Role of the IJN in WW2

[herakles]

It seems to me that the Japanese did not have a concise naval plan at the time of WW2. What exactly was the IJN attempting to do?

They seemed to be hoping and building for a Jutland style engagement which never happened. The Japanese Navy had no real idea as to how to defeat the USN and confused tactics with strategy to the point that it felt that winning one great battle would resolve the war in Japan's favour.

Their attack on Pearl Harbor dashed any idea of a Jutland style engagement. The Pearl Harbor attack actually prevented the US from even attempting what the Japanese strategy called for them to do, a rush across the Pacific with the battle fleet to save the Philippines. The Pearl Harbor attack from the standpoint of strategy was completely unnecessary and scuttled any chance that the US would lose the will to fight. Knowing that they would be inferior in numbers to a US fleet they intended to make this up through the use of heavily armed cruisers and torpedo attacks as they had as Tsu Shima. The carrier allowed them to carry this further forward.

On the other hand they seemed to be looking forward with their construction of Aircraft carriers. After Midway, the Japanese shifted views and recognized the carrier as central to the war effort. They made a crash program to build new carriers and a new naval air force. But their efforts paled in comparison to what the US produced.

Japan imagined herself a world power, but that was far from being the case, as subsequent events proved. She had no idea what total war involved, nor the depth of the US's determination.

What do other members think of these ideas? Am I wide of the mark?

[John Odom]

You are absolutely correct! Part of the problem was that the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy were intense rivals, not always cooperating asnd seldom working in concert.

[herakles]

Ohhhhhhhh! Someone's replied! :rolleyes:

I completely agree with your comment John.

And to make matters worse for them was the over-riding significance of their Emperor.

[HMS Bergamot]

As the Americans said after Pearl Harbor, in one stroke the Japanese have turned a 21 knot fleet into a 27 knot fleet.

Well, duuuh, how dumb was that?

It might have been different if they had caught the US CV's in port, but it was one hell of a gamble they took to attempt that.

The worst that could have happened is the US would havbe been pushed out of the Pacific onto their own west coast, but I think we all know that they would have been back anyway, it would have just taken longer.

[herakles]

Yes, I agree. I also don't think the Japs fully appreciated how Pearl was going to affect the USA in that it turned all heavily against them whereas until then there had been plenty of doubters.

The same sort of thing happened as a result of Sep 11th.

[John Odom]

Yes, many Americans were islationists before Pearl. Further the Japanese War Hawks had no remote comprehension of the productive capacity of a fully mobilized America. I Think Yamamoto understood the production issue, but not the psychological ones.

[astraltrader]

I think it needs to be pointed out that Yamamoto did not want to wage war with America, as he always believed it was a war that Japan could never win.

With General Tojo now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the Army would lead the Navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations.

Ultimately Yamamoto had no choice but to accept and embrace this desire for impending war with America and therefore came up with the only possible way to achieve a sort of positive outcome with America - hit them hard and fast and then attempt to reach a negotiated peace.

His idea for the attack on Pearl Harbor was the best way he could forsee of achieving this unlikely scenario.

It is clear to see that he always held a pessimistic view of the liklihood of success...

[John Odom]

I just started a new thread based on this article:

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20081205p2a00m0na004000c.html

[Tiornu]

Japan's Constitution had a grievous flaw in it, providing no civilian oversight of the army or navy. Instead, each branch became, in effect, rival political parties, each with its own cabinet-level office and thus able to bring down the government whenever it wanted. By the 1930's, the rivalry was so intense that advancement of one's own party eclipsed national interests, a situation some of us can recognize in our own current politics.
The prizes in thie inter-service rivalry were government funding and influence. To maximize its shares, the army was forced to emphasize continental strategic matters. Death and destruction in China was a boon for the army, making it seem more vital. Obviously, the navy seemed less important on the Asian mainland, causing its leaders to emphasize the South Seas where vital resources were located.
At the same time, the navy itself was divided. At the Washington Treaty, a far-sighted Adm Tomosaburo Kato showed himself willing to subordinate the navy's policies for the sake of the country. One of his men, Kanji Kato (no relation), saw things differently. When the treaty fixed the IJN at a less than optimal strength, two factions took shape around the two Katos' ideals. The Fleet Faction was fanatically pro-navy; the Treaty Faction understood that national security deriveed more than military growth. I'm sure you can tell where my sympathies lie. The Treaty Faction remained strong enough to 1930 to manage a moderate settlement of the London Treaty of that year, but the Fleet Faction reacted so strongly against it, that things devolved from that point on. By the time of the 1936 London Treaty, the IJN as a group blatantly preferred confrontation with foreign powers (America and Britain, anyway) over treaty-wrought security.
Enough for now.

[CGRET]

Good Day,

I would agree with what has been said up to this point....

But there is the underlying issue of the embargo against japan for the actions in China prior to the attach on Pearl harbor. The embargo itself was to the point where japan could not longer or barely keep it's enconomy going. To this end Japan had little in the way of options.

(1)They could pull out of China and hope the western world would stop the embargo, and that would have led to the IJN being brought back in compliance with the London treaty.

(2)Or start a war with the US and hope they could hold out for 6 months to a year to consolidate there holding's in Asia. Before the "Sleeping Gaint" would wake up.

Even before the attack Yamamoto had threaten to step down. He also knew the war with the US was not a winable war from the start.

Regards
CGRET

[Tiornu]

"Japan cannot defeat America. Therefore, Japan should not fight America." That's a quote from him prewar, and pretty explicit. But here's a fundamental problem with the Japanese system. The army and navy, in their rivalry, had both convinced themselves that they were the true salvation of Japan. Therefore, anything that benefited the navy (or army, depending on your "party") benefited the country. What benefited the navy was expansion southward, which could only be accomplished through war. What benefited the army was war on the continent. So each service believed that war was in Japan's best interests, and each fantasized that its chosen war was winnable. They had given themselves no options. The navy had to fight the Allies or lose influence, falling behind the rival army and thus (as they saw it) making Japan vulnerable.

[Norsky]

A quick thought.

As mentioned earlier in this thread, Japanese naval doctrine, since the time of the Russo-Japanese war in the early 1900's (Tsushima 1905) had centered on the decisive battle, where the enemy navy would be decimated by Japanese battle line. It was along this idea that the Yamato class were built.

My point is that during WW II, the decisive battle came and went, without the fact being recognized by the Japanese Navy.

They therefore held back Yamato, Musashi from battle, awaiting the decisive battle, which had in fact already happened.

The decisive battle being Guadalcanal. Midway was big, a huge turning point.

But had Yamato and Musashi been used at Guadalcanal, instead of the older, much less capable Hiei and Kirishima, the tactical situation in SE Asia could have been dramatically changed.

I am not astute enough to readily read into history and say what would and would not have happened with Yamato /Musashi thrown into the battle at Guadalcanal.

But had they been used, perhaps Japanese defeats in the decisive naval battles for Guadalcanal could have been turned into victories, forcing an Allied withdraw from the island.

This in turn could have changed the whole Allied strategy of island hopping their way towards Japan as the main idea in the Pacific. Failure at Guadalcanal would certainly lead to a re-thinking of Allied strategy.

This could lead to the Japanese finishing their air base at Guadalcanal, and in turn lead to new threats towards Australia by Japanese naval and air forces.

Do remember that in terms of carrier forces, the US and Japan were both short of carriers by the end of 1942. The big Essex class replacement carriers were not yet ready for the US Navy. Japan still had carriers either under repair or building, but their big shortage was air crews with experience.

Now add the huge losses to the Allied navies off Savo Island, which would now also include the battleships South Dakota and Washington, from their defeat by Yamato - Musashi and, like I said, the tactical situation has most certainly changed.

[Tiornu]

There's some problem with using the Pacific War as a case study for IJN strategy. The war began while the fleet was in transition from its traditional concepts to...well, it never quite achieved a final form, but it is seen in Yamamoto's reorganization that concentrated the air fleet. Yamamoto was no deveotee of the battleship, and so it's no surprise that he declined to attempt a traditional Decisive Battle.
The Decisive Battle plan had itself evolved to something approaching absurdity. As originally conceived, it was expected to take place close to the Home Islands after a lengthy, attritional grind forward by the enemy. But that makes no sense if you've gone to war to secure your lines to the southern resources. So the battlefield was pushed progressively outward over the years. This naturally reduces the attrition phase which the Japanese were depending on to equalize the battle lines before the final brawl. Horns of a dilemma.
Japanese strategy was like a multi-faceted gem--so many ways you can look at it, so many perspectives that reveal its flaws.
"In the Battle of Guadalcanal, when two American battleships confronted one Japanese battleship, that ship should have been Yamato, designed to fight superior numbers. But no, it was Kirishima, designed to fight World War I." I read that in a book somewhere.

[designeraccd]

Their "brilliant" battleship Admirals carefully hoarded them until they became sitting ducks as PoW and Repulse were. Mistakes were made on both sides and both sides fought bravely and tenaciously; fortunately the USN had the infrastructure in the US to both build massive #s of ships....AND train the people to use them!

The difference between wartime pilot training (naval) programs all but ensured the demise if the IJN, along with numerous other basic infrastructure decisions that compounded the IJN's problems. Of course the "cooperation" between IJN and IJA was something to behold, too. DFO :)

[herakles]

It took some time but now there have been some wonderful posts to my thread here. Posts that have given me much thought. I thank you recent contributors for them. Most insightful.

[John Odom]

Yes, it has been a thought provoking thread.

The industrial might of the US was a major factor in winning both the war in Europe and the Pacific. Our industry is mostly gone now. I wonder what would happen if we were atacked now? No matter how dedicated, brave and skilled our fighting forces are we will fail if we can't KEEP them supplied and equipped. My cousin, just back from Iraq, said all his personal uniform and equipment, except his weapon and amunition, was Chinese. They even found some ammo marked made in USA was actually made in China and (unlawdully) remarked as made in USA.

[Norsky]

There was an article some time back I read, concerning United States war / industrial production during WW II.

I do not recall the percentage now, but as a percentage of global economy, the US outproduced the rest of the planet combined.

Back to Japan. RE cooperation between Imperial Army & Navy: a television program within the last year or so covered Japan's efforts to build atomic weapons during WW II.

As mentioned here, both Army & Navy had their own separate efforts, and it appears they did not cooperate.

Hooray for the good guys here, because it does appear that the Japanese Navy did detonate an atomic bomb off the coast of Korea in August 1945. Their production facility would have been located around either Hungnam or Wonsan, in what is today North Korea.

[herakles]

Hooray for the good guys here, because it does appear that the Japanese Navy did detonate an atomic bomb off the coast of Korea in August 1945. Their production facility would have been located around either Hungnam or Wonsan, in what is today North Korea.

This is such an incredible thing to say that I must insist you support this statement. With evidence.

[HMS Bergamot]

Unbelievable as that statement appeared, I found out where it came from:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_atomic_program

[Tiornu]

A good overview of Japan's atomic ambitions and the vast distance between them and a successful project can be found in Secret Weapons & World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science by Walter E. Grunden (Kansas, 2005). In sum, Japan was nowhere near making an atomic bomb.

[John Odom]

I don't believe that the Japanese were that close. Their physicists had made some basic miscalculations, and their program was suffering because of it. I don't doubt for a minute that if they had had one, they would have used it.

I think this is one of those cases where Wikipedia is unreliable.

[astraltrader]

Anyway if the inference is that if the Japanese did posess a nuclear weapon, then it gave legitimacy to the dropping of the two nuclear bombs on Japan in 1945 - then IMO that would just be an additional reason.

It has always seemed clear to me that the Japanese were more than willing to fight on and would have fallen back to resolutely defending their home islands.

Therefore the number of both Allied and Japanese casualties this would have resulted in to me more than justifies the bringing of the war to a swift end by the dropping of the bombs.

Projected allied deaths in the order of 500,000-1 million were the estimation, if it had gone on to result in an invasion of Japan.
The way the Japanese defended small and relatively insignificant islands in the Pacific and the resulting number of allied casualties does lend credence to these figures...

[CGRET]

The number of death's as stated by Terry were projected to be just the first phase of the landing's and not the push to get off of the beach.


Regards
CGRET

[herakles]

This is a lot clearer now that I learn the source is Wiki. It's a most unreliable source of information if only because it implies that it is reliable. I have stopped being amazed at the many errors I've found there.

[astraltrader]

Absolutely Cgret.

It is accepted that they would have defended their homeland virtually down to the last enclave...

It is usual to talk about the number of allied lives that would have been lost in an invasion of Japan, however the number of Japanese that would have died would have been little short of astronomic.

Whilst many people could never bring themselves to admit it - the dropping of the two atomic bombs very likely saved millions of lives.

In addition the devastion wrought by this terrible new weapon has by example gone a long way to help prevent another world war...

The nuclear deterrant has worked because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki...

[CGRET]

Terry,

I would agree!

Regards
CGRET

[Norsky]

This is such an incredible thing to say that I must insist you support this statement. With evidence.

OK, been away for a few days.

Here's some to be found on this, and certainly NOT Wikipedia.

1) History Channel - program aired I believe during August of last year, titled Japan's Atomic Bomb: only link I could located leads to where one can buy the video:

http://shop.history.com/detail.php?a=74425#details

2) I cannot find Internet link to this at the moment. But gist is that the head of the NSK (Japanese Newspaper organization, similar to Associated Press in the United States) in 1945 was taken to witness the explosion off Korea. He gave an interview back in the early 1990's. He was getting elderly at the time, and wanted to tell this story before he died.

His interview, recounting his witnessing the explosion, came out in a WW II magazine I purchased during the 1990's. Of course, I don't have it now. It would have been nice to be able to quote by article, author and date. I do think it was connected to or at least partially based on a US reporter named David Snell. More on him to follow.

In addition to this interview, the article also covered the cyclotrons used by Japan. Those in mainland Japan were dumped into the Pacific Ocean by US Occupation forces. Those in Korea were captured by Russian forces.

And finally, here is a third article, written by one David Snell. He was a reporter in the US Army, sent to Japan and Korea after the war.

Another link:http://www.reformation.org/atlanta-constitution.html

My thoughts? Possible, entirely possible that Japan did detonate a bomb. From the accounts of the test off Korea, I assume, perhaps incorrectly, but assume anyway that Japan planned to use such weapon by detonation in the midst of the planned US invasion force off Japan. The weapon would be taken by submarine into the vicinity of the invasion force.

Do remember that Japan's post war fate was much different that Germany's in many respects, but similar in one important factor. That is in the use by the United States of any technical personnel in fields where either Germany or Japan had an advancement over the allies.

Werner von Braun with his V-2 rocket experience, and Japanese scientists /military involved in biological weapons research in Manchuria are two examples of these personnel. Both groups were brought to the United States after the war to further their work. And of course, the Japanese group was so secret it took almost fifty years to find out about their inhumane research done in Manchuria, and yet they were still used post war by the United States.

Lastly, do recall that the mainland Japanese atomic program, run by the Japanese Army, was a failure. The program in question here was operated on the Korean peninsula by the Japanese Navy, and overrun by Russian forces in the final days of the war. The Japanese Navy program may be the last major secret still remaining of WW II.

It's location in Korea put it completely out of view of the Western Allies, and smack dab into the hands of the Russian Army, who certainly were not cooperating with the Allies with information such as this by the end of the war.

Whatever the case, it certainly makes for good conversation.:D:D

[herakles]

You have certainly argued a good case for this extraordinary information. I was concerned when you mentioned The History Channel. I put them in the same category as Wiki. But other factors you have raised certainly do give one cause for thought.

There will be many great secrets from WW2 that we know nothing about and are unlikely to. This might well be one of them.

What a remarkable situation would have occurred if Japan had the bomb and perfected it.

I am wondering what their source of enriched uranium would have been. Did they have access to crude uranium and enriched it themselves? This is hugely difficult as the Americans discovered at the time and Iran is finding out now.

[Norsky]

Sure do not know with any certainty where their uranium would have been obtained.

I would venture a guess that Manchuria would have been the source. I do seem to recall reading somewhere that Manchuria has a good supply of this metal.

As far as refining, you have me there. Way, way too many years since I took high school chemistry or physics. :eek::D:D

But, in my limited understanding, would the uranium for the gun barrel type bomb (as used at Hiroshima) require the same type of refinement as that used in other bombs?????

Or would the cyclotrons separate out the U-235 needed for that type (gun barrel) bomb??? it is my understanding that there was only about as much U-235 in that bomb as would be equal in size to a large grapefruit.

[herakles]

It seems that uranium is found in Manchuria. From what I've discovered, it would have been the only source available to the Japanese at the time.

The two bombs used by the Americans were based on U235 and plutonium.

The amount of U235 occurring naturally is very small so huge amounts of U238 need to be refined to obtain it. It is a slow and tedious process. It's why the Allies could drop only 2 bombs in 1945.

The Iranians have been at this for years and have still to collect enough as I understand things.

[nigelweysom]

having found this to be an interesting thread but being unable to comment i have taken the book ,
The Pacific War Companion out of our library,
and would like to offer this quote which touches on points that have been made regarding strategy and the differences of opinion between the IJN and the IJA,and are taken from chapter 4 entitled
coping with disaster and written by professor Raymond Callahan
"by 1941 the basic American war plan , plan dog foresaw a concentration on defeating Germany first , with a strategic defense in the Pacific for a prolonged period ,the Philippines and island outposts like Guam and Wake would of course be defended but their eventual loss was foreseen and expected, thus American and British plans by early 1941 were similar , ABC -1 the Germany first strategy was adopted in January , while the British had no difficulty maintaining a united front on strategy , things were otherwise in Washington, the Germany first strategy had the support of the US Army it was a strategy that called for a large army, the Navy however understood that it was a strategy that they could not dominate ,it also called for intimate cooperation with the British and many of the Navy's senior officers were deeply Anglophobe , it called as well for a degree of inter-service cooperation that they were uneasy about , as a consequence the US Navy was prone to place a much higher emphasis on Pacific operations, which would be their war,
Nigel

[flythreestbd]

Given the element of surprise and the forces available to the Japanese there should not have been even a tugboat left afloat on Dec.8 1941 or better yet why not attack Pearl,gain complete air control,and launch a land invasion.
Capture the Islands outright,would have been a quite a battle but the only aircraft flying over the battle would have been Japanese.
Even if the US carrier force showed up they would have been quickly dealt with by the Japanese,aircraft and submarines.
With the Islands in Japanese hands the US would have had to operate from mainland USA,running a gauntlet of Long Lance torpedoes to even reach the occupied areas.
Dec.7 1941 was brilliantly put together,but done differently could have resulted in the loss of the entire Pacific.
Really all they achieved was to,"awaken a sleeping tiger and fill it with a terrible resolve."

[CGRET]

I would agree the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was brilliant.

But one must also take into consideration the mind set of the most of the japanese naval personnel. They were sure they would not live through the attack and would be soundly defeated. Also what is not mentioned is the fact that the fleet carriers (Enterprise) was inbound from delivering aircraft to the Pacific outposts. The Japanese commanders on the scene were well aware of this and were no willing to launch another wave and be detected.

Regards
Charles

[astraltrader]

flythreestbd - although I would agree that with a slightly different approach the Japanese could have maximised the attack on Pearl and achieved far more than they actually managed - it would still have ended up the same way.

Once America became fully geared to the production of war material and fully committed to the prosecution of war the end result would never have been in any doubt...

[Kevin Denlay]

I would agree the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was brilliant.

But one must also take into consideration the mind set of the most of the japanese naval personnel. They were sure they would not live through the attack and would be soundly defeated. Also what is not mentioned is the fact that the fleet carriers (Enterprise) was inbound from delivering aircraft to the Pacific outposts. The Japanese commanders on the scene were well aware of this and were no willing to launch another wave and be detected.

Regards
Charles

Hi Charles,

Two of your above statements struck me as rather odd and not quite what my understanding of the matter was, but I must confess to only a fairly basic understanding of the higher echelons of the IJN and the planning for the Pearl Harbor raid. So to clarify my understanding I posted a question re same ( http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=7824.0 ) over on the IJN Navy page where some serious IJN historians and aficionados exchange views ( http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?board=5.0 ). For the (historical) record below is one of the answers I got, which expanded considerably on what I more or less thought was the case.

Regards,
Kevin

********************************
Kevin,

1) They were sure they would not live through the attack and would be soundly defeated............

Not as far as my readings have ever revealed. The Kido Butai did (based on their wargaming results) historically expect to loose as many as two carriers sunk and another damaged (with two full airgroups lost) though.

According to Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" several of the KB's pilots discussed deliberately crashing their warplanes into any anti-torpedo nets that might be found deployed around the US battleships inside Pearl Harbor, so that other follow-on torpedos might then get thru ...

Others discussed crash diving their damaged warplanes into US installatiions so as not to risk leading any pursuing USAAF or USN aircarft back to the Kido Butai's at sea location NE of Oahu.

There is a big difference between "sure they would not live through the attack" and being willing to die for their Emperor, if necessary, in the fulfillment of their mission orders.

Also what is not mentioned is the fact that the fleet carriers (Enterprise) was inbound from delivering aircraft to the Pacific outposts. 2) The Japanese commanders on the scene were well aware of this and were no willing to launch another wave and be detected."

I have never read of any historical indication that Nagumo and company were at any time aware of the Enterprise TF's location at the time of Pearl Harbor. Or Lexington's either. For that matter those Japanese weren't clear on exactly where Saratoga, Yorktown, Ranger and Wasp were either. It seems that they believed (incorrectly) that there were in fact 5 USN carriers at large somewhere in the Pacific at that time.

Their consulate spy, Yoshikawa, had kept the KB informed that only two, the Enterprise and Lexington were actually based out of PH and that as of 1801 Dec.6'41 neither was inside of that (soon to be a target) area.

Many have argued that Nagumo left Hawaiian waters without having flown a third air atack against Oahu because, at the time, he feared a surprise air attack from the (up to 5) missing American carriers and/or from the the survivors of the 500 modern USAAF warplanes that the Japanese had (incorrectly - there were only 286, mostly old and many out-of-service) estimated were based on Hawaii's airfields.

Page 546 of Prange's work indicates however that, as reported by Yamaguchi, Nagumo had already decided, before the KB had even left Japanese waters that he would obey the letter of Yamamoto's Oahu attack orders but not their spirit, by making only one air strike (in two halves) but no more than that. Rather than the "roll the dice" approach of Yamamoto the gambler, Nagumo, the old battleship man, played it conservatively instead by opting to preserve his carriers and pilots for another day's fighting, elsewhere.

[CGRET]

Hey Kev,

Well, maybe I stated in the wrong terms, my mistake!

But in the book "And I Was There" Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton. it does make a reference to the japanese having the understanding that if the carriers were not in port they were considered a tactical risk. He also has alot more detailed information than "At Dawn we Slept", which i have read.

Also another inside look at that mind set is in the book "Japanese Navy of World war 2" page 16, Rear Admiral Ugaki letter. Also look at page 29 half down the page.

So to some it maybe hogwash but if you look Pg29 of my references it does make sense.

Regards
Charles

[kjm55]

Don't know if the IJN actually had a precise plan, but I personally think they had planned to attempt to defeat the US navy in a series of decisive battles which unfortunately just went the wrong way for the IJN. For example, Midway (IJN carriers completely destroyed by mere few bombs apiece) Guadalcanal (Kirishima intercepted brilliantly by Washington and Hiei being unable to withdraw) etc

[Don Boyer]

The role of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II is neatly delineated in the book "Kaigun" by Evans and Peattie, which traces the development of naval policy from the formation of the navy following the Meiji restoration. This book is based on Japanese documents, not on American or other interpretations of Japanese Policy. Tsushima put the Japanese navy on the track of "decisive battle" -- that one great conflict that would knock the enemy out of any capability to wage war at sea. By the time the war actually came about, the senior hierarchy of the Japanese navy -- those at Imperial Headquarters, were almost mystically tied to the concept. Unfortunately, the war Japan started was a war of attrition, not a decisive battle. Therefore, to be blunt, they lost their ass, and deservedly so. The Imperial Army was wrapped up in the mystical "Bushido" concept of battle as well, and that didn't fare well either compared to .50 cal lead well-directed by determined men.

Japan, with their self-centered xenophobic view of the world, were completely unaware that the supposedly soft and degenerate westerners could be just as skilled, violent, and dog-mean as they could be. They never figured out how to deal with that.

Some points to ponder re the start of the war. Japanese historians point haughtily at the American decision to cut of resources to Japan, particularly oil, in retaliation for her China policies as the main reason for going to war. Actually, ALL THE DECISIONS THAT MATTERED re going to war with America had already been made by the Imperial Army (who controlled the country) the year before we cut them off. This is clear in "Soldiers of the Sun" as well as Toland's "The Rising Sun. Japan set themselves up for what happened.

Today, Japan continues it's policy of trying to weasel out of any responsibility for WWII and the atrocities they committed; they avoid teaching it in schools, and they refuse to recognize modern scholarship that is based primarily on translations of Japanese records, not interpretations of history generated by "gaijin" (foriegners -- the literal translation is "barbarian"). Everything is played down as if it all happened a long time ago and wasn't that serious anyway. It is a view of world history that I for one refuse to countenance in any way shape or form.

As the former Public Affairs officer at the USS Arizona Memorial, I've watched thousands of Japanese tourists pass through the museum and exhibits with little comprehension of what actually happened even though the photographic evidence is right in front of them.

I have also made friends of people like bomber pilot Zenji Abe (Akagi) who thought the war was a terrible travesty that the bloated and egotistical Imperial Army foisted off on the country under the guise of nationalism. He was right, God rest his soul.

[astraltrader]

I coudnt think of a better way to sum up the militaristic activities of Japan at the onset of WW2 Don.

[Don Boyer]

In re-reading this thread I ran across posts concerning Japan's supposed atomic bomb. I have not followed any of the posted links, read any of the articles or anything else.

Just so my background is understood, for six years I built nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for the military, my primary specialty. I've seen every test film, seen every weapon, learned the functions of nuclear physics packages as well as thermonuclear packages. It all seems simple today, when countries have built tens of thousands of the damn things, but starting from scratch is a different proposal entirely. the Soviets would have struggled for eight to ten years with their project had they not stolen what they needed from us through Klaus Fuchs and others.

Under no circumstances imaginable other than the direct intervention of almighty God could the Japanese have built and tested an atomic bomb during the war years. You don't build a nuclear weapon with a couple of brainy scientists and "a cyclotron". Japan did not have the resources, money, time or collective brains to build a bomb. the US did and it still took years of effort and about 6 billion dollars (counting the delivery system). I don't care what any of those articles about "Japan's bomb" say, they cannot be anything but a crock of unadulterated crap dreamed up by somebody.

Here's a few things to consider:

-- Japan's nuclear scientists knew a bomb was feasible, and knew they couldn't do it. They said so, adamantly, to the military several times. And this at a time when you didn't tell the Imperial Army things they did not want to hear.
-- Japan had absolutely no one capable of developing explosive lensing.
-- Japan had no industry capable of machining the physics package.
-- Japan had no chemists with the knowledge to develop esoteric explosive mixtures. Nor could they develop the necessary "package wrapping" needed to make a nuclear core.
-- Japan had no scientist or laboratory capable of dreaming up a polonium - beryllium neutron generator.
--Japan had no industry capable of developing cascade enrichment processes or the buildings to house them. They had no capacity or industry capable of building a nuclear reactor of even the most basic design like the Chicago project.
--Japan did not have enough mathematical processing equipment to figure out the critical mass balances or any of the other items requiring high-end slide rule math from hell.

The list goes on....the story has to be bunk from the get go.

[astraltrader]

Another excellent post Don. Agree with every word.