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22-08-2007, 12:25
The following text is from "Battles of the Nineteenth Century Vol II"
Battles of the Boer War
The Boers of the Transvaal are descended from the settlers brought to the Cape by the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth century. In 1814 the King of the Netherlands finally ceded the colony to Great Britain. The Boers had been intolerant of the stern rule of the masters of their own nationality, and they chafed not less under the milder dominion of the later English government. The truth was, and still is, that the Boers from the first have disliked all government, especially when it clashed with their ideas regarding their rights over the natives. A disturbance which occurred in 1815 led to the “great trek,” as the emigration of the Boers from Cape Colony was called-a movement which resulted in their settlement in the Transvaal and in the territory now unknown as the Orange Free State. Up to 1852 the British government theoretically extended up to the twenty-fifth degree of latitude. But no attempt was made to enforce this claim, and in the end even the shadow of suzerainty was renounced when, on 17th January 1852, the Sand River Convention was entered into between the British Government and the delegates of the Transvaal Boers, by which Great Britain formally renounced all rights over the country north of the Vaal river. Originally there were four republics in the Transvaal, but in 1860 they were united into one under the title of the “south African Republic,” which is now its official designation.
The South African Republic did not prosper. From the first it was impecunious, and within a decade after its establishment it was practically insolvent. The discovery, in 1867, of diamonds and of gold brought into the country a rush of strangers, whose energy and enterprise might have altered the condition of the Transvaal but for the lethargy and obstinate isolation of the Boer population. Burgers, the last President before the annexation, was a man of vigour and talent, but the stolid and ignorant Boers declined to be welded by him into a nation. In a war upon which they entered with Sekukuni, a powerful native chief, their poltroonery was flagrant. The fighting was done for them by the warlike native tribe of Amaswazis, who were so disgusted with the cowardice of their white allies that they left them in dudgeon. When the Boers had to do their own work their hearts failed them, and they fled ignominiously. Burgers, with tears, strove to rally them, but in vain, and he begged them to shoot him rather than disgrace him. But they shrugged their shoulders, and more than two thirds of them “trekked” home, leaving him hemmed in and powerless.
The republic was encircled by native enemies all round the Transvaal borders, all waiting for the impending onslaught by Cetewayo, the Zulu king, the master of a formidable army which lay on the frontier ready to strike, and restrained from immediate hostilities against the Boers-who had provoked him by many encroachments-only by his fear of the English and the personal influence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Native Secretary of Natal. On the northeast the Amaswazis brooded in sullen discontent; northward, within and beyond the frontier, anarchy raged; and in the west the Bekhuanas were waiting for their opportunity. Financially the republic was hopelessly insolvent. The Boers set their faces against taxation. It is a notorious fact that when the Shepstone annexed the Transvaal there was found in the public treasury only twelve shillings and six pence, part of which was base coin. Clearly a crisis was impending which threatened to involve South Africa in great peril. The annexation was no sudden act. The Blue books contain remonstrance on remonstrance addressed by British officials to the Transvaal authorities. At length Carnarvon’s forbearance was exhausted. Shepstone was sent for to England, and received a commission of date 5th October 1876, directing him, should the emergency render such a course necessary, to annex the Transvaal to her Majesty’s dominions. Shepstone escorted by twenty-five mounted policemen and a few officials, reached Pretoria in February 1877. It was an open secret that he was empowered to annex the country if he deemed it advisable, but he expressed his readiness to refrain from that step if certain reforms were carried out. The Boers would have no reforms, and on April 12th 1877, Shepstone issued a proclamation formally annexing the Transvaal to Great Britain. For some time the Boers remained sullenly quiet. A few of them rendered good and loyal service with Sir Evelyn Wood during the Zulu War, but the main body stood aloof. Sir Owen Lanyon succeeded Shepstone as Administrator of the Transvaal, and from the first was unpopular with the Boers. At the close of the Zulu war Sir Garnet Wolseley, who held the position of High Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa, came up into the Transvaal with a considerable strength of regular and irregular troops. During his stay no actual emeute occurred, but there were ominous demonstrations, which would probably have come to a head but for the presence of the troops. The Boer discontent was enhanced by the positive intimation from the Colonial Secretary that “under no circumstances whatever would the Transvaal independence be restored to the Boers,” and by Sir Garnet’s less prosaic but equally resolute utterance, that “so long as the sun shone and the Vaal River flowed to the sea the Transvaal would remain British territory.” He finally left the Transvaal in March 1880, and the troops in that territory were gradually reduced until in November of the same year they consisted of but thirteen companies of infantry, two troops of mounted infantry, and four guns, distributed in detachments in some half-dozen garrisons scattered over the country.
Throughout the land there was a deceptive peace, which lulled Lanyon into a sense of security, and to some extent deceived Wolseley. The Boers were playing the waiting game. Mr. Gladstone became Premier in March 1880. Taking it for granted that he would act on the lines of his speeches when in Opposition, the Boer leaders called on him to rescind the annexation. The answer of the Government came in the curt telegram; “Under no circumstances can the Queen’s authority in the Transvaal be relinquished.” There was consternation among the Boers; the British inhabitants, trusting implicitly in an assurance so specific, rejoiced greatly and bought land without hesitation. In the matter of taxation the Boers had always presented a passive resistance against the British rule, but Lanyon’s officials considered that they might now crush the resistance by active measures. A Boer named Bezuidenhuit was levied on, and in default of payment a seizure was made. Bezuidenhuit and his friends forcibly recovered the article seized, and an attempt to arrest him was thwarted by a gathering of Boers. At a mass meeting on the 13th of December 1880, it was decided that the South African Republic should be restored; it was resolved to fight for independence, and a triumvirate consisting of Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius was appointed to administer the Government. On the 16th the republic was proclaimed at Heidelberg, which became the headquarters of the new Government. A large body of Boers took possession of that place, another went to Potchefstrom, and a third “commando” was detailed to another service presently to be described.
Lanyon was powerless to interface, and he and the English in Pretoria had to await events, pending the expected arrival of the detachment of the 94th Regiment, which had been ordered up from Lydenburg, whence it was known to have moved on December 5th. This ill-fated body was destined never to reach Pretoria. On the march Colonel Anstruther had frequent warnings of danger, to which he paid insufficient heed; there prevailed in the force the rooted belief that the Boers did not intend serious mischief. It was scarcely to be expected that the men who had pusillanimously recoiled from before Sekukuni’s spear armed natives would venture to assail a body of British regular infantry. But long before the end of this miserable war the valour and constancy of the Boers, not less than their moderation and humanity, had come to be acknowledged and admired. In this, their first conflict with the “red soldiers,” their unerring marksmanship was the chief surprise.
The scouting duties of Colonel Anstruther’s detachment were performed with carelessness; else, whatever might have been its fate, it would not have been taken by surprise. About noon on December 20th the little column, marching at ease, was approaching Bronkhorst Spruit. The ground traversed by the road was sparsely wooded, sloping down from either side. Military precautions were neglected, and the convoy stretched to an interminable length. The band at the head of the column abruptly stopped playing when about 150 armed mounted Boers suddenly became visibly in skirmishing formation on a rise on the left of the road, at a distance of a few hundred yards. Colonel Anstruther immediately galloped back, and ordered the leading wagon to halt and the others to close up. A Boer advanced midway with a flag of truce, and was met by Colonel Anstruther, to whom he handed a letter written in English. Its terms were at once quaint and peremptory. “We don’t know,” it ran, “ whether we are in state of war or not, consequently we cant allow any movements of troops from your side, and wish you to stop where you are. We not being at war with the Queen nor with the people of England, but are only recovering the independence of our country, we do not wish to take to arms, and therefore inform you that any movements of troops from your side will be taken by us as a declaration of war.”
The messenger was to take back an answer, which had to be given within five minutes. Anstruther read the letter and tersely replied: “I go to Pretoria; do as you like.” The messenger departed, and the colonel, hurrying back towards his men, ordered them to skirmish. But it was too late. The Boers had closed in upon the rear and flanks of the column and opened fire at point-blank range. Their fire was deadly, every shot told; that of the troops was scattered and ineffective. In ten minutes, out of a total of 259, there had been killed or wounded 155 officers and men. Colonel Anstruther, he riddled with bullets, then ordered the “Cease fire,” and intimated the surrender of the remains of his force. The Boers then closed in, ordered all arms to be laid down, and formed a cordon round the scene of the slaughter. When the fighting was over, Boers and soldiers became very friendly. The Boer commander, Joubert, came forward and shook hands with Colonel Anstruther, expressing regret that he should be among the wounded. A hospital camp was pitched close by, and leave was given for the retention of the wagons containing baggage, provisions, and hospital equipment, tents for the wounded, and some uninjured men as hospital nurses; the remaining unwounded prisoners with the rest of the wagons were removed to Heidelberg. Two men were permitted to carry the tidings of the disaster to Pretoria, whence without hindrance surgeons, hospital orderlies, and ambulance were sent out to Bronkhorst Spruit. The Boers showed themselves most obliging, and were extremely solicitous for the comfort o the wounded in camp, bringing in milk, butter, eggs, bread, and fruit gratuitously. The statements regarding the Boer losses I the short fight was curiously conflicting. The Boers affirmed that they amounted only to two killed and five wounded.
When Sir Garnet Wolseley went home he had been succeeded, in July, as High Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa, by Colonel (afterwards Major-General) Sir George Pomeroy Colley, an officer of high character. Tidings of the outbreak in the Transvaal reached him at Pieter Maritzburg on 19th December, and were in possession of the Colonial Office in London on the following day. Reinforcements from India were promptly ordered to Natal, and further instalments of troops were sent out from England as early as possible. Considering the weakness of the forces at Colley’s immediate disposition, he would have been wise to wait until he had been reinforced; but he had a great contempt for the Boers, and was eager to distinguish himself before officers of higher rank should supersede him. He was warned by Colonel Bellairs (in military command of the Transvaal) that there were “from 6,000 to 7,000 rebels in the field, who under good leadership, would exhibit courage, discipline, and organisation.” Colley hurried up towards the Transvaal frontier the few companies of infantry, which he had in Natal. The arrival of some drafts was very opportune-a naval brigade was landed and sent up, as also a squadron of dragoons and mounted infantry under the command of Major Brownlow, and the Natal Mounted Police. Colley had early intimated his intention to enter the Transvaal about the 20th January 1881, with a column consisting of eight companies of infantry, four guns, and a mounted squadron-a miserably inadequate force. So far from accomplishing this anticipation, he was able only to quit Newcastle (a border town of Natal) on January 24th with about 60 officers and 1,200 men. This little force was styled the “relief column,” as it was intended to raise the siege of the Transvaal towns in which were scanty British garrisons beleaguered by the Boers. Apart from Pretoria, the besieged capital of the Transvaal, there were six of those places-Potchefstrom, Rustenburg, Marabastadt, Lydenburg, Standerton, and Wakkerstrom, all of which held our gallantly until the restoration of peace.
Before advancing from Newcastle, Colley sent an ultimatum to the Boers, ordering them, as insurgents, to disperse. They replied, declaring that all they wanted was the rescinding of the annexation and the restoration of the South African Republic under the Protectorate of the Queen. On the 26th the British force entrenched itself on an elevated position at Mount Prospect, about twenty miles north of Newcastle, in the mountainous region forming the northern projection of Natal. The camp was about a mile right of the road from Newcastle to Standerton, which crossed the ridge known as Lang’s Nek- about three and a half miles further northward. In the vicinity of Lang’s Nek a considerable number of Boers were seen. On the morning of the 28th, Colley moved out with a strength, all told, of about 1,160 men consisting of five companies of the 58th, under major Hingeston, and 150 mounted men under Major Brownlow, the whole commanded by Colonel Deane; five companies of the 3rd battalion 60th Regiment, under Colonel Ashburnham; 75 men of the Naval Brigade, four guns under Captain Green, R.A., and details. The pass over Lang’s Nek crosses the ridge about the centre of a rough semi-circle, on the west of which is the Majuba mountain; on the east is a long spur surmounted by a rocky crest. In front of the proper left of this spur, several hundred yards to the front, is an isolated conical hill. The ground in the bottom of the enclosed basin is low, with a gradual rise towards the face of the spur, something in the nature of a glacis. About nine o’clock the British force, having moved up along a ridge out of shot, formed into position on a rise in the bottom, with the mounted squadron and the 58th on the right, the guns in the centre, and the 60th and naval brigade on the left, the whole facing toward the spur.
The action was begun by shelling parts of the enemy’s positions, and by pushing forward a company of the 60th and the Naval Brigade, with their rockets, which took some effect on the Boer reserves in rear of the Nek. At ten o’clock the 58th advanced to the attack of the spur, covered on its right by artillery fire and by Brownlow’s squadron. The leading troop of mounted men swept with fine dash up the isolated hill, and then charged. The hilltop was held by a Boer piquet of considerable strength. Brownlow shot the Boer leader with his revolver, but his horse was shot from under him; Lieutenant Lermitte and Sergeant-Major Lunny were killed; the supporting troop was checked-the leading troop, fatigued and broken by the charge, and with its leaders all down, could make no head, and the whole squadron gave way. It was no proper ground for cavalry, and the horsemen should have acted as mounted infantry. Meantime, the 58th had begun climbing the steep ascent through the long entangling grass, which retarded the men’s progress. The Boer piquet from the hill, having repulsed Brownlow’s squadron, moved down and opened fire on the now exposed right flank and rear of the 58th, while the Boers on the spur gathered on its brow and maintained a deadly fire from behind cover. Anxious to get to close quarters out of this purgatory, Colonel Deane gave the order to charge. The officers led nobly, and the men struggled on through the hall of fire. Colonel Deane’s horse was shot, but he dashed forward on foot until riddled with bullets ten yards in front of his foremost man. Major Poole and Lieutenants Inman and Elwes were killed in supporting Colonel Deane; Major Hingeston and all the mounted officers of the 58th, were shot down or dismounted. The stubborn soldiers of those gallant regiment-youngsters as they were of them continued to hold their ground unflinchingly for some time, notwithstanding the bitter fire. Lieutenant Baillie, carrying the regimental colour, was mortally wounded, and when his comrade Hill went to his assistance, the brave young officer said with his last breath, “Never mind me; save the colour!” Hill, who had been carrying the Queen’s colour, took the other also; when he went down, Sergeant Budstock took both colours, and carried them until the general retirement, which soon had to occur. “The 58th,” wrote Colley, “having fallen back leisurely without haste or confusion, reformed at the foot of the slope, and marched back into position in as good order, and with as erect and soldierly a bearing, as when it marched out.”
Spite of much British bravery, the combat of Lang’s Nek was an unquestionable and severe defeat. But many noble deeds were performed. Lieutenant Hill (already named) brought wounded man after man out of action, and worthily earned the V.C. Trooper Doogen saved the life of Major Brownlow; Private Godfrey and Band boy Martin remained with Major Hingeston and Captain Lovegrove when those officers lay wounded, enduring heavy fire in doing so. The great brunt of the losses fell on the 58th. The casualties altogether amounted to 198, of which 173 belonged to that regiment, which had to bury 75 officers and men out of a total strength of 494. Lang’s Nek caused the Boers exceptionally heavy loss. Their total casualties from beginning to end of the war were but 101, of which Lang’s Nek accounted for 41-14 killed and 27 wounded. The Boers behaved with humanity. The moment that the “Cease fire” sounded they gave permission to the English surgeons to attend the wounded lying in front of the Boer position, fetched water to them, and assisted in binding up their wounds.
The folly of the forward position prematurely taken up by General Colley with an inadequate force was made apparent by the result of the battle of Lang’s Nek. The comparative handful of men in Mount Prospect camp could no longer be regarded by any stretch of imagination as a “relief column.” That repulse had taught the Boers their ability to arrest the further advance of the British force, and enabled them to turn their attention to the interception of its line of communication. The Boers, in effect, were masters of the situation. Their patrols penetrated nearly to Ladysmith, and threatened Newcastle from the Drakensberg and Utrecht districts. Convoys were cut off, captured, and destroyed; the mail service was arrested, and except for the telegraph service, which remained un-interfered with, the Mount Prospect camp was all but entirely isolated. An escort of mounted infantry sent out on February 7th to attempt to reach Newcastle with mails, was driven back to the camp by the fire of the Boers. Colley then determined to make a more formidable effort next day to open up communications with Newcastle, and to clear the Boers from the road. On the morning of the 8th he left camp with five companies of the 60th Rifles under Colonel Ashburnham, two field and two mountain guns under Captain Greer, R.A., and a small detachment of mounted men under Major Brownlow. About five miles south of the Mount Prospect position the Newcastle road is crossed by the Ingogo river, which runs from west to east through a valley. The ground north of the river is broken and rugged; from the south bank there is a gentle rise to the foot of a flat-topped ridge strewn with rocks and boulders, and irregularly cut by rocky depressions.
The general leaving the two mountain guns and a company of infantry on a commanding crest north of the river crossed it with the main body, which he formed on the plain beyond, and then moved it forward to the fort of the ridge bounding the valley to the southward. As the troops were ascending the rise to the ridge the Boers showed themselves in considerable strength, and they at once galloped forward to dispute the ridge, and to take advantage of the cover afforded by the intersecting valleys. Greer brought his two guns into action, but the Boers had already taken cover, from which they directed a heavy and active fire on the guns and skirmishers. Greer was killed early, and the command of the guns developed on Lieutenant Parsons. The engagement became heavy and general about noon, when the companies of the 60th were pushed forward against the enemy, whose fire from behind cover was very deadly. The guns had to be freely exposed, and were in action with case shot at a range of less than 500 yards. The gunners suffered very heavily, and a company of the 60th, which most gallantly advanced to cover the guns, and met the Boer fire at close range, had many casualties from the steady and accurate fire of the enemies enjoying almost perfect cover. So severe was the fire of the Boers that the guns had soon to be withdrawn from their exposed position, and during the rest of the affair fired only occasionally. It was apparent that the enemy were being gradually reinforced, and the general sent orders to camp for three companies of the 58th to move out and occupy the ridges north of the river, and for a part, if practicable, to cross the Ingogo in support of the troops already deeply engaged and reduced by severe losses.
About three o’clock there was a comparative lull, although the Boers maintained a very accurate fire, anyone on the British side being almost certainly struck if at all exposing him. Later in the afternoon the Boers received considerable reinforcements, and Lieutenant Parsons, wounded as he was, reopened with his guns for a short time; but darkness presently set in, and the Boers gradually withdrew to their camp. It was Colley’s conviction that the enemy intended renewing the engagement next morning in overwhelming strength, and he acted wisely in deciding to withdraw to camp under cover of darkness. It was a gruesome night. Torrents of rain were falling, and the darkness was intense, except when the lightning flashes broke the blackness of the cold and dismal night. The ambulances sent out during the fight had not been able to reach the actual scene of action, since the Boers had threatened to fire on them if they advanced while the engagement was going on. They were not now available in the darkness; and the wounded, which in many instances it had been impossible to remove from the advanced positions, had to be searched for. Those who were found were collected and sheltered for the night as well as possible with waterproof sheets, blankets, great-coats, etc.; but many lay as they had fallen throughout the long, inclement night. The guns were horsed, although insufficiently, by collecting all the available animals, and by withdrawing the team from the ammunition wagon, which had to be abandoned. When all arrangements had been completed, the force moved off in silence, formed in Hollow Square, the guns in the centre, the infantry in skirmishing order on the four sides. The river, swollen by the rain, was deep and rapid; and some of the first men trying to cross were swept down, but found foothold on a sandbank. The main body crossed in detachments with locked arms. The camp was reached about 4 a.m. on the 9th. The soldiers had dragged the guns up the hill, the horses being unable to pull them up the steep and slippery road. The 58th companies spent the night on the northern ridges, and were not withdrawn until the following day.
The casualties had been heavy. Among the slain were Captain MacGregor, R.E., General Colley’s assistant military secretary; Captain Greer, R.A.; Lieutenant Garrett and O’Connell; and Mr. Stuart, a Natal resident magistrate. A most promising officer, Lieutenant Wilkinson of the 60th, was drowned while crossing the Ingogo, when returning to the field with assistance for the wounded, after having distinguished himself throughout the engagement by his coolness and gallantry. The total loss of this unfortunate day amounted to 139 officers and men. According to the statement of the Boers, the Ingogo fight cost them eight killed and six wounded. The Boers returned to the scene of action on the morning of the 9th, expecting to renew the engagement. They took away two gun limbers and the ammunition wagon abandoned overnight by Colley’s people, and then fell back behind Newcastle to join their main force, reported as threatening to prevent the advance of the reinforcements recently arrived from India. Their disappearance gave opportunity to succour the wounded and bury the dead without molestation, and opened the road from Mount Prospect to Newcastle, to the hospital at which latter place were promptly sent the wounded from the British camp. The communications in rear of Mount Prospect remained open from this time forward.
Sir George Colley had sustained a second reverse, proportionately more bloody than had been the first. By this time, one would imagine, it might have begun to dawn on the home authorities that Colley, to say the least, was not a successful commander. His experience of actual warfare was but slender; he had served only in the China war of 1860 and in the Ashantee campaign. He was comparatively new to South Africa, and was quite unfamiliar with the Boer nature. Yet the authorities had assigned to him as second in command an officer senior to him in army rank, who had fought with distinction through the Crimean and Indian Mutiny wars, and in the Ashantee and Zululand campaigns, in high and successful commands. Brigadier-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., was the only officer in the latter campaign under which Boers served and died-served with a loyal devotion, died gallantly under his eye. He knew the strange, simple, yet stubborn nature of the Boers; he was ready to fight with them, and equally ready to argue them out of a folly. Wood and Colley were old and fast friends; Wood was quite content to serve under his junior, and had hurried out to India with a number of “Special service” officers. He reached Durban on February 12th, four days after the Ingogo reverse, Sir G. Colley’s account of which was in London on the 10th, and notwithstanding the unwarrantable optimism of its tone, must have been read between the lines in Pall Mall. Then would have been the time to avert further futile waste of brave soldiers by instructing by telegraph Colley and Wood to exchange their relative positions. The arrangement would have been perfectly regular, and Colley was the sort of man who would loyally have accepted the secondary position.
Picking up on his rapid journey the Indian column from its camp on the Biggarsberg, Wood and it (consisting of the 15th Hussars, the 2nd battalion 60th Rifles, and the 92nd Highlanders) reached Newcastle on the 17th. Colley men him there, and it was resolved between the two officers that no further advance should be attempted until more reinforcements, now on the way up, should arrive. They parted on the 21st, Colley moving the Indian column up to Mount Prospect without molestation; Wood returning to Pieter Maritzburg to press on the advance of further reinforcements.
Sir George Colley’s motive in making the fatal advance on the Majuba mountaintop, whatever it might have been, died with him. His assurance had been given to Wood that no further advance should be attempted pending the arrival of further reinforcements. He had engaged with the Boer Vice-President in negotiations, which promised favourable results. A reconnaissance in force to the summit of the mountain could give no more information than a mere patrol could easily ascertain-the position of the Boer laagers and an approximate estimate of the force occupying them. A Boer piquet occasionally held the hilltop during the day, and Colley resolved to occupy it by making a night march. At ten o’clock on the night of February 26th he left the Mount Prospect camp with a force of 22 officers and 627 men-a smaller force than he had employed at Lang’s Nek. At the start its composition and order were as follows: - Two companies 58th, the Naval Brigade, three companies 92nd, followed by some details; two companies of the 2nd 60th moved out later to the piquet post close to the foot of Inquela hill, with instructions to occupy its summit with some detachments. Further on, upon the narrow Nek between the Inquela and the Majuba, Captain Robertson’s company of the 92nd was dropped as a link, with orders to entrench itself. The Nek traversed, the troops, guided by friendly Kaffirs, had now to undertake in single file the actual climb up the steep and rugged side of the Majuba, whose top is 6,200 feet above sea level and more than 2,000 feet above the positions of the Boer laagers. From time to time during the tedious and toilsome ascent, a halt was made to enable the men-heavy laden with rations and extra cartridges-to regains their breath. As the troops neared the summit the obstacles increased. The steep grassy slopes were succeeded by great boulders and deep dongas, varied by sharp crags and treacherous loose stones, over and up which the wearied and burdened men had to drag themselves. Near the top the ascent had to be accomplished on hands and knees. Between four and five in the morning of the 27th the force, much exhausted after the heavy toil, and now only about 400 strong, gained the summit.
Like most of the mountains of South Africa, no peak crowns the Majuba. Its top is a plateau of saucer like shape, dipping towards the centre, across which is a rocky reef about breast high. The circumference of the plateau is about 1,200 yards. When the summit was reached it was still dark, and the troops having got mixed during the scramble up, and being weary, lay down where they stood until dawn. With daylight they were extended round the edge of the plateau, with a small reserve in the central hollow. No instructions were given to entrench, and, indeed, the troops had no tools for such a purpose; but the men of their own accord attempted to obtain some cover by throwing up defences of turf and stones. Here and there the soldiers showed on the skyline, and a few shots were fired, which for a moment caused great consternation in the Boer camps in the lower ground northwest of the Majuba. Seeing that the mountain was in British occupation, the expectation was natural that an attack would presently be made on their positions on the Nek, in which case they would find themselves between two fires. Their first idea, it seems, was to flight. The oxen were in spanned, and hurried preparations were made for retreat. But when it became evident that the troops on the summit were in no great strength and had neither cannon nor rockets, and that their Nek position was unmolested, the courage of the Boers revived. Smijt, the fighting general, made a short stirring speech, and at his summons a number of the younger men began to climb the mountain side under cover of the stones and scrub. Joubert, the commanding general, detailed a force of the older men in support of the storming party-picked shots who remained below watching the edge of the plateau, and firing at every soldier who exposed himself. As the morning passed Boer detachments attacked and hemmed in the British position on the north, the east, and the southwest. The defenders were not in sufficient strength to hold the whole of the edge of the plateau, and detachments had to be moved hither and thither to meet and attempt to thwart the advances of the Boers. Slowly and steadily the hostile skirmishers clambered upwards from cover to cover, while the supports below protected their movement with a steady and accurate fire. During the hours from dawn to noon our men had not suffered very heavily, notwithstanding the Boer marksmanship. The first officer to fall was Commander Romilly, of the Naval Brigade, while reconnoitring with General Colley. But the long strain of the Boers close shooting began to tell on the morale of the British soldiers, and when the Boers at length reached the crest and opened a deadly fire at short range the officers had to exert themselves to the utmost in the effort to avert disaster. The reserves stationed in the central dip of the plateau, out of reach until then of the enemy’s fire, were ordered up in support of the fighting line. Their want of promptitude in obeying this order did not augur well, and soon after reaching the front they wavered, and then gave way. The officers did temporarily succeed in rallying them, but the “bolt” had a bad effect. To use the expression of an eyewitness, “funk became established.”
It was struggled against very gallantly by the officers, who, sword and revolver in hand, encouraged the soldiers by word and by action. A number of men, unable to confront the deadly fire of the Boers, had huddled for cover behind the rocky reef crossing the plateau, and no entreaty or upbraiding on the part of their officers would induce them to face the enemy. What then happened one does not care to tell in detail. Everything connected with this disastrous enterprise went to naught, as if there had been a curse on it. Whatever may have been the object intended, the force employed was absurdly inadequate. Instead of being homogeneous, it consisted of separate detachments with no link or bond of union-a disposition that notoriously has led to more panics than any other cause that the annals of regimental history can furnish. Fragments of proud and distinguished regiments fresh from victory in another continent shared in the panic of the Majuba, seasoned warriors behaving no better than mere recruits. To the calm-pulsed philosopher a panic is an academic enigma. No man who has seen it-much less shared in it-can ever forgets the infectious madness of panic stricken soldiers.
In the sad ending, with a cry of fright and despair the remnants of the hapless force turned and fled, regardless of the efforts of the officers to stem the rearward rush. Sir George Colley laid dead shot through the head just before the final flight. A surgeon and two hospital attendants caring for the wounded at the bandaging place in the dip of the plateau were shot down, probably inadvertently. The elder Boers promptly stopped the firing in that direction. But there was no cessation of the fire directed on the fugitives. On them the bullets rained accurately and persistently. The Boer, now disdaining cover, stood boldly on the edge of the plateau, and firing down upon the scared troops, picked off the men as if shooting game. The slaughter would have been yet heavier but for the entrenchment which the company of the 92nd, left overnight on the Nek between the Inquela and the Majuba, had made. A company of the 60th, under Captain Thurlow, joined Captain Robertson at dawn from camp. Later there arrived at the entrenchment on the Nek a troop of the 15th Hussars, under the command of Captain Sullivan. After midday the sound of the firing on the Majuba rapidly increased, and men were seen running down the hill towards the laager, one of whom brought in the tidings that the Boers had captured the position, that most of the troops were killed or prisoners, and that the general was dead with a bullet through his head.
Wounded men presently came pouring in, and were attended by Surgeon-Major Cornish. The laager was manned by the two companies, and outposts were thrown out, which were soon driven in by large bodies of mounted Boers, under whose fire men fell fast. Robertson despatched the rifle company down the ravine towards the camp, and a little later followed with the company of the 92nd under a murderous fire from the Boers, who had reached and occupied the entrenchment. The Highlanders lost heavily in the retreat, and Surgeon-Major Cornish was killed. The surviving fugitives from Majuba and from the laager finally reached camp under cover of the artillery fire from it, which ultimately stopped the pursuit. With the son sent of the Boer leaders a temporary hospital was established at a farmhouse near the foot of the mountain, and throughout the cold and wet night the medical staff never ceased to search for and bring in the wounded. Sir George Colley’s body was brought into camp on March 1st, and buried there with full military honours. The other dead of the Majuba fight rest in a cemetery on the plateau of the mountain summit-victims of a strange and almost incredible folly.
Of the 650 officers and men who were in action on this disastrous day 90 were killed, 133 were wounded, 58 were prisoners, and two were missing, the total casualties being 283, the great majority of which occurred in the 92nd, whose losses were 125; in the 58th, with a loss of 93; and in the Naval Brigade, which lost 36-more than half of its strength.
Sir Evelyn Wood reached Newcastle on March 4th, and assumed command. On the 6th he met the Boer leaders, when an armistice to last for eight days was agreed upon. The British garrison in the Transvaal were revictualled for twelve days, pending the raising of their siege on the consummation of peace; and Sir Evelyn Wood acknowledged the right of the Transvaal people to complete self-government subject to the suzerainty of the Queen. Terms of peace were signed on March 23rd; and next day General Sir Frederick Roberts, who had been sent out with large reinforcements to succeed Sir George Colley, reached Cape Town, but learning of peace being signed, immediately sailed home.
The total number of Transvaal Boers capable of carrying arms was under 8,000 at the beginning of hostilities. The total British force in South Africa, or on the way thither, at the close of hostilities consisted of thirteen infantry regiments, five cavalry regiments, twenty-two guns, three naval brigades-in all, not far short of 20,000 men. This total was exclusive of the British garrisons besieged in the Transvaal during the war. The Boer casualties throughout the war, as already mentioned, amounted to 43 killed and 58 wounded. The British casualties were over 800 killed and wounded. At Majuba the Boers had one man killed and five men wounded.
Battles of the Boer War
The Boers of the Transvaal are descended from the settlers brought to the Cape by the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth century. In 1814 the King of the Netherlands finally ceded the colony to Great Britain. The Boers had been intolerant of the stern rule of the masters of their own nationality, and they chafed not less under the milder dominion of the later English government. The truth was, and still is, that the Boers from the first have disliked all government, especially when it clashed with their ideas regarding their rights over the natives. A disturbance which occurred in 1815 led to the “great trek,” as the emigration of the Boers from Cape Colony was called-a movement which resulted in their settlement in the Transvaal and in the territory now unknown as the Orange Free State. Up to 1852 the British government theoretically extended up to the twenty-fifth degree of latitude. But no attempt was made to enforce this claim, and in the end even the shadow of suzerainty was renounced when, on 17th January 1852, the Sand River Convention was entered into between the British Government and the delegates of the Transvaal Boers, by which Great Britain formally renounced all rights over the country north of the Vaal river. Originally there were four republics in the Transvaal, but in 1860 they were united into one under the title of the “south African Republic,” which is now its official designation.
The South African Republic did not prosper. From the first it was impecunious, and within a decade after its establishment it was practically insolvent. The discovery, in 1867, of diamonds and of gold brought into the country a rush of strangers, whose energy and enterprise might have altered the condition of the Transvaal but for the lethargy and obstinate isolation of the Boer population. Burgers, the last President before the annexation, was a man of vigour and talent, but the stolid and ignorant Boers declined to be welded by him into a nation. In a war upon which they entered with Sekukuni, a powerful native chief, their poltroonery was flagrant. The fighting was done for them by the warlike native tribe of Amaswazis, who were so disgusted with the cowardice of their white allies that they left them in dudgeon. When the Boers had to do their own work their hearts failed them, and they fled ignominiously. Burgers, with tears, strove to rally them, but in vain, and he begged them to shoot him rather than disgrace him. But they shrugged their shoulders, and more than two thirds of them “trekked” home, leaving him hemmed in and powerless.
The republic was encircled by native enemies all round the Transvaal borders, all waiting for the impending onslaught by Cetewayo, the Zulu king, the master of a formidable army which lay on the frontier ready to strike, and restrained from immediate hostilities against the Boers-who had provoked him by many encroachments-only by his fear of the English and the personal influence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Native Secretary of Natal. On the northeast the Amaswazis brooded in sullen discontent; northward, within and beyond the frontier, anarchy raged; and in the west the Bekhuanas were waiting for their opportunity. Financially the republic was hopelessly insolvent. The Boers set their faces against taxation. It is a notorious fact that when the Shepstone annexed the Transvaal there was found in the public treasury only twelve shillings and six pence, part of which was base coin. Clearly a crisis was impending which threatened to involve South Africa in great peril. The annexation was no sudden act. The Blue books contain remonstrance on remonstrance addressed by British officials to the Transvaal authorities. At length Carnarvon’s forbearance was exhausted. Shepstone was sent for to England, and received a commission of date 5th October 1876, directing him, should the emergency render such a course necessary, to annex the Transvaal to her Majesty’s dominions. Shepstone escorted by twenty-five mounted policemen and a few officials, reached Pretoria in February 1877. It was an open secret that he was empowered to annex the country if he deemed it advisable, but he expressed his readiness to refrain from that step if certain reforms were carried out. The Boers would have no reforms, and on April 12th 1877, Shepstone issued a proclamation formally annexing the Transvaal to Great Britain. For some time the Boers remained sullenly quiet. A few of them rendered good and loyal service with Sir Evelyn Wood during the Zulu War, but the main body stood aloof. Sir Owen Lanyon succeeded Shepstone as Administrator of the Transvaal, and from the first was unpopular with the Boers. At the close of the Zulu war Sir Garnet Wolseley, who held the position of High Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa, came up into the Transvaal with a considerable strength of regular and irregular troops. During his stay no actual emeute occurred, but there were ominous demonstrations, which would probably have come to a head but for the presence of the troops. The Boer discontent was enhanced by the positive intimation from the Colonial Secretary that “under no circumstances whatever would the Transvaal independence be restored to the Boers,” and by Sir Garnet’s less prosaic but equally resolute utterance, that “so long as the sun shone and the Vaal River flowed to the sea the Transvaal would remain British territory.” He finally left the Transvaal in March 1880, and the troops in that territory were gradually reduced until in November of the same year they consisted of but thirteen companies of infantry, two troops of mounted infantry, and four guns, distributed in detachments in some half-dozen garrisons scattered over the country.
Throughout the land there was a deceptive peace, which lulled Lanyon into a sense of security, and to some extent deceived Wolseley. The Boers were playing the waiting game. Mr. Gladstone became Premier in March 1880. Taking it for granted that he would act on the lines of his speeches when in Opposition, the Boer leaders called on him to rescind the annexation. The answer of the Government came in the curt telegram; “Under no circumstances can the Queen’s authority in the Transvaal be relinquished.” There was consternation among the Boers; the British inhabitants, trusting implicitly in an assurance so specific, rejoiced greatly and bought land without hesitation. In the matter of taxation the Boers had always presented a passive resistance against the British rule, but Lanyon’s officials considered that they might now crush the resistance by active measures. A Boer named Bezuidenhuit was levied on, and in default of payment a seizure was made. Bezuidenhuit and his friends forcibly recovered the article seized, and an attempt to arrest him was thwarted by a gathering of Boers. At a mass meeting on the 13th of December 1880, it was decided that the South African Republic should be restored; it was resolved to fight for independence, and a triumvirate consisting of Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius was appointed to administer the Government. On the 16th the republic was proclaimed at Heidelberg, which became the headquarters of the new Government. A large body of Boers took possession of that place, another went to Potchefstrom, and a third “commando” was detailed to another service presently to be described.
Lanyon was powerless to interface, and he and the English in Pretoria had to await events, pending the expected arrival of the detachment of the 94th Regiment, which had been ordered up from Lydenburg, whence it was known to have moved on December 5th. This ill-fated body was destined never to reach Pretoria. On the march Colonel Anstruther had frequent warnings of danger, to which he paid insufficient heed; there prevailed in the force the rooted belief that the Boers did not intend serious mischief. It was scarcely to be expected that the men who had pusillanimously recoiled from before Sekukuni’s spear armed natives would venture to assail a body of British regular infantry. But long before the end of this miserable war the valour and constancy of the Boers, not less than their moderation and humanity, had come to be acknowledged and admired. In this, their first conflict with the “red soldiers,” their unerring marksmanship was the chief surprise.
The scouting duties of Colonel Anstruther’s detachment were performed with carelessness; else, whatever might have been its fate, it would not have been taken by surprise. About noon on December 20th the little column, marching at ease, was approaching Bronkhorst Spruit. The ground traversed by the road was sparsely wooded, sloping down from either side. Military precautions were neglected, and the convoy stretched to an interminable length. The band at the head of the column abruptly stopped playing when about 150 armed mounted Boers suddenly became visibly in skirmishing formation on a rise on the left of the road, at a distance of a few hundred yards. Colonel Anstruther immediately galloped back, and ordered the leading wagon to halt and the others to close up. A Boer advanced midway with a flag of truce, and was met by Colonel Anstruther, to whom he handed a letter written in English. Its terms were at once quaint and peremptory. “We don’t know,” it ran, “ whether we are in state of war or not, consequently we cant allow any movements of troops from your side, and wish you to stop where you are. We not being at war with the Queen nor with the people of England, but are only recovering the independence of our country, we do not wish to take to arms, and therefore inform you that any movements of troops from your side will be taken by us as a declaration of war.”
The messenger was to take back an answer, which had to be given within five minutes. Anstruther read the letter and tersely replied: “I go to Pretoria; do as you like.” The messenger departed, and the colonel, hurrying back towards his men, ordered them to skirmish. But it was too late. The Boers had closed in upon the rear and flanks of the column and opened fire at point-blank range. Their fire was deadly, every shot told; that of the troops was scattered and ineffective. In ten minutes, out of a total of 259, there had been killed or wounded 155 officers and men. Colonel Anstruther, he riddled with bullets, then ordered the “Cease fire,” and intimated the surrender of the remains of his force. The Boers then closed in, ordered all arms to be laid down, and formed a cordon round the scene of the slaughter. When the fighting was over, Boers and soldiers became very friendly. The Boer commander, Joubert, came forward and shook hands with Colonel Anstruther, expressing regret that he should be among the wounded. A hospital camp was pitched close by, and leave was given for the retention of the wagons containing baggage, provisions, and hospital equipment, tents for the wounded, and some uninjured men as hospital nurses; the remaining unwounded prisoners with the rest of the wagons were removed to Heidelberg. Two men were permitted to carry the tidings of the disaster to Pretoria, whence without hindrance surgeons, hospital orderlies, and ambulance were sent out to Bronkhorst Spruit. The Boers showed themselves most obliging, and were extremely solicitous for the comfort o the wounded in camp, bringing in milk, butter, eggs, bread, and fruit gratuitously. The statements regarding the Boer losses I the short fight was curiously conflicting. The Boers affirmed that they amounted only to two killed and five wounded.
When Sir Garnet Wolseley went home he had been succeeded, in July, as High Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa, by Colonel (afterwards Major-General) Sir George Pomeroy Colley, an officer of high character. Tidings of the outbreak in the Transvaal reached him at Pieter Maritzburg on 19th December, and were in possession of the Colonial Office in London on the following day. Reinforcements from India were promptly ordered to Natal, and further instalments of troops were sent out from England as early as possible. Considering the weakness of the forces at Colley’s immediate disposition, he would have been wise to wait until he had been reinforced; but he had a great contempt for the Boers, and was eager to distinguish himself before officers of higher rank should supersede him. He was warned by Colonel Bellairs (in military command of the Transvaal) that there were “from 6,000 to 7,000 rebels in the field, who under good leadership, would exhibit courage, discipline, and organisation.” Colley hurried up towards the Transvaal frontier the few companies of infantry, which he had in Natal. The arrival of some drafts was very opportune-a naval brigade was landed and sent up, as also a squadron of dragoons and mounted infantry under the command of Major Brownlow, and the Natal Mounted Police. Colley had early intimated his intention to enter the Transvaal about the 20th January 1881, with a column consisting of eight companies of infantry, four guns, and a mounted squadron-a miserably inadequate force. So far from accomplishing this anticipation, he was able only to quit Newcastle (a border town of Natal) on January 24th with about 60 officers and 1,200 men. This little force was styled the “relief column,” as it was intended to raise the siege of the Transvaal towns in which were scanty British garrisons beleaguered by the Boers. Apart from Pretoria, the besieged capital of the Transvaal, there were six of those places-Potchefstrom, Rustenburg, Marabastadt, Lydenburg, Standerton, and Wakkerstrom, all of which held our gallantly until the restoration of peace.
Before advancing from Newcastle, Colley sent an ultimatum to the Boers, ordering them, as insurgents, to disperse. They replied, declaring that all they wanted was the rescinding of the annexation and the restoration of the South African Republic under the Protectorate of the Queen. On the 26th the British force entrenched itself on an elevated position at Mount Prospect, about twenty miles north of Newcastle, in the mountainous region forming the northern projection of Natal. The camp was about a mile right of the road from Newcastle to Standerton, which crossed the ridge known as Lang’s Nek- about three and a half miles further northward. In the vicinity of Lang’s Nek a considerable number of Boers were seen. On the morning of the 28th, Colley moved out with a strength, all told, of about 1,160 men consisting of five companies of the 58th, under major Hingeston, and 150 mounted men under Major Brownlow, the whole commanded by Colonel Deane; five companies of the 3rd battalion 60th Regiment, under Colonel Ashburnham; 75 men of the Naval Brigade, four guns under Captain Green, R.A., and details. The pass over Lang’s Nek crosses the ridge about the centre of a rough semi-circle, on the west of which is the Majuba mountain; on the east is a long spur surmounted by a rocky crest. In front of the proper left of this spur, several hundred yards to the front, is an isolated conical hill. The ground in the bottom of the enclosed basin is low, with a gradual rise towards the face of the spur, something in the nature of a glacis. About nine o’clock the British force, having moved up along a ridge out of shot, formed into position on a rise in the bottom, with the mounted squadron and the 58th on the right, the guns in the centre, and the 60th and naval brigade on the left, the whole facing toward the spur.
The action was begun by shelling parts of the enemy’s positions, and by pushing forward a company of the 60th and the Naval Brigade, with their rockets, which took some effect on the Boer reserves in rear of the Nek. At ten o’clock the 58th advanced to the attack of the spur, covered on its right by artillery fire and by Brownlow’s squadron. The leading troop of mounted men swept with fine dash up the isolated hill, and then charged. The hilltop was held by a Boer piquet of considerable strength. Brownlow shot the Boer leader with his revolver, but his horse was shot from under him; Lieutenant Lermitte and Sergeant-Major Lunny were killed; the supporting troop was checked-the leading troop, fatigued and broken by the charge, and with its leaders all down, could make no head, and the whole squadron gave way. It was no proper ground for cavalry, and the horsemen should have acted as mounted infantry. Meantime, the 58th had begun climbing the steep ascent through the long entangling grass, which retarded the men’s progress. The Boer piquet from the hill, having repulsed Brownlow’s squadron, moved down and opened fire on the now exposed right flank and rear of the 58th, while the Boers on the spur gathered on its brow and maintained a deadly fire from behind cover. Anxious to get to close quarters out of this purgatory, Colonel Deane gave the order to charge. The officers led nobly, and the men struggled on through the hall of fire. Colonel Deane’s horse was shot, but he dashed forward on foot until riddled with bullets ten yards in front of his foremost man. Major Poole and Lieutenants Inman and Elwes were killed in supporting Colonel Deane; Major Hingeston and all the mounted officers of the 58th, were shot down or dismounted. The stubborn soldiers of those gallant regiment-youngsters as they were of them continued to hold their ground unflinchingly for some time, notwithstanding the bitter fire. Lieutenant Baillie, carrying the regimental colour, was mortally wounded, and when his comrade Hill went to his assistance, the brave young officer said with his last breath, “Never mind me; save the colour!” Hill, who had been carrying the Queen’s colour, took the other also; when he went down, Sergeant Budstock took both colours, and carried them until the general retirement, which soon had to occur. “The 58th,” wrote Colley, “having fallen back leisurely without haste or confusion, reformed at the foot of the slope, and marched back into position in as good order, and with as erect and soldierly a bearing, as when it marched out.”
Spite of much British bravery, the combat of Lang’s Nek was an unquestionable and severe defeat. But many noble deeds were performed. Lieutenant Hill (already named) brought wounded man after man out of action, and worthily earned the V.C. Trooper Doogen saved the life of Major Brownlow; Private Godfrey and Band boy Martin remained with Major Hingeston and Captain Lovegrove when those officers lay wounded, enduring heavy fire in doing so. The great brunt of the losses fell on the 58th. The casualties altogether amounted to 198, of which 173 belonged to that regiment, which had to bury 75 officers and men out of a total strength of 494. Lang’s Nek caused the Boers exceptionally heavy loss. Their total casualties from beginning to end of the war were but 101, of which Lang’s Nek accounted for 41-14 killed and 27 wounded. The Boers behaved with humanity. The moment that the “Cease fire” sounded they gave permission to the English surgeons to attend the wounded lying in front of the Boer position, fetched water to them, and assisted in binding up their wounds.
The folly of the forward position prematurely taken up by General Colley with an inadequate force was made apparent by the result of the battle of Lang’s Nek. The comparative handful of men in Mount Prospect camp could no longer be regarded by any stretch of imagination as a “relief column.” That repulse had taught the Boers their ability to arrest the further advance of the British force, and enabled them to turn their attention to the interception of its line of communication. The Boers, in effect, were masters of the situation. Their patrols penetrated nearly to Ladysmith, and threatened Newcastle from the Drakensberg and Utrecht districts. Convoys were cut off, captured, and destroyed; the mail service was arrested, and except for the telegraph service, which remained un-interfered with, the Mount Prospect camp was all but entirely isolated. An escort of mounted infantry sent out on February 7th to attempt to reach Newcastle with mails, was driven back to the camp by the fire of the Boers. Colley then determined to make a more formidable effort next day to open up communications with Newcastle, and to clear the Boers from the road. On the morning of the 8th he left camp with five companies of the 60th Rifles under Colonel Ashburnham, two field and two mountain guns under Captain Greer, R.A., and a small detachment of mounted men under Major Brownlow. About five miles south of the Mount Prospect position the Newcastle road is crossed by the Ingogo river, which runs from west to east through a valley. The ground north of the river is broken and rugged; from the south bank there is a gentle rise to the foot of a flat-topped ridge strewn with rocks and boulders, and irregularly cut by rocky depressions.
The general leaving the two mountain guns and a company of infantry on a commanding crest north of the river crossed it with the main body, which he formed on the plain beyond, and then moved it forward to the fort of the ridge bounding the valley to the southward. As the troops were ascending the rise to the ridge the Boers showed themselves in considerable strength, and they at once galloped forward to dispute the ridge, and to take advantage of the cover afforded by the intersecting valleys. Greer brought his two guns into action, but the Boers had already taken cover, from which they directed a heavy and active fire on the guns and skirmishers. Greer was killed early, and the command of the guns developed on Lieutenant Parsons. The engagement became heavy and general about noon, when the companies of the 60th were pushed forward against the enemy, whose fire from behind cover was very deadly. The guns had to be freely exposed, and were in action with case shot at a range of less than 500 yards. The gunners suffered very heavily, and a company of the 60th, which most gallantly advanced to cover the guns, and met the Boer fire at close range, had many casualties from the steady and accurate fire of the enemies enjoying almost perfect cover. So severe was the fire of the Boers that the guns had soon to be withdrawn from their exposed position, and during the rest of the affair fired only occasionally. It was apparent that the enemy were being gradually reinforced, and the general sent orders to camp for three companies of the 58th to move out and occupy the ridges north of the river, and for a part, if practicable, to cross the Ingogo in support of the troops already deeply engaged and reduced by severe losses.
About three o’clock there was a comparative lull, although the Boers maintained a very accurate fire, anyone on the British side being almost certainly struck if at all exposing him. Later in the afternoon the Boers received considerable reinforcements, and Lieutenant Parsons, wounded as he was, reopened with his guns for a short time; but darkness presently set in, and the Boers gradually withdrew to their camp. It was Colley’s conviction that the enemy intended renewing the engagement next morning in overwhelming strength, and he acted wisely in deciding to withdraw to camp under cover of darkness. It was a gruesome night. Torrents of rain were falling, and the darkness was intense, except when the lightning flashes broke the blackness of the cold and dismal night. The ambulances sent out during the fight had not been able to reach the actual scene of action, since the Boers had threatened to fire on them if they advanced while the engagement was going on. They were not now available in the darkness; and the wounded, which in many instances it had been impossible to remove from the advanced positions, had to be searched for. Those who were found were collected and sheltered for the night as well as possible with waterproof sheets, blankets, great-coats, etc.; but many lay as they had fallen throughout the long, inclement night. The guns were horsed, although insufficiently, by collecting all the available animals, and by withdrawing the team from the ammunition wagon, which had to be abandoned. When all arrangements had been completed, the force moved off in silence, formed in Hollow Square, the guns in the centre, the infantry in skirmishing order on the four sides. The river, swollen by the rain, was deep and rapid; and some of the first men trying to cross were swept down, but found foothold on a sandbank. The main body crossed in detachments with locked arms. The camp was reached about 4 a.m. on the 9th. The soldiers had dragged the guns up the hill, the horses being unable to pull them up the steep and slippery road. The 58th companies spent the night on the northern ridges, and were not withdrawn until the following day.
The casualties had been heavy. Among the slain were Captain MacGregor, R.E., General Colley’s assistant military secretary; Captain Greer, R.A.; Lieutenant Garrett and O’Connell; and Mr. Stuart, a Natal resident magistrate. A most promising officer, Lieutenant Wilkinson of the 60th, was drowned while crossing the Ingogo, when returning to the field with assistance for the wounded, after having distinguished himself throughout the engagement by his coolness and gallantry. The total loss of this unfortunate day amounted to 139 officers and men. According to the statement of the Boers, the Ingogo fight cost them eight killed and six wounded. The Boers returned to the scene of action on the morning of the 9th, expecting to renew the engagement. They took away two gun limbers and the ammunition wagon abandoned overnight by Colley’s people, and then fell back behind Newcastle to join their main force, reported as threatening to prevent the advance of the reinforcements recently arrived from India. Their disappearance gave opportunity to succour the wounded and bury the dead without molestation, and opened the road from Mount Prospect to Newcastle, to the hospital at which latter place were promptly sent the wounded from the British camp. The communications in rear of Mount Prospect remained open from this time forward.
Sir George Colley had sustained a second reverse, proportionately more bloody than had been the first. By this time, one would imagine, it might have begun to dawn on the home authorities that Colley, to say the least, was not a successful commander. His experience of actual warfare was but slender; he had served only in the China war of 1860 and in the Ashantee campaign. He was comparatively new to South Africa, and was quite unfamiliar with the Boer nature. Yet the authorities had assigned to him as second in command an officer senior to him in army rank, who had fought with distinction through the Crimean and Indian Mutiny wars, and in the Ashantee and Zululand campaigns, in high and successful commands. Brigadier-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., was the only officer in the latter campaign under which Boers served and died-served with a loyal devotion, died gallantly under his eye. He knew the strange, simple, yet stubborn nature of the Boers; he was ready to fight with them, and equally ready to argue them out of a folly. Wood and Colley were old and fast friends; Wood was quite content to serve under his junior, and had hurried out to India with a number of “Special service” officers. He reached Durban on February 12th, four days after the Ingogo reverse, Sir G. Colley’s account of which was in London on the 10th, and notwithstanding the unwarrantable optimism of its tone, must have been read between the lines in Pall Mall. Then would have been the time to avert further futile waste of brave soldiers by instructing by telegraph Colley and Wood to exchange their relative positions. The arrangement would have been perfectly regular, and Colley was the sort of man who would loyally have accepted the secondary position.
Picking up on his rapid journey the Indian column from its camp on the Biggarsberg, Wood and it (consisting of the 15th Hussars, the 2nd battalion 60th Rifles, and the 92nd Highlanders) reached Newcastle on the 17th. Colley men him there, and it was resolved between the two officers that no further advance should be attempted until more reinforcements, now on the way up, should arrive. They parted on the 21st, Colley moving the Indian column up to Mount Prospect without molestation; Wood returning to Pieter Maritzburg to press on the advance of further reinforcements.
Sir George Colley’s motive in making the fatal advance on the Majuba mountaintop, whatever it might have been, died with him. His assurance had been given to Wood that no further advance should be attempted pending the arrival of further reinforcements. He had engaged with the Boer Vice-President in negotiations, which promised favourable results. A reconnaissance in force to the summit of the mountain could give no more information than a mere patrol could easily ascertain-the position of the Boer laagers and an approximate estimate of the force occupying them. A Boer piquet occasionally held the hilltop during the day, and Colley resolved to occupy it by making a night march. At ten o’clock on the night of February 26th he left the Mount Prospect camp with a force of 22 officers and 627 men-a smaller force than he had employed at Lang’s Nek. At the start its composition and order were as follows: - Two companies 58th, the Naval Brigade, three companies 92nd, followed by some details; two companies of the 2nd 60th moved out later to the piquet post close to the foot of Inquela hill, with instructions to occupy its summit with some detachments. Further on, upon the narrow Nek between the Inquela and the Majuba, Captain Robertson’s company of the 92nd was dropped as a link, with orders to entrench itself. The Nek traversed, the troops, guided by friendly Kaffirs, had now to undertake in single file the actual climb up the steep and rugged side of the Majuba, whose top is 6,200 feet above sea level and more than 2,000 feet above the positions of the Boer laagers. From time to time during the tedious and toilsome ascent, a halt was made to enable the men-heavy laden with rations and extra cartridges-to regains their breath. As the troops neared the summit the obstacles increased. The steep grassy slopes were succeeded by great boulders and deep dongas, varied by sharp crags and treacherous loose stones, over and up which the wearied and burdened men had to drag themselves. Near the top the ascent had to be accomplished on hands and knees. Between four and five in the morning of the 27th the force, much exhausted after the heavy toil, and now only about 400 strong, gained the summit.
Like most of the mountains of South Africa, no peak crowns the Majuba. Its top is a plateau of saucer like shape, dipping towards the centre, across which is a rocky reef about breast high. The circumference of the plateau is about 1,200 yards. When the summit was reached it was still dark, and the troops having got mixed during the scramble up, and being weary, lay down where they stood until dawn. With daylight they were extended round the edge of the plateau, with a small reserve in the central hollow. No instructions were given to entrench, and, indeed, the troops had no tools for such a purpose; but the men of their own accord attempted to obtain some cover by throwing up defences of turf and stones. Here and there the soldiers showed on the skyline, and a few shots were fired, which for a moment caused great consternation in the Boer camps in the lower ground northwest of the Majuba. Seeing that the mountain was in British occupation, the expectation was natural that an attack would presently be made on their positions on the Nek, in which case they would find themselves between two fires. Their first idea, it seems, was to flight. The oxen were in spanned, and hurried preparations were made for retreat. But when it became evident that the troops on the summit were in no great strength and had neither cannon nor rockets, and that their Nek position was unmolested, the courage of the Boers revived. Smijt, the fighting general, made a short stirring speech, and at his summons a number of the younger men began to climb the mountain side under cover of the stones and scrub. Joubert, the commanding general, detailed a force of the older men in support of the storming party-picked shots who remained below watching the edge of the plateau, and firing at every soldier who exposed himself. As the morning passed Boer detachments attacked and hemmed in the British position on the north, the east, and the southwest. The defenders were not in sufficient strength to hold the whole of the edge of the plateau, and detachments had to be moved hither and thither to meet and attempt to thwart the advances of the Boers. Slowly and steadily the hostile skirmishers clambered upwards from cover to cover, while the supports below protected their movement with a steady and accurate fire. During the hours from dawn to noon our men had not suffered very heavily, notwithstanding the Boer marksmanship. The first officer to fall was Commander Romilly, of the Naval Brigade, while reconnoitring with General Colley. But the long strain of the Boers close shooting began to tell on the morale of the British soldiers, and when the Boers at length reached the crest and opened a deadly fire at short range the officers had to exert themselves to the utmost in the effort to avert disaster. The reserves stationed in the central dip of the plateau, out of reach until then of the enemy’s fire, were ordered up in support of the fighting line. Their want of promptitude in obeying this order did not augur well, and soon after reaching the front they wavered, and then gave way. The officers did temporarily succeed in rallying them, but the “bolt” had a bad effect. To use the expression of an eyewitness, “funk became established.”
It was struggled against very gallantly by the officers, who, sword and revolver in hand, encouraged the soldiers by word and by action. A number of men, unable to confront the deadly fire of the Boers, had huddled for cover behind the rocky reef crossing the plateau, and no entreaty or upbraiding on the part of their officers would induce them to face the enemy. What then happened one does not care to tell in detail. Everything connected with this disastrous enterprise went to naught, as if there had been a curse on it. Whatever may have been the object intended, the force employed was absurdly inadequate. Instead of being homogeneous, it consisted of separate detachments with no link or bond of union-a disposition that notoriously has led to more panics than any other cause that the annals of regimental history can furnish. Fragments of proud and distinguished regiments fresh from victory in another continent shared in the panic of the Majuba, seasoned warriors behaving no better than mere recruits. To the calm-pulsed philosopher a panic is an academic enigma. No man who has seen it-much less shared in it-can ever forgets the infectious madness of panic stricken soldiers.
In the sad ending, with a cry of fright and despair the remnants of the hapless force turned and fled, regardless of the efforts of the officers to stem the rearward rush. Sir George Colley laid dead shot through the head just before the final flight. A surgeon and two hospital attendants caring for the wounded at the bandaging place in the dip of the plateau were shot down, probably inadvertently. The elder Boers promptly stopped the firing in that direction. But there was no cessation of the fire directed on the fugitives. On them the bullets rained accurately and persistently. The Boer, now disdaining cover, stood boldly on the edge of the plateau, and firing down upon the scared troops, picked off the men as if shooting game. The slaughter would have been yet heavier but for the entrenchment which the company of the 92nd, left overnight on the Nek between the Inquela and the Majuba, had made. A company of the 60th, under Captain Thurlow, joined Captain Robertson at dawn from camp. Later there arrived at the entrenchment on the Nek a troop of the 15th Hussars, under the command of Captain Sullivan. After midday the sound of the firing on the Majuba rapidly increased, and men were seen running down the hill towards the laager, one of whom brought in the tidings that the Boers had captured the position, that most of the troops were killed or prisoners, and that the general was dead with a bullet through his head.
Wounded men presently came pouring in, and were attended by Surgeon-Major Cornish. The laager was manned by the two companies, and outposts were thrown out, which were soon driven in by large bodies of mounted Boers, under whose fire men fell fast. Robertson despatched the rifle company down the ravine towards the camp, and a little later followed with the company of the 92nd under a murderous fire from the Boers, who had reached and occupied the entrenchment. The Highlanders lost heavily in the retreat, and Surgeon-Major Cornish was killed. The surviving fugitives from Majuba and from the laager finally reached camp under cover of the artillery fire from it, which ultimately stopped the pursuit. With the son sent of the Boer leaders a temporary hospital was established at a farmhouse near the foot of the mountain, and throughout the cold and wet night the medical staff never ceased to search for and bring in the wounded. Sir George Colley’s body was brought into camp on March 1st, and buried there with full military honours. The other dead of the Majuba fight rest in a cemetery on the plateau of the mountain summit-victims of a strange and almost incredible folly.
Of the 650 officers and men who were in action on this disastrous day 90 were killed, 133 were wounded, 58 were prisoners, and two were missing, the total casualties being 283, the great majority of which occurred in the 92nd, whose losses were 125; in the 58th, with a loss of 93; and in the Naval Brigade, which lost 36-more than half of its strength.
Sir Evelyn Wood reached Newcastle on March 4th, and assumed command. On the 6th he met the Boer leaders, when an armistice to last for eight days was agreed upon. The British garrison in the Transvaal were revictualled for twelve days, pending the raising of their siege on the consummation of peace; and Sir Evelyn Wood acknowledged the right of the Transvaal people to complete self-government subject to the suzerainty of the Queen. Terms of peace were signed on March 23rd; and next day General Sir Frederick Roberts, who had been sent out with large reinforcements to succeed Sir George Colley, reached Cape Town, but learning of peace being signed, immediately sailed home.
The total number of Transvaal Boers capable of carrying arms was under 8,000 at the beginning of hostilities. The total British force in South Africa, or on the way thither, at the close of hostilities consisted of thirteen infantry regiments, five cavalry regiments, twenty-two guns, three naval brigades-in all, not far short of 20,000 men. This total was exclusive of the British garrisons besieged in the Transvaal during the war. The Boer casualties throughout the war, as already mentioned, amounted to 43 killed and 58 wounded. The British casualties were over 800 killed and wounded. At Majuba the Boers had one man killed and five men wounded.