The British Pacific Fleet - A Political Pawn

[jainso31]

Michael Coles in “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Octagon) published in The Journal of Military History January 2001, 65, 1 Research Library pp. 105-129 provides a good analysis of the Allied decision to allow the Royal Navy a role in the Pacific and the objections of Admiral Ernest King to the proposal.

PREAMBLE
The renewal of the Royal Navy’s Pacific role began at the 1944 Octagon Conference where the Allied Joint Staff made the decision to bring the Royal Navy back to the Pacific. Admiral Ernest King was the only dissenter in the question of Royal Navy operations in the Pacific. The strategic aspects of this decision are seldom addressed by most who chronicle the Pacific war. William Kimball in “Forged in War: Roosevelt Churchill and the Second World War” never mentions the naval strategy discussed at the Octagon conference. Samuel Elliott Morison in “The Two-Ocean War” described the decision for the Royal Navy to enter the Pacific as “important” and outlines King’s opposition to it without addressing strategic considerations. John Costello in “The Pacific War” described how Churchill insisted on the Royal Navy being committed to operations against Japan and how Roosevelt’s agreed to “to avoid a bitter clash.” Likewise Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett in “War to Be Won” note that one of the goals of Octagon was “to determine the level and nature of British in the air-naval war in the Pacific.” However they do so as do the others without addressing the naval strategy. Max Hastings mentions Octagon in “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945” again without specific reference to naval strategy. However later in the book later discusses the Royal Navy’s limitations in ships, manning, logistics and operational art as it entered the Pacific campaign. Other writers chronicle British operations in the Pacific but usually focus in the gallantry and determination of the Royal Navy and not its weaknesses.
Coles’ article is invaluable to understand the decision in relation to the political, military and economic considerations which influenced both King’s opposition to the deployment and the performance of the British fleet in the Pacific.

POLITICAL ISSUES
Coles analyzes tensions between King and the other participants at Octagon. He judges King to be more realistic and informed regarding Royal Navy capabilities and more importantly its limitations than British leaders especially Churchill.
King was surprised at Roosevelt’s decision to accept Churchill’s offer of the Royal Navy without prior discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Coles notes that King may have kept silent at subsequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs, because he either assumed that his positions were logical and apparent to all or that he believed that Churchill was lying about his navy’s capabilities. Of course it was politically impossible for King to suggest such
King’s realism on the subject was a directly related to the political tensions between American and British visions for the outcome of the Pacific war, and the pressing strategic considerations necessitated by Japanese offensives in Burma and China.
The British goal of re-establishing colonial rule in Southeast Asia was a major bone of contention. Many Americans believed that the British goals were “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in South East Asia and restoration of British prestige.” Yet the US wanted to defeat Japan’s formidable Army in Asia without the sacrifice of large numbers of American troops or material which necessitated British participation. The introduction of large numbers of American troops on the Asian continent was impossible due to the lineation of the US Army to 90 divisions, most of which were engaged in Europe. Likewise US domestic issues regarding war production and the Navy’s share of it in relations to changing wartime conditions was a major concern for King. King and the Navy argued for high naval production while others including George Marshall were beginning to question it, especially if the British could provide “make substantial Naval forces available in the Pacific.”

US SUPPORT-LEND LEASE
American Lend Lease aid to Britain was another issue. Roosevelt calculated that the US needed Britain to be active in post-war Europe, this required significant post war aid. Roosevelt viewed “vigorous participation” by the Royal Navy as a means to gain congressional support in spite of the fact that Britain could no longer play a global military role without US support. One of the problems faced in the Pacific was how British mandated modifications to weapons systems supplied by the United States caused problems in production and caused shortages in key weapons systems, especially naval aircraft. Coles’ notes how King had problems with this and wondered if supplying the Royal Navy’s Pacific operations “represented the most effective use of American industrial capacity. However King did not chose to argue this point at the conference, once again demurring to President Roosevelt.

LOGISTICS AND OTHER PROBLEMS
The most compelling factor discussed by Coles was the operational and logistic problems related to the deployment, supply and operation of the Royal Navy. There were a number of problems that the Royal Navy faced as it deployed to the Pacific. First among them was the fact that the Royal Navy was in large part short-legged and cold water Navy. Its ships were designed mainly for service in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and ill-suited for the Pacific. The fleet included 17 aircraft carriers (with 300 aircraft), four battleships, 10 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 18 sloops, 13 frigates, 31 submarines, 35 minesweepers, other kinds of fighting ships, and many support vessels.The Royal Navy did not have the operational experience of the Americans in regard to Fast Carrier Task Forces, especially coordination of refueling and resupply operations or coordination of air group operations. Admiral Philip Vian insisted that “Before joining the Americans…we needed to be adept at using a great many more aircraft at a time, and for longer periods.” Max Hastings’ noted that the Royal Navy was “overstretched and war weary" and Coles goes to great lengths to illustrate British weakness while analyzing tensions in the British-American relationship particularly the shift in the relationship as the Americans took the leading role.

KING OUT IN THE OPEN
King had the foresight to recognize that the British contribution would be more of a liability than help. The principal Royal Navy purpose in the Pacific was political, not military and Coles asks if it helped or hindered “the achievement of the respective nations’ policy objectives.” Coles does not believe that it helped; that in fact the Royal Navy would not have been able to continue had the war continued. He quoted a British liaison officer who wrote that the Royal Navy would have “been unable to continue operations because of lack of logistic support." Coles calls the Royal Navy’s effort in the Pacific an “expensive instrument of failed policy” and that Admiral King seemed to have recognized this better than others, arguing that King’s opinions were not based on simple personal prejudice.
Coles uses an excellent mix of primary and secondary sources including diaries, operational reports, histories and journal articles from American and British sources to document his work providing ample references throughout his article. His work is important in recognizing the importance strategy plays in making political decisions in coalition warfare. Likewise he places value on individuals such as King who are able to recognize the strategic aims and limitations in coalition warfare by various partners.


THE OUTCOME
Though the Royal Navy’s participation in the Pacific War was a relatively insignificant in terms of its overall role in the war it provides lessons for our time. Coalition warfare requires that members of the coalition be able to function our time we can see a similar situation where many of the NATO forces in Afghanistan are dependent on the US for most of their operational and logistic support. It also requires that the members of the coalition have a firm grip on the overall strategy and understand the capabilities and limitations of each.
The United States Navy (USN), which had control of Allied operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, gave the BPF combat units the designation of Task Force 57 (TF-57) when it joined Admiral Raymond Spruance's United States Fifth Fleet on 15 March 1945 for Operation ICEBERG where it did sterling service. On 27 May 1945, it became Task Force 37 (TF-37) when it became part of Admiral William Halsey's United States Third Fleet.
In March 1945, while supporting the invasion of Okinawa, the BPF had sole responsibility for operations in the Sakishima Islands. Its role was to suppress Japanese air activity, using gunfire and air attack, at potential Kamikaze staging airfields that would otherwise be a threat to U.S. Navy vessels operating at Okinawa. The carriers were subject to heavy and repeated kamikaze attacks, but because of their armoured flight decks, the British aircraft carriers proved highly resistant, and returned to action relatively quickly. The U.S.N liaison officer on the Indefatigable commented: "When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at Pearl [Harbor]. When a kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case of 'Sweepers, man your brooms.
However the USN High Command and politics had their way when it came to finishing off the IJN at KURE-the BPF was just not wanted on that occasion.George Marshall and others wondered if the British could provide significant naval support which would alleviate the need for high naval production which they questioned.
Strategy and the desired end state must be central to how coalitions fight wars.


jainso31
http://padresteve.com/2009/11/29/lessons-in-coalition-warfare-admiral-ernest-king-and-the-british-pacific-fleet/

[jainso31]

A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF ADMIRAL KING CominCh USN filched from Wikipedia

King was highly intelligent and extremely capable, but controversial. Some consider him to have been one of the greatest admirals of the 20th century; others, however, point out that he never commanded ships or fleets at sea in war time, and that his Anglophobia led him to make decisions which cost many Allied lives. Others see as indicative of strong leadership his willingness and ability to counter both British and U.S. Army influence on American World War II strategy, and praise his sometimes outspoken recognition of the strategic importance of the Pacific War. His instrumental role in the decisive Guadalcanal Campaign has earned him admirers in the United States and Australia, and some also consider him an organizational genius. He was considered rude and abrasive; as a result, King was loathed by many officers with whom he served.
He was... perhaps the most disliked Allied leader of World War II. Only British Field Marshal Montgomery may have had more enemies... King also loved parties and often drank to excess. Apparently, he reserved his charm for the wives of fellow naval officers. On the job, he "seemed always to be angry or annoyed."
There was a tongue-in-cheek remark about King, made by one of his daughters, carried about by Naval personnel at the time that "he is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage." Roosevelt once described King as a man who "shaves every morning with a blow torch".
It is commonly reported that when King was called to be CominCh he remarked,"When they get in trouble they send for the sons-of-bitches”. However, when he was later asked if he had said this King replied that he had not but would have if he had thought of it.
[
B]PS.Please feel absolutely free to make whatever comment you feel is appropriate re.#1 and2-whether you agree/disagree,etc.[/B]

jainso31

[Shinysheff]

Adm King sounds like an effective no nonsense officer but with little political skills and a lot of a b@*&@&!

[jainso31]

Yes Shiney-you have him about right-a right B@>?~~+@.

jainso31

[WGVSr]

As you say Jim, King was not a 'people person', however, he was a Navy person and as an Naval 'operator', he was largely unmatched during WWII.

There is a relatively new [2011] account of the BPF titled, appropriately enough, 'The British Pacific Fleet' by David Hobbs which I haven't yet seen but I have the title in my wallet in case I happen by it at the library. The BPF was by far the most powerful strike force assembled by the RN during the War.

Given the fact that Britain still had strategic interests in the Pacific [Malaya, Hong Kong, etal], it is logical that the RN have a place at the table although some have felt King saw the Pacific as an American lake. While the sun was fading on the Empire by 1944/5, although that was by no means obvious at the time, national interests had to be observed. Consider the other Empires in the Far East, the Dutch and the French. By 1945, neither had a fleet left in being and both were either still under Nazi sway or had just been liberated but both returned to the East Indes and Cochin China immediately postwar as if nothing had changed only to face almost immediate insurgency.
Bill

[jainso31]

Hi Bill -I do have David Hobbs's book and Peter C Smith's Task Force 57,but these are mainly operational accounts however Hobbs does discuss the political aspects of the creation of the BPF-as again does Correlli Barnett.
The purpose of this thread is not so much what the BPF achieved but to gauge how much of a political move was it.Admiral King was against on the score that it was not needed,British COS wanted it on the score that it would get us a seat at the negotiation table but Churchill was against it, probably seeing King's point as well as wanting the British to finish the war in in SE Asia but also counting the cost of the BPF-he knew of the already huge Lend Lease Debt.
So who was right, who achieved what- is the final question for this thread-I wonder who paid attention to the words "fighting coalition wars"???

jainso31

[jainso31]

There are no true winners in war. For there are always the dead and maimed.

America profited well financially from the war. Britain had to pay the US for use of resources and machinery, leaving Britain heavily in debt, thus Britain's empire eroded as the cost of retaining it was too much when compared to the debt they were in.
The Soviet Union profited well territorily. They set up many supportive regimes in countries that were pro Soviet, securing their borders and having a powerful influence in Europe and the world.
The US and USSR came out best off, whereas Britain suffered. Switzerland profited well from staying neutral, hording Nazi gold and looted belongings that the Germans had placed there for safe keeping.
Japan of course, is now a major economic power based on America's model of capitalism. But in total reality, there are no true winners in war.

jainso31

[PhilipG]

Jainso31
An interesting thread about the BPF, the logical conclusion of which is that the Americans wanted to take Japan by themselves, or at least not with the Brits, I have never heard that theory being promulgated before. As far as I am aware many RAF and Army units were being prepared for dispatch to the Far East and the eventual potentially very bloody invasion of the Japanese home islands.
Getting back to the BPF, it is true to say that the RN did not have the fleet train necessary to back up its largest ever task force, 5 or 6 Fleet Carriers as I recall not counting KGV battleships. As such much of the logistical support had to be provided by the USN, that annoying Admiral King.
The RN had laid down before the end of the war 10 Colossus Class, 6 Majestic Class and 4 Centaur Class Light Fleet Carriers, making a total of 20 Light Fleets, another 4 Centaur class had been planned but where cancelled at the end of the war.
This suggests to me that the RN would have been able to have quite a presence in the Battle for Japan, assuming that they sorted out the logistics chain, 5 Fleet Carriers and up to 20 Light Fleets, is quite a force.
What would have happened to the Light Fleets in “The Battle of Japan” is another matter of course, I am not sure that the comments from the U.S.N liaison officer on the Indefatigable commented: "When a kamikaze hits a U.S. carrier it means 6 months of repair at Pearl [Harbor]. When a kamikaze hits a Limey carrier it’s just a case of 'Sweepers, man your brooms.” Would apply to any of the Light Fleets except possibly the Centaur Class.

[jainso31]

Philip the thread is not about what the BPF achieved or did not achieve-it is about it's very existence-was it truly necessary to enable the USN to win the Battle of the Pacific? As TF 57 and 37 it was a very small cog in a huge train, and it was not really able to sustain itself.That apart I am asking a straight forward question-was it really necessary or was a political expedient?? nothing to do with future ships and extra men-the US had the A bomb and when push came to shove-used it to end the war-that is an inescapable fact.
Please read the preamble again and decide whether King, Churchill or his COS were right thinking.Many thanks for your genuine interest and input but please think much deeper.

jainso31

[PhilipG]

I think that there are two questions here: -

Was there a need for the BPF in the open Pacific "Island Hopping" War, to which it could well be argued that the answer was no, the USN with all the new Essex Carriers and a well developed fleet train could well have achieved the Island Hopping campaign.

The second question is assuming that there had been an invasion of Japan then as was shown later in Korea, carriers would have been needed in abundance to give close air support to the ground troops. As well as ships needing to be in the gun line. I am not sure that even the USN had the resources to do this on two coasts of the Home Islands.

Yes I have re read this PM the Alanbrooke Diaries about the meetings in Quebec and it would have seemed to me that Adml King was the one who had the problems about working in a team. I also recall the Max Hastings remarks.

It could thus be argued strategically that the US might not be prepared alone to suffer the losses that an invasion of Japan was going to result in, so a British and Empire input was required and it would have been unusual to have just supplied the ground troops, so the BPF and Far East Air Force was required, at least their presence gave the Japanese the view that there was going to be an invasion.

[jainso31]

But Philip-the BPF was a microcosm in the USN's Pacific Fleet and I daresay that a mainland invasion my very well have been envisaged and yes extra boots on the ground would be needed but at what point was this discounted ie there was not going to be an invasion of the Japanese mainland.- when the Abombs were ready-see below:-

"Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 1530," Top Secret
Source: Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal Files, 1942-1945, box 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th

With the devastating battle for Okinawa winding up, Truman and his military advisers stepped back and considered the implications and requirements of the invasion of Japan. In this meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Truman reviewed plans to land troops on Kyushu on 1 November, heard a range of casualty estimates, and contemplated the possible impact of eventual Soviet entry into the war with Japan. This account hints at discussion of the atomic bomb (“certain other matters”) but no documents disclose that part of the meeting. This document has figured in the highly complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. While post-war justifications for the bomb suggested that an invasion of Japan could have produced very high levels of casualties (dead, wounded, or missing), from hundreds of thousands to a million, historians have vigorously debated the extent to which the post-war estimates were inflated.

This meeting has also played a role in the historical discussions of the alternatives to nuclear weapons use in the summer of 1945. According to accounts based on post-war recollections and interviews, McCloy raised the possibility of winding up the war by guaranteeing the preservation of the emperor albeit as a constitutional monarch. If that failed to persuade Tokyo, he proposed that the United States disclose the secret of the atomic bomb to secure Japan’s unconditional surrender. While McCloy later recalled that Truman expressed interest, he said that Secretary of State Byrnes quashed the proposal because of his opposition to any “deals” with Japan. Yet, according to Forrest Pogue’s account, when Truman asked McCloy if he had any comments, the latter opened up a discussion of nuclear weapons use by asking “Why not use the bomb?”

As you can see Philip-they were discussing other ways of ending the war-nothing to do with the USN and the BPF-in June the BPF were back at base replenishing etc. The British COS unknowingly were girding their loins for nothing- sending out extra ships and men,including the ill fated MONABs-it was all for nothing.
TF37 under Halsey were not allowed in the attack on KURE for the final destruction of the IJN; and that decision came from the top.Now tell me that the BPF were needed.Very shortly the entire USN Pacific Fleet would be redundant-their work done.

jainso31

[PhilipG]

Jim, your analysis is correct with 20/20 hindsight, I was going forward from Quebec, at which time, correct me if I am wrong, the output of the Manhattan Project was at best uncertain, we agree that more boots on the ground would be needed, so as we agree extra assets would be needed, after the end of the war in Europe, what was the fleet meant to do?

Go to Australia and anchor up until needed for the assault on the Home Islands?

The BPF could be put in harm's way due to the armoured decks on the fleet carriers etc. The thought of non battle hardened crews going up against the home islands is very frightening.

If when it became apparent that the Manhattan Project was bearing fruit, the withdrawal of the BPF, even to the Indian Ocean would have in my view caused many questions to be asked, that could not be answered, in Parliament. In a way I suppose I am saying that it was a bit like the German mobilization just before world war one, once it had started, it had to continue....

[jainso31]

Jim, your analysis is correct with 20/20 hindsight, I was going forward from Quebec, at which time, correct me if I am wrong, the output of the Manhattan Project was at best uncertain, we agree that more boots on the ground would be needed, so as we agree extra assets would be needed, after the end of the war in Europe, what was the fleet meant to do?

Go to Australia and anchor up until needed for the assault on the Home Islands?

The BPF could be put in harm's way due to the armoured decks on the fleet carriers etc. The thought of non battle hardened crews going up against the home islands is very frightening.

If when it became apparent that the Manhattan Project was bearing fruit, the withdrawal of the BPF, even to the Indian Ocean would have in my view caused many questions to be asked, that could not be answered, in Parliament. In a way I suppose I am saying that it was a bit like the German mobilization just before world war one, once it had started, it had to continue....

Philip- I said the Commander in Chief of the US Forces was in meeting on 18 June 1945 (Quebec Octagon Conference was 1944) whereat the use of the A bomb was discussed as a means of ending the war- not about Armies.Navies or Air Forces.They had a pretty shrewd Idea that this "means" would nullify the need for an invasion of the mainland of Japan but it was still very much top secret so the preparations continued for a conventional ending.
I am telling you that Halsey's dropping the BPF out of the final attack on the IJN at Kure was an indication that their use was at at end for reasons explained earlier-they did not want the BPF to be seen as part of the Victory in the Pacific-sad as it may seem; and it did not have to be drawn back to the Indian Ocean to cause that amount of embarrassment-the snub at Kure was quite enough.
In MHO I think the BPF was a political expedient conjured up by the British COS which failed to deliver what they thought it would-a fillip for British prestige-nothing to do with what the BPF actually achieved as a fighting unit.

jainso31

[PhilipG]

Jim, I think that we are agreeing! The BPF was set up prior to the meeting you quote, it may be construed to have done its work by getting the RN ship(s) in Tokyo Bay for the surrender.

[jainso31]

It has been a pleasure debating is issue with you Philip-you really should put yourself about much more in future.
However I'm not yet finished and I am going to quote from Corelli Barnett's "Engage the Enemy more Closely" :-
"Nevertheless the American command deliberately left the British Pacific Fleet out of a major strike on 24th July against the remaining ship's of the Japanese Navy lying immobilised at Kure naval base.Halsey accepted the advice of his chief of staff that the British should be excluded in order,in Halsey's words "to forestall a possible claim by Britain that she had delivered even a part of the final blow that demolished the Japanese fleet".So much for Sir Alan Brooke and his colleagues'naive hopes that to contribute British Pacific Fleet would earn a share in the victory and a voice in the American counsels"
The BPF was not present in the mighty victory array -only a squadron of HMS Duke of York with Adm Sir Bruce Fraser had steamed up from Australia for the occasion due to shortages of tankers.Even the victorious culmination of Churchill's Indian Ocean and SW Asia Campaign had been relegated to anti climax by order of MacArthur,who forbade any landings on Japanese held British territory ,until after his own grand ceremony on the Missouri.

jainso31

[PhilipG]

Good debate, if I might point out the last air to air action of WW2 was FAA shooting down zeros....
Yes the BPF was not in overall terms the RN's greatest achievement, with time and a change of culture it could have flowered into an important part of the coalition force that invaded Japan.
Is it me or why is it that the FAA with Unicorn, as well as many other escort carriers and the Monabs well prepared for a long war, whilst the logistics for the main fleet seem to have been slightly to say the least jury rigged.

[the Chief]

I think that the BPF was political similar to the continued combat employment of Australian forces long after it was needed to do their assigned job. Their political masters were afraid of being left out. The Commonwealth navies I think would have received a warmer welcome if they were using US ships and training so they could have been fitted into the chain like any USN ship.

[jainso31]

Philip you are still getting bogged down in what the BPF achieved in battle-the thread is quite specific- what did it achieve politically,because I am content in the belief that it's formation was a political expedient;which,in a nutshell-failed in that purpose-it did not deliver the share in the Victory and a seat in the American counsels which the British COS had it created for.
However I reiterate-I enjoyed the debate and you welcome to sit in on any of these type of debates in the future.

jainso31

[jainso31]

The Chief's linking of the Australian Forces with the BPF is interesting -all I am aware of is that their Infantry Divisions were pulled out of North Africa after El Alamein for New Guinea,The RAN remained as an integral part of British RN and 6 CanadianGroup, Bomber Command stayed in UK along with Aussie and Kiwi aircrews, until the war in Europe came to an end.
Taking the units of the RAN and RNZN and subsuming them into the USN and being equipped with US ships and Training-really does not seem likely to me; but who knows- because it did not happen.My thanks to you Chief for your interest and input-perhaps you could expand on your theory of Commonwealth integration

jainso31

[PhilipG]

Philip you are still getting bogged down in what the BPF achieved in battle-the thread is quite specific- what did it achieve politically,because I am content in the belief that it's formation was a political expedient;which,in a nutshell-failed in that purpose-it did not deliver the share in the Victory and a seat in the American counsels which the British COS had it created for.
However I reiterate-I enjoyed the debate and you welcome to sit in on any of these type of debates in the future.

jainso31

Jim
We are agreeing, I think, the view of Allanbrooke et al as well as Marshall was that an Empire element was required in the final invasion of the Home Islands.

The war winning tool that the US pulled out of its hat was the A bomb. Yes it helped the US political view that the days of Empire, British, French, Dutch well any except US, where over, so the political goals of the US where achieved by the "shortening" of the war by the use of the A bombs.

If the Manhattan project had not been a success and the invasion had gone ahead, it can be argued that a share of the victory would have been forthcoming.

So my argument is that the BPF and the input of other British / Empire forces became a political expedient as you say when the initial A Bomb development showed results. The BPF would have been a political necessity for President Truman if Japan was to be invaded. Selling the story that the US needs to do Japan by itself to the US public would not sit well when you consider how many losses the US had suffered in the European theatre.

I just noticed that there were no Fleet Carriers in Tokyo Bay at the surrender, an interesting political message? Where they not there as they were a reminder of how the US had entered the war, or was it "operational reasons". The RN supplied 2 of the 10 Battleships in the Bay.

[barryp]

I seem to recall reading somewhere Cunningham criticising the decision to equip the BPF with British as well as American aircraft, when it would have made far better logistic sense to equip the fleet entirely with American aircraft which were already in RN service anyway; Corsairs, Hellcats, Avengers etc. So that could be seen as a political decision in favour of the UK aircraft industry, which would be in a fight to the death with the US industry after the war.

Although we now know they weren't needed, at the time the decision was taken to create the BPF I think the addition of the light fleets would have provided a significant boost to the force. Leaving some or all of the short-legged KGVs back in the UK probably would have helped too. I think the light fleets performed pretty well in Korea, which isn't far from Japan and overall they were a better option than the US escort carriers, which still made up a significant portion of the US fleets - they weren't all Essexes. It's purely hypothetical of course, but in an invasion scenario, once the Kamikazes were spent, the smaller carriers could have provided important support to ground troops much as they did in Korea.

[jainso31]

Agreed Alanbrooke a Co and Marshall were for the BPF at the Quadrant Conference,but for different reasons-Alanbrooke and Co's reason has been stated over and over again,Marshall saw the enormous amount of war materiel that would be required on Lend Lease.
Yes the Manhattan Project would come on line and would be a decisive factoe in the ending of the war.
.At 5:29:45 (Mountain War Time) on July 16, 1945, in a white blaze that stretched from the basin of the Jemez Mountains in northern New Mexico to the still-dark skies, "The Gadget" ushered in the Atomic Age. The light of the explosion then turned orange as the atomic fireball began shooting upwards at 360 feet per second, reddening and pulsing as it cooled. The characteristic mushroom cloud of radioactive vapor materialized at 30,000 feet. Beneath the cloud, all that remained of the soil at the blast site were fragments of jade green radioactive glass created by the heat of the reaction.
So,Philip-the A bomb was not an if or a maybe after the 16th July 1945; and a week later came the decision that the BPF would not take part in the final destruction of the IJN Fleet at Kure.The writing was on the wall that the days of "usefulness" of the BPF was at at an end.
I did tell you that the Duke of York's Squadron with Sir Bruce Frasesr was the only British presence in Tokyo Bay for the final ceremony because there were not enough tankers to fuel the whole Fleet; and by the way there never was enough,US tankers looked after them in the Combat Zone- but not in Australia and so they were left out.
So there we were- sans Fleet,sans Glory and tragically sans pride-the BPF was created as a political expedient (Pawn) and was now a Cinderella Fleet and carrying out humanitarian aid work at japanese occupied territory.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Barry- the real problem with our BPF carrier fleet WAS it's aircraft-Fairey Barracudas and Firflies and CAP's of Seafires, whose deck landing gear just was completely unsuitable for landing on a carrier at sea-hence our losses of this aircraft were mostly via undercarriage collapses.So yes Avengers (Tarpons) and Corsairs were really what we needed regardless of opinion elsewhere.The redevelopment of Fleet requirements did manifest itself in the Korean War.
We did have twenty Light Fleet carriers at the end of WW2 in the Pacific .

jainso31

[Graham Barnes]

Hello,

Two points:

re US carriers at Tokyo Bay, from the NHC website:

Though "cease fire" orders were issued on 15-16 August, the fighting forces were uncertain that the Japanese would stop fighting so abruptly after nearly four years of brutal combat. Therefore, the combined U.S. British fleet remained at a high degree of alertness. However, the days passed without serious incident as carrier planes actively patrolled over Japan to monitor the situation and to seek out prisoner of war facilites.

On 27 August, units of the fleet entered Japanese waters for the first time. Guided by local pilots, the ships anchored in Sagami Wan, just outside of Tokyo Bay and within view of Mount Fuji. A day later, some of the fleet went into Tokyo Bay itself, though almost all of the aircraft carriers remained at sea, ready to provide air cover "just in case". Fleet Admiral Nimitz, who had directed much of the Pacific War, arrived on 29 August and made USS South Dakota his flagship. Aboard USS Missouri, which flew Admiral Halsey's flag, preparations were underway to host the formal surrender ceremonies on 2 September.


re Ernie King & the BPF matter--One should never forget that our navy never wanted to place any of its ships under the command of another nation--either before or during the war--and the fiasco in ABDA did not help. King was instrumental in the talks in DC that established ABDA and the Combined Joint Chiefs in DEC 1941, but like almost all USN officers he was deeply suspicious of the British...The inter-war years had seen a fair amount of rather paranoid mental habits re the British develop in our services. And following the ham-fisted mishandling of US units in the disastrous Java Campaign (by VADM C.E.L. Helfrich of the RNN primarily), King said Enough is Enough...(And he never got over that "coolness" towards the Dutch, BTW.)

Remember Tom Hart of the Asiatic Fleet did not agree to lend even so little as a division of old four-piper DDs to Tom Phillips until December 6, and even then it was pretty reluctantly. (This was DesDiv 57 at Balikpapen, Borneo.) Hart had mixed feelings about the British during his ABDA service; he didn't have too many illusions about being successful in what was--to him--essentially a British Army set-up ("the Wavell Command" as he actually called it in later years) devoted almost exclusively to Malaya/Singapore. He admired Phillips, had no use for Layton, and he thought Palliser (RN) & Collins (RAN) the two most competent & efficient naval officers out there w/him in ABDA. These two men received high praise after the war from the taciturn Hart, who threw compliments around like they were manhole covers...

As for King's notoriously prickly personality, I like what Jim Hornfischer wrote in Neptune's Inferno...when he desribed Chester Nimitz as being like a "valley of humility" between those two mountains of arrogance: King and MacArthur. Of course King was a bastard, but he was what was called for under the circumstances, and today--of all days--we should recognize that and be glad of it...on this side of the Atlantic anyway. (Some have gone so far as to describe GEN Sir Alan Brooke as a difficult fellow as well, I seem to recall.;))

[jainso31]

Hello Graham thanks for popping in as it were- I have carefully read what you have written and would answer as follows:-

1. Due to a typhoon interfering with the assembly of aircraft in Okinawa for the lift of U.S. Army occupation forces, Naval forces were prevented from entering Japanese waters until 27th August, when the Third Fleet, including the B.P.F. Force, anchored in Sagami Wan. The following day, sufficient berths had been swept inside to allow the entry into Tokyo Bay of MISSOURI, IDAHO, and DUKE OF YORK with WHELP and WAGER.

On the 29th and 30th, the remainder of the U.S. forces, with KING GEORGE V and other British and Dominion ships in company, entered Tokyo Bay. On the latter day, large scale airborne landings took place and landing parties from the Third Fleet and the B.P.F. occupied Yokosuka Naval Base and the forts at the entrance of the Bay.
The British Commonwealth Force consisted of 300 seamen and Royal Marines.

Outside, INDEFATIGABLE and eight destroyers remained with the U.S. Carrier Task Force, prepared for any emergency. It soon became apparent that no Japanese treachery was to be expected, and the U.S. authorities ordered a big reduction in Carrier strength. This allowed the withdrawal of INDEFATIGABLE and her destroyers on 3rd September without relief. This meant that IMPLACABLE could be prepared immediately in Sydney as a P.O.W. evacuation ship, instead of sailing to relieve INDEFATIGABLE.

2 "One should never forget that our navy never wanted to place any of its ships under the command of another nation--either before or during the war-"

The very fact that did happen was on the orders of the British COS-the prime instigators of the formation of the BPF; however I am disappointed that you have not commented on whether you thought the BPF was a purely political expedient or otherwise-the point of the thread.I do hope that you will reconsider al the facts and give a verdict -one way or other.Thank you.


http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-BPF4512OccupationofChinaCoast1945.htm
jainso31

[WGVSr]

Hello,

Two points:

re US carriers at Tokyo Bay, from the NHC website:

[I]Though "cease fire" orders were issued on 15-16 August, the fighting forces were uncertain that the Japanese would stop fighting so abruptly after nearly four years of brutal combat. Therefore, the combined U.S. British fleet remained at a high degree of alertness. However, the days passed without serious incident as carrier planes actively patrolled over Japan to monitor the situation and to seek out prisoner of war facilites.



I believe the orders were to shoot them down in a friendly manner. :rolleyes:
Bill

[Don Boyer]

A great series of posts on a subject of great interest. Jim's done another bang-up job of finding a great topic for discussion. I've managed to acquire the books recommended by my forum friends regarding the operations of the BPF and the whys and wherefores contained therein are more familiar to me now. For what it's worth, my observations.

My conclusions, and I stress mine, are that militarily the BPF was unnecessary to the Pacific War and was barely capable of contributing in the end. The fact that they did contribute, and mightily, rests entirely with the RN admirals, captains and seamen who took on the job despite the odds, the heavily strained logistics and the political infighting regarding the overall situation. They performed far beyond anybody's expectations, and would have contributed even more had the US navy not deliberately marginalized them as to operating areas and targets.

Politically, however, the presence of the BPS was VERY necessary, and it was for these reasons that the fleet was deployed. (Had they not been so deployed, I assume that the BPF in some lesser form would have been involved in the operations around Burma and in making Japanese lives miserable in the captured territories in Indonesia and SE Asia. To me, that seemed like a more logical purpose for a BPF, particularly as it would not have strained the logistics so much and would have been easier on the fleet units as they would have been operating at "Atlantic" distances from bases of resupply and retrofit.)

Admiral King's assessment of British capabilities was accurate and he did speak his mind the one time it was needed. However, it was also very obvious right off the bat that Roosevelt was going to support Churchill, period, regardless of the military realities and King was quite smart enough to not go against that aliiance of great men. It would have been a career-ender had he done so. One has to remember that King had already pissed off Roosevelt (and Marshall) several times over wartime issues. While these clashes were to be expected amongst the great wartime leaders in Washington trying to figure out how to win two wars, pissing off Roosevelt over the issue of supporting Churchill's desires, right or wrong, would have been beyond the pale. Remember, there was one Admiral senior to King available who could have immediately replaced him -- Leahy -- and King was well aware of that.

As to King's personality, that has been outlined in glaring detail in many sources. He was a dyed-in-the-wool son of a bitch. He was perfect for the role in the Washington environment in wartime and proved it over and over again, even if he earned no friends doing it. He wasn't paid to make friends, he was paid to win a war and stop the killing. Nimitz was a somewhat softer soul -- he had much better people skills --but was King's equal in every respect as far as fighting a naval war was concerned. Nimitz also never commanded wartime fleets at sea, but he, in the end, garners the kudos as America's greatest Admiral over King for his ability to get everybody on board to win the war without charring careers, getting drunk or fondling the derriere of some junior officer's wife. Given the choice, I would have worked for Nimitz over King.

For the overall big picture, the worries of the US over "Britain trying to re-establish itself in the colonies," that was for the big politicians to play with. It mattered not a whit to the US Navy. Here, the US pissed in its boot in my estimation. We could have quite easily have said that Britain and the Commonwealth nations could do whatever they desired in those areas post war, but the US would not provide major support. Creating the impression that the US was "against" colonialism was unnecessary, because it was quite obvious that Britain was at the end of their tether -- in fact beyond it -- and that there would not be the money or desire in Britain to try to take back all the colonial possessions for any longer than it took to ensure they were Japanese-free and not going communist. It would have cost the US nothing to ignore the situation rather than faff on about "colonialism," which the US had been a partner in for many years anyway with their own possesions in Asia.

[nigelweysom]

i would say that the BPF was one of a number of politically expedient decisions made during WW11 and in fact any war , if wars were fought by the military alone things would be different , but they are not the shots are called by politicians , who always have to consider public opinion ,and the opinions of their political allies , decisions in the war in Europe were made in order to keep Russia happy ,and because of the outrage following Pearl Harbour the USA had to be seen to be the victors over Japan
Nigel

[the Chief]

The Chief's linking of the Australian Forces with the BPF is interesting -all I am aware of is that their Infantry Divisions were pulled out of North Africa after El Alamein for New Guinea,The RAN remained as an integral part of British RN and 6 CanadianGroup, Bomber Command stayed in UK along with Aussie and Kiwi aircrews, until the war in Europe came to an end.
Taking the units of the RAN and RNZN and subsuming them into the USN and being equipped with US ships and Training-really does not seem likely to me; but who knows- because it did not happen.My thanks to you Chief for your interest and input-perhaps you could expand on your theory of Commonwealth integration

jainso31
My thought was that with US equipment and training RN andCommonwealth forces could have been able to work alongside the USN with less problem, not that they would have been asked to do so. Having the same equipment and training is what made integration of RN and Commonwealth forces as easy as it was.
As far as Australian forces, they were kept in combat in the Pacific longer than needed where simply being in the neighbourhood would have kept the Japanese forces in check. I think that some fairly well known RAAF officers were in near mutiny over this policy, I am sure someone else with more knowledge could expand on that.
I have to agree that the political aims of the BPF's masters did not pan out.

[Graham Barnes]

Well, that's a tall order...because it's a very large subject. But, let's say an "impurely political expedient" since nothing is ever purely political. This means that I expect that politics played a major role, but not the entire role...Something like the ABDA business, really.
If, as you suggest, it was a political expedient in its essence, then I suppose you can't blame the Americans entirely if it failed to achieve what the British COS wished---Can we assume among other things at the time this meant regaining some of their colonial losses in the Far East?

Seems I also recall reading that fuel (unreps) problems with the BPF were an issue re the projected attacks against the Japanese home islands?:confused:

{Nonetheless, one should acknowledge it also probably involved very little generosity on the part of the United States--In view of developments such as dumping the East Indies into Mountbatten's lap (SEAC) when "Move Over, God" MacArthur decided it was beneath his dignity...}

[jainso31]

Many thanks for your views gentlemen and methinks they tend to side with my thinking in this knotty thread-so I give below a summary of the politics behind the creation of a British Pacific Fleet:-

The U.S. was liberating British territories in the Pacific and extending its influence. It was therefore seen as a political and military imperative to restore a British presence in the region and to deploy British forces against Japan. The British government were determined that British territories, such as Hong Kong, should be recaptured by British forces.
The British establishment was not unanimous on the commitment of the BPF. Churchill, in particular, argued against it, not wishing to be a visibly junior partner in what had been exclusively the United States' battle. (The Australian and New Zealand forces there had been absorbed into US forces.) He also considered that a British presence would be unwelcome and should be concentrated on Burma and Malaya and other SW Asian areas
Naval planners, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, believed that such a commitment would strengthen British influence and the British Chiefs of Staff considered mass resignation, so strongly held were their opinions. Some U.S. planners had also considered, in 1944, that a strong British presence against Japan was essential to an early end to the war and American home opinion would also be badly affected if Britain did not put itself in the line.
The Admiralty had proposed a British role in the Pacific in early 1944 but the initial USN response had been discouraging. Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, an alleged Anglophobe, was reluctant to concede any such role and raised a number of objections, including the requirement that the BPF should be self-sufficient. These were eventually overcome or discounted and at a meeting, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt "intervened to say that the British Fleet was no sooner offered than accepted. In this, though the fact was not mentioned, he overruled Admiral King's opinion".
The Australian Government had sought U.S. military assistance in 1942, when it was faced with the possibility of Japanese invasion. While Australia had made a significant contribution to the Pacific War, it had never been an equal partner with its U.S. counterparts in strategy. It was argued that a British presence would act as a counter-balance to the powerful and increasing U.S. presence in the Pacific.
At this second Quebec conference in 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the role the British would play in the final defeat of Japan with the United States accepting a British offer to contribute air and naval forces. Answers should be sought to three questions: (i) Why did the British put forward this proposal? (ii) Why did the United States accept this offer if they lost more than they gained? (iii) How were these policy interests implemented? The answers lie in diplomacy, domestic politics and naval operations.
These views were the product of an intense policy debate in London that had the potential to bring down the Churchill Cabinet, and ran counter to the inclinations of the prime minister. Influential figures in both the United Kingdom and the United States thought that if there were to be any chance of a post-war alliance between their two nations, then the British had to contribute to the theatre of operation that would most directly lead to the defeat of Imperial Japan.
If the British concentrated their efforts on trying to reclaim colonies lost early in the war – which was the preference of the prime minister – or if they directed their energies towards a quick demobilisation, the general expectation in both Washington and London was that the American people would turn against the United Kingdom.
Finally I would like to endorse Don's statement about Britain and it's colonies and to thank him for the kind words-much appreciated.

"For the overall big picture, the worries of the US over "Britain trying to re-establish itself in the colonies," that was for the big politicians to play with. It mattered not a whit to the US Navy. Here, the US pissed in its boot in my estimation. We could have quite easily have said that Britain and the Commonwealth nations could do whatever they desired in those areas post war, but the US would not provide major support.
Creating the impression that the US was "against" colonialism was unnecessary, because it was quite obvious that Britain was at the end of their tether -- in fact beyond it -- and that there would not be the money or desire in Britain to try to take back all the colonial possessions for any longer than it took to ensure they were Japanese-free and not going communist. It would have cost the US nothing to ignore the situation rather than faff on about "colonialism," which the US had been a partner in for many years anyway with their own possesions in Asia.

jainso31

[PhilipG]

Jim

I think that the thread has come to a natural end.

There are a number of levels, is it Naval Strategy only, or was this Allied Coalition politics....

After the BPF had been mobilised as a cog in the wheel for the planned invasion of the Home Islands, there was a game changer in the A bombs becoming available and proven in combat. Thus the Army and the Royal Air Force where not needed for the invasion of Japan.

After the Trinity test 16/07/1945, assuming that Little Boy was successfully transported to Tinian and dropped as it was 06/08/1945, not a certainty, thinking of the west to east transit of the USS Indianapolis...

The Emperor broadcast on 15/08/1945, after the second use of a nuclear weapon, effectively halting the war. These two linked events resulted in the BPF being a political expedient I could argue for a week or so....

Philip

[jainso31]

I am still of the opinion Philip-that the BPF was sired by the British COS and for it to be a "political expedient or pawn" for the reasons already stated previously.Operationally it did it's utmost to add to the striking power of US Pacific Fleet; but it's ramshackle Fleet Train let it down miserably; but through no fault of it's own-the ships in the Train were just not good enough. .
However "solid" answers should still be sought to three questions: (i) Why did the British put forward this proposal? (ii) Why did the United States accept this offer- if they lost more than they gained? (iii) How were these policy interests implemented? The answers lie in diplomacy, domestic politics and naval operations.

jainso31

[sons of anzac]

The BPF was a political contribution by the British towards overcoming the final resistance of the Japanese to ending hostilities. The USN certainly regarded it as nice to have but certainly not essential. Australia regarded it as essential to re-establish damaged British reputation and interest in the Pacific War.

In the longer term there was ongoing planning for the contribution of ground and air forces to the actual invasion of Japan but all that was negated by the A bombs and the Japanese finding a way to end the blocks to accepting surrender.

The long drawn out pathway to its actual creation and deployment to Australia are covered in ‘Grave of a thousand schemes’ for the period 1943-45. (Sorry I’m away from my resources so I cant get the author etc). The RN’s long standing argument was that the final, long awaited contribution of the RN to the Pacific War could only come through participation in the main US drive against Japan not as a peripheral effort either against Burma - Malaya or a proposed middle course from Morotai – Borneo / NEI – Malaya / Indo-China. Churchill drove the Imperial Staff to distraction with his continual dithering, seeking to delay a decision and coming up with other proposals. Indeed the Imperial Staff were at a stage in late 1944 of resigning en mass if Churchill refused to approve the plan to establish and hence create the BPF. Churchill was perhaps more mindful of the limitations of the RN although he never framed his arguments around that, and maintained his obsession of Indian Ocean based efforts against Burma / Malaya / Java. Hence almost 2 years of standoff between the military and political leadership of Britain.

At the same time as this was going on, Australia was in the mix prodding Churchill and longing for the return of Britain to the Pacific to march with them against Japan. Unfortunately by this stage of the war Australia had become subsumed within the American war effort and under the spell of MacArthur and his version of American interests. Alas, Curtin had long abrogated the requirement of independent Australian military advice and took things straight from MacArthur without question and critical study. Thus Australian effort ended up being sidelined from late 43 onwards. Australia devoted large resources towards hosting the BPF as its main Pacific base but were scratching their heads and baulking at the proposed requirements for British land and air forces when they would have begun to deploy late in 1945 after Germany’s defeat.

A sensible plan for both the commitment of Australian and British military effort would have been the ‘middle plan’ going from Morotai (captured late 44 by US forces) on to Borneo and then either Indo-China or Malaya. It kept their military demands separate from the US which allowed for their different equipment requirements (GB & Oz equipment was the same or similar, US & GB-Aust was not) and enabled use of existing RAF and RAAF airpower to support the relatively modest numbers of land and sea forces required. Further, it would have placed less strain on the devoted RFA fleet train and requisitioned ragtag collection of merchant vessels.

The BPF performed well within their limitations and proudly flew the British flag alongside American and Australian vessels in the final stages of the Pacific war. This provided a political statement of British will, but perhaps American and, to a lesser degree, Australian angst remained that something could have been done earlier to help in their times of need. Not a fleet, but something.

One thing though I am personally grateful for was that the British did not land in Malaya (Operation Zipper) before the war ended. The Japanese had clear orders and plans to kill all POW’s if the Allies landed and going from their record at Sandakan and a host of other places I have no doubt they would have.

[Don Boyer]

Outstanding precis, Anzac, and right on. Appreciate the post.

I always think of the BPF as making a substantial contibution within their limits, and that the last battleline at the end of the war included HMS King George V, as well it should have, along with the USS Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, North Carolina and Alabama.

Regards,

[jainso31]

Thank you ANZAC and Don for winding up this tricky(sometimes)thread-I think that all the answers we are going to get have been stated;unless,of course.someone else knows different.
Must admit that I had forgotten ZIPPER and it's implications-thanks for reminding me.Beautiful models Don- the American BB dwarfing KG5 Class

jainso31

[Werlin]

If I'm not very much mistaken, Eisenhower once exclaimed that "the easiest way to shorten the war by 12 months is for someone to put a bullet in Admiral King".
King was popular within some branches of the navy, but not very popular elsewhere. Eisenhower, for example, took strongly Cunninghams side in the discussion of overall naval command during Torch.

In his autobiography, Cunningham - the then first sea lord- relates a quite stunning story of how the US accepted the BPF.
He claims that the USN commanders in the pacific was in favor, and so was many officers in Washington. King on the other hand, an anglophobe if there ever was one, objected strongly and constantly made up new excuses why the BPF couldn't come. High level political, military and diplomatic arguing had been going on for many months, and it seemed like it would go on for many months more.
Also, as mentioned before, Churchill was not in favor of a large BPF operating freely, but believed that it should be used to help regain Singapore, Malaya and other British positions. The Chiefs of Staff, Cunningham, Brooke and Portal, on the other hand argued for a strong BPF operating in the Pacific alongside USN forces.

Now, to the stunning story. (jainso have touched on this, but I thought I give a more complete story, since Cunninghams book is on the table before me anyways) On the journey to the Quebec conference, Churchill had taken the position described above, and was quite adamant, and had not given any signs to his CoS that he would change his mind. And, as said, US (mainly King) and UK chiefs of staff had been in strong disagreement for many months. And it looked like there would never be a BPF.

Then this happens on the first meeting in Quebec:
I let Cunningham tell the story from here (A Sailors Odyssey, p 611)
"Our first plenary meeting with the President, Prime Minister, and the US Chiefs of staff took place the next day. Mr. Churchill led off with a good review of the war in general, and then, somewhat to the surprise of Brooke, Portal and myself, ended by offering the British main fleet for operations against Japan in the central Pacific in co-operation with the American fleet. Mr. Roosevelt at once replied: "No sooner offered than accepted"

Cunningham goes on to say that King in a later meeting tried to claim that the President's acceptance didn't mean what had been said. "Then [King] turned his guns on General Marshall, [and] was finally called to order by Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, with the remark: "I don't think we should wash our linen in public". King, with the other American Chiefs of Staff against him, eventually gave way; but with very bad grace"

The story goes on, that King accepted that he had been defeated, but that the BPF could not expect any help at all from the USN. At the same time, the British where reassured by other USN officers including (if I'm not very much mistaken, but this is taken from memory) Nimitz, who said that they can have whatever they want, in whatever quantity they want, as long as it could be hidden from King.

My take on King is probably biased by Cunningham (who, I'm quite sure, could be quite arrogant himself), but it seems to me like King set his own agenda and his own politics head of both the USN, the war and his political masters.
It is also a shame that so few in the USN remembered the 6th Battle Squadron/US Battleship Division Nine, and their cooperation with the British in the Great War.

What strikes me, is how grateful we should be to Eisenhower and how brilliant that man was. Not only was he, though he was quite junior then, one of the most important figures in promoting USN/RN cooperation (in his capacity as CiC Tourch), but consider this: in the navy the fleet commanders operated nicely and it was only "the guy at the top" that where quarrelsome. Imagine how bad the western front would have been with hotheaded and overly proud characters like Montgomery and Patton if they didn't have Eisenhower at the top.

[jainso31]

Excellent post William but you have not said why Churchill changed HIS mind and I quote from Corelli barnett's Book "Engage the Enemy more [/B]Closely" :-
"Early in August Churchill held a three day staff conference in London,attended by Mountbatten as well as Cabinet Ministers and COS,to TRY and and decide on a British strategy for the war with Japan.In regard to SE Asia,it was agreed to launch a sea borne landing ar Rangoon as soon as forces(including landing craft) could be released from the German war,with Churchill's old favourite "Culverin",as a fill in during the meantime.

Operation Culverin was a planned operation in World War II, in which Allied troops would recapture the northern tip of Sumatra (the present day province of Aceh) from the Japanese. It was never carried out. Lack of resources prevented it being mounted as originally planned, and other events later made it unnecessary.
The idea was first put forward by Winston Churchill at the Quebec Conference on August 20, 1943. He was dissatisfied by the existing scope of Allied plans for the South East Asian Theatre for 1943 and 1944. In his vision, by seizing northern Sumatra, "we should be striking and seizing a point of our own against which the Japanese would have to beat themselves if they wished to avoid the severe drain which would be imposed on their shipping by our air action from Sumatra".
At this point, no detailed staff study of the operation had been made, and the matter was allowed to lapse.

To continue-"But the conference-now Churchill grudgingly too-also agreed that the greatest offer of naval assistance should be made at once to the US Joint COS,it being pressed on them that it was our desire to share with them in the main operations against the mainland of Japan or Formosa.
By this time, of course,Nimitz had won the crushing victory of the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Marianas had fallen into American hands.The United States had less need than ever for British assistance in the Pacific.Nevertheless the PM at the Octagon summit conference in Quebec formally offered Roosevelt [B]the British main fleet including our best and most modern battleships,adequately supported by fleet aircraft carriers ,escort carriers,cruisers,etc.to take part in major operations against Japan under American commandAlthough Roosevelt accepted the offer in principle,Adm.King in a Combined COS meeting the next day still fought a dour rearguard action---the Combined COS under the heaviest possible pressure:-
a)Agreed that the British fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific and
b)Took note of the assurance of the British COS that this fleet would be balanced and self supporting"
So- after all Brooke,Cunningham and Portal, had their way,even though Churchill was not convinced.

jainso31

[Werlin]

Thank you Jim.

And thank you for your post, I did not say because I did not know, so your post was most interesting.

[jainso31]

William- It is a pleasure to have you aboard-you have a great aptitude for the debate-do please become a regular subscriber in this Forum-you can only be an asset and thereby gain stature.

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Admiral King was indeed the major stumbling block in the negotiations over the use of the BPF in the Pacific. As I mentioned earlier, he could also recognize when a fight was no longer worth the effort. Fortunately, Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific could make sure the BPF got support from the USN units there, and he could ignore a lot of King's sour grapes over the situation. Nimitz, in almost daily contact with King, could deal with him better than any other flag officer, Navy or Army, which is one of the main reasons I consider Nimitz America's greatest Admiral and a far better man and Admiral than King ever was. Nimitz could take the heat King put on him with unflappable confidence and "disarm" a lot of the heated criticisms King tossed about so carelessly and callously because Nimitz simply would not be "baited" by King's ascerbic style of management.

Nimitz has his faults, but dealing with King wasn't one of them, luckily for the BPF operations in the Pacific.

[jainso31]

Yessir Don-Nimitz's temperament made him an absolute boon for the USN in WW2-was extremely cool under pressure and never "lost it",even when sorely tried at Leyte.He did prove an excellent "friend" to the somewhat raw BPF which had come into the Pacific Theatre with no previous experience of that arena.As you say Don if he handled King and the mercurial Halsey-who couldn't he handle.I think the event at Kure was one he wisely stayed out of.








jainso31

[jainso31]

Adm NIMITZ Quotes

I do believe we are going to have a major war, with Japan and Germany, and that the war is going to start by a very serious surprise attack and defeat of U.S. armed forces, and that there is going to be a major revulsion on the part of the political power in Washington against all those in command at sea, and they are going to be thrown out, though it won't be their fault necessarily. And I wish to be in a position of sufficient prominence so that I will then be considered as one to be sent to sea, because that appears to be the route.
On his expectations of war, and that he would someday become the Chief of Naval Operations, in a conversation during the mid 1930s with his son, Chester W. Nimitz, Jr.; as quoted in Nimitz (1976) by E. B. Potter. ISBN 0870214926
A ship is always referred to as "she" because it costs so much to keep her in paint and powder.
Remarks to the Society of Sponsors, U.S. Navy, 13 February 1940
Through the skill and devotion to duty of their armed forces of all branches in the Midway area our citizens can now rejoice that a momentous victory is in the making.
It was on a Sunday just six months ago that the Japanese made their peace‑time attack on our fleet and army activities on Oahu. At that time they created heavy damage, it is true, but their act aroused the grim determination of our citizenry to avenge such treachery, and it raised, not lowered, the morale of our fighting men.
Pearl Harbor has now been partially avenged. Vengeance will not be complete until Japanese sea power has been reduced to impotence. We have made substantial progress in that direction. Perhaps we will be forgiven if we claim we are about midway to our objective!
After the Battle of Midway, CINCPAC Communiqué No. 3, (6 June 1942)
Is the proposed operation likely to succeed?
What might be the consequences of failure?
Is it in the realm of practicability in terms of matériel and supplies?
"Three favorite rules of thumb" Nimitz had printed on a card he kept on his desk, as quoted in LIFE magazine (10 July 1944)
By their victory, the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and other units of the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully. Among the Americans serving on Iwo island, uncommon valor was a common virtue.
Statement after the Battle of Iwo Jima (c. March - May 1945); "UNCOMMON VALOR WAS A COMMON VIRTUE" has been inscribed on the USMC War Memorial.
They fought together as brothers in arms; they died together and now they sleep side by side...To them, we have a solemn obligation — the obligation to ensure that their sacrifice will help make this a better and safer world in which to live.
Of those who died in the war in the Pacific, after ceremonies in Tokyo Bay accepting the official surrender of Japan (2 September 1945).
The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war. ... The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan.
Public statement quoted in The New York Times (6 October 1945) and in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (1996) by Gar Alperovitz
When I assumed command of the Pacific Fleet in 31 December, 1941; our submarines were already operating against the enemy, the only units of the Fleet that could come to grips with the Japanese for months to come.
It was to the Submarine Force that I looked to carry the load until our great industrial activity could produce the weapons we so sorely needed to carry the war to the enemy. It is to the everlasting honor and glory of our submarine personnel that they never failed us in our days of peril.
Foreword, in United States Submarine Operations in World War II. (1949) by Theodore Roscoe, p. v
The U.S.'s major strength factor and weapon is its economy. If you cripple it, you cripple the military.
As quoted in "According to Plan" in TIME magazine (13 March 1950)
That is not to say that we can relax our readiness to defend ourselves. Our armament must be adequate to the needs, but our faith is not primarily in these machines of defense but in ourselves.
Speech at the University of California, Berkeley (22 March 1950)
God grant me the courage not to give up what I think is right even though I think it is hopeless.
Appended to a variant of the Serenity Prayer in The Armed Forces Prayer Book (1951)
We shall never forget that it was our submarines that held the lines against the enemy while our fleets replaced losses and repaired wounds.
As quoted in Historic Ship Exhibits in the United States (1969), by United States Naval History Division, United States Navy, p. 24
I felt that it was an unnecessary loss of civilian life... We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything.
On the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as quoted by his widow, who also stated that he had "always felt badly over the dropping of that bomb because he said we had Japan beaten already" in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (1995) by Gar Alperovitz
The enemy of our games was always Japan, and the courses were so thorough that after the start of World War II, nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected.
On his training for warfare in the Pacific at the Naval War college in 1922, as quoted at The American Experience (PBS)
The war with Japan had been enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war. We had not visualized these.
Writing the president of the US Naval War College shortly after World War II. Quoted by Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy]
Hindsight is notably cleverer than foresight

jainso31.

[barryp]

From a (personal) Australian perspective, the machinations of Churchill are clearly crucial, and it appears to me that he had no real understanding of Asian sensibilities. He seems to have thought that if Britain had re-conquered some part of its previous empire in Asia, this would have saved some 'face' for the British. I think this was a false understanding on his part. Providing a key part of the force that actually took the battle to the Japanese at the most critical part of the battle might have made some impression, but I don't think that would have changed the long term outcome for Britain in Asia.

I suspect that the reason that Churchill waxed and wained on the issue is that it was all too foreign for him. The Australian government wanted the British re-engaged in South-East Asia, but again this was to pursue Australia's strategic interests as they perceived them, which was a long way from Britain's perspective.

[jainso31]

Barry I think you have got Churchill just a tad wrong-I cannot argue about his colonialist attitude, because that did prevail in those times-after all he was a Victorian;but to infer that he was not interested in pursuing an aggressive policy in SE Asia because it was too" foreign" for him is incorrect IMO-see below.He was however faced with a rebellion by his COS -so he grudgingly gave in to them re.the establishment of a BPF

Operation Culverin was a planned operation in World War II, in which Allied troops would recapture the northern tip of Sumatra (the present day province of Aceh) from the Japanese. It was never carried out. Lack of resources prevented it being mounted as originally planned, and other events later made it unnecessary.
The idea was first put forward by Winston Churchill at the Quebec Conference on August 20, 1943. He was dissatisfied by the existing scope of Allied plans for the South East Asian Theatre for 1943 and 1944. In his vision, by seizing northern Sumatra, "we should be striking and seizing a point of our own against which the Japanese would have to beat themselves if they wished to avoid the severe drain which would be imposed on their shipping by our air action from Sumatra".

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Jim -- re the following in your previous post:

"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war. ... The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan."

I am wondering about the accuracy of that statement. Not saying it might not have been made, but it is totally incorrect on Nimitz part if it was, and sounds uncharacteristic of him as well. Japan's final notice that they would accept surrender wasnt' available until around August 15th, six days after Nagasaki, and the atomic age had been announced to the public on 6 August (in the US). And the two bombs had a direct effect on military operations in the Pacific -- they convinced the Emperor to tell the most die-hard warriors in Japan to knock it off, period. That's an enormous "military effect". Up until the Showa Emperor spoke, the Imperial Army and navy had still been refusing to surrender except on terms that would have been totally unnaceptable to the Allied Powers.

[Werlin]

Jim: thank you for your kind words, it's much appreciated.

As for Nimitz, I agree heartily with the other comments. He was one of the best admirals of wwii.

[jainso31]

"They fought together as brothers in arms; they died together and now they sleep side by side...To them, we have a solemn obligation — the obligation to ensure that their sacrifice will help make this a better and safer world in which to live."
"Of those who died in the war in the Pacific, after ceremonies in Tokyo Bay accepting the official surrender of Japan (2 September 1945).
The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war. ... The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan".
Public statement quoted in The New York Times (6 October 1945) and in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (1996) by Gar Alperovitz

The first paragraph was part of Adm Nimitz's Homily to the dead of the Pacific War.The second paragraph is the one you have highlighted and is stated as a public statement "quoted" in the New York Times"6th Oct.1945 and may very well have been misconstrued.
Is there any merit in the statement irregardless of who made it "The atomic bomb played no decisive part,from a purely military standpoint,in the defeat of Japan"taking all the words that were supposedly said; given that the Japanese were beaten,but would not admit this- so the the two atomic bombs made up their minds for them.???I cannot disagree that it did have an effect that could be said to be "military".

jainso31