So now we get TWO losers-10 of each-instead of 1 oversized, underarmed TARGET! joy. DFO :rolleyes::rolleyes:

Littoral Combat Ship Dual Purchase Passes

Both the House and Senate Continuing Resolution approving the dual purchase of the Littoral Combat Ship passed tonight, and the President will sign the bill. There are several things worth watching here.
AMAZING how many things now get passed in the dead of night, under obama's administration....

How long will it take the Navy to issue contracts? The Navy should act with haste to issue contracts to both shipyards. It would be good if this happened before Christmas. If these are indeed fixed cost contracts and if the deadline was on December 15th, then any time wasted reflects negatively on the Navy.

Will there be economic impact? Color me seriously unimpressed with President Obama's economic stimulus ideas to date. This is a $5 billion contract that impacts two specific geographic areas. It is important to track economic data from both areas, not to mention other regions where venders are, to see what kind return on government investment we see impact economics locally in these regions. This is not trivial, there is a lot of data supporting evidence that shipbuilding has huge second and third effects as government stimulus, but there are very few case studies in the modern era. LCS offers an opportunity to examine a case study. Another major point - shipbuilding directly influences jobs at all levels of education, from the high school drop out to the PHd.

Cleaning the poop off the yard. If Seapower 21 was LCS, DDG-1000, CG(X), and Sea Basing then under ADM Roughead's watch he has built four LCS while locking another 20 into fixed price contracts, truncated DDG-1000 from a purchase of 7 to a purchase of at least two or maybe three, sent the CG(X) to the drawing board graveyard, and Seabasing has been scaled back dramatically with investments mostly going to JHSVs and a handful of other ships like MLPs. These Seapower 21 era ideas and initiatives were inherited by ADM Roughead from ADM Mullen, Roughead's current linear superior (sortof). ADM Roughead really deserves a lot more credit than anyone will be willing to give, at least for awhile, regarding the way he cleaned the crap off the Navy's front lawn.

The Little Crappy Ship.

Surfgun

22-12-2010, 19:12

The USN apparently wants fast, expensive helicopter ferries. Not to mention, fastest mine hunter ever!

designeraccd

30-12-2010, 11:54

JOY!! Rammed thru the "Lame Duck Congress"...are we LUCKY or what??

Navy Issues LCS Contracts Here are the official announcements:

Lockheed Martin Corp., Baltimore, Md., is being awarded a fixed-price-incentive contract for the fiscal 2010-2015 block buy of Flight 0+ Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The fiscal 2010 LCS Flight 0+ ship award amount is $436,852,639. There are additional line items totaling $54,742,639 for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. The total amount of the contract is $491,595,278. The contract includes line items for nine additional ships and options for post delivery support, additional crew and shore support, special studies, class services, class standard equipment support, economic order quantity equipment, selected ship systems equipment for a second source and selected ship system integration and test for a second source which, if authorized/exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $4,570,604,367. The cumulative value excluding any option items related to the second source is $4,069,913,166. Work will be performed in Marinette, Wis. (56 percent); Walpole, Mass. (14 percent); Washington, D.C. (12 percent); Oldsmar, Fla. (4 percent); Beloit, Wis. (3 percent); Moorestown, N.J. (2 percent); Minneapolis, Minn. (2 percent); and various locations of less than one percent, each totaling seven percent. Work is expected to be complete by August 2015. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except for fiscal 2010 RDT&E. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website with two offers received. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA, LLC, Mobile, Ala., is being awarded a fixed-price-incentive contract for the fiscal 2010-2015 block buy of Flight 0+ Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The fiscal 2010 LCS Flight 0+ ship award amount is $432,069,883. There are additional line items totaling $33,398,998 for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. The total amount of the contract is $465,468,881. The contract includes line items for nine additional ships and options for post delivery support, additional crew and shore support, special studies, class services, class standard equipment support, economic order quantity equipment, selected ship systems equipment for a second source and selected ship system integration and test for a second source which, if authorized/exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $4,386,301,775. The cumulative value excluding any option items related to the second source is $3,785,807,006. Work will be performed in Mobile, Ala. (50 percent); Pittsfield, Mass. (17 percent); Cincinnati, Ohio (3 percent); Baltimore, Md. (2 percent); Burlington, Vt. (2 percent); New Orleans, La. (2 percent); and various locations of less than two percent each totaling 24 percent. Work is expected to be complete by June 2015. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except fiscal 2010 RDT&E. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website with two offers received. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-11-C-2301).
The Navy also has a very well done write up here, which includes these specific additional details.

Both contracts also include line items for nine additional ships, subject to Congressional appropriation of each year's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program requirements. When all 10 ships of each block buy are awarded, the value of the ship construction portion of the two contracts would be $3,620,625,192 for Lockheed Martin Corp., and $3,518,156,851 for Austal USA. The average cost of both variants including government-furnished equipment and margin for potential cost growth across the five year period is $440 million per ship. The pricing for these ships falls well below the escalated average Congressional cost cap of $538 million.

It's only money the USA doesn't have, to build at best UNDER armed, OVER sized "yachts".....what a lovely New Years "present" to the US taxPAYER.......DFO :rolleyes::rolleyes:

designeraccd

30-12-2010, 13:02

from the USNI blog today..........

#4 US Navy Dual Purchase of Littoral Combat Ship

The Littoral Combat Ship is the single most interesting US Navy discussion there is, and it isn’t even close. If I need to increase the traffic to my home blog by an extra few thousand visitors on any given day, all I have to do is write an article about the Littoral Combat Ship. Folks inside and outside the Navy are critical of the LCS – indeed I often find the comments of active duty SWOs are the most damning criticisms tossed towards the LCS. I personally think the LCS represents one of the most horribly designed great concepts in modern naval history by any nation, but the truth is no one actually knows what the LCS is, or will be in the future. What we do know is that over the next 5 years the Navy will build 20 more at an average cost of $440 million per hull, and at that price the LCS is less expensive per 1000 tons than the Osprey MCHs, the Avenger MCMs, and even the Perry FFGs. Because the ship is also armed like the Osprey MCHs, the Avenger MCMs, and the Perry FFs we can all look forward to 5 more years of criticisms.

a truely useless WARship it would appear, but great political pork........DFO :eek:

Surfgun

30-12-2010, 16:59

While not cheap, it looks like costs have been contained with the new contracts.http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/12/navy-awards-lcs-contracts-to-lockheed-martin-austal-122910w/

astraltrader

30-12-2010, 20:48

As we seem to have two threads in existence about these LCS I have combined them both.

Gone Asiatic

30-12-2010, 23:39

Me thinks they should drop the "C" from LCS and just call it a "Littoral Ship."

designeraccd

03-01-2011, 14:29

From the USNI Blog..........

The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment…January 2011

From a Congressional Research Service report filed at the end of November:

LCS was designated by the Navy as a Level I survivability combatant ship, but neither design is expected to achieve the degree of shock hardening as required by the CDD [Capabilities Development Document]. Shock hardening (ability to sustain a level of operations following an underwater explosive attack) is required for all mission critical systems, as required by a Level 1 survivability requirement. Only a few selected subsystems will be shock hardened, supporting only mobility to evacuate a threat area following a design-level shock event. Accordingly, the full, traditional rigor of Navy-mandated ship shock trials is not achievable, due to the damage that would be sustained by the ship and its many non-shock-hardened subsystems.

The LCS LFT&E [Live Fire Test and Evaluation] program has been hampered by the Navy’s lack of credible modeling and simulation tools for assessing the vulnerabilities of ships constructed to primarily commercial standards (American Bureau of Shipping Naval Vessel Rules and High Speed Naval Craft Code), particularly aluminum and non-traditional hull forms. Legacy LFT&E models were not developed for these non-traditional factors, nor have they been accredited for such use. These knowledge gaps undermine the credibility of the modeling and simulation, and increase the amount of surrogate testing required for an adequate LFT&E program.
The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment as evidenced by the limited shock hardened design and results of full scale testing of representative hull structures completed in December 2006.

The whole document is here. Read it and weep.
So, we have a warship design that is not expected to fight and survive in the very environment in which it was produced to do so. Poorly-armed, poorly-protected, with an over-abundance of speed that will eat through a fuel supply in half a day.

Yet, the Navy leadership on whose watch this abomination was delivered is hypersensitive to criticism of either their performance or the LCS itself. That such a questionable and limited capability will cost taxpayers UNDER $500 million per copy is a seeming source of pride for them.

Warships remain the single most expensive combat system a nation can buy. Has been so since the beginnings of the iron warship. Those who run the United States Navy (not just NAVSEA) are entrusted with billions of this nation’s treasure. And this is the result. A half-billion dollar counter-drug and counter-piracy platform.

Combat in the littorals is characterized by fierce and unexpected engagements, from small and fast surface vessels, submarines, shore-based weapon systems, missiles, mines, and aircraft. Putting US Navy Officers and Sailors on a platform such as LCS borders on criminal. It is an act of sheer folly, or one of desperation.

The lessons of littoral combat were learned and written in the blood and sacrifice by the thousands of our Sailors and Marines in the Solomons, New Guinea, the Admiralties, the Gilberts and Marshalls, off the beaches of Italy and France, the Philippines, and Okinawa. They are there for all to see, on the old pages of damage reports, battle reports, and combat histories written by survivors and shipmates.

The result of those lessons were classes of tough, powerful, fast, survivable units capable of dishing out and absorbing tremendous punishment. These lessons were reinforced in Korea, Vietnam, and the Falklands, where ships that did not possess those qualities paid dearly.

All of which makes the Littoral Combat Ship so inexplicable. Unable to do precisely what its name implies. Risking the vessel, the Sailors, and the mission.
The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas.

Not Diversity, not social experimentation, not being an Employer of Choice, and not far-flung Humanitarian Missions at the expense of combat readiness and forward presence. There will be screams of protest regarding that last sentence, to be sure. But none of those peripheral distractions mean a hill of beans if the US Navy cannot execute the words printed in bold above. When Navy leadership ignores those words, and fails to heed them, the result is the LCS, and an emperor with no clothes.

Littoral Combat Ship is not a part of a combat-ready Naval force capable of winning wars. Perhaps those who championed and continue to champion it shouldn’t be, either.

Oh my COMMON SENSE, without the carefully nuanced PC BS about how wonderful this BLOATED, underarmed, OVER priced set of incompatible "yachts" are....our tax money being WASTED, again....DFO :mad:

terreplein

03-01-2011, 18:51

So all they have to do is find non-hostile combat environments to use them in? :rolleyes:

designeraccd

03-01-2011, 19:01

Now there is simply IMPECCABLE...uhh..."LOGIC".....must be what the brass in charge of this Fuster Cluck of a program thought, too!!! DFO :D

Surfgun

03-01-2011, 23:57

They will most likely go on good will port visits, California sunset cruises along the Baja, Caribbean patrol, far east gun boat patrol, act as a Black Sea ski boat, and perhaps operate with amphibious groups. Plus these ships carry helicopters for sightseeing! Nice yachts, indeed!

Hank

09-01-2011, 20:13

"As the Navy works to cajole a lame-duck Congress into approving the Navy’s proposal to build 10 variants of each LCS model, it is interesting–and potentially educational–to observe the shipbuilders who have skin in this fight–the recently divorced General Dynamics/Austal team, and the Marinette/Lockheed team."

At this point, Designer, I'd be picking up the phone and calling some of the smaller yards, whilst telling the representatives of the larger corporate entities that I cannot make it to lunch. It's interesting to me to consider the part the fishing fleet of the Gulf of Mexico played in the recent massive oil spill. For what its worth I include extract from Admiralty minutes regarding British effort to increase capability, rapidly, of a littoral force with some deep water capability. Regards

First Lord to Controller and others

Requisitioning of Trawlers 18.10.39

I have asked the Minister of Agriculture to bring Mr. Ernest Bevin and his deputy to the Admiralty at 4.15 o'clock to-morrow after they have explored the ground among themselves. Let all be notified, and an official letter written to the Ministry of Agriculture inviting them here. I will preside myself.

Meanwhile A.C.N.S. (Assistant Chief of Naval Staff), D.T.D.(Director of Trade Division), and Controller or Deputy-Controller should, together with the Financial Secretary, meet together this evening to work out a plan, the object of which is the Utmost Fish, subject to the naval necessity. The immediate loss arising from our requisition should be shared between ports, and the fact that a port has built the best kind of trawlers must not lead to its being the worst sufferer. Side by side with this equalisation process a type of trawler which can be built as quickly as possible and will serve its purpose should be given facilities in the shipyards. As soon as these trawlers flow in, they can either be added to the various ports or else be given to the ports from whom the chief requisition has been made, the equalising trawlers being restored after temporary use-this for local opinion to decide. It is vital to keep the fish trade going, and we must fight for this part of our food supply as hard as we do against the U-boats.

Winston S. Churchill "The Gathering Storm" page 664

Surfgun

14-01-2011, 19:29

The USN now appears to have a plan to arm the LCS class with the Griffin missile with its massive 13 pound warhead! Other than speedboats, I can not fathom a use for such a small weapon (other than against another LCS).

designeraccd

24-01-2011, 14:25

A well written, reasoned article from USNI PROCEEDINGS:

Wrong Ship at the Wrong Time Issue: Proceedings Magazine - January 2011 Vol. 137/1/1,295
By Commander John Patch, U.S. Navy (Retired)

U.S. Navy
The littoral combat ships (top) USS Freedom (LCS-1) and (bottom) Independence (LCS-2) are in the vanguard of a nascent ship class, but both variants already are weighed down by increasingly expanding requirements, and "despite the fact that LCS is a poster child for platform-mission creep, the Navy is still adding more systems," the author notes.

It is clear that the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program cannot live up to expectations. Yet the surface Navy still badly needs low-end ships for littoral and maritime-security missions.

Since the concept phase of the LCS program, supporters and detractors alike have argued for or against the ship class. Recently, however, the debate has shifted away from pundits to official U.S. government assessors, with arguably damning conclusions about the ships. Navy leaders espousing the virtues of LCS-1 and -2 are increasingly in the minority amid a rapidly building case for the program’s dramatic restructuring—or demise. Instead of muddling forward to an almost certainly marginal outcome, the Navy should cancel the LCS program and acquire a proven single-mission hull.

Scrutiny on the LCS is nothing new. Still, summing up previous criticisms of the LCS is worthwhile—though the list of deficiencies and concerns is long:1

• Unaffordable. The near tripling of the expected hull price tag and unrealistic Navy cost estimates are well documented in current literature, but they become a stark program stigma amid current Department of Defense fiscal austerity. Life-cycle costs of the two “orphaned” LCS hulls after the down-select decision are also a factor.

• Too complex. All the higher-end, multi-mission capabilities not only increase costs, but also could make the crews’ tasks unmanageable.

• Excessive technical risk. Incomplete designs at production start exacerbated risk. Some LCS components are also technically unproven or exhibited problems during acceptance trials, such as water-jet tunnel pitting and corrosion and the need for additional buoyancy tanks.

• Impractical. Expectations of seamless integration of the many mission modules, unmanned vehicles, core hull systems (57-mm gun, radars, etc.) and net-centric capabilities were exceedingly unrealistic.

• Inefficient. The failure of the Coast Guard and Navy to conduct a combined effort to design a new cutter/corvette-sized vessel remains perplexing.

• Vulnerable. Many experts argue that the vaunted speed factor will not protect LCS from littoral antiship-missile or torpedo threats.

• Poor endurance. Both LCS versions rapidly deplete fuel stores—especially at the higher speeds envisioned for anti-access missions and with heavy MH-60R/S helicopter operations—requiring frequent bunkering in port or replenishment at sea.2

• Unstable. Excessive high-end requirements have driven up hull machinery and combat system weight, negatively affecting displacement and stability.

• Logistics-heavy. Staging of the mission modules and associated personnel requires a forward sea base or shore facilities.

• Imprudent. Insufficient analysis before program design and acquisition resulted in spiraling costs to address unanticipated problems.

• Insufficient hotel services. Berthing and support requirements for expanding aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and module detachments have exceeded ship capacity.

New Concerns, Changing Requirements
Several recent, authoritative assessments raise serious new concerns about the LCS. A 2009 assessment by the DOD’s Office of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) criticized the premature LCS deployment, which delayed for years the office’s initial hull testing and evaluation, including survivability assessments.3 The wisdom of deploying a new vessel before a full evaluation seems questionable and suggests Navy eagerness to prove the new class amid growing criticism. The DOT&E assessment also expressed concerns about LCS-1’s stability: “The ship will exceed limiting draft in the full load condition,” reducing reserve buoyancy and “the ship’s capability to withstand damage and heavy weather.”4 The report also questioned the limited system-shock hardening, raising issues about whether the warship could actually fight it out in the littorals. The most disturbing statement in the report asserted, “LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment. . . .”5 Indeed, the LCS is no “streetfighter.”

An August 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment drew similar critical conclusions.6 The report questioned Navy decisions to continue to implement design changes even as the third and fourth hulls were being built, increasing unit and design costs significantly. Further, the promised warfare-module (also called mission-package) capabilities are in doubt. The GAO statement on the modules that resonates most focuses on the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) module: “Navy analysis of antisubmarine warfare systems has shown the planned [LCS] systems do not contribute significantly to the antisubmarine warfare mission.”7 The report also stressed development and procurement delays for all three mission packages—ASW, surface warfare (SUW), and mine warfare (MIW)—and asserts that those delays prevented their timely fielding, leaving them unproven and leaving the Navy at risk of “investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver its promised capability.”8

The MIW package, for instance, has components that are not expected to be fielded before 2011, with some as late as 2017.9 Similarly, the Navy has not yet integrated the SUW package’s 30-mm guns into the ship’s combat-systems suite, and DOD canceled the non-line-of-sight missile-launch system in 2010, seriously limiting LCS SUW capabilities. In fact, as of August 2010, the Navy had taken delivery of only five partial mission packages. The report asserts that all of this boils down to two hulls (one already deploying operationally) with functionality largely constrained to self-defense, as opposed to mission-related tasks.

The GAO report also criticized the Navy for accepting delivery of LCS-1 and LCS-2 with both hulls in an incomplete state and with outstanding technical issues.10 Addressing those issues has required the Navy to schedule extensive post-delivery work periods for each ship, adding to program costs and again delaying operational testing and evaluation. Despite the additional yard periods, launch-and-recovery system payload-handling cranes were deemed to have significant safety issues.

As of 2010, Navy leaders still seem to be adding requirements and missions to this already “top-heavy” ship class. The January 2010 LCS Request for Proposals called for adding an SPQ-9B fire-control radar—typically found on larger combatants—that would add complex equipment and increase topside weight and the LCS radar cross-section. The Navy is also purchasing and testing a new variable-depth sonar system for the LCS after it found problems with the existing ASW package.11 Even Marine Corps leaders are seeking to add to LCS missions and system requirements by modifying the ship to carry a reinforced company of Marines.12 Recent LCS-deployed operations also revealed the need for an additional 20 crew to cover missions that the existing 75 cannot, such as boarding operations, despite the fact that maritime interception operations were part of the original LCS mission.13 Add to that the training, equipping, and normal ship services for 20 extra crew, and a vicious cycle becomes apparent: ever-expanding crew requirements. Notwithstanding the fact that LCS is a poster child for platform-mission creep, the Navy is still adding more systems.

In November 2010, Navy leaders surprised many by indicating that they would ask Congress for approval to award contracts to both defense-industry teams for ten ships of each type. The Navy argument is that buying both hull types will “stabilize” the LCS program and support an increased ship-procurement rate.14 But the two ships have very different hull/mechanical and combat-systems suites, which would potentially double the maintenance and training requirements for two virtual ship “sub-classes.” This decision would seem to exacerbate many of the legacy issues described here, especially cost and efficiency concerns.

A Mixed Track Record
Navy accounts of recent LCS operations paint them as successes, but a closer look reveals more uneven results. While the LCS’ high speed did indeed support the interdiction of “go-fast” small craft during 2010 Caribbean counternarcotics operations, that mission itself is on the low end of promised LCS capability—involving none of the high-profile systems for which the LCS is touted. The agility and speed that a helicopter (from any ship) offers in the maritime counterdrug arena, for instance, arguably obviates the 40-knot LCS capability. The capabilities that drew the most praise from the operation were the 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat and the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment—not especially exotic in nature and easily deployable on other U.S. warships. Finally, the loss of two ships’ service diesel generators during the operation, which required an in-port repair effort with a manufacturer’s service team flown in from the United States, is troubling. The loss of 50 percent of electrical-generation capability is serious, but the inability of the crew to effect emergent underway repairs raises bigger questions.

The basic problem with the LCS program is that from inception, it suffered the ills of Navy attempts to design, build, deploy, and sustain a small warship to do too many things. It comes down to a decision whether to field small combatants with expensive multi-mission flexibility or single-mission capability to handle the more likely lower-end operational missions in peacetime and war. Small-combatant success stories do exist (Meko, Visby, FFG-7), but a paramount factor in their development was strict limitation of mission scope and capabilities. The alternative is just too expensive and fraught with difficulties—both of which the Navy is dealing with today. Taken alongside the official findings noted previously, the question becomes: How bad does the prognosis for this ship class need to get before Navy or DOD leaders cancel it?

Keep It Simple
Fleet and regional combatant commanders clearly and consistently have a high demand for small combatants, especially frigate-sized warships.15 To meet this growing demand, several options still exist for Navy and DOD leaders to consider:

• Dramatically scale down LCS hull requirements (including 40+ knot speed and mission modules) to what amounts to a basic SUW model with self-defense and helicopter-support capabilities. Since many of the next-generation MIW, ASW, and SUW capabilities of the LCS reside on the MH-60R/S, carrying through with the helicopter-based upgrades and new systems seems prudent regardless of LCS hull or class decisions.

• Cancel the program and shift funds to a corvette based on the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter hull with basic SUW, self-defense, and helicopter-support capabilities.

• Restart Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigate production as an acceptable compromise to cover littoral and low-end missions. The Royal Australian FFG-7 class upgrade is evidence that this basic hull type is still viable.

In all three options, SUW would be the primary-hull mission area, since it is the mission most likely in demand in peacetime and war. The armed helicopters could augment a 57-mm gun and a short-range antiship missile system. A limited-hull ASW capability, however, would be needed for independent littoral operations. Alternatively, an ASW version of any of these hulls is an option in addition to SUW hulls. The thrust here is to keep one primary mission area for optimizing combat systems and crew expertise.

Since Navy leaders first conceived of a small littoral combatant more than a decade ago, the Navy has repeatedly violated its own “keep it simple” golden rule. But it is not too late to alter the LCS program or cancel it altogether in favor of a small, simple, affordable, single-mission warship to provide an 80-percent solution for Fleet and combatant commanders. For now, however, the Navy plans to spend more than $25 billion to acquire 55 hulls and 64 mission packages.16 If the program follows current trends, by 2035 the Navy will have a large fleet of impressive-looking, fast, and fragile ships that cannot handle littoral threats and bring little real combat power to the fight.

What a FUBAR.........DFO :eek:

G. Shoda

24-01-2011, 21:43

We need to send the Navy proponents of this program into harm's way on one of these ships and see if they still want to be proponents.

Real sailors may die some day because of the queer decisions being made at present.

designeraccd

25-01-2011, 11:44

from the NAVY TIMES:

Navy considering big changes for LCS
By Sam Fellman - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Jan 24, 2011 5:36:58 EST

The Navy is considering big changes to the mission modules for its littoral combat ships, including fielding the Griffin missile and axing a helicopter mounted anti-mine cannon, the Navy’s director of surface warfare announced Jan. 11.

The rapid airborne mine clearance system, a Northrop Grumman system being tested as part of the mine counter-measure module of LCS, “has slid to the right, and it is not not testing well, but it is an expensive program,” Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe, director of surface warfare division, said in a speech at the national symposium of the Surface Navy Association.

The system features a 30mm gun designed to detonate floating and shallow-water mines. It fires an armor-piercing tracer round, outfitted with fins, that vaporizes the water in front of it and reduces drag, according to a Northrop Grumman factsheet on the weapon.

But the delay in testing has put the system in the crosshairs. Pandolfe said the Navy is now considering replacing it with another mine shooter, the Airborne Mine Neutralization System.

“What we’re looking at is adapting the airborne mine neutralization system, to not only neutralize bottom mines, but to work up in the water column and also do shallow and surface mines,” Pandolfe told the SNA audience. “If that works, and the prelim testing is very promising, then we may not need RAMICS. That would allow us to streamline the program, save money and go to a single kill vehicle.”

AMNS is a Raytheon-built mine killer that features a helicopter-deployed sled. The helicopter crew acquires the mine with a vehicle launched from the sled, and fires a “neutralizer” to destroy it, according to a Raytheon factsheet.

Another anti-mine system is facing the ax. Pandolfe said that the reliability of the remote minehunting vehicle — a diesel-powered, semi-submersible sled that tows the AQS-20 sonar — is at “80 percent of where we need it to be.”

He added, “It’s on the right glide slope. It’s getting lots of attention. We’re going to get where we need to be.”

On the surface warfare module, the Griffin missile might replace the now-canceled Non-Line of Sight missile, Pandolfe said. The Navy chose Griffin, a short-range missile designed for unmanned aerial vehicles, after a six-month review of all available and upcoming missiles.

“The one that we think is most promising is called Griffin. It’s a Raytheon missile,” Pandolfe said. “We have proposed to our leadership that we replace NLOS — or fill the hole created by the cancellation of NLOS — with Griffin, at first in a shorter-range increment and then in a second increment, which is longer range and more capable. It would allow us to get the weapon in the fleet on the time line that NLOS would have arrived, keeping the package intact.”

Griffin will enable LCS to engage small boats at close range, Pandolfe said.

The shorter range missile will likely be fielded starting in 2015, with an over-the-horizon one arriving in 2017, according to one of the presentation slides Pandolfe used.

How about the ONE common sense change? SCRAP this entire misbegotten "program" before USN sailors get killed on these glorified "yachts"???! DFO :mad:

designeraccd

09-02-2011, 10:34

from a Naval Blog........

Assessment
LCS 1:

•Critical ship control systems essential to support the crew have performed well in testing; however, several systems required for self-defense and mission package support have demonstrated early reliability problems.
•The crew appears to be operating at nearly full capacity during routine operations, and the Navy is still assessing whether the crew is “right-sized” to cope with the workload. The ship does not have sufficient installed berthing to accommodate the nominal crew complement, nor is the installed refrigerated food storage capacity sufficient to meet the prescribed provision endurance.LCS 2:

•Builder trials were initially delayed due to leaks at the gas turbine shaft seals. More testing identified additional deficiencies related to the main propulsion diesel engines, further delaying completion of the trials until October 2009.
•During Acceptance Trials, the ship was found to be incomplete. Several spaces and critical systems were incomplete and had not been accepted by the government. Spaces and systems that were accepted had various levels of documented material deferrals necessitating a second Acceptance Trial, which is tentatively scheduled for early 2011.
•LCS is not expected to be survivable in terms of maintaining a mission capability in a hostile combat environment. This assessment is based primarily on a review of the LCS design requirements. The Navy designated LCS a Survivability Level 1 ship; the design of the ship just allows for crew evacuation. Consequently, its design is not required to include survivability features necessary to conduct sustained operations in a combat environment. The results of early live fire testing using modeling and simulation, while not conclusive, have raised concerns about the effects weapons will have on the crew and critical equipment. Additional live fire testing and analysis is needed to fully assess the survivability of the LCS class of ships. Additional information is available in the classified LCS 1 Early Fielding Report.
•The LFT&E Management Plan describes the major tests and analyses that will serve as the basis for DOT&E’s survivability assessment. To address the vulnerability implications of building ships with aluminum structure to commercial standards, relevant to both ship designs, the LFT&E program will include the following surrogate tests: fire-induced structural collapse test of a multi-compartment aluminum structure, internal blast test of a multi-compartment aluminum structure, and an underwater explosion-induced inelastic whipping test of a surrogate ship.
Recommendations

•Status of Previous Recommendations. Two recommendations from FY05 and FY06 remain; recommendations concerning a risk assessment on the adequacy of Level I survivability, and detailed manning analyses to include mission package support. The Navy has partially addressed one FY09 recommendation to develop an LFT&E program with the approval of the LFT&E Management Plan; however, the recommendation will not be fully addressed until the details of the surrogate testing and the lethality testing are developed.
The recommendations from FY06 on survivability and manning are described as such:

•DOT&E previously recommended the Navy assess the risks to be sure Level 1 survivability is sufficient for a class of small combatants. Level 1 calls for minimal survivability features and is the standard for auxiliary vessels. Most combatant ships are Level 2. The Navy maintains its intent for LCS to have Level 1 survivability.
•DOT&E also previously recommended the Navy conduct analysis to ensure 75 is the appropriate number of personnel necessary to accomplish LCS missions. The Navy conducted some manpower studies, but did not determine by analysis that 75 personnel is the correct number with which to man LCS. Initial conclusions indicate manning levels do not portend success in a stressing mine warfare scenario. Unanticipated damage control efforts and other contingencies may lead to excessive fatigue and failure to accomplish tasks.
FY10 Recommendations

1.LCS 1: The Navy should implement all recommendations from DOT&E’s Combined Operational and Live Fire Early Fielding Report.
2.LCS 2: The Navy should address all deficiencies noted in the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey Acceptance Trials report.
There are four issues here: each platform individually, manpower, and survivability.

The Platforms

LCS 1: Some of the reliability problems have been well documented publicly, others not so much. A lot of this is first in class growing pains, while other is just simply poor design growing pains. LCS 1 is about to undergo the ships first INSURV. While I don't know the date of the availability, I do know that during the first major drydock availability for the ship the refrigerated food storage capacity issue and extra berthing capacity issue will be addressed.

LCS 2: I know much less about LCS 2, except to say I believe the Navy accepted the ship before it was finished and as a consequence will pay a hefty price for it. What I really don't understand is how the DOT&E report suggests the Navy was delivered an incomplete ship, and NAVSEA gives the civilian PEO an award "for efforts resulting in the successful completion of post-repair trials and industry post-delivery availabilities for USS Independence (LCS 2)." How can the Navy give someone an award for post delivery excellence of a ship that still isn't finished?[/B
Manpower

As I understand it the manpower analysis for LCS 1 will be completed before the drydock availability, and if I remember correctly that will be over the next few weeks/months.

A lot has been made of the reduced crew on LCS issue, but here is my take. The manpower issue on LCS is a fact of life issue for the Navy as a whole. Either the Navy learns how to design and operate ships with reduced manning, or the fleet shrinks. That is the choice, there is no middle ground here. Either learn to love ships with fewer sailors, or learn to love a small fleet. No analysis exists anywhere that says otherwise.

Manpower costs are the single greatest expense in the US Navy, and finding ways to address that issue without reducing capability is a challenge the Navy must meet. Anyone who believes the Navy can sustain 300 ships this century without drastically reducing the number of sailors on ships is dreaming. I don't know if 40, 55, or 75 is the right number of LCS, but I am certain the number will be in that neighborhood because it has to be, because the Navy has to learn how to operate ships with smaller crews. Welcome to the 21st century.

Survivability

The LCS is designed as a Survivability Level 1 ship, defined by OPNAVINST 9070.1 as follows:

Level I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability for designated ship classes to sustain operations in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the general war-at-sea region. In this category, the minimum design capability required shall, in addition to the inherent sea keeping mission, provide for EMP and shock hardening, individual protection for CBR, including decontamination stations, the DC/FF capability to control and recover from conflagrations and include the ability to operate in a high latitude environment.
The Navy's argument is multi-fold, starting with the idea that PCs and Minesweepers are Survivability Level 1 ships. A slightly more impressive argument is based on a study done by Captain Wayne Hughes (ret) that studies all ships damaged since WWII and finds the single most important factor in the survivability of warships, all warships both foreign and domestic, is the length of the ship. Anyone familiar with Captain Hughes work knows that his work on these topics is second to none. In that vein, the argument by the Navy is that the LCS 1 at 378 feet (115 m) and LCS 2 at 418 ft (127.4 m) are both just slightly less survivable than the FFG7s at 453 ft (138 m) based on this historical study of all warships that have taken damage - a study that I have personally never seen.

Look, I am Captain Hughes biggest fan, and if someone called me an internet nerd fanboy of Captain Hughes, I'd simply smile, nod, and voice my answer in the affirmative. I'm sure the study is one of the best of it's kind, but I am skeptical that things can be reduced to such simplicity.

The DOT&E Annual Reports have been asking legitimate questions on survivability for years, and unfortunately they probably will continue to keep asking the question. This comes down to a disagreement on what the survivability standard for the LCS should be. The Navy says Level 1, while I think most observers including myself would suggest Level 2 seems more appropriate given the environment the ship is intended to operate in.

[B]What really irks me on this issue though is that some jackass in the Navy years ago, and I'm speaking about whoever came up with these requirements and every single officer that approved of them along the way, decided that speed was an important and worthy investment for the platform but survivability was not. I struggle to wrap my head around those two distinctly different priorities in the LCS design.

The Navy will argue otherwise, but the fact is the Littoral Combat Ship is expendable. The crew is not, Survivability Level 1 by definition means the crew is not expendable, but by the same definition the platform is. The Navy might as well get comfortable with the idea that some jackass designed an expendable ship, because that is what the DOT&E Annual Report will basically be saying every year when it discusses LCS. If folks on Capitol Hill are unhappy about the US Navy building expendable ships, ask for names - several of the folks involved are still in the Navy and testify all the time.

The Art of Failure

I was talking with a certain SWO who made what I think is a profound observation regarding the development of the LCS. If you study the history of AEGIS, it is a premier success story of program development. "Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot." The focus from the beginning was the development of a combat capability. The first AEGIS ship was not a cruiser or destroyer, rather the seaplane tender USS Norton Sound. When it came time to put AEGIS on a ship, they reused the Spruance hull to build the first AEGIS ships to save costs. When the Arleigh Burke class finally came along, AEGIS was a mature capability where many of the associated technologies had already been worked out. CEC and BMD are really the only major new technology additions to AEGIS since the Burke was designed, and they are both systems upgrades that plugged right onto the platform.

If you study the history of LCS, it is the exact opposite of AEGIS, and the results simply validate it. Instead of focusing on the capability desired, all of which is associated with the modules, the Navy has been fully focused on the hull. Because the Navy was never primarily focused on the development of the deployable combat systems and the necessary communication networks needed to support those systems from a platform, and because even today those systems don't actually exist in a tested and developed state, how is it possible the Navy ever understood the weight, space, people, power and cooling needed on the platforms for the combat capabilities being deployed. The answer is simple, the Navy never did and still doesn't. The platform is a total mismatch to the capability being delivered because the platform was designed without any understanding of the systems that make up the primary combat capability.

In my opinion, the Littoral Combat Ship program has been the worst managed shipbuilding program since the USS Pennsylvania, a saga nearly 190 years old. The modules have always been the most important aspect of the LCS, but the focus by the Navy has consistently been the platforms. Just as AEGIS is the center of the major surface combatants in the US Navy, under the LCS concept, the NETWORK is the primary combat capability of the Littoral Combat Ship. The Navy is so backwards on this program that they will field the platform to get to the modules, then field modules to get to the systems, and then field systems before finally developing the lethal payloads. Only once the Navy is capable of fielding lethal payloads will the LCS requirements for the network be fully understood, even though that network has always been the single most important capability of the LCS concept.

The Navy's approach to LCS has been the complete opposite of AEGIS, and just as AEGIS was brilliantly developed over time, the LCS has been a disaster.

Nice, huh? DFO :mad:

Darleydave

18-06-2011, 20:30

Recently acquired photo's of the Combat Ship USS Independance.

Dave

Hugh Williams

18-06-2011, 21:16

Recently acquired photo's of the Combat Ship USS Independance.

Dave

Beautiful pics of an ugly ship (and controversial too). However, beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

Cheers,

Hugh

WGVSr

19-06-2011, 00:59

Didn't we have these once before, about 20 years ago ? I think they were called the Cyclone class then. Another relatively fast, underarmed, overpriced craft to go in shallow water. How'd that work out ? Even the USCG doesn't really want them.

I read somewhere that at full speed [30, 40, 50 knots, whatever] the endurance was about 5 hours. While that would clear the datum point nicely, I don't know that you could always count on a tanker nearby.
Bill

designeraccd

19-06-2011, 01:18

The Cyclones were a low priced, decently armed BARGAIN compared to these two gold plated floating OVER priced TARGETS! Just my humble opinion, of course...DFO :rolleyes:

Hank

19-06-2011, 03:57

Honestly , when I think of what's required I'm thinking of prior developments and not the model year philosophy that is current. Monitors? Regards

Hank

16-08-2011, 18:28

News came in of some of the anti-weapons platforms to be anti-armament of the LCS. Regards

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/08/15/Mine-hunting-sonar-demonstrated/UPI-16631313429020/

Surfgun

26-10-2011, 23:43

LCS-3 Fort Worth has finished builder's trials.
Photo's and a short film,
http://www.lmlcsteam.com/?page_id=13

Surfgun

29-10-2011, 16:53

While watching the video of LCS 3 Fort Worth, I noticed what appears to be a third mission module position just forward of the RAM launcher (LCS 1 only has two mission module positions).

culverin

29-10-2011, 18:16

LCS-6.
This ship will be named USS Jackson.
Coincidence maybe with a certain court case.
Timing could not have been either a, worse, or b, better.
Depending on that outcome.

LCS-9.
To be USS Little Rock.
Wicked name, the crew will have that running right through their bones.
Seems these LCS are acquiring a city/town moniker.

WGVSr

30-10-2011, 15:16

LCS 7 & 8 are supposed to be Detroit and Montgomery, respectively.
Bill

BlackBat242

31-10-2011, 02:31

USS Jackson (LCS-6) will be an Independence-class littoral combat ship of the United States Navy. She will the first ship to be named for the city of Jackson, the capital of Mississippi.

Southern comfort.

designeraccd

31-10-2011, 09:26

And another UNDERarmed, overpriced 3000 ton "target" begins assembly....US tax dollars being squandered.............

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2011/102711_LM_LCS_5_keel.html

However, US tax money can apparently pay for small, fast, armed WARships for Egypt: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=8063568&c=SEA&s=TOP

DFO :eek:

Don Boyer

31-10-2011, 15:41

These ships seem to be littorally a problem of trying to cram "best ever" into something where "good enough" would have done. I'd be a lot more impressed overall if the ships actually had a conventional gun that could penetrate a tin can as well as a missile that can defend the ship in the environment it's supposed to operate in. 57mm seems awfully "low end" when looking at the latest Jane's suggests the rest of the world seems to find 76 mm far better. I guess all these "modular" packages are supposed to solve all problems of maintaining the ship at sea in a hostile littoral environment while cleansing the Earth of the ungodly such as pirates. What "package" is being installed to deal with all those lovely sea-skimming ship killers out there?

BlackBat242

01-11-2011, 04:45

The USN decided that the 57mm could double as a "heavy CIWS", and it is more than big enough to deal with "Iranian speedboat" attackers.

The LCS isn't supposed to get into slugging matches with corvettes and frigates... that's what the helicopter and DDGs are for.

If they are close enough to use a 76mm they are well inside anti-ship missile range... and then they'll be needing their gun to help shoot down incoming missiles.

designeraccd

01-11-2011, 08:34

Great "theories" about the 57mm, on a 3000 ton "TARGET". Personally I would not care to be one of the "lucky" few crew members who someday get to PROVE that theory on a ship heavier than a WW 2 Gearing class destroyer, which was actually armed for both defense and offense. DFO :eek:

Don Boyer

01-11-2011, 23:26

I'm not quite sure I'm getting the reference to guns...if a ship is vulnerable to ASMs inside 3" range, a 57 mm would be even more the case, as it has less range and far less hitting power to boot. And the 57 mm as a "heavy" CIWS makes me wonder as well -- the BAE Systems 57mm/70 is listed as 220 rpm to 9 nautical miles with a 5.28 lb shell, but I'm not sure it has the CIWS-type rapid track-while-scan fire control that would be needed to counter incoming missiles. The lates Jane's I have (2010) isn't exactly full of detail on the fire control for these two types of LCS. The disparity between 220 rpm and 2000 rpm for the Phalanx also raises concerns in my mind. Is 220 rpm enough lead spraying about to actually guarantee a hit on something at near or above mach at sea-skimming level even if it is a larger round than the usual 20mm?

And I also find it interesting that other countries have, or are building, ships of similar tonnage (but not speed) and size for the same general purposes that seem far better armed to deal with all threats from "Iranian speedboats" to incoming ship-killers. I'm certain the US navy could do far better with the weapons packages on the LCS types, and I wonder why they haven't -- there are better gun systems out there than the 57mm. All I know, based on personal experience, is that when it comes to guns, I would much prefer one that kills everything in sight, even if it's overkill -- "it's the only way to be sure." :)

BlackBat242

02-11-2011, 01:44

Its because these ships are not conventional surface combatants, but everyone seems to be forgetting this and trying to force them into a role they are not designed for.

They are intended to do more "second-hand" fighting... using their helicopter to conduct anti-surface and anti-sub warfare some distance from the ship, provide minesweeping capabilities, and to support special ops missions.

The key to this flexibility is that, instead of dedicated "hard-mounted" weapons systems, they have interchangeable "mission modules"... some of which are (were) to contain much more potent weapons systems.

Add in the large propulsion plant needed for the ultra-high speed demanded by the original "quick-response self-deployment" requirement, and the internal volume that in earlier ships was devoted to weapons is not available.

Now, whether it was a good idea to try to make one ship type do all these missions, some of which have highly conflicting ship-design requirements... that's a different question altogether.

Don Boyer

02-11-2011, 06:58

BB, I think you hit on my major worry about these ships...the blivet syndrome, trying to pack 10 lbs of manure into an 8 lb sack. It doesn't work well, as it brings systems into conflict, as you suggested. I like the high speed and ability to work in the littoral. I have not yet seen what these magical "modules" are that will make them work so well. I guess we will see what comes out of it once they start actually performing some of these functions for real and we have some actual working data to play with. But despite good intentions, I will never be convinced a 57mm will cut it in many combat scenario's I can think of.

designeraccd

02-11-2011, 22:21

Perhaps that is why the Russian's have seen fit to equip their 2200 ton WARships with a 100mm plus 30mm CIWS type weapons and missiles, both SAM and SSM, plus of course a helo??? Presumably with the latest electronics to control the weapons fit. DFO ;)

Surfgun

02-11-2011, 23:18

The "mighty" 57mm at work.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzBPGfCq21s

designeraccd

02-11-2011, 23:53

For that matter, this latest Italian 76mm seems to pack quite a PUNCH, too! DFO ;)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrUXDAhP3Fg&NR=1

Aren't ADS wonderful? Of course the real proof comes at sea when under real threat/attack conditions.........I suppose that being a former US Marine I tend to believe in MAXIMUM possible firepower put ON the enemy! It does tend to work.

Surfgun

03-11-2011, 00:56

The LCS will just have to hide in the shallows (or under the watchful eye of a DDG) to avoid bigger problems. The weapon with the largest weapon aboard (currently scheduled)(non-helicopter based), is the RAM. It's warhead is larger than the one on the LCS's other anti-surface weapon, the Griffin.

designeraccd

03-11-2011, 08:30

Both RAM and Griffith are ANTI-AIR missiles, from everything I've read....not SSMs......back to the 57mm. pop pop pop....... DFO ;)

Surfgun

03-11-2011, 20:22

Griffin is a ASM being developed into an SSM for the LCS.
http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology/rtn10_ausa/newsroom/news03/

designeraccd

03-11-2011, 21:09

My apologies, I either misread or remembered incorrectly a Navy Admirals' comments I saw about the possible use of this as a stopgap now that the NLOS has been dropped for cost reasons.

At present published reports do seem to indicate the Navy is leaning toward a smaller, very short-range weapon called the Griffin. It is a 33+ pound, 42 inch long Griffin B missile with a 13 pound blast-fragmentation warhead, and uses a combination GPS/INS and semi-active laser seeker. Estimated Griffin B range is in the Hellfire class, or about 3.5 miles when ground launched without a booster motor. That’s less than 1/6th the Raytheon NLOS-LS PAM’s planned 25 mile range, and this severe cut, coupled with the warhead’s size, sharply limits LCS surface combat operations

Given these limits in range and warhead it seems little wonder the Admiral was less than thrilled, as I recall........DFO :eek:

Surfgun

03-11-2011, 22:38

Reportedly, there is also an extended range Griffin in the works for the LCS (range would be less than a dozen miles?).

designeraccd

04-11-2011, 10:36

Wow! That will make enemy ROWBOATS stay away! DFO :rolleyes:

Surfgun

04-11-2011, 18:58

I believe that the current Griffin may be the first missile fitted aboard a USN ship that will have a shorter range than the ship's naval rifle.:confused:

designeraccd

04-11-2011, 19:37

BRILLIANT now isn't it? DFO :rolleyes:

designeraccd

08-11-2011, 16:36

More on the TARGET SHIP/moneypit known as the LCS............

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/11/07/the-navys-lcs-missile-problem/

DFO :eek:

Don Boyer

09-11-2011, 00:58

Gee, DFO, reading these posts, one would think you didn't think much of the LCS concept. But wait---for only $1 billion more (plus shipping and handling), you can have eight or ten LCSs, all with powerful and destructive "modular" fits for any holiday occasion. I want to see one committed to a police action somewhere hot, and see how it does. It's the only way to be sure. Time to put yon dollars to work.

Regards :)

designeraccd

09-11-2011, 11:06

Or the USN could purchase these heavily armed FACs, being built in US (with taxpayer money, no doubt) for Egypt..........

http://www.eaglespeak.us/2011/11/for-my-navy-i-want-what-we-sell-to.html

DFO :(

Don Boyer

09-11-2011, 20:29

I believe these were fully funded by Egypt...will have to look for the article.

Arabs springing for the ships -- who knew?
Regards,

Surfgun

17-11-2011, 01:15

The LCS may be on the chopping block (plus other major programs).
per, 16 November 2011 Aviation Week
By Jen DiMascio

What does inaction by the U.S. Congress on the federal deficit mean? According to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, it means no more Joint Strike Fighter. No new bomber. No Littoral Combat Ships and no Ground Combat Vehicle program.

The Budget Control Act in August set up a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to find at least $1.2 trillion in deficit cuts. And if Congress fails to pass a deficit-reduction plan by Jan. 15, 2012, the defense budget would undergo $600 billion in automatic cuts over the next 10 years.

Since August, lawmakers have been calling on the Pentagon to provide details about exactly what a reduction of that magnitude would mean. Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) recently wrote a letter to Panetta asking him to lay out the parameters. The senators plan to sponsor a bill that would remove the $600 billion penalty.

And McCain says President Barack Obama, who has threatened to veto a deficit reduction bill that fails to include tax increases, should listen to Panetta. “[Obama’s] secretary of defense just wrote us a letter saying [sequestration] would have the most devastating effects on our national security,” McCain says. “I hope he would listen to his secretary of defense.”

On Nov. 14, Panetta laid out $200 billion in kills or delays to major programs in the long term that would result from Congress’ failure to act. The F-35, the bomber, the Littoral Combat Ship, Ground Combat Vehicles and the next-generation ballistic missile submarine would all fall by the wayside.

And those aren’t the only programs that the process known as sequestration would relegate to the scrap heap. The U.S. could wave goodbye to Army helicopter modernization programs, “major space initiatives,” European missile defense, unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and the missile leg of the nuclear triad, adding another $56 billion.

When Panetta says cuts would be devastating, he means all that and more. The Defense Department would also have to scale back training and furlough civilian personnel. He reminded the senators that sequestration would apply cuts across the board in ways that don’t make sense.

“A 23 percent cut in ship and military construction projects would render them unexecutable — you cannot buy three quarters of a building,” Panetta writes. “A 23 percent cut in [a] weapons program would drive up unit costs and lead to reductions in quantity of one-third or more.”

The letter comes just more than a week before the so-called super committee has to make its recommendations to the rest of Congress for budget reductions.

After the letter’s release, Robert Spigarn of Credit Suisse says even though the maximum penalty is “unlikely,” steep reductions are coming the Pentagon’s way. “We see limited longer-term sector upside due to continued incremental negative news flow and potential for further declines in consensus estimates,” he says in a note to investors.

“Regardless of what is decided this year, we think fiscal reality will require further cuts later, leading to a “boiling frog” scenario where cuts are $1 [trillion or greater] over a longer period.”

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/asd/2011/11/16/02.xml&headline=Panetta%20Details%20Budget%20Doomsday%20F or%20Congress&channel=defense

Surfgun

13-01-2012, 00:28

Look what is rolling off of the production line.
http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=113329

Surfgun

19-01-2012, 03:02

LCS, may get a missile upgrade?

http://defensetech.org/2012/01/18/boeings-new-missile-for-littoral-combat-ships/#comments

Hank

19-01-2012, 14:53

Given the amount of press regarding the Boeing transitional propulsion system missile as an alternative to the "Hellfire" derivative planned, the "might" included in your text seems fair certain.

I have another means of force projection that would be amenable for a littoral combat type vessel. Short range of projectile delivery has been decried in previous posts. The lack of return fire from projected systems became the butt of many of Designer's asides. What of a 6" Bore rotating barrel, say four, capable of launching a varity of munitions at a varity of angles, some rounds , perhaps, having navagation capability. A choice on the control board....Nowheres near as slick looking as the Colorodo, a few of which would be handy to have around. The premise of my vessel design presupposes that the enemy coastline is not subject to movement,but the forces of same must surely be. The only other detail design I wish to include in consideration of a littoral area vessel is the bulged hull, along with the fact that the vessels lend themselves to fisheries management with minimal design consideration.

A letter came in from a Brother recently, mentioning the synopsis of the Commandant of the War College. Worth the read

Washington Post
January 6, 2012
Pg. 15

Forgetting The Lessons Of History

By Robert H. Scales

Regards, Hank

Surfgun

30-01-2012, 21:35

More news to get the folks fire-up.

By Michael Fabey mike_fabey@aviationweek.com
WASHINGTON

The U.S. Navy has already altered its Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship, LCS-1, to address problems uncovered in testing, but the ship still needs to be fundamentally redesigned, say leading defense analysts.

They base their conclusions on briefings from the Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) on the findings of Navy and industry reports detailing the vessel’s hull and deckhouse cracking and engine problems. AWIN was given exclusive access to the documents. The analysts also call for an investigation into how the ship was accepted in such — in their view — questionable shape. LCS-1 was built by a Lockheed Martin-led team.

AWIN subscribers can click here to read the complete story on the reports’ findings and the rebuttal from the LCS team.

“What the documents show is grounds for questioning this LCS variant’s viability,” says Ben Freeman, national security investigator for the Project On Government Oversight, who also was briefed on the reports.

“If the reports outlined are as serious as indicated, then there may be some significant redesign work required — even beyond the modifications to LCS-1 that have been made based on initial lessons learned with the first hull,” says Bob Nugent, vice president of advisory services for consultancy AMI International’s Washington operations.

As a result of hull cracking issues on LCS-1, the ship designed to be the Navy’s cheetah of the seas and envisioned as comprising about half of the service’s future surface combatant fleet was limited to a “safe operating envelope” in which it could travel no faster than a laden cargo freighter in sea-state 5 conditions, the reports show.

Analysts were equally dismayed about the reports’ findings on the engine failure reported earlier with the ship. The Rolls-Royce Trent MT30001 gas turbine engine shut down when components failed because of corrosion and oxidation following a number of significant and unexpected ingestions of seawater over an 18-month period.

Lockheed Martin and the Navy say the Freedom has since been repaired and upgraded to address the issues identified during that time and is scheduled to be redelivered to Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea) soon with an eye toward re-evaluating its operational limitations.

“Navsea isn’t familiar with any new official ‘reports,’ either from Navy or industry sources, indicating the issues ... either new or as alarming [as indicated],” said Navsea spokesman Christopher Johnson when asked about the report’s findings and analysts’ conclusions.

“If it were my boat, I would tie the ship up and have a commercial tug take it back to the builder and demand he fix her,” defense analyst and Navy-issues author Norman Polmar says. “I’d stop production until that first ship is fixed and guarantee that similar problems don’t occur on the follow-ons.”

Blaydon

30-01-2012, 21:42

designeraccd

30-01-2012, 22:15

The news about these more or less floating targets just gets better and better with each new revelation about how defective the base design is.

Rather matches those other two fine programs that continue to soak up cash yet don't deliver: LPD-17 class and F-35. Disgusting, but gee it's only my and other citizens tax money being flushed down the "LOO"......DFO :eek::mad:

WGVSr

31-01-2012, 01:17

I wonder if the LCS 2 class is having similar 'teething' pains ? There was/is a terrible war of words going on between the two competing camps. Viewing eithers advertising, one would think the other camp didn't exist.

The initial planning docs requested the ships be able to operate a/c in sea state 5 and considered sea states 3-5 as the ships normal environment.
Bill

Surfgun

03-02-2012, 23:14

More LCS 1 Freedom news:

LCS Freedom suffers leak while underway
By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Feb 3, 2012 17:36:54 EST
The littoral combat ship Freedom suffered minor flooding while underway off Southern California on Wednesday night, the Navy said Friday.

The ship “suffered a failure of the port shaft mechanical seal,” said Lt. Jan Shultis, a spokesperson with Naval Surface Forces command in San Diego. “There was some flooding.”

An inflatable boot seal was deployed in a successful effort to contain the flooding, Shultis said, and the ship returned to San Diego on its own power.

“The flooding was quickly controlled and contained to the bilge area,” Shultis added.

Engineers from Naval Sea Systems Command now are inspecting the ship to determine the cause of the failure.

“The ship will continue trials once repairs are complete,” she said.

LCS ships use waterjets rather than conventional propeller shafts to reach very high speeds. The 3,300-ton Freedom is fitted with four Kamewa 153 SII waterjets that drive the ship at speeds that have topped 47 knots.

The first-of-class Freedom was delivered from Lockheed Martin in September 2008, but has spent much of the past six months in shipyard hands undergoing upgrades. The flooding incident occurred while the ship was underway for sea trials following a pierside overhaul in San Diego.

Freedom is set to leave California later this year to voyage to Singapore, which has offered to host several forward-deployed LCS ships.

Hank

04-02-2012, 00:03

Mention of the port side mechanical seal as a factor of one of LCS-1's leaks history might be a source of the humidity that trashed the R-R Trent engine, one respectable piece of engineering. Compressor area vacuum and faulty panel seals are problems encountered in large portable generators, the same might be applicable to the Trent engine compartment.

No mention of areas affected by hull cracking of LCS-1. X-frame (as used in the hulls of the first six Frigates buit for USN) might be of use here. Ships too small to hinge her, might want to make her stiffer with ROBUSTflex where needed. Regards

designeraccd

04-02-2012, 00:24

Maybe the USN can borrow that big Russian tug that has been "escorting" the Kuznetsov on her current cruise? It is a long way to Singapore from San Diego for this problem prone, all but unarmed waste (IMO) of taxpayer money.

DFO :eek::(

designeraccd

04-02-2012, 23:00

It would be very interesting to see a point by point comparison of the 3300 ton LCS with Russia's "corvette" of about the same size, the Project 20380 class. From what I have seen it would appear that either LCS "design" comes in THIRD best out of 2 with the Russian unit. DFO :(

Surfgun

10-02-2012, 22:05

For some reason this made me feel a little queasy.

Navy Names Littoral Combat Ship Gabrielle Giffords

Story Number: NNS120210-25 Release Date: 2/10/2012 3:57

From Department of the Navy

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced Feb. 10 that the next Independence variant littoral combat ship (LCS) will be named USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10).

The selection of Gabrielle Giffords, designated LCS 10, honors the former congresswoman from Tucson, Ariz. who is known for supporting the military and veterans, advocating for renewable energy and championing border security. Giffords recently resigned from Congress to recover from wounds she sustained in an assassination attempt in 2011.

"The Navy motto is Semper Fortis, Always Courageous," said Mabus during a ceremony held in the Pentagon Courtyard. "Unwavering courage has defined the Navy for 236 years and it is what we expect, what we demand of our Sailors every single day. So it's very appropriate that LCS 10 be named for someone who has become synonymous with courage, who has inspired the nation with remarkable resiliency and showed the possibilities of the human spirit."

Mabus also announced the ship's sponsor will be Roxanna Green. Green is the mother of Christina-Taylor Green, the nine-year-old girl who was killed while attending the meeting of constituents where Giffords was shot. A ship's sponsor plays an important role in the life of the ship, naval tradition holds that her spirit and presence guide the ship throughout its service life.

"On that dark, tragic day now more than a year ago, Christina-Taylor Green was taken from us. A nine-year-old who had just been elected to the student council, she wanted to become a more active participant in our democracy. Her mother, Roxanna Green, continues to express her daughter's hope for the future and, as the President said, "of a nation as good as she imagined."

"I am pleased to honor Gabrielle Giffords and the people of Arizona with the naming of this ship," said Mabus. "Giffords and the ship's sponsor, Roxanna Green, are sources of great inspiration and represent the Navy and Marine Corps qualities of overcoming, adapting and coming out victorious despite great challenges."

The ship is part of a dual block buy of LCS class ships announced by Mabus in December 2010. By procuring both versions of the LCS - Lockheed Martin's semiplaning monohull and General Dynamic's aluminum trimaran - the Navy is stabilizing the LCS program and the industrial base with an award of 20 ships each; increasing ship procurement rates to support operational requirements; sustaining competition through the program; and enhancing foreign military sales opportunities. Both designs meet the Navy's LCS requirement. However, the diversity provided by two designs provides operational flexibility.

Littoral combat ships perform a vital role in the Navy's ability to execute DoD's Defense Strategy. USS Gabrielle Giffords will be designed to defeat growing littoral threats and provide access and dominance in the coastal waters. A fast, agile surface combatant, the LCS provides the required warfighting capabilities and operational flexibility to execute focused missions close to the shore, such as mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. The LCS class of ships will be outfitted with reconfigurable payloads, called mission packages, which can be changed out quickly as combat needs demand. These mission packages are supported by special detachments that will deploy manned and unmanned vehicles and sensors in support of mine, undersea and surface warfare missions.

Gabrielle Giffords will be 419 feet in length, have a waterline beam of 103 feet, displace approximately 3,000 tons, and make speed in excess of 40 knots. The construction will be led by Austal Shipbuilding in Mobile, Ala.

This is the 16th ship to be named for a woman and the 13th ship to be named for a living person since 1850. This is the first ship to bear Giffords' name.

For additional information about the Littoral Combat Ship class, visit http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4.

For more news, visit www.navy.mil.

Surfgun

16-03-2012, 23:35

Well, at least the unit costs are inching downward.

Navy orders four more LCS vessels
By Christopher P. Cavas - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Mar 16, 2012 18:10:13 EDT
Construction contracts for four more Littoral Combat Ships were awarded March 16 by the Navy, bringing the total number of LCS vessels under order or in service to 12.

Lockheed Martin received $715 million for two ships, or $357.5 million apiece.

Austal USA received $691.6 million for two ships, at $345.8 million each.

The funds do not include government-furnished equipment needed to fully outfit each ship, such as weapons or communications equipment.

All the ships were funded in the 2012 defense spending bill.

Lockheed will build the Little Rock (LCS 9) and Omaha (LCS 11) at the Fincantieri Marinette Marine shipyard in Marinette, Wis. The ships are to be delivered in February and August 2016, respectively, according to the 2013 budget.

Austal USA will build the Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) and Sioux City (LCS 12) at its yard in Mobile, Ala. The Giffords is to be delivered in August 2015, while the Sioux City is to follow in March 2016.

All four ships are part of two 10-ship, fixed-price incentive block buys covering ships from each builder from 2010 to 2015.

Two classes of LCS are in production: Lockheed’s LCS 1-class single-hull ships and Austal USA’s all-aluminum trimaran LCS 2 class. So far, all odd-numbered ships are built to the Lockheed design, while Austal USA’s ships are even-numbered.

The first two LCS ships are in commission, and two more are to enter service this year. The Fort Worth (LCS 3) is to be delivered in June from Lockheed, and Austal USA is aiming for a March 2013 delivery of the Coronado (LCS 4).

designeraccd

04-05-2012, 10:38

For those who haven't seen it; the arrival of LCS-2 in San Diego. One could wonder why this "target" was left bare aluminum in a saltwater environment? Instant recycling? :rolleyes: DFO :eek:

ASSAIL

06-05-2012, 12:54

For those who haven't seen it; the arrival of LCS-2 in San Diego. One could wonder why this "target" was left bare aluminum in a saltwater environment? Instant recycling? :rolleyes: DFO :eek:

Its quite a common practice with mid size alu ships. No painting cost, no extra weight, no rust etc.
To keep clean simply scrub down or if tyre marks etc need removal, some commercial alu cleaner/.acid (ally bright)

We have operated a 33 mtr 300 to ton pearling cat built 1996 and its as good as day 1 plus its the cheapest for hull maint.

The natural colour is a good camo as its v hard to sea in tropical areas like the Timor and Arafura seas

designeraccd

06-05-2012, 14:45

Good luck cleaning that overpriced, under armed TARGET even with truckloads of "simi-chrome", which I've used on my motorcycles for decades.
Somehow the idea of a "warship" that's @ 1 year old looking like that isn't exactly acceptable to this former MARINE! Of course it can probably fight as good as it looks, given its minimal weaponry..:rolleyes: DFO :eek:

ASSAIL

07-05-2012, 00:12

Surfgun

10-05-2012, 00:10

Here is a good article on the cracking, rusting target.

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_09_2012_p0-456228.xml&p=1

2nd article added.
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/05/defense-lcs-program-lauded-but-freedom-not-yet-ready-050912/

Hugh Williams

14-05-2012, 19:35

designeraccd

14-07-2012, 19:02

And now comes this oh so SHOCKING conclusion:

LCS: Quick Swap Concept DeadU.S. Navy Revising Ships’ Operational Plans

The original idea for the littoral combat ship (LCS) envisioned modular mission packages that could be rapidly swapped, so one ship could change missions easily from mine warfare, for example, to anti-submarine warfare over the course of a single deployment.

But instead of taking just days to make the switch, it’s now apparent it could take weeks. An LCS assigned to a particular operation will likely operate in a single “come-as-you-are” configuration, requiring additional ships equipped with other mission modules to provide the flexibility the concept once promised.

That’s one conclusion among many following a series of Navy exercises and reports intended to take stock of LCS. Other conclusions criticize the ship as failing to match capabilities inherent to the ships it would replace. The assessment aims to figure out what the ship can and can’t do, how it should be employed, what kind of support it will need, and what changes must be made to man and fight the ships without wearing out their small crews.

These include a classified study ordered by Adm. Mark Ferguson, the vice chief of naval operations; two war games carried out by U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) in Norfolk, Va.; and the ongoing operating experiences of the two ships already in service.

The assessment comes as LCS transitions from an acquisition and shipbuilding program into a deployable fleet asset. The first two ships are now ensconced at their home port in San Diego, and the third LCS is about to be delivered. A fourth ship arrives in 2013.

The classified study, known as the OPNAV report (referring to staff reporting to the chief of naval operations), was headed by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez. Beginning in January, Perez and a 10-person team looked at all aspects of the fleet’s “readiness to receive, employ and deploy” the LCS.

USFFC in January conducted a “sustainment war game” to understand the issues and risks in manning and supporting an LCS across the Pacific Ocean — a key concern with the Freedom, the first LCS, scheduled to deploy to Singapore in the spring of 2013. It will be the first time an LCS has operated outside the Western Hemisphere.

Another war game, focusing on operations and war fighting, was held in mid-June. The results of that effort are still being analyzed, Navy sources said.

While the Navy would not release the OPNAV report, a number of sources familiar with both LCS and the report said it lays out in greater detail the problems and issues confronting the entire LCS effort, including the concept of operations (CONOPS), manning shortages, maintenance and training concerns, modularity and mission module issues, and commonality problems between the two LCS variants.

It also cites problems with how the LCS is perceived in the fleet, how leadership presents LCS capabilities, and the need to effect changes in virtually every operational area.

“As I looked at some of the draft documentation to say how we’re going to run LCS, what I thought we needed to do was a rebaselining, understanding how much information we’ve generated on how we’re going to operate these ships, and take that and build a foundation,” said Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden, OPNAV’s director of surface warfare, during an interview at the Pentagon. “I will call this a concept of employment, or CONEMP.”

Rowden is leading the work to coordinate and compile the LCS analytical efforts.

“The reality of it is, it’s time to step back and say, what did we get wrong here?”
CONOPS
Planners originally envisaged the LCS as a replacement for the fleet’s frigates, minesweepers and patrol boats, but the new assessments conclude the ships are not equal to today’s frigates or mine countermeasures ships, and they are too large to operate as patrol boats.

The LCS, according to the assessments, is not able to fulfill most of the fleet missions required by the Navy’s primary strategy document, the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” and included in a 2011 revision of the LCS CONOPS document.

Equipped with a surface warfare or maritime security mission package, the ships were judged capable of carrying out theater security cooperation and deterrence missions, and maritime security operations, such as anti-piracy.

But the LCS vessels cannot successfully perform three other core missions envisioned for them — forward presence, sea control or power projection missions — and they can provide only limited humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations, sources said.

The shortcomings are well known in the fleet, prompting a perception that service leaders are looking for missions to fit LCS, rather than the other way around.

A key LCS failure identified by the OPNAV report, sources said, is its inability to effectively defend against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a weapon carried by hundreds of small, fast-attack craft operated by virtually all potentially hostile navies. These weapons include C-801 and C-802 Chinese missiles, Russian SS-N-2 Styx missiles, European weapons such as the Otomat and Exocet, and U.S.-made Harpoon missiles.

Navies that can launch ASCMs include those of China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. The weapons have taken on an added dimension since 2006, when the Israeli corvette Hanit was hit by a C-802 launched by a Hezbollah shore battery in Lebanon.

The U.S. Navy’s requirements document for the LCS says it must be able to operate offensively in multithreat environments — areas that would include the Arabian Gulf or the Yellow Sea — but until a solution is found, the assessments call for a CONOPS more consistent with the ships’ capabilities, and suggest the need for studies to increase LCS combat power.

The Navy is continuing to look at ways to increase the ship’s weaponry and lethality. A major gap is for a weapon to replace the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), a surface-to-surface missile program canceled in 2010 that was to have given the LCS a prodigious capability.

“I certainly have asked to take a look at Harpoon, if we can take the weight,” Rowden said. “Also looking at the Griffin,” a small weapon being purchased for a trial installation on the Freedom. “There are some other missiles that we’re looking at, but those are the two I can talk about right now.”

The Harpoon is currently the Navy’s standard surface-to-surface missile, carried on destroyers and cruisers. But adding such a missile would probably mean removing something else to compensate for the additional weight. The Griffin is much smaller, but doesn’t pack the Harpoon’s punch.

Rowden also has asked the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to study replacing the 57mm gun on both LCS designs with a 76mm weapon, similar to the weapon on today’s frigates.

“It’s a larger gun, more range, certainly gives us a better opportunity to engage the enemy,” Rowden said of the 76mm.

The trouble with that weapon is that it can fit on Freedom LCS 1-class ships, but not on the narrow bow of the trimaran Independence LCS 2-class. “I don’t know if we can get it on both hulls,” Rowden acknowledged.

Range is still another concern, because of capacity for both fuel and crew provisions. Although the original CONOPS called for ships to operate at sea for at least 21 days, the ships have storage capacity to only carry enough food for 14 days, according to sources familiar with the classified report.

Module Issues
The sustainment war game and the OPNAV report also discuss serious issues with the exchange of mission modules, detailing the reasons why the quick-change concept isn’t working.

“The logistics of mission package exchanges are more complicated and time-consuming than currently reflected” in the CONOPS, according to an unclassified assessment of the January war game obtained by Defense News.

The modules are considered the primary armament of the LCS. Each of the modules now in development — mine warfare, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare — includes the module equipment, a 15-person module crew, an MH-60 helicopter with an aviation detachment of 25 people, a mission package exchange team and the ordnance required for the mission.

“Choreographing the preparation and movement of all elements to arrive in theater at the same time is a complex task and subject to potential delays,” said the war game assessment.

The LCS CONOPS calls for the swap-outs to happen OCONUS — outside the continental United States — and requires that planning for a swap needs to begin “anywhere from 30 to 60-plus days depending on the OCONUS destination,” according to the assessment.

“At present, storing mission packages in CONUS and conducting on-demand mission package exchanges OCONUS appears untenable,” the assessment read.

Suggested fixes, such as storing mission packages at a forward operating station or aboard prepositioning ships, help with the time-distance challenges, but manning and infrastructure requirements would increase.

Other problems, according to the assessment, include command-and-control issues over who has the authority to mandate a module exchange, how the request is communicated and how long a request needs to be routed and approved.

Recommendations from the war game include holding a “stand-alone event” to evaluate the exchange processes, refine timeline estimates and explore alternative methodologies.

Other recommendations include: Each mission package needs to be incorporated into the Navy’s Global Force Management planning process, an effort that includes individual ships, squadrons and units; and a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to study forward-basing of mission packages, and the CONOPS should be revised “to more accurately reflect the logistics timeline.”

Eventually, all the effort will be gathered into the concept of employment, or CONEMP, document.

“It is not going to be a static document,” Rowden declared. “We’re going to be inputting things, and as we learn things we’re going to make modifications to keep it relevant and reflect experience.

“We’ve got folks from Fleet Forces Command, Pacific Fleet, Naval Surface Forces, Naval Air Forces, NAVSEA, OPNAV and the manpower assessment team all working together to try and understand what we’ve observed and what we have learned so we can have a good, informed document with respect to this concept of employment,” Rowden said.

“My gut tells me we’ve got to get the manning squared away, then the training, sustainment and maintenance will flow from that as we move forward,” he added. “We’ll get to a better place to say these are the things we need to do to maximize the availability and capability of the ships.”

After how many hundreds of BILLIONS of dollars, they finally figure out the USN is building the world's most expensive targets; simply brilliant! DFO :rolleyes:

Surfgun

14-07-2012, 22:08

Wait a 76mm can go on PHM, that's right a little old hydrofoil, bout not on the 420' LCS 2 class? If it is narrow, try a couple of blisters!

designeraccd

14-07-2012, 22:48

Let's not be logical or actually creative-NOT allowed as is painfully obvious with these huge TARGETS! DFO :eek:

WGVSr

15-07-2012, 00:37

And now comes this oh so SHOCKING conclusion:

A key LCS failure identified by the OPNAV report, sources said, is its inability to effectively defend against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a weapon carried by hundreds of small, fast-attack craft operated by virtually all potentially hostile navies. These weapons include C-801 and C-802 Chinese missiles, Russian SS-N-2 Styx missiles, European weapons such as the Otomat and Exocet, and U.S.-made Harpoon missiles.

I've always heard that the Harpoon's 500# [+/-] warhead was a relatively small bang when compared to a Styx or C-801/2. Is that the case ?
Bill

Blaydon

15-07-2012, 01:40

I've always heard that the Harpoon's 500# [+/-] warhead was a relatively small bang when compared to a Styx or C-801/2. Is that the case ?
Bill

Harpoon is 488 lb warhead.
C-801/802 is 364lb
Exocet is1884lb
Styx 1100lb

So yes and no the 801/802 is a harpoon clone type weapon similar in size but small the Exocet and Styx about twice the size.

What is remarkable is that a 3000t warship cannot even fit harpoon due to the possibility that the weight could affect stability, I would say such a vessel already has stability issues.

The leanders and type 21 were circa 3000t and had 4 Exocet plus a good deal of other weaponry aboard so why these 3000t speedboats cannot take a reasonable weapon load is down to poor planning and a failure to fully realise the concept and the problems associated with these vessels.

What the USN is left with is two very expensive vessel types of very limited utility for which they are trying to invent a niche.

BlackBat242

15-07-2012, 05:23

The Leanders traded their Mk6 twin 4.5" gun mount for those Exocets, and the Type 21s were designed with Exocet,... there is nothing for LCS to trade for Harpoon, and they were not designed for it.

designeraccd

15-07-2012, 11:18

One can only be amazed that USN designers in WW2 were able to "cram" 6-5", 40mm, 20mm and 10-21" TT plus radar, depth charges, sonar into 2200 ton hulls and now we have the genius's that created these 2 3000+ ton types with 1 57mm popgun + electronics. Apparently the electronics will let the tiny crew see their incoming destruction which they will be powerless to stop?

With thinking (I use the term loosely...)like this we would have readily LOST WW2! A USMC rifle squad has better fire power! DFO :mad:

Surfgun

15-07-2012, 13:18

Wait a 76mm can go on PHM, that's right a little old hydrofoil, bout not on the 420' LCS 2 class? If it is narrow, try a couple of blisters!

Wait again, a little PHM can mount 8 Harpoons, but an LCS can not? I don't believe it.

I thought I saw a illustration somewhere of an export version with the fancy mini Aegis Radars with a set of Harpoons on her forecastle, just behind the 57mm?
Here it is.
http://www.gdlcs.com/gd-lcs-solution/international-variant

Blaydon

15-07-2012, 13:21

The Leanders traded their Mk6 twin 4.5" gun mount for those Exocets, and the Type 21s were designed with Exocet,... there is nothing for LCS to trade for Harpoon, and they were not designed for it.

Why was a vessel which had a surface warfare role not designed to take any form of effective SSM?

Two 30mm, one 57mm and the possibility of the Griffin missile with a 3.5nm range seems barely enough for self protection against a few small vessels.

CGRET

15-07-2012, 16:48

It still beg's the question, Why no real defensive or offensive weapons suite? What was the idea behind the design that dictated the lack there of? To many issue's for a class of ship that maybe a "Red Herring".

Regards

Rupert

15-07-2012, 21:25

Harpoon is 488 lb warhead.
C-801/802 is 364lb
Exocet is1884lb
Styx 1100lb

So yes and no the 801/802 is a harpoon clone type weapon similar in size but small the Exocet and Styx about twice the size.

?
Exocet has 360lb warhead

Blaydon

15-07-2012, 23:06

sorry misread Exocet 364lb

BlackBat242

16-07-2012, 00:42

The main missile system (anti-boat/shore, I believe) that LCS was intended to ship got cancelled... there is nothing in that weight/range/payload combination available to replace it.

Either the potential replacements are heavier, shorter-ranged, or less-capable overall.

Shinysheff

17-07-2012, 08:23

Has the Defence Department been hiring ex MOD staff?

Surfgun

10-08-2012, 19:14

I hope they will be taking donations to patch up BB 35 Texas at the commissioning ceremony for USS Fort Worth.

Navy Accepts Delivery Of LCS 3
Story Number: NNS120606-05Release Date: 6/6/2012 1:41:00 PM A A A
From Naval Sea Systems Command Office of Corporate Communication
MARINETTE, Wis. (NNS) -- The Navy officially accepted delivery of the future USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) June 6 during a ceremony in Marinette, Wis.

Fort Worth is the third littoral combat ship (LCS) delivered to the Navy, and the second LCS of the steel, semi-planing monohull Freedom variant.

Prior to delivery, the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) conducted acceptance trials aboard LCS 3. INSURV found LCS 3 to be "highly capable, well-built and inspection ready," and recommended the vessel be accepted.

"Fort Worth showed significant improvement during her trials when compared to the first ship of the class, USS Freedom," said Rear Adm. James Murdoch, program executive officer for Littoral Combat Ships. "We've had two years to operate Freedom at sea, identifying typical, first-of-class deficiencies, learning lessons on her design and rolling those lessons into Fort Worth. That experience, plus the introduction of improved construction processes and shipbuilder facilities, greatly benefitted Fort Worth."

Delivery is the last shipbuilding milestone before commissioning, scheduled for Sept. 22 in Galveston, Texas. Once commissioned, Fort Worth will join sister ships USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2).

The Lockheed Martin team now has Milwaukee (LCS 5), Detroit (LCS 7), Little Rock (LCS 9), and Sioux City (LCS 11) under construction at the Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette. Austal USA has Coronado (LCS 4), Jackson (LCS 6), Montgomery (LCS 8), Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), and Omaha (LCS 12) in production at the company's shipyard in Mobile, Ala.

LCS is a high speed, agile, shallow-draft, focused-mission surface combatant designed for operation in near-shore environments yet fully capable of open-ocean operation. Fort Worth, a high-speed steel mono-hull ship, is designed to defeat asymmetric "anti-access" threats such as mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft. The 387-foot Fort Worth will be outfitted with reconfigurable payloads, called mission packages, which can be changed out quickly, and focus on three mission areas: mine countermeasures, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare.

PEO LCS is responsible for delivering and sustaining credible littoral mission capabilities to the fleet and is working with industry to achieve steady production to increase production efficiencies and leverage cost savings. Delivering high-quality warfighting assets while balancing affordability and capability are key to supporting the nation's maritime strategy.
http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=131229

Brian Wentzell

10-08-2012, 23:32

Surfgun: One would expect improvement in the second and subsequent ships in each class of LCS. LCS-3 appears to be consistent with shipbuilding experience in the USA and other countries. However, neither the builders nor USN can be complacent as the LPD 17 San Antonio Class shows. Improvement occurs because the people and process improve, bad design or bad material require different attention.

Brian

Surfgun

11-08-2012, 00:17

1st step in improving the LPD 17 class was to shut down the Avondale yard. Hopefully, the remaining ships of the class are much improved.

WGVSr

11-08-2012, 01:00

Here's a suggestion for a littoral ship. Use the hull of a Fletcher class DD, build a new one. We have the drawings, we know how it responds [not sure we still have the physical plant to build one though]. It's a strong unit. Yank the engines and put in two of the standard LM2500 powerplants. This again is a known and is roughly equivalent in power to the old steam plant. Stick a 5"62 forward about halfway between where A & B mounts would have been. A couple or three 8 cell VLS's aft would take care of limited anti-air and/or anti-ship. Fill amidships with a low superstructure with the requisite electronics. Manning should be less than a 100 or so. A Fletcher hull is roughly the size of a Freedom-class ship for a whole lot less $. Thoughts DFO ?
Bill

CGRET

11-08-2012, 04:31

I like the idea of a Fletcher hull updated! It makes more sense then the current design, oops, my bad.

It would appear from the postings this Class of ship is a "Red Herring". Power Plants not up to the task, Ship's hull cracking, from what? Faulty welds, bad grade of Aluminum from the source? Weapons systems are not realistic, in concept, Price, function. A Bad design all around! From the photo's of the hydraulic rams it is a simple case, "lack of proper preparation and painting"! Given the current paint system used by the USN someone missed the mark on that.

A sad expense on the tax payers backs!

Regards

designeraccd

11-08-2012, 11:45

More like a useless expense, after all how many TARGET "ships" does the USN really need? Now actual WARSHIPS needed, different question.

Speaking of which, the PLAN has put 5 type 056 corvettes in the water already this year. Their specs would suggest they are actually well armed, small warships capable of COMBAT!....... DFO :eek::rolleyes:

Brian Wentzell

11-08-2012, 13:33

Gentlemen: While I understand why the leadership of the USN wanted a flexible vehicle that could be reconfigured from one war mission to another, the same leadership violated one of the most basic rules of product development. Create a statement of requirements, design a solution, build a working prototype (or two for competitive reasons), test the prototype(s) completely, redesign the better solution and build it. The concurrent design, build, test and produce idea has failed to produce effective and affordable solutions, witness the F35 fiasco. How many produced aircraft will have to be rebuilt, or scrapped, because they will be found wanting once a final product is created?

Even the much maligned USA automotive industry builds concept vehicles before a working prototype is produced and further refined into a production vehicle.

Of course the response from the leaders and politicians will be: we need this new aircraft, ship or motor vehicle now, not ten years out! But, ten years out it shall be with huge amounts of needless waste.

Brian

BlackBat242

12-08-2012, 05:09

ASSAIL

12-08-2012, 06:27

I have been reading with interest the strident criticism of these ships and have formed a conclusion that some refuse to accept the new paradigm of a modern surface fleet.

Gone are the days of large battle groups steaming around with overwhelming force. Standoff weapons, EW, ISR and modern sensors have changed the game. Off course this does not preclude a major fleet engagement but it makes it less likely.
Further, navies need to be flexible tools capable of graduated responses to emerging strategic scenarios, something that has been lacking in the USN ORBAT for some time. The toolkit has room for small hammers as well as wrecking balls!

If navies are to survive modern budget pressures they must change their current thinking and be capable of delivering payload at a cheaper thru life cost.

The upcoming deployment of 2 x LCS to Singapore is an example of such flexible response as the post Cold War era pivots the USN from NATO to the WESTPAC/Indian Ocean strategic area.

Is the LCS a finished package? off course not, it has years, possibly decades to evolve, but it is a start, it has IT commonality capable of plugging in any number of evolving weapons and sensores and most importantly it is a capable small ship aviation platform.

This forum published an excellent paper by Admiral Jonathon Greenert USN - "Payloads over Platforms - charting a new course" on another thread http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course

and I hope that those who disagree with the LCS concept at least consider the rationale for their introduction.

designeraccd

12-08-2012, 08:50

ASSAIL

12-08-2012, 12:51

The THEORY behind the LCS sounds great and helped sell the program. However, it has mushroomed into a huge, costly seagoing target without any interchangeable modules at this point; plus has the weapons package of a much smaller OPV that costs a fraction of the price.

The U.S. taxpayer has not gotten good value for the many billions of dollars squandered on this "concept". There are many OPV, corvette or even small frigate designs that appear very capable of modern combat at apparently a fraction of the cost that has been SUNK into the LCS boondoggle. The new Spanish OPVs, PLAN type 056 corvettes and Russian Project 22380s illustrated below, (approx. 1000 tons smaller than LCS) all come to mind. DFO :eek:

All surface ships are "targets". The 3 alternatives you list for the LCS no more and no less so.
Unless your surface vessel is protected by the Aegis umbrella they are all exposed and there's no reason to single out the LCS.
I suspect that they will have an adequate CIWS for independant ops within a very few years and they already have a reasonable ASuW capability with their helos.

Don Boyer

12-08-2012, 13:52

I think there is very good reason to single out the LCS as a weakly-armed, under protected, ineffective piece of crap that can't do what they said it could do, doesn't have the so-called "modules" they said it would have and can't do any but the most menial of naval tasks, if that. Other than that, it sure looks pretty and modern and "advanced". It's what comes from using a politically-motivated vision of a sea-going role that was stupid to start with as a basis for designing a warship. You design and build warships that are intended to slaughter the crap out of potential enemy warships (even if they are never used in that role, they have accomplished their goal) and thus are built to engage what the enemy is building, not pirate-infested junks in the littoral in some fanciful vision of what navies should do in the modern world.. You also build them to last and to quality standards that exceed by far what we've seen so far. The fact that all surface ships are targets isn't the issue. The issue is making them the least vulnerable target possible given the situation at hand. The LCS doesn't even come close to dealing with that issue. In WWII the US built thousands of "targets" of all classes, vulnerable to attack by enemy ships of more or less equal capability. The difference was ours were built in quantity, were well armed, well used, well led and manned by highly competent professionals, the result being few of our ships were lost whereas the enemy lost 97 percent of their navy in three years. If some of our weapons systems had been better to start with, it would have been less than three years, but that's another issue.

Dealing with the scum in the littoral who live by the rpg is a tertiary role easily handled by a Harpoon or 5"/60 in their lunch, if one happens to have a government with enough stones (sadly lacking so far) to deal with the situation in the manner of Ye Olde RN in the days of sail, a program that was highly effective against the enemy of the moment using the ships of a size and ability to deal with the problem that already existed.

So far, the LCS is worthless in comparison to similar vessels of other nations, well-armed, well equipped and capable in their roles. That comparison alone shows the LCS for what it is.

designeraccd

12-08-2012, 14:03

For some reason (logical conclusions based on fact??) I find it impossible to dispute anything Don said re the LCS..........DFO :eek:

WGVSr

12-08-2012, 16:46

Surfgun

12-08-2012, 16:50

I figure that perhaps we should stop thinking of the LCS as a frigate replacement, but just as an ultra fast, armed, multi-purpose, aviation centric, minesweeper?:confused:

Regardless, these ships will not be in the fleet for long, due to their light construction and high horsepower, they will beat themselves to bits. I will be surprised if any of these ships, especially the first batch will last 20 years. That is if they actually deploy these things, as they so far have not traveled very far from the US.

cadillac811

12-08-2012, 21:31

Don, you said it all. This is what happens when you try to design some futuristic ship to solve a politically motivated problem. The LCS never struck me as a good idea. It seems the old American habit of adding over engineering to meet several problems-none very well. If we have problems in the Littoral just send a frigate to "Fry the scum". Believe me a Harpoon missle or a 5"60 can really ruin your day. Of course politicans at the U.N. will scream, but thats good for a change. Well said Don, keep it up. Cadillac811

brian james

12-08-2012, 23:09

Well said Don....over-computerised Naval Architectural blunders...under-armed aluminium???... Now where have I heard of that disasterous design before??...Regards Brian...

ASSAIL

13-08-2012, 00:22

The real world of competing commercial and idealogical differences is not as simple as "beating the crap out" of adversaries. Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy!
Navies are the tools by which politicians exercise foriegn policy and therefore there is a requirement for "politically motivated" designs within the Orbat. Unfortunately, the "scum" of the littorals is a modern reality and must be dealt with and a more efficient (and diplomatically acceptable) way of doing it is with this type of vessel and not wasting a billion dollar Burke on the task. The hot and cold wars of the 20th century have passed.

Personally, I agree with most that the design philosophy is flawed and that speed as a primary requirement skews cost and the other requirements way off kilter.
However, these are by no means frigates as we in the RAN understand them.
They are glorified OPV's which will eventually have working mission modules that can do the tasks envisioned.
I think I"ll wait a few years and see how the concept pans out before passing judgement on the success or otherwise of these strange ships.

Don Boyer

13-08-2012, 01:00

"The real world of competing commercial and ide[o]logical differences is not as simple as "beating the crap out" of adversaries. Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy!"

In this modern age, "diplomacy" as practiced by our dear modern neighbors and friends has accomplished only one thing that I can see -- it has allowed more people to die over a longer period of time than are getting killed in actual head to head combat between armies in whatever war is popular at the moment. It does so by delaying or destroying opportunities to take positive action early on that stops the criminal behavior that passes for the rule of law in many areas of the world. If diplomacy had solved anything at all, there would have been no Korea, no Vietnam (dragged on for years), no Iraq (still hanging on), no Afghanistan (still dragging on) no scummy warlords bleeding African nations to death over "sharia law" (name your country) no piss-pot dictators bleeding their country dry for drug profits (name your South American or Asian nation of choice) and no thousands of young Americans killed for very little gain whatsoever and at considerable drain of our national treasure better spent on ourselves.

There would be no crucible in Syria killing thousands so an idiot can stay in power. There would be no Iran desperately trying to build an atomic bomb to destroy Israel with. (What other possible reason could they have for acquiring one other than to threaten their neighbors? Nobody is threatening them with nuclear devastation, we just threaten them with freedom of religion and freedom of speech, neither of which they can tolerate.)

As practiced today, diplomacy is a cop-out for the spineless for doing nothing for fear of "looking bad" in the eyes of others (most of whom would knife us in the back at first opportunity), and it allows those who wish to control a nation by any means necessary to do exactly that without fear of hindrance for years while the killing fields grow and grow and the secret police reign. It leaves the residents of such countries no other choice but to die by the thousands in an attempt to force change for the better, usually a losing proposition because they don't have the money and weapons for the job, having been bled dry and denied the basics by their so-called national government. The United Nations has become exactly the same collection of competing windbags that the League of Nations was from the start, and they've had about the same effect on improving world conditions through diplomacy. We all saw how the League of Nations, diplomats all, fended off World War II real nicely.

Diplomacy has been a sack of excrement for years now and shows not the slightest sign of becoming anything else. Look at the type of people who immerse themselves in diplomacy -- what human drek. That being the case, I vote for warships that actually perform a useful function and in quantities necessary to cover all the bases since nuking it from space isn't an option. I also vote, if forced into war (we don't start wars) for getting in there and killing the enemy so quickly and in such mass quantities that they crawl out of the rubble and beg you to quit, like the Japanese were forced to do. Shortens war, saves money, saves our own military's lives, and we can get on with the business of figuring out how to set up governments whose primary goal isn't trying to take away that which is ours and while we're at it figuring a way to stop killing each other in mass quantities over some of the stupidest "causes" imaginable.

ASSAIL

13-08-2012, 01:34

Don. I can see you never had an ambition to join the State Department!
Cheers

Don Boyer

13-08-2012, 04:26

Or be elected to public office! :)

Been on the sharp end of the stick too often not to notice the actual on-the-ground results of the style of diplomacy that seems to be the fad these days. However, I should stand up and say that I would MUCH PREFER that diplomacy solve our problems short of constant warfare. Would that it were so. The diplomacy practiced today isn't solving problems effectively and in a timely fashion, and that is my problem, not the process of diplomacy as it should be among nations. We've been killing each other for centuries now without resolving the basic differences via diplomacy, and war hasn't solved these differences either. We are fighting our wars the wrong way since the end of WWII as well, so nothing is working quite right, and the neo Pol Pots, Stalins and Hitlers go their merry way once again, the ungodly unchecked by righteousness. We really do need to put a stop to that and, among myriad others things, it takes a strong navy with the right weapons for the jobs at hand to get that done. The LCS isn't one of those ships...

Regards,

designeraccd

18-08-2012, 12:34

Oh my, it seems bad test results were scuttled!

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_08_16_2012_p0-486738.xml#

If at first you don't suceed...LIE! Pic shows LCS-1 sterndoor in CLOSED position; that will sure keep sea out, about like Titanic! DFO :rolleyes:

Don Boyer

18-08-2012, 13:19

Like I said -- LCS = Leaking, Corroding Ship, so at least they got the acronym right.

Were it me (and it never is) the program would come to an immediate halt, contractors would not be receiving fat paychecks and we'd get the designers to work on a real ship. There are enough examples about now of heavily-armed and functional vessels capable of operations inshore so that we might actually be able to cobble something together that actually works.

The LCS could be used for a Presidential Yacht in future -- :)

designeraccd

18-08-2012, 15:44

Now now Don....way to LOGICAL and cost effective to do as you suggest! Yes indeed: government of, by and for the people...if the "people" have connections and loads of money to properly "influence" decision making.

COMBAT effective? Now who needs that, after all the USN is now; umm...I forget the PC tagline of their current ads....perhaps someone can remember? DFO :mad:

Surfgun

20-08-2012, 23:53

I wonder if Fort Worth, the newest LCS will have any cracks before her commissioning?
http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=131658

Don Boyer

21-08-2012, 00:06

Interesting photo, Surf -- one wonders at all the unsecured line on deck in bad weather. Tsk, my old Bosun will be spinning in his grave!! :rolleyes:

Brian Wentzell

21-08-2012, 01:00

LCS 3 made it as far as Halifax last weekend (August 18 ot thereabout) on her delivery voyage from the builder's yard up on the lakes.
Brian

Rob Hoole

21-08-2012, 08:58

Well said Don. As to most current active littoral threats, I still prefer the Russian solution. Put them on the mother ship, set same on fire, sail off. Of course, a well-directed burst from a chain gun would have the same result, should an Administration decide to say, 'enough is enough'.
Bill

Hello Bill,

I think you may have been watching too many doctored 'fantasy videos' on YouTube (or reading the Daily Mail). :)

Russia frees Somali pirates captured in Gulf of Aden (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8667640.stm)

Russia hands over Somali pirates to Middle East states (http://rt.com/news/russia-hands-over-somali-pirates-to-middle-east-states/)

Russians transfer captured somali pirates to Iranian military (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=71f_1323883257)

Brian Wentzell

21-08-2012, 11:16

Update: Google the "Halifax Shipping News" and you will see the LCS 3 failed to sail from Halifax yesterday because she has main propulsion problems. This suggests that things continue to be problematic for this version of the LCS.
Brian

designeraccd

21-08-2012, 15:27

I'm just delighted to know our tax money is being so well....uhhhh...spent. Altho FLUSHED comes to mind.........DFO :mad:

Surfgun

22-08-2012, 02:51

It looks like they got her going.

The word is that LCS 3's main propulsion diesels are out of action and she's running on her gas turbines. There's always something with these boats, isn't there? What next? Will she be able to make it all the way to Galveston without having to stop somewhere for repairs? August 18, 2012.
LCS 3 is now alongside a pier in Halifax. See the report in the Halifax Shipping News here. 1230, August 18, 2012.
Still tied up at the Canadian Navy base in Halifax. 1830, August 19, 2012.
Still there. 0630, August 20, 2012.
Leaving the pier in Halifax, with the tugs Atlantic Larch and Atlantic Willow. 1600, August 20, 2012.
Tugs gone back to base, LCS 3 heading south at about 12 knots. 1700, August 20, 2012.
About 200 miles east of Cape Cod, chugging along at about 13 knots. 0630, August 21, 2012.

http://www.coltoncompany.com/

designeraccd

22-08-2012, 10:34

Maybe a bank of big Honda or Evinrude outboards should be attached to her stern? It will be hard to man the oars, for propulsion, given her tiny, overworked crew.:eek:

One can hope she is at the very least running on Navy Secretary Mabus vaunted BIO-FUEL, at a mere 4X the cost of regular Navy fuel, but at least that makes "tree huggers" happy! DFO :rolleyes:

Surfgun

23-08-2012, 00:00

Her last port was Halifax, I'm sure they fueled her up with petroleum products made from the oil sands!
At 0630 on the 22nd, she was reported to be off of Delaware. I would hazard a guess and think she is to make port in Norfolk this evening. I also would guess she will hide out there, till Tropical Storm Isaac passes before continuing her trip South.

Brian Wentzell

23-08-2012, 00:48

Surfgun

23-08-2012, 02:13

Surfgun: Sadly, you appear to know nothing about the source of crude oil in Atlantic Canada. None of it comes from Western Canada's oil sands. You folks down south consume the vast majority of it.

Atlantic Canada gets its crude oil from the North Sea, Nigeria, and the Persian Gulf. That is one reason Canada maintains a frigate in the Persian Gulf area.

Regards,
Brian

Actually, the oil sands comment was a bit of a tongue in cheek jab at our dear leader, since he has been blocking the Keystone Pipeline and been pushing his alternative fuel agenda.

Brian Wentzell

24-08-2012, 01:16

Surfgun

24-08-2012, 02:25

Surfgun: Canadians are very sensitive about these matters. President Obama made a decision but our counter to that is to sell more of the Oil Sands output to China. That will require a new pipeline to our Pacific Coast but there is huge opposition in this country to this. Personally, I think we should stop selling additional crude to China and the USA. We should use some of our crude to replace the foreign crude imported to our Eastern provinces and the rest should be refined and sold on the world market to the highest bidder.
Brian

B.W. my apologies. I did not mean to make light of the situation in that way. I guess it is just a bit of a slap happy way to deal with the frustration with the current administration in D.C. and how it deals with our friends up North. Trust me, it is only the extreme environmentalists that support the non-sense of blocking the construction of the pipeline.
I like my money going north! I'm saving up for a replacement for my aging Bombardier.

Back on topic, word has it LCS 3 Fort Worth was in the area of Hampton Roads, VA the morning of 23 August. Perhaps she is need of a refit before continuing South?

Brian Wentzell

24-08-2012, 12:17

Surfgun: No problem with the oil talks!

I see the USN has established a three star panel to oversee the LCS program. Do these leaders know much about ship design and construction? One fears that no matter what the real facts are that they will have no real authority to affect change, irrespective of their individual or collective knowledge and expertise.

Brian

designeraccd

24-08-2012, 12:23

And/or...if one was cynical, one might wonder if the panel members were mostly picked for PC reasons? I fear the LCS program would damage to many careers if found wanting; for example if it was to really be a COMBAT worthy warship. DFO :eek:

Don Boyer

24-08-2012, 16:01

It is a sad fact in these modern times of MBAs and PC militarism that the acquisition of stars on shoulder boards is not necessarily congruent with the acquisition of useful knowledge in brains. I've had the feeling for years that if Admiral Chester Nimitz were to return from the staff of the Supreme Commander to inspect his navy's senior command of today he'd throw up.

I call it the Busby Berkeley syndrome. Have a big problem? Let's do a "show!" The actual process of solving the problem takes second place to PR and scrambling to "inform" the media that it isn't really that serious, a solution is in hand and the money they can't account for wasn't wasted. All the tap dancing and singing submerges results under good drama. The only difference is back in the day Busby and the kids actually put on a show that saved the farm/school/business from insolvency and Mickey Rooney got the girl.

designeraccd

25-08-2012, 17:30

The link below is a pretty good summation of the history of these pathetic, uber-expensive boondoggle pair of designs:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

They also note how under armed these large, frigate sized ships are. No talk of faulty engines, but perhaps the next update will cover that, too.....DFO :eek:

Surfgun

26-08-2012, 00:35

LCS 3 is reportedly at Norfolk for training.
http://www.wvec.com/my-city/norfolk/New-Navy-ship-in-Norfolk-for-training-167320055.html

Brian Wentzell

26-08-2012, 01:15

Surfgun: I noticed the local press is apparently unaware of the little hitch in Halifax. It would have been embarrasing to have her sprouting oars or a sail! There is a story of a World War 2 RCN Bangor minesweeper, HMCS Lockeport, that had experienced propulsion problems whilst en route to Baltimore, Md. She got there partly under sail and partly under two. As she had been financed by the British she was returned to them on July 2, 1945 and scrapped in 1948. So there is a precedent for innovative solutions:)

Brian

Surfgun

27-08-2012, 21:10

120824-N-YM856-054 NORFOLK,Va. - Future littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) sits pier side at Naval Station Norfolk after arriving for training. Fort Worth is scheduled to be commissioned in September and will be homeported in San Diego, Calif. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brittney Cannady/Released)
USS Fort Worth Visits Norfolk
By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brittney Cannady, SURFLANT Public Affairs Office
Norfolk, VA - In route to its commissioning ceremony in Galveston, Texas, future littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) stopped in Norfolk on Friday to conduct training with Afloat Training Group.
The third of only four littoral combat ships built and the second LCS of the steel, semi-planing, mono-hull Freedom variant, Fort Worth is set to be commissioned Sept. 22, 2012 and will be homeported in San Diego, Calif.
Although it currently has just two sister ships in the fleet, the crew of Fort Worth has enjoyed the process of getting the ship ready for service, even creating a “commissioning countdown” on the command’s Facebook page for Sailors to track.
“We’ve stopped a lot of places mostly for stores; it’s been pretty cool to go to all the Canadian ports that we’ve visited I had never been to Montreal and Vancouver.” said Sonar Technician (Surface) 1st Class Thomas Garcia, who has been on board since 2010.
Constructed at Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette, Wis., Fort Worth builders applied experiences from the first ship of its class, USS Freedom (LCS 1), implementing design changes that are now part of the standard design that will be included in future ships of the class.
“It’s challenging billet.” said Chief Select Gunner’s Mate David Daigle. “There are definitely pros and cons to being stationed aboard only the second ship like this, a lot of ‘firsts’. You take ownership, then you have to give it up to someone else after four months. It’s a unique experience, unlike any ship I’ve been on before.”
Fort Worth will be manned by two rotational crews composed of up to 75 Sailors, depending on the size of the mission package detachment embarked at any given time, as well as an aviation detachment.
Fort Worth, a high-speed steel mono-hull ship, is designed to defeat asymmetric "anti-access" threats such as mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft. The 387-foot LCS will be outfitted with reconfigurable payloads, called mission packages, which can be changed out quickly, and focus on three mission areas: mine countermeasures, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare.

No mention if some of the "stores" picked up may have been engine components!

WGVSr

28-08-2012, 00:18

Hmmm, one corrodes and the other cracks. Time Magazine suggested renaming them 'Independence from Corrosion' and 'Freedom from Cracking'.
Bill

Scatari

28-08-2012, 03:00

designeraccd

28-08-2012, 08:28

A truly advanced GPS....no wonder those poor diesels gave out!!! DFO :D:D

Brian Wentzell

28-08-2012, 11:15

Perhaps the fumes from the failing diesels caused him to confuse Halifax for Vancouver! The fog was not any worse than it has been in the early mornings for most of the summer! On the other hand the folks from down south are renowned for their lack of knowledge about the land to their north. It will be interesting to see how they try to get LCS 3 to San Diego with that GPS :)

Brian

designeraccd

28-08-2012, 14:52

Nooooooooooo comment, other than to say many Americans are like my wife: NO sense of direction or knowledge of geography! Of course, to imply the LCS is a WARship; USN Fleet Tugs of WW2 were more combat worthy and lethal...........DFO :eek:

brian james

30-08-2012, 09:04

Bauxite 'end product' Naval Ships have been 'tried' before...by the UK... with catastrophic results!!!....plus.. Constructing these floating targets under commercial build standards is asking for trouble ...Brian..

Surfgun

05-09-2012, 23:42

Fort Worth has some bugs...

Navy's LCS-3 Spider Infested
by Mike McCarthy
August 29, 2012 - Defense Daily

[ABOARD THE FUTURE USS FORT WORTH] - They can deal with the occasional busted part or software glitch, and the hard work that accompanies resolving it. But one thing the sailors on the latest Littoral Combat Ship are getting a little fed up with is the big, ugly and menacing-looking spiders dangling around the new warship.

And there are many. The future USS Fort Worth (LCS-3) is infested with them. Some larger in diameter than golf balls, the brownish spiders show up in droves around sunset, spinning webs around railings to catch prey, or greet crew by suddenly pirouetting down from overhangs.

Their presence stems from prime contractor Lockheed Martin’s [LMT] partner for building the ships, Marinette Marine. The Wisconsin shipyard on the shores of Lake Michigan gets overrun with the spiders this time of year as they seek the fresh water to prey on insects, the ship’s commanding officer, Capt. Randy Blankenship, said. It didn’t take long for them to get aboard the ship ahead of sailing Aug. 7.

“They inundated the crap out of the ship,” he said. “We’ve been thinking about going out and getting a big extermination kit.”

The critters aren’t harmful, he says, nor do they appear to have penetrated living quarters like the mess room and bunks. But the arachnids are--at the very least--a nuisance around the mission bay, bridge and deck areas of the ship.

“It’s annoying. It’s annoying as can be,” Blankenship said, adding he wants the ship to be a presentable as possible during its Sept. 22 commissioning ceremony in Galveston, Texas.

Blankenship predicted their population will dissipate at sea as food sources dwindle. There were even more when the ship initially got underway, when measures taken by the crew to rid themselves of the creatures proved fruitless.

“We were out there with friggin’ water hoses. Fire mains. 50 PSI going after those suckers,” Blankenship said. “Those little resilient bastards came right back.”

An extension entomologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Phil Pellitteri, said the spider’s presence will dissipate because they’ll run out of insects to eat at sea. Even if they make it to laying eggs, the newborns will have nothing to feed on and will quickly die.

“When they hatch, they’re in big trouble,” he said.

By examining a grainy cell phone photo sent through email, Pellitteri identified them as belonging to the orb weaver family of spiders and confirmed they’re harmless. The large webs they spin could have easily allowed them to be picked up by wind and blown onto the ship, he said.

The orb weaver is a “late summer” spider, Pellitteri said, meaning they could have infiltrated the ship after it was delivered to the Navy in early June and remained at Marinette before its departure earlier this month. Michael Draney, an entomologist at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, said the orb weavers on the ship could be of the Larinioides sclopetarius species, which is also know as the "bridge spider" because it's the "only spider in our region that is usually willing to spin its orb web on metal."

Lockheed Martin said it was unaware of the problem. "We weren't aware of a spider issue on board LCS-3," a company spokeswoman said. "We can work with the Navy on a solution if needed."

Regardless of when or how the spiders came aboard, the crew wasn't thrilled about their unwanted shipmates.

“The ship’s (bleeping) infested with them,” said one sailor. “We’ve got to live with them, I guess,” added another one before dropping a few expletives and concluding with: “It’s ridiculous.”

For some members of the crew, the spiders can be a source of entertainment during long night watch shifts. With food becoming scarce at sea, the spiders start going at each other, as one of the vessel’s chiefs noted.

“They’re awesome. They are fighting right now because they don’t have any food. We stand six-hour watches and it can be boring, and (spider brawling) takes up a good four hours,” Chief Matthew Moore said before reminding himself of his captain’s presence. “We’re still being vigilant, of course, but we can’t help it because they’re right there.”

Pellitteri said attempting to eat each other could be one reason for the fighting, but it may also have to do with their “brutal way of mating.”

BlackBat242

06-09-2012, 04:35

Well, we have the ship's theme song... The Who: Boris the Spider (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vgx7abJH6uI)

Don Boyer

06-09-2012, 06:00

What happens if Charlotte shows up?

Scatari

06-09-2012, 06:50

Lends a whole new meaning to the expression "working the bugs out" of a new ship!

Tim

Don Boyer

06-09-2012, 16:06

I wonder if Chief Moore's boys (post 189) were chastised for surfing the webs instead of scanning the horizon while on watch?

Poor LCS -- just can't catch a PR break no matter what! :)

designeraccd

06-09-2012, 16:34

Maybe they can be trained to spin the webs if cracks appear...to help hold the tub together, given the strength of spiderwebs. ;)

I remember watching that type in the eves of our duplex as a kid up in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin...pretty much due east of Marienette on Wisconsin's "thumb". At that time (early 50s), both minesweepers and LSTs were being built up there; with enough gun power on each to shred an LCS! DFO :)

brian james

07-09-2012, 21:29

Re the Arachnid LCS Invasion.....Brings a new connotation to the saying 'web of deceit'....Brian...

WGVSr

10-09-2012, 22:40

Brian Wentzell

10-09-2012, 23:08

Bill: The suggestion of a new FFG in lieu of the LCS has surfaced from time to time. At least the FFG, particularly if it were built to the current RAN configuration, would certainly provide a more general purpose platform.

The most critical mistake made by your navy after the initial decision to proceed with the LCS was to give up the competition between the two competing designs. You now have two ships that have yet to prove their capabilities and certainly one of the two designs will prove to be the better but with the wasted resources assigned to the runner up your country will never be able to develop the better design to its full potential.

This is a procurement disaster.

Brian

WGVSr

11-09-2012, 02:05

Don Boyer

11-09-2012, 23:53

The US seems to have an obsession with treating the military and its needs and operations as if it were "just another business" -- a culture that arises from the fact that so many of those in important governmental positions such as Congressmen and agency leaders come from the business world/legal world and are blinded to anything else as a management system to achieve results. Few recognize the special category of the military -- it should be a nasty killing machine capable of defeating all enemies in war, and hopefully so powerful it prevents wars in the first place. This is a whole different concept on which to plan the future and spend the money. It isn't banking or selling insurance.

The corollary of this is what I call "buzz-word poisoning" -- someone comes up with a buzzword that's supposed to have deep significance and meaning (usually it doesn't, it's a bastard offspring of a word or concept already in existence) and suddenly a whole governmental agency is supposed to revise its entire existence in order to properly meet this "new" challenge to democracy, which it obviously was incapable of doing before.

I tend to consider most of it large horse t**s perpetrated by contractors looking to "sell" their stuff to a gullible management structure, but then that's just me after 34 years of dealing with it. Examples from the civilian world were the concepts of "Management by Objective (MBO)" --an off-shoot of the McNamera Defense days -- which was supposed to make everything more productive through clearly stated objectives which management would then "manage" to fruition. This made the rounds in the agency where I worked, and -- in a big "sell it to the troops" meeting -- I posed the question as to how the f*** you could manage anything without objectives to start with. I became instantly loathed by management (who always see stars and promotions when they can back "the latest thing"), loved by the troops, and the whole thing was eventually mooted out of existence, a fate I had already predicted. The NSPS personnel management system, of more recent vintage, went the same way for the same reasons -- it sucked to start with.

Of even more recent vintage is "Lean Six Sigma" a mish-mash of already existant analytical tools and methods designed to "streamline" business processes and save money. It may well be capable of doing that, used properly, but it's most often used to cut operating costs by cutting personnel, which any competent manager ought to be able to do (if that's the only choice) minus the over-blown mathematics. And of course, considering it's most common use, no personnel want anything to do with it.

So some genius coins the word "littoral" and builds this whole concept around the fact that somehow our military needs to be prepared to deal with "warfare in the littoral". Apparently none of these geniuses read a WWII history book. With only a few exceptions, naval actions in WWII took place in the littoral, or close to it in support of operations that were in the littoral. Somehow, absent the amphibious invasions of the past. our navy got lost out in deep water and was no longer capable of dealing with conflict in the littoral? The actual fact is they didn't have to, and when they did, they could do so with little failure. Mine warfare got neglected, etc. etc., but in no modern conflict has the US Navy lost a ship in the littoral due to combat incapability. The Falklands war may have been the only example of serious difficulties in that department, and still the navy that took the most blows in that conflict still emerged victorious for the same reason they always have -- they never turn from battle, ever, and the quality of their fighting men far exceeded that of their opponents.

So out of our little buzzword "littoral" comes LCS -- an inept and incapable ship concept that was created to bolster and equally inept and inacable concept of warfare. Navies should be designed to fight in any environment the sea can throw at them with ships equipped to meet the challenges they need to face and designed to support each other -- where one has a weakness, another has the strength, exactly as was done in WWII, which was for the US navy (and the world, for that matter) the most successful naval operation in history.

Rupert

12-09-2012, 09:04

but in no modern conflict has the US Navy lost a ship in the littoral due to combat incapability.

Whilst technically true, I think that underestimates the vulnerability of the USN in some departments.

USS Stark was not "lost", but demonstrated a vulnerability of its combat system
USS Missouri incident in Iraq war showed this also (recognising that whilst a T42 shot the missile down, it was late, but the USN systems did not detect it)
USS Cole incident demonstrated other vulnerabilities

During recent decades the USN has not had to really face much in the way of determined attack (apart from these incidents) in the way that for example the RN did in the Falklands.

So personally I think the USN was over-complacent and over-confident in AEGIS for far too long. Thus I think that the USN did have to take significant steps to improve matters, though whether they have taken the right steps is a more complicated matter, but I think and hope that in Spy-3 they have taken the most important step

designeraccd

12-09-2012, 10:31

I sure wish I could disagree with any of the previous posts, but what we the U.S. taxpayer have is a complute SNAFU of major magnitude. Besides providing patronage, the only other thing these poorly designed tubs are really good for, despite hard working, under manned crews...is target practice. DFO :mad:

Don Boyer

12-09-2012, 15:36

I agree, Rupert, the US navy (and other services) seem to find themselves with their knickers about their knees when something goes up -- a habit worth avoiding. ALL ships are vulnerable these days to the modern weapons deployed by unsavory twits, which was really the point I was leaning toward. By this one would conclude the operators of such vessels would have the lights on in their heads and that ALL ships operated by our navy would be as prepared for defense and offense as modern weapons/sensor fits would allow, not developing and under-armed and under-equipped "specialized" vessel of little combat worth as a response to a universal threat. The examples you quoted are the proof of that. I think we've had what, four vessels badly damaged in operations around Iraq/Mideast so far, with heavy loss of life on one. The lessons of past wars are ignored these days, the blissful assumption that nothing will go wrong substituting for preparedness in my estimation.

I still feel strongly that the root cause of a lot of naval "troubles" goes back to the idiotic concept that the military should be run as some sort of super-business proposition rather than as an expensive but necessary fighting machine that should be run like a military organization in order to avoid mistakes such as building ships that don't work.

emason

12-09-2012, 21:00

Navies should be designed to fight in any environment the sea can throw at them with ships equipped to meet the challenges they need to face and designed to support each other.
By this one would conclude the operators of such vessels would have the lights on in their heads and that ALL ships operated by our navy would be as prepared for defense and offense as modern weapons/sensor fits would allow, not developing and under-armed and under-equipped "specialized" vessel of little combat worth as a response to a universal threat.

Sounds as though you need a modern day Fisher, who as First Sea Lord got any rid of 150 ships that were incapable of fighting in battle, calling them "too weak to fight, too slow to run away", and replaced them with the new dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers.

BlackBat242

13-09-2012, 07:18

Interesting article in the new [September] issue of the USNI Proceedings on the origin of these ships. Seems they are the result of wargames fought ca. 1990 concerning a hypothetical closure of Hormuz. So we have a mission in search of a ship. The article seems to say the two different assembly lines were originally to find the best ship and are now to provide political capital. The author suggests closing one line, scrapping the modular concept and build two versions on one hull. The professional comments I see in the online version suggest scrapping the whole lot of them and cancelling the program. They also suggest building more FFGs.
Bill

Yes, but that original recommendation was for a whole swarm of 400-600 ton fast surface warfare boats... to be carried to the operating area aboard a larger "mother ship"!

Basically, a modern PT boat to deal with Iran's armed speedboats/suicide craft and NOT for ASW, mine warfare, etc!

But then the careerists (and Admiral Vernon Clark) got hold of it in 2001... and said it had to "self-deploy", and be "multi-functional" and "transformational".

:mad:

WGVSr

13-09-2012, 22:27

You know BB, I've wondered about that. Since the Vietnam-era, the USN has been incredibly disinterested in small ships. Most of the small stuff was left 'incountry' when we left. Yes, there were a few hydrofoils and the PCs, and a lot of talk, but that's been about it for the last 30 years or so. Are we short of Lieutenants who exhibit leadership qualities ? Many of the DEs of WWII vintage were commanded by [generally] junior Lt Cdrs [or even, heaven forbid, reserve officers] and they did perfectly fine. I guess Lockheed/Martin/Newport News/whoever doesn't make enough money on the small stuff.
Bill

Don Boyer

14-09-2012, 07:27

BB provided beautiful examples of exactly my point..."buzzword poisoning" instead of dealing with things in terms of reality; "transformational" ...meaningless.

Read an issue of the US Naval Institute Proceedings and you'll find endless examples -- acronym after acronym, "business speak" at every paragraph and I doubt any of the writers is capable of shooting an enemy and actually hitting anything. It's disgusting, and results in material expressions -- the LCS -- as worthless as the language that helped create them. The USN is not alone in this ballgame, either.

designeraccd

14-09-2012, 12:02

Now now Don, without Power Points and mouth twisting acronyms where would the modern USN be? Think of all the additional unemployed there would be without bloated staffs!! Our DEARLEADER would have an even harder time hiding true unemployment figures!

How can one complain, when we now already are blessed with 3 3000 ton modern TARGETS........... DFO :rolleyes:

ASSAIL

15-09-2012, 06:42

Despite what a few of you continually lament, the LCS is with the USN and the jury is still out on what the final package may look like.

However, some of you hark back to the good ol days when the USN had destroyers to burn and suggest these were far more capable that the LCS.
I disagree and submit the following comparison between LCS 2 and USS Gearing.

Displacement - L2 2,784 GE 3,460
Range - L2 4,300 @18kts, GE 4,500 @ 20kts
Main gun - L2 Mk110 57mm, Max rg 19,000yds at 220 rpm, Proj wt 14lbs
- GE 6 x 5"/38 Max rg 18,000 yds @ 16x6rpm proj wt 55lbs
CIWS - L2 SEARAM, 2 x 30mm Bushmaster chain gun
- GE 12 x 40mm, 11 x 20mm

Now for the big ticket!

Helo L2 carries at least 1 x MH60R/S plus a Firescout UAV with all the capacitty that brings including active dipping sonar, Hellfire anti ship missiles, airborne Mk 54 torps and a Fleet data link.

In comparison, Gearing has 10 x 21" tubes!

By whatever measure, LCS 2 is a better armed ship than USS Gearing

So, "the good ol days" were not that good and they should NOT be used in any debate about LCS.

What should be used is to compare a modern FFG with LCS but as the fixed cost of the LCS platform is now USD 350m/unit or less, a new frigate is at a distinct disadvantage.

I've said this before here, we have yet to see the LCS programme reach its potential and that will progressively occur over the following decade and I'll reserve my judgement until the programme has matured.

The reality is that the United States can no longer afford to spend to keep a navy that outspends the next most capable 13 navies combined.
The social cost of that spend is way too high.
The USSR tried that and failed.

Blaydon

15-09-2012, 07:28

WGVSr

15-09-2012, 13:03

Given that the problems seem to be in the hull, my previous suggestion of a Gearing-like hull, LM 2500 propulsion and put what you want on top still seems valid.
Bill

ASSAIL

15-09-2012, 13:09

Reports I have read put the cost per unit at $450M per plus $100M per mission module, none of which are yet in production.

Base weapons are 1 x 57mm, SeaRam and .50 cal MGs.

The 30mm are part of the SW module which is not yet in production.

You are right about not comparing it to a WW2 designed Destroyer, instead it should be compared to a modern small Frigate or Corvette against which it fails to measure up in most respects.

The Average ship (fixed price) across the dual block buy is $362 for LM and 352 for Austal (USN April 2012-sorry can't get the link to work)

LCS2 was fitted with the 30mm chain guns 28th July 2010
www.spacewar.com/reports/First_Gun_Mission_Module_Installed_Aboard_LCS_2_99 9.html

I have no first hand knowledge of either of these facts, just reports via google

Surfgun

18-09-2012, 23:11

PCU Fort Worth, made it.
http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=133970

designeraccd

08-10-2012, 16:02

Another concise review of the LCS..............

Navy's Littoral Combat Ship: "Big Bucks, Little Bang"

(Source: Project On Government Oversight; issued October 5, 2012)

The Navy’s newest ship, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), is woefully inferior to comparable ships, according to an article written by John Sayen for Time magazine’s Battleland blog.

Sayen, a Marine Corps veteran who has written extensively on the military, says that the LCS “cannot match the combat power of similar sized foreign warships costing only a fraction as much.” Even with its mission modules, which won’t be fully finished or tested for years, it compares poorly with similar ships in foreign navies.

Sayen provides several examples (excerpted below with permission of Time):

“The new Russian Steregushchy-class frigate, for example, is (at 2,200 tons) about 30% smaller than an LCS and cost only 20-25% as much. Yet, it carries a 100mm automatic gun, 14.5-mm machineguns, close-in defense “Gatling gun” systems (AK-630), medium range surface to air missiles (S400 series), SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles (sub-sonic and shorter ranged than the US Harpoon but far more capable than the Griffin), 533-mm (21”) torpedoes, 324mm anti-submarine torpedoes and a helicopter. The ship is not only in production for the Russian Navy but also for the navies of Algeria and Indonesia. A version is also being built for China.

“The Swedish Visby-class corvette was one of the models on which LCS was based. It carries the same 57mm gun plus antisubmarine rockets and torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, a radar-deflecting hull, and a helicopter pad (but no hangar, apparently). It can also reach 35 knots but it is only a fifth as large.

“The Chinese have more than 80 Houbei-class fast-attack boats in service. Each costs only $40 million to build and displaces only 220 tons (one-fifteenth as much as an LCS). Yet they carry C-801 series anti-ship missiles that greatly outrange any weapon the LCS has.

“About the only threat the LCS might handle is the “swarms” of Iranian machine-gun and RPG-carrying speedboats in the Persian Gulf. Apart from the fact that the Iranian crisis will have been resolved for better or worse before most of the LCS fleet can be built, these Iranian small craft lack weapons big enough to menace any serious warship.”

In short, the LCS costs more, yet brings less firepower to battle than comparable ships that aren’t riddled with cracks, corrosion, and failed equipment. Sayen makes the critical point that, even if you believe the Navy should be doing the missions the LCS was designed for, they can still be done at a fraction of the cost.

In this fiscal climate, the Pentagon can’t afford to keep throwing more bucks after less bang.

Can't argue with ANY of his valid points...DFO :(

Rupert

10-10-2012, 20:24

US Navy response to the previous article
http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2012/10/10/lcs-lets-talk-facts/

If I may comment from a different perspective, there is a lot of talk of hard kill weapons. There is less talk about sensors and soft kill weapons. These are important because it is tricky to defend yourself against a threat you can't see, and the combat record shows that soft-kill is effective against anti-ship missiles - indeed it has a better record than hard kill weapons.

The LCS is I believe fitted with Spy-3, some of the cost may be due to incurring a higher proportion of the development costs because that is new (not sure, don't know how development cost is amortised in the USN). That is a move the USN had to make, whatever hull they used, because Spy-1 is a dead duck technologically speaking and is unsuited to modern warfare despite its many updates.

I don 't know what EW/soft-kill is fitted to LCS, but I would suggest that it is important to the success or otherwise of the class.

Much is made of the lack of long range AAW. Firstly if the ship is in littoral water, then long range is to some extent wasted - threats will appear at close range, second, their is no point having a long range AAW if your sensors cannot detect at long range (so I personally would choose Spy-3 to longer range weapons)

Which is not to say that I agree with everything about the vessel. But the USN is trying to innovate rather than stagnate (as it has in many areas in the recent past) and mistakes will be made when it is doing so. I trust that a lot will be learned to improve and I for one wish the USN luck.

As I have said before in this context, but the mention of Fisher makes it relevant again - Fisher had to fight against many of the same arguments to bring in the Dreadnoughts, but he was right. That doesn't make the LCS proponents right, but it is worth remembering that in whenever technological change is introduced to navies, it is fought by those who think the existing ships are better, or the change is too expensive. Indeed that is a lesson Fisher may have learned early in his career when he was the 5th (? IIRC) ranking officer aboard HMS Warrior, the biggest technological change any navy has ever seen, and herself the subject of derision.

Surfgun

10-10-2012, 21:50

Rupert, there is no SPY-3 on the LCS, I believe that is the set up for the upgraded, export version that has no orders.

Rupert

10-10-2012, 22:02

My mistake. I see you are right. Spy 1F

Oh

Surfgun

28-10-2012, 17:20

Perhaps, the LCS will act as a mother ship for these drones?
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2224165/Now-drones-seas-U-S-Navy-launches-unmanned-combat-boats-firing-missiles-time.html

Surfgun

29-11-2012, 01:55

USS Freedom is having issues holding onto its paint.
http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=140502

OSCSSW

29-11-2012, 14:32

Which is not to say that I agree with everything about the vessel. But the USN is trying to innovate rather than stagnate (as it has in many areas in the recent past) and mistakes will be made when it is doing so. I trust that a lot will be learned to improve and I for one wish the USN luck.

As I have said before in this context, but the mention of Fisher makes it relevant again - Fisher had to fight against many of the same arguments to bring in the Dreadnoughts, but he was right. That doesn't make the LCS proponents right, but it is worth remembering that in whenever technological change is introduced to navies, it is fought by those who think the existing ships are better, or the change is too expensive. Indeed that is a lesson Fisher may have learned early in his career when he was the 5th (? IIRC) ranking officer aboard HMS Warrior, the biggest technological change any navy has ever seen, and herself the subject of derision.[/quote]

I come late to the WNS forum and this thread but I find a great deal of good common sense in what Rupert and others have written in favor of LCS.

I am rightly an Ordinary Seaman here at WNS Forum, but unlike in the fleet I don't have to keep my mouth shut.

I am also an USN retired Senior Chief Operations specialist "OSCS" with both Enlisted Surface Warfare "SW" and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen "SWCC" quals. That means I've been around the Blue water USN (CGs, FFG, DDs, FFs,) the Brown water (PBR) USN and the Green water (Littoral) (PTF, PBMKIII, MK V SOC, Cyclone class PG) USN for more than 26 years.

I actually think the LCS is exactly the right, "Corvette" type small combatant
for the USN. Given the type of ops every day ops we are most likely to do for the forseeable future it makes sense to me. I approve of the modules concept that allows us to tailor these fast, small ships for various specialized littoral roles. Like any new “Type” of warship the LCS is a Work In Progress as are the modules. It will take time and, judging by history, a lot of redesigns to get it right. That is just the way it is with cutting edge, revolutionary technology and concepts.

As pricey as they are, they fill a vital need of the USN and that is to get
battle ready vessels in sufficient numbers to free up the limited number of Blue water, main fleet units for their primary roles.
Like them or not given the current fiscal reality we need hulls to meet our operational demands and we also need them to train the Blue Jackets and officers who will eventually man the blue water fleet.

I see lots of innovation in hull, machinery, sensors, manning, UAVs, UCAV, UUWV, boat handling, weapons and doctrine associated with the LCS that will pay huge dividends in the way we fight naval battles.

IMO, the only real problem most folks have with the LCS is that they are not and never will be Battle Cruisers.

Brian Wentzell

29-11-2012, 16:38

OSCSSW: Welcome to the Forum. It is good to read an experienced sailor's comments on the LCS. As you inow, naval requirements today are much different from those of the Cold War and World War 2 periods. Ideas and many ships from those periods still dominate naval strategy and doctrine. The USN has put money in two LCS classes while other countries have pursued flexibility in other ways, the Danish Absalon Class being an excellent example. Time will tell the strengths and weaknesses of each solution.

Regards,
Brian

OSCSSW

29-11-2012, 17:14

OSCSSW: Welcome to the Forum. It is good to read an experienced sailor's comments on the LCS.
Brian been out since '95 but some of my "Kids" both Officers and enlisted are now in senior billets and they do keep this onery old barnicle informed!

As you know, naval requirements today are much different from those of the Cold War and World War 2 periods.
Absolutely concur for now Brian but IF the ChiComms succeed in building a professional Blue water fleet based on CVs, SSNs and associated modern combat and auxiliary vessels we might just be dusting off the plans for the Soviet red Banner Fleet---)))

Ideas and many ships from those periods still dominate naval strategy and doctrine. The USN has put money in two LCS classes while other countries have pursued flexibility in other ways, the Danish Absalon Class being an excellent example. Time will tell the strengths and weaknesses of each solution. Absolutely agree Brian. Regards,
Brian

I am very, very intrigued by the Danish Absalon Class.
Being the new boy here, is it OK for us to steer this thred to discussing the
Danish Absalon Class or do I have to start a new thread?

Scatari

29-11-2012, 17:24

I am very, very intrigued by the Danish Absalon Class.
Being the new boy here, is it OK for us to steer this thred to discussing the
Danish Absalon Class or do I have to start a new thread?

You should start a new thread ... probably best placed under "All Other Naval Ships" in the "Naval History" section.

Suggest you use the "Search" function first to see whether there is an existing thread on this class ... don't remember one, but there may well be.

ASSAIL

30-11-2012, 01:27

USS Freedom is having issues holding onto its paint.
http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=140502

All incorrectly prepared surfaces lose their paint. The topcoat only connects with the undercoat, the fact that the ship is aluminium is irrelevant.

Surfgun

30-11-2012, 01:51

Freedom Class hulls are made of steel. The aluminum (aluminium), superstructures of the Freedom Class and all exposed metal surfaces of the Independence Class are not painted.

ASSAIL

30-11-2012, 07:02

Thanks Surfgun, brainfreeze on my part however I still would not like to be the foreman painter.

CGRET

30-11-2012, 14:54

It still really amazes me that the "new" buzz word for "Brown water ops" is now called "Littoral".

Yes, as OSCSSW has stated maybe?, the right mix or type for the US Navy. But the overriding factor as in any new class of warship is the cost and how well it would preforms under all operating regimes. As of this posting it has yet to excel or even meet the ops requirements for this class. Now having said that this new class of ship is now having problems that in the short term, "do not" lend itself in a favorable light as these ships are being operated.

As for the maintenance issues with aluminum and steel being built together in a salt water environment, electrolysis will get hold and spell doom if not correctly addressed. i.e., Hamilton Class ships for the US Coast Guard. Sloppy prep and paint issues are another problem that as we all know the press will take the story and run with it......

Moreover this new Class of Surface Combatant on the face of it, the lack of operational use of these ships/ continuing problems/costs themselves are to the point of being prohibitive. The USN would have been better served to have built 1 of each class and worked the bug's out first, then in Incorporated the fixes in to the design BEFORE beginning full scale production.

WELCOME to OSCSSW to the form!

Regards
Charles

Brian Wentzell

30-11-2012, 19:13

Charles: I think your last paragraph encapsulates the problem, one akin to the F35 procurement. The original USN intent was to build one of each class and then pick the winner for production. This would have been the sensible thing to do and would have produced a better ship for the requirement. The requirement itself is pretty advanced and adequate trials would have validated its merits and demerits. However, building both designs in a production environment means the USN is learning and changing on the run.

Over at the F35 side, the costs are beyond effective control and there will be a large number of planes that will be built to interim standards that will never really be updated due to additional costs.

Both have deterorated into procurement disasters that were avoidable. The US taxpayers are being hammered as will those of other purchasing countries.

Brian

ASSAIL

30-11-2012, 23:20

[QUOTE]It still really amazes me that the "new" buzz word for "Brown water ops" is now called "Littoral".

Brown water is close coastal and riverine.

Green water ops is littoral

Rob Hoole

01-12-2012, 08:07

The 'littoral' is not just coastal/riverine waters (green or brown) but applies in a joint sense, not just naval, to encompass the adjacent land and the airspace common to both, too. This is from the US Marine Corp's Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century (http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.quantico.usmc.mil%2FMCBQ%2520 PAO%2520Press%2520Releases%2F090430%2520CDI%2520Do cs%2FCDI_AmphibOps21stCent.pdf&ei=bca5UM6XFuKv0QX1g4GgCg&usg=AFQjCNGJ7JeUAq1Kf3FFkAxjiJp1Zi6lWA&cad=rja):

The littoral is composed of two segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. This confluence is infinite in its variations. As a result, littoral operations are inherently challenging.

designeraccd

01-12-2012, 08:15

No matter how it's defined we are building large, horribly expensive, UNDERarmed TARGETS in search of any mission they can actually accomplish in wartime; other than being sunk. DFO :mad:

Don Boyer

01-12-2012, 11:47

I have a rant in this thread earlier concerning the use of the term "littoral" which is actually quite meaningless, as are most "buzzwords" used these days by the MBA graduates we seem to be substituting for salty naval officers these days, but bottom line of this thread has not changed from post one. The concept, and therefore the ships are horribly flawed. The fact that now that two have been at sea for awhile and revealed some serious faults just adds to the mess. Some idiot designed and built a ship that seems to be designed to chase drug runners or Somalian pirates about and look "cool" and all modern instead of building what's really needed, examples of which exist in many navies in quantity -- comparitively heavily-armed frigates that are clear linear descendants of their predecessors and quite capable vessels for working close inshore. The range of their weaponry and sensors obviates the need to operate in six inches of water.

OSCSSW

02-12-2012, 17:24

I clearly stated to the best of my ability why I consider the LCS the right USN Covette type vessel for the litorals now. There is not much more I can add except to point out the following:

1. All new Types (think CV, SS, SSN, SSBN etc.) as opposed to classes (which have pretty severe class leader probelms too) have massive teething problems when intriduced to the fleet.

2. Like it or not the USN needs deployable hulls and the LCS are all we are going to get for a long time. Those hulls will free up our blue water main fleet units from low intensity, littoral missions.

3. Until the modules are available and have been through a few deployments you have no basis for criticizing the war fighting ability of these ships.

4. I am optimistic based on 26 years of dealing with "new" technolgies
such as the Lamps Mk1 and III. I was an RD2 "ASAC" in the radar gang of "Happy Harry", AKA USS Harold E. Holt (FF-1074), when we worked out the operational, safety, logistics and technincal issues for the
Lmaps MK1/Sh2 helo. If ever there was a steep learning curve that
was one---)))

And so I conclude the only valid comparison betweeen the F-35B and the LCS is that they both represent revolutionary technologies that will take time, money and a lot of triial and error before we get the most out of them.

Time will tell who is right but I am betting on the Blue Jackets of MY Navy to make these ships work

WGVSr

03-12-2012, 00:06

I'm thinking the Blue Jackets are the strongest part of the equation. I don't worry about them performing if push comes to shove.
Bill

Don Boyer

03-12-2012, 05:26

I agree Chief, that the LCS is about all we're going to get for now, but i think the main complaint about the vessel that matters in the 10 or so pages of posts on this ship is that it is so poorly armed for the role it is supposed to take on. A 57mm is a wimp gun compared to other frigates of similar size, there is no close in weapons system, and no ship-killing missiles. It would seem all these would be needed, yet nothing of substance; despite all this talk of "modularity" there's nary a module in sight. One would thinks you'd design a ship with the weapons it needs from the start instead of a glorified cigarette boat with a BB gun. Instead of the first two cruising around looking good, they should be cruising around testing all their weapons systems, and they aren't.

Bottom line, the vessel has potential, but none of it has shown up yet, and it should have been fully equipped to start with. That's my bitch with the thing, anyway. I for one am always in favor of things that makes large "booms" on enemy vessels from the get go. It's the best way to prevent large booms from appearing on one's own vessel.

designeraccd

03-12-2012, 06:22

Don's point about weapons would seem to lie at the heart of the matter for these supposed WARships, that are all but unarmed. Approximately 3000 tons and hundreds of millions per unit to carry a 57mm popgun + chopper to sea? Plus no "modules" in sight. A Danish ABSOLON looks pretty enticing about now!

Given the weapons and sensor fit of Russia's Project 20380/385 or the PLAN's type 056, these huge targets and their small crews make the old 4 pipers versus Fubukis or Kageros appear an "even" match!

Progress and evolution is always needed, but steps backward that result in huge, pathetically underarmed ships that at this point have essentially no AA, minimal gunpower and no SSM capability and how much ability for ASW outside of the chopper? Not an impressive package in view of the cost and size. DFO :eek:

ASSAIL

03-12-2012, 07:07

[COLOR="Blue"][QUOTE]I clearly stated to the best of my ability why I consider the LCS the right USN Covette type vessel for the litorals now. There is not much more I can add

You have argued the case for the LCS with much clarity. These ships are a capability which will develop over a great many years and us old salts will just have to get used to them because without them, the USN will not be able to perform its world wide projection of power and influence.

We may be proved wrong but I have enough confidence in the US ability and technological excellence to both conceive and implement the capabilities represented by these ships.

The traditionalists complain about a lack of weapons but I don't see that. The capability provided by helos/UAV's and the future modules will far surpass any traditional small frigate and the ability to upgrade those weapons as technology evolves will ensure that they remain in front of the pack for decades.

For the record, I am a traditionalist, I have served on a 5"/54 DDG and many conventional frigates in both the RAN and RN on exchange. I consider my time with 7th FLT serving on the Gunline as being a highlight.

Cheers

designeraccd

03-12-2012, 11:08

Call it what you want, but if you are on a 3000 ton "target" with inbound SSMs and no defense.........then what? DFO :(

Rupert

03-12-2012, 11:59

Call it what you want, but if you are on a 3000 ton "target" with inbound SSMs and no defense.........then what? DFO :(

Decoys are under-appreciated but have been shown to be pretty successful to date. Indeed I don't think a ship has ever been hit by a missile if they fired decoys in time.

There is no point putting long range and/or area defence weapons on a LCS. They are not designed for area AAW, and when in the littoral, the threats will generally be fired from close range. Thus the most appropriate hard-skill weapons will be short range missiles or gun systems

As I understand it, both USS Freedom and Independence have decoys and SeaRAM.

Therefore the weapons they have been allocated from the US inventory are the most appropriate. Whether those particular weapons are effective is the subject of a very different debate. However it is wrong to suggest that they have no defence/defense

OSCSSW

03-12-2012, 12:01

Glad to have a bloke like you on my side Shipmate!
Did you ever serve aboard HMAS Brisbane D41? I did three months riding her after the USAF decided HMAS Hobart D39 was a NV gunboat and chewed her up with 20mm. Long story I just might tell some day---)))

[quote=OSCSSW;10054988]

You have argued the case for the LCS with much clarity. These ships are a capability which will develop over a great many years and us old salts will just have to get used to them because without them, the USN will not be able to perform its world wide projection of power and influence.
Concur

We may be proved wrong but I have enough confidence in the US ability and technological excellence to both conceive and implement the capabilities represented by these ships.
Concur

The traditionalists complain about a lack of weapons but I don't see that.
Niether do I mate.
[COLOR=black]The capability provided by helos/UAV's and the future modules will far surpass any traditional small frigate and the ability to upgrade those weapons as technology evolves will ensure that they remain in front of the pack for decades.
The entire Magazine Right in the X Ring. That big flight deck, the module bay and all the supporting elec and auxiliaries specificly designed to support the new modeuels as they come on line is what our friends here are discounting.

For the record, I am a traditionalist, I have served on a 5"/54 DDG and many conventional frigates in both the RAN and RN on exchange. I consider my time with 7th FLT serving on the Gunline as being a highlight. We have sailed the same "litoral" seas at just about the same time. Nothing like 30 days on the Gun Line (Did 60 once). Shooting em up with H&I all night and on call fire mission during the day and night. Then high tail it to an AE and unrep the mags, (nothing like humping 60lb rounds for a few hours) for another go.

Cheers

designeraccd

03-12-2012, 13:24

Call me old fashioned, but in the USMC we relied on MASSIVE firepower to take out the enemy. Works for me.

Sure hope you fellows are correct in your positive assesments of these large, underarmed ships, or many sailors will pay the hard way some day in the not to distant future........DFO :eek:

Rupert

03-12-2012, 20:52

Call me old fashioned, but in the USMC we relied on MASSIVE firepower to take out the enemy. Works for me.

Not a technique that has ever successfully shot down an anti-ship missile in combat though.

Though one USN ship did manage to shoot another USN ship whilst trying to hit such a missile IIRC.

I'll choose effective over massive personally

designeraccd

03-12-2012, 21:43

Let me rephrase that: MASSIVE, ACCURATE firepower.........as Beatty perhaps learned weapons that don't hit their targets are so much deadweight...........conversly Von der Tann and other HSF ships did hit and destroy what they were shooting at.

All Marines, no matter their MOS, have to qualify every year with their weapons on the range. With my M-14 and iron sights we fired at 200, 300 and 500 METERS. Obviously bigger weapons tend to reach out a wee bit further, but rapidly and ACCURATELY! DFO ;):D

ASSAIL

03-12-2012, 23:03

[QUOTE]Did you ever serve aboard HMAS Brisbane D41? I did three months riding her after the USAF decided HMAS Hobart D39 was a NV gunboat and chewed her up with 20mm. Long story I just might tell some day---)))

Hobart copped a pair of Sparrow AAM's IIRC as well. I was HMAS Perth D38 1970/71 and your right about sleepless nights with H&I 13,500 rounds worth for us. I spent the entire 7 months up on AA Control staring down the barrel of Mt 51 and I'm sure at least half of those rounds fired on the aft safety limits which means my ears are now about 50% useful:D

OSCSSW

03-12-2012, 23:30

Don's point about weapons would seem to lie at the heart of the matter for these supposed WARships, that are all but unarmed. Approximately 3000 tons and hundreds of millions per unit to carry a 57mm popgun + chopper to sea? Plus no "modules" in sight.

Lets take a look at the Popgun first, shall we friends?

The Bofors 57mm (2.2 in) L70 gun Mk3 in US service is the MK110 Mod 0 57mm gun.

Ammunition:
The 57mm Mk-295 ammunition is based on the Bofors Defence all-target Programmable, Pre-fragmented, Proximity-fuzed (3P) ammunition.
Note how revolutionary this round is for a Corvette
The Mk-295 ammo has six operating modes, each programmable by the fire control system to combat all surface, air and shore threats.
They include:
Proximity (Air)
Gated Proximity (Air, Anti-jamming)
Gated Proximity with Impact Priority (Air, Large Targets)
Precision Time (Surface)
Armor Piercing (Surface and Shore)
Impact (Shore)

This substantially increases the flexibility and effectiveness of the gun system, which has further reduced the reaction time of the gun and it is possible to choose ammunition mode at the moment of firing, giving it the ability to switch rapidly between surface targets, air targets as well as ground targets.

Air burst capabilities permit the engagement of concealed targets, small, fast-maneuvering naval craft and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Known as Rapid Switchover for Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO), this all-target ammunition enables the gun to fire warning shots, step up to disabling fires, then instantly switch to lethal fires if required to slow, stop or destroy a vessel of interest.

General Characteristics:
Range: 10.5 miles max. Max effective is more like 6 miles.

Rate of Fire: 220 rounds/minute.

Elevation: -10° to + 77° / maximum elevating speed: 44°/sec.

Train: unlimited / maximum train speed: 57°/sec.

Weight, complete without ammunition: 14960 lbs

Life of air-cooled barrel: >4000 rounds

Ammunition Capacity: 120 ready-rounds in gun / up to 1000 rounds in mounting

Time for loading rounds: 3-4 minutes

In my not so humble opinion, the Mk110 is exactly the type of "gun" system a
fast ship, in litoral waters, where the threat is on you with minimal warning, provides the very best in rapid response and flexability. The lethality of rapid, multiple 57 mm hits Gated Proximity with Impact Priority,
Precision Time, and or Armor Piercing fuse settings of the Mk-295 will be absolutely devestating on any vesel up to and including a FF. Even against DD in a "quick draw" action I think the Mk110 has a fair chance at a mission kill and then be able to use that Speed some of you think is so usless to clear datum before the Can gets back inot the fight.

Against, small fast craft the Mk110 has a definite advantage within it's effective range over the much slow firing 5 inch.

I also have read the Mk110 has a very good point defense mode against anti ship missiles.

Helos would be dead meat within it's effective range and the one and very rarely two ship killing "vampires" they carry can not swamp the Mk110 and RAM battery of the LCS.

Ram battery
Description:

The RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) is a lightweight, quick-reaction, fire-and-forget missile designed to destroy anti-ship cruise missiles and asymmetric air and surface threats.

Features:

The RIM-116 RAM is designed as an all-weather, high-firepower, low-cost, self-defense system against anti-ship cruise missiles and other asymmetric threats. The original Block 0 design was based on the infrared seeker of the Stinger missile, and the warhead, rocket motor, and fuse from the Sidewinder missile. The Block 0 configuration uses Radio Frequency (RF) for midcourse guidance and transitions to Infrared (IR) guidance for terminal engagement. There is no shipboard support required (i.e., no illuminators) after missile launch. The Block 1 incorporates the added capability of autonomous IR-all-the-way guidance, thus countering advanced anti-ship cruise missiles that do not employ onboard radar seekers.

The Block 2 will provide kinematic and guidance improvements to the missile for countering maneuvering threats and regaining battlespace. It will feature a Control Section upgrade (4 Canards vs. Current 2), a Propulsion Section Upgrade (a larger, composite case rocket motor) and an Evolved Radio Frequency (ERF) receiver. RAM Block 2 Initial Operating Capability will occur in Fiscal Year 2013.

Background:

The RIM-116 RAM is a cooperative venture between the U.S. and German governments. The RIM-116 RAM is fully operational in the U.S. and German Navies with more than 3,400 missiles and 180 launchers deployed on more than 100 ships ranging from fast patrol boats to aircraft carriers. It is also being installed on a majority of new USN ship classes (LHA 6, CVN 78 and LCS).

General Characteristics:
Primary Function: Ship Self-Defense.
Propulsion: Solid-propellant rocket
Speed: Mach 2+
Effective Range: 5,6 nmi
Warhead: 7.9 lbs. (explosvie weight)

Progress and evolution is always needed, but steps backward that result in huge, pathetically underarmed ships that at this point have essentially no AA, minimal gunpower and no SSM capability and how much ability for ASW outside of the chopper? Not an impressive package in view of the cost and size. DFO :eek:[/quote]