The Battle of Santa Cruz

[jainso31]

This sea battle was a long range a/c carrier engagement; which the Japanese
claimed as a victory.The actual result was rather more difficult to define.Perhaps it was Pyrrhic??

jainso31


http://www.cv6.org/1942/santacruz/santacruz.htm

[Don Boyer]

The problem with Japanese "victories" in the early battles of WWII in the Pacific was that in terms of damage to the enemy -- i.e., ships sunk or knocked out of the war for awhile, they were often correct from that narrow point of view, but in the view that counted -- who was winning the war -- they came up far short. All the battles around Guadalcanal had the objective of getting US forces off Guadalcanal and "recapturing" Henderson Field. The Japanese totally failed in this objective every time.

The Imperial Army in particular had as the central objective of all their operations at Guadalcanal as "recapturing the airfield." It apparently never occurred to them, because of their collective overweening ego, that recapturing the airfield wasn't really necessary. Just preventing it from operating and making it a sinkhole for US defenders would have sufficed, and that WAS within their capabilities, at least early on. Recapturing the airfield from US Marines, using Japanese methods of field combat was not, and that situation rapidly only got far worse with the passage of time.

Japanese naval operations followed a similar pattern, only here it was cautious and piecemeal commitment of forces that brought eventual defeat. Santa Cruz was a great opportunity for the Japanese to eliminate their worst enemy -- American carriers -- from the battle scenario, and it was as close as they got to success. The most dangerous and capable ship in the US Navy -- Enterprise -- eluded them once again, and her availability later on was key in stymieing Japanese efforts once again. On such thin threads does real victory often hang.

[jainso31]

Don
I cannot but agree with your opening preamble; because it is a known fact that the Japanese approach to taking Guadalcanal was wrong; and their
futile attempts to put Henderson Field out of action by bombing or by naval bombardment was military idiocy.
Coming to this particular "engagement" there are two points that I think need to made.
Halsey calls for Immediate Attack; but Kincaid holds off for more "hard" evidence to come in-who was right in this instance??
The Task Force was split in two ie. Hornet and Enterprise were ten miles apart, when Enterprise runs into a severe rain squall and she loses Hornet visually. As luck would have it Hornet had to bear the brunt of suicidal attacks from a swarm of japanese bombers and torpedo bombers-some flying their planes on to Hornet's deck.
Hornet was reduced to a blazing wreck; while Enterprise who had emerged from the rain smother was also savagely attacked; but had an effective CAP; and even though hit managed to gather in her a/c and escape.
What if the boot had been on the other foot; and Enterprise took the first onslaught??
,
jainso31

[jainso31]

Having further researched Halsey's order to attack,I found what appears to be quite a delay between this order(Halsey) and it's execution(Kinkaid).
I quote from Morison's "Two Ocean War" :-
"In the gray hours before dawn Admiral Halsey on Noumea riffled through the dispatches,glanced at his operations chart,and sent out the words ATTACK-REPEAT-ATTACK!"
Following this, is a quote from Macintyre's "War in the Pacific":-
"The lessons of Midway still fresh in his mind,Nagumo had a striking force of 65 aircraft,half of them Zero fighters,ranged on his three aircraft carriers before daylight.So at 0658,when final confirmation of the position of one American aircraft carrier reached him, the strike was on its way in 12 minutes (0710).Twenty minutes later (0730) Hornet followed suit and 30 minutes after that (0800) Enterprise got her strike force into the air"
Dawn that day was 0523-therefore Halsey's order could have been as early as say 0430; and was executed some three hours later.
This tells it's own story re. Kinkaid's "one bite".

jaonso31

[WGVSr]

As I recall, Halsey had only recently been returned to command after a serious case of shingles I believe. I never knew if the electric "Attack, repeat, attack' order was tactical or strategic in scope. The fog of war and the fate's fickleness were heavy in this engagement. Nagumo indeed got the right hook off first and delivered a body blow to the US fleet, enviscerating TF 17. But, he missed Enterprise and TF 16. However, the fighter escort fell on Enterprise's strike headed the other direction and all it could do was rattle Kirishima. The later Junyo strike found Enterprise and savaged her. Continued piecemeal strikes doomed Hornet who demonstrated her toughness by refusing to sink for Mustin and Anderson. Hornet would be sunk by Makigumo and Akigumo.

However, from a strategic standpoint, after all the fire and destruction, the Marines were still at Henderson Field. In other fields, this battle probably also marked the end of the 'professional' Japanese Navy air groups as they suffered significant losses to compound those at Eastern Solomons and the transfers of naval flyers to Rabaul. The 150 or so flyers lost by the Japanese included the majority of the squadron and section leaders. While future Japanese flyers' courage couldn't be questioned, their skill level could.

I also respectfully disagree with your assessment of the Japanese strategy for Guadalcanal being deficient. If you follow the war in the Southwest Pacific Area [SWPA] you will note that the US advances were constrained by the range of supporting air cover, beginning with Darwin and Port Moresby. The next assault would be within the range of the air cover from the fields built at the last invasion site. This was true also in the Solomons and all the way up the island chains to, actually, Iwo. Reverse the field, factor in the longer range of Japanese aircraft and you have the same effect going south. Remember that the Japanese had almost completed what became Henderson Field [the next major field north was Rabaul] when the Marines invaded in August and that they had established a seaplane base at Tulagi when they invaded, taking the islands from the Australians in May, 1942. Had the Guadalcanal base been put to use, New Caledonia and the Hawaiian-Australian supply line would be in jeopardy. Remember also, that Henderson was in fact neutralized at least twice for a short period by bombing and bombardment. My assessment of the chief impetus for the naval activity was logistics. Neutralize Henderson, stop the resupply and your reinforcement and resupply becomes easier. In fact, the battle eventually became one of logistics, who could resupply and reinforce first and best.
Bill

[Don Boyer]

Good points, all, Bill.

The Japanese problem with the whole Guadalcanal scenario stemmed from a little mis-coordination between the Japanese Army and Navy. It was the Imperial Navy that moved into Tulagi and then decided an airfield on Guadalcanal would be a nice aesthetic improvement. The Army didn't find out until after the fact. The problem was that Rabaul was the closest air base of operations for the IJN, and it was just far enough of a stretch -- around 1400 miles round-trip -- to make it a flyer's nightmare. Zeros couldn't loiter around Guadalcanal for very long, especially if there was any air combat, and even though the Betty had the range, coming back wounded was a real iffy proposition. Attrition became the word of the day -- the US planes didn't have to fly far at all to engage the Japanese, which worked to our logistical advantage. Logistics.

With Henderson Field in American hands, and the Japanese Army embarrassed by the destruction of the gung-ho Col Ichiki's detachment, the Army was forced to divert troops to Guadalcanal to "retake" the airfield, an operation very detrimental to the Army's planned operations in New Guinea. The Army was forced, by Imperial Navy miscalculation, into splitting their forces in the face of the enemy, a War College no-no going back to cave men with clubs. More logistics.

Compounding this was the long logistical train needed to move troops from Rabaul or wherever to Guadalcanal, always under air and sea threat from surface and submarine forces. What with the limited number of suitable transport vessels available, this also worked against the Japanese' original plans for this area -- focus on New Guinea. Logistics again worked against them. The US could get reinforcements in from the east, and they would only be under real threat when actually near Guadalcanal (submarines excepted, but they were almost totally ineffective in interdicting US supply efforts).

The fact that Henderson Field was made inoperational for a day or so (twice) becomes moot when one considers that the only thing that would actually be effective would be to make it inoperational permanently. Nothing else would do. The Army thought they had the right idea, capture the field, which would have accomplished that goal, but was well beyond their tactical capability, obviously after the battle on Edson's Ridge and elsewhere demonstrated the effectiveness of bushido compare to .50 cal slugs and 105 mm. howitzers, etc. Lacking that capability, the only way to ruin Henderson would have been to totally destroy it from naval air and surface forces, yet the conservative IJN committed forces piecemeal over and over and never go the job done. Plus the IJN had to support army troop movements, which sucked up a lot more ships, thereby splitting their forces even more. The Japanese not only lost the logistics battle they lost the whole battle from poor tactics, poor Army field equipment, lack of jungle training, conservative thinking in the naval hierarchy and insurmountable inter-service rivalries.

[jainso31]

The problem with Japanese "victories" in the early battles of WWII in the Pacific was that in terms of damage to the enemy -- i.e., ships sunk or knocked out of the war for awhile, they were often correct from that narrow point of view, but in the view that counted -- who was winning the war -- they came up far short. All the battles around Guadalcanal had the objective of getting US forces off Guadalcanal and "recapturing" Henderson Field. The Japanese totally failed in this objective every time.

The Imperial Army in particular had as the central objective of all their operations at Guadalcanal as "recapturing the airfield." It apparently never occurred to them, because of their collective overweening ego, that recapturing the airfield wasn't really necessary. Just preventing it from operating and making it a sinkhole for US defenders would have sufficed, and that WAS within their capabilities, at least early on. Recapturing the airfield from US Marines, using Japanese methods of field combat was not, and that situation rapidly only got far worse with the passage of time.

Japanese naval operations followed a similar pattern, only here it was cautious and piecemeal commitment of forces that brought eventual defeat. Santa Cruz was a great opportunity for the Japanese to eliminate their worst enemy -- American carriers -- from the battle scenario, and it was as close as they got to success. The most dangerous and capable ship in the US Navy -- Enterprise -- eluded them once again, and her availability later on was key in stymieing Japanese efforts once again. On such thin threads does real victory often hang.

Bill I do not understand why you say you disagee with my assessment of Japanese strategy for Guadalcanal being deficient.I was agreeing with Don that the plan did NOT include TAKING Henderson Field; but rather shelling/bombing the airfield into "sinkholes" as he put it- was the wrong plan.I had not come to question of Logistics at that point.
I do not see the relevance of Halsey's skin disease, which he had just recovered from, had to do with his tactical decision to mount a dawn attack on the Japanese Task Forces-he obvioussly saw a bigger picture than Kinkaid did.
Had that order been carried out -the outcome of the Santa Cruz battle may well have been very different; irregardless of what did ,in fact, happen.
Coming to the issue of Logistics-i am aware that the Japanese plan had to be supported by the best logistics plan they could come up with; and in that respesct it was sometimes touch and go struggle against the Americans; who planned to STOP resupply AT ANY COST- as we have seen in the desperate battles (7) for the island; and which we know the USN won eventually.
,;
jainso31

[jainso31]

Don thank you for the discourse on SWPAC/japanese strategies which I must say I read with interest.
I would like to return to the thread.RE. Halsey's ATTACK order which the Intro.article put Kinkaid's failure to execute, down to a Communications snafu,and there is no reference to it in Kinkaid's papers.Halsey did however hold Kinkaid responsible for the loss of Hornet.
I quote Morison "Admiral Kinkaid,after being allowed "one bite"-the loss of Hornet in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands-rose to be one of our greatest seaman"
It is said in mitigation that if Kinkaid knew what Halsey knew,he would not have hesitated over the pre-emptive strike. HOW NAIVE IS THAT??- as well as an admission that he had received the order from his C in C.

jainso31

[WGVSr]

Actually, the strategy was to bomb Henderson into neutrality and then recapture it [witness the various attempts to do just that]. The problem the Japanese had was with the coordination of the combined arms as Don points out. The shelling and infantry attacks were never set off at the same time. Anyway, back to your question on Halsey....

Halsey went on sick leave upon his return from Coral Sea [trust me, shingles goes far beyond being a skin disease - personal experience]. As a result Spruance took his chair on Enterprise's bridge at Midway. On 16 October, Nimitz polled his staff about what to do about Ghormley and the ominous position in the South Pacific and the result was a resounding thumbs down. Ghormley never set foot on Guadalcanal and suffered from security issues in that the Savo disaster was made public after he was relieved so the obvious inference was that Savo was the cause. To his credit, Ghormley took his relief with dignity. So, Halsey, just coming off sick leave, was posted to Noumea to replace his old friend of 40+ years. He arrived on 18 October with a brief to shake up things and get results as CO of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. This he did in spades by moving his HQ from Auckland to Noumea, changing the dress code getting rid of ties and generally bedeviling the Free French by moving his HQ ashore from the Argonne and generally lighting a fire under the staff. The "Strike, repeat, strike" [usually quoted as "attack, repeat, attack"] order was issued in the early hours of 26 October. Was it strategic as in "this command will always attack" or was it tactical to Kincaid to strike the Japanese fleet at Santa Cruz ? I tend to think they were meant as a not so subtle encouragement for Kincaid although Kincaid did not know where Nagumo's carriers were and wouldn't until about 0830. Halsey, of course did, having reports from the PBYs. If you ever get a chance to see it, the film "The Gallant Hours" is about this period of time and is excellent. Jimmy Cagney played Halsey as I recall.
Bill

[Don Boyer]

Bill puts his finger on the key issue. "Strike, Repeat, Strike" makes eminent sense under the circumstances, but Kincaid was in the bind of not knowing where to strike until he had solid info. You can't kick carrier air groups out in the general direction of the enemy and hope someone spots them in the meantime with any sense of security. The Japanese had, I believe, three separate forces, two of them carrier groups and one of them composed of the two Pearl Harbor survivors, the only true fleet carriers the Japanese had left, and therefore the most dangerous. Sometimes in battle the timing of recon isn't any help in getting their first with the most. Hornet paid for that. But, in the end, once again, despite a 'victory" with ships on the bottom, the strategic objective was not accomplished, and the strategic objective was the only one that counted.

[jainso31]

Good morning Bill-Yes I did see the movie "The Gallant Hours" in the 1960's
with my father, who died a couple of years after that.
What I cannot understand,and I really do not;is why Kinkaid did not ask HQ for a reference point; after he received the order to make a tactical pre-emptive strike-or would that have put Kinkaid in a "bad light"?
I, coming from a heavy industry-deep coal mining-working my way up from pit boy to mine manager in the first twenty years and thereafter Personnel Managemet and industrial Relations.This last because I was always interested in People and their Behaviour.When discussing a way out of a "strike" say -you had to know the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition and how to use those qualities to gain your point.
Coming back to Thomas Kinkaid a "black shoe"-did he make a "calculated" mistake in ignoring Halsey's order or was it pecadillo? Nagumo had no such weakness.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Bill puts his finger on the key issue. "Strike, Repeat, Strike" makes eminent sense under the circumstances, but Kincaid was in the bind of not knowing where to strike until he had solid info. You can't kick carrier air groups out in the general direction of the enemy and hope someone spots them in the meantime with any sense of security. The Japanese had, I believe, three separate forces, two of them carrier groups and one of them composed of the two Pearl Harbor survivors, the only true fleet carriers the Japanese had left, and therefore the most dangerous. Sometimes in battle the timing of recon isn't any help in getting their first with the most. Hornet paid for that. But, in the end, once again, despite a 'victory" with ships on the bottom, the strategic objective was not accomplished, and the strategic objective was the only one that counted.

Good morning Don
Yes Strike-Repeat-Strike makes eminent sense-I said that way back.Was it really beyond the capabilities for Kinkaid to ascertain what Halsey knew and if so why he did not??
Yes I am making heavy weather of this because I think the loss of the Hornet could have been avoided; or mitigated in some way.
I now understand the American mindset of Strategic Victory at whatever the cost,having now dealt with six of the battles in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal and which were all "flawed"one way or another.Santa Cruz was another "close run thing"-leaving Big E and the Sara as the sole USN air strike ships.
I am reminded of the Battle for Crete-the RN did try their utmost; but were bombed into sea by aircraft from Italy and islands nearby.We failed miserably to counter the German air attacks; by the mindset of the High Command of the RAF refusing to lay aside their set purpose whatever it was; and pitch in to alleviate the RN's perilous state.,
I digress I know- but singleness of purpose can pay off at times.

jainso31,

[Old Salt]

Some time ago I came across the official reports of some Pacific encounters and the number of pilots and planes lost trying to find and attack the Japanese fleet astounded me. Likewise has the number of ships and souls lost.

That was some lengthy heated battle and we can all be proud of those taking part. Hindsight is a great thing, but making decisions and acting during the battle is another thing. Mistakes will be made but for me that does not detract from the extraordinary bravery, courage and commitment shown by all.

Brian.

[jainso31]

Well said Brian, I cannot argue about the issue of hindsight or the astonishing bravery of those who participate in battles or indeed the actions of cammanders on the spot.
However accepting this as a premise, would nullifiy all enquiries after the event; which of course was/is not the case-all battles were/are continually dissected- for others to learn from the rights and the wrongs of such "actions".
Hence this Section which gives an opportunity for members to mutually dicuss Battles and Events-a bit like War Gaming in my opinion.
Thank you for your interest and input
Regards
jainso31

[Old Salt]

I was not saying one should not study or learn from history, more that one should be careful not to make 'ármchair' observations on decisions made under the extreme pressure of battle.

I was indeed very fortunate that all of my 'battles' were fought in simulators.With the best plans made, the battle commenced and one became very engrossed and unaware that it was not 'for real'. The staff would bring into play events that greatly changed the situation and decisions had to be made moment by moment. I cannot describe the intensity one felt dodging torpedoes or incoming missiles ... it did seem real. At the end of each session was a debrief where events were reviewed. Finally, did we áchieve our mission ?

Understanding the human aspects involved one can be assured that the command decisions made were those seemingly the best at that time and under those circumstances.

Brian

[WGVSr]

I think Brian makes the correct observation, "did we achieve our mission". That may be answered emphatically, the Japanese, no; the US, yes. Was there a cost, indeed, individually priceless.

As to Kincaid, I don't know. Remember the directives he got from Ghormley seem to leave much to Kincaid's interpretation. Halsey wasn't that sort of fellow [hard to misinterpret Halsey's missive]. It may have also been security. Now with double whiz-bang encrypted sidebands, it might be that commanders can communicate all they know to their subordinates [I know the Army systems can do a version of this] but in 1942 ? Was Halsey the type of commander who would volunteer this info, again I don't know. One other consideration might be that the info was passed on at a lower level by some subordinate per protocol and just didn't get to Kincaid in a timely manner. I know, heckuva way to run a railroad but I've seen just such messages passed in my studies of Midway. At the time commanders didn't have the capability to redirect a strike in flight and so Admirals generally awaited positive location before launching.

One thing that strikes me as cosmic karma is the ironic bookend the message Halsey sends, 'strike,repeat, strike', makes with Nimitz's message to Halsey almost exactly two years later, 'where is TF34 ?'.
Bill

[jainso31]

I was not saying one should not study or learn from history, more that one should be careful not to make 'ármchair' observations on decisions made under the extreme pressure of battle.

I was indeed very fortunate that all of my 'battles' were fought in simulators.With the best plans made, the battle commenced and one became very engrossed and unaware that it was not 'for real'. The staff would bring into play events that greatly changed the situation and decisions had to be made moment by moment. I cannot describe the intensity one felt dodging torpedoes or incoming missiles ... it did seem real. At the end of each session was a debrief where events were reviewed. Finally, did we áchieve our mission ?

Understanding the human aspects involved one can be assured that the command decisions made were those seemingly the best at that time and under those circumstances.

Brian

Thank you again Brian for you contribution to this thread.However,I have to say it would be difficult not "to make armchair observations on decisions made under extreme pressure of battle" Surely the very function of this Section is to do just that; and there are plenty of examples where members have done just that eg Halsey and Where is TF 34?,why did Kurita turn away, and why was Bomber Harris allowed to burn Dresden; are all well documented criticised decisions here, and of course the world wide.
All I am trying to do in this thread is act for the "prosecution"; and I am trying to get the "defence" to negate my argument.
Brian- i am not out to impugn anyone's character-believe me.,

jainso31,,"

[jainso31]

I think Brian makes the correct observation, "did we achieve our mission". That may be answered emphatically, the Japanese, no; the US, yes. Was there a cost, indeed, individually priceless.

As to Kincaid, I don't know. Remember the directives he got from Ghormley seem to leave much to Kincaid's interpretation. Halsey wasn't that sort of fellow [hard to misinterpret Halsey's missive]. It may have also been security. Now with double whiz-bang encrypted sidebands, it might be that commanders can communicate all they know to their subordinates [I know the Army systems can do a version of this] but in 1942 ? Was Halsey the type of commander who would volunteer this info, again I don't know. One other consideration might be that the info was passed on at a lower level by some subordinate per protocol and just didn't get to Kincaid in a timely manner. I know, heckuva way to run a railroad but I've seen just such messages passed in my studies of Midway. At the time commanders didn't have the capability to redirect a strike in flight and so Admirals generally awaited positive location before launching.

One thing that strikes me as cosmic karma is the ironic bookend the message Halsey sends, 'strike,repeat, strike', makes with Nimitz's message to Halsey almost exactly two years later, 'where is TF34 ?'.
Bill

Hi Bill good morning
I think the Japanese won this encounter tactically, but it was a Pyrrhic Victory and USN had the edge strategically.Mind you- I still do not think much of the US strategy in this engagement; but if this was was retain hold of Guadalcanal-then that was achieved at the cost of a new aircraft carrier-Hornet.
I am well aware of the desperate issue Guadalcanal posed; and if it took desperate measures,and at times there were;to hold the island; then that was achieved.
I take it from your reply that Kinkaid was not in a position to ask/obtain the Japanese TF's position-then he would certainly have to wait until he was sure.Why- I wondered did Halsey hold the loss of Hornet against him???

jainso31 then

[Old Salt]

All I am trying to do in this thread is act for the "prosecution"; and I am trying to get the "defence" to negate my argument.
Brian- i am not out to impogn anyone's character-believe me.,

jainso31,,"

Quite. All I am saying is to include the human elements affectng decisions. You act on the best info possible at that moment. Mistakes were not made deliberately. Remember that the USN were ( and are) an efficient navy. . Their leaders were likewise professiobal. The USN was still set up for peacetime and went into the war in a hurry without a proper work-up together. Hence misreaed and misunderstood signals etc. They were initially unfamiliar with nightime battles whereas the Japanese were highly trained in all aspects . Unfamiliarity with the Long Lance torpedoes and Japanese tactics meant that their 'Book' was rendered obselete. They learned as they went along and rewrote the book. And did a damn fine job.

I earned a lot of salt before earning my armchair !

Brian

[jainso31]

Brian- what I said in#17 and repeated in your reply; does not appear to have registered. I am just "playing a role" in the thread-appearing as the "villain" against the "good guys".
I would not dream of bringing myself into disrepute by maligning the US Navy, anyone serving or who has served in it.It is just not in my thoughts.
I really am sorry- that you have taken- what appears to be offence at the way I have handled this thread-but then I always have in previous threads-so nothing has changed.
Again please accept my apology for making you feel aggrieved- that was never my intention.

jainso31

[WGVSr]

I take it from your reply that Kinkaid was not in a position to ask/obtain the Japanese TF's position-then he would certainly have to wait until he was sure.Why- I wondered did Halsey hold the loss of Hornet against him???

jainso31 then

I've done some thinking and some more reading on the issue and I think the reason that Kincaid didn't ask could be as simple as radio silence. While descrambling wasn't an art in 1942, RDF certainly was. It may have been Kincaid didn't want to tip his location to Nagumo, not knowing of course that Nagumo already knew where he was as of 0658. Nagumo had his strike ready and launched upon reports from his scouts about 0710. Kincaid was only slightly slower, launching at 0830 after locating the carriers at 0750. Of course, 30 minutes can be an eternity. I don't know that Halsey specifically held Hornet's loss against Kincaid. In fact, Kincaid went on to higher and better positions, CO of North Atlantic Forces in '43, command of the SWP Forces and the 7th Fleet in late '43 and on to 4 Stars [full Admiral in the USN] in 45. Hardly the career path of someone in the doghouse. I suspect Halsey regretted the loss of Hornet but as Kincaid was doing what he was ordered, it was the cost of the struggle.
Bill

[Don Boyer]

Halsey did work quietly in the background to get Kincaid out of carriers, and Kincaid was aware of it. He went on to higher commands as he was an excellent officer, commanding 7th Fleet at Leyte just in time for Halsey to mess things up for him again during the big battle. Friends they were not, but Halsey, after he left SOPAC, was in no position to influence Kincaid's career any further.

[jainso31]

I cannot but agree, Bill, that the use of RDF-which may have banned anyway-may have been Kinkaid's only, but because breaking radio silence- unvailable option. So that buries that possibility.
I never thought that Kinkaid was a poor commander ;but the very fact that he was a "black shoe"Admiral meant his rise to the four star rank was via commands of conventional warships,as opposed to Carriers.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Bill thanks for this last contribution.
I agree that RDF may have been prohibited ,because of breaking radio silenceand that in turn would preclude Kinkaid from finding out Nagumo's position.
R/Adm Kinkaid did of course rise through the flag ranks to the four four star status in conventional commands thereafter.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Don -you have an uncanny knack of delivering the final touches ie. the Halsey/Kinkaid relationship was not "friendly" and he Halsey, was the instigator of getting Kinkaid "out of carriers"; and to a certain extent, ensured the square peg was fitted in a square hole.
The foregoing speaks volumes.
My thanks to all who have contributed to this thread.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Brian- what I said in#17 and repeated in your reply; does not appear to have registered. I am just "playing a role" in the thread-appearing as the "villain" against the "good guys".
I would not dream of bringing myself into disrepute by maligning the US Navy, anyone serving or who has served in it.It is just not in my thoughts.
I really am sorry- that you have taken- what appears to be offence at the way I have handled this thread-but then I always have in previous threads-so nothing has changed.
Again please accept my apology for making you feel aggrieved- that was never my intention.

jainso31

Ha! Ha! Too many voyages and command experience to ever feel aggrieved.:p

There those who try to find the best in people and situations, accepting that neither am I perfect.

Then there are the others ...........

Brian

[jainso31]

The unfortunate sinking of Hornet; and the severe damage to the Big E meant that the USN had only one Fleet Carrier operational. Help was to come from an unexpected source-the Royal Navy's HMS Victorious to be known whilst serving with the USN as USS Robin or "the Limey Flattop".
She gave sterling service until the Essex Class Fleet Carriers started arriving in theatre.

jainso31

[WGVSr]

jainso:
I know we have another thread going elsewhere on 'Robin' but how long did she operate in theater, do you have dates ?
Bill

[jainso31]

Bill
Herewith dates from Official History of HMS Victorious

Dec.42 detached Home Fleet and took passage to Norfolk VA.
Jan.43 Refit Norfolk VA US Navy Yard
Feb.43 Passage to Pacific via Panama Canal
Mar,43Arrive PH
Apr.43 Conversion to US Equipment,planes,etc at PH
May 43 Exercises with USS Saratoga and passage to 3rd Fleet
June43 To TG 36.3
July43 Operations with Saratoga.
Aug Operation Cartwheel.
Sept.43 Released from Loan Duty.
Oct.43 Rejoined Home Fleet.

jainso31
.

[WGVSr]

An interesting article in the latest edition of the magazine 'Naval History' discusses the Battle of Santa Cruz. They don't have any more luck in declaring a victor than we did.
Bill

[BlackBat242]

There were a number of naval battles in WW2 between the USN and IJN that were pretty much a draw in terms of ships damaged/sunk, etc.

The only real way was to look at whose long-term plans were thwarted and whose continued on.



That's like Jutland... if all you look at is relative fleet strengths and ship lost/damaged, the RN was the loser and the Germans the winner.

However, the Germans went home and the British stayed at sea in the area for a while, and while the German fleet pretty much kept to the Baltic after that (save for 1 or 2 very quick runs west) the British sailed repeatedly around the areas of the North Sea that the Germans used to cruise around in.

Therefore, the British "won" Jutland despite the "points scored".

[jainso31]

The problem with Japanese "victories" in the early battles of WWII in the Pacific was that in terms of damage to the enemy -- i.e., ships sunk or knocked out of the war for awhile, they were often correct from that narrow point of view, but in the view that counted -- who was winning the war -- they came up far short. All the battles around Guadalcanal had the objective of getting US forces off Guadalcanal and "recapturing" Henderson Field. The Japanese totally failed in this objective every time.

The Imperial Army in particular had as the central objective of all their operations at Guadalcanal as "recapturing the airfield." It apparently never occurred to them, because of their collective overweening ego, that recapturing the airfield wasn't really necessary. Just preventing it from operating and making it a sinkhole for US defenders would have sufficed, and that WAS within their capabilities, at least early on. Recapturing the airfield from US Marines, using Japanese methods of field combat was not, and that situation rapidly only got far worse with the passage of time.

Japanese naval operations followed a similar pattern, only here it was cautious and piecemeal commitment of forces that brought eventual defeat. Santa Cruz was a great opportunity for the Japanese to eliminate their worst enemy -- American carriers -- from the battle scenario, and it was as close as they got to success. The most dangerous and capable ship in the US Navy -- Enterprise -- eluded them once again, and her availability later on was key in stymieing Japanese efforts once again. On such thin threads does real victory often hang.:cool:

Don- I have learned a lot from you since we have been doing these Pacific Battles; and you have always said that whichever side's long term gains were met-that side is the winner.I accepted that then and I accept that today.Your last line says it all.:cool:
PS.our old friend Morison said and I quote "Japanese air strength had been reduced by about 100 planes,and some of the best pilots.The land battle,which the naval battle was supposed to cover,had failed. Moreover,this Santa Cruz set to gained precious time for the Americans to prepare for the next expected onslaught"
jainso31