The Battle of Mers el Kebir

[astraltrader]

3 July 1940
The battle of Mers El Kebir, codenamed by the British as Operation Catupult was a tragic action between heavy units of the Royal Navy and the bulk of the French fleet at their Algerian Naval base of Mers El Kebir, near Oran.
Churchill worried that these ships might end up in the hands of the Germans, ordered Admiral James Somerville who commanded the powerful Force H at Gibraltar to set sail for Oran to present the French Admiral Gensoul with the following ultimatum:

" It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;
(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.

(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.

If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.

(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.

If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands. "

The force referred to in this ultimatum consisted of the Hood, Valiant, Resolution plus many other cruisers and destroyers, backed up by the carrier Ark Royal.
When Somerville reached his intended position a few miles outside Mers el Kebir, the dismayed French were presented with the ultimatum. Negotiations dragged on until it became clear that neither side intended to climb down. Sadly the French Admiral Gensoul did not advise the French Navy Minister Admiral Darlan of the full text of the ultimatum - in particular the paragraph allowing the French ships to sail for American ports which probably would have been allowed.

Finally at 5pm on the 3rd July Admiral Somervilles ships opened fire on the hemmed in French ships...

A 15 inch shell from the Hood blew up the old 22,000 ton Battleship
"Bretagne" killing almost 1,000 frenchmen. Her sistership "Provence" along with the even larger 26,500 ton "Dunkerque" and the destroyer "Mogador" were severely damaged and had to be beached. The 26,500 ton "Strasbourg" although slightly damaged managed to esacape along with four destroyers to Toulon.
In all almost 2,000 French sailors were either killed or wounded. The British lost just two airman from a skua that crashed into the sea.

In addition whilst this attack was underway, the French ships in Alexandria under command of Admiral René-Emile Godfroy, including the old battleship "Lorraine "and four cruisers, were blockaded by the British in port on 3 July and offered the same terms as at Mers-el-Kébir. After negotiations, the French Admiral agreed on 7 July to disarm his fleet and stay in port until the end of the war. They stayed there until they eventually joined the Allies in 1943.
Reaction to the raid was immediate and furious.
A rift became evident in anglo-French naval relations - the scars of which remain to this day.
Admiral Somerville later was quoted as saying the attack was "the biggest political blunder of modern times and will rouse the whole world against us…we all feel thoroughly ashamed…"
This however did not prove to be totally true as generally news of the raid was well received by the British public and impressed many influential Americans with what became a symbol of British ruthlessness and determination to win the war...

[The Sailor]

The best of posts Terry. In keeping with the high standard that this forum has now achieved. Your membership and posts are valuable.

What a tragic thing this was. What a situation. What a mess the political situation was then.
After the first World War with the unimaginable loss of life that the French suffered on the Western Front just over twenty years before, it is virtually beyond belief that any Frenchman could have sided with Germany. This at a time when Germans are in Paris again goose stepping down the Champs Elysee.

The French they are a funny race, parlez vous.

[astraltrader]

Thank you Graeme. Your kind words are appreciated.
As you rightly say the French [to us anyway] are a funny race. I think the anti-Americanism which really started with DeGaulle when he was President is equally hard to understand.

[John Brown]

A sad day for all concerned. Seamen firing on seamen who only a short while before had been allies. Particularly harrowing for some members of Hood's Company as she had previously sailed in a squadron comprising mainly of French ships and under a French Admiral. It may well have been that they were firing on men they had met or even 'drunk with'.

Worth mentioning that Hood gave chase to Strasbourg but had to give up after 'stripping' a turbine. That mechanical failure must have brought huge relief to the crews of both ships. However it does show, no matter highly regarded Hood was, that on the only two occassions she was really asked to perform she effectively broke down on the first and was sunk on the second. (No reflection on the crew)

[Harley]

The best of posts Terry. In keeping with the high standard that this forum has now achieved. Your membership and posts are valuable.

What a tragic thing this was. What a situation. What a mess the political situation was then.
After the first World War with the unimaginable loss of life that the French suffered on the Western Front just over twenty years before, it is virtually beyond belief that any Frenchman could have sided with Germany. This at a time when Germans are in Paris again goose stepping down the Champs Elysee.

The French they are a funny race, parlez vous.

To be more precise Gensoul was siding against the British rather than with the Germans. Anglophobia was rife in the Marine National (not quite sure why, jealousy perhaps?) and anti-British feeling was still quite strong following the events leading up to the war. Many many reasons why some Frenchmen would rather die than give in to the English, however misguided.

As to goose-stepping down the Champs-Elysee - exactly. The German occupation forces would hardly have been too happy to watch the French fleet sail out of their hands, and p*ssed off conquerors don't make the best guests. Especially only 2 weeks after the Armistice.

I'd be slightly funny if my country had been invaded successfully twice in the past 70 years. To illustrate in a roundabout way, after being torpedoed twice during the Second World War my Marconi-operator great-uncle went slightly funny in the head.

Fortunately the English-speaking nations haven't been successfully invaded for a very, very long time. And I shudder to think what we'd be like if it happened.

Harley

[John Brown]

To their credit though despite what the French must have felt about the British after their ships were seized, Dunkirk and Oran, they did keep their word and scuttle the fleet in Toulon when the Germans tried to take it.

[astraltrader]

True jb - this they did, but not until as you say when the Germans tried to seize them. They could have sailed for Algiers to have joined the fight against the Germans - a fact which brought on bitter criticism from De Gaulle...

[Harley]

The Germans proved what they could do against ships when the Italian fleet sailed for Malta in 1943. I'm assuming that for various reasons the ships wouldn't have been fully crewed?

Harley

[John Brown]

Terry

I assume this would have been covered in the terms of the French surrender and the setting up of the Vichy Govt. It would be easy to say the ships should have sailed regardless of any agreement with the Germans. However, I suspect there would have been terrible reprisals against not only the seamens families but the general population too. I doubt many sailors wanted to risk this.

Even scuttling the fleet must have risked reprisals but at least this action was brought about by the Germans breaking the agreement in the first place. In addition, as has been mentioned, the ships were probably required to be manned by reduced crews.


John

[astraltrader]

Both of you present fair points. Nevertheless it is on record that General De Gaulle heavily criticised the Vichy admirals for not ordering the fleet to flee to Algiers. To be realistic we are all correct with our suppositions. The Vichy Admirals could have sailed the fleet had they been united in their support of the Allies [they were not]. The ships were on reduced crews but most of the units could have sailed. However your cogent point about repercussions is undeniable. Relations still living in Vichy France would have been at risk. The Germans were indeed ruthless especially when crossed. After all On 8th November 1942, the Allies invaded French North Africa (Operation Torch). General Dwight Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, made a secret agreement with Admiral François Darlan, commander of Vichy forces in North Africa, that Darlan would be given control of the fleet if he joined the Allied side. When Adolf Hitler discovered this plan, he immediately triggered Case Anton, the occupation of Vichy France.

[John Brown]

On September 24/25 1940 the Vichy French air force made a raid on Gibraltar in retaliation for the British attack on their ships at Mers-el-Kebir and the later attempted occupation of Dakar. After the attack 1400 Gibraltarian women and children were evacuated to England for the duration of the war.

The Vichy Government broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and urged a declaration of war. The French WW1 air ace Rene Fonck had organized around 200 Vichy pilots who were willing to join Germany in the war against Britain. The idea was eventually rejected by Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin who said ‘War with Britain would worsen France’s already pitiful condition’.



John

[herakles]

The two sides to France! Many know of the dramatic operations by their guerilla forces inside France during Occupation. And the risk associated with this if captured. But the Vichy French were something again. France still seems to have a bi-polar attitude toward Britain today. Le Bif Steak!

The battle for Syria conducted mostly by Australian troops against the Vichy French, was a bloody affair. On that D-Day, our troops massed on the border and were led across by a guide, a young Mosha Dyan. Later to be Israel's greatest soldier by a mile. And, would you believe, they were ordered to wear their slouch hats so that the Vichy French would recall our wonderful salvation of France in WW1 and perhaps not fight. How weird.

[Jean Lassaque]

I dare to share a story I've never told before. When a boy in the 1950s, I lived in Oran, french Algeria. I was very close to an uncle of mine who was a WW1 fighter pilot and in 1940, a major pilot instructor. He was manager of a factory in Mers el-Kébir and had his home taken over by the french navy to use as provisional barracks to naval officers from the battlecruiser Dunkerque. After released as a reservist, he shared the house with them for several months and they discussed the technical case of the british attack, hence my story.
The second attack on Mers el-Kébir (july 6th, 1940) was conducted by TSR aircraft and many topedoes were launched at the Dunkerque, badly damaged on july 3rd (but the british didn't realize it yet) but a very few hits obtained. Therefore, research work was conducted not to leave tons of ordnance down in the harbour. And all torpedoes were recovered.
Some bore a strange device just abaft the revolving pistol at warhead : a crude crescent-shaped piece of wood with some thread attached.
Il took a while before realizing a likely purpose of this device. Obviously, there was a risk for torpedo-carrying aircraft to fall in the sea just after taking off from their carrier, thus to drop a torpedo right in the middle of the squadron with a possibility of hitting a friendly ship. It was guessed that the wooden device would have prevented the pistol to revolve thus avoiding the torpedo engine to run on hitting the water and making the torpedo sink. It was concluded that once the aircraft safely airborne, the aircrew would have pulled back the thread, freeing the torpedo pistol. What most seemingly did not.
My uncle devoted great repect to these airmen who conducted a very hazardous mission (the AA fire was very dense at Mers el-Kébir on the 6th) complying with their orders but who seem to have thought "enough is enough" and have regarded the DIY safety device operation as not specially mentioned in their orders. An so do I.
Did you ever heard about these facts ?
Best regards
Jean

[herakles]

A most interesting story Jean!

Casts a new light on events.

Thanks for posting it.

[christophe]

I too have recently heard about these "deffective" torpedoes at Mers El Kebir. It now seems to be considered as a fact (and not a theory) by serious historians... On the other side, it seems that French pilots either did not show any enthousiasm in their fight against the British on this particular day...
Just to mention about it, my father was a sailor (after the war) and he always told me about Trafalgar but very rarely about Mers El Kebir. It is true that Vichy (and German propaganda) tried to use it to "return" French opinion but the attempt quickly failed.
As for the raid on Gibraltar, worth to mention that it can't have been 600 tons of bombs (equivalent of 60 fully loaded Lancaster??).
By the way, we don't call English people "Bif Steack" but "Roast Beef"... :)
Anyway, nearly 70 years later, I wouldn't say it was "fair" from our previous Allies but I think it was at least understandable and maybe even necessary (most probably more for political reasons than for military one).

[astraltrader]

Thank you very much Christophe for your most interesting and gracious take on what was a most difficult episode for all involved.
"C`est la guerre!"

[John Brown]

Christophe

Welcome to the forum.

I agree that 600 tons of bombs mentioned in my earlier post seems too high especially as only 'minimal' damage was caused. I have checked the original source of this info and it does say 600 tons so I suspect it is a misprint.

I will correct my post immediately.

Many thanks for pointing this out.



Regards...John

[christophe]

hello again,

Regarding Gibraltar bombing, I know I got it somewhere... :) will look in my books!

Anyway, I think Mers El Kebir has to be seen from the political point of view.

Vichy government considered fleet and colonies as the "aces" in their hand in case of a deal with Hitler. Please note that no one at the time would have bet a single penny on UK (except De Gaulle... :)). The fleet had to show its ability to resist to any attempt from the RN (Mers El Kebir, Dakar...). Situation was quite different in Alexandria, Godfroy did not have to protect anything except his ships! This he could do, thanks to Cunningham. As a matter of fact, Vichy took a lot of benefit from Mers El Kebir, and a bit later from Dakar.

On his side, Churchill needed to show his willingness and fortitude (not quite sure if it's the right word) to both English and Hitler. For sure, he shown it and in the same time made sure the French fleet would not join Italian navy (worst case for RN in Mediterranean sea at this time) as the RN had destoyed a battleship and badly damaged two others.

Now the German. Please note that it's useless to have material if you can not use it because of a lack of men. Just to say that the KriegsMarine couldn't have done anything with all these ships at the time. Do you think Hitler would have been such a fool to let the French Fleet sail to sea with French crews to fight against the RN? And do you think in that case the Fleet would have fired on the RN ships?

Maybe sad to say but I think the only victims were the sailors on both side (ok, to be honnest, was bitter for us!).

Sorry for my bad english

Christophe

[historydavid]

There certainly was a political component to Churchill's decision to neutralise/sink the French Fleet, but the there was also a practical one as well.

France had just capitulated and the Vichy government set up to control the unoccupied south. This government was led by Petain, who was certainly not pro-British, and who, under pressure from Hitler, might well have ceded control of the fleet to Germany. There was also the possibility that the Germans would gain control of it if it invaded and occupied the remainder of France; Hitler was not well-known for standing by treaties.

It has already been mentioned that some, at least, of the French admirals were anti-British, and the crews could have been coerced by pressure on their families. With the addition of a contingent of the German military on each ship the fleet could, and would, have done the German's bidding and fought against against Britain.

This would have placed the British navy in an impossible position, because it was already over-stretched. It was therefore necessary to neutralise or destroy the French ships.

[christophe]

I fully agree that there were practical reasons for Catapult and Mers El Kebir, and I’d say that at the time, “men on the spot” mainly saw them and certainly did not think of all political issues involved.

But I think 70 years later, we can see that results were more political than others.

The big issue is to know if there had ever been any “chance” for the French fleet to join the Axis. I think we can agree on the point that a fleet without crews is useless and if the German had seized the ships, they could not have manned them at least before a very long time (different equipment, crews to be trained... a Fleet is a very technical tool). Plus, the French wouldn’t have given the ships that easily (both politician and officers even if for different reasons). See what happened in Nov, 1942 and the scuttle in Toulon. Keep in mind that at that time (Nov, 1942), Germany was still the big winner and no one could even imagine the result of Stalingrad (and certainly not the French Navy officers).

Don’t even think of given the fleet to Italy (same reasons as for Germany plus the rivalry between France and Italy in the Mediterranean sea).

Then, you must come to the last possibility: the French fleet joining the Axis volontarily. In June, 1940, France was a defeated country and Germany was the ennemy (still). To say that some French admirals were anti – British became true mostly after and because of Catapult (and not before!). All repports about this period (1939 – 1940) show that cooperation between the two navies was rather good. Plus, the two navies have been working together for almost 40 years already (which is a long time if you consider that most of the French officers in command in 1939 had fought Germany some 20 years before, already side by side with the RN!). It is common in France to joke about the “Roastbeef” as it is in UK about the “Froggies” but it doesn’t go much further. You are “our preferred ennemy” or our “worst friend”. You should not exagerate these feelings and all the studies show that the anti – British feeling in France at that time was very small (even if it grew up a little with Catapult – far more in the Navy of course, it did not last long). I’m really convinced that any of the french sup officer never thought of the possibility of joining the Axis in 1940.

But, as they’re always a “but”, if I had been Churchill at that time, no doubt that I would have ordered Catapult and Mers El Kebir without the slightest hesitation! C’est la guerre!

[historydavid]

Sorry for the delay in responding Christophe.

The order and its implications will be debated far into the future by both sides, but I very much agree with with your final comment. I believe Churchill had no other choice if he didn't want to risk a disastrous outcome.

[David Shipton]

Some years ago, in the 70's, I read a book about the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet anchored in Mers al Kabir, near Oran in Algeria.

I've had a look on Google and only came up with "Road to Oran" which costs £90!!! I'm sure that the book I read was by a popular fiction writer and it was a paper back edition.

Does anyone have the title and author of the book so that I can see if Amazon have it

Thanks
David

[alanbenn]

David, welcome to the forum. The subject you refer to has been discussed previously on the forum you can reach it by linking to the page below.

Hopefully someone may be able to help with your request.



http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=1033


Regards
Alan

[David Shipton]

Thanks for that Alan, its a very interesting thread and I enjoyed hearing another side of the story from Christophe.

[astraltrader]

Have now moved this post to the thread Alan kindly pointed out previously existed.

[ChalkyWhite]

Some years ago, in the 70's, I read a book about the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet anchored in Mers al Kabir, near Oran in Algeria.

I've had a look on Google and only came up with "Road to Oran" which costs £90!!! I'm sure that the book I read was by a popular fiction writer and it was a paper back edition.

Does anyone have the title and author of the book so that I can see if Amazon have it

Thanks
David

The book you are most probably referring to is The Deadly Stroke by Warren Tute fist published in 1973 at £3!!! ISBN 0 00 211171 3

Hope that helps you.
Yours Aye,

Chalky White
Chalky White

[ChalkyWhite]

Some years ago, in the 70's, I read a book about the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet anchored in Mers al Kabir, near Oran in Algeria.

I've had a look on Google and only came up with "Road to Oran" which costs £90!!! I'm sure that the book I read was by a popular fiction writer and it was a paper back edition.

Does anyone have the title and author of the book so that I can see if Amazon have it

Thanks
David
Hello David,


Did you receive my message re the book you were after?

Chalky White

[Kevin Denlay]

A stamp commemorating the battle.

K

[astraltrader]

Thanks for that Kevin - I have never seen that before. Very interesting.
I presume it is part of a set of stamps with a Naval theme?

[David Shipton]

Chalky

Thanks for the book name and author. Didn't see it sooner as I hadn't realised my thread was merged - doh!

Off to Amazon now to find a copy

Cheers
David

[Kevin Denlay]

Thanks for that Kevin - I have never seen that before. Very interesting.
I presume it is part of a set of stamps with a Naval theme?


Pardon delay in reply Terry but I missed this previously.

It is not from a 'set' so to speak, but what seems like a series of stamps of different naval battles and/or personalities.

Kevin

[tinduck]

A selection of photos from Mers el Kebir. Some of them are not very large, and all downloaded from French sites

Dave

[NASAAN101]

Guys,
i found this on wiki: Hood, then under the command of Captain C.S Holland, gave chase to the fleeing French battleship Strasbourg. Holland gave up the chase after ninety minutes because he perceived that a night pursuit would be dangerous as other French forces might come to assist Strasbourg, Hood was low on fuel and Holland was concerned about Italian submarine threats. what are the chance of hood actully being able to keep up with her?
Nikki

[patroclus]

Captain Holland was not on board the HOOD which was commanded by Captain I.G. Clennie and flying the flag of Admiral Somerville.
See:
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/official/adm234/adm234-317.htm

for Somerville's Report, including the reasons for abandoning the pursuit.

[NASAAN101]

ya,
i saw that, but what get me, was Strasbourg, was bally enought to even trying to escape like like, i would have put hood out more, then she was, so that way, she could have cut off her escape path, but what do you guys thing? are there any pros or cons about that??
Nikki

[Andy H]

Some footage o the bombardment here:-

http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=75194

Regards

Andy H

[Shinysheff]

I have this vague recollection of seeing a video of HMS Hood accelerating to catch the Strasbourg. Her bow was almost out of the water as the screws dug in. Has anyone else seen this? I've tried searching for it but to no avail.

[INVINCIBLE]

The book you are most probably referring to is The Deadly Stroke by Warren Tute fist published in 1973 at £3!!! ISBN 0 00 211171 3

Hope that helps you.
Yours Aye,

Chalky White
Chalky White

It is a very good book and quite well illustrated. Warren Tute has a very readable style and I strongly recommend it. Warren Tute has written many other good books including his classic history of the RN 'The True Glory', also 'The Rock' (about Gib), 'The Cruiser', 'The Admiral' etc..
Somebody borrowed my copy of 'The Deadly Stroke' way back, which was the last I saw of it. People always seem to borrow the books we most want to hang on to, but that is life!

[John Odom]

In the US, there was a program on the Mers el Kebir last night. Generally good, including interviews with participants. It was on the series "Secrets of the Dead."

[John Odom]

I forgot to note that the entire episode is viewable online. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/category/episodes/

Click on "Churchill's decision."

[Andy H]

If not already mentioned I thought this might be of some interest:-

http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm199/adm199-391_7-31.php
http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm199/adm199-391_32-53.php
http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm199/adm199-391_54-81.php

Regards

Andy H

[David Verghese]

Andy H.,

Thank you for posting thse useful links.

I imagine that all wider aspects and considerations of Operation Catapult have been debated and analysed "ad infinitum" at naval and defence colleges worldwide.
I have often peronally wondered if the immediate outcome would have been different if Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville had himself accompanied his fluent French speaking subordinate, Captain Cedric Holland in the latter's difficult 'negotiations' with Admiral Gensoul. The latter's personality, pride and sense of honour were to play a crucial role in his interpretation of the ultimatum presented to him and his personal attitude/response towards it. Communication to higher French authority was clearly limited for him and time constraints clearly narrowed Gensoul's reasoning. One could argue that there was no time for the niceties of personal protocol to appease the subjective feelings of a scorned and slighted ally, but I believe the presence of the senior British Naval Flag officer at the meeting with the French commander, if he had known the character of Admiral Gensoul, just might have saved the loss of so many lives within the French naval squadron.
In the end, with communication of essentials limited, the black and white situation prevailed and the Mers el-Kebir fleet was essentially destroyed.

David

[GaryH]

Hi to all.

Today (3rd July) is 70 years since the regrettable Royal navy attack on their French counterparts in the North African port.

What was the state of the gunfire damage to Dunkerque and Provence?
Wikipedia says that Dunkerque settled on the harbour bottom whilst Provence was beached to prevent flooding.
How bad did Hood, Valiant and Resolution damage these ships?

Dunkerque was further damaged 3 days later when swordfish bombed the Terre-Neuve which was moored alongside and her depth charges blew.
Strasbourg managed to escape

Thanks

[astraltrader]

Above post moved to existing thread we already have on this battle.

Just speaking personally I dont think the battle was regrettable either. Tragic yes but regrettable no.
Every effort was made to get the French fleet securely out of the reach of the Germans but none of the suggestions were accepted.

At that time Britain was involved in a life and death struggle and to let these ships fall into the hands of the Germans would have been nothing short of madness.

Despite Admiral Somerville calling the raid a blunder, I have always been aware that back in Britain the raid was well received by the British public and more importantly still it sent a clear signal to the Americans that we were both determined and capable of fighting on against Germany.

[GaryH]

Thanks for moving it Terry.

On the subject of Hood chasing Starsbourg.......
Maybe Strasbourg did just genuinely escape?
Strasbourg was a 30 knot ship and was pretty much nearly brand new.
Hoods powerplant was 20 years old and good for maybe 28/29 knots

[NASAAN101]

GaryH,
It wasn't til the attack on pearl that the US finally got in the war, But we were the life line Britain need in the early stages of the war!
Nikki

[Andy H]

Hi to all.

Today (3rd July) is 70 years since the regrettable Royal navy attack on their French counterparts in the North African port.

What was the state of the gunfire damage to Dunkerque and Provence?
Wikipedia says that Dunkerque settled on the harbour bottom whilst Provence was beached to prevent flooding.
How bad did Hood, Valiant and Resolution damage these ships?

Dunkerque was further damaged 3 days later when swordfish bombed the Terre-Neuve which was moored alongside and her depth charges blew.
Strasbourg managed to escape

Thanks

Hi Gary

For some superb answers/information on the questions you've asked, may I suggest the following title from your library:-
French Battleships 1922-1956 by John Jordan & Robert Dumas, Published by Seaforth 2009, ISBN 9781848320345

Regards

Andy H

[emason]

At that time Britain was involved in a life and death struggle and to let these ships fall into the hands of the Germans would have been nothing short of madness.

Despite Admiral Somerville calling the raid a blunder, I have always been aware that back in Britain the raid was well received by the British public and more importantly still it sent a clear signal to the Americans that we were both determined and capable of fighting on against Germany.

That is my understanding of the decision also. At the time Roosevelt had recently rejected Churchilll's request for destroyers, probably thinking it pointless as Joseph Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to Britain) had told him that a British surrender was inevitable.

It is worth remembering that Churchill had been Prime Minister for less than two months and Dunkirk was only the month before.

However, with this action Churchill demonstrated that he was a leader unafraid of making difficult but necessary decisions and the Navy was capable and willing to fight ruthlessly. That coupled with the RAF currently engaged with the Battle of Britain at its height, showing that they too could fight, convinced Roosevelt that Britain was worth helping. On 2 September 1940, he authorised the sending of 50 destoyers to Britain.

As there is no official documentation about Roosevelt's thought processes, one can only surmise, but Mers-el-Kebir probably made a favourable impression upon him.

[astraltrader]

Fully agreed Bill. That is exactly as I saw events.

[Harley]

Hi Gary

For some superb answers/information on the questions you've asked, may I suggest the following title from your library:-
French Battleships 1922-1956 by John Jordan & Robert Dumas, Published by Seaforth 2009, ISBN 9781848320345

Regards

Andy H

Definitely a recommended book. The information is solid, and some of the illustrations are amazing.

Simon

[designeraccd]

According to a footnote in the FRENCH BATTLESHIP book: "There is no evidence that Hood made more than 27 knots in her pursuit of Strasbourg. ....Although she made 31 knots in her prime, Hood was in serious need of a major overhaul." Pg. 84..........DFO ;)

[Ben410]

Does anyone know of any paintings commemorating the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir? I could only find one. (It was by Shannon Stirnweis.)

[Carole_2]

Hello
I am doing an essay on the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir and I would like to know if anyone knows any diaries from soldiers and sailors that mention this battle?
Both french and english would be great?
I know I am a little late but I already read everything and it already helped me a lot.

[patroclus]

Hello
I am doing an essay on the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir and I would like to know if anyone knows any diaries from soldiers and sailors that mention this battle?
Both french and english would be great?
I know I am a little late but I already read everything and it already helped me a lot.

A good start on the British side would be "The Somerville Papers", published by Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1995;ISBN 1 85928 207 5. This consists of selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral Somerville.

[Paul C.]

Hi Carole,

You might find some information from the French side here:

http://www.ledrame-merselkebir.fr/

And there are some first hand British accounts here:

http://www.hmshood.com/history/forceh/index.htm

Hope that helps (and not too late).

And hello to everyone...my first post in this great forum! So much here...it was hard to pick where to start!

Paul

[HMS DARLASTON]

On 3 July 1940, the same day as Mers-el-Kebir and Alexandria, French ships in British ports were also boarded and captured.

In Plymouth the battleship ‘Paris’, destroyers ‘Mistral’ and ‘Ouragan’. torpedo boat ‘Bouclier’. Three sloops, the cruiser submarine ‘Surcouf’ (the largest submarine in the world at the time), and the submarines ‘Junon’ and ‘Minerve’.

In Portsmouth, the battleship ‘Courbet’, the destroyer ‘Léopard’, the torpedo boats ‘Brandlebas’,’ La Cordeliere’, ‘La Flore’, ‘L’Incomprise’, ‘La Melpomene’, six sloops and a supply ship ‘Pollux’.

In Falmouth, two submarines ‘Orion’ and ‘Ondine’, three sloops and the target ship ‘L’Impassible’.

In Dundee, the submarine ‘Rubis’.

There were also over 180 other smaller vessels taken in British ports.

During the boarding some French crews co-operated while others resisted with force; two British officers and one French sailor were killed. After the boarding, some crews joined the Free French forces; those who refused were repatriated back to France.

[BlackBat242]

That is my understanding of the decision also. At the time Roosevelt had recently rejected Churchilll's request for destroyers, probably thinking it pointless as Joseph Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to Britain) had told him that a British surrender was inevitable.

It is worth remembering that Churchill had been Prime Minister for less than two months and Dunkirk was only the month before.

However, with this action Churchill demonstrated that he was a leader unafraid of making difficult but necessary decisions and the Navy was capable and willing to fight ruthlessly. That coupled with the RAF currently engaged with the Battle of Britain at its height, showing that they too could fight, convinced Roosevelt that Britain was worth helping. On 2 September 1940, he authorised the sending of 50 destoyers to Britain.

As there is no official documentation about Roosevelt's thought processes, one can only surmise, but Mers-el-Kebir probably made a favourable impression upon him.

Actually, there IS plenty of documentation that Roosevelt had fully committed to fighting Germany well before this date*, but was constrained by the domestic political situation.

1940 was an election year, and with the degree of isolationist sentiment in the US at the time, FDR needed something to convince the American people (and Congress), that not only was Britain worth supporting, but that they were an asset to be aided, not a liability to be shunned.

If FDR had signed the destroyer deal before Mers-el-Kebir, the political fallout might well have cost FDR the election**.

MeK showed that Britain still had both strength and resolve, which gave FDR the political currency needed to gain approval for both the "destroyer for bases" deal and further aid as well.



* See Roosevelt's Secret War; Joseph E. Persico 0-375-50246-7 and A Man Called Intrepid; William Stevenson (most recent 978-1585741540).

FDR had been corresponding with Churchill well before the Fall of France, and had pledged every aid he could get past Congress... to the point of bypassing Ambassador Kennedy, and entering an agreement to allow the establishment of a British Intelligence office in New York in early 1940 (and ordering the FBI to work closely with that office).

By May 1940 the communications between FDR & Churchill had been re-directed to bypass the US Embassy in London completely, which leads to the lack of "official" correspondence indicating the depth of FDR's commitment to saving Britain.


** The interesting thing is that the Republican candidate, Wendell Wilkie, was considered to be just as "pro-Britain, anti-Nazi"... and just as likely to "get the US into the European war"... as FDR.

[emason]

Thank you BB for that enlightening post. I reread the relevant passage in Churchill's account of ww2, in which he said that, in reply to his letter, Roosevelt agreed to all his requests for arms and supplies, except the destroyers as "the time was not opportune", thus confirming that it was a political decision, but not a refusal.

Thanks again.

[JarrowDave]

Years ago I developed the habit of reading two books during a given time period, a couple of chapters of one then a couple of chapters of the other. Always one factual and one fiction.

At the time I read "A Man Called Intrepid" I also read "Lord of the Rings". It occurred to me then that Bill Stevenson's British Security Co-ordination was the practical embodiement of Tolkein's Ring. Powerful when used for good, but, will drag you down if you keep it long enough. Sentiments which I think Stevenson ennunciated in the final chapter of his book.

On a somewhat seperate point I think that President Roosevelt simply did not like General De Gaul. Presumably "Mon General" returned the favour. For myself I have always thought that De Gaul acted in France's interest, as he saw it. No doubt he was sometimes right and sometimes wrong, he was probably off school with a cold on the day they covered diplomacy.
A lot of people think that he was anti- British, but hey, he did try to keep us out of the Common Market. Just wish he had succeded.

[Canada Para]

Does anyone have links to accurate articles on this event?

[mossie]

There should be plenty of information and help on this site suggest you type in Mers-el-Kebir in the search box.These links will give you a starter for ten! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers-el-K%C3%A9bir and here a some old film footage http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KspmgsPr2XQ

Cheers...........M:)

[jainso31]

There is currently, an extensive thread covering this very Event; on this page for all to view.

jainso31

[qprdave]

Canada Para

Before you get sent away from this forum, it is always best to do a search here for your request.

There is a very good thread here http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=1033&highlight=Mers-el-Kebir to look at before you leave us.

Wikipedia, although very popular, has been shown to have many inaccuracies and shouldn't been taken too seriously.

Dave

[CYLLA]

At this present time i am reading this book ..

Critical Conflict: The Royal Navy's Mediterranean Campaign in 1940 [Hardcover]
Peter C. Smith (Author)

cylla

[Canada Para]

Thanks to all, I shall search on here thoroughly before asking in future :D

[Canada Para]

Fascinating thread on something that has always interested me about the naval role in european waters during WWII.

Would anyone else agree that Thatcher's decision to sink the Belgrano when out of the exclusion zone was akin to Churchill's?

[astraltrader]

I suppose there are similarities - it was a ruthless decision made in the time of war. I can only speak personally but it had a tremendous effect on the Argentinian Navy who from that moment stayed very much out of the war remaining bottled-up back at their base to the great benefit of the British forces.

[KizmeRD]

Fascinating thread on something that has always interested me about the naval role in european waters during WWII.

Would anyone else agree that Thatcher's decision to sink the Belgrano when out of the exclusion zone was akin to Churchill's?

I can't say that I see any similarities. We were not at war with France, we were with Argentina in 1982".

Don't forget the word's Chuirchill used in the openning paragraph of the text forwarded to Admiral Sommerville for him to convey to the French Admiral Gensoul "It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe.

The Belgrano was simiply a tactical threat to the operations of the task force, whereas the French fleet in WW2 was a significant strategic asset that (had it fallen into German control) would have denied the Royal Naval and the Allies any chance at all of operating in the Med. - that would have meant, no North African campaign , no relief for the Russians and no invasion of Italy.

mb

[jainso31]

KizmeRD's response is,IMHO, a very fair assessment of the two quite different situations and I applaud him for that.

jainso31

[qprdave]

I don't understand some people's opinion on this subject.

There is no doubt that the French Fleet could have been a very damaging threat if the ships had come German control. There is no doubt that the elimination of this threat had to be carried out.

It is not as if we sneaked up to them and stabbed then in the back they were given a number of options, destruction was the final one.


Likewise, the Belgrano. Who cares if it was sailing away or outside the 200 mile zone. How long does it take to say "Starboard 20 Full speed ahead". What would the disgruntled Brits, who thought that they had a chance to get at Margaret Thatcher, have said if the Belgrano had attacked and sunk the Q.E.2, or the Hermes.


In my opinion, for what it's worth. If the Belgrano didn't want to be a threat to the British, it should have stayed in Port, as did their Carrier


Dave

[KizmeRD]

I suppose if one is looking for historical parallels, I would suggest the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801 is a closer fit. Like Sommerville, Hyde Parker had orders to sail to the Baltic and detach Denmark from the 'League of Armed Neutrality' by amicable arrangement or by actual hostilities.
As we know, Nelson ended up sailing his ships in and dealing with the problem
by force, after the British diplomatic ultimatum was rejected.

[Canada Para]

I can't say that I see any similarities. We were not at war with France, we were with Argentina in 1982".

Don't forget the word's Chuirchill used in the openning paragraph of the text forwarded to Admiral Sommerville for him to convey to the French Admiral Gensoul "It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe.

The Belgrano was simiply a tactical threat to the operations of the task force, whereas the French fleet in WW2 was a significant strategic asset that (had it fallen into German control) would have denied the Royal Naval and the Allies any chance at all of operating in the Med. - that would have meant, no North African campaign , no relief for the Russians and no invasion of Italy.

mb

I understand where you are coming from. My point was that of two wartime leaders removing potential threats, both of which were not actually in the theatre of war at the time, so that they never could influence the course of the war Britain was involved in.

[Canada Para]

I don't understand some people's opinion on this subject.

There is no doubt that the French Fleet could have been a very damaging threat if the ships had come German control. There is no doubt that the elimination of this threat had to be carried out.

It is not as if we sneaked up to them and stabbed then in the back they were given a number of options, destruction was the final one.


Likewise, the Belgrano. Who cares if it was sailing away or outside the 200 mile zone. How long does it take to say "Starboard 20 Full speed ahead". What would the disgruntled Brits, who thought that they had a chance to get at Margaret Thatcher, have said if the Belgrano had attacked and sunk the Q.E.2, or the Hermes.


In my opinion, for what it's worth. If the Belgrano didn't want to be a threat to the British, it should have stayed in Port, as did their Carrier


Dave

I wasn't going to bring the Thatcher factor into it, but you are correct.The criticism for sinking the Belgrano would have been nothing compared to the outrage had it not been done & cost the lives of british servicemen.Them or us.

[qprdave]

"so that they never could influence the course of the war Britain was involved in"

I'm afraid that I totally disagree with you. On both counts they were possible threats.

With the French, I admit that they weren't a threat at that exact time. It would only take one signal from Vichy France and the whole course of the European War could have changed

Any warship at sea can be thought of as a threat. That is why we followed Russian Nuclear submarines and major Russian surface ships whenever we found them. They did it to us as well. Whilst on HMS Hermes, we were told that if war was declared, we had nine minutes before we were taken out!

Dave

[Canada Para]

"so that they never could influence the course of the war Britain was involved in"

I'm afraid that I totally disagree with you. On both counts they were possible threats.

With the French, I admit that they weren't a threat at that exact time. It would only take one signal from Vichy France and the whole course of the European War could have changed

Any warship at sea can be thought of as a threat. That is why we followed Russian Nuclear submarines and major Russian surface ships whenever we found them. They did it to us as well. Whilst on HMS Hermes, we were told that if war was declared, we had nine minutes before we were taken out!

Dave

I think you've misread my long winded sentence!! Churchill & Thatcher both did what they did in sinking these ships 'so that they never could influence the course of the war Britain was involved in'.

For the record I agree with the actions taken & the reasons for them. I shall be a bit more concise in future!!

[qprdave]

My apologies, Steve. You are right. I did misread your post.

Dave