Battle of Vella Lavella - Oct 6th 1943

[jainso31]

ON the morning of the 6th Oct.1943 ,a force of 9 destroyers and assorted landing craft under the command of R/Adm Ijuin set sail from Rabaul headed forVella Lavella to evacuate the 600 man garrison there.
American forces had bypassed Kolombangara and had landed with little opposition on Vella Lavella on 15th Aug. as part of an island hopping operation and had moved on.
On the afternoon of the 6th Oct.,search planes sighted the Japanese force and six DD's in the area had sailed towars the evacuation point at Marquana Bay.A group of three DD's Selfridge,Chevalier and O'Bannon,under command of Capt.Frank Walker arrived at their rendezvous point ahead of the other three DD's Ralph Talbot,Taylor and LaVallette commanded by Capt,Harold Larson.
Knowing that that the Japanese scout plane had denied him the element of surprise,Walker decided not to wait before he engaged the much larger japanese force.
Shortly before midnight,the attack began and torpedoes and gunfire turned the Japanese destroyer Yugumo into a flaming wreck;but the long odds soon asserted themselves.USN DD Chevalier was hit by a Long lance which exploded her No.1 magazine and tore her bow section clear off to the bridge structure; and she had to be abandoned; and only heroic damage control saved Selfridge from the same fate..
The appearance of Larson's DD's convinced the Japanese commander to retire toward Rabaul.The Japanese had successfully evacuated the garrison at the cost of one destroyer. This was to be the last Japanese victory at sea.One question sticks out like a "sore thumb"-should Walker have waited for Larson??
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/vella_lavella.htm

jainso31

[jainso31]

This is an Addendum to the above; and I believe ought to be said.
The Japanese inflicted more damage and successfully completed their mission.
Ijuin's strategic battle concept proved sound, as he caught the Americans between two divisions; and sank or damaged the entire force of one of them.
However he forfeited the opportunity for a greater victory, by seeing wolves, when he faced only hounds.
This opinion is of course open to discuss it's merits/demerits.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Jim

Having read up on several sites about this battle, it seems that opinion is divided on the question .

Some say that he should have waited for the other three destroyers to join before attacking the IJN ships. Concentration of forces is one of the basic principle of war.

On the other hand there are those who say Walker was right to be aggressive and attack immediately ... the presence of the other three DDs would not have affected the outcome ..... the fast attack caused Adm. Ijuin to consider he was facing a superior force.

Who achieved their mission ? If Ijuin 's mission was to recover the 600 troops, then he achieved his mission. If the USN mission was tp prevent the IJN from rescuing their troops, then clearly they failed.

As part of the longer term strategy, it can be said the US succeeded, by showing that they would attack a superior force and inevitably keep pushing the Japanese forces from each island. Whilst knowing that their ship numbers were increasing at a rate faster than the Japanese could.

I consider Walker should have joined up with the other three DDs and led a concentrated six-ship attack. The principles of war have been proven over centuries. They are to be ignored at your peril, and all three destroyers paid the price.

What say ye ?

Brian

[jainso31]

Good Morning Brian -thank for kicking off this thread.
Like you I am in two minds about this action and like you I believe in the concentration of forces.For one destroyer division to get virtually wiped out by going it alone,smacks of recklessness.The other division was virtually unemployed.
After Walker's first success he should have played it more tactically; instead of allowing Selfridge to rush into torpedo laden waters. for which she paid the price.

jainso31

[Vince O'Hara]

If nothing else, Vella Lavella demonstrates that the confidence of American destroyer commanders in themselves and their weapons was running strong and while confidence doesn't trump the principals of war, it’s a necessary ingredient in victory. When Nimitz considered Walker’s report he wrote: “the utter fearlessness and skill with which our Task Group 31.2 attacked against such odds is worthy of great praise.” He also said, “War cannot be made without taking risks and there is considerable justification for Commander Task Group 31.2’s decision [to engage the way he did]” What I get from all this is that Walker played it right in the minds of his superiors . . . they wanted gunners, not managers leading their destroyers. I should also note that, as always, they believed that Walker caused more damage than was the case.

Vince

[jainso31]

If nothing else, Vella Lavella demonstrates that the confidence of American destroyer commanders in themselves and their weapons was running strong and while confidence doesn't trump the principals of war, it’s a necessary ingredient in victory. When Nimitz considered Walker’s report he wrote: “the utter fearlessness and skill with which our Task Group 31.2 attacked against such odds is worthy of great praise.” He also said, “War cannot be made without taking risks and there is considerable justification for Commander Task Group 31.2’s decision [to engage the way he did]” What I get from all this is that Walker played it right in the minds of his superiors . . . they wanted gunners, not managers leading their destroyers. I should also note that, as always, they believed that Walker caused more damage than was the case.

Vince

Thank you Vince for your reply to this thread.I endorse unequivocally your first sentence.I agree with "utter fearlessness" but not "skill".I also agree that "War cannot be made without taking risks"
Nimitz would certainly have wanted to believe Walker's claims-Good PR!
I quote from your book "If Walker had followed Moosbruger's example ,his column would have turned 90 degrees right after launching torpedoes, rather than plowing into waters teeming with enemy torpedoes" this is where he showed utter fearlessness but lacked skill.

jainso31

[Vince O'Hara]

The question was whether Walker should have waited for Larson. It was the safer thing, but he acted in accordance with what higher command expected. As for his claims, Nimitz was not one to accept at face value what his captains said they did and I doubt he was worried about PR the in a confidential battle evaluation report that was intended to serve as a learning tool to guide future action.

As for Walker's tactics, a turn away would have avoided the torpedo danger. The battle evaluation compared his actions with those of Moosbruger's and it noted that Moosbruger had a second destroyer group to follow up with a gunfire attack and Walker did not. The report wondered, "whether Chevalier's loss was repaid by the extra gunery punishment inflicatred on both enemy gruops thur holding his general course after exchanging torpedoes with Group I." In my assessement that Jim quotes I was judging Walker on what I knew and not on what he knew and was trying to accomplish. If I were to revisit the battle, I'd qualify my assessment a little more.

Vince

[jainso31]

Thanks for your forthright reassessment of this action Vince; and I can certainly see where you are coming from.
Second guessing is very much like war gaming; and in the long run does not change what actually happened.
So the question of whether this action would have gone better if Walker had waited for Larson is academic.
However-IF both divisions had arrived "a la Mooseburger"- the outcome certainly ought to have been much improved.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Points taken ... but all of our discourse on these battles is academic !

These battles are mostly new to me and I comment from the view of an old ship driver. There is a very fine line between being aggressive and being 'gung-ho' ! One can say " gunners, not managers" .. cowboys or ranchers ... Beatty RN lost more sailors than he needed to.

I would forsee more confidence, less losses and a greater result had five minutes been spent joining up the second group . Bringing twice as many ships, torpedoes and guns into the fray cannot be a second choice. This would not being a 'manager' , but being a strong leader one could follow with confidence.

Brian

[jainso31]

Absolutely on the money Brian -my sentiments precisely.There is no question regarding Walker's bravery but it was reckless; and if he had given the action a little more thought- he would not have sacrificed his Division so easily.
Beatty does spring to mind -he too, was a supreme egotist; who wasn't at all careful of his sailor's lives.
Kia Kaha
jainso31

[Keith Enge]

The problem is that the two US groups were 20 miles apart. Even if they sailed towards each other at 30 knots for a closing speed of 60 knots, it would take 20 minutes for them to join not the 5 minutes mentioned. They then would have to refind the Japanese which might not have been possible. The choice, therefore, was charging in or being safer with risk of getting nothing.

[jainso31]

Keith -sure Walker's division could charge in, but did he HAVE to stay in; and so lose his ships-that is the one observation that I am sure is valid. Anything else is supposition and coulda, woulda,shoulda, which of course is complete nonsense.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

The problem is that the two US groups were 20 miles apart. Even if they sailed towards each other at 30 knots for a closing speed of 60 knots, it would take 20 minutes for them to join not the 5 minutes mentioned. They then would have to refind the Japanese which might not have been possible. The choice, therefore, was charging in or being safer with risk of getting nothing.

Keith

One of the sources I read said 10 minutes ... perhaps it was 10 miles. I stand corrected.

Six DD in a scouting line abreast with radar should have no difficulty if finding the enemy They knew the area where the troop carriers were heading, surely.

Horses for courses, Keith !

Brian

[jainso31]

Thanks again Brian- for your insight on this vexed question-I, like you believe in fighting as a cohesive unit with a Battle Plan.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Thanks again Brian- for your insight on this vexed question-I, like you believe in fighting as a cohesive unit with a Battle Plan.

jainso31

Jim

That's what they taught at Maritime Tactical School many moons ago..... I suspect the same is taught today.

Brian

[jainso31]

Brian you are on the money again -you old sea dog; and you know what cant be done to an old dog!!?
Kia kaha
Jim

[jainso31]

In summing up this thread- the following points seem valid to me:-
1)The Japanese inflicted more damage and successfully completed their mission and landed the troops.
2)The Japanese strategic plan proved sound- as they caught the Americans between two divisions; and sank or damaged the entire force.
3)The Japanese forfeited a greater victory by seeing the enemy as a bigger threat than they actually were.
4)USN -Walker attacked head on despite the odds which he thought were one to three against him.
5)If Walker had followed Moosbruger's example,his column would have turned to port after launching torpedoes- rather than steaming into waters teeming with enemy torpedoes he would reduced the risk of losing his ships.
6) Even after losing two ships via the above move- Walker remained doggedly aggressive.

jainso31