Tsarevitch

[Stan.J]

The Russian Battleship "Tsarevitch" was Rear-Admiral Vitgefts flagship in the Russian breakout from Port arthur to Vladivostok during the Russo-Japanese war. At 18.37 hours. Admiral Togo`s main battle squadron hit "Tsarevitch" with a salvo of 12" shells which wrecked the bridge and conning tower, killing the Rear-Admiral himself. The ship1s rudder was jammed to starboard, causing the warship to veer out of the Russian battle line. She managed to make one of the neutral Chinese ports and was interned. August 1904.

The blunders which occured during this war and made by the Russians were so stupid that, when looking back , they could only make folk laugh. If anyone has the book by Geoffrey Regan, "The book of naval blunders" and read "The voyage of the damned" you will see what I mean.

[astraltrader]

I have often thought that a certain amount of the great praise awarded to the Japanese for their historic victory in the Russo-Japanese war was down to the incompetence of the Russians as much as to the brilliance of Admiral Togo...

[Dmitry Antonov]

You may also call it VERY BAD luck... But incompetence of commanding officers, corruption among the authorities and degradation of society as a whole were so deep and vast, that Russia exploded in revolution in 1905. However, there are some great and free plans of several Russian battleships of the period:
http://www.navarin.ru/page_info.php/pages_id/1
Go to the middle of the page to a serie of links with tags (1:100) .
Best regards,
Dmitry Antonov

[MMM]

But there were also events of outstanding competence and spirit of enterprise:
having no dock capable to take torpedoed battleships Tsarevitch and Retvisan
(two best units of Port Arthur squadron torpedoed during Japanese Torpedo Boats' initial attack in the night of 27th january (10th february) 1904)they were able to repair these ships in about 2 months each.

They constructed wooden (!!!) caisson of diameter 12,5 x 10 m to cover the holes of about 15 m2 (3 to 4 meters below water level), with hul structure deformed on about 35 m2 !

They had to overcome many problems ranging from how to seal the surface of hull-caisson junction and how to sink wooden caisson along ship board to
how to make new elements using what was available in permanent lack of steel etc.
It should be also remembered everything were done under Japanese fire.

Engineer Kotelnikov (head of repair team) used later that caisson also to
repair mined battleship Pobyeda.

A big piece of good old fasionned engineering indeed!

Regards Miro

PS. 3 pics of Tsarevitch before war (in white livery), during the war in olivegreen and during repair. Al 3 pics from www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru

[Antoine]

Hello, gentlemen!

Two corrections if you please: this Russian battleship is named "Tsesarevich" and the surname of the engineer is Kuteinikov.

With best wishes,
Antoine.

[John Odom]

I sent the post voyage of the dammed from this forum to a friend of mine in Japan who retired from teaching Japanese history. He had always extoled the battler of Tsuchima as Japans; entry as a world power. He said "Perhaps it was not too hard for Admiral Togo to defeat them."

[MMM]

And the same can be said after every easy won battle;)
With no offence: Have you ever asked your frend about First Savo battle or Tassafaronga battle?:):) He would probably say the same.
In 1904-1905 they had tought the bitter lesson to stale regime and later they did the same to "Leading" Democratic and technologically far more developped countries:D:D:D:D

[designeraccd]

The IJN certainly did give a bloody PASTING to USN and Allied Navies for @ 6 months +, but then USN started LEARNING and with increasing #s of ships coming into the fleet, radar and overall better tactics and planning: GOODBYE IJN...eventually. Of course setting the whole iondustrial might of the U.S. (gee...we had that...then...) on a war footing certainly was required, too.


AND, IMhO...as we did NOT have CNN back then we did have a FIGHTING chance unlike the 24/7 bad news is the only news of today........... DFO ;)

[MMM]

this learning took place very slowly considering later Kolombangara and Kula events.:D:D:D:D
Maybe Russians just had too little time to learn a thing?

In 1904-1945 at least two techologically equally partners took part but in 1941 and on....... should be much easier matter. But did not;););) Dont you think?

[designeraccd]

Based on my reading of history, BOTH sides were very capable of making mistakes, bad decisions. FORTUNATELY the Axis Powers made EVEN MORE!!!
DFO :eek::D

[barracuda]

For interest, here's a photo of the Tsarevitch underway in Portsmouth Harbour.

Peter Thomas

[astraltrader]

Agreat picture Barracuda - thank you for uploading it.

[Alex Shenec]

Hi.

"Tsesarevich" in Portlend.


Best regards
Alex

[designeraccd]

This French built Czarist pre-dreadnought was, from what I've read, far superior to her "half sisters" built in Russia...the Borodinos. DFO :eek:


from a web site:

The conditions of their construction set the fleet up for a fiasco. The Russian Marine Ministry had purchased rights to construct more vessels on the Tsesarevich plan, but with war against Japan already likely, they initiated crash construction in 1899, before the Tsesarevich was even launched. Since all the detailed drawings were all in Brest, only sketchy plans were available to the 3 Russian yards, each of which drew up its own interpretation. These plans were approved without much technical scrutiny. The order of the day was to rush forward as war with Japan was impending; and then as now, defense spending was politically popular, 5 battleships being a huge order for the Russian shipyards. Stern frames were ordered from the Skoda Works in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Krupp-cemented armor plate from Bethlehem Steel in the U.S. The Russian yards' equipment and techniques were far cruder than those available in France; their forgings and particularly their turrets came out dramatically heavier as a result. Practically every day as construction proceeded, the excess topweight increased; to remedy this, the Russian engineers deducted weight by thinning the ships' armor and reducing the area covered by the armor belt. Where the Tsesarevich was built with a 9.84" (250mm) armor belt, the maximum protection on the Borodinos was 5" to 7.64" (125-194mm), and many areas protected in the French original were plain 1/4" steel plate on the Russian copies. When the ships actually went into battle, the consequences of this inattention to hull protection were frightful.


Also, 2 views of the original.......

[Don Boyer]

One of the most overlooked results of the Russo-Japanese war was not so much the Russian incompetence displayed during the war which resulted in resounding Japanese victories, but in the Japanese reaction to the war. Tsushima in particular demonstrated to the Japanese that "one decisive battle" could win a war. Even though that was not exactly the case with Tsushima, it was still the major principle the Japanese took with them from the war and war-gamed at Eta Jima and the War College over and over.

A reading of "Kaigun" by Evans and Peattie shows the extent this principle permeated Japanese naval thinking, down to designing warships whose purpose was to fill some little niche in the "decisive battle scenarios" they developed with the United States as the predicted enemy. Over-specialization resulted in fewer ships in various type categories than they could have had otherwise, and proved useless in attrition warfare for the most part. Although there were innovative thinkers in the Japanese navy from 1906 - 1941, few other than Yamamoto exerted enough influence to modify in any way the principle of decisive battle that permeated Japan's navy, and even he was not the forward thinker many post war have made him out to be. The senior leaders up to and including those in charge all through WWII still believed in the concept, and in the eventual superiority of the battleship in a line of battle scenario. In fact it seemed that they could not come up with any other kind of battle strategy until the point was reached where no strategy was going to work anyway.

They clung to this concept no matter what evidence to the contrary was being provided by a well-equipped dedicated enemy engaging in a war of attrition; all through the war it was the same. Pearl Harbor and Midway were to be decisive battles removing the American fleet from the scene while Japan conquered her empire of resources in the south. Didn't work out that way. Guadalcanal was to be the decisive point at which the American navy would drown in the superior battle tactics of the Japanese. It was a bloody draw as far as ships on the bottom were concerned, but a total victory for attrition warfare and the US Navy.

From then on out, every battle had some Admiral sending out a message stating that "fate of the Empire" rested on the next battle and "every sailor is expected to do his utmost" -- all paraphrasing Togo's famous missive before Tsushima (itself a paraphrase of Nelson, whom Togo admired). And in each case -- failure.

I feel that the Japanese inability to be really strategic thinkers before WWII was a huge contribution in allowing the US Navy to hang in there with what they had long enough to bring the Japanese to a dead halt. It also prevented the Japanese from consolidating their gains in a manner that would guarantee no penetration of the limits of Empire. One example: Japan was desperate for oil, yet did not or could not expend the energy to develop a nautical "pipeline" of tankers roaring back and forth between Borneo and Japan to fill those huge bunkers at Yokusuka and Sasebo and Kure and keep them filled. Destroyer were to be used for decisive battle, not chasing submarines or protecting the lines of merchant traffic. The list of strategic failures in naval thinking and planning are endless.

The Russians bumbled the war with Japan. Japan bumbled the lessons to be drawn from that war, contributing mightily to their defeat in World War II.

[Don Boyer]

As to MMM's comment: "With no offence: Have you ever asked your frend about First Savo battle or Tassafaronga battle? He would probably say the same. In 1904-1905 they had tought the bitter lesson to stale regime and later they did the same to "Leading" Democratic and technologically far more developped countries."

Follow the battle tracks and timing of those battles and most others from then on in the Pacific war and note that the Japanese turned away and left the scene of battle (even when they had it in the bag, like at Savo) because of their hyper-conservative concern over losing more of their very limited number of ships. Note also that no matter how bad the battle was going, such as the Nov. 13-14 night battle off Guadalcanal, no "leading democratic and far more technologically developed" ship capable of battle turned away from anything as long as there was something to shoot at.

The Japanese were tactically very tough and good fighters. But not that good. Turning from battle for fear of losing assests is not ever a winning strategy, as some of the Mediterranean battles can also demonstrate.

Regards,

[Alex Shenec]

Hi.

Wallpaper.

Best regards

Alex

[Old Seaman]

The Russian edition of the Wikipedia present some of old pictures of the BB "Tsesarevich", see below.

[Old Seaman]

If to be more precise according to the Russian Navy classification this ship was of a Squadron Dreadnought class. Below is a picture which was done in 1904 in Quindao, China.

[steve roberts]

Hi Guys.Reading the tactical talk on this thread,am I Not right in two points.The Japanese were surprised at the initial accuracy of the Russian fleets Broadsides,and turned away to widen the range to decrease this accuracy.In doing so they created the first "Battle Turn away" in History tough not as successful as Scheers at Jutland,as they turned away in line.Not altogether like Scheers Ships.Thereby sustaining more damage than they needed too,instead of just drawing away gradually to increase range.Regards Steve.:confused:

[Old Seaman]

As it was told here above she waslaid down and buit in France. Below you can see the drawing of her initial project. On 27/09/1907 she was reclassified as a Linear Ship or BB.

[Old Seaman]

After Russo-Japanese war she was transfereed to the Baltic Sea Squadron where she took part in several missions including Med deployment. In 1917 she got a new name "Grazhdanin" ("Citizen"). In 1924 she was scrapped. The history of this glory ship is described in a special book.

[Alex Shenec]

Hi.

Greater photo.

Best regards/

Alex

[BattleshipEnthusiest]

Allo Alex,

When was this photo taken? was it after she was interned at Kiaochou?

Battleship

[Antoine]

Excuse me for the "invasion". This photo was taken at Portsmouth on March 1907.

[BattleshipEnthusiest]

Thanks Antoine,

this is the second time that you have answered my questions, I'm much obliged.

thanks again,
Battleship

[Antoine]

If I can ignore the man with the "Peresvet" on his avatar?;)

[nigelweysom]

You may also call it VERY BAD luck... But incompetence of commanding officers, corruption among the authorities and degradation of society as a whole were so deep and vast, that Russia exploded in revolution in 1905. However, there are some great and free plans of several Russian battleships of the period:
http://www.navarin.ru/page_info.php/pages_id/1
Go to the middle of the page to a serie of links with tags (1:100) .
Best regards,
Dmitry Antonov

Dmitry Ive tried your link but it doesn't seem to work when i try to down load i keep getting the same message but as its i Russian i cant read it ,
Nigel

[astraltrader]

Nigel if you right click over the page that comes up when you click on the link you should find an option to translate - click on that.

[nigelweysom]

Terry the translation works fine but the download doesn't
thanks any way
Nigel