Battle of Cap Bon 13 December 1941

[jainso31]

This naval action took place between two Italian light cruisers and an Allied Division of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla.
The Italian 4th Cruiser Division,commanded by R/Adm.Antonio Toscano,consisting of the light cruisers Alberto da Giussano and Alberico da Barbiano (F) and the TB Cigno,sailed from Palermo bound for Tripoli on 12 December 1941-they had previously sought skelter there following air attacks.The cruisers were carrying aviation fuel (2000tons)in drums and cans; some of which was carried as a deck load including the bridge.
In the meantime the 4th Destroyer Flotilla Division consisting of HM Ships Sikh (F),Maori, Legion and the Dutch destroyer Isaac Sweers under the command of
Comm.G H Stokes was sailing from Gibraltar to join the Med. Fleet in Alexandria.
This force was spotted by an Italian aircraft but the Regia Aeronautica concluded that the British would not reach Cape Bon before their cruisers had passed this point.The Italian signals were intercepted by Ultra; and orders went out to the Allied destroyers to attack.Stokes gave the order to increase speed from 20 to 39kts.
At 03.02 on the 13th Dec.as the destroyers approached Cape Bon,lookouts spotted lights and ship silhouettes that quickly disappeared around the promontory.Changing course from E to SE,Stokes got as close in to the rocky shoreline as was safe; and suddenly he noticed the Italians fine off his port bow coming back!
At 03.23 Sikh edged starboard and fired a salvo of four torpedoes at da Barbiano from 1500 yds and within seconds the Italian flagship erupted in flames as two torpedoes slammed into her.She was also hit by two more torpedoes from Legion.
The destroyers also opened up with their 4.7"guns and m/c guns, setting the aviation fuel alight on each ship.Sikh now fired her last six torpedoes at da Giussamo-she had only got off three salvoes in the action, before she too was hit by torpedoes at 03.27 and gunfire which caused a massive explosion she began to lose way, and become hopelessly on fire.
Both Italian cruisers were sunk as towering infernos.After a brief encounter with the Dutch destroyer,Cigno rescued 500 survivors,while others reached the coast or were later saved by other TB's.Over 900 men lost their lives,including Adm.Toscano.The entire action lasted a mere 5 minutes.
Why did Toscano choose to abort the mission and come about when he did; and why come about simultaneously instead of line ahead, and thus changing Cigno's position from van to rear???
What was the thinking behind(if any)sending two light cruisers to sea with aviation fuel as a deck load-smacks of a suicide mission!!??
PS Comm. Stokes was awarded an unprecedented CB for this action.The Battle of Cape Bon was an embarrassing defeat for the Supermarina.
jainso31

[dmagro]

Without any prior knowledge of this event, I'd have to guess that it was a form of desperation.

Perhaps the pressure on superiors (by their superiors) to get the fuel down there asap caused them to go with the quickest available means, regardless of the risk.

[jainso31]

dmagro
I am given to understand that R/Adm. Toscano thought he heard aircraft overhead-he had been warned of a possible night attack by torpedo planes; and despite knowing that a destroyer division was coming in his direction; but did not know of their exact position in relation to his ships,decided to abort the mission and came about.:confused:
The fact that he came about the way he did. was to be his final undoing-Cigno was no longer in the van of the line, and therfore was no longer the scout.
It was a "chancy" business all round and- Yes reeked of desperation.Thank you for your interest and input-should you wish to comment further vis a vis my reply-you are very welcome.
PS you will find details on the "dreaded" Wiki.
jainso31

[patroclus]

dmagro
I am given to understand that R/Adm. Toscano thought he heard aircraft overhead-he had been warned of a possible night attack by torpedo planes; and despite knowing that a destroyer division was coming in his direction; but did not know of their exact position in relation to his ships,decided to abort the mission and came about.:confused:
The fact that he came about the way he did. was to be his final undoing-Cigno was no longer in the van of the line, and therfore was no longer the scout.

jainso31

The generally accepted view is that his 180 degree turn was designed to mislead any shadowing aircraft and that he did not intend to abort the mission.

[jainso31]

Thank you patroclus for your input here; and it does explain why he made such a turn- though obviously unaware Nemesis was there waiting for him.
What do you make of the decision to send aviation fuel in drums and cans lashed to deck and superstructure of light cruisers.???

jainso31

[patroclus]

The RM were under great pressure to get urgent supplies to North Africa. In November, many merchant ships and some warships had been lost in attempting the crossing and deliveries had fallen far short of requirements.

If Rear Admiral Toscano's 16 point turn was designed to throw off British reconnaisance rather than to return to Palermo then he would be on that course for a relatively short time before turning back for Tripoli and this may explain his decision to turn his ships together rather than in succession. The Rear Admiral and all of his staff were lost in the engagement.

[jainso31]

patroclus-it is because Toscano and his staff were lost in this engagement that I am sceptical about why he made the decision to "come about".Where would the evidence about the "hearing aircraft overhead "come from-hearsay??
Count Ciano was moved to write"What is happening in the Navy is baffling,unless what Somigli (DCNS) says is true,and that is our General Staffs are obsessed by an inferiority complex that paralyses all their activities".

jainso31

[patroclus]

patroclus-it is because Toscano and his staff were lost in this engagement that I am sceptical about why he made the decision to "come about".Where would the evidence about the "hearing aircraft overhead "come from-hearsay??
Count Ciano was moved to write"What is happening in the Navy is baffling,unless what Somigli (DCNS) says is true,and that is our General Staffs are obsessed by an inferiority complex that paralyses all their activities".

jainso31




Captain Bragadin, who was in a position to know what was thought in Supermarina (and to know the survivors’ stories), states: "Believing that an enemy air attack would soon be unleashed, the commander of the Italian division reversed his course at 0320, shortly after passing Cape Bon, in the hope of escaping the enemy reconnaissance effort”.

In fact, Swordfish TSRs from Malta arrived over the scene of the action shortly after its conclusion.

Toscano was under orders to return to Palermo if discovered by enemy reconnaissance aircraft but I have difficulty construing Bragadin’s account as anything other than a temporary course change. If Toscano had decided to abandon the attempt to reach Tripoli surely a turn in succession and an increase in speed would have been logical.

I appreciate that some writers state the Toscano had decided to retire but I have not seen any citations of a primary nature to support that view. What I consider to be the best account of the Mediterranean war at sea avoids the issue (perhaps wisely) by not offering a reason for the 16 point turn!

I am not sure about the relevance of the Ciano quote; Somiglio had lost his job a year prior to this action and there had been other high level changes. Perhaps the "inferiority complex" story has been overworked. :D

Whatever, it was one of the best destroyer actions of the war (even if the coordination of the attack was not all that it should have been).

[jainso31]

patroclus I am indebted to you for keeping this thread alive.However I am agog to know from whence you obtained the statement that "Swordfish TSR's from
Malta were overhead arrived over the scene AFTER it's conclusion"- this cannot be construed as arriving BEFORE IT'S START.
Toscano had already aborted this mission and pulled into Palermo for the self same reason-would to some extent back up the theory that he aborted again.
Finally I cannot but agree that this was jolly fine piece of work by Cdr Stoker and his destroyers.
NB Smigli as an ex DCNS is more likely to be frank and open about the RM; than the existing incumbent at the time.
PS Perhaps you would be so kind as to inform me what you do consider is the best account of the Mediterannean war at sea.

jainso31

[patroclus]

What I said was:

"In fact, Swordfish TSRs from Malta arrived over the scene of the action shortly after its conclusion".

I mentioned this as it seems to justify Toscano's expectation of air attack and his attempt to throw off any reconnaissance aircraft. His three cruisers had been attacked by torpedo aircraft on 10th December on their earlier foray and he would be understandably concerned about a repitition. Consequently it is conceivable that, when making his turn, he intended to return to base, but I do not think so. The official Italian account states: "a noise of aircraft in the sky above our formation shortly before the encounter led Admiral Toscano to reverse his course; and on completion of the turn he was suddenly confronted by four British destroyers". It does not attempt to further guess the Admiral's intentions (or, at least, not in the extract I have seen!). Whether the noise was imaginary or whether it was made by an aircraft of one of the four powers active in the area, we do not know.

As far as books are concerned, I was referring to "The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943" by Greene and Massignani.

[Abbeywood.]

Hi Jim,
Sorry I cannot comment in depth on this thread as although I had read of the event that had only been in passing interest. However, with reference books 'at the ready' i have endeavoured to find out more.
Switching to 'nit-picking' mode I would point oit that none of the British destroyers were capable of 39 knots, (alledgedly), even after a full overhaul and on a clean bottom. They all seem to be listed as 36 knot ships. 'Nit-picking' mode now switched off
In regards to the Torpedo-boat 'Cigno', although I have found references to her in other tomes, for some reason or other she does not feature in 'Janes Warships of WW2'. That is not to say that she didn't exist, as she obviously did, but apparently a total of 60 ships of the type were originally ordered, with many being either bombed to destruction or remaining incomplete.
I would plumb for her being a member of the 'Gabbiano' class, but can't be more specific. No doubt some good chappie will put me right.
Thats all I can add to an interesting thread.
regards, Pete'

[patroclus]

CIGNO and CLIMENE (which was also to have formed part of this squadron but was left in Palermo with mechanical problems) were "Spica" Class ships, 640 tons standard displacement and an armament of 4 x 450mm TT, 3 x 100mm/47 guns, 8 x 13.2mm MG, 2 x DC throwers. Designed max speed 34kts.

[jainso31]

Thou hast not forsaken me and thy return Pete, is that of the long lost-end of biblical mode:D
a) for 39 read 30 -Typo- 9 is next to 0. This was a largish nitpick!!:rolleyes:
b)thank you for the treatise on the Cigno; which you think is a Gabbiano class boat-are there any basic specs for this class of boat eg.tonnage dimensions,armament etc.patroclus has just provided the answers to this question by ESP -spooky!!
"Thats all I can add"-go on with you!

jainso31

[jainso31]

patroclus -I can see you have your teeth into this thread.
I admit to mangling what you said about the Malta TSR's; but they did arrive AFTER the five minute action was over:o.
I accept that if the "extract"(of what) that you have seen, bears out the reason for turn about then so be it.:)
I cannot believe that you have read my mind re.specs for Cigno-for which many thanks; as you can see I asked Abbeywood aka Pete for specs, before I saw your addendum.:confused::eek:
I am awaiting some further evidence re. this encounter from another member which may throw fresh light on this affair-please stay tuned.:cool:
but in the meantime all contributions are welcome
jainso31

[Vince O'Hara]

I always thought the reason the Italian formation reversed course was because they heard aircraft engines overhead and Toscano was following orders to scrub the mission should his force be discovered. This discussion has caused me to look at the December 2009 Bollettino d’Archivo dell’Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare which printed an article “La notte di Capo Bon.” Pgs 11-34. I’m taking this information from that article.

It is unclear by Admiral Toscano reversed course, but the article's author, Andrea Ghisotti is offering a theory supported by the reports of the Cigno and some of the survivors from the cruisers.

The British/Dutch destroyers were sighted by the Italians at 1500/12. Supermarina communicated this to Toscano at 2223/12 (in the clear).

The Italian formation arrived off Cape Bon at 0300/13, an hour behind schedule. It is not known why they were running late: The author assumes they took a wider turn around the Egadi Islands.

At 0245 they heard the sound of an aircraft. This was an ASV Wellington from 68th Squadron out of Malta. Corvette Captain Riccardi, commander of Cigno wrote in his report:

“At 0245 on 13 December the sky over the torpedo boat was repeatedly crossed by an aircraft. When the sighting was confirmed we sent to Da Barbiano by light the signal “aircraft overhead.” It was 0256 and the units were crossing 3.5 miles from the Cape Bon light heading due south.”

At 0256 Da Barbiano advised the other two ships to be on the lookout for enemy vessels.

At 0320, after she was already south of the cape, Da Barbiano suddenly reversed course from 157 to 337 without first advising the other two ships, and came to full speed. She then communicated the change of course by radio and Di Giussano “hastened to follow.” Cigno did not notice the course change or hear the signal and did not come about until five minutes later. The article speculates that the sudden maneuver was because Toscano had spotted something on the starboard quarter toward the coast. Visibility was good and there was a strong luminescence in the water that would have betrayed a bow wake.

According to the report of a surviving under officer of Da Barbiano the ship’s captain was ordered by the admiral to reverse course and to have the guns follow their electric indices (pointers)

The article concludes that “reversing course, coming to full power and the aiming the guns toward the coast clearly demonstrates that Da Barbiano was going to the attack."

I think this is interesting. It makes sense, especially given that the reversal came 35 minutes after the report of aircraft engines and the suvivor's memory of the Admiral's order to Da Barbiano's captain.

Vince

[jainso31]

Thank you Vince for throwing light on this rather tricky situation.It certainly was extremely brave of Toscano to fight his ships laden with aviation fuel; but in the circumstances he did not have many options.He did however at this juncture know the "score"-so he turned ,came up to full speed and trained his guns towards the shoreline.The British destroyers were however concealed by the huge backdrop on Cap Bon and therefore had the advantage of first strike.

jainso31

[patroclus]

Thank you, Vince, for a most interesting post.

It appears from this that when Toscano saw the destroyers they must have been fine on his quarter, range unknown. They were therefore in a very unfavourable position for a torpedo attack and if Toscano continued to steer for Tripoli, increasing to maximum speed, they would have a long stern chase under the guns and TTs of the cruisers - I do not know what the two cruisers were capable of in the way of speed by late 1941 but I would have thought that there would not be much difference between their maximum and that of the destroyers (as these were bound for Malta I would be surprised if they, too, did not have extra stores on board). We do not know the wind and sea state . Toscano was on an important mission, and he knew from earlier advices of the possibility of meeting the destroyers, so it prompts the question as to why he turned back to engage a known threat when his own ships were in such a vulnerable condition.

[jainso31]

patroclus you raise the very point that has been in my mind for some time and that is is - why did he turn at all-he could he have stayed on course in a calm sea with little wind (O'Hara) "stepped on the gas" and given the destroyers a run for their money.
Thus you and I are in agreement- about we think his action should have been in this affair.
I thank for your support in this discussion and your valuable and informed opinion-which is what I would expect from you.:)
I sincerely hope to see you again in my next endeavour.

jainso31

[tjstoneman]

Jainso31,

Thanks for this interesting thread. As a another minor nitpick, your post #1 says "Sikh .... fired a salvo of four torpedoes" and "Sikh now fired her last six torpedoes". The Tribals carried a single quadruple torpedo tube mounting, so there's an error in the numbers somewhere! Also, SWEERS carried twin 4" mountings, not 4.7". (Nitpicking mode OFF)
Tim

[jainso31]

Thank you very much for your interest and obvious superior naval knowledge. I have looked at my primary source again; and I see that I have misread the relevant section-It was Legion who launched her last 6 torpedoes-the entry mentioned both ships in the same sentence. It was Legion that had twin quadruple torpedo mountings.
I confess I did not know what main armament Sweers carried- but thanks for telling me.

jainso31

[Abbeywood.]

Thanks, Patroclus, for the corrections, (re: Cigno).
Returned to my Janes WW2 but neither of those ships are mentioned, but, as another poster, on another thread has pointed out, 'Janes' has been known to be wrong, and probably more so with a wartime edition. They did however, cover them selves by stating that allthough there were at least 60 ships ordered under the 'Gabbiano' label some were known to be of different types and how many of each were actually built is speculative. There were some fitted out as mine-sweepers and others had 2 x 18" TT's, (in single tube units, (but I suppose this is logical, seing as they were described as Torpedo-boats) so the 'Spica' class may well have been a derivitive.
Thanks again, Patroclus. and to all you friendly 'nit-pickers', my regards to you all.
Pete'

[jainso31]

And here's me thinking you were going to dissent Pete; and we all know what dissension means- a protracted thread,which in turn, means further discussion.
However you have given your regards-for which we thank you and call it a day.:( BUT should there perchance, be further comment-feel free.

jainso31

[patroclus]

Thanks, Patroclus, for the corrections, (re: Cigno).
Returned to my Janes WW2 but neither of those ships are mentioned, but, as another poster, on another thread has pointed out, 'Janes' has been known to be wrong, and probably more so with a wartime edition. They did however, cover them selves by stating that allthough there were at least 60 ships ordered under the 'Gabbiano' label some were known to be of different types and how many of each were actually built is speculative. There were some fitted out as mine-sweepers and others had 2 x 18" TT's, (in single tube units, (but I suppose this is logical, seing as they were described as Torpedo-boats) so the 'Spica' class may well have been a derivitive.
Thanks again, Patroclus. and to all you friendly 'nit-pickers', my regards to you all.
Pete'


The "Gabbiano" Class were later, war built, corvettes. They were about the same displacement as the "Spicas" but had a speed of only 18kts and were less well armed. The early ones were launched in mid 1942. The majority were seized by the Germans at the time of the Armistice. Some 60 of them were built. Some were scuttled more than once.

There were about 30 of the "Spica" Class, usually sub-divided into about four sub-classes. They were built during the mid to late 1930s.

[jainso31]

Thanks patroclus for the additional ship details- which I am sure Pete will be delighted to learn.
I note you have not commented on the proposition that it WOULD have been better for Toscano to to have stuck to his course for Tripoli; and given the destroyers "a run for their money".

jainso31

[Vince O'Hara]

There were two problems with Toscano making a run, once he knew he had been spotted. First, the speed of these cruisers was, at this point in the war, less than commonly believed. They would have had trouble sustaining more than 30 knots. Second, the blast from the aft turrets would have ignited the deck cargo of gasoline stored there.

Vince

[jainso31]

And that, I think Vince, scuppers that particular proposition.Thanks for the timely intervention.Did think about the aft turrets-forgetting the hazardous deck cargo.
So- it's Game,Set and Match-if you will excuse the unintended pun.

jainso31

[patroclus]

There were two problems with Toscano making a run, once he knew he had been spotted. First, the speed of these cruisers was, at this point in the war, less than commonly believed. They would have had trouble sustaining more than 30 knots. Second, the blast from the aft turrets would have ignited the deck cargo of gasoline stored there.

Vince



Did the article “La notte di Capo Bon” (Post 15) draw any responses from readers, or is it not that sort of bulletin?

[Vince O'Hara]

Its a magazine published by the Italian navy's historical section similar in concept to Naval War College Review in the U.S. Do a google search for Bollettino d'archivio.

Vince

[patroclus]

This is an interesting read:

http://www.focus.it/il-ritrovamento-del-relitto-dell-incrociatore-italiano-da-barbiano_C7.aspx

I must admit that I am not entirely convinced.

[jainso31]

I am now of the opinion that this whole sorry affair; was down to German pressure on the Italians, to be seen doing something about the war in Africa; and the loss of two old light cruisers did much "to get the Germans off the Italians backs"
Italian convoy methods were changed and battleships were involved; but how effective is to be seen.

jainso31