Pearl Harbor: The Attack

[herakles]

I add these pictures for your interest.



These Pearl Harbor photos were found in an old Brownie camera stored in a foot locker.
What quality from 1941!

THESE PHOTOS WERE APPARENTLY TAKEN BY A SAILOR WHO WAS SERVING ON THE USS QUAPAW ATF-11O.

[herakles]

I have higher quality pics of these as well.

[astraltrader]

Some interesting photo`s, Herk. I think that I can place most of them with the exception of photo 7 and 10.

1. USS Arizona burning in Battleship Row.
2. USS Nevada burning.
3. The wrecks of USS Downes and USS Cassin.
4. USS Shaw exploding.
5. USS Shaw burning in dry dock YFD-2.
6. View of Naval Air Station Ford Island across to USS Shaw exploding.
7. ??
8. Damaged Catalina flying boat.
9. View looking down toward USS Nevada.
10. ??

Perhaps someone else can put a name to the other two pictures?

[astraltrader]

To go with these from Herk, here are a few taken mainly by the Japanese during the actual raid. The last two are of a rescue of survivors from USS West Virginia and finally an aerial shot of the destruction taken three days after the raid...

[herakles]

Your pictures are very graphic Terry.

Are you able to identify the remaining pictures that I posted?

Or anyone else for that matter!

[BB60]

Top row left to right, numbering the pics 1 through 10.

1 Hickam Field, looking toward the Southeast. Hangars and aircraft are burning. Pearl Harbor is behind and below the photographer.

2 Battleship row, early in the attack. R to L Oklahoma has heavy port-side list and West Virgina is listing also. Inboard ships are Tennessee and Marlyand. Arizona has not exploded yet, Vestal is still alongside. Nevada is to the far left is trying to get underway. The stern of oiler Neosho is visible to the extreme right.

3 View of Battleship row toward the the East. West Virginia and Oklahoma have taken torpedo hits, oil is visibly spilling from West Virginia. Torpedos are in the water, bearing down on the West Virginia and/or Oklahoma. The time is no later than 0755.

4 Looking toward the Northwest. Hickam Field at the bottom, East Loch in the middle and Ford Island is under the Japanese airplane, a Nakajima B5N "Kate". Must be late in the raid; Arizona is burning furiously and Oklahoma is capsized. Ships at drydocks are burning.

5 Japanese plane trailing smoke.

6. This looks like a view of the East Loch, looking to the Southwest. Closest ships appear to the the Mt Whitney, Conyngham, Reid, Tucker, Case and Selfridge. The far left is Ford Island with smoke from burning ships. The Mt Whitney is a tender, the others are destroyers.

7 ?

8. View of Ford Island looking to the East. Smoke plume in center is Arizona. Battleship to the right, along picture border is the California, which is sinking. The Oklahoma is visible capsized to the left of the California's aft cage mast.

9. I think this is the West Virgnina with the Tennessee inboard. Burning oil from the Arizona is threatening to envelope these two.

10 Self explanatory. Top left California, Bottom of Oklahoma, Maryland inboard, sunken West Virginia wedged against the Tenessee, which is wedged against the pylons. Arizona at bottom, leaching large amounts of oil. Land mass to the top is Ford Island.

[BB60]

Top three pics left to right

1. View from the sub yard, buildings are probably the Navy Yard adjacent to the drydocks. This was near the oil storage tanks that Japanese failed to address and could have crippled naval operations for a long, long time had they been damaged or destroyed.

2. Battleship Row. Recently capsized Oklahoma to the left, West Virginia to the stern, Rear tripod of Arizona visible to the right. Nevada may already be underway and out of the picture to the right. This one was made after the Arizona has blown up, as the Arizona's explosion and the Oklahoma's capsizing were at about the same time.

3. View from the 1010 dock, looking to the West. Capsized Oglala immediate foreground. Fires appear to be coming from the drydock area, the big plume of smoke to the right is probably the Shaw. The Oglala was not actually struck by any Japanese ordinance, she suffered concussion damage from nearby hits on the Helena. She was an old ship, not originally built for the Navy. She was jokingly said to have sank from fright. Look at her and read about the efforts to salvage her here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Oglala_(CM-4)). It was interesting.

[herakles]

Crikey Jeff, you know your Pearl Harbor! Thanks so much for putting in the detail.

[BB60]

Thanks Herk. I have those pics on my puter, plus a good many more.

In the third pic of the first group, showing the capsized Oglala and the Shaw burning, it also show the the USS Nevada, although she is not very visible in the pic, as it is small. My larger one clearly shows the Nevada to the very right, partially cut-off, also burning. She had gotten underway after the Arizona was lost and was making a run for the sea. She was hit by several bombs and torpedos as she cruised up the channel, eventually ending up grounded at Hospital Point in a sinking condition. She was the only BB to get underway during the raid, as she was in the process of switching over boilers and had most of them lit when the raid commenced.

The California and the Oklahoma were both opened up for inspection and were never able to establish water-tight integrity, due to immediate severe damage and flooding. The West Virginia almost suffered the same fate as the Oklahoma. Were it not for the actions of the LT Claude Ricketts, who ordered counterflooding and allowed the ship to settle on the harbor floor on her bottom, she would undoubtably would have capsized also.

Of the five BBs sunk at Pearl Harbor, 3 returned to fight in the war. Five of the six BBs that comprised Jess Oldendorf's battleline at the Surigao Strait were at Pearl Harbor that day in 1941- the USS Pennsylvania, California, Tennessee, Maryland and West Virginia, with the California and West Virginia sunk and raised.

[BB60]

Here is an interesting picture from that day, in that it shows two disasters in one picture.

The first disaster is obviously the USS Arizona exploding.

The second one is on the very right hand side of the picture. It is the aft tripod head of the Oklahoma as she is rolling over. You have to look closely, but it is plainly there, inside the little triangle of clear sky, surrounded by smoke and flame.

Just to the left on the bottom margin of this "triangle", partly obscured, you can see the silhouette of what is most likely the #2 turret and guns of the USS Tennessee.

[herakles]

Yes, you can see it but it needs quite a lot of magnification.

What a tragedy this was. To say nothing of the infamy.

[bd popeye]

Hi there! I'm Big Daddy Popeye. Some of you may know me from other forums. I'm new to your forum. I've been on line since
1999. I served in the USN from 1971-'91.

Those pictures were not found in a Brownie camera somewhere near Pearl Harbor. They were found at one of the two web sites below;

http://www.navsource.org/

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usn-name.htm

For verfication go here;

http://www.snopes.com/photos/military/pearlharbor.asp

I've seen these photos many times and it would be impossible for a sailor to be in all those places on that day unless he was Superman. Period.

One last thing the USS Quapaw was not in commision until 1944.

The USS QUAPAW ATF 110 ( Auxiliary Tug Fleet ) was built by the United Engineering Company of Alameda, California, her keel being laid on 28 December 1942, launched on 15 May 1943, sponsored by Mrs. N.Lehman, and commissioned on 6 May, 1944, Lt. Comdr. N.H. Castle in command.

[herakles]

Really popeye? So I was tricked when I received those photos? How odd.

Thanx for the correction.

[bd popeye]

Really popeye? So I was tricked when I received those photos? How odd.

Thanx for the correction.

Yes that FW email has been floating around on line for several years. Great photos never the less!

[BB60]

Number 7 is a view of the seaplane base on Ford Island.

Number 10 appears to be a view across the East Loch, possibly looking east to west for the Sub base. Smoke from fires at dry docks. This is just a guess.

I don't think Number 2 is the USS Nevada burning. It looks more like the USS Shaw burning in a floating drydock to me.

[BB60]

I found another pic that shows what the 10th picture is. It is looking from the Sub base, but to the northwest, not the west. The billowing black smoke is from the burning battleships.

The pic I found is an aerial shot made two weeks before the attack and the same little ship is moored there that is visible in pic 10. Submarines would be moored to the left and right, buildings and then the tank farm is behind the photographer.

[herakles]

Great detective work Jeff!

[John Odom]

As the anniversary approaches, I would like to suggest we all review that day. I was 5 years old, and between Havanna and Miami on my way from Panama to the Philippines (Via the US) when the Captain announced that Pearl Harbor had been bombed and "we are at war." If my Dad hadn't been sick and delayed in finishing a project in Colon Panama we would have already been in Manila and become guests of the Japanese in the Philippines for the duration of the war.

There is a lot of good material on the Pearl Harbor attack at the USS Oklahoma site. I would like to suggest you take a look at:

http://www.ussoklahoma.com/

The USS Oklahoma survivors site. There is a lot to see, hear and do there. Between the time I first met with the survivors in Oklahoma City in 2005 and now, many brave survivors have passed on. I am so glad I got to meet many of them and hear their stories.

I was in Pearl Harbor for the dedication of the USS Oklahoma Monument last December 7, 2007.

For my connection to the "Okie" see my web page, the URL is in my SIG below.

[herakles]

As the anniversary of Pearl Harbor is upon us, members might like to watch this video of that day and listen to a personal reminiscence of someone there.

http://www.marshallkarp.blogspot.com/

[John Odom]

That was a great video, Herk. Thanks for posting the link. It is humbling and awe inspiring to hear the stories from the men who were there. I'll never look at the pictures of the capsixed Oklahoma the same way as I did before I met both men who were trapped in her, and the men who cut them out. We must never forget.

We Americans know, but don't really appreciate what the Brits went through BEFORE Pearl Harbor.

[herakles]

Thanks John.

One of the many good things about the net is that the memories of ex-servicemen can be captured and shared with many others.

[John Odom]

Ensign Flaherty was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on the USS Oklahoma 67 years ago today. I feel so honored to have had the privelege of talking to and hearing the stories of men who were saved by Enisgn Falherty's actions. I was also priveleged to talk to the man who lifted every one of the survivors who were cut from her hull, and to a dockyard worker who helped cut them out. I have cut and pasted Ensign Flaherty's citation below:

*FLAHERTY, FRANCIS C.

Rank and organization: Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve. Born: 15 March 1919, Charlotte, Mich. Accredited to: Michigan.

Citation:
For conspicuous devotion to duty and extraordinary courage and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. When it was seen that the U.S.S. Oklahoma was going to capsize and the order was given to abandon ship, Ens. Flaherty remained in a turret, holding a flashlight so the remainder of the turret crew could see to escape, thereby sacrificing his own life.

I

[herakles]

That was the action of a very brave man.

Let us also remember the brave men whose actions were not recognised.

[bluestreak]

I recently received an e-mail with these shots of Pearl Harbour after the Japanese attack. I think they are very evocotive and certainly bring home the amount of destruction suffered. I hope they are of some use for someones archive.

[Don Boyer]

BLUESTREAK:

I am actually very glad you put those photos in the post, but not for the reason you might suspect. First off, I would bet that those pictures were attached to a gushing email full of exclamation points and colored sentences I’ve gotten about 20 times in the past year stating that these are photographs “recovered from and old Brownie camera found in a trunk belonging to a sailor from the USS Quapaw” or something similar. Fantastic, never before seen, blah blah blah. I would dearly love to go to lunch with the originator of that email so I could slip powdered bamboo in his/her tea.

(Bluestreak, if these photos are not from the email you got, bear with me, because that email is soooo annoying we need to get the word out on the Forum anyway and the photos are the same ones.)

As my Australian buddy from many years ago used to say: “Let’s have a look at it, mate!”

Now, these are authentic December 7th photos of Pearl Harbor, there is no doubt of that. But for you buffs out there who may see this again, here’s the real scoop.

1. It is chemically impossible for a role of exposed film from that long ago to have survived in quality shape short of having been stored in deep space next to the Alien eggs. Proof of that? Take a look at Dulin and Garzke’s “Axis and Neutral Battleships of WWII,” which reproduces two photos taken of Yamato and Musashi departing Brunei, Borneo on October 23, 1944 from a role of film “stored in a camera for years.” You can tell what you’re looking at, but the quality sucks.
2. No Brownie camera in history ever took a photo of the quality of those Pearl Harbor shots unless owned by Ansel Adams or Edward Steichen. I hate to say it, but I’ve used my grandma’s old Brownie , and it didn’t take that kind of picture.
3. The USS Quapaw, a fleet tug (ATF-110) was not commissioned until 1944. At my request, the Miracle Council of the Catholic Church at the Vatican is currently investigating her presence at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, prior to the steel for the ship having been made.
4. I have also requested an investigation by the same group of the sailor who purportedly took the photos because, for example, he was apparently able to photograph the explosion of the destroyer Shaw from at least four vantage points within seconds of each other and across water. Last I heard, only one fella I know could do that, and although he was unquestionably there on December 7th, I hardly think he was doing anything other than lovingly gathering the lambs to the fold.

It’s a shame that these excellent photos, all part of the 14th Naval District photo collection, all in the public domain, and published in books for years, have to be surrounded by such silly and unnecessary BS and shipped around the world.

Again, Bluestreak,, if those photos weren’t from that specific email, forgive my rant, but they are the same set of photos as the email I am talking about here.

I think this catches us up on the issues you’ve all raised. Look forward to more Pearl Harbor “stuff.”

[NASAAN101]

guys,
the bomb that hit Arizona,from some of the photos, it look like it went down the smokestack, is that even posible?? its just sad they didnt move the us battleships back to the states, and then japan couldnt sink any of them.. what so you guys thing?
Nikki

[Andy3E]

guys,
the bomb that hit Arizona,from some of the photos, it look like it went down the smokestack, is that even posible?? its just sad they didnt move the us battleships back to the states, and then japan couldnt sink any of them.. what so you guys thing?
Nikki

I think your referring to the plume of smoke which shoots out of the Arizona's stack? thats most likely due to as the explosion and fire move throughout the ship it took the path of least resistance and shot out through the boiler rooms and up the stack while the rest of the explosion had to move through the structure of the ship.

As for the fleet being at Pearl to begin with, the ships were there (i presume) to specifically give the Japanese pause for thought before invading any US interests in the pacific such as the Philippines, If the fleet were in the US there was even less keeping the japanese from invading any territory they wanted (perhaps even the Hawaiian islands themselves)

[Don Boyer]

guys,
the bomb that hit Arizona,from some of the photos, it look like it went down the smokestack, is that even posible?? its just sad they didnt move the us battleships back to the states, and then japan couldnt sink any of them.. what so you guys thing?
Nikki

Hi, Nikki, once again:

See my post #27 above in regard to the explosion on the Arizona. That plume from the stack is back pressure from the bulkheads between turret 2 and the forward boiler room, plus all their substructures being blown out backwards by the simultaneous detonation of all the forward magazines that crushed the boilers, venting all that pressure via the path of least resistance back out the stack flues. The collapse and destruction of all that understructure on the Arizona is what shifted the conning tower forward and down almost against turret two, and pulling the bridge and foremast down.

A bomb dropped from an airplane not only drops, it has an angular forward motion as well, making it impossible to go "straight down the stack". Had it hit the stack, it would have gone through it at an angle and come out the opposite side. Had it done so, the Arizona might have survived, but she was hit by the "golden bomb" like the "golden shell" on Hood that ensured her destruction.

As Andy3E encapsulated above, the decision to forward deploy the battleship and carrier fleet to Pearl Harbor, made by President Roosevelt was intended as a political message to Japan to stop her aggressive moves in China and her intentions to absorb more Asian territory to the south. It was a calculated political gesture, and it didn't pay off.

Admiral Richardson, the then current Pacific Fleet commander, objected strenuously to President Roosevelt against such a move and got fired for his efforts, leaving his successor, Admiral Husband Kimmel to become the great scapegoat for Pearl Harbor, along with General Short.

The fact that this fleet move also placed the fleet within reach of Japanese plans to eventually have to war against America (Japan had committed to war well before even the planning for the Pearl Harbor attack was started) was completely underestimated by the politicians and the military, who had no idea at all that Japan had developed a six-carrier attack force, the famed "Kido Butai" with the skill and cunning to execute an undetected attack against Pearl Harbor.

It had, in earlier American naval exercises, been shown that it could be done or at least that it was technically feasible with the aircraft carriers and planes of the period, but no one from the top down thought it was POSSIBLE or even PROBABLE as a Japanese wartime strategy except by a very few Japan experts who were too low-ranking to be listened to. One does note however, that six months after Pearl Harbor, four of the six carriers of the vaunted Kido Butai lay on the bottom of the ocean off Midway and Japan's dreams of glory and conquest died with them, although they didn't realize it at the time.

Sort of like it was thought possible but highly improbable that well-financed terrorists could fly airliners into major metropolitan buildings.

[NASAAN101]

Don,
I didn't realize you already said about it? that was my bad ok..
Nikki

[Don Boyer]

Nothng bad about that at all --- I missed stuff all the time wandering about this forum...just ask qprdave...lol..

[NASAAN101]

She was a cool ship.. its just sadly we do side-whiped, i was thing if anyone was going to bring us in, it was goin to be germany.
Nikki

[spatzthecat]

Hi

The fifth and final sub found with no torpedoes aboard, see...

http://chattahbox.com/us/2009/12/07/pearl-harbor-day-nova-announces-finding-missing-mini-submarine-in-41-attack/

Spatz

[Don Boyer]

We need to see photographs for this one, but should be a very interesting story if true.

[John Odom]

Today's Paper quoted the AP as saying that there is evidence this sub entered the harbor and torpedoed the Oklahoma. I will be interested in seeing the evidence when it is made public.

[Don Boyer]

Today's Paper quoted the AP as saying that there is evidence this sub entered the harbor and torpedoed the Oklahoma. I will be interested in seeing the evidence when it is made public.

That tech site I think it was you pointed out (Naval Technical Board), has a whole article devoted to questioning that photo that purportedly shows a mini-sub firing torpedoes. It would be a great new historical part of the Pearl Harbor story if it were true, but I want to see photographs!!! Hopefully, the NOVA special will actually show something of historical significance instead of pulling the "Nostradamus" game of "it COULD have happened this way" and all that crap that passes for historical reporting today in between episodes of that TV vomit "Ice Road Truckers" and the like. Fortunately, NOVA has a better rep for real science than the History Channel of late.

God rest the Oklahoma's souls....
Regards,

[CGRET]

Well, let's hope they do not use the japanese combat photo's of the torpedo attack on battleship row which does in fact show torpedo trail's in that direction.

Let hope the mystery of the missing torpedo's is solved.

Regards
Charles

[mike d]

This is facinating news! If I understand the article correctly,the mini sub remains were dredged up with the wreckage of those LST's that were destroyed during the war and then dumped at sea.
I believe the photo in question is the one re-produced in Day of Infamy,is it not? The documentary I saw a few years back showed either that picture or one in the same series and supposedly showed evidence of the torpedo tracks leading to Oklahoma as coming from a mini sub positioned in the Southeast Loch or close to the end of 1010 dock.
I think we shall have to pick Don Boyer's brain on this one!!
For example...Day of Infamy shows a photo of the sub sunk by Monaghan being buried in sea wall construction,with another mini sub on a flat bed in the background. Were the crew remains ever repatriated? Where was the wreck of the recently found mini sub discovered compared with its possible firing position in the harbour?
The mini subs had two torpedo tubes forward but did they have re-load capability?
Was one torpedo fired at Oklahoma and West Virginia each,or both at Oklahoma? Questions, questions, questions.............

[Don Boyer]

I've got as many questions as you guys do!

I've always thought the little "distortion" in the Japanese photo was some effect other than the possibility of one of the mini-subs broaching after firing. I based this simply on my feeling that if I was a mini-sub commander, the last piece of water I would want to be in to launch my torpedoes would be the same piece of water as the aircraft from the carriers were using! That to me is just asking for it. But as we know, those guys have to be credited with the cojones of bulls just for taking on the job in the first place. Have to give them credit for that.

As to having to bring in some heavy lift equipment to West Loch after the disaster, it seems reasonable that would be done regardless, as we are talking about chunks of LSTs and such, which are not little tiny boats even if they aren't battleships.

There are still a lot of bits of those exploded ships remaining in West Loch, as a Google Earth look will show...in fact I snuck onto part of one of the LSTs with some friends when I was in high school, of course having no idea that qualified EOD personnel blanch at the thought of having to go aboard those remains. The decks are literally covered in unexploded 20 mm and 40 mm shells and who knows what else...

Another issue is the crew..there was supposedly a "safe house" but it was on the tip of the Pearl Peninsula (that suspiciously shaped piece of ground that dangles into Pearl from the north) and that would have been a real piece of work for two lonely Imperial sailors.

LIke you said, questions, questions, questions, and I am as interested and amazed as anyone if this is really the final piece of the mini-sub puzzle. And I state here for all to see, I haven't got the slightest idea whose right or wrong yet and am afraid to even guess!

Let's see -- what else. The sub on the flatbed was the one recovered from Bellows. And the mini subs carried only the two torpedoes and had no reload capability. If I remember correctly, if there were crew remains in the Monaghan sub, they stayed with the sub when it was buried in the new dock. Seems a logical way to go.

I will say one thing, I want to see photographs of what cannot be anything other than one of the mini-subs. No if, ands, or buts. None of this shakey, out of focus stuff like you see every time someone videos a UFO (Where does one go to get a video recorder that not only shakes uncontrollably but constantly remains out of focus only when filming alien invasions? And do they cost less than ones that actually work all the time??? You know what I mean.) :)

I can't wait for the NOVA special -- this would be something truly new and exciting for us Pearl Harbor buffs that have about exhausted the "what ifs" around the Pearl Harbor attack. And some of us who have been pretty adamant that that could not possibly be a sub in the photo launching against Oklahoma (include yours truly) may have a large dish of crow pie to eat!

Regards

[Pelican]

Good evening Gents.
I also received fotos posted by Bluestreak in his post 41 but in addition received the attached which may be of interest? Trust I am not duplicating.
Thank you for your advice Alan.

[Don Boyer]

Mousey:

First off, let me say no reflection on you personally, but that "Brownie camera" has been the bane of Pearl Harbor history buffs for going on three years now.

I just can't tell you how much I would like to meet and have lunch with the person who started the "old Brownie" camera email so I could put powdered bamboo in their tea.

There never was such a camera. No Brownie ever made could take pictures of the quality of the ones accompanying that email. I know, I used my Grandmother's Brownie as a lad. No film of any kind, once exposed, could survive chemically intact over that period of time. Furthermore, each and every one of those photos is from official US Navy sources now in the National Archives and in the public domain since the 1950s. They've been around for years.

The real killer in those photos is how could one man get so many shots of the exploding Shaw from so many different angles from such widely separated spots on shore and separated by only a few seconds in time, to say nothing of water?

I've only heard of one person who could walk on water, and I am sure He was at Pearl Harbor on that day too, but not taking photographs.

The photos are real Pearl Harbor photos. The "camera story" is, unfortunately, pure BS. Why someone would need to attach such a cock and bull story to such good photos is beyond me.

Respectfully, and with Holiday Cheer,

[Pelican]

"Why someone would need to attach such a cock and bull story to such good photos is beyond me."

May I suggest Don that the answer is at the end of the email as shown below. Perhaps to draw attention or see who is paying attention, bearing in mind that people like me are comparatively new to modern computers and the internet plus many are joining every day and would not have seen the fotos before. Again like me. Have a peaceful Christmas.

"Share this with people of ALL ages...Elderly will remember, Young will be Awed."

[Marek T]

... No film of any kind, once exposed, could survive chemically intact over that period of time. ...
I agree, though I have once developed a film that was almost 40 years old. I left it in developing solution for twice the time prescribed for that kind of film and the outcome was quite good, though the photos still looked as if underdeveloped a bit.

[Don Boyer]

Mousey:

That may be true. However, my problem is creating a phony story and attaching those great photographs to it instead of doing a far better thing -- publishing the photos and crediting the photographers who took them...they were risking their lives out there to get those shots. Shrapnel, wayward AA fire, machine gun fire, people shooting people out of sheer panic, stuff exploding --it was easy to get killed on that day if you were exposed, even after the Japanese had left. Do they get any credit in that email?? Nope...just and old camera "found in a trunk" belonging to a sailor on a ship supposedly in Pearl Harbor that day that hadn't even been built yet (there are several versions of that email floating about).

Marek T:

There are photographs in Dulin and Garzke's Battleship book on Axis and Neutral battleships of WWII that were taken out of a Japanese camera after many many years and developed. They show Musashi and Yamato leaving Brunei, Borneo with their heavy cruiser escort enroute to Leyte Gulf. You can distinguish the two battleships from the cruisers, and that's about it. They by no means approach the solid, detailed, focused quality of the photos attached to that email. That is what I based my comment on regarding old film survival.

Sincerely.

[Bear]

You are correct, Don, the remains of the midget sub crew were left in the sub when they buried it in the sea wall they were making.
Those early Japanese midgets had the torpedoes loaded externally.
Burying the crew without acknowledgment was the right way to go. Admiral Muirhead-Gould, RN (commonly known as manurehead by his subordinates--well he would be,wouldn't he?), gave the four midget sub crew recovered in Sydney Harbour a burial with full military honours and then sent the ashes home with the returning Japanese Ambassador to Australia.
This was a massive propaganda coup for the Japanese who used it both to glorify the actions of their dead submariners and also to tell their people that Australians thought Japanese far braver and better fighters than their own people.
A couple of good books are 'First Shot" by John Craddock--it contains a few historical and technical errors, but is a good overview of the mini-subs at Pearl.
Another good one is 'Underwater Warriors' by Paul Kemp. Again, the book has some factual errors, but is a good look at the mini-subs, human torpedoes and doings of frogmen from all nations.

[Don Boyer]

Thanks for the post, Bear, appreciate the confirmation.

Similarly, the Captain of the USS Missouri had the half of the Japanese airman who crashed into the side of the ship buried at sea with military honors, which did not sit well with many aboard the ship. Of course, in this case, the Japanese could not make a propaganda coup out of it. The Admiral made a bad PR move for sure.

I have the Burlingame book "Advance Force Pearl Harbor" which covers in detail the operations of the Japanese HAs in the war and I also have the book on Italian operations -- far more successful than the Japanese. I will add the others to my "list" of future reading which is probably longer than I have years left!

Thanks,

[BB60]

Mousey:

First off, let me say no reflection on you personally, but that "Brownie camera" has been the bane of Pearl Harbor history buffs for going on three years now.

I just can't tell you how much I would like to meet and have lunch with the person who started the "old Brownie" camera email so I could put powdered bamboo in their tea.

There never was such a camera. No Brownie ever made could take pictures of the quality of the ones accompanying that email. I know, I used my Grandmother's Brownie as a lad. No film of any kind, once exposed, could survive chemically intact over that period of time. Furthermore, each and every one of those photos is from official US Navy sources now in the National Archives and in the public domain since the 1950s. They've been around for years.

The real killer in those photos is how could one man get so many shots of the exploding Shaw from so many different angles from such widely separated spots on shore and separated by only a few seconds in time, to say nothing of water?

I've only heard of one person who could walk on water, and I am sure He was at Pearl Harbor on that day too, but not taking photographs.

The photos are real Pearl Harbor photos. The "camera story" is, unfortunately, pure BS. Why someone would need to attach such a cock and bull story to such good photos is beyond me.

Respectfully, and with Holiday Cheer,

My sentiments exactly.

[CGRET]

I too have seen up close the remains of the LSt in the west lock. I was stationed on the USCGC Mallow and we had some bouy work to preform. It was known at that time there was still unexploded ordance around the area. The ship used extreme caution (GQ was set) when setting a bouy's in the area because of that fact.

Regards
Charles

[Don Boyer]

Yet we doofus kids get on and off with no trouble! We did take extra care -- goes to show how true that old saw is about God protecting kids and inebriated sailors. (I've been both!) The ship by the way is slowly collapsing inside -- the area where we crawled aboard is thoroughly rotted out now.

Regards,

[CGRET]

Don,

Is this the LST?

65018

Regards
Charles

[Don Boyer]

As Gary Cooper would have said -- "Yup!"...LST 480. Back in the day (1962-3) much of the main deck remained as well as the interior decks. No aft superstructure at all, but the rest was relatively intact.

No trespassing in the area, but there were places where local fishing was allowed, so we had a fishermen friend use one of our walkie-talkies to alert us to the roving shore patrol as well as the occasional boat patrol. Had we been caught by the Navy, they would have hauled us in, called parents, etc. etc. -- a scenario best avoided. Had we been caught by the Marines, they would have taken us off in the boonies, kicked our butts and tossed us over the fence with an invitation to come back anytime.

All things considered, I would have preferred the Marines. As it was, they were all pretty lazy about patrolling there and we never had a problem getting in and out as we knew all the back trails and waterways better than they did.

Crazy stuff boys get into, right?

:)

[CGRET]

Don,

Yes, indeed crazy for boy's. Although i did have the opportunity to visit the the remains of the Arizona once. Again the site was breath taking to say the least. I was silent through much of the walk around, kind of hallow ground! Just walking around and seeing the remains was good enough for me and a friend not wanting to disrespect the site/remains.

Regards
Charles

[mike d]

Don,I think you were pretty darned lucky to have Pearl Harbor as a playground,even with the un-exploded ordnance laying about!!:D

[Don Boyer]

mike d:

I feel the same way. Got into lots of places that were supposedly off limits like kids do, but we never were vandals or "bad boys," we just liked seeing all that neat military "stuff" stashed out in out of the way corners of the harbor.

An old warehouse full of leftover Korean war materials for ships, old storage units, abandoned machine shops and boat house -- all the stuff kids love and parents freak out about -- especially mothers :eek: Nice thing is, I can still go out there! One of the reasons I moved back to Hawaii is that from the moment I set foot on the island I realized this was my home, despite living everywhere else but here up to then. Apparently, I had been misplaced prior to 1961 -- who knew? Not everybody gets that lucky, and I feel blessed to be able to stay here and do the things I love.

Happy New Years to all of you out there..
Regards,

[John Odom]

My local PBS station just ran an ad stating that a new program on Pearl Harbor would be on NOVA Tomorrow night at 8:00 pm. The video showed torpedo tracks and stated there was new material subjected to forensic analysis.

I hope it is worth watching, because I plan to!

[Don Boyer]

I havent' checked back with Daniel Martinez, but I think the "potential midget sub in the Japanese photo" was subject to an episode of Unsolved History on which Mr. Martinez often appears. This NOVA show must be newer material, and I hope they put it on here in Hawaii soon as well...Hawaii always seems to have and off schedule compared to the mainland.

Thanks for the reminder!

Regards,

[John Odom]

I just watched the show. I hope Don gets to see it as I want his opinion! I'll try to summarize what I saw:

1. They have found the 5th midget sub, and identified it as the type used at PH.

2. The torpedo tubes are empty.

3. It is in three pieces, consistent with scuttling charges.

4. There are cables attached to the pieces, consistent with salvage and having been moved.

5. They found a document in which Chester Nimitz. mentioned the recovery of a dud Japanese torpedo with a 1000 lb. charge. This is consistent with the submarine torpedoes, not the aerial ones.

6The mini-sub surfaced and sent a message to its mother ship claiming success, which was relayed to Japan. That this success was accepted as fact in Japan where the crew were considered heroes, is confirmed in IJN records.
7. divers found no evidence of torpedo damage to the Arizona.

The famous Japanese aerial photo of "torpedo tracks" headed to USS West Virginia was analyzed, simulated and studied and discussed.

Problems: There were two torpedoes. two witnesses claim to have seen tracks toward USS Arizona and Vestal. There are two tracks in the photo. that is one more track than there were torpedoes!

They claim the sub was scuttled in the West Loch, and debris moved in cleanup of the multi LST disaster. The area around the sub remains is littered with amphibious tractor remains, consistent with debris from the LST disaster in the West Loch.


Side note: There was a quick shot from the USS Oklahoma Memorial dedication, and another glimpse of the memorial.

[steve roberts]

Hi John. The only Japanese mini-sub I ever saw was on a plint outside the Enlisted mens club in Guam.There was a rumour that the US Marines after a night on "Bamiba" tied to refloat her. When I was there they had her with sand to stop any more attempts.I wonder if it is still there?:D:D:D Regards Steve.

[steve roberts]

Hi again John. Back to PH. Is it true that USS Oglala which sunk was never actually hit.In "Day of Infamy" she is called "The ship that died of shock" Steve:confused:

[John Odom]

Yes, it is my understanding that Ogalla was damaged by two near misses: A torpedo that ran under her and hit USS Helena and a near miss aerial bomb, Her salvage and whole career are very interesting.

[Don Boyer]

Well. I will bet I will disappoint some, as I missed the TV special -- I have been down with a badly infected ear and haven't even looked at a TV. Sorry about that!

Looking at John's post, it certainly sounds as if there is now solid evidence to say the five submarines have been accounted for. Only one item stood out for me in regard to the statements there...The Japanese 18" torpedo was a submarine torpedo, but not one with a warhead approaching 1000 lbs. 400 lbs. would seem more realistic. Minor detail though. There was an intact 18" aerial torpedo recovered from Pearl years ago...it's remains are in the Arizona Memorial museum now.

Did that sub appear in the well known photo? Did that sub actually launch torpedoes and hit the Oklahoma or West Virgina?? Looks like there will now be a lot more serious look at these issues...and that's great from the historical point of view. I can't wait to see more!

Scuttling the sub in West Loch would have been the appealing solution for the Japanese crew, given that there would be no way out for them right after the attack except the way they came in....which was saturated with ships on ASW patrol. I wonder if they chose to sit on the scuttling charges or try to escape to the "safe house"?

Hopefully they will re-run the show soon. I am soooo disappointed I missed it!

For some of the other posts:

USS Oglala capsized due to shock damage without actually having been hit. She was a passenger ship acquired by the Navy in WWI and converted to a minelayer. Her most famous role was laying a portion of the Northern Mine Barrage for the British in WWI with the ex-cruiser Baltimore (which also happened to be in Pearl Harbor on December 7th). She had been the flag of the Pacific Fleet Mineforce since 1922 (replacing Baltimore). Re-floated, she was rebuilt as an "engine repair ship" and served out the war in that capacity.

As to the schlock movie "Pearl Harbor" I was peripherally involved in the filming of that movie. The producers made it clear from the get go that they "weren't re-hashing Tora Tora Tora." A shame, because they would have made a far better movie AND with CGI they had the opportunity to re-stage the attack on Pearl Harbor exactly as it happened on the cheap, compared to the construction of huge models like in Tora3 -- which I also happened to be involved with even more indirectly, I was in the harbor on a carrier the day they blew up all the battleship models at Ford Island!

But they wanted to cram that hokey crap love story down our throats instead --. As to the attack, the explosion of the Arizona and capsizing of the Oklahoma was very realistic and close to the actual events, of course, but all that aircraft gun fighting down amongst the ships at Pearl DID NOT HAPPEN --- the aerial fights were all around the harbor area, but not in it, as the dogfights occurred with planes approaching or leaving the harbor attack.

So that part, at least, is a bit phony. Tora3's film of the attack is far more realistic.

As to the "modern ships", the movie producers took advantage of the fact that West Loch also holds the Inactive Service Craft Facility with a mess of retired destroyers, cruisers, amphibious and supply vessels on hand which were easy to rig with fake explosives and the like. Gave you the "mess of anchored ships effect" that would have been the case over at the main docks at Pearl east of 1010 pier.

It was the commander of the West Virginia, CPT Mervyn Bennion, who tried to keep inspiring his sailors while mortally wounded on the bridge of his ship (he was gutted by flying steel from a bomb that hit the USS Tennessee's No. 2 turret.) One who tried to help him was Marine bugler Richard Fiske, many years later a dear friend of mine and a volunteer at the USS Arizona Memorial. He passed a few years ago.

I am so glad so many of my regular forum correspondents and commenters feel the same way about that movie that I do -- at least I don't feel alone...and I actually like the producers, who have done some outstanding TV shows since then. I saw the movie, fully expecting it to be crap and was not disappointed in that respect. The most unrealistic thing I saw was fighter pilots willingly moving over to become light bomber pilots. You don't become a war-hero "ace" flying a frickin' bomber, and even Doolittle would have had to put a gun to those pilot's heads to get them to switch over.

John is right, though, it did at least remind many of Pearl Harbor.

And he is also right that if you trace the "roots" of that conflict back to any real starting point, it will be with Commodore Perry's "opening" of Japan to trade in the early 1850s, although there were some other reasons for the visit with big warships -- primarily to get them to stop killing our merchant sailors when they were shipwrecked on Japanese soil. (It was easy for our sailors to be killed in Japan -- all they had to do was piss off a samurai and they were dead. Even crossing a samurai's shadow on the ground was punishable by death -- what westerner would be aware of that?)

Therein lie the roots of WWII though -- for example, imagine us here in America having a huge superior naval force of some foreign country come to our shores and say, "Sorry, folks, no more isolation for you, you have to join the real word and conduct trade with us whether you like it or not, and if you don't we have these highly persuasive gunships here to negotiate with." That's not really playing "nice." (But on the other hand, in the case of Japan, it was the only thing that was going to work short of war.)

Perry's visit to Japan was so disruptive of the existing Japanese culture that it was the root cause of a revolution in Japan that resulted in the Meiji Restoration -- the return (supposedly) of the Emperor to political control of Japan -- and the fall of the Tokugawa shoguns, the last clan of warlords.

Relatively bloodless, compared to what it could have been, the Restoration resulted in the creation of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. The Japanese Army in particular became the home of the displaced samurai caste, who eventually, once again, gained control of the civilian government and created the circumstances that inevitably caused World War II. Funny, that.

[John Odom]

PBS has some clips from the program on line. Go to http://pbs.org/nova for links. These are just little clips. There is also a clip about Yamato, that I have not looked at.

[steve roberts]

Thank you for that John.I will certainly do that.Regards Steve.:)

[Don Boyer]

OK, folks. thanks to the marvels of modern technology and PBS.org, I was able to see the video in its entirety today. What an impressive piece of work...the Hawaiian Underwater Research Lab has really made an enormous contribution to WW II history, having found the two remaining midget subs involved in Pearl Harbor.

There is no doubt in my mind that the is the original HA Type submarine as used at Pearl Harbor, and that this is therefore most likely the long missing No. 5.

More cover one's butt research is needed to show beyond any shadow of a doubt that NONE of the early midgets from Guadalcanal or Alaska were recovered, brought to Pearl for analysis and subsequently destroyed -- eight boats were known from the Canal and 3 in the Aleutians. the Aleutian photos show all three badly damaged in their shore racks -- I believe they are still there but have no documentation. I doubt that any recoveries were made, considering how the HA subs were handled right after Pearl Harbor... dumped in a fill area for a new pier and the intact one sent around the country on War Bond drives. The technology didn't interest the US Navy, apparently, and considering their lack of success anywhere in the war, this isn't surprising. I have never read anything on such a recovery.

Did the sub fire at the Arizona? Possibly, but if so, it must have been a dud. However, note that the bow of the Arizona, like the rest of the hull is buried deeply in the mud and sand; damage might not reach up the hull far enough to be noticeable. Also, if the hit was in the same area as that damaged a few minutes later by the monstrous explosion of Arizona's magazines, there would be no evidence visible at all as the hull is torn apart there all the way to the keel.

Far more likely that it fired at West Virginia and/or Oklahoma.

Is that the sub in that now famous photo? More work needed there, although the Chinese-American gentlemen you saw in that part of the video is truly an explosion expert -- I met him, and he helped design the hulls of the Arliegh Burke class destroyers to make them as resistant to underwater shock as possible. The guy knows his stuff and the analysis looked good.

It wasn't pointed out, but there is a small boat just in front of the midget sub. One wonders if anyone in the boat was looking backwards at the time -- seems unlikely with all action in front of them. What a view they missed!

The only thing about that sub being in that specific area is the very large cojones it would take to deliberately choose the same water airplanes are using to drop torpedoes -- as one can imagine, not exactly a choice spot, but it might have been one of those "now or never" things, and those Japanese sailors had already proved to me that they fit the bill in the cojones grande department.

One thing that did bother me was the references to "Long Lance" torpedoes, which can be confusing. The term "Long Lance" is American and not Japanese, applied to the long-range oxygen powered nasty thing the Japanese introduced us to in The Guadalcanal campaign. There were three types, the Type 93 24" surface ship version, which our cruisers and destroyers all got so familiar with, The Type 95 21" variety used by submarines and the very specially modified Type 97 17.7" used in only one operation -- Pearl Harbor. The Type 97 was defective and never used again. It did have a 772 lb. warhead, much larger than the aerial torpedo.

West Loch to me would be the ideal hiding spot for a midget sub on the run if the sub turned and tried to exit Pearl Harbor without going around Ford Island. A look at the map shows the entrance to West Loch very close to the harbor exit, and exiting the harbor was probably a no-go by then. Blowing the ship up underwater and sacrificing oneself in the process, after reporting success, would be entirely Japanese.

Being picked up and disposed of after the 1944 West Loch disaster is not in the least out of the realm of the possible. I certainly hope that some researcher is forcing the navy to toss up the records of the incident and it's aftermath to see if it can be proven a sub was found there. So far that is not substantiated in the historical record. I like things to be substantiated in dated documents myself...just a little historical quirk of mine.

This is going to be a very interesting thread to follow, as that is the one sub that should be salvaged and studied. It may not be.

I do feel that that this will prove to be the No. 5 sub, though. The odds favor it.

And, in closing: Corinne:

Strafing of men in the water undoubtedly occurred at Pearl Harbor by the gunners in the torpedo planes and possibly some of the fighters. What I was saying was that there was NO "dogfighting" between American and Japanese planes right over battleship row. That all occurred elsewhere.

Also, despite all the comments of "treachery" and "cowardice" and such, the Japanese did NOT intend for the attack to appear that way. They felt that the ultimatum delivered to Washington by their diplomatic representatives would make it clear war was next. Unfortunately, since the Japanese Army (and thus navy, who had to politically kow-tow to the Army) refused to let the diplomatic corp in on their little secret, the fact that the message was delivered and hour or so late didn't mean anything to the diplomats. They were as surprised as we were at the attack, although no one believed them at the time. Talk about loss of face, all because of the Imperial Army methods of conducting political negotiations! Admiral Yamamoto, above all a man of honor, was absolutely enraged by this sequence of events, as he knew exactly what America's reaction would be. He, like many naval officers, hated the Imperial Army's haughty running of the wartime government and the fact that the Army got them involved in China. He knew that America would now be so enraged that there would be little chance of negotiating ANY kind of peace even if the war effort turned in Japan's favor over the next year.

[John Odom]

Thanks, Don! I certainly hope the sub is salvaged and brought ashore for study.

Corrine: there was strafing of men in the water. USS Oklahoma survivors told me so. The strafing was primarily directed at the ships, however.

[CGRET]

Don,

I can say there is atleast one mini-sub left on the Island of Kiska still in the slip ways when it was found the by the U.S. Ground forces during the invasion of said island. The book is called if you can get now. The Aleution Warriors, A history of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4 By John Hale ISBN0-929521-35-8 Part 1. On Page 182 show the mini-sub on the slip way badly damaged, and again photograghed in 1989 still in the same spot. I can remember anchoring in this harbor several times to avoid storms in the Bering Sea, nasty ones at that.

Note: the Park Service did a with the cooperation of the U.S. Third Fleet conducted a project Seamark to locate and document objects in Kiska Harbor. What they found was another mini-sub RO-65.

The Island is Restricted to visitation because of the live ordenance that is still laying around, We were told that a Park Service personnel had be with any visitation to the island.

Regards
Charles

[Pedlar]

I do not know if these have been posted previously, if they have my apologies

[Gypsyvannergirl]

I have a question and I know at least one of the Pearl Harbor historians can help me (actually hubby and I were discussing it yesterday). I put a picture of USS North Carolina on my computer as a screen saver and while we were discussing her guns, I noticed they were capped. This reminded me of something I either heard or read about one of the battleships at Pearl Harbor having her guns capped and munitions locked down because of an Admiral's inspection. Is this true? If so, which battleship was it?
If this is true, the timing couldn't have sucked worse than it did. Japanese attack and a battleship unable to do anything to help!!!!! Murphy's Law at its worst.

Corinne
Gypsyvannergirl

[John Odom]

This was true on the Uss Oklahoma, and perhaps on other ships as well. The various watertight doors were open for easy passage of the inspection party as well.

[Don Boyer]

Hi, Ms. Gypsy:

The USS California was basically opened up, as she was due for a materiel inspection the week following Pearl Harbor which necessitated opening hatches and tanks, etc., that would not be necessarily open otherwise. Other than Oklahoma, I don't know if any of the other battleships were also due for inspection. Pennsylvania was already opened up by virtue of being in drydock.

As to the big guns (or any guns of any size, for that matter) they were always capped or had tompions installed (tight-fitting plugs) to keep the barrels clear of any detritus. They could be pulled by hand or popped off with a burst of high-pressure air. (High-pressure air was used to blow out the barrels after firing and before opening the breech to ensure any remaining burning powder or smoldering powder bag remnants were gone. It was good for goosing the caps off too.)

Having these gun barrels capped had nothing to do with the ship's readiness for combat, it was merely protective and secondarily decorative.

Also, the major ammunition and powder would always be locked down in the magazines, although many gun turrets had arrangements for a small supply of ammunition and powder to be quickly available for use usually stashed in the turret itself and the powder in a "ready issue" room in the magazines. Smaller guns, hand loaded (5" and down) almost always had "ready storage" nearby in boxes or within a gun mount for immediate use, but they would also be locked up because absolutely nothing on the planet is sailor-proof. The theory is you would have enough advance notice to unlock everything and be ready for combat. The theory does not always hold...obviously.

Regards,

[Gypsyvannergirl]

So they were following the correct procedure at a time when they probably wished they hadn't. There was nothing they could do when the Japanese attacked.

Just out of curiosity - what effect would the watertight doors have had on the USS Oklahoma's turning over? Or would that have been negligible.? I did notice on the movie that when they cut into her hull in an effort to rescue trapped sailors, the water flooded even faster and the men drowned before a hole could even be cut. Did this have something to do with her watertight doors being open at the time?

Just curious

Gypsyvannergirl

[Don Boyer]

Oklahoma was hit so quickly by so many torpedoes that any watertight integrity was destroyed well before the crew could close enough hatches to make a difference. Time ran out on closing what would have been around 75 to 100 hatches necessary for full watertight integrity. Hatches and such are intended to be closed when the ship is upright, or only has a slight list. Moving hatches against the swing of the ship would have been impossible in many cases, as they were too heavy. You would be trying to shut them "uphill" instead of on the level.

I will go research a bit on Oklahoma. I don't remember there being any comment on crew drowning when the holes were cut in the bottom. This could only occur if there was a clear path from the outside of the ship (where the torpedo damage was) to the compartment in question. In that case, the air would simply be trapped against the bottom of the ship, and any hole would immediately allow the water to continue flooding by forcing the air out. However, I believe the compartments that were cut into had been isolated from the free-flooding by the closing of hatches and therefore, there would have been no water pressure to force the air out.

John Odom is our resident expert on the events that occurred on Oklahoma, and he may have more information. I'll check my references when I can and see if there were instances of full flooding when the rescue crews cut into the bottom of the ship. I just don't remember reading that. But then I've been wrong before! :)

[steve roberts]

Hi Don.I am sure that between you & John,some answers to Corrine's question will emerege.I for one would be interested as well.The same Rescue attempt was tried on the Tirpitz as well,but only very few were saved....Regards.Steve.:)

[John Odom]

If you go to this page:

http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/survivors.htm#anchor1009684

And read the Last of the USS Oklahoma survivors reports, D. Weissman, Seaman, First Class, indicates water was coming up when the escape hole was cut into the "lucky bag" compartment.

I have a number of other survivor's statements that I don't think are on the web, I might be able to get permission to post them here if there is interest.

[Don Boyer]

Thanks, John, I knew you'd have a source to hand. I have Wallin's book, but hadn't got that far down the list yet. I see from Weissman's statement that there was flooding from the holes cut in the hull, but he does not note any casualties as a result of it. The holes were all above the waterline of the ship as she lay upside down, so that would contribute to keeping away from the flooding.

Regards,

[Don Boyer]

Our Diver in residence, Kevin sent me a PM with a link to a website on Japanese Aircraft and fleet units with 74 pages of discussion on the supposed new midget sub found in waters south of Pearl.

There is a considerable amount of skepticism on the issue revolving around the same points I brought up...being "salvaged" in West Loch with no fanfare after the West Loch disaster. and being unable to determine if this was possibly one of the Guadalcanal submarines (captured pretty much intact) brought back for study and discarded, if that actually occurred.

Basically, school is still "out" on the subject until a lot more convincing evidence comes up.

Thanks to Kevin for the heads up!

The Fifth Pearl Harbor Midget Submarine (http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=8601.0)

Regards,

[Don Boyer]

http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?board=5.0

This is the link to the j-aircraft.com index site.

Hopefully it works!
Regards,

[BB60]

Oklahoma was raised because they needed the space on "battleship row." After raising they decided it was not practical to fix her. Her guns etc. were salvaged for use on her sister ship Nevada. She was sold to a San Diego company for scrap. While being towed she "parted her towline and was lost approx 200nm East of Oahu." There are recent reports that the navy actually paid to have her towed to sea and scuttled. Her scrap value was not sufficient to have warranted both her purchase price and cost of towing to San Diego and deliberate scuttling has long been suspected..

Also, the Oklahoma was displaced further out into the channel and was a greater hazard to navigation. The structural damage to the OK was such that she could could be righted and refloated, whereas the Arizona would have presented great difficulties. Wasn't her keel broken?

Makes me wonder if the AZ had been birthed where the Nevada was, would she have been salvaged, due to her more exposed location?

[CGRET]

Don,

I would agree with your statement only to add the original dictaphone wire recording of Rossevelt calling the navy department on the location of the fleet is now in the public domain. Yes indeed the president/US Navy knew the location of the fleet, but the nagging question is, did the president know the fleet was heading for Pearl Harbor? Nothing in the archives has indicated that the president had that knowledge prior to the attack.

Regards
Charles

[Don Boyer]

CGRET:

The "who knew what and when" of the Pearl Harbor history prior to the attack is probably the most enduring mystery and "fun topic" for historians. Heated debate can still be generated, and revisionist historians still try to paint Roosevelt as a villain. Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, we knew a great deal of "where the fleet was." Escorting the big convoys headed south for Malaya, etc. Around the Philippines, nearing Guam, all over the South Pacific Islands, etc. and of course units in home waters (most of the battleships that deployed to sea, doing nothing, so no one at home would see them anchored at Hashirajima and wonder how Japan started a war without employing all those expensive battleships.)

Everything except where those six big carriers were could either be pinpointed or assumed via radio traffic analysis, a bit of code-breaking or visual observation in the days just before the attack.

There has yet to be any definitive words on paper anywhere that gives the slightest indication of their location being known by anyone except the ship's navigators of the kido butai. Even the Imperial Navy could not be exactly sure where they were, as they could deviate from the planned approach if necessary. They made absolutely no radio transmissions whatsoever, were not spotted by any surface craft, submarine or aircraft, and were not discussed in any Japanese naval message traffic concerning the operations of other units. The majority of the Imperial Navy itself had no idea what that carrier group was up to.

I have yet to see any definitive proof that anyone in the US knew where kido butai was. And their location in the north Pacific would mean that there was only one possible target they could have been headed for, so any spotting of them, or interception of transmissions would tip their hand immediately. If anyone did know and didn't tell, that amounts to high treason, plain and simple. None of our leaders at the beginning of the war from Roosevelt on down was that criminal, despite what one might think of them politically. Not too bright, maybe, but not criminally negligent or treasonous.

With war looming obviously in the Pacific (based on known movements of huge numbers of Japanese troop ships and escorts toward their targets) if I was President, I'd be asking where there fleet was myself. But he wasn't asking about the specific part of the fleet targeting Pearl, I would bet.

Admiral Layton, in his book "And I Was There" remarked that he had no idea where those carriers were --- they weren't represented in any radio traffic or intel. That in itself would be worrisome to me. Why would the most powerful striking force of the Imperial Navy suddenly drop off the intelligence map when fleet war movements were being made all over the place?

But the counterpoint is that although we knew that they had formed a "First Air Fleet," we did not know it comprised all six of the big carriers and the cream of their aviation, and we certainly didn't know how professional a group that fleet really was. That racist profile of buck-toothed, thick glassed, little yellow men still prevailed in many quarters. Pearl Harbor was the US Navy's first exposure to that strike group, and we discovered they were quite good at their job.

Another factor of interest -- there was absolute 100 percent certainty that the Japanese were going to war. Probably 95 percent certainty that they would involve the Philippines and therefore the US (Guam and Wake would have done). This being the case, no one in Washington had any motivation whatsoever to "allow" an attack on Pearl Harbor just to get into the war. The Japanese were doing all the work needed to get the United States in the war. Pearl Harbor was a surprise because we collectively did not think the Japanese were that good regardless of what weapons platforms they deployed. The price of underestimating an enemy can be very high.

[scjon]

Agreed Don,
I have read a couple of the conspiracy theory books just to see what they were about and the evidence they usually present is circumstantial at best. In the book "Day of Deceit" one of the authors smoking guns is that he claims that one of the battleships began to use the Akagi's radio call sign but that the USN signalman who intercepted the message knew it was fake because he knew the "fist" (specific typing style unique to anyone using a wireless, almost like a fingerprint) of the Akagi's radio operator so well and that wasn't it. And then of course all of the higher ups buried his report.
I read Layton's book too and really enjoyed it. I had the same questions as you at the end though. Why was it not a bigger deal that Kido Butai just disappeared. I believe Kimmel did actually remark that they could be rounding Diamond Head and he wouldn't know. The fact they were missing should have been a bigger worry than it seemed to be to the people in Washington, but I think this was attributable to overconfidence though not a treacherous cover up!
It does supply endless debate and interesting thought. I have always wanted to ask, if it were a conspiracy wouldn't it have been just as effective for propaganda if the Navy and Army had "repulsed" the Japanese sneak attack?
I mean if it was a conspiracy why not have them win the battle if they could and still get the same effect? I personally don't think they could have won though but it would still look better than the defeat they suffered.

[Don Boyer]

I guess the part in CGRET's post that I don't "get" is the term "the fleet". Too generalized, and just what was Roosevelt asking? The Japanese had many "fleets" and the majority (except the battleships other than the Kongo class) were deployed. He could not possibly be asking about the First Air Fleet itself, the one single unit aimed at Pearl Harbor. The term "First Air Fleet" was known to US intelligence at the time if I remember correctly, but not that all six first line carriers were part of it or that all six were in fact operating together, or that all six were aimed at Pearl Harbor. That knowledge simply did not exist. Therefore my assumption is that Roosevelt's conversation is referring to the fleet units EVERYBODY knew were at sea...those escorting the invasion force for Malaya/Thailand.

Conspiracy theories always abound. My main problem with the Pearl Harbor one is that it requires suspension of belief in the honor and dignity of too many people -- Roosevelt could not possibly have carried out the "he knew about the attack but didn't do anything" scenario without the help of others, such as George Marshall and those high up in the War and Navy Departments, etc. Since that would comprise high treason by a group of very honest and honorable men, the odds of it being a fact are less than nil, particularly considering everyone of them would have to have taken that terrible secret to their graves. That defies human nature in the extreme.

[qprdave]

"there was absolute 100 percent certainty that the Japanese were going to war. Probably 95 percent certainty that they would involve the Philippines and therefore the US (Guam and Wake would have done)"

In the words of Rose (Golden Girls). Can I ask a silly question?

If the above statement was true. Why was the Pacific Fleet in and around Pearl in such a low state of readiness? Is it just my 20/20 hindsight vision, that tells me that it was better to destroy the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour before the invasion of American interests in the Pacific and the East.

Also. Does anyone know if there were Japanese plans to try and do the same to San Diego or other US Navy ports on the West Coast?

Dave

[Don Boyer]

qpr:

Despite War Plan Orange and whatever the other one was -- Rainbow 5, I think, realistic thinking had written off the Philippines and Guam and Wake as indefensible by sending the fleet west or any scenario like that. Slipping B-17s into the Philippines and such was about the best that could be hoped for, and the other islands were complete write-offs. No other choices presented themselves as viable alternatives.

The US, ever optimistic, hoped that the talks ongoing with Japan up to and including the day of the attack might achieve results, slim as those odds might have been. There was optimism that the Japanese would by-pass the Philippines entirely and focus on the British and Dutch possessions (we had made no firm commitment to come into the war even under these circumstances.)

The fleet at Pearl, and the Army and Army Air Force assests on the island were "on the alert" but it had happened so much as to be almost boring. The fleet was unprepared (did not sortie) because the commanders were not prepared to believe the Japanese could and would attack Pearl Harbor with the six-carrier striking force they had that we knew next to nothing about. There was no compelling evidence of any kind to convince them the Japanese could do that kind of strike that far from their home waters.

Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines was equally unprepared and lost most of his air assets AFTER Pearl Harbor was attacked because none of the generals who were supposed to lead could get their act together. Naturally, none of that was Dougie's fault.

Caught unprepared and with no fall-backs available to prevent further damage. Complacency, racism, hubris, underestimating the enemy, lack of cohesive integrated intelligence, all these factors left us sitting on our collective butts. We were lucky the carrier strike force was led by a less than bold officer who refused to do more than what had been specifically assigned.

The Japanese floated plans for invasions of Australia and other places, but never presumed to plan for any invasion of the west coast of the US. Their military assests were not sufficient to do that and then sustain and attack that would accomplish anything. They did not have the merchant carrying capacity to eventually invade Australia, and even the less than brilliant Imperial Army could see that. The Japanese were aware that taking the British and Dutch possessions, plus the Philippines, outlying islands and maintaining their army at war in China and on guard in Manchuria had strained their logistics to the absolute limit.

That was why, when they got "victory fever" and decided to extend beyond their initial accomplishments (Malaya, Indonesia, Philippines, etc.) they came to a crashing halt because the attrition formula began to work seriously against them -- submarine losses, far extended bases that could not be adequately developed, defended and expanded -- all these factors came into play. Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal were all failures, where before had been success, and the stage was set to nearly have their own nation destroyed to the last man because of their refusal to consider surrender as a national option. (the Imperial government in the end was only concerned with preserving itself, not with the suffering of the nations' common population.)

[qprdave]

Just watched Pearl Harbour Mysteries on the History Channel and they claimed that the U.S fired the first shot of the Pacific War. USS Ward, old WW1 Destroyer, on 7th Dec 1941, sighted and attacked one of the small Japanese submarines that were sent to the area. The USS Ward claimed that they hit the submarine in the Conning Tower (Fin, Sail). This was not confirmed for 60yrs when the submarine was discovered after a 10 year search. When the submarine was examined they found a shell hole in the conning Tower. So (arguably), the USS Ward commenced hostilities first.

A signal sent to Pearl took over an hour to get to the Headquarters at Pearl and did not raise any suspicions

Dave

[John Odom]

Technically true, but it can be argued that the "first shot" occurred when the task force launched armed planes.

[Don Boyer]

My point would be that a small submarine operating in the known defense zone of a foriegn nation and attempting to penetrate the main naval base in the Pacific is an act of war in itself. The Ward fired the first shot, made the first kill, but it didn't start the war, she just got the shooting started. She was one of the post WWI retread "four-stackers: of the same class as the fifty destroyers given to England for escort duties.

"Submanrineitis" had been affecting the inshore patrols around Pearl for months, so the report of a sub wasn't surprising anymore. However, the idiots ashore ignored something that had NOT been reported before..."We have ATTACKED, FIRED UPON, and DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON submarine operating in Defensive Sea Area..." (emphasis mine). This message went out at 0712 to the staff duty officer, who did not believe it to be anything other than another false alarm at first, yet recognized that it was different than previous reports in that something had actually happened. By the time duty and staff officers had kicked the message around to higher command, bombs were dropping on the tarmac at Ford Island. Old habits are hard to break, and the peacetime navy was operating at its Sunday morning peacetime best when the Japanese planes hove into sight.

[designeraccd]

The old WARD had an active career in the Pacific following Pearl Harbor. The 4" gun that sank the IJN midget sub was removed during her conversion to an APD and is preserved in Minnesota.

From Wilkipedia:

Pearl Harbor
On the morning of 7 December 1941, Ward was conducting a precautionary patrol off the entrance to Pearl Harbor when she encountered a Japanese Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarine, attacked and sank it, thus firing the first American shots of World War II a few hours before Japanese carrier aircraft formally opened the conflict with their attack on the Pacific Fleet inside the harbor.

While a minority of academics doubted whether Ward had really sunk a Japanese mini-sub, since undersea searches off Pearl Harbor had previously failed to locate the midget submarine, on 28 August 2002, a team of scientists from the University of Hawaii finally found the vessel. They discovered that the submarine lies 1,200 ft (370 m) underneath the sea in American waters about 3-4 mi (5–6 km) outside of Pearl Harbor [2] The starboard side of the submarine's conning tower exhibits two shell holes; evidence of damage from Ward's guns. While her depth charges were sufficient to fully lift the 46-ton (42-metric-ton), 78-foot (24 m) midget out of the water, they did no apparent structural damage to the submarine, which sank due to water flooding into the vessel from the two shell holes.[3]

After Pearl Harbor
In 1942, with LCDR Frederick Von Windegger Lemly in command Ward was sent to the west coast for conversion to a high speed transport. Redesignated APD-16 on 6 February 1943, she steamed to the South Pacific to operate in the Solomon Islands area. She helped fight off a heavy Japanese air attack off Tulagi on 7 April 1943 and spent most of the rest of that year on escort and transport service. In December, she participated in the Cape Gloucester invasion. During the first nine months of 1944, Ward continued her escort and patrol work and also took part in several Southwest Pacific amphibious landings, among them the assaults on Saidor, Nissan Island, Emirau, Aitape, Biak, Cape Sansapor and Morotai.


Fate
As the Pacific War moved closer to Japan, Ward was assigned to assist with operations to recover the Philippine Islands. On 17 October 1944, she put troops ashore on Dinagat Island during the opening phase of the Leyte invasion. After spending the rest of October and November escorting ships to and from Leyte, in early December Ward transported Army personnel during the landings at Ormoc Bay, Leyte. On the morning of 7 December 1944, three years to the day after her No. 3 gun fired the opening shot of America's involvement in the war; she was patrolling off the invasion area when she came under attack by several Japanese kamikazes. One bomber hit her hull amidships, bringing her to a dead stop. When the resulting fires could not be controlled, Ward's crew was ordered to abandon ship, and she was sunk by gunfire from O'Brien, whose Commanding Officer, William W. Outerbridge, had been in command of Ward during her action off Pearl Harbor three years before. LT Robert E. Farwell, was her last Commanding Officer.


DFO :)

[CGRET]

Here is my point:

1. The dictaphone tape of Roosevelt asking the CNO where the "fleet" is on the tape and an answer could heard to say North of Hawaii. Now having said that it has been several years since i have heard the tape.

2. It was also standard practice for Naval Intel to go through Hawaii without having the naval command added as "for information only" on it's way the Washington.

So yes, it will always be a question to which the "true" answer may never be known.

Regards
Charles

[Don Boyer]

Truly an interesting post, Charles. First time I have ever heard of the dictaphone tape associated with anything to do with Pearl Harbor. I wonder if anyone has researched this, as I find no mention in my books here, admittedly none of them "the latest publication."

I hope we hear more of this!

Thanks for bringing it up. Should generate some future comments.

designer dudes post on the Ward is one of those fascinating little vignettes of war that make you wonder at the coincidences -- December 7, and the same commanding officer involved. It's a true story that always garners interest at the Arizona Memorial among those attending various lectures and such.

[CGRET]

Don,

From what i understand the freedom of information act did release the recording some years ago along with all of the President's office recording's. It may very be in his library.

You may have better luck in finding out if that recording is availible or a copy there of.

Regards
Charles

[Dave Hutson]

Hi Don - I know this isn't the right thread for this one but here goes anyhow.

To you and yours , and extended to any of our cousins across the pond or wherever they are:-

HAPPY FOURTH OF JULY GREETINGS TO ONE AND ALL

[terreplein]

I was reading about the salvage at Pearl Harbor after the attack recently, and put together this slide show after looking through some photos. Thought I'd post it here as we approach the anniversary of the attack again.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CL3ixbcy18

[designeraccd]

EXCELLENT work! I was suprised to see a fair number of pics I had not seen before, which suprised me.

Indeed a FITTING TRIBUTE to the brave folks who died in this attack. SEMPER FI! DFO ;)

[oldsalt]

Thanks for that group of pictures many of which I have not seen before. The INFAMY was eventually avenged.

[emason]

I was reading about the salvage at Pearl Harbor after the attack recently, and put together this slide show after looking through some photos. Thought I'd post it here as we approach the anniversary of the attack again.

Like 1st September 1939, it is a date that will never be forgotten.

Incidentally, is it my imagination or did Roosevelt say Germany bombed Oahu, about one minute into the video?

[terreplein]

Matt,
Don & others who have more knowledge will give you an answer. My first thought is, Invincilble & Hood both had their main batteries engaged in action at the time of the explosions, shells and charges were being passed to the guns, flash shutters weer being opened & closed to pass them through, etc. The explosions could thus travel into the turrets. Arizona was operating her secondary & anti-aircraft batteries, but had no reason to be sending shells into the 14" turrets at the time. Things should have been shut tight. I'm sure there are other reasons. That's the first one that comes to mind for me.

John

[Don Boyer]

To the best of my recollection when discussing the Arizona explosion while still working at the Arizona Memorial, the feeling was that the majority of the explosion vented all around the turrets -- both sides, aft and forward, as the damaged ship photos show, and of course the huge movement of the hull to port allowed much explosive force to vent. This literally cracked the armor plate in several places -- one can imagine the force it takes to do that. It is obvious the force of the explosion blew out the heavy bulkhead structures separating the turret area from the forward boilers as well -- thus the huge cloud of black smoke venting up the stack. The collapse of this understructure is what caused the bridge, conning tower and foremast to fall over. Turret two, close to the surface after she sank, was cleaned out, but things were pretty messy below the gun houses -- no salvage there, and of course Turret one wasn't touched at all, absolutely no way to access it as the structures around it were mangled. Divers could not safely get near the inside of Turret one. So it's hard to judge if anything within the turrets contributed to the explosion. Doesn't seem likely. Also, it is felt the bottom of the ship was also blown out -- Turre one and it's barbette are sitting 13' lower than their normal position.

In the movie of the detonation, (the original is in color, by the way) you can see the majority of the explosive cloud venting out up and forward of the ship, followed of course by the enormous fires that didn't go out until the morning of December 10th, three days later.

I've always felt the turrets were probably buttoned up as would be usual regardless of whether at sea or in port, and as was said, no large amount of ready ammo/powder in the trays or hoists so there was no contributory explosion within the turrets from ammo and powder. .

[VirtualF]

To the best of my recollection when discussing the Arizona explosion while still working at the Arizona Memorial, the feeling was that the majority of the explosion vented all around the turrets -- both sides, aft and forward, as the damaged ship photos show, and of course the huge movement of the hull to port allowed much explosive force to vent. This literally cracked the armor plate in several places -- one can imagine the force it takes to do that. It is obvious the force of the explosion blew out the heavy bulkhead structures separating the turret area from the forward boilers as well -- thus the huge cloud of black smoke venting up the stack. The collapse of this understructure is what caused the bridge, conning tower and foremast to fall over. Turret two, close to the surface after she sank, was cleaned out, but things were pretty messy below the gun houses -- no salvage there, and of course Turret one wasn't touched at all, absolutely no way to access it as the structures around it were mangled. Divers could not safely get near the inside of Turret one. So it's hard to judge if anything within the turrets contributed to the explosion. Doesn't seem likely. Also, it is felt the bottom of the ship was also blown out -- Turre one and it's barbette are sitting 13' lower than their normal position.

In the movie of the detonation, (the original is in color, by the way) you can see the majority of the explosive cloud venting out up and forward of the ship, followed of course by the enormous fires that didn't go out until the morning of December 10th, three days later.

I've always felt the turrets were probably buttoned up as would be usual regardless of whether at sea or in port, and as was said, no large amount of ready ammo/powder in the trays or hoists so there was no contributory explosion within the turrets from ammo and powder. .

Thank you for your reply,I suppose I was just surprised that given the movie footage that anything forward of the superstructure survived at all but as your explanation highlighted the detonation probably took the paths of least resistance.I suppose that if the ship had been at sea then the forward part of the ship would have probably separated and would then have resembled ships that had suffered similar fates.As she was in port Im assuming that the depth of water isn't that great and the shattered forepart of the ship hadn't got far to sink before she could settle and be supported by the seafloor.

May god rest their souls.

Again,thank you for your reply,

regards

Matt

[CGRET]

I would also add to what Don has said the decks on the Arizona forward of Frame 26 were not passable because of the massive collapse due to the internal explosion.

Regards
Charles

[Don Boyer]

Forgot to mention the full set of Arizona model photos as she is now that I took last Dec. 7 were posted to the modeling thread, with some explanatory text. The most significant photo is the bows-on shot, showing the huge amount of hull displacement to port from turret 1 to about even with the stack. Even the armor plating was displaced -- an impressive view.

[terreplein]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANbWaKLYw1Y

[CGRET]

Terreplein,

Great video story from one of the crew, thanks for sharing.

I have a couple of photo's and i do not remember where i got them. I was wondering if Don has seen these before.

93282 93283

Regards
Charles

[Don Boyer]

Neither are photos I've seen before. Looks like the Arizona while still under partial salvage. Great shots, and glad that you found them! That's what makes this forum really a great place to dig into naval history. Note that the Arizona is not sitting as deep in the water as she is now -- took awhile for those tons to settle onto the hard coaral base under the mud.

[terreplein]

I found CG's first photo in the Life magazine google collection. It was taken in 1948.

[dennis a feary]

Hello Contributers to this Thread of the Forum.
Have not been much in evidence here, so what follows may have been posted before - but here goes ;
Apparently these are `new' pics of the attack on Pearl Harbour. They were found in a camera in an attic `somewhere'. The pics were taken at the time of the attack, and have only just `surfaced'.

Hope they come out successfully.

Sadsac

[dennis a feary]

WOW !! Out they have come. If of interest will post more.

[astraltrader]

Dennis - no offence my friend but that story about Pearl Harbor pictures "recently surfacing, having recently been found in an attic, etc," is a load of baloney and been doing the rounds for years!!

I think this particular "myth" has been discussed somewhere in the forum before but anyway, the pictures you show have been around for years and in fact are even in this thread on post #41 uploaded back in 2009!

Sadly the internet although an invaluable source for information, also has its fair share of fables, myths and untruths! I expect most of us have at one time or the other fallen foul or victim, to one or the other sort of untruth or rumour. :o

[dennis a feary]

Terry, no offence taken at all.
I did `suspect', as usually there is nothing `new', but it did come from a RAFA `monthly booklet' sent to me - but what do a load of `crab-fats' know about the goings on, on `terra-wet' !!
My apologies to all for having taken up time & space - at least it did show me that out such pics do come.

Sadsac

[astraltrader]

No problem Dennis - it is always good to read your posts. :)

[Don Boyer]

These photos have been discussed before --- part of the "found in an old Brownie camera" and other email stories concocted around the photos. They are in fact all "official USN" and printed many times in many books. I am waiting for the email that actually credits the photographers who took the pictures, as they were taking great risks doing so. I have never seen them credited to a particular individual. Even the famous film of the Arizona blowing up is credited only to "a doctor aboard the hospital ship Solace" and I don't think his name has ever come up. A shame that those people never got credit where due.

[Aussie Bhoy]

I visited Pearl Harbour in 1990 for RIMPAC 90, I was onboard HMAS Brisbane (Charles F Adams class DDG) at the time. It was a great place to visit, we were there for a couple of months.

On the subject of the Japanese attack, I believe a 3rd wave was considered and rejected by the Japanese Admirals (much to their later regret), but what if they had been even more ambitious? They had 6 carriers plus battleships and cruisers. Considering the major damage done to the Pacific fleet and the airforces and airfields, could the Japanese forces have remained close to Pearl Harbour and continued attacks over the next few days. Perhaps even attempt a landing and invasion. Or would the US ground forces in Oahu have been too strong? Was their good shore defences, coastal fortifications, etc?

Photos from RIMPAC 90, USS Missouri and USS Independance and a joint parade at Punchbowl Merorial Cemetary

[jainso31]

I do not think a landing was considered.The primary objective was to destroy the US fleet at harbour; and they came close, but missed the Carriers;that is where there plan fell short of the desired result.

jainso31

[Hank]

The second strike on the U.S. Naval installations was cancelled when it was known that the aircraft carriers were not berthed at Pearl Harbor at that time. This caused the Japanese command to have concerns regarding their location and a possibility of encountering an irate U.S. Naval aviation strike. The secondary target of this second strike was to be the fuel bunkers. An attempt was made to strike targets by large seaplanes several days later, actually overflying Hawaii. Attack cancelled due to cloud cover. Regards

[Don Boyer]

As with so many battles in the Pacific in WWII, the Pearl Harbor strike as it actually evolved on December 7th 1941 depended less on strategy and tactics than it did on the commanding Admiral. VAdm. Chuichi Nagumo was a traditionalist of the old school who was given command of the kido butai by virtue of seniority, not because of demonstrated abilities in command of carrier air groups. There might have been worse choices available but other than Boshiro Hosogaya, none come to my mind. Nagumo was iron-clad "battleship" all the way, and not really a fitting commander for the new weapons system the Japanese had forged with the First Air Fleet.

Nagumo had little or no concept of the actual power available to him with the six most experienced aircraft carriers and air groups in the world at the time. He had not favored the Pearl Harbor attack to start with, rightly or wrongly, and had no idea of how to effectively employ these assets other than rigidly following the orders given by CinC Combined Fleet. Original thinking was not Nagumo's forte, nor that of any of his senior staff.

The senior Japanese air group commanders and the carrier commanders were all for a third strike to finish the job. Nagumo deferred, ostensibly because the American carriers were not in Pearl Harbor and therefore might be at sea somewhere within striking range and the fleet had supposedly already achieved their main goal in crippling the American fleet at Pearl.

While Enterprise and Lexington were both in the general area, neither was anywhere near being the combat-capable strike weapons that Nagumo commanded. They were completely untried in battle, had no cohesive battle doctrine, were equipped with lousy anti-aircraft batteries, minimally effective aircraft with no combat experienced crews, and were not operating as a cohesive task group. Had they been discovered by the kido butai, they most likely would have been quickly destroyed. Of course Japan could not afford to accord these carriers any less ability than they themselves possessed, so the assumption was these carriers would be very dangerous antagonists, which weighed heavily in Nagumo's thinking, or at least he said it did after the fact.

So Nagumo turned and headed for home, disobeying part of the orders he had been given. Staffers on Admiral Yamamoto's staff wanted the CinC to order Nagumo to complete the job, but he did not, because to do so would cause Nagumo enormous loss of face. (The concept of face was the bane of Japanese naval and military operations throughout the war, and a large contributor to their loss of the war.) so the third strike, which would have caused enormous damage to the base itself (almost worse than the ship damage in the long run) never happened. And Admiral Nagumo's enormous loss of face would have to wait six months when he mis-handled his way into the Midway battle.

He was eventually removed from sea command and ended his days on Saipan in command of the local (non-existent) naval forces there. I've often wondered what he thought seeing battleships his carriers had "sunk" at Pearl Harbor bombarding the shores of Saipan shortly before he killed himself.

Could the kido butai have hung around after the initial strikes and finished the job later? Very problematic due to the need to refuel, especially the destroyers. A few days at most, and then only if someone had thought of bringing their tankers in closer. They would have been discovered sooner or later, bu then there wasn't much there for the US to strike back with. If there had been a shred of original thinking to meet actual battle circumstances instead of the usual wishful thinking that substituted for battle awareness in the Imperial navy, they might have carried it off. With Nagumo in command, not a chance.

As to an invasion of Hawaii, this idea was heavily studied and war gamed by the Japanese before and shortly after Pearl Harbor. The Imperial army and navy finally concluded it was just logistically not possible. Even if they took the island (not an easy task with a 5,000 + mile logistics line) they would only do so against a very large armed force on the island of Oahu that could fight from inland positions for a long time. Japan did not have the ship bottoms or staying power for the job, something even the thick-headed Imperial army recognized, so the plan was never a serious one. Even had things gone better for Japan from mid-1942 on, the idea would never have borne fruit. it would have been impossible to supply the armies in the field in SE Asia and China and support a Hawaiian invasion at the same time. By May of 1942 Japan had stretched it's war-making and territory grabbing abilities to the absolute maximum, a fact clearly demonstrated by having their hands cut off as soon as they tried to grab one more piece of territory.

For those interested in the defenses of Pearl Harbor, the best study is in the Osprey "Fortress" series of publications, No. 8: "Defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu, 1907 -1950," by G. Williford and T. McGovern. (Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2003.)

PS -- Aussie Bhoy, those 1990 photos bring back memories! The Missouri was still and active fleet unit then, on her last deployment. She visited Pearl the following year for the 50th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor and was then retired for the last time.

[Hank]

Appreciate your thoughts, Don. Interesting that you mention Nagumo as the old-school battlewagon guy he was, the miracle of seniority being in force here. The same can be noted in the Allied command chain regards use of Radar, the recent posts on the Savo battle highlighting the misuse of this advantage.

It was never Japanese intent to invade any U.S. territory until their move on the Aleut Isles. The intent of the attack of December 7, 1941 was reduction of Naval and Aviation capability.

Regards

[jainso31]

Hank- I have to say that your last post "mirrors" my thoughts on this subject entitirely; and I include your observations on the use of radar eg.Savo,etc.

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Guadalcanal was definitely the proving ground for use of radar fire control for the US Navy. Only Ching Lee among admirals had and excellent understanding of how to use radar and even he didn't always trust it. One notes his flagship, the USS Washington, had the best fire control team in the navy in 1942, as the Kirishima discovered. Post war data shows Washington hit her 20 times with 16" AP shells, not the 9 often found in earlier records. the effect must have been somewhat demoralizing for the Japanese.

Compounding the radar problem in the early days was the technical skill of the Japanese in night battle -- at the time, no one was better, period. Their night vision sometimes exceeded the ability of radar to detect targets, and the mighty Type 93 torpedo exceeded the firing range of almost every ship in the US inventory short of battleships. Many in the USN did not believe torpedos could have been responsible for the damage and sinkings that occured in some of the battles around that island. Even after the USN got their hands on a few for study, the results never got anywhere, another example of the Bureau of Ordnance supporting the war effort from their desks in Washington to go along with the many and varied problems with Amercan torpedoes.

Of course, the radar story at Pearl was a poor showing as well. Radar detected, humans ignored. The human factor is almost always the key.

[brian james]

Yeah Don..Sometimes you just have to believe the old MK1 Eyeball and act accordingly.....

[John Odom]

There is no substitute for good human judgement. Unfortunately good Judgement does not always follow command responsibility. There were a lot of examples of thet on our side at Pearl Harbor.

[jainso31]

Don -a question which has always nagged me in the Guadalcanal Sea Battles; was the seemingly oblivious use of ordinary cordite fired shells by USN warships, which when fired, illuminated their positions so effectively,that the Japanese had no need of Radar and they used flashless propellant to boot.
When did the USN "cotton on "to this failing? Apologies for going off thread.

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

My recollection is that the US was well aware of the flash problem and had been experimenting and trying to develop effective "flashless" powder which essentially traded huge amounts of smoke for flames. It wasn't available in '42, like many things the USN could have used, like effective torpedoes for example. The Japanese definitely had the edge there for awhile. As to radar, they could have really used and effective radar even early in the war, as the Mk 1 eyeball began to fail them relatively soon in the night battles, despite their superb optics. Tactical inexperience on the part of the USN had more to do with the pounding our navy took at Guadalcanal than visibility issues. In several battles, the targets were seen, but the tactical situation was not reacted to fast enough to take advantage of radar's gift and those Long Lance torpedoes had a chance to do their work while Admirals faffed about trying to figure out what to do. War lessons are harsh like that. The RN had similar problems trying to figure out how to cope with inadequate air defense on their ships early on, and to respond to the U-boat, despite a previous war dealing with just that issue. You go to war with what you have on hand when the shooting starts, and sometimes that's not much fun. Pearl Harbor is a prime example of that, among many sterling examples.

[jainso31]

Don -my sincere thanks for your usual astute observations, which allow me to see the whole picture and not just a keyhole view.I suppose the Long Lance torpedo was similarly "faffed" about with-because the USN torpedo in 1942 seemed a pretty ineffective weapon.

jainso31

[spruso]

Although not directly related to Pearl Harbor itself, the photograph below is part of the Pearl Harbor story. It's an early-morning view of Kolekole Pass in the Waianae Mountains just above Schofield Barracks. Part of the Pearl Harbor attack force came through this pass on December 7, 1941 -- the fighters and bombers assigned to attack Wheeler field in particular. Shown in both Tora Tora Tora and the dreck Pearl Harbor movie, the aircraft were not actually skimming the treetops as depicted in the movies, but descending from their filight altitude to attack altitude. Viewed from a distance, one can see how it might appear that the planes were much lower than they actually were as they passed over Kolekole. Portions of the Schofield Barracks Army base are in the foreground, as is a bit of winter low-lying fog common in this area at this time of year. The Naval Ammunition Depot at Lualualei is on the other side of the pass and their is a road connecting the two. This is my view driving to work every morning -- I work in one of the buildings in the photo.


I visited the Kolekole Pass Lookout in 1999. Fantastic view looking down towards the coast. I don't know if you can still access it since 9/11 because you had to drive through Schofield Barracks. If it's still reachable check it out. (Ignore the machine gun and explosive noises you hear as you drive up.)

Here is a link to this great view. The view is much wider than the one shown in the link.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/boydbrooks999/4162120622/sizes/o/in/photostream/

Cheers
Bruce

[Hank]

The second raid on Pearl Harbor took place on the night of 4 March 1942 with the first operational use of the Kawanishi H8K1 flying boat, the largest of its type developed by the Japanese on a 1938 order. Two planes from Yokohama staged the attack, refuelling from a rendezvous with a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, 550 miles from Pearl Harbor. Cloud cover over the Hawiaan Islands reduced chances of an accurate attack and the bomb load of the two planes were released, falling in an unpopulated area. I include an image here of one of the H8K1's later in the war after receiving the attentions of Allied air power. I believe the photo was taken at Saipan.
The H8K2 was given the Allied code name "Emily". The late-war model 12, 112 of this variant constructed, had air to ground radar search capability.Regards

[Don Boyer]

The second raid on Pearl Harbor took place on the night of 4 March 1942 with the first operational use of the Kawanishi H8K1 flying boat, the largest of its type developed by the Japanese on a 1938 order. Two planes from Yokohama staged the attack, refuelling from a rendezvous with a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, 550 miles from Pearl Harbor. Cloud cover over the Hawiaan Islands reduced chances of an accurate attack and the bomb load of the two planes were released, falling in an unpopulated area. I include an image here of one of the H8K1's later in the war after receiving the attentions of Allied air power. I believe the photo was taken at Saipan.
The H8K2 was given the Allied code name "Emily". The late-war model 12, 112 of this variant constructed, had air to ground radar search capability.Regards

The Japanese attempted a similar (recon only) effort from French Frigate Shoals (NW of Pearl between Pearl and Midway) as part of the preliminaries to the Midway operation using the same type of aircraft. Staion Hypo codebreakers at Pearl were well aware of the earlier effort, and the navy had seaplane tenders Thornton and Ballard at the Shoals for just such an occassion prior to Midway -- the Japanese submarines were unable to operate from there and "Operation K" was called off, one of several intelligence failures by the Imperial navy's submarine command that contributed to the debacle at Midway.

Interestingly enough, one of the Station Hypo staff was W.J. Holmes, a former submarine officer recalled to active duty after Pearl Harbor. He was the liaison between Hypo and COMSUBPAC/CINCPACFLT. Before the war, writing under the name Alec Hudson, Holmes had written submarine stories for the Saturday Evening Post and other magazines, one of which included the concept of submarines refueling aircraft at sea. The poor Japanese just didn't get any breaks at Midway!

[Hank]

By whatever means and for whatever reason several posts evaporated from this website on the morning of July 3, 2011. I'm reposting this one. Regards

I've considered events preceeding the opening of hostilities in the Pacific in the last month of 1941. The following is what I've found to be applicable in considering the situation. Given the level of knowledge I've found here it's a certainty that some bit of information, or another tack in observation, might exist. Please advise.

CNO Admiral James Raynsford Stark's Dispatch, October 11, 1941:

In order to understand the preceeding events that culminated in the United States of America being launched into World War II in the Pacific by the Japanese Naval Operation Z of December 7, 1941 I've read reams of primary documentation. Given the level of documentation regarding Japanese intent available to and made by Allied intel sources in the months of October and November of 1941, one sentence jumped out at me. This being in CNO Admiral Stark's Top Secret dispatch to his command of October 11, 1941. It states, in part, "In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." This gave a latitude to area commanders in their actions that would have, properly implemented, dulled the blade about to thrust. I leave it to the reader to consider what actions could have been taken, by whom and where. The fact remains that instead of organizing some of the staffers were complacent to go to the Golf Course or saddle the Horse and get lost. That little was organized meant free reign to Japanese military forces until the Battle of Midway in 1942, with years of attrition to follow until Japan's resignation of the war effort. If one feels that I am beating a dead horse in the assessment one must consider that my New Jersey neighborhood during the formative years was in possession than more of its share of Gold Stars and folded flags in the linen closet generated by the events of the time. In the waning days of the 1930's and beginning of the fourth decade of the twentieth century possibilities were great that those folded flags might have been located in the Soviet Socialist Republics; the Western powers being observers to a Russo-Japanese conflict.

It should have been obvious that European sovereignty in the Far East was not a consideration in Japanese aggression. Though the occupation of France by Nazi Germany in May and ensuing Three-Power Pact in June of 1940 made a moot point in the September invasion of French Indo-China the fact remains that a European protectorate had been occupied by Japanese military force. The remaining free European powers, stretched thin as to their abilities to resist militarily, were at disadvantage when confronted with this two-front military situation. I don't believe the observation affected American military planning to the degree it should have.

With the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Nonagression Pact in Moscow on April 13, 1941, Russia was freed to concentrate on what was believed to be a coming war with Hitler's Germany while Japan was able to concentrate on her plans for Pacific expansion, this entailing war against Great Britian, the United States and the Netherlands. Though this pact served the interests of both parties, Japan did reconsider invasion of the Soviet Union. On July 3, 1941, the next day after an "imperial session" cabinet conference in Tokyo (the meeting considered an issue regarding an attack on the USSR), a senior American official released an official statement to a Soviet ambassador. An American official stated that the US government had been informed about the intention of the Japanese government to abolish the non-aggression treaty with the USSR and attack the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow received the information of the growing danger from other sources. On July 8th, 1941, Foreign Commissar of the USSR Molotov wrote to Soviet ambassador in Washington, Umansky: "It would be interesting for us to find out, which measures the American government could or wanted to take in order to prevent or to complicate Japan's attack on the USSR, and which position it would take in case of an attack." Another "imperial session" of September 6, 1941, decided to adjourn the implementation of the Japanese plan to attack the Soviet Union on August 29th, 1942. Still, until September 30, 1941, both Roosevelt and Churchill thought Japan was going to strike in the north.

After meeting with President Roosevelt on October 16, 1941, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: "We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move — overt move." On November 25th, the day before a diplomatic ultimatum was sent to Japan's ambassadors, Stimson wrote in his diary: "The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot...."


In 1940, a Presidential election year, Admiral James Otto Richardson, USNA class of 1908, the Pacific fleet's commander, flew to Washington to protest FDR's decision to permanently base the fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the island of Oahu, instead of its normal berthing on the U.S. West Coast at San Pedro, California. The Admiral had sound reasons: Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to attack, being approachable from any direction; it could not be effectively rigged with nets and baffles to defend against torpedo planes and in Hawaii it would be hard to supply and train crews for his undermanned vessels. Pearl Harbor also lacked adequate fuel supplies and dry docks, and keeping men far from their families would create morale problems. Richardson left Washington accomplishing little except the ruination of his career. Said Richardson: "I came away with the impression that, despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined to put the United States into the war if Great Britain could hold out until he was reelected."

Richardson was quickly relieved of command in February of 1941. Replacing him was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also informed Roosevelt of Pearl Harbor's deficiencies, but accepted placement there, trusting that Washington would notify him of any intelligence pointing to attack. This proved to be misplaced trust. As Washington watched Japan preparing, Admiral Kimmel, as well as his Army counterpart in Hawaii, General Walter C. Short, were completely sealed off from information, neither the Army or Navy Pacific commands receiving any of the diplomatic decrypts then available after mid-July of 1941. I've determined the reason intelligence was not disseminated as it, in good sense, might have been, was the discovery in Franklin Delano Roosevelt's wastebasket information in the form of early decrypted messages. The United States Secret Service holds the onus of the blockade enforced on information, even Roosevelt being denied access.

Extract from September 11, 1941. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : Subject : Political Developments in Japan:
Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably "buy" time by entering into negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely event, will change the whole picture. The present cabinet, however, will initiate no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude independent action on the part of Japan's armies in the field.

On 7 December 1940, exactly one year to the day before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, a Japanese linguist with past experience in OP-20-G, became the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Layton's analysis of callsign and address usage as applied by the Japanese military augmented the diplomatic message information that had previously been the sole source of critical information. Layton's discovery that the Japanese had begun a military buildup in the Mandate Islands (Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls) was a development which had gone unnoticed by COMINT analysts, the organization concerned with communications intelligence; technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients, in Washington, and rather than foster good relationships between Pearl Harbor and Washington this episode caused considerable ill feeling toward Layton.

The following Top Secret classification document, sent on October 11, 1941 by Chief of Naval Operations Stark, states the level of concern generated by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet.
Top Secret. ' 9 Ocax)BEB 1941. From : CNO. Action : All U. S. holders of WPL fifty-two outside of Navy Department Info: 082335 (Paraphrase) On October 11th at 0200 GCT cancel WPL 51 and place WPL 52 in effect. [18] Top Secret. 16 OCTTOBER 19«. From : CNO. Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (Acknowledge). Info: 162203 The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochment with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third Aides inform appropriate Army and Naval District authorities X Acknowledge XX

The second to last sentence above, to me , illustrates the major error committed by the Pacific naval command based at Pearl Harbor, as mentioned in the opening paragraph above. Though vessels patrolled offshore of the Hawaiian Islands, they did not patrol at great distance and in force. It is nearly a certainty that United States Navy Destroyer forces placed at distance from the islands would have made hydrophone contact with the 6th Fleet submarines in November or early December and possibly have indication of surface forces of the Japanese Imperial Navy. Placement of seaplane tenders at distance and near the patrolling USN destroyers would have maintained greater area of patrol coverage through use of the PBY Consolidated Catalina aircraft that were later destroyed at NAS Kaneohe and Hickham Field in the December 7th attack while parked and idle. I believe it would have been the best choice to transmit communictions "in the clear" by the distantly-placed patrolling force in order to allow the potential aggressor knowledge of preparedness. Radio transmission analysis as practiced by Layton would have had the opportunity to gage a reaction.

On October 31, 1941, Japanese Navy callsigns changed in Fleet and Air units. This potential disaster for Allied intelligence gathering capabilities was averted by the fact that Japanese radio traffic provided both callsigns in transmissions during the transition. Ability to understand message routing was complete to United States Fleet Intelligence by November 1.

On November 10, 1941 the Japanese Army and Navy agree to attack plan. The Pearl Harbor Strike Force departs home waters for the Kurile Islands, arriving November 22. On November 10 it was known that the dispositions of the Japanese Naval and Air Forces were as follows: Combined Flt mostly in Kure area, BatDiv3, CINC2, and two CruDivs noted specifically. 3rdFlt in Sasebo/Takao; 4thFlt in Truk; 5thFlt has one unit at Chichi Jima; CdrCarDiv3 possibly with Combined Flt units at Kure/Sasebo; CINC Combined AF at Takao.
Decrypts provided the information on November 12 that Messages from Tokyo to Manila on 5 November request information regarding U.S.aircraft and ships.
An intelligence assessment of units and positions provided to CINCPAC on November 26, which mentioned the movement of one-third of the Japanese submarine force, was elaborated on with the message of the following day. The location of carriers and submarines remained a question mark until their appearance off Oahu:
C 27 November COM-16 261331Nov41, to CINCPAC, COM-14, OPNAV, CINCAF; "JAPANESE NAVY-ORGANIZATION OF FLEETS Date of Issue-27 November 1941. Following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communications Intelligence Unit, referring to and commenting on yesterdays' information from the 14th Naval District Communications Unit. During the past few days traffic analysis indicates that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is directing units of the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and Submarine Force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections. For purposes of clarity the units expected to operate in South China will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in the Mandates will be referred to as Second Section. The estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division Seven, Air Squadron Six, Defense Division One, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Submarine Squadron Six. The Second Section consists of Cruiser Division Five, Carrier Division Three, (Ryuju and one Maru), Destroyer Squadrons Two and Four, Submarine Squadron Five, Base Force at Palao, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division Six and Battleship Division Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be clarified yet. There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron Three, Cruiser Division Seven, and Submarine Squadron Six are in the Takao area. The balance of Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron Five will take stations in the Straits of Formosa or further south. Combined Air Force units from the Empire proper are in Paidoh. [Possibly Paiho in South Central Taiwan.] It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates. The best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers are still in Sasebo-Kure area. Directives to the above Task Forces, if such, are directed to individual units and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations. Commanders-in-Chief, Second, Third, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet, appear to have major roles. Traffic from the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff to Commanders-in-Chief of the Fleet appears normal. This evaluation is considered reliable.

27 November- USN OPNAV WAR WARNING message alerts all Pacific commands to "An aggressive move ... within the next few days." Possible objectives mentioned: Philippines, Kra Peninsula, Thailand, or Borneo. Guam and Samoa to take measures against sabotage.

The Japanese did not repeat the error of transmitting duplicate callsigns when the following message was released.:
1 December- All radio calls of units afloat changed at midnight. Unusual. Service calls usually last six months. Suggests an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. 1stFlt: nothing to indicate Fleet out of home waters. Believe most of 1stFlt is in 2ndFlt Task Force. 2ndFlt believed proceeding from Kure/Sasebo in direction of South China, Indochina, probably passing up Takao. CruDiv7 and DesRon3 definitely in Indochina area. 3rd/4th/5thFlts NTR, Carriers, NTR; Combined Air Force, NTR. Large numbers of subs believed east of Yokosuka/Chichi Jima and Saipan.

Japanese diplomats at various embassies around the world received orders to destroy code machines and documents. These orders are the most damning evidence of intent to war precedent to the Pearl Harbor Attack.:
Top Secret 3 December 1941 From : OPNAV Action : CINCAF, Com Sixteen Info : CINPAC, Com Fourteen 031855 Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy Purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has com- plied

The tipoff regarding impending attack in the following message is the mention of radio silence being maintained by carrier and submarine forces. Admiral Kimmel, responding to the December 1 report of cryptanalyst Joseph J. Rochefort's mention of Japanese 3rd Fleet radio silence made the query to Layton that, " Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" Layton replied that he had hoped they would have been spotted before now. Mention of plain text message.:
5 December- All circuits overloaded. Tokyo-Mandates circuit duplex. Many new schedules. Both Takao and Tokyo handling traffic for 2nd/3rd Flts, some of which is old traffic. A plaintext message from a ship's captain from Tokyo to Takao referring to the Far Eastern crisis, notes that "specific orders will be issued soon." No traffic from Cdr carriers to sub force seen. In the 3rdFlt, a "COS" sent a message to "Commander 14th Army" aboard Ryuju Maru in 3rdFlt. A number of Maru vessels have been addressing CINC3. Shiogama Air and 2 U/I Corps are moving to probably Indochina.

Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's Fleet, moving southward for operations supporting Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo's move against the Malay Peninsula, had been spotted by an RAF aircraft on December 6.

On December 7,1941 at 7:55 A.M. the United States Naval base at Pearl Harbor was attacked by 353 Japanese fighters, bombers and torpedo planes in two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers of Vice Admiral Chuici Nagumo's combined Fleet. The coordinated and and complex naval strike, including thirty-three Japanese surface vessels, was accomplished under the management of Admiral IsorukuYamamoto, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy. Commander of the Fifth U.S. Air Force George Churchill Kenny stated that the air assault that struck U.S. forces on Oahu was, " an air attack that was a model of perfection and precision." The Japanese had prepared their attack with the utmost secrecy; in order to hide the assembly and marshalling of the Combined Fleet warships in the inland sea generated false radio traffic in order to mislead American intelligence into believing the Japanese aircraft carriers were still in home waters. Twenty-seven long range submarines of the Japanese Sixth Fleet sailed from Yokasuka and Kure naval bases on November 10, one of them stationed at points North off the Aleutian Islands; another off the island of Fiji, the remainder ringing Oahu, were on station on December 6 after refuelling at Kwajalein. Five more submarines left their Japanese bases on November 18, each carried a midget two man submarine and was designated the Special Attack Unit, these small boats to be released in the attack area of Oahu coincident with the main aerial attack. One of the midget submarines beached off Oahu, the other four were destroyed in the attack. For the record Admiral Yamamoto was against the opening of the war, his knowledge of United States productive capability leading him to the conclusion that, while Japan would sustain a period of victories, the attrition would eventually lead to a Japanese defeat. Yamamoto's being steeped in the culture of his nation, with the Nihon Seishin, Japanese Spirit, dictated that there should be a fight.
The old adage, " An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure", is certainly applicable in the scenario that preceeded the beginning of the Pacific War. Regards

[Graham Barnes]

"By whatever means and for whatever reason several posts evaporated from this website on the morning of July 3, 2011. I'm reposting this one."

Obviously a massive cover-up and conspiracy have been detected here...:)

[Don Boyer]

Not only did your post disappear, so did mine, and of course lots of other things. I would have to extend the greatest appreciation to kc, whom I know is in the background trying to repair the damage caused by the server upgrade issue. I bet he has burned much midnight oil on this, and of course, we all appreciate the fact that things are slowly being put right.

That aside, Hank, I found your post very well done, and a good look at the bad situation we found ourselves in pre-Pearl Harbor. There was not the slightest doubt in the minds of those at the top of the political food chain in the US that Japan was going to force a war upon at least Britain and the Dutch, and most likely us, since the Philippines flanked everything the Japanese were looking to do in SE Asia. We fully expected a move on the Philippines, and fully expected to have to write it off to boot, along with anything else of ours too far from Hawaii and too close to Japan, like Wake and Guam.

The idea of an opening attack on Pearl Harbor was considered remote in the extreme, unfortunately, but for fairly valid reasons and because we didn't think the Japanese were good enough to pull it off. Bad assumptions as it turned out.

Enjoyed reading your post, and appreciate you taking the time to put it out there for us.

Regards,

[jainso31]

I am still of the opinion that Adm. Stark's obscure Top Secret Order "to take due precautions and make preliminary deployments" was indeed so vague that area officers would have been risking their careers, if making any kind of move which could be seen as belligerent.
America wanted to come into the war BUT NOT be seen as "throwing the first stone" Nobody did anything, so Pearl Harbor happened; and America went to war.
Thanks for the clever dissertation Hank

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Yes, those orders were vague in the extreme, especially "preliminary deployments" -- deploy what and where? For what purpose? There was absolutely no way the Pacific fleet battleships, even if supported by carriers, could have done anything to help the Philippines or anywhere else in SE Asia without risking far too much for far too little gain. They would have arrived too late to fend off invasion, and would have faced a well-prepared Imperial Navy ready to meet the American fleet in exactly the scenario they had hoped for and planned for for years before the war, operating from interior lines of communications to boot. Even though the majority of the Imperial Navy's battleships were NOT deployed for the outbreak of the war (except the four Kongos), they WERE at sea and could have gotten to the potential battle area around the Philippines well before the US Fleet could have.

The "deployment" that would have been most advantageous, had there been any hint of an attack on Pearl, would be to have gotten the battleships the hell out of the way entirely, but no US Admiral worth his four stripes would have accepted that, as it would appear to be an unwillingness to fight; sensible as it would appear in hindsight, it would have been considered cowardice. The carriers would probably have been committed against the attack since they were armed and at sea anyway, but two untried rookie carriers with poor aircraft facing the six best trained, manned and equipped carriers in the world is not a winning scenario in my book. It would, of course, have been done anyway. And the battleships would no doubt have been put in harm's way as well.

The results theoretically could have been much worst than what actually happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7th and all based on the vague "desires" of the desk-jockeys in Washington who were busy fumbling the intelligence picture and fighting with each other over who would be at the top of the intelligence heap and over "what it all meant" from the messages they were intercepting and translating and passing to the high command, more or less.

[designeraccd]

Deploying the US Pacific Fleet (Plan Orange, if I remember) would have, as Don said, played right into the hands of a well trained IJN. The probable losses the USN would have incurred then most likely would been total losses. Difficult to salvage a torpeoed, bombed and perhaps shelled Gen 2 BB from the bottom of the Pacific. Had the desired (by IJN) battle occurred the loss of life could have been horrific.

The six main IJN Fleet carriers certainly dominated the air until Midway, where 2 were fortunately missing due to the Coral Sea battle. Between their (then) better trained pilots, and superior aircraft (especially the Zero), the USN might have had a complete disaster that could have prolonged the War and cost more lives. Not a pleasant thought, if one has lived through battle conditions.

As it was, despite the loss of life and some ships, the IJN effectively "modernized" the USN in one morning. Pearl Harbor showed the true dominant surface ship of WW2: the aircraft carrier. Fortunately we had a massive ship building program and personnel training program underway. The IJN never did either on anything remotely approaching the scale of the USN.

While a hard fought, close thing thru 1942, by 1943 the scales had definately tipped in favor of the rapidly burgeoning, battle hardened USN.

As an aside, I never realized the IJN had worked out "alongside" replenishment prior to WW2. A recently purchased monograph on the Atago class heavy cruisers clearly shows this with a photo of that I had never seen. The author also commented on the IJN's ability to do this. DFO ;)

[jainso31]

DFO I could not agree more .Your summing up is crystal clear and there should be no argument about that.:cool:

jainso31

[derek s.langsdon]

Todays Daily Telegraph reproduces its front page for July 26th 1941 headlining "Britain & U.S Freeze all Japanese Credits" following Japanese seizure of Military bases in Indo-China-described by Eden in our Parliament as" a plain threat to our terrritories."Associatd Press reported at the same time that Japan was calling up over a million men, the largest mobilisation since their war against China in 1937. In addition Roosevelt announced 7/25/41 "Japanese ships in U.S.ports will be prevented from moving",,,"Japan's Armed Forces are a potenial menace to the Straits Settlements and British Supply lines...our moves will bring the U.S.Public to a greater awareness of the deadly perils of the whole world situation"

Wonder why everyone was so surprised and unprepared for events that took place five months later ??!!

derek-L/Norfolk

[John Odom]

None are so blind as those who will not see.

[Hank]

A bit of follow-up on the time line of events I'd posted regarding the December 7th attack on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu.

CNO Admiral James Raynsford Stark's Dispatch, October 11, 1941 has its precedence in a January 17, 1940 memorandum written to him by by Vice Admiral Walter Stratton Anderson. Anderson, with an impressive career record as a vessel and shore base commander, like many involved in naval intel during the period in question, had no intelligence postings prior to his posting as Director of Naval Intelligence in June of 1939. His thoughts and observations during his tenure in ONI till December, 1940 are an insight into the White House and Washington, D.C. of the time.

Vice Admiral Husband Kimmel considered sending cruisers at distance in response to the Stark memorandum and the War Alert. Kimmel considered the final part of the sentence, not to provoke war, and erred on the side of caution. No vessels out of the port save for the local patrolling force. The destroyer USS Ward caught and sank one midget submarine of the IJN Special Attacking Force as she was attempting to enter the port, the first overt naval action of the war in the Pacific.

Regards

[jainso31]

In other words the Top Secret Order from Stark was really a "deterrant"-ie nobody makes any sort of move-just sit tight!!!

jainso31

[Don Boyer]

Pre-war peacetime inertia and "don't rock the boat"-itis prevailed at Pearl Harbor before December 7th. Remember, Kimmel was quite aware that his predecessor was fired from the job for telling Roosevelt that his forward deployment policy (as a "restraint" on Japan) was basically useless. That's not conducive for creating original thinking about war preparations even with war obviously coming (but NOT obviously coming to Pearl Harbor). I doubt that even with a man like Halsey (who at least had more stones than most, if not brains) in charge things would have been much better. The "attitude" needed to be prepared at Pearl Harbor was an attitude only generated by combat and war experience, and there wasn't any of that on hand at Pearl Harbor until about 0800 on December 7, 1941.

[Hank]

No Kiddin', Don- I believe the concept of the Direct Order, a condition missing from CNO Stark's memorandum, was developed to overide a commanders natural fear of doing the wrong thing.

I've studied VA James Richardson through some of the mass of records out there, really haven't made a dent in the pile yet, though I believe he'd have been closer to wharf 1010 than the Golf Course. He probably would have been more curious as to what was near him in the water than Kimmel.
Regards

[Don Boyer]

Hank, I agree. Richardson was more the sea dog that would have wanted to do the best possible job of anticipating.

Of course, on the other side of the coin, there are those in the tons of writing about Pearl Harbor who think "Somebody should have done something!" regardless of the murky intelligence picture.

And this falls afoul of reality intruding. Done what? Almost any scenario one could come up with for a "more alert" Pacific fleet would probably risk far more damage to the fleet than actually occurred. No Admiral worth his salty stripes would have gotten the fleet the heck out of the way in order to preserve the battlefleet -- it would have left Pearl bare-assed and subject to massive damage. (The odds of the Army successfully defending Pearl against and aierial assault from the kido butai would have been real slim, considering their own uprepardness.) And sortieing to do battle would probably have resulted in battleships and other fleet units down and unrecoverable. A real catch 22 there.

Pearl Harbor has generated about as much print as any battle in modern history (except in Japan, of course) and most of it overlooks the fact that when you get down to ACTUAL damage to the fleet (discounting the terrible loss of life) you chalk up two battleships down for the count and nothing else.

For an attack by the combined airgroups of six aircraft carriers, this is a really poor showing. Of course the shock to US sensibilities, the affect on morale, and the inevitable witchhunt for "those responsible for this disaster" far outweighs the amount of print devoted to what actually happened in terms of strategic consequences and materiel loss to the navy as a whole.

The impact of Pearl Harbor on the US navy's effort to defeat the Japanese can be gauged by the fact that Japanese expansion in the Pacific was stopped cold by November of 1942 with the fleet we had on hand when the war started (give or take the trickle of new ships showing up about that time, like the first batch of Fletchers and Clevelands). It was only after that when the materiel superiority of American industry came to the fore, and at that point there was NO action on the part of the IJN, no matter how skillfully handled, that would have changed the outcome of the war -- other than surrender, of course, and that was a non-starter because of Imperial Army control of the government. At that time, the surrender-minded would have had a fatal accident.

[jainso31]

Don -your last paragraph in your last post says it all -without equivocation.
Once the juggernaut, which was the US war machine; really got into overdrive- there was to be no other outcome but victory.

jainso31

[Dreadnought]

Members might find THIS POST (http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?p=10006307#post10006307)of interest - describing the attack on USS Shaw in the floating dock YFD2

[sierra hotel]

here we go have some cropped close images of that fateful Sunday morning, but with captioning, this is from a VERY LARGE original scanned picture from the National Archives. Feel free anyone to upload, download or whatever...

[Don Boyer]

Nice photo enhancements, thanks for posting them.

The third photograph is still being analyzed to death trying to figure out if one of the midget subs is visible at center left in the area of the splash remains from previous aircraft torpedo drops. There are those who are totally convinced that one of the midgets is visible just behind the ship's launch in the water. My only problem with that is the fact that the sub -- if there -- is exactly in the middle of the area where aerial torpedoes are being dropped, which is also exactly the last area you, as a submarine commander, would want to be in with a small submarine, considering those torpedoes drop at least 20 feet into the water before leveling out. Even if they didn't detonate due to not being armed, being hit by one would ruin your day in any case. No final irrefutable conclusions have been reached on the subject, as none of the submarines or crew survived of those that penetrated the harbor and the photo just does not yield any new data even under the best of computer enhancements.

[Forester]

One thing that the picture illustrates very clearly is the blatantly obvious exposure of 'Battleship Row' to aerial torpedo attack. At the time, the US Navy must have been aware of the potential threat as their own air arm would have been engaged in perfecting the technique - especially after the British example of succesfully attacking the Italian fleet with Swordfish bi-planes.

Its all a matter of tradition I suppose. The military are addicted to lining up in nice straight rows.

[Andy3E]

Looking at the Picture it seems the Oklahoma, California and West virginia have already been hit judging by the wakes from their sides

[BlackBat242]

One thing that the picture illustrates very clearly is the blatantly obvious exposure of 'Battleship Row' to aerial torpedo attack. At the time, the US Navy must have been aware of the potential threat as their own air arm would have been engaged in perfecting the technique - especially after the British example of succesfully attacking the Italian fleet with Swordfish bi-planes.

Its all a matter of tradition I suppose. The military are addicted to lining up in nice straight rows.

The depth of the harbor is much less than Taranto... shallow enough that the USN's torpedo people said that aerial torpedoes would get stuck in the bottom and therefore be useless there (a dropped aerial torpedo dives to about 60' (or more) before coming back up to its running depth).

Therefore, it was felt that torpedo nets were not needed.

Unfortunately, those wily Japanese developed a high-tech solution which evaded the USN's best thinkers... they attached a wooden structure to the torpedoes' fins which kept it from diving deep upon water entry.

[BlackBat242]

There are those who are totally convinced that one of the midgets is visible just behind the ship's launch in the water. My only problem with that is the fact that the sub -- if there -- is exactly in the middle of the area where aerial torpedoes are being dropped, which is also exactly the last area you, as a submarine commander, would want to be in with a small submarine, considering those torpedoes drop at least 20 feet into the water before leveling out.

My main problem with this theory is that the locations of all 5 subs during the attack are definitely known (see below), and all 10 torpedoes are accounted for... either we found them unfired in their subs or we know when and at what ships they were fired.

The photo analysis was first printed in 1999, three years before the wreck of I-20tou was discovered with both torpedoes still aboard. So at the time these conclusions were published, two torpedoes were unaccounted for. With the discovery of I-20tou in 2002, the question is reduced to which account is more credible: the attack on Battleship Row or the attack on St. Louis.

Since the meticulous records the Japanese kept on the preparations for, and execution of, this attack survived intact, there is no possibility of a "sixth mini-sub" to be in that photo.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-053.htm

name - sunk by - location - notes

I-16tou: found 2009 - just outside - fired at St. Louis.
alternate story - inside PH - torpedoed WV and OK.
I-22tou: Monaghan (DD-354) - inside PH - Two torpedoes missed
I-20tou: Ward (DD-139) - outside - both torpedoes found
I-18tou: mechanical failure/depth charged - outside - both torpedoes found
I-24tou (#19): captured - aground outside - both torpedoes found

I place no credibility on the alternate theory for the first sub... phantom torpedo sightings don't produce surface explosions. To counter this real explosion when no aircraft were around (10 minutes after the second wave headed back to their carriers) is speculation as to indistinct smudges on a single photo which some (but by no means even a majority) of analysts think might be a mini-sub.
At 0931, St. Louis moved away from the pier and headed for South Channel and the open sea. 15 minutes later, her 6 in (150 mm) guns, whose power leads had been disconnected, were in full operating order.

As the cruiser moved into the channel entrance, she became the target of a midget submarine. The enemy's torpedoes, however, exploded on striking a shoal less than 200 yd (180 m) from the ship. Destroyers then pounded the bottom with depth charges and St. Louis continued out to sea where she joined in the search for the Japanese fleet. After failing to locate the enemy strike force, the hunters returned to Pearl Harbor on 10 December.

Also note that, if that really was a mini-sub, it would be where the attack plan said it should NOT have been for another two hours!

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/hydrodynamics/q0280.shtml
A map obtained from the captured HA-19 also indicates that none of the midget submarines were supposed to reach that area until at least 10 AM, a full two hours after the photo was taken, to avoid interference with the aerial torpedo attack.

[jainso31]

On closer examination I am inclined to agree with you Andy.The tracks of disturbed water seem to indicate exactly that; or perhaps just on the point of contact.

jainso31

[Dreadnought]

I have seen a copy of this photograph, on the rear of which, is a comment regarding visible torpedo tracks. Would learned members wish to comment.

[BlackBat242]

Looking at the Picture it seems the Oklahoma, California and West virginia have already been hit judging by the wakes from their sides

Yes, the notes on the photos specifically state this (except for California).

[Dreadnought]

I have seen a copy of this photograph, on the rear of which, is a comment regarding visible torpedo tracks. Would learned members wish to comment.

I think I have now found more information regarding my comment/query above, and whilst the Pearl Harbor buffs here maybe aware of the following article and its conclusions, I thought for the benefit of less infomed members about this topic, like myself, that it was worthwhile reproducing an extract of it here.

The photograqph referred to and anlaysed by USS Arizona historian Dan Martinez is the one submitted by Ray in post #1


Did a Japanese Midget Submarine Sink the USS Oklahoma on December 7, 1941?
by Vernon Maddux

In 2009, Marine historians and history buffs claimed that at least one of the torpedoes that hit the USS Oklahoma was from a Japanese midget-submarine. It is clear from the evidence that two of the midget-subs did managed to penetrate inside the harbor before the attack began
The single most pertinent evidence offered by Marine historians that supports their view that it was a Japanese midget Submarine that capsized the USS Oklahoma is the picture taken by a Japanese crewman in the second wave of Kate bombers that attacked the ship in Battleship row.

In the photo, a small puff of smoke can be seen rising from the Light Cruiser USS Helena and the USS Ogalala (center). The big smoke rising in the background are burning aircraft at Hickam Field. This photo indicates several torpedoes are in the water by 0800. USS California, upper right, has been hit by a torpedo and is gushing oil, the USS Oklahoma had been torpedoed (at least twice). USS West Virginia just behind Oklahoma had been struck by at least one torpedo and is listing to port.

USS Arizona Historian Dan Martinez comments on the photo:

Six torpedo tracks are seen in the water headed for Oklahoma and West Virginia. Four appear partially erased by the traveling surface concussion waves. Two tracks appear to be thinner and show less alteration by the wave concussion. Four of the torpedo tracks can be seen in alignment with respective water splashes associated with aerial torpedo drops. The two thinner tracks that were less affected by the wave concussions converged at a point coinciding with the linear object but without water splashes. One of the thinner tracks terminated with a small water plume characterized by the beginning of an underwater explosive detonation against the side of the West Virginia’s hull. The surface concussion rings propagated radially from the West Virginia’s and Oklahoma were the result of the torpedo detonation, its gas bubble in expansion and contraction, a phenomenon of underwater explosion. The magnitude and propagation velocity of the concussion waves can be measured. Thus total elapsed time intervals were computed to be 174 seconds (approximately three minutes) after the Helena was hit. This substantiated that the combat photo was taken at approximately 0801. (Rudimentary shadow analysis agrees that the time was 0801-0803).

The USS Monaghan (DD 354) was one of the “ready duty” destroyers in Pearl Harbor that morning. At 07:51 the ship was ordered to leave the harbor and join Ward, who had just reported sinking an unidentified submarine off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. A few minutes later, before Monaghan could cast off and get underway, the Japanese air attack began. Monaghan went to battle stations and soon opened fire. It still took until 08:27 before steam came up on all boilers and the ship cast off and headed out to join Ward. It was at this point when the captain became aware of an unknown type midget submarine inside the harbor. The following are excerpts from the Monaghan’s log.

1. 0835. Signalmen reported to Monaghan’s captain that USS Curtiss was flying a flag hoist indicating the presence of an enemy submarine. Shortly thereafter the Captain and other personnel on the bridge observed the conning tower of a submarine located approximately 200-300 yards on the starboard quarter of the Curtiss (moored at berth X-22) and that the sub was under vigorous fire by machine guns from Tangier (moored at Northwest end of Ford Island) and from machine guns and the 5" turret from the Curtiss.

2.0837. Captain (of Monaghan) ordered "all engines ahead flank speed" and word was passed that it was intended to ram the submarine – then distant about one thousand yards. At about the same time Williamson, D.C., (CQM) who had the helm, was directed to head for the submarine when he gave assurance that he saw it.

3. The first shot from Monaghan struck over and ricocheted into a derrick moored near the west bank. When it was evident that we were attempting to ram the sub the guns were ordered to cease firing. Within 75 yards the submarine turned sharply toward our bow and released a torpedo. The torpedo porpoised twice and then passed parallel to the ship's starboard side a distance of about 20-30 yards. The torpedo was seen to go up against the north bank throwing up a geyser of water about 200 feet high. The midget submarine was struck a glancing blow causing it to slide aft along the starboard side. The bow lifted out of the water as if the boat was blowing ballast (this was the natural result of firing one of the torpedoes). As the sub passed astern the first depth charge was released. The explosion brought the bow and superstructure of the sub into full view.

4. At about 0843 word was passed to stand by for a shock forward as the submarine had disappeared from the view of those on the bridge and ramming was considered imminent. Shortly thereafter a slight shock was felt and about 0844 the two depth charges released exploded violently about 50-100 yards astern of the Monaghan.

5. At about the same time of the depth charge explosions the order was given "all engines back emergency full speed", which, although carried out promptly, was insufficient to check the headway of the ship which consequently struck a derrick moored near Beckoning Point a slight blow.

6.Upon attempting to back clear of the derrick it was discovered that we were entangled with one of her mooring lines but by going ahead slowly we were able to free the Monaghan and at about 0847 we swung into the channel astern of the Dale and proceeded out of the harbor passing the Entrance buoys at 0908 from where we proceeded to our assigned station on the Offshore Patrol.

About two hours after Monaghan left Pearl Harbor, the damaged and barely functional Ha-19 passed Honolulu beach and rounded Diamond Head. The shock of the earlier collision with the reef had cracked the batteries, which emitted chlorine gas. The gas became so thick inside the hull that it rendered the crew unconscious. When Sakamaki finally regained consciousness, he found that the sub had surfaced and was rolling in the surf on the surface near the shore. He opened the hatch to breathe fresh air. Looking west over the crest of Diamond Head, he could see dense smoke rising from ships burning in the harbor. Sick and confused, Sakamaki tried to drive the craft up on the beach but struck hard on a reef several yards offshore. Sakamaki and Inagaki shifted ballast and freed the midget submarine, but now the rudder was so damaged that the boat would not answer the helm. Drifting helplessly, Ha-19 was spotted and depth charged by a patrolling PBY. Sakamaki again tried to beach the boat, but stuck on an outer reef again. Finally, the officer gave up and lit the fuse of the midget submarine's self-destruct charge. He and Inagaki then crawled out of the hatch and leapt into the surf. Sakamaki was knocked unconscious by big waves crashing over the reef. Battered, his unconscious body washed ashore on WaimanaloBeach near Bellow's Field. PO2C Inagaki Kiyoshi’s body was never found.

Ha-19’sscuttling charge failed to explode. When the authorities found the derelict Ha-19 the next day after the attack, they found both torpedoes intact and inside there was a map indicating that none of the midget submarines were supposed to attack the capital ships until at least 10 AM, a full two hours after the attack was supposed to begin. This was to avoid interference with the aerial torpedo and bombing attack.

Injured and confused, Sakamaki was captured the next morning, December 8 (Hawaii time). He was Japanese POW number one. Under interrogation, he refused to answer any questions and repeatedly demanded he be allowed to die by his own hand or preferably, to be shot by a firing squad.

At 10:40 pm December 7 (Hawaii time) submarine I-16 picked up a garbled radio transmission the captain interpreted to be the midget-submarine’s code words for "Success, success, success". It is not certain if the message came from M-16 but it was from one of the midgets. Another transmission "unable to navigate" was received at 12:51 am the following morning 8 December (Hawaii Time). This was believed to have been sent by M-16’s officer.

Three of the subs have been found outside the harbor and two midget-subs are known to have penetrated the harbor. One was certainly destroyed by Monaghan in the main channel inside the harbor around 0844. It fired both of its torpedoes. The other midget that penetrated inside the harbor may have hidden to be scuttled the next day. What happened to its two-man crew is uncertain, but they did not escape or survive the war.

Sakamaki’s capture was quickly discovered by the IJN. During the war, the Japanese Navy proclaimed the lost mini-submariners to be great heroes and erected a shrine to them at Etajima. The high command officially ignored Sakamaki. PO2C Inagaki is inscribed as the only crewman in HA-19. None returned to the mother submarines.

Conclusions

1. M-16. About five miles from the harbor entrance, USS Ward’s Lookouts spotted a periscope heading toward the entrance to the naval harbor. At 6:53, about an hour before the aerial attack on Pearl Harbor began, the Ward sent a radio message that it fired on and dropped depth charges on a submarine. The vessel did not come up after being depth-charged. This was no doubt M-16...... At 12.20 p.m. on August 28, 2002, the Pisces IV and Pisces V, two deep diving submersibles operated by the Hawai‘i Undersea Research Laboratory (HURL), which are carried aboard the research vessel Ka'imikai-o-Kanaloa came upon the 78-foot, two-man submarine three to four miles off Pearl Harbor in about 1,200 feet of water. It had a 4 inch hole at the base of the conning tower exactly as Ward had claimed.

2. M-20. At c 0730 a patrolling PBY "Catalina" flying-boat 14-P-1, piloted by Ensign William P. Tanner of Patrol Squadron VP-14, spotted another periscope (he had helped USS Ward find and attack M-16) in the waters off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. This was possibly M-20. Tanner attacked this mini-sub with depth charges. The fate of this sub is not known and may have made it inside the main harbor where it fired its torpedoes and then was abandoned.

3. M-18. This sub was spotted inside the Keehi Lagoon next to Pearl Harbor by a destroyer and depth charged and sunk. On 13 June 1960, the submarine discovered lying on the bottom of the lagoon in 75 feet of water. On 6 July 1960, this boat was raised by the submarine rescue ship USS Current (ARS-22).

4. M-22. One midget, probably Lt Iwasa's M-22, penetrated inside Pearl Harbor and is known to have fired both torpedoes. It is confirmed that a mini-sub attacked the seaplane tender AV-4 Curtiss and DD Monaghan (DD 354). At 0836, Curtiss, underway and moving in the harbor, sighted a periscope and opened fire. A torpedo from the submarine missed Curtiss, but blew up a dock at Pearl City. Four minutes later this Japanese midget submarine surfaced and was further damaged by gunfire before diving again, after which USS Monaghan attacked it directly and dropped depth charges. Recently, the Los Angeles Times reported that Iwasa may have attacked and hit the battleship Oklahoma. According to Admiral Nimitz’s official testimony to Congress, one intact Japanese 800 lb (warhead-1000 lb total weight) submarine-type torpedo was later reportedly recovered from the bottom of the harbor which may or may not have been from M-22.

5. M-24 (Ha-19). Sakamaki’s boat was discovered damaged but intact, washed up on WaimanaloBeach below Bellows Field on the day following the attack. The sub was perfectly operational except for some external damage. It was repaired and shipped to the United States.

The Fifth and Last Midget Submarine

Three pieces of the sub (with cables intermingled, showing how the pieces were salvaged) were found during routine test dives between 1994 and 2001 by Terry Kerby, chief pilot of the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory's submersibles Pisces IV and Pisces V. But Kerby and others assumed they were a part of a war trophy that had been captured by allied forces at Guadalcanal or elsewhere, towed back to Hawaii and scuttled. Stephenson got involved in 2007 because he was looking for the fifth Japanese mini-sub. In 1941, a crewman on the I-16 had received a radio call from the I-16-tou at 10:41 p.m. on Dec. 8 reporting the success of its mission. That indicated to Stephenson that the mini-sub had found a calm place in the harbor and hidden until the next night before surfacing and sending the call. The crew members would have then scuttled the craft because they could not get it out of the harbor. The West Loch would have been a good location to hide, but researchers could find no trace of the boat there. A diver who had been looking for the mini-sub suggested that Stephenson talk to Kerby, who sent him pictures of his find.

"As soon as I saw the bow section with the distinctive net cutter, I knew that we had found the fifth midget sub," Stephenson said. No torpedoes were found on the wreck, and evidence suggests that they were not present when the boat was sunk. In looking at the photo of torpedoes in the water striking battleship row, Stephenson believed was from a mini-sub firing a torpedo into Battleship Row. A report to Congress in 1942 by Adm. Chester W. Nimitz describes an unexploded 800-pound torpedo recovered after the battle. That's twice the size carried by the torpedo bombers. That torpedo was apparently a dud that missed the West Virginia. But an examination of the remains of the Oklahoma shows that it apparently had underwater damage much larger than that associated with aerial torpedoes. An underwater blast would have caused it to capsize, Stephenson said. "Otherwise it would have settled to the bottom upright," like the other sunken ships. (Author’s note: Stephenson either ignores the fact that Oklahoma was wide open, or was not aware that the ship was being prepared for an intensive Captain’s inspection. It was also struck repeatedly, perhaps as many as a dozen aerial torpedoes).

Out of the five midgets, Ward sunk the one above outside the harbor entrance; the second, HA-19 beached off Bellows Field; a third was sunk and later recovered from inside the Keehi Lagoon; a fourth midget made it inside the channel to Pearl Harbor and launched both torpedoes at the cruiser USS St Louis near the harbor entrance and was sunk by Monaghan. The fifth midget has been found among the debris off the entrance to the harbor but its activities remain a mystery. This last midget submarine may have laid low inside the harbor during the confusion of the air raid after firing its torpedoes then scuttled itself when it could not exit the harbor. In the evening hours of December 8, the mother sub I-16 received a message that one of the midgets was experiencing "navigational problems."

It is clear that from the evidence that two Japanese midget submarines entered Pearl Harbor. One fired both torpedoes, which were spotted by USS Curtis and then destroyed by the USS Monaghan. Ultimately salvage crews dredged this midget sub from the harbor with its stern crushed by depth charges. The other midget, which entered Pearl Harbor apparently also fired both its torpedoes, at something--perhaps the ships on the west side of FordIsland. It was then probably scuttled by its commander, killing both crewmembers. Salvage crews scooped-up debris from the Forager disaster from southwest loch, including the second midget sub, and hauled the debris out to sea; it was re-discovered with its dredging cables still attached to the three pieces of the hull in 2009. Neither of these two midget subs could have fired at the USS Oklahoma. There is no doubt that the Oklahoma’s sinking was the result of multiple aerial torpedo hits (at least seven and perhaps ten or more) and the fact that the ship was in a fragile, non-water tight configuration. No bombs hit Oklahoma because by the time the level and attack bombers got around to hitting Battleship Row, the ship had already capsized.

[BlackBat242]

OK... now they are getting ridiculous... a fourth midget made it inside the channel to Pearl Harbor and launched both torpedoes at the cruiser USS St Louis near the harbor entrance and was sunk by Monaghan.

This attack was at about 0945. Monaghan had cleared the channel and was outside the harbor by 0908, according to point #6 above.

The sub that Curtis observed, and was attacked by Monaghan, fired a torpedo at her around 0840, and was sunk by depth charges at about 0844 (points 3-5 above).

Saint Louis didn't sail out until after 0930, so this had to be a second sub inside Pearl Harbor.

And now they have two more torpedoes being fired at ~0801?

That's 2 torpedoes fired by one sub @ ~0801, and at least two more torpedoes fired later... one @~0840 by the sub that Monaghan sank @ ~0844, and another a full hour later!

Sorry, they only carried 2 each, and a sunk sub can't fire torpedoes in another part of the harbor. That means 3 subs, all of which fired torpedoes... but there were only 5 subs, and 3 of them have been found with both torpedoes still present... the math simply doesn't add up.




Poor scholarship here... and a desperate stretching of facts to fit theory... instead of using facts to construct the theory.

[Don Boyer]

BB 242 has done his homework well and I am in agreement with his posts on this subject. I apparently opened a can of worms regarding the midget-subs, but then that is exactly what the forum is for. The midgets have been a point of "could it be?" crap from the "forced historical controversy school" of television programming that infests our (American) TV programming from what should be reputable entities such as the History Channel and even National Geographic, which has finally gone from promoting science at its best (remember Costeau?) to promoting itself with shoddily-done programming. All these programs are full of "could it be that...?" "is it possible that....? " all surrounded by pontificating talking heads of little historical or scientific merit, and even less solid proof, and unfortunately a lot of modern historical "scholarship" regarding Pearl Harbor falls in that category, most particularly the midget subs which is about the only subject about which there is any new information to be garnered.

Case in point, back a few years ago, National Geographic and a well-known researcher of sunken ships came to Hawaii on Pearl-Harbor related subjects, and with the intention of looking for the midget sub sunk by the Ward. They were far too smart and well-informed to listen to the local experts, and went merrily bobbing about the sea hunting here and there and finding nothing. Not too long later the University of Hawaii's underwater research unit found the sub -- hole in the conning tower just as expected -- in about the area they expected to eventually find it.

As to the torpedo tracks, they are most certainly visible, which would be expected in a photograph taken from the back seat of a Kate torpedo bomber. California, Oklahoma and West Virginia have all been hit, as has Honolulu in the background (and, by default, Oglala moored outboard of Honolulu and which later sank). Note that no torpedo tracks lead toward the Arizona or Nevada at this point. (Nevada was hit forward by a torpedo; it has been claimed by witnesses that Arizona was also hit forward, but there is no photographic or underwarer archeology that confirms this at all.) This photo is probably one of the most dramatic ever taken of "war at sea" in my opinion, as it clearly shows the unpreparedness of a nation at peace, and presages the utter destruction of those making the attack.

Thanks for those posts, BB -- saved me looking it all up. You must have some real resources quick to hand there! :)

[sierra hotel]

captionings are my own observations....

[sierra hotel]

3 more interesting views before and during.... I hope you folks like these, I have all of these and TONS more on a Hi Res photo DVD....

[Hank]

RE Post 8: It is my understanding that the Ho Kyoteki crews were in league with the laying in range of Nakajima B5N aircraft in the attack. No mention in the Culver caption of which torpedoes were involved with "hits". The aircraft and submarines utilized seperate torpedo ordnance.

Please do some digging on the Japanese side of the fence. The Inland Sea of Japan became the focus of intense training with the July of 1941 training regimine. Attack training was repeatedly carried out at Lake Ogawara at Misawa. The depth of the lake was simular to Pearl Harbor's. Unlike Western navies hesitance to launch torpedoes due to the expense the Japanese considered them useless if untried, several launched and recovered daily.
Misawa maintained its relevance as a training area into the war, becoming the target of massive Allied application of explosives, delivered by air, of course. Regards

[Don Boyer]

The third photo of post # 154 is one of the most interesting of the attack photos taken by the Japanese. Nevada has just taken a torpedo hit forward, ripping a 30' x 45' hole in the hull forward. The retreating shockwave is very visible, in total contrast to the Arizona just forward and just about to be blown up. There is no evidence of any torpedo track or shock wave anywhere near Arizona's bow, which pretty much puts paid the tales by witnesses that she was torpedoed -- it's far more likely a bomb falling between Arizona and Vestal created that compressed water-column detonation that looked like a torpedo hit. (The water column from a torpedo hit is much different than that of a near miss bomb--for examples, see the later war photos of Shoho and Shokaku under air attack.)

Nevada is under a smoky cloud because she's on fire forward and her starboard 5" battery and .50 cals. are hard at work shooting at aircraft. Shrapnel damage started a lot of small fires forward at this time.

[jainso31]

Marvellous photography and excellent commentary by the posters; for which many thanks from one from "the other side of the world".:cool::cool:

jainso31

[Dreadnought]

Following on from Don's comments about Nevada in post #157 ...

USS Nevada (BB36) was at the northern end ‘Battleship Row’, ahead of USS Arizona. Her Commander and Executive Officer were ashore leaving the junior officers in charge Lieutenant Comander J. F. Thomas USNR in charge. Some of the men were planning a tennis tournament later in the day, others were preparing for a swim at the nearby beach at Aiea Landing. Moments before the first Japanese planes appeared over the harbour many of the crew were still at 08:00 colours.

At 08:03 a torpedo struck Nevada, and exploded between frames 41 and 42, approximately 14 feet above the keel. This opened a large hole in the ship's port side below her two forward turrets. Her anti-torpedo protection, of a type back-fitted to the Navy's older battleships, resisted the warhead's explosion fairly well. However, serious leaks were started in the inmost bulkhead, allowing a considerable amount of water into the ship, causing her to list at an angle 5 degrees. Luckily, Nevada’s boilers happened to be fired up, and at around 08:40, she was able to slowly get under way, hoping to reach the saftey of the open sea. As she moved down the channel, the ship’s engineers were able to correct her list through counter-flooding, but she was still in a battered state, with water continuing to pour in as a result of the damage inflicted by the torpedo.

At about 08:40, and as she was halfway along the channel,the second wave of 170 Japanese planes appeared over the harbour, and a squardon of dive bombers targetted the escaping Nevada hoping to sink her in the channel and block the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbor.

The slowly moving battleship was an attractive target for the enemy bombers, and at 09:07, she suffered five direct hits from 250 kg bombs. One exploded over the crew's galley at Frame 80. Another struck the port director platform and exploded at the base of the funnel on the upper deck. Yet another hit near No. 1 turret inboard from the port waterway and blew large holes in the upper and main decks. Two struck the forecastle near Frame 15, with one passing out through the side of the second deck before exploding, and the other exploding within the ship near the fuel oil tank, causing leakage and intense fires foward.

The fires that flared up around Turret 1 might have caused more critical damage if the main magazines had not been empty.For several days prior to the attack, all of the 14 in gun battleships had been replacing their standard-weight, main-battery projectiles with a new heavier projectile that offered greater penetration and a larger explosive charge in exchange for a slight decrease in range. All of the older projectiles and powder charges had been removed from the magazines of Nevada, and the crew had taken a break after loading the new projectiles in anticipation of loading the new powder charges on Sunday.

It was now clear that Nevada was too badly damaged to reach safety, and whislt passing the Air Station, a signal was received that the ship should not leave the harbour but should continue to the west side of Ford Island. It was hoped that she could be settled in shallow water to prevent her being sunk in the channel, and where she could continue to fight; her gunners already having shot down four planes.

As she steered for the shoreline, the current caught Nevada, and as her crew fought her many fires, the ship twisted around until she was facing back up the harbour. With the help of tugs (Hoga and Avocet), she was backed across the channel and grounded, stern-first, at Hospital Point at around 09:25. By the following day, she had settled to the bottom with everything below decks almost totally filled with seawater.

USS Nevada suffered a total of 60 killed and 109 wounded during the attack.

The salvage of USS Nevada will be covered in the ‘Pearl Harbor: Aftermath & Salvage’ thread.


Nevada_1: Heading down the channel. Taken from Ford Island. Tug Avocet in the foreground. US Navy photograph. NHHC Collection.

Nevada_2: Beached at Hospital Point at around 9:40 ? (some reports say it was not until 10:45 that she settled). Tug Hoga in attendance, assisting with firefighting. Photogrpah US National Archives NARA-306548

Nevada_3: Another, aground off Waipo Point. Photogrpah US National Historical Center #80-G-33020
.
.

[Don Boyer]

Very nice post, Clive, nice of you to highlight the Nevada so thoroughly.

I wanted to add a bit to your post regarding the actions of the Nevada and the various photographs one sees of the ship at various times during the attack, as there is often confusion concerning how she ended up where she did after the attack.

In the first photo you posted, Nevada is trying to negotiate the narrow channel between Ford Island (on the ship's starboard hand) and the shoreside Hospital Point to port. She would soon ground bow-first at Hospital Point, and photographs often show her in the background in this position. While grounded, her stern slowly swung with the current until she was actually pointed down the channel stern first, in which position she was finally able to back off and, going astern, move across to the west side of the channel (west and slightly south of Ford Island) where she grounded on the hard reef bed at Waipio Point, often known as Nevada Point now. There she remained until refloated and sent off to return to service. This "swing" of Nevada while grounded is so often overlooked in historical accounts it makes for confusion when looking at many of the attack photos that include Nevada in the scene.

Regards,

[Teuchter]

Thank you Clive, Don and everyone else who has contributed to this excellent thread - BZ to all of you!!

[ludsie]

Great thread I to recieved the email that purported to be from a lost brownie camera

Thanks for clarifying the actual origin of the pictures