HMCS Uganda: Opting out of War.

[johnny07]

I have read about this before but I was reminded today while watching an old film.
In the East while fighting the Japs the mainly Canadian crew of the cruiser Uganda decided they did'nt want to fight the Japs anymore, they had a vote, gave up the fight and went home. Absolutely unbelievable but true. :confused:

[harry.gibbon]

I have read about this before but I was reminded today while watching an old film.
In the East while fighting the Japs the mainly Canadian crew of the cruiser Uganda decided they did'nt want to fight the Japs anymore, they had a vote, gave up the fight and went home. Absolutely unbelievable but true. :confused:

Amazing what offering up only part of a story can suggest Johnny. There was much more to the situation than you include in your piece, see extract which follows:-
--------
The spring of 1945 found the Allied forces advancing against the Axis1 on all fronts. With victory in Europe only a matter of time, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced on 4 April that the Canadian Government no longer intended to deploy personnel, other than volunteers, to the Pacific Theatre. The "Volunteers Only" 2 policy, as it was called, required that all naval personnel specifically re-volunteer for service in the Pacific Theatre before they would be dispatched to participate in hostilities. Unaware of the impending policy change, HMCS Uganda had already set sail to augment the British Pacific Fleet (BPF).

-------- (continues)

taken from CFB Esquimalt Naval & Military Museum (http://www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/controversies/uganda_episode.html)site.

Little h

[Mitch Hinde]

Hi All

It should also be mentioneed that Uganda had been seriously damaged by a radio controlled bomb in the Med and had been repaired and refitted in the States prior to being handed over to the RCN so would probably have needed working up to achieve anything like an operational condition.
Never does to let the facts get in the way of a good story.

Mitch Hinde

[Brian Wentzell]

Mitch: Not so. HMCS Uganda was in the Pacific Theatre on operations when the Mackenzie King Government's mandated vote was held.
Brian

[jainso31]

Seemingly- a not altogether happy ship; but I do not think she opted out of the war-she was sent home to be re-crewed.This Extract from the book "A Lonely Ambassador"

"According to Makovski the shoot was a success, but one of the pilots
involved told a different tale, later writing that the operation "had been ghastly."
The shoot had been a complete waste of time, as the ship's r/ts [radiotelephones] had not been working properly. Furthermore, one of the ships reported that her "gunnery table" aiming system was u/s [unserviceable]and she was shooting independently. This she did all over the place, and confused the rest...However, shore bombardment was impo rtant to the Navy for it was the only independent contribution which the non-carrier fleet was capable of making in the Pacific. It therefore figured large in
their reports to their Admirals and to the Press, and thus the historyA Lonely Ambassador books, in spite of its insignificant accomplishments and vast consumption of valuable stores.
Such an evaluation may seem rather harsh in light of the advantages of accuracy and effectiveness cruisers offered, but this was after all an indirect shoot.

Signalling procedures had to be near-perfect, and the Admiralty's Director of Gunnery and AntiAircraft Warfare saw problems, relating that "This is really a tale of communications disasters and, apart from technical failures, amounts to another strong recommendation for adequate pre-bombardment exercises with the aircraft airborne." He further insisted that the "results were disappointing.
Mainguy's report on Inmate made clear the fact that the Canadians had as much to learn about bombardment missions as about anti-aircraft operations. In the brief period allowed for training on the way to Truk, Uganda had not once successfully completed an exercise with a spotter, and during the operation communications proved so inadequate
that Achilles had to act as a link between the Canadian ship and the aircraft. Even then,"three way communication only ensued for sho rt periods." Brind concluded that "under the circumstances a direct bombardment could have been effectively employed, but at the late stage this was apparent and since there was no reason to doubt Run 1 had been effective it was not employed."
The apparent breakdown in communications is of interest. Uganda had, as we have seen, been fitted with fighter direction facilities, but these have been rated as"primitive" by recent authors on the subject, and were obviously not up to the kind of communications load imposed by bombardment operations.

This was borne out at Truk,where the pilot reported that he had been able to establish contact with Achilles, but not Uganda. "After a period of ranging with HMNZS Achilles, R/T contact failed, and although both aircraft transmitted long and frequent transmissions to both ships and flew directly over them, no further contact was established... HMNZS Achilles was heard
endeavouring to pass the spotter's initial orders to HMCS Uganda without success."
Truk was Uganda's last operation of note. Although the ship continued to the BPF until the end of July, it did so as part of the cruiser/destroyer screen, the main work of attacking Japanese facilities being left to the Fleet Air Arm. Picket duty could still be somewhat unnerving, as it placed the cruiser out on its own, and one gunnery officer commented that he hoped "not to leave anyone with six inch bricks at their feet." For the most part the cruise was uneventful, though poor living conditions,especially the heat, continued to undermine crew morale.

A. Murray Rogerson remembered that when movies were shown in the hangar, "it would be so hot, with so little air, that the rig to wear was mostly a towel and a pair of shoes. At the end of the movie the deck would be wet with perspiration running off our bodies.
"
The powersthat-be were not ignorant of the situation and tried to mitigate conditions whenever they could, on one occasion requesting from NSHQ the number of Canadian personnel expecting to be serving in the Pacific in future, "in order to estimate beer requirements."
In mid-July Uganda began sailing for Canada to take on a new complement,
hoping to work up in a few weeks and return to the BPF in time to begin operations against the Japanese home islands. It arrived in Esquimalt on 10 August.

But even as the ship was docking, two atomic bombs had already been dropped on Japanese cities".

jainso31

[Mitch Hinde]

Mitch: Not so. HMCS Uganda was in the Pacific Theatre on operations when the Mackenzie King Government's mandated vote was held.
Brian

Hi Brian

Uganda was hit by FX1400 glider bomb on 13th September 1943 and was towed to Malta for temporary repair by US tug Narrangansett and took passage to the USA arriving there on 3rd December 1943 for repair in Charleston South Carolina. During January to September 1944 she was under repair and refit in the US and transfer to the RCN was agreed. On completion of repairs and refit she was re-commissioned and manned by the RCN and the name retained due to colonial connections. On the 30th December she was on passage to UK for completion of repairs not possible in the US. On completion of these repairs she took passage to the Med for working up. In January 1945 she was in Alexandria under repair following explosion of torpedo under maintenance. February 1945 took passage to Australia to join BPF where she acquitted her self well until relieved by HMS Argonaut and returned to Canada following Canadian government decision on volunteers only service in Pacific.

Mitch Hinde

[Brian Wentzell]

Jim: If one reads the first edition of Marc Milner's "Canada's Navy The First Century" a sense of the conditions aboard the ship can be gleaned and the full impact of the government's policy on "volunteering" for service in the Pacific Theatre can be understood.

Reading from pp. 154-155, the scene is portrayed as follows:

" ... on 4 April (1945)-about the time Uganda arrived off Okinawa to support the American landings-the government changed its manning policy for the Pacific war. As a result, all those headed for the Pacific had to revolunteer for such service, and, if they did, they were eligible for thirty days leave in Canada before deployment. No exception ... was permitted, and the obilgation to revolunteer extended to RCN personnel already in the Pacific.
... Uganda's crew... were fully engaged in the shooting war... on May 1, 1945 Uganda and the other cruisers and battleships bombarded the airbases on Shakashima Gunto...
In the midst of all this action came the news of the governments's new policy. Uganda's crew was caught in an insoluble dilemma...
Aboard Uganda, the absurdity of the situation was clear to the men... Apart from the stupidity of the government's policy, the crew was growing tired of conditions aboard a ship designed for a northern climate. As Tony German recounts, Uganda was too poorly ventilated for Pacific service-'the ship was a great steel oven.' British rations were intolerable, fresh water was in short supply, and most men had not been ashore for nine months...
In the end, Uganda's crew were so piqued by (the government's) scheme and so fed up with conditions on board that 600 of the 900 elected not to serve in the Pacific war. She nonetheless carried on with her duties through June and July while the Naval Staff in Ottawa figured out what to do next."

I think this speaks adequately to the reason for her withdrawal from the theatre. The crew did not let down the side, the government of the day did; however, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, had his reasons and those reasons are well recorded by Canadian historians.

Brian

[jainso31]

Agreed Brian-I ought to have included the Canadian Government of the day's policy re.manning of their warships and it's attendant causes of disgruntlement;
but in my defence, I did not support the theory of "opting out of the war"-as it was put in the thread intro.

jainso31

[Brian Wentzell]

Jim: The politics behind the Prime Minister Mackenzie King decision is fascinating but it would be too much to explain it in a blog. My very surface summary follows.

It should be noted that all Canadian sailors and air personnel in World War II were volunteers. The very limited army draft was the result of severe shortages of infantry soldiers in 1944 and the imposition of compulsory service nearly destroyed the government and country. Thus the decision requiring volunteers to re-volunteer made some political and moral sense as many of the volunteers had signed on before the Japanese entered the war.

The Pacific Theatre was also a difficult political issue as we were badly burned by the United Kingdom in the debacle of the fall of Hong Kong. British led operations in the Western Pacific and political dreams of restoration of Asian elements of the Empire were difficult for the Canadian government to support.

Furthermore, the close relationship of the RCN and RN was regarded by our politicians with great suspicion. Hence, the desire for a Canadian Pacific Fleet of two carriers, two cruisers, and fourteen Tribal and Cr Class destroyers, and supporting vessels. was not well supported in Ottawa. Fortunately, the war ended before the whole matter escalated. Canada was more comfortable with United States leadership in the war against Japan.

Regards,
Brian

[jainso31]

WOW!!!Brian even having lived this long- I never realised that there was any sort of antipathy between the the two countries except as stated in last para.
.Pray do expand if you can- on "burned by the UK over the debacle of the fall of Hong Kong"and "the close relationship between RCN and RN was regarded with great suspicion by Canadian politicians"
I am aware of some animosity between Monty and some Canadian Army Generals-but that was Monty!!In RAF Bomber Command-the Canadians had their own Group (6).
I would have thought the real hurt would have been caused by the profligate loss of Canadian life at DIEPPE!! A Churchillian disaster (backed by Mountbatten) of monstrous proportions.

jainso31

[Brian Wentzell]

Jim: This is Battle of Atlantic weekend which is celebrated by the Merchant Navy Veterans (today, Saturday) and by the RCN Veterans tomorrow (Sunday). My wife and I attended the Merchant Navy ceremony today as my uncle was torpedoed twice in World War 2 and survived. The first time he was helmsman on the Norwegian ship "Stargaard" and in the second case was a crewman on the Canadian ship "Lord Strathcona". Hence, the tardiness in my response to your interesting questions.

In my opinion, there were several independent but related events in and prior to World War 2 that led to Canadian discomfort with British leadership.

The Hong Kong venture had obscure origins. Essentially, the British Army's close relationship with the Canadian Army and the desire of the British to get Canada involved in the Pacific Theatre provided the basis for a request from the British Government for an Infantry Brigade of garrison troops to help secure Hong Kong. British intelligence failed to comprehend the competence and intentions of the Japanese Army to take the colony. Churchill had already decided the colony could not be defended successfully but, of course, did not share that with Canadian politicians. Canada lacked the ability to properly assess the risks associated with the venture and relied upon British representations.

The two infantry battalions had no combat experience but fought valiantly with heavy losses in battle and in their subsequent captivity. The debacle led to a Royal Commission of Inquiry, which has been considered to be a whitewash, that exonerated the Canadian Government from culpability. However, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was not prepared to be burned a second time. Hence, this was one reason for his reluctance to get the country involved in a land war in the Western Pacific or even an extensive naval or air campaign.

Prior to World War 2 the RN had propositioned Canada to develop a significant navy that would mimic the RN through the construction of cruisers and destroyers to take over protection of Canadian waters and to contribute to the defence of the Empire. This included the funding of at least one British battleship. Canada declined to contribute and kept defence expenditures to a minimum.

The losses suffered by the Canadian Expeditionary Forces in France in World War 1 had not been forgotten. The Battle of Vimy Ridge had demonstrated that Canadian generals and troops were just as competent as their British cousins in the execution of operations. Thus, Canada could and would make decisions that reflected its own interests. Fortifying the Empire was not of great importance. Neither was its restoration.

The RN and RCN were of a different mind and had concluded that a robust contribution to the British Pacific Fleet was in order. The Prime Minister had not been consulted and was not happy to learn of the conniving. While the gift of HM Ships Uganda and Minotaur was accepted and the concept of two light carriers and the squadron of "Cr" destroyers approved, the Government made it clear that the ships would operate in regions of the Pacific Ocean that were important to Canada. In practice it appears that this was the central Pacific where US forces were pushing the Japanese back. Canada had maintained defensive forces in the Eastern Pacific and worked closely with US forces in recovering the Aleutian Islands and defending North America.

The political decision to staff the Pacific Theatre with re-volunteering volunteers was a clever means to thwart the rush of the Canadian generals and admirals to swing troops, sailors and air force personnel from the European Theatre to the Pacific. Many of these volunteers had been overseas for up to five years and were war weary. They had signed on to defeat the Germans and Italians of the Axis and were rejoicing in the result.

Dieppe was a sore point and, like Hong Kong, the real story has not be ascertained. Many pointed their fingers at Lord Mountbatten while others believe that Churchill must have been involved. The truth has never been revealed. However, the seeds of distrust had been planted.

With world peace in sight, the Canadian politicians were starting to think about post war adjustment and demobilization. Japan would certainly fall, the question was when and at what cost. The US would largely determine the answer to these questions and did so.

In the result by late 1944 and early 1945, Canadian politicians were reluctant to get "overly" involved in the Pacific. British leadership was no longer accepted without question.

Regards,
Brian

[BlackBat242]

Just wondering why, since this is about the RCN almost entirely, this is in the RN section rather than the RCN section... where logic says it should be?

[jainso31]

Good morning Brian -many thanks for the explanation re the antipathy vis a vis the Government of Canada felt towards the Government of the UK.

Looking at the Great war Canadian casualties:-
VIMY RIDGE-A splendid victory =4000
SOMME-!st Newfoundland regiment destroyed=65 left out of 800*
PASSCHENDAELE-4000 dead 17000 wounded
LAST 100 DAYS-46000 casualties*
Total=67000 dead 241000 wounded for the Great War

I thought that I was a military historian but I forgot completely the Canadian Contingent at Hong Kong-it's an age thing!!

Both Churchill and Mountbatten were the originators of DIEPPE-"blooding the Canadians" and then some.All those casualties 3158 out of 3890 total casualties; for an abject failure.Mountbatten remarked later that D Day was won on the beaches of Dieppe!!
I could go on- but I now see where you are coming from.I appreciate your efforts.

jainso31

[Brian Wentzell]

Jim: Thank you for mentioning the Battle of Beaument Hamel which occurred on July 1, 1916. Newfoundland was an independent dominion until it joined canada in 1949. The Canadian Government probably did not consider the senseless sacrifice of Newfoundlanders in World War 1 in their political calculations of World War 2.

However, the Newfoundlanders certainly did and that is why they raised and contributed a regiment of field artillery troops in the second war for European operations. They also raised 125 (Newfoundland) Squadron, RAF [a fighter squadron] and contributed individual sailors for service in RN and RCN ships. There were also home guard forces supplemented by large numbers of Canadian and US personnel and units.

In the interest of full disclosure; I commanded the 2nd, Battalion, Royal Newfoundland Regiment from 1983 to 1988 and the Newfoundlan Militia District which consisted of both battalions, engineers, logistics and headquarters units from 1989 to 1992.

Regards,
Brian

[jainso31]

I am honoured to make your acquaintance Brian-one never knows who we are going to meet in these Forum Halls.As the CO of the Newfoundland Militia District-would that be a Colonel.???

jainso31

[Brian Wentzell]

Jim: Indeed that was my final rank.
Brian

[Forester]

I never realised that there was any sort of antipathy between the the two countriesCertainly not between our own and the "Prairie Sailors". My father's ship was in Canadian C1 Escort Group and, although Royal Navy, the captain had the Maple Leaf emblem painted on the forrard funnel - but in green to avoid confusion. The crews of the various ships mixed ashore and while in dry dock in Halifax for two weeks for repairs, the crew of Forester were each entertained to a week's home visit with Canadian families, leading to many long term/long distance relationships.

[the Chief]

An aquaintance of mine (now sadly deceased) was on Uganda (stoker)and told me about this episode. He said the Americans could not get their heads around it and thought of it as nothing less than desertion. He told me that when they got to Pearl on the way home they were not allowed in the inner harbour and were denied any shore leave. He thought it was the stupidest move ever as they all had volunteered in the first place to serve anywhere. He felt that the right thing to do would have been to ORDER Uganda home and then get it sorted out in Esquimalt.