The Battle O Kula Gulf--6 July 1943

[jainso31]

On the 5th July 1943 the USN Task Group 36.1 under the command of R/Adm W L Ainsworth made up of the light cruisers Honolulu,St Louis and Helena with four destroyers Nicholas,Strong ,O'Bannon,and Chevalier in the screen were off for duty.
Destroyer Transports Dents,Talbot,McKean ,Waters,Kitty and Crosby with DMs Hopkins and Trevor carried a landing force of five battaloions screened by DDs Radford,Gwin,McCalla,Ralph Talbot and Woodworth was another operation scheduled for the 10th July and were not involved in this particular episode.
Ainsworth' had received word that another Tokyo Express mission down the Slot was under way, and the task group proceeded NW past New Guinea.
At 01.06 on the 6th July,the task group just off Kolombangara came into contact With the Japanese reinforcement group commanded by Adm Akiyama which consisted of ten destroyers loaded with 2600 combat troops bound for Vila.The Japanese were divided into two forces,and a formation of three escorts trailing the main column, came under attack from Ainsworth's force.
The US ships opened fire at 01.57; 51 minutes after contact,fired 612 shells in 21 minutes,and quickly sank the destroyer Niizuki and killed Adm. Akiyama. Helena having expended all her flashless ammo,was firing smokeless ammo; and each salvo lit her up like a fairground.Two Japanese DDs launched their Long lance torpedoes and hit Helena and fatally damaged her and she quickly sank.
The japanese only managed to disembark 850 of 2600 troops before breaking off.The DD Nagasuki ran aground and Hatsuyuki was damaged.
Both forces began to withdraw from the area; but one Japanese and two US Desroyers remained in the area to rescue survivors and exchanged torpedoes and gunfire-Amagiri was hit and retired.
This battle demonstrated again the lack of speed that Ainsworth showed in opening fire; and once more the frailty of the US torpedo and their ineffective use by the task group.
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/kula_gulf.htm
jainso31

[jainso31]

In mitigation to his (Ainsworth's) tardiness in opening fire; was that he believed that he had the surprise; and therefore to open fire to soon would have produced a worse outcome, to that of holding fire.
Why he did not use his destroyers in their conventional role ie.closing and launching torpedoes, then turning away; is not explained.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

His cruisers' 6 " guns outranged the IJN 4" . Perhaps he could have used this 'gun gap' advantage by engaging before coming into their gun range. ?

Knowing the capabilities of the Long Lance as well, keeping more distance would seem to be a better alternative ?

Brian

[jainso31]

Good morning Brian
Thanks for the "kick off " You are,as usual,right about Ainsworth's tactics being wrong. His cruisers should have opened fire, as soon as they were in range; and his destroyers should have raced ahead and launched torpedoes.This now being 1943; and the lessons of the Guadalcanal battles ignored, a cruiser was caught at relatively close range, firing with smokeless powder, for which she was quickly sunk! Even worse was to follow for this Admiral at Kolombangara!!
It takes an old sea dog to know.
KIA KAHA

jainso31
.

[Old Salt]

Good morning Brian
Thanks for the "kick off " You are,as usual,right about Ainsworth's tactics being wrong. His cruisers should have opened fire, as soon as they were in range; and his destroyers should have raced ahead and launched torpedoes.This now being 1943; and the lessons of the Guadalcanal battles ignored, a cruiser was caught at relatively close range, firing with smokeless powder, for which she was quickly sunk! Even worse was to follow for this Admiral at Kolombangara!!
It takes an old sea dog to know.
KIA KAHA

jainso31
.

Yup ! Kiwis will always remember Kolombangara. We lost a few that night, but saved the ship (Leander)

Brian

[jainso31]

Thanks again Brian for the response.I remember the pictures you posted of Leander on the Kolombangara thread-she was sorely damaged; but as you say she was fully repaired and went back into service. :)Did she serve during the Korean War??

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Thanks again Brian for the response.I remember the pictures you posted of Leander on the Kolombangara thread-she was sorely damaged; but as you say she was fully repaired and went back into service. :)Did she serve during the Korean War??

jainso31

After repair in Boston, she reverted to RN service: in 1946 she was involved in the Corfu Channel Incident and finally scrapped in 1949.

Brian

[jainso31]

She certainly did not last long then Brian-1946-49-what was the problem -economics??
The Corfu Channel incident 1946 is this where HMS Saumarez and Volage were mined??
jainso31

[Old Salt]

She certainly did not last long then Brian-1946-49-what was the problem -economics??
The Corfu Channel incident 1946 is this where HMS Saumarez and Volage were mined??
jainso31

Quite so : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corfu_Channel_Incident

Leander was undamaged in the incident, I have no idea why she was scrapped so soon afterwards. By this stage Leander, Achilles and Gambia had been replaced in the RNZN with Bellona and Black Prince.

Brian

[jainso31]

Off thread altogether now -we were fortunate to be paid reparations; but we did hold Albania's gold as guarantee.
Returning to the thread; I am still looking for an answer as to why Adm. Ainsworth did not use his destroyers as torpedo boats.

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

When Leander was sold for scrapping, she was 16 years old and built to a 20 year old design. Since cruisers typically are thought to have a service life of 20 years, she was close to the end anyway and her war damage had aged her additionally too. Postwar, the Royal Navy had manning problems and it made sense to keep only younger ships of more recent designs.

As for the Kula Gulf battle, the US destroyers did fire torpedoes. In fact, they fired more than the Japanese. Three of the four US destroyers fired full loads of torpedoes while only two Japanese destroyers did. Both sides angled away soon after firing. The problem is that turning away didn't help the US force because of the long range of the long lances. Meanwhile, the US torps died before reaching the withdrawing Japanese. The main problem wasn't torpedo tactics but rather gunfire distribution. The usual fault of night gunnery cropped up again, everyone fired at the largest radar blip. Therefore, Niitsuki, the lead destroyer, drew the fire of all three cruisers. She was soon sunk but this left the other two destroyers to fire their fish undisturbed.

[jainso31]

Thank you Keith- for your full and to the point reply.I now understand completely why Leander was taken out of service-it was not only economics; but all importantly keeping the ships that could be manned.
I accept that Ainsworth's DD's did fire their torpedoes BUT not effectively ie.in "penny packets" and/or at too great a range IMO. Moreover; and here I must agree with you, that USN marksmanship was singularly unremarkable.When the two remaining cruisers crossed the T of the transports ,their automated ,radar directed 6" "machine guns" only damaged the four destroyers and none seriously.
More importantly this was July 1943; and not a deal of improvement on this showing; and worse was to come at Kolombangara. See Thread.

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

jainso31 -
I think that you are focused too much on the torpedo tactics; that worked according to current doctrine. The torpedoes were to be used as a deterrent to prevent the enemy from closing. With the enemy forced to keep their distance, the cruisers' gunfire was supposed to decimate them. Unfortunately, all three cruisers shot at Niitsuki, disabling her after only three minutes of gunfire (she sank only 9 minutes after gunfire was opened). With this potent gunfire, the cruisers should have spread their fire over several targets. As it was, it seems that Niitsuki was the only one taking gunfire before the cruisers had other problems when Helena was torpedoed by multiple hits and immediately broke in two and sank.

Jenkins fired her full load of 10 torpedoes at the medium speed setting when the nearest enemy was 6700 yards away. The maximum range of the torps at that speed was over 11,000 yards so the enemy was well within range (the opposing forces were paralleling each other at that point). However, one minute after firing the fish, the Japanese ships turned 90 degrees away because of the damage Niitsuki was taking. Thus turn away meant that the torpedo spread would die before reaching their target. However, according to doctrine, they had served their purpose; the enemy had kept their distance.

The two other US destroyers that fired fish, Nicholas and Radford, fired theirs about five minutes after Helena had sunk, basically after the battle was over. The battle, for all intents and purposes, ended when Helena sank and the other US cruisers circled away. I imagine, if Helena had not been hit, the three other destroyers would have used their spreads individually in turn to continue to keep the enemy away. The problem with the battle was the over-concentration of gunfire on Niitsuki. If spread out, other Japanese destroyers would have suffered similar fates. As it was, only she drew gunfire before the battle ended prematurely.

The other problem, of course, was the long lances. Fired at their highest speed setting, they were 50% faster than the setting Jenkins used and could still reach over 20,000 yards, more than enough to reach the US ships even when the US ships turned away.

I probably should emphasize again how short the battle was. A minute after gunfire was opened, Suzukaze fired her torps. A minute later, Tanikaze fired hers; Jenkins launched at the same time. Five minutes later, Helena sank. The battle, therefore, lasted seven minutes. Jenkin's fish lingered for another five minutes. As they died, Nicholas and then Radford fired theirs but to no real purpose; the range was over 11,000 yards at that point and opening. The maximum torpedo range at the setting they used was over 15,000 yards but, by the time they too died, the Japanese were over 35,000 yards away from the nearest US ship.

[jainso31]

Hi Keith-my main concern with this action was the deep seated resolve that the Admiral had to close with the enemy with his cruisers; and this he did, commenced firing at the enemy when the range was down to 7000yds. Had he opened fire as he could/should have done at 11000yds- having previously sent his destroyers to close with the enemy,launch full spreads of torpedoes and turn away-I am of the opinion that the outcome would have been better.
Coming to the point of keeping the enemy at a distance-closing with them with his cruisers does IMO belie that objective-wouldn't you agree??
By this stage in the war the Americans were beginning to suspect that Japanese torpedoes were more more deadly than they hitherto believed. Nevertheless Ainsworth,ignoring the advice of DD Ralph Talbot's radio operator,didn't know he had he had been involved in a surface engagement; and supposed Strong had succombed to a submarine.

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

It is difficult to put oneself in the US commander's head but I'll try. I imagine that he was confident that he had the stronger force. Except for the brush the previous night, the latest action in the Solomons had been four months earlier. That also occurred in the Kula Gulf and the US side won easily. With his gun-heavy light cruisers, he probably wanted to do the same again so he let the enemy close enough so that they couldn't escape his trap. After all, the Japanese had previously shown a propensity for hit-and-run tactics (fire fish and duck away) and he was probably hoping that he had found a counter to this. His problem, besides everyone shooting at a single target, was that the long lances were a lot faster than he expected. Therefore, having planning the timing of his turn away to comb any torpedo tracks based on conventional torpedo speeds, the 50 knot torps arrived before he started that planned turn. For what he knew, his tactics, although not great, were reasonably appropriate.

At that time, there was some speculation that Japan had a super torpedo but most of the emphasis was on its range and warhead size, not its speed. It was eight months later in March 1944 that a comprehensive report on the long lance was distributed. Also, the existence of quick reloading gear wasn't suspected; this cost the US dearly a week later at Kolombangara.

By the way, as I recall, the loss of Strong the previous night was attributed to a mine not a submarine, probably because it occurred in such constricted waters. As a point of interest that previous night, of the four Japanese destroyers, only Niitsuki had long lance torps (and only four tubes with four reloads). Another two had 24" torps but not of the long lance variety; the other had 21" torps.

[jainso31]

Keith I really do appreciate your input into this thread.I have tried to turn you; but you are not for turning.I do note your insistence that Ainsworth allowed the Japanese to get close enough to him; whereas I see him as closing with his enemy to a very dangerous 7000yds.
I do realise that what we are doing is putting our cases forward and butting our heads together.However to cut to the chase-it is my opinion that Adm Ainsworth was not up to harsh realities of the Pacific war; and even though he was given another chance at Kolombangara-he made a worse job of that and I have never seen him mentioned again- in command.
My sincere thanks for your interest and input and I hope we can "lock horns" again soon.
PS Should you feel there is more to be said here-please do.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Keith

Thanks for the additional info, always good to see things from every perspective.

Whether Ainsworth wanted to get up close or not, most certainly targets should have been delegated

One wonders how much IJN info was available ? Was he aware of the entire enemy force ? Methinks a radar echo in those days was not in a pretty rotating picture but was just a blip on an A-scan tube ?? Very hard to get a good overall picture.

I need to read up the official report !

Brian

[jainso31]

Brian-you do have the "eye"-yessir he should have ,without a shadow of doubt;
have delegated the targets and mitigated the final outcome possibly.Your point about the radar of the day is very important.
If you do get to read the Official Report-I hope you will get back to us.
Once again my thanks for your interest and input.There is a new thread you may care to have look at.
KIA KAHA

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

Jainso31 -
I don't feel that we were really locking horns or butting heads. Basically, I agree with you. I don't feel that Ainsworth was a particularly good admiral either. However, I do think that I understand a bit of why he did as he did. It is easy with the benefit of hindsight to see where he could have done differently and better. One large hindsight advantage that we have is that we know the true results of these battles. We humans tend to learn best from our mistakes; unfortunately, at the time, the US commanders didn't realize that they were making mistakes. They knew that they lost some ships in these actions but felt that Japan was losing as many or more. Therefore, they thought that their tactics were working so saw little reason to change, especially since the true nature of the long lance wasn't yet known.

You and others mentioned uncertain radar plots in these days of no CICs or only early versions of CICs (combat information centers). In the constrained waters of the Solomons, enemy blips tended to periodically disappear as their returns merged with those of nearby islands. When a blip disappeared, the combat reports optimistically often regarded those ships as sunk. Enemy losses were thus inflated, skewing the post-battle analysis and turning actual battle losses into perceived ties or even wins. This may make the actions of US commanders like Ainsworth more understandable. they weren't necessarily bullheaded or stupid but mostly misinformed instead.

This sort of thing, of course, wasn't unique to the US Navy. All other navies had similar, if different, problems. For example, the Italian Navy constantly overvalued the number of torpedo hits that their surface ships were getting on Royal Navy ships. They therefore persisted in faulty piecemeal torpedo tactics, thinking instead that they were working well. This and, of course, their lack of oil, radar, and air support does much to explain many of the Italian Navy's combat problems.

By the way, the Kula Gulf battle wasn't the end for Ainsworth. His superiors seem to have been satisfied with him (probably those faulty post-combat reports again). In fact, he won the Navy Cross at Kula Gulf. He later commanded fire support task groups of cruisers and destroyers (and sometimes battleships), first at Kiska in the Aleutians and later in some of the most important 1944 island invasions. In 1972, he posthumously had a fast frigate named for him, USS Ainsworth (FF-1090).

[jainso31]

Keith -sorry for the clumsy epithets-"butting heads" and "locking horns"-I was really thinking impasse.When running a thread I always have one eye on the continuity; and the other one on termination signs.I too realise that villifying a particular commander has to be done with a degree of finesse or else you put the "other sides" back up.The aim is to extract as much out of the thread without turning people off.
We did not do at all badly with this one,in as much that both of us knew the outcome historically.
I thought that Kolombangara would have been the end of him; but you say no and I accept that.
Hope to see you next time out -watch this space;my thanks for all the input and interest shown.

jainso31

[Vince O'Hara]

I'll chip in about Ainsworth and his battle plan. Battle Plan "A" was to open fire beyond maximum range of visibility but at medium ranges of eight to ten thousand yards under full radar control. Plan "B" was to saturate the skys above the Japanese formation with star shell and open fire at thirteen thousand yards. At this time the cruiser task force commanders believed that rapid fire from 6-inch guns was a fercious weapon. And it was, when it was well directed. The destroyers were tied to screening duties. Task Force 18's doctine was for them to fire torpedoes after the cruisers had opened fire at Ainsworth's direction, or if a good opportunity presented itself. Moreover, in this battle the destroyers were from different formations and not completely familar with Ainsworth's doctine. As Radford's commander put it: "The power of destroyer torpedo attack does not appear to be emphasized sufficiently in this doctrine nor is this weapon adequately exploited in practice."

Ainsworth's manuevers leading up to the opening of fire was intended to maximize the oportunity for gunfire. They degraded the opportunities for torpedo attack. But this was according to his doctrine.

The point Keith made about what was known then as opposed to what is known now is well taken. Immediately after the battle Ainsworth wrote: "The Task Force Commander has been well aware of the tendency to over-estimate the damage inflicted upon the enemy, especially in actions at night. However, in this action he feels that the individual ship reports will bear out the despatch sent immediately after completion of the action to have been a very accurate, if not an underestimation of enemy losses."

Ainsworth commanded a one cruiser task force (Honolulu) at Leyte.

Vince

[jainso31]

Thanks for your fine postscript Vince-From what you said I deduce that plan A was the operative plan; and that not too well accomplished.The destroyers were left in the screen; but were to attack targets of opportunity with torpedoes.
The cruisers certainly maximised their gunfire power; BUT ON A SINGLE SHIP!!!
I always accepted in my mind that Keith was right about the Then and Now scenarios.A thread is built on argument and counter arguement-if the premise had no loopholes and was historically accurate- it becomes a statement of fact and nothing to contest ergo no thread.
I do not give a great deal of credence to what Ainsworth said in his post battle report-sounds very much like passing the buck; or hiding behind what others are purported to have said, for his final overestimates-perhaps that was the norm!?
Thanks for the piece about Adm. Ainsworth's outcome in the service-I admit I was curious.

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

jainso31 -

I don't mind dialogue coming with a bit of confrontation. Like I said, I'm not too thrilled with Ainsworth myself. My only hard and fast rule in any forum is not to make the least little criticism of the Spitfire aircraft. In my opinion, nothing is more likely to incite a "flame" war.

Until next time,
Keith

[jainso31]

Thanks Keith for your PPS- I am encouraged.
Re.Spifires,they were a beautiful little aircraft; but as the Seafire they were essentially a failure, due to their undercarriage being quite unsuitable for deck landings.Thus their loss rate in deck landings seriously outweghed any losses in combat.:(

jainso31

[Keith Enge]

jainso31 -
Now you have done it. You criticized at least one version of the Spitfire. Countless people will soon be crawling out of the woodwork to berate you. Besides the landing gear, their painfully short range was a great detriment in a naval setting, limiting both strike range as an escort and CAP (combat air patrol) endurance as an interceptor.

[jainso31]

Keith-be it upon your head (boiling oil) for the very mention of that aeroplane.I understand that all it could be used for from a carrier, was as CAP and then it had to land.:(:eek:

jainso31