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bob shayler
16-06-2008, 12:45
Arthur Zimmermann:
Born in Marggrabova, East Prussia in 1854, Arthur Zimmermann initially studied law from 1884 – 1887 in Konigsberg, East Prussia and Leipzig. He served a period as a junior lawyer eventually receiving his Doctorate of Law. In 1893, his career took a different direction when he entered the consular service in Berlin. From there he moved to China in 1896 moving to Canton in 1898. He rose to the rank of Consul by 1900 and witnessed the Boxer Rebellion.
Called back to the Foreign Office he became Under Secretary of State in 1911 serving under Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow. In this post, Zimmermann assumed a larger share of responsibility than might normally have been the case due to von Jagow’s reserved ness. Over a period of several years he undertook negotiations with foreign envoys on von Jagows behalf. In recognition of his unwavering support for the Third Supreme Command (an effective military dictatorship led by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff) Zimmermann succeeded von Jagow as Secretary of State on the 24th November 1916.
Towards the end of 1916, Zimmermann supported the highly controversial policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, designed to counter the successful Allied blockade of Germany which had been in force since the beginning of the war and was strangling Germany’s ability to wage war. This policy would eventually bring the United States into the war in April 1917.
It was obvious to Germany that this policy would upset the United States and perhaps bring them into the war, an outcome that Germany wished to avoid. America’s patience had already been tested to the limit by such events as the sinking of the following ships causing the death of American citizens:

· Falaba, March 28th 1915, killing Leon Thrasher, the first American casualty.

· RMS Lusitania on May 25th 1915, 128 Americans killed

· Arabic, August 19th 1915, 2 Americans killed.

· Sussex, March 24th 1916, 25 Americans killed.

The Sussex incident brought matters to a head. President Wilson demanded that Germany must follow cruiser rules or America would break off diplomatic relations with Germany. On the 19th April 1916, President Wilson reiterated his threat to a special session of Congress sending Germany an ultimatum. In response to this on the 24th April 1916, the Kaiser issue the Sussex pledge after taking the advice of the Chancellor, Bethman-Hollweg, Foreign Minister Gottfried von Jagow and Ambassador Johan von Bernsdorff, all of whom opposed submarine warfare due to the risk of upsetting America and bringing her into the war. All U Boats were recalled to base by Admiral von Scheer (the Cymric being sunk in the meantime as the recall arrived too late, this was sunk by the same U Boat which sank Lusitania) thus ending the merchantman campaign. The U Boats turned their attention to the Mediteranean and America was, for the moment, appeased.
The winter of 1916 – 1917 however proved disastrous for German food production when they suffered the ‘turnip winter’. The potato crop had failed, pork and eggs had disappeared from the table and bread had to be made from turnips. The growing food shortages brought about the new policy which it was hoped would enable Germany to stifle Britain’s supply routes and starve her out of the war first.
So it was that on the 16th January 1917, Zimmermann sent the telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, Johann von Bernstorff who forwarded it to the German Ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt. The telegram read as follows:

We intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on the 1st of February. We shall endeavour in spite of this to keep the United States neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: Make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to re-conquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you.
You will inform the President [of Mexico] of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.
Please call the [Mexican] Presidents attention to the fact that the unrestricted employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England to make peace within a few months. Zimmermann.

The telegram was transmitted by radio and across two telegraph routes under the cover of diplomatic messages by two neutral Governments, Sweden and the United States, a privilege granted to German Diplomats by Woodrow Wilson in the hope that Germany would remain in touch with the U.S. and further Wilson’s aims of ending the war. (The British had cut German cables in the Atlantic and shut down German stations in neutral countries.) Being forced to use these means of transmission increased the risk of interception. The message passed over cables which touched British soil and was promptly intercepted there by British intelligence.
The code breakers in Room 40 at the Admiralty immediately set about decrypting the telegram. It had been encrypted by the German Foreign Office using cipher 0075 which room 40 had partly broken. They initially decrypted enough to realize they had an opportunity to encourage America to join the war on the Allied side.
There were two problems that had to be overcome in passing this intelligence on to America.

· How to tell the U.S. how they had obtained the ciphertext of the telegram without disclosing how neutral diplomatic traffic was being monitored.

· To prepare a plausible public explanation of how they had the telegrams deciphered text without revealing they had broken the German codes.

The first problem was solved by obtaining a copy of the ciphertext of the telegram from the telegram office in Mexico. This was achieved by a British agent, Mr. ‘H’ (thought to be Sir Thomas Hohler, the British Ambassador in Mexico who bribed an employee of the telegraph company. This could be passed to the U.S. without any embarrassment.
The British discovered that the retransmission was enciphered using cipher 13040 which had been captured by the British in Mesopotamia. By mid February, the British had the complete text.
To solve the second problem, a cover story was fabricated that the telegrams deciphered text had been stolen in Mexico. (The U.S. was informed of the deciphering and backed up the cover story). The German’s, refusing to accept their codes had been broken, embarked upon a witch hunt for a traitor in their embassy in Mexico.
On February 19th 1917, Admiral ‘Blinker’ Hall, the head of room 40, showed the telegram to the Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in London, Edward Bell. Bell was incredulous and believed the document to be a forgery. On February 20th, Hall sent a copy to the U.S. Ambassador, Walter Page. On the 23rd, Page met with the British Foreign Minister, Balfour, who passed the message in German accompanied by the British translation. Page then reported the matter to President Wilson along with details to be verified by telegraph company files in the U.S.
At this time, sentiments in the U.S. were anti-Mexican as well as anti-German. General Pershing had long been chasing Pancho Villa who had carried out several cross border raids. News of the telegram further inflamed ill feeling towards Mexico.
For all this, the telegram was still thought to be a forgery by British Intelligence. That is until March 29th when amazingly, Arthur Zimmermann admitted the telegram was genuine. This admission was to prove fatal to Germany.
President Wilson responded by asking Congress to arm American ships to enable them to fend off submarine attacks. On April 2nd, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. The United States entered the war on April 6th 1917 making any hope of a German victory less likely.
Zimmermann chose retirement in August 1917 and died in 1940.
Regards,
Bob

bob shayler
16-06-2008, 12:47
My apologies,
I had many attachments for this post but they failed,
regards,
Bob

astraltrader
16-06-2008, 15:15
Very interesting Bob. Thank you.
When you said your attachments failed I assume you were using JPEG rather than Bitmap?

bob shayler
16-06-2008, 16:02
Thats correct Terry. Spoilt it a bit but not to worry,
regards,
Bob

astraltrader
16-06-2008, 16:32
Why not convert `em to Jpeg and resend Bob?

bob shayler
23-06-2008, 09:49
The Mexican response to Zimmermann's proposal:
The Mexican President, Venustiano Carranza assigned one of his Generals to investigate the feasability of Zimmermanns proposal to assist them in retaking their former territories. The General concluded that it would not be desirable for the following reasons:
Any attempt to retake the former territories would almost certainly mean war with the United States.
Any financial support from Germany would be worthless as the only sizeable arms manufacturer in the Americas was the United States. Supplies of arms direct from Germany would also be impossible due to the fact that the Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic sea lanes.
Even if Mexico had the military means to retake the territory, it would have great difficulty accomodating / pacifying the large English speaking population.

On April 14th 1917, President Carranza formally declined Zimmermanns proposals. By then, the U.S. had already declared war on Germany,

regards,
Bob

christophe
25-06-2008, 09:45
Very interesting! I didn't know about this possible alliance between Germany and Mexico...

What is amazing to me is that Germany made the same mistakes in 1939 as in 1914: they couldn't even think that British had broken their codes. This has probably been one of the most important key to victory...

An other mistake is to think that you can avoid battlefleet and rely on submarine to win a war against seapowers (we French have made the same mistake for centuries!).

I don't fully agree when you say that US entering the war made it impossible for Germany to win. In 1917, US was not such a powerfull country yet and Germany, Austria and Turkey had still time before US army reinforcement would prove effective.

Christophe

bob shayler
26-06-2008, 20:44
Hello Christophe,
Thank you for your feed back and I am pleased you found the thread interesting. As you stated, breaking the German code in two world wars was the key to victory, but I would imagine we experienced great difficulty using this intelligence to our advantage time after time without revealing the true source, the method Room 40 used in this thread being one example.
I appreciate your comment on my stating it was now impossible for Germany to win, perhaps ‘less likely’ or something similar may have been more accurate,
Regards,
Bob

Commodore Armiger
27-06-2008, 06:40
Christophe,

I agree that the US forces in 1917 were not capable of making an immediate and decisive difference. But USA's strength lay in its ability to mobilise fresh manpower and provide the allies with food, raw materials and materiel at a time when Germany and Austria were being drained of fighting men and the ability to feed their populace. Children, women and old men could not hope to replace the farm-workers lying dead or exhausted on the Western Front, in Russia and in northern Italy. American farms were already far more mechanised than most european ones.

Even given the bonus of troops released from the Russian front following the Bolshevik revolution, the Germans did not have a war-winning strategy, they could only batter at the Western Front, with no tanks to speak of, a homeland in virtual revolt and allies who could no longer bear their share of the struggle.

Keeping the USA out of the war was vital to Germany. Getting the USA in was vital to Britain and France. A negotiated peace, with a weakened but undefeated Germany, seemed the only likely alternative to both sides, and equally unattractive to both. Would it have saved Europe from the rise of Hitler and a second cataclysm? I personally doubt it. At some stage a revived Germany would surely have hoped to achieve European dominance.