Encounter off Gavdos-Matapan Prelude

[jainso31]

This event is entitled an Encounter off Gavdos, an island to the SW of Crete; and is the action leading up to the famous Battle of Matapan on 28/29 March 1941

When Ultra intelligence reported in March 1941 that Italian warships were to set sail, even the normally phlegmatic Cunningham was delighted by the opportunity this presented. Fortunately, because of recent operations around Greece, the bulk of the Royal Navy was already deployed in the eastern Mediterranean. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and the light cruiser squadron under Vice Adm. Henry D. Pridham-Wippell at Piraeus, Greece, were alerted. At Alexandria lay the 1st Battleship Squadron, consisting of three of the proudest battleships in the Royal Navy — Warspite, Barham and Valiant — along with four destroyers from the 14th Destroyer Flotilla. In support, having just arrived in the area, was the aircraft carrier Formidable, loaded with 14 torpedo bombers. Most were Fairey Albacores, the marginally improved successor to the Sword-fish biplane. Also on board were 13 Fairey Fulmar fighters, slow but heavily armed.

On the night of March 26, 1941, Admiral Iachino left the port of Naples on his flagship Vittorio Veneto with four destroyers to rendezvous with three additional cruiser divisions in the Strait of Messina. From Brindisi came the 8th Division, composed of two of the best light cruisers in the Italian navy, Garibaldi and Abruzzi, along with two destroyers. These cruisers carried 10 6-inch guns as well as heavier armor protection.

The 1st Division from Taranto, under Admiral Carlo Cattaneo, consisted of the heavy cruisers Pola, Zara and Fiume, along with four destroyers. Last was the 3rd Division from Messina, Sicily, under Admiral Luigi Sansonetti, with the heavy cruisers Trieste, Trento and Bolzano, accompanied by three destroyers. With the exception of Bolzano, these warships were poorly designed and functionally obsolescent, having been launched in the mid-1920s. Above all else, what Iachino's ships lacked was the technological breakthrough of the age — radar. Iachino also lacked confidence in his intelligence service and brought along his own cryptographer, who would be useful in deciphering some types of messages.

Things seemed to go wrong for the Italians from the start. Promised air support for the morning of March 27 never materialized. That afternoon, a British Short Sunderland reconnaissance plane from Crete spotted the Italian ships while they were still in the Aegean.

Iachino now knew that he had lost the element of surprise. Nevertheless, he decided to wait for Rome to make the decision to terminate the operation. Rome, however, was more influenced by political ramifications than military considerations and decided to modify, rather than terminate, the mission. At 1800 hours Iachino was advised that as a consequence of the Sunderland identification the sweep north of Crete by the 1st Cruiser Division would be canceled, and the fleet would concentrate its forces south of the island and sweep northward past Cape Matapan at the southern tip of Greece. When Cunningham received the decoded message from the Sunderland confirming that the Italians were at sea, he ordered Pridham-Wippell to rendezvous with his 1st Battleship Squadron south of Gaudo. Should Pridham-Wippell encounter the Italians prior to the meeting, he was to lure them southeastward toward the 15-inch guns of his battleships.

At first light on March 28, the Italians launched two Imam Ro.43 reconnaissance planes. One plane was ordered north of the fleet, the other south-southeast. Iachino's operational orders were that he would return to Taranto if no encounter occurred by 0700. At 0650, however, the Ro.43 pilot flying the southern course advised that he had made visual contact with four British light cruisers accompanied by four destroyers. This was Pridham-Wippell's force, consisting of the light cruisers HMS Ajax, Orion, and Gloucester, and HMAS Perth, accompanied by four destroyers en route to join Cunningham.

Admiral Iachino realized that he was confronted by a far less powerful force than he already had concentrated in that area. Seeing an opportunity for a cheap victory, he ordered the closest Italian division, Sansonetti's 3rd, to alter course, increase its speed to 30 knots and intercept the British cruisers. Changing his own course and the course of the 1st Division in support of his cruisers, he ordered Vittorio Veneto's speed increased to 28 knots. Sansonetti's force made contact with the British ships at 0800, with the first Italian salvos fired at 0812 hours from a distance of 25,000 yards. All the Italians' guns were directed at the last ship in the line, the cruiser HMS Gloucester.

Pridham-Wippell's immediate response was to order smoke and begin zigzagging. He had been warned earlier by one of Formidable's search planes that a cruiser force along with destroyers had been spotted in the area, but he mistakenly believed the sighting was his own cruiser squadron rather than an enemy force. Now he raced toward the protection of Cunningham's fleet. While the Italian cruisers were fast, their gunnery systems were antiquated and the shells all fell short. As the Italians approached Gloucester's range, her crew gamely returned fire with her 6-inch guns, accurately enough to dissuade her pursuers from closing. Staying out of reach of Gloucester's guns, the 3rd Division continued its inaccurate fire.

As the British light cruiser squadron continued to make a dash for safety, it became clear to Iachino that the battle was moving away from his supporting ships and well within the range of British air cover. The 3rd Division was already halfway to the North African coast. Rightly fearing the intervention of the Royal Air Force (RAF), he ordered Sansonetti to terminate his pursuit and turn to a course 300 degrees west, toward home. The 3rd Division broke off at 0850, turning to port for the return journey and believing that it was leaving the British force behind. However, as the Italians would find out on more than one occasion during the war, it was far easier to start a fight with the British than to end one.

The British light cruiser squadron turned about and followed the Italians, carefully remaining out of range of their guns. Annoyed by Pridham-Wippell's boldness, Iachino quickly formulated a plan to envelop his arrogant enemy. With no knowledge of the British battleship squadron heading his way at 22 knots, at 1035 he ordered Vittorio Veneto to alter course toward Pridham-Wippell's light cruisers and destroyers. He ordered the 3rd Division to do the same. With luck, they could catch the smaller British force between them.

As the British were shadowing the Italians, HMS Orion's crew noted a ship far to its north. When flashed the recognition signal, the ship responded with a salvo of shells. The salvos had come from Iachino's flagship, Vittorio Veneto. Unknowingly, Pridham-Wippell had maneuvered himself between the jaws of a rapidly closing Italian trap. Given the circumstances, the British admiral again decided on a swift retreat. Laying smoke and using speed and evasive action, the British cruisers still had a difficult time leaving the Italians behind. Vittorio Veneto alone fired 94 15-inch rounds at the cruisers, mostly at Gloucester. Orion then attracted the attention of Vittorio Veneto, sustaining some damage from several near misses.There had to be a reason for nil hits from 94 X 15" rounds.

At approximately 1100, a group of torpedo bombers that had been launched from Formidable, in response to Pridham-Whipple's signal intercepts by Adm Cunningham on Warspite; arrived on the scene. After being fired on by nervous sailors in their own fleet, the six Albacores flew on toward Vittorio Veneto. When first spotted by the Italians, they were misidentified as friendly aircraft stationed at Rhodes.Once recognised the subterfuge was out.

Upon realizing their mistake, the Italian gunners put up a screen of anti-aircraft fire while Vittorio Veneto maneuvered to avoid British torpedoes. Although they did not score any hits, the Albacores kept the Italians occupied for about 30 minutes, which allowed the British light cruisers to escape. Having survived the torpedo attack unscathed but still uneasy about the presence of enemy aircraft, Iachino ordered a return to Italian waters. With no air cover of his own, he had decided again to repair to the safety of Taranto as quickly as possible.


jainso31
http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=9&t=3409&start=60

[KizmeRD]

It's always been a puzzle to me why (in general) Italian long range naval intelligence was often so poor.

And althougn lacking radar, Iachino did at least have eyes in the sky with the two Imam Ro.43 reconnaissance planes that were embarked.

However, it does seems pretty clear to me that Pridham-Wippell's goose would have been well and truly cooked, had it not been for the timely arrival of Formidable's Albacores.

Michael

[WGVSr]

Handsome looking float plane, any particulars ? Were they BB only or also the cruisers ?
Bill

[jainso31]

Above all else, what Iachino's ships lacked was the technological breakthrough of the age — radar. Iachino also lacked confidence in his intelligence service and brought along his own cryptographer, who would be useful in deciphering some types of messages and who at1220 27/3 had decoded a British sighting report,just as Trieste spotted the shadowing aircraft.
Things seemed to go wrong for the Italians from the start. Promised air support for the morning of March 27 never materialized. That afternoon, a British Short Sunderland reconnaissance plane from Crete spotted the Italian ships while they were still in the Aegean
Yes the Albacores sent by ABC saved Pridham Whipple's bacon but gave the game away
Liked your attachments-though it might have been a map.

jainso31.

[jainso31]

Bill at a guess the float plane was Vittorio Veneto's but the heavy cruisers carried three recconaissance planes

jainso31

[emason]

The British were expecting an Italian force to sortie, as Ultra had revealed from a couple of intercepted signals, that the convoys from Alexandria to Piraeus in Greece were to be attacked on 28 March. The Sunderland was used to verify the composition of the Italian force, and to make it appear that their discovery was by chance, so as not to compromise Ultra.

[patroclus]

I notice that in Post #1 the Italian cruiser squadron is described as obsolescent and having antiquated gunnery systems and yet this is the same squadron whose gunnery proficiency was favourably commented upon by the British admirals in the Cape Spartivento skirmish only a few months earlier? All Treaty cruisers had their problems.

[KizmeRD]

Handsome looking float plane, any particulars ? Were they BB only or also the cruisers ?
Bill

Yes - the Italians always had good looking seaplanes in WW2.

And in order to answer your question, the easiest way is to quote directly from Wikipedia (which generally speaking I try to avoid, but in this case, I'm fairly happy to do)..

The aircraft's good endurance meant that the seaplanes could still be useful in the constrained Mediterranean. Six Ro.43 launched from light cruisers played a role in spotting the British fleet during the battle of Calabria, in the opening rounds of the war. One of them, departing from the cruiser Eugenio di Savoia, kept visual contact with the battleship HMS Warspite during the exchange of fire between the British capital ship and the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare before being chased off by a Sea Gladiator from the carrier HMS Eagle.

Near the end of 1940, a lone Ro.43 launched by the heavy cruiser Bolzano was the first to spot the British fleet at the beginning of the battle of Cape Spartivento, at 9:45 while the seaplane of Gorizia located the British convoy at 11:45. British Skuas from the carrier HMS Ark Royal claimed to have shot down one of the seaplanes after a fruitless bombing on the Italian fleet, purportedly from the battleship Vittorio Veneto. The performance of the Ro.43s in this battle was eulogized by the Italian supreme command. Another Ro.43 launched by Vittorio Veneto pinpointed the British cruiser squadron at 6:35 during the engagement near Gavdos island, the prelude of the Battle of Matapan, on 28 March 1941.

A cruiser-borne Ro.43 signaled the presence of the British convoy by dropping flares during the Second Battle of Sirte, while another seaplane from the battleship Littorio directed the fire of the Italian fleet on the British squadron before disengaging at 17:24.

The Ro.43s continued to take part in shipborne operations as late as June 1942, during the Italian cruiser attack on the Harpoon convoy. One of the Italian seaplanes was shot down by a Bristol Beaufighter from Malta in the course of this action.

Therefore it seems pretty clear from the above that (generally speaking) Italian battleships, heavy cruisers and also some light cruisers all had the capability of launching a catapult launched aircraft.

The main failing of the Ro.43 was that it was somewhat fragile.

Michael

[KizmeRD]

Further to my last...

The Italian heavy cruisers were fitted with an airplane catapult aft, initially carrying two Piaggio P6 reconnaissance seaplanes, later replaced by M41s, then Cant 25 ARs, then M.F.6s, and finally (in 1938) by Ro. 43s.

The catapults for airplanes on Di Giussano class light cruisers were fitted on the foredeck. Whereas the Cadorna, Montecuccoli and the Duca d'Aosta had catapults located either between or aft of the funnels. Finally, the Garibaldi had two catapults placed astern of the after funnel.

Michael

[jainso31]

Thank you gentlemen for your interest and input.Further to my #4:-
Both sides deplored the the quality of operational intelligence provided by their aircraft.The RM went to war with the RA;but had no control over aviation; except for shipborne reconnaissance. Cooperation with the RA was never good and Italy never solved this basic problem. Vince O'Hara says it was "Poorly conceived and executed aerial reconnaissance which influenced almost all missions of the Italian battle fleet....and formed the RM's true Achilles Heel"
The Introduction #1 is taken from an Italian appraisal of this encounter and I see no mention of antiquated gunnery systems;unless "functionally obsolescent" covers this particular criticism.
I note that no one has taken up the question of why there were no hits from
Vittorio Veneto's 94 X15" rounds fired during this encounter; although straddles were accomplished ,

jainso31

[KizmeRD]

I note that no one has taken up the question of why there were no hits from
Vittorio Veneto's 94 X15" rounds fired during this encounter; although straddles were accomplished ,
jainso31

I heard it said that there were issues over the dispersion of the salvos.

[patroclus]

Thank you gentlemen for your interest and input.Further to my #4:-
Achilles Heel"
The Introduction #1 is taken from an Italian appraisal of this encounter and I see no mention of antiquated gunnery systems;unless "functionally obsolescent" covers this particular criticism.
I note that no one has taken up the question of why there were no hits from
Vittorio Veneto's 94 X15" rounds fired during this encounter; although straddles were accomplished ,

jainso31

Yes, I am guilty of mis-reading Post No. 1. Actually TRENTO and TRIESTE had fire control systems based on a British model.

As can be seen in many photographs of both 8" and 6" cruisers, the guns in twin turrets are placed very close together (and mostly in common cradles)and this caused problems with the shells in flight.

Generally, the RM seem to have had dispersion problems and this is usually given as the reason for VITTORIO VENETO failing to hit the GLOUCESTER, although frequently straddling.

[jainso31]

Given below is an entry in the link given in#1 and does show the probability of strikes during battery firing


Theoretical hit probability for batteryshootings of SK 38 at a target 30m wide at
25 km 15,5%, flight time 43 sec, 50% zone 120 m lenght ~25m breadth
30 km 11,1%, flight time 55 sec, 50% zone 140 m length ~30m breadth
35 km 8,1 %, flight time 68 sec, 50% zone 170 m lenght ~35 m breadth
if target is straddled

50% zone area of a gaussian distribution with 50% of possible events.
The complete 100% zone is approximately 4 times wider than the 50% zone

In reality dispersion of any shooting at long distances must be increased artificially for range and deflection to compensate for expected errors of the firing solution and possible changes of target speed and course. This was standard practice in the KM as well in foreign (i.e. USN) navies.

Tirpitz should have achieved in summer 1941 during artillery testing in the Baltic- a hitprobability of ~10% at 25 km if I interprete the few available informations this exercise and the usual practice of batteryshootings of the KM correctly.

I realise that this does not give a clearly defined reason for "misses" during barrage firing-but it does give an indication of the possibility of such occurances. You may wish take a look at this "discussion" provided by the link; it may indicate how to correct "spread"

jainso31



-----------------------------

[jainso31]

Thank you patroclus for clearing up the "misunderstanding" about the Italian cruisers guns and the additional data re. problems with shells in flight along with dispersion problems with Vittorio Veneto's salvo firing.
I understand there was a photograph in Time Magazine showing the towering shell splashes around Gloucester-I really must look for that.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Hereunder map of the area of encounter

111878

[KizmeRD]

Herewith, a link to the Life magazine report on Matapan.
http://books.google.com.ar/books?id=kkwEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA32&dq=gloucester+matapan&hl=en&cd=1#v=onepage&q=gloucester%20matapan&f=false
Michael

[jainso31]

Thank you kindly young sir-I looked but did not find anything relevant.
Shall we take this event just a bit further:-

Admiral Cunningham had not only Formidable's aircraft under his command but also land-based bombers stationed in Crete and Greece. The plan called for these planes, along with reconnaissance aircraft from Formidable, to shadow and continually report on the location, speed and composition of the Italian flotilla. However, the two opposing fleets were still more than 60 miles apart. Cunningham's 1st Battleship Squadron was slow compared to the Italian ships. Only air attacks could delay the Italian warships long enough for his ships to intercept. As the British admiral watched the noon flight taking off from Formidable, he could only hope that these pilots, the best of the Fleet Air Arm, would buy him the time he needed. Formidable then recovered the returning aircraft from the morning attack, at which time their pilots wrongly reported that an Italian battleship had suffered a probable hit.

In the interim, land-based Bristol Blenheim bombers from Crete repeatedly attacked Iachino's force from a high altitude. Each division received some attention from these planes, which returned to their bases reporting additional probable hits. Cunningham believed that his hopes for delaying the enemy force were being realized, but the reality of the situation was quite the opposite. No hits had been scored, and the Italians continued to widen the distance between the two forces.

The second carrier-based air attack consisted of three Albacores and two Swordfish torpedo bombers accompanied by two Fulmar fighters. At approximately 1510, they sighted the Italian battleship fleet as it was being attacked by some of the high-altitude bombers from Crete. Flying low, they were not immediately noticed. Once identified, however, they received an intense barrage of anti-aircraft fire. Ignoring the tracers closing on his aircraft, the leader dropped his torpedo 1,000 yards off Vittorio Veneto's port side shortly before being killed by enemy fire. A tremendous explosion soon rocked Vittorio Veneto. The Italian battleship shook under the explosion and stopped dead. Within minutes the ship had taken on some 4,000 tons of water. Vittorio Veneto was a resilient ship with a modern flood-control system, and she was served by a dedicated and well-trained crew. Through their efforts, the battleship was moving again in minutes. Her crew got her speed up to 10 knots, maneuvering solely with her starboard screws. Although the British had failed to sink the enemy battleship, they had damaged it sufficiently to slow it down.

With Warspite's best speed of perhaps 23Kts-would it be enough.See map in #15-use "tools" (spanner) in top right corner to enlarge AFTER you have clicked the [/[B]B]thumbnail to initially enlarge to a new window- If you have Google Chrome

jainso31

[emason]

Laying smoke and using speed and evasive action, the British cruisers still had a difficult time leaving the Italians behind. Vittorio Veneto alone fired 94 15-inch rounds at the cruisers, mostly at Gloucester. Orion then attracted the attention of Vittorio Veneto, sustaining some damage from several near misses.There had to be a reason for nil hits from 94 X 15" rounds.
Hitting a fast moving light cruiser that is zigzagging and making smoke, while only showing her stern, from ten miles away would have been extremely difficult for anyone, no matter how good their gunnery. It is a completely different situation from gun duels between battleships where both would be steering a steady course for their own gunlayers, where several hits would be expected.

[jainso31]

Thanks for the comment Bill and I accept the logic of what you have said; but there was a problem with the spread of a salvo fired at 30km.
Notwithstanding gaining straddle after straddle; the chance of a hit was only 11% in each salvo. see#13

jainso31

[emason]

Jim, if you look at the situation from Gloucester's position, they would have been able to see the 15" guns firing; they then had about 30 seconds in which to change course to avoid the area where the shells were predicted to land. In order to hit her, Vittorio Veneto's gunlayers would have had to anticipate which new course their target would take in order to predict where she would be in 30 seconds time - not easy.

[jainso31]

Again I cannot argue with your logic; but the truth is that both Gloucester and Orion were straddled several times; and suffered splinter damage-so IMHO the target ship is being tracked pretty efficiently; but as I have said, the "Spread" of the salvo-the chance of obtaining a single "solid" hit is low.
I have however to concede that the manoeuvring of the target ship ,will of course;further shorten the odds of being hit.

jainso31

[KizmeRD]

Hello Jim,

I take it from your comments concerning the Life magazine link that photos of towering shell splashes don't float your boat - so let me return to naval aviation.

Further to your remarks concerning 'the best of the FAA',
fyi battle honours for Matapan were issued to the following Naval Air Squadrons:

Flying off HMS Formidable (33 aircraft)
NAS 803 - Fairley Fulmars
NAS 829 - Fairey Albacore
NAS 806 - Fairley Fulmars
NAS 815 - Fairley Swordfish
NAS 825 - Fairley Albacore (Canada)
NAS 829 - Fairley Albacore
Plus the catapult seaplanes, Supermarine Walrus (e.g. as flown off HMS Gloucester).

To everyone's credit, this thread has so far sucessfully avoided straying over to Matapan proper (which already covered in another forum thread).
Interestingly, this 'prelude' (i.e. the action off Gavdos Island) occurred during daytime, when the advantages that the Royal Navy enjoyed in having radar equipped vessels weren't quite so great as they were during subsequent nightime engagements.

Michael

[jainso31]

Now who is being sensitive-I thoroughly appreciated your obtaining the photos; which sit well in the thread-I think I was "fluttering" with a beakful of extra text;
which took us up to the critical point in the chase and the answer to ABC's prayers.
Lt. Cdr.J Dallyell-Stead led his three Albacores of 829 Sqdn FAA off Formidable at 15.19 and at 15.30 flying within 1000yds of the great ship, in a hail of flak; dropped his torpedo, which hit the VV aft and sixteen feet below the waterline; and just above the port outer screw and brought her to a standstill.
Dallyell-Stead and his crew lost their lives in this daring venture; and he was awarded a posthumous DSO. Iachino later wrote "And so died a brave pilot without the satisfaction of knowing that his attack had been successful"
Thank you for the FAA Sqdn's Battle Honours.
Point taken about this thread and the fact that the action took place in daylight- negating to some extent the advantage of having radar.
At 16.44 ABC ordered Pridham-Wippell to go ahead with Force B at full speed to regain surface contact with the enemy;using Nubian and Mohawk as forward scouts and maintain signal contact with ABC and PW.

PS Did you get the map to work??

jainso31

[patroclus]

The real problem for the FAA was their failure - throughout the early years of the war - to get aircraft in numbers over the target. Instead, attacks were made with a few aircraft and were relatively easy to evade. The reasons for this failure are many and include doctrinal errors by the RN. They cannot all be related to finance or problems with the RAF.

[Vince O'Hara]

Jim, if you look at the situation from Gloucester's position, they would have been able to see the 15" guns firing; they then had about 30 seconds in which to change course to avoid the area where the shells were predicted to land. In order to hit her, Vittorio Veneto's gunlayers would have had to anticipate which new course their target would take in order to predict where she would be in 30 seconds time - not easy.

I agree with Bill's comments. The expectation of a 10% hit rate from battleship batteries based on German exercises has no relevance in this type of action. Battleships didn't get many main battery hits on small maneuvering targets at long ranges. Such actions are not what they were designed to fight. Vittorio Veneto’s fire was quite good, straddling Orion and causing splinter damage and then, after a pause of three minutes straddling Gloucester as well. Massachusetts at Casablanca in 8 November 1942 provides an example of some success achieved by battleship gunnery against small, maneuvering targets at long ranges. She fired for an hour from 0918 to 1016 and got one hit on the French destroyer Fougueux and another on the contre-torpilleur Milan, which was underway. More than 300 rounds were fired to achieve these results. She engaged again from 1030 to 1103, firing 26 six to nine gun salvos (about 200 rounds) and hit a stationary destroyer. Her radar was shorted out and there was a lot of smoke, but the French ships were basically circling in a constricted area. I think this was remarkable shooting. On 17 February New Jersey and Iowa expended 18 and 40 rounds respectively trying to hit a fleeing Japanese destroyer using radar. There was no smoke. Ranges started at 32,000 yards. They didn’t come as close as Vittorio Veneto. The general lack of success of the Japanese battleships at Leyte Gulf is another example. I don't think the sinking of the Ardent and Acasta by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau applies in this case because the battleships engaged the destroyers with secondary batteries at relatively close ranges and the destroyers were conducting torpedo attacks.

Vince

[jainso31]

Hi Vince thanks for your interest and input.There is some contradiction here- Bill says how can gunlayers get back on target after thirty seconds .Well they just did after giving Gloucester a torrid time, then they quickly got on to Orion and proceeded to do the same.
I never said that the salvo shooting was not accurate so you have to agree with also.I questioned why out of 94 15" rounds there were no strikes, and I was looking at the "spread" at 30km. I am not saying that the bit of analysis necessarily had the answer to this problem; but it sort of pointed the way
Nobody has come up with an answer to salvo spread and that is what I was probing for and there is where you have misread me.One success story is perhaps USS Washington v IJNS Kirishima

From the same discussion,the following:-

"Does anyone know if it was possible to quantify the effect of rate of fire on accuracy? Friedman in US cruisers says that prewar practice results could not be reproduced in the War against fast maneouvring cruisers at long range because the rate of fire of their 8 in guns (3 rpm) was too slow. The result was the Des Moines class with automatic 8 in guns.
This implies that battleships were in an even worse position with their slower rate of fire (2 rpm was good). It is often said that Prinz Eugen hit the Hood before the Bismarck because of its higher rate of fire (despite a smaller danger space).
The VVs did not compare well, with only 1.3 rpm. Perhaps this is why they fired turret salvos to give 3 salvos per effective boadside, whereas British ships fired alternate 4 and 5 gun salvos for 2 salvos per effective broadside"

I can see that there was not a finite answer to this problem

jaiso31. .

[patroclus]

Nobody has come up with an answer to salvo spread and that is what I was probing for and there is where you have misread me. jaiso31. .

I am not sure what you mean by an "answer" - we have discussed the spread due to dispersion which can be contributed to by many factors e.g. shell manufacturing tolerances were too large (a known Italian problem) and barrel wear – especially in the “Littorio” Class with their short barrel life - although the latter should be compensated for in the fire control process. Spread, of course, could increase with range.

[jainso31]

patroclus your comment on the performance of the FAA attack aircraft in the early days of the war-was about lack of numbers of aircraft participating in the attack.
In this and other cases-there was only one aircraft carrier and one to three squadrons aboard at a time. Should the first fail- there was a reserve to try again.
In this engagement one aircraft out of nine from Formidable on a second attempt; got a hit on Vittorio Veneto, and a pretty important one.One strike on Bismarck by a unit of Swordfish from Ark Royal did much the same. At Taranto there were strikes made by twelve and nine aircraft respectively from Illustrious and they made quite an impact.
Can you cite an occasion where a massed attack by FAA torpedo bombers was made in WW2 ??

jainso31

[jainso31]

patroclus
The word "answer" should have been "solution" following "reason for"
I now accept that salvo spread or dispersion is a condition depenedent on a number of factors, which you have described; and yes I know that we have had this in discussion before.
I had no intention of causing a furore over something that I could only try to comprehend but was probing for an "answer" ;and I ultimately had to accept that long range hits were NOT commonplace. Please do not mention Warspite's famous hit.

Dispersion - The distance from the point of impact of a particular projectile to the MPI of the salvo. Dispersion in range is measured parallel to the line of fire and dispersion in deflection is measured at right angles to the line of fire. A Dispersion Pattern is the combining of all the impact points of a particular salvo.

jainso31

[KizmeRD]

I'm no gunnery expert, so I would be interested in hearing opinions from fellow forum members who have far stronger knowledge of this particular specialization than I do.

How much truth therefore in the following comments regarding the VV class battleships' (long barrel) main armament?

...the Regia Marina sought to maximize hitting power by adopting three triple turrets, armed with long-barreled (50 calibers) naval guns. These provided a very long range (42.8 kilometres (26.6 mi)) and muzzle velocity (870 metres per second (2,900 ft/s)), but consequently suffered barrel lives just half as long as their counterparts in other navies, and inconsistent shell patterning. This last problem was exacerbated by uneven powder loading and the sheer weight of the shell (885 kilograms (1,950 lb)). Also, the main battery could only average 1.3 rounds/gun/minute.

Michael

[jainso31]

Nor am I Michael- but what you have propounded is as good an answer- that there's likely to be. It has been on my mind for a while; and I have looked at a great deal of text on naval artillery.
Like you I hope there is someone who will put us right OR corroborate what you have just posted. Many thanks for your research.

jainso31

[patroclus]

The following figures are those of John Campbell:


Italian 15” 50cal- Shell: 1951lb Firing Cycle: 45” Max Rnge: 46216yds/35deg M/V 2789 f/s. Approx Life 110-130 EFC

British 15” Mk. I 42cal- Shell: 1938lb Firing Cycle: 30” Max Rnge: 33550yds/30deg. MV 2458 f/s Approx Life: 335 EFC

German 15” 48.43cal- Shell: 1764lb Firing Cycle:26” Max Rnge: 38880yds/30deg M/V 2690 f/s. Approx Life 250 EFC


With reference to Michael's post No. 30, I can believe that a powder loading problem could exist in addition to the poor shell manufacturing tollerances mentioned earlier.

[KizmeRD]

With reference to Michael's post No. 30, I can believe that a powder loading problem could exist in addition to the poor shell manufacturing tollerances mentioned earlier.

Yes I agree, I found two references to potential powder problems, but couldn't see how sheer shell weight would also have been an issue in itself. Thanks for your reply.
Michael

[Vince O'Hara]

The following figures are those of John Campbell:


Italian 15” 50cal- Shell: 1951lb Firing Cycle: 45” Max Rnge: 46216yds/35deg M/V 2789 f/s. Approx Life 110-130 EFC

.

Bagnasco (The Littorio Class: a great book well worth the price) gives slightly slightly different values: 46,810yds/36 degrees MV870 m/s later dropped to 850 m/s to reduce barrel wear. Regarding dispersion he says that the guns suffered "a rapid and progressive increase as the range to the target rose to the point where the effectiveness of fire at maximum range was essentially nullified." However, he notes that dispersal patterns at 20,000 meters were within the general performance parameters of the large gun calibres of the major navies and better than those of the 320mm guns of the Cesare and Duilio classes. Maxmimun effective range was considered to be 25,000 meters (27,340 yards). The guns were fine tuned as the war went on and were considered among the best used by the Regia Marina.

The matter of manufactoring tolerance, powder preformance and carriage closesness is the subject of a major recent study which, when I get a chance, I'll cite at greater length. Basically it says that much of these criticisms arose in a work by Iachino(Tramonto di una grande marina) where he excused his lack of success by damning his weapons. More on this later. It's Valentines Day and I'm running out the door to take the family to dinner.

Vince

[jainso31]

We are much obliged to you Vince for the short (Valentine's Day) treatise on big gun performance.It does in a way substantiate my claim that the greater the range- the gun's effectiveness DECREASES, until finally nullified.
When VV fired a six shell salvo from 25000yds (MER) at Orion-it certainly was too close for comfort;massive columns of water two hundred feet high sprang up on either side of the British flagship and PW knew they were in trouble
Look forward to learning more on the big gun issue


jainso31.

[barryp]

It would also be informative to know if VV was achieving the occasional straddle or was straddling consistently. If she was only straddling occasionally then I would imagine the statistical probability of hitting would be much reduced. Everything I've read suggests that hitting a manouvering vessel at sea was very difficult with any calibre of weapon. Didn't US cruisers have a similar problem trying to sink a Japanese picket boat prior to the Doolittle raid?

[patroclus]

It would also be informative to know if VV was achieving the occasional straddle or was straddling consistently. If she was only straddling occasionally then I would imagine the statistical probability of hitting would be much reduced. Everything I've read suggests that hitting a manouvering vessel at sea was very difficult with any calibre of weapon. Didn't US cruisers have a similar problem trying to sink a Japanese picket boat prior to the Doolittle raid?

From the British point of view VV had “straddled the target repeatedly” in her 29 salvos, a near-miss causing slight damage to ORION, her initial target; but bear in mind that the spreads were large.

[jainso31]

This has been the whole crux of this part of the debate ie IJN ships straddling very often, but achieving no strikes on target.As patroclus has pointed out the VV's last salvo fired on Orion was too close for comfort.

jainso31

[Vince O'Hara]

Here are a few extracts from the Admiralty document Progress in Naval Gunnery, 1942) with relevant paragraph numbers

326. The most satisfactory and profitable gun actions in the Mediterranean whether fought by battleships, light forces or submarines, have been fought as nearly as practicable at point blank range. The only satisfactory day action commenced at long range and fought to a finish was H.M.A.S. Sydney v. Colleoni.

About the Bismarck action it noted:
377. Although satisfactory at times, spreads in general appear to have been large and in consequence there must have been many false straddles and wasted rounds. The excessive spreads of the capital ships' main armament salvos at the close of the final action (range 3-4,000 yards) was possibly due to fatigue of layers as the flatness of the trajectory could not have been wholly responsible; the need for more stringent pointer-following drills is indicated. Although the sea was rough, the motion on the capital ships was not unduly heavy.

This data is from the 1943 Progress in Naval Gunnery for test firings giving mean spread of five gun salvoes corresponding to the observed 50 percent zone.

King George V at 11,700 yards 326 yards. This was in September 1941
Duke of York 18,200 yards--407 yards (June 1942)
Anson 21,400 yards--413 yards (September 1942)
1937 tests from the Queen Elizabeth class reanged from 324 to 274 yards with the longest range being 16,000 yards.

In contrast, test firing of the 381/50 OTO guns made in 1939 at 21,000 meters (nearly 23,000 yards indicated a dispersion of 290 meters and 185 meters at 17,000 meters. The Ansaldo guns didn’t do as well with a dispersion of 416 meters at 22,500 meters.

The Italian data comes from Il tiro navale italiano by Giuliano Colliva published in Storia Militare 199 (April 2010). He also wrote a longer study published by Bollettino d’archivio of the USSMM in 2003 I referred to eariler.

The point is that test firings indicated that the dispersion of the Italian guns was less at equal ranges than test firings made of similarly sized British guns. I’m not sure what evidence exists, other than antidotal, that the Italian problem with dispersion at long ranges was greater than anyone else's.

Vince

[KizmeRD]

I’m not sure what evidence exists, other than antidotal, that the Italian problem with dispersion at long ranges was greater than anyone else's.
Vince

Thanks for your valued input Vince, after seeing what you've written, I'm now satisfied that the issue of long range dispersion wasn't a problem specific to the VV (and other Italian battleships). As you said in Post#67, the seed of doubt was most probably first sown by Iachino himself in his book 'Tramonto di una grande marina' (excusing his lack of success by damning his weapons).

Michael

[patroclus]

The results of practice firings are not always reflected in action situations. There seems to be some evidence of drill or materiel deficiencies in VV’s Gunnery Department (I think I have seen a figure of more than 10% misfires?) and the follow-the-pointer system used in these Italian 15” mountings could have been a vulnerable point in dispersion. The ships under fire thought that the spreads were large but I cannot recall having seen any comment on whether the large spread applied to both range and line. Whether or not the dispersion was greater than reasonable at these ranges, the other aspects of VV’s fire control seem to have been very good and she certainly had the British light cruisers worried.

I note the observation about Iachino’s writings being self-serving but is there any actual evidence from contemporary sources to confirm this?

[Vince O'Hara]

I note the observation about Iachino’s writings being self-serving but is there any actual evidence from contemporary sources to confirm this?

Yes.

In 1945 a commission of inquiry led by Admiral Gino Dicci was very critical of Iachino’s actions at Matapan. Many of Iachino's contemporaries condemned his books and considered them self-serving. Admiral Cavagnari, the former chief of staff, published a critical article about Gaudo e Matapan, Iachino’s first book in Nuova Antologia. Admiral Cocchia wrote an extremely critical review of Tramonto when it came out.

Iachino lived until the mid 1970s. It was a case similar to Churchill’s comment that history would be kind to him because he intended to write it. Iachino was a good writer; his books sold well and his statements carried a lot of weight because of his former position. Most of his critics died before he did and in any case, there was reluctence in the navy to publically air dirty laundry. Opinions about Iachino’s works began to change in the 1990s. Today the consensus is that Iachino’s comments about dispersion, the superior German 149mm projectiles, poor tolerances, etc. are invalid. Colliva’s 2003 article is a good place to find a detailed refutation by a leading Italian historian.

Vince

[patroclus]

Yes.

In 1945 a commission of inquiry led by Admiral Gino Dicci was very critical of Iachino’s actions at Matapan. Many of Iachino's contemporaries condemned his books and considered them self-serving. Admiral Cavagnari, the former chief of staff, published a critical article about Gaudo e Matapan, Iachino’s first book in Nuova Antologia. Admiral Cocchia wrote an extremely critical review of Tramonto when it came out.

Iachino lived until the mid 1970s. It was a case similar to Churchill’s comment that history would be kind to him because he intended to write it. Iachino was a good writer; his books sold well and his statements carried a lot of weight because of his former position. Most of his critics died before he did and in any case, there was reluctence in the navy to publically air dirty laundry. Opinions about Iachino’s works began to change in the 1990s. Today the consensus is that Iachino’s comments about dispersion, the superior German 149mm projectiles, poor tolerances, etc. are invalid. Colliva’s 2003 article is a good place to find a detailed refutation by a leading Italian historian.

Vince



Thanks for those comments.

It must be supposed that the documents associated with Vice Admiral Silvio Salza, mentioned by Greene & Massignani, do not exist or do not represent the true state of affairs?

It is notable that at Punto Stilo the WARSPITE's salvos at similar ranges were described by Campioni as "concentrated" and the Italian battleship salvos by the British as excessive in dispersion.

The possibility of turret drill errors as a source of dispersion in the particular case we are discussing remains but is unlikely to be definitely established one way or the other.

[Vince O'Hara]

It must be supposed that the documents associated with Vice Admiral Silvio Salza, mentioned by Greene & Massignani, do not exist or do not represent the true state of affairs?

Salza's comments refrenced by Greene & Massignani were contained a report to Admiral Cavgnari written after a test firing in 1939. G & M were looking at that small portion quoted in Giorgerini's book, Da Matapan al Golfo Persico. About dispersion Salza said: "Troppo forti quelle da 320 e 152/55." (much too great in the 320 and 152/55) About munitions he said: "Si e avuto leggero regresso rispetto all'anno precedente. La questione delle spolette e della sicurezza di capsula e ancora oggetto di esperienze. I colpi non scoppiati sono sempre troppi per tutti i calibre. Si sono avuti dei bossoli incollati perche usati troppe volte." roughly: It was a minor regression from last year. The question of fuzes and the safety of percussion caps is under investigation. The shells from all calibers do not always explode. There have been shells jams when it is used too many times)

Iachino is the other source quoted by Greene and Massignani. I don't have a copy of Salza's original report so all I can conclude from these snippets is that there were specific problems in a specific pre-war exercise and while that is good and interesting to know I would not conclude that it proves the existance of a long-term, systemic problem.

Vince

[patroclus]

Salza's comments refrenced by Greene & Massignani were contained a report to Admiral Cavgnari written after a test firing in 1939. G & M were looking at that small portion quoted in Giorgerini's book, Da Matapan al Golfo Persico. About dispersion Salza said: "Troppo forti quelle da 320 e 152/55." (much too great in the 320 and 152/55) About munitions he said: "Si e avuto leggero regresso rispetto all'anno precedente. La questione delle spolette e della sicurezza di capsula e ancora oggetto di esperienze. I colpi non scoppiati sono sempre troppi per tutti i calibre. Si sono avuti dei bossoli incollati perche usati troppe volte." roughly: It was a minor regression from last year. The question of fuzes and the safety of percussion caps is under investigation. The shells from all calibers do not always explode. There have been shells jams when it is used too many times)

Iachino is the other source quoted by Greene and Massignani. I don't have a copy of Salza's original report so all I can conclude from these snippets is that there were specific problems in a specific pre-war exercise and while that is good and interesting to know I would not conclude that it proves the existance of a long-term, systemic problem.

Vince



Thanks.

There seems to be a difference of opinion here with the users (Campioni, Iachino, Salza) and the receivers:) (the British) believing that the Italian salvos suffered from too great a dispersion (or, at least, significantly greater than the British) and the documents, which I have not read, studied by Giuliano Colliva which may say something else. If Colliva's documents relate to practice firings only then I think that they can be discounted. What we do not know is what caused the large dispersion. Materiel or drill?

[barryp]

The actual mountings might be the cause, might they not? From photos it does seem as though the Italian 8 inch guns were mounted very close to each other in the turrets, whereas the spacing of the 15 inch guns seems more 'normal'.