Battle of Kolombangara 1943

[jainso31]

Admiral Ainsworth believed he had inflicted severe damage on the Japanese at Kula Gulf and was eager to inflict more.The opportunity to do so came quickly enough.The American Campaign to take Vila was not going well.
A Tokyo Express was scheduled for the night of 12th/13th July.
The Japanese Force was commanded by R.Adm Izaki and comprised 1LC, 5DD and 4DT.
Ainsworth had 3LC, and two Destroyer Squadrons of 5 DDs each.
A Black Cat PBY Catalina aircraft spotted the Japanese at 0036 at a distance of 26miles. or futher details see link below.Just what exactly went wrong this time???
jainso31

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/kolombangara.htm

[mikebatzel]

I think that Ainsworths problems in this battle were two-fold. First he assumed he had surprise on his side. The old strategy of "hope for the best, expect the worst" would certainly apply. The Japanese had a new radar detection device that would see its combat debut (precisly which unit I am still trying to figure out), removing any chance the Allies had at surprise.

The second mistake he made was to try chasing after cripples. The Japanese destroyers were simply reloading. To be fair the Japanese neither before or after had reloaded their fish as quickly as this. By the time there were noticed in a position that appeared they may make a torpedo attack, it was to late.

[jainso31]

Mike -according to my reading of the radar situation.At that time the Japanese had none,they did however have a radar detecting device which enabled them to track enemy radar pulses. Izaki was therefore able to track Ainsworth's progress up the Slot for an hour before American radar bounced off a Japanese ship. Izaki launched torpedoes at 0108,one minute before Mcinerney's van destroyers got theirs off.
Regarding the chasing after imaginary "cripples"-the Japanese destroyers had reloaded in a rain squall in the remarkably fast time of 18 minutes,swung round and altough picked up by US radar, Ainsworth did not know whose destroyers they were; and delayed gunfire, until it was too late. The Japanese launched 31 torpedoes which sank Gwin,caught Honolulu , St Louis and the Leander
I'll leave you to finish off this salutary tale-it is the real "sting in the tail"

jainso31

[jainso31]

According to S E Morison's book "Two Ocean War" he said that the USN had salvaged a (Long Lance) torpedo and had handed it over to the US Bureau of Ordnance for appraisal;the results of which had not reached Adm Halsey.
Had Ainsworth been apprised of this weapon's capabilities, he would not have closed to 10000 yds; and manoeuvered about in Japanese "torpedo water"
As it was, he was fortunate to get his three cruisers back to base on their bottoms-badly damaged though they were.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

I did have the official New Zealand War History describing this battle. From memory there was some confusion over the turn signal which is why Leander 'turned wide'.

I will look it out : in the meantime here are some pics of the hole in Leander's bow.

Brian

[Old Salt]

I did have the official New Zealand War History describing this battle. From memory there was some confusion over the turn signal which is why Leander 'turned wide'.

I will look it out : in the meantime here are some pics of the hole in Leander's bow.

Brian

Here is the extract from the official publication :

Immediately after the Jintsu opened fire the destroyers Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Kiyonami, and Yugure followed suit and, at a mean range of 6500 yards, discharged twenty-nine 24-inch torpedoes.1 These were well on their way when Admiral Ainsworth passed a signal to his ships by TBS radio2 to make a turn of 180 degrees to port together, but as a result of defects in the system the ‘executive’ order was not received in the Leander and was missed by all the rear destroyers except the Ralph Talbot. All the ships were firing hard and the situation was complicated by the dense smoke from the guns. It was seen through a gap in the smoke that the Honolulu had started to turn to port and drastic action had to be taken by the Leander to avoid collision, and she checked fire after getting off twenty-one broadsides.3 The Ralph Talbot was ‘forced to put her engines full astern, manoeuvre radically and use whistle signals to avoid the other four destroyers which were standing on at 30 knots’.

The cruisers were badly bunched at the turn and, almost as soon as the Leander had straightened up to follow the St. Louis on the new course, she was shaken severely by the violent explosion of a torpedo which hit her on the port side amidships. The engines were at once ordered to be stopped and the Leander was quickly left behind by the Honolulu and St. Louis, which resumed firing and continued the action to the north-eastward.

[jainso31]

Brian
My thanks for the Pictures of Leander's port bow section; and the extract from the Official Report.There seemed to be quite a melee of ships trying evade the incoming torpedoes, which probably made the general situation worse.I understand that Leander's damage was so severe0- that it almost took her out of the war.:(

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Brian
My thanks for the Pictures of Leander's port bow section; and the extract from the Official Report.There seemed to be quite a melee of ships trying evade the incoming torpedoes, which probably made the general situation worse.I understand that Leander's damage was so severe0- that it almost took her out of the war.:(

jainso31

It did in fact take her out of the war. The LONG LANCE torpedo on port side amidships caused extensive damage and wrecking No 1 Boiler Room. Considerable flooding and fuel supply contaminated by sea water. Good damage control enabled steam to be maintained from No 3 Boiler Room and ship was able to return to base. (Note: Hole in A Boiler Room measured 3m x 6m.)

Some temporary repairs were made firstly at Tulagi, then at Auckland she was further repaired to allow passage to US Navy Dockyard, Boston, Mass. She arrived there on 23 December 1943 and did not leave again until the refit was completed in August 1945. She then reverted to Royal Navy service.

brian

[Vince O'Hara]

Mike -according to my reading of the radar situation.At that time the Japanese had none,they did however have a radar detecting device which enabled them to track enemy radar pulses. Izaki was therefore able to track Ainsworth's progress up the Slot for an hour before American radar bounced off a Japanese ship. "

jainso31

I posted that article about Kolombangara a long time ago. The claim about the radar detection device originated with a statement by Yukikaze's captain. The Japanese history, Naval Operations in Southeast Area Vol. 2 only says that a seaplane reported Ainsworth's approach and this was the source of Izaki's forewarning. After looking at the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan material about Japanese Radar Counter-measures (it's online) I don't think they had any such device at that time.

Vince

[jainso31]

Brian
I thought that Leander's damge looked very serious-(from your pictures) and on reflection; am not now surprised that they did end her Active Service:(

jainso31

[jainso31]

Vince I will certainly bow to your vastly superior knowledge on the matter of
whether the Japanese had a "tracking" device.You say they hadn't and that is good enough for the likes of me.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Brian
I thought that Leander's damge looked very serious-(from your pictures) and on reflection; am not now surprised that they did end her Active Service:(

jainso31
Not quite !

HMS LEANDER sailed from Boston on 27/8/45 and after call at Montreal to embark gold reserves took passage to UK. She arrived at Rosyth in September and refit work was continued in a Tyneside shipyard during 1946. Further work was undertaken at Portsmouth before she was re-commissioned in September 1946 for service in 1st Cruiser Squadron, Mediterranean Fleet. The ship escaped with no damage when, in company with HM Cruiser MAURITIUS, HM Destroyers SAUMAREZ and VOLAGE, the ships entered an Albania minefield off Corfu. Fleet service in the Mediterranean ended in December 1947 when she returned to pay off at Chatham and reduce to Reserve status. Placed on the Disposal List she was sold to BISCO for demolition by Hughes Bolcow in December 1949. Before being towed to the breaker’s yard the ship was used as a trials target and arrived at the Blyth in January 1950.

[Vince O'Hara]

Vince I will certainly bow to your vastly superior knowledge on the matter of
whether the Japanese had a "tracking" device.You say they hadn't and that is good enough for the likes of me.

jainso31

Jainso31, I only wanted to correct the article's mistake.

Vince

[jainso31]

I did appreciate what you were trying to do; and I in turn,was deferring to you as an eminent historian.I am, as one of our members so puts it,"standing on the shoulders of a giant"
I am expecting your book "The USN against the Axis :Surface Combat.1941-1945" sometime this week-this I hope, will keep me in the game.

jainso31

[jainso31]

Brian thank you for the postscript re.HMS Leander-a sad end for such a beautiful ship-decommissioned 1949 and broken up at Blyth, County of Northumberland in 1950:(.

jainso31

[Old Salt]

Would I be right in thinking that Allied ships at that time were not very aware of the capabilities of the Long Lance torpedoes?

Brian

[Don Boyer]

The existence and capabilities of the "Long Lance" torpedo came as a complete surprise to Allied forces in the early part of the Pacific war, the testament to that being the large number of holes punched in allied ships with fatal or near-fatal effects early on.

As mentioned in other posts, we did capture some, yet I can find absolutely nothing but minimal reference to any analysis of the torpedo by the Bureau of Ordnance or anyone else that laid out the torpedo's characteristics. Obviously, word did finally filter out regarding the torpedo's speed and range, judging by the decision made by commanders in later battles. And of course, Japanese submarines had a smaller version of the same torpedo that was used to telling effect during the Guadalcanal campaign. After that period, IJN submarines tended to have a real short life-span at sea and were nowhere near as effective.

[jainso31]

Yes Don I recall you detailing the Long Lance saga ie. the who's who and the whens and whys, but I cannot remember where this discourse was posted.

jainso31

[jainso31]

As a postscript I add a quotation from Vince O'Hara's book "The USN against the Axis"
Ainsworth later wrote to Nimitz "Looking over one's shoulder,one can always see how we should have done differently;and no one knows the fallacy of chasing Jap destroyers with cruisers better than I"
I wonder just how the Battle of Kolombangara's outcome affected Ainsworth's career in the USN-adversley or not at all??

jainso31